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THE  LIBRARY 
OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 
GIFT  OF 


FLINT  &  MacK  A-V 

i|?l2  Eowan  Buil^ 


SHIPPERS  AND  CARRIERS 

OF 

INTERSTATE  AND  INTRASTATE  FREIGHT 


Third  Edition 


Shippers  am)  Cahkikks 


OF 


Interstate  am)  Intrastate 
Freigjit 


Volume  One 


By 
EDGAR  VV ATKINS,  LL.  B. 

Of  the  Atf.axta   Bar 


An. AN  lA 

TIIK   IIAl^MnsoX  COMI'AXV 

I. AW     P)()(tK     INlU.ISlIF.HS 


Copyright   19()9,    1916  and  1920 
BY 

Edgar  Watkins 


T 


PREFACE. 


No  l)r;m('li  of  the  law  is  iiku-i'  iiiiimrtaiit  lliaii  that  relutin;^ 
to  the  ri^'lifs  and  duties  i>f  sliippci's  and  carriers,  and  no 
ijrancli  (»f  the  law  is  less  i^cncrally  known.  The  purpose  of 
this  book  is  to  assist  tliose  who  may  he  called  iii)on  to  advise 
as  to  such  ri'_'hts  and  dulies  lo  an  undei'standinf;  of  this  in- 
terest int;  phase  of  the  law. 

In  api)roacliinf;  the  subject  the  expei'ienee  of  an  active  prac- 
titioner was  drawn  upon  to  deleniiine  what  would  lie  most 
useful,  not  only  to  the  le<;al  profession,  but  to  traflKc  men, 
whether  in  the  employ  of  the  carriers  or  of  tliose  bureaus 
organi/e(i  t  hi-oii|j:hout   the  country  to  aid  and  advise  ship[)ers. 

From  tins  experience,  it  was  thouj^ht  that  where  the  state 
of  the  authoi-ities  justified,  the  law  should  be  given  as  nearly 
as  mi<,'ht  be  in  the  lanfrua^je  of  the  courts  of  final  authority. 
For  this  reason,  wliei-e  (piestions  liave  been  definitely  deter- 
mined, liberid  (piolations  have  been  inserted. 

Afany  (luestions,  however,  affecting  the  subject  of  this  book 
have  iu)t  yet  been  settled.  AVhere  this  is  true,  the  opinions 
of  tlh'  fedei-al  courts,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and 
state  courts,  hav(^  been  referred  to  and  discussed.  In  this 
way  it  has  been  sought  to  deduce  the  principles  of  the  law. 

The  .\et  to  Kegulate  Conuneree  has  been  annotated,  not 
only  with  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  but  also  with  the  opin- 
ions of  the  Intei'state  Commerce  Commission.  Tliis  will  en- 
a))le  oiu^  desii'ing  to  investigate  a  i)ai'ticular  provisit)n  of  tluit 
act  to  trace  the  construction  thereof  by  the  references  which 
have  Ic'ii  made  therctn  l)y  the  tribunals  ^\•hosc  duty  it  is  to 
enforce  this  great   statute. 

The  SluM-nuin  and  Clayton  .\nti-Trust  Statutes,  the  Twcnty- 
Kight  Hour  Law.  and  otliei-  acts  alVeeting  the  question  are 
eitiMl  and  discusscii  in  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  subject 
under  investigation.  Statutes  such  as  the  Safety  Appliance 
Acts,  the  Employers'  Liability  Act.  the  Hours  of  Service  Act, 
the  Federal  Trade  Commission  auil  Anti-Trust  Acts,  and  other 
acts,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  necessarv  to  tln>se  who.  as  prac- 

(7) 


755850 


8  Preface. 

titioners  oi-  otliei'wise  have  to  do  with  the  enforcement  ol 
those  laws,  or  are  required  to  advise  or  act  with  reference 
thereto,  are  inserted. 

Because  the  r-onference  rulings  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Coinmissiou  are  of  such  general  use  and  are  not  always  avail- 
able, and  adopting  the  suggestions  of  lawyers  and  traffic 
officials  familiar  witii  the  practice  before  the  Commission, 
these  conference  rulings  have  been  copied  at  the  end  of  Volume 
One 

While  few  lawyers  have  given  special  attention  to  the 
questions  here  discussed,  the  widening  scope  of  interstate 
commerce  makes  it  necessary  that  all  practitioners  shall  be 
ready  to  advise  clients  as  to  their  rights  and  liabilities  grow- 
in<r  out  of  the  law  relating  to  transportation. 

Claims  for  overcharge,  for  loss  and  for  damage  on  ship- 
ments moving  from  one  state  to  another  arise  in  the  business 
of  most  manufacturers,  jobbers  and  merchants.  The  law 
fixing  the  rights  growing  out  of  such  shipments  is  found  in 
the  statutes  and  decisions  of  the  Federal  Government.  To 
make  the  T^aws  more  easily  available  and  understandable  is 
the  purpose  of  this  work.  AVith  what  success  that  purpose  has 
been  afVected  must  be  determined  by  those  who  may  make  use 
of  what  is  herein  set  down. 

Intrastate  transportation  is  so  closely  related  to  that  which 
is  interstate,  that  a  new  chapter  has  been  added,  in  which  is 
discussed  intrastate  transportation  in  so  far  as  it  affects 
directly  or  indirectly  the  principal  subject  of  the  book. 
The  author  desires  to  acknowledge  the  valuable  services  of 
Mr.  ^lac  Asbill  who  has  assisted  in  revising  the  manuscript. 

Edgar  Watkins. 
Atlanta,  Ca.,  June  1,  1920. 


'IWI^.LK  ol'  CoN'rivXTS. 


VnlJMH   I, 


CHAPTER   I. 


STATK   UKCILATIOX  OK  CAHKIKRS    EXCJACKD   i.\    INTERSTATE 

COMMERCE. 

§     1.  Scope  of  Chapter. 

2.  Interstate  Commerce  Defined. 

3.  Power  of  Congress  Exclusive,  When. 

4.  Power  of  the  States  Indirectly  to  Affect  Interstate  Commerce. 

5.  Commerce   Exclusively    Within   the   Control   of  the   States. 

6.  All   Commerce  Subject  to  RcRuIation. 

7.  Eminent  Domain. 

8.  States   May   Establish    Means   for   Interstate   Transportation. 

9.  Regulation  of  F'aclllties — Depots. 

10.  Regulation   of  Facilities — Terminal   Roads. 

11.  State  Laws  Forbidding  the  Consolidation  of  Comi)eting  Carriers. 

12.  Regulation  of  Facilities — Si)ur  Tracks. 

13.  Requiring  Physical  Connections  Between   Carriers. 

14.  Delivery  over  Connecting  Tracks. 

15.  Regulating  Crossings. 

16.  Elevator  Charges. 

17.  Through  Routes  and  .loinl    Rates. 

18.  Regulation  of  the   Movement   of  Trains.     Sunday  Law. 

19.  Same  Subject      Requiring  the  Operation  of  a   Particular  Train. 

20.  Same  Subject.     Speed  of  Trains. 

21.  Requirement  That  Trains  Shall  Stop  at   Particular  Stations. 

22.  State    Regulation    of  Carriers   and   Their   Employees. 

23.  Blowing  Whistle  and   Checking  Speed  at  Crossings. 

24.  Furnishing  Cars  for  the  Receipt  and  Delivery  of  Shipments. 

25.  Same   Subject.      Rule    Since    Hepburn    Act. 

26.  Same   Subject.      Rule   Established. 

27.  Requirements  as  to  Accounting  and  Reports. 

28.  Transmis.sion  and  Delivery  of  Telegraph  and  Telei)hone  Messages. 

29.  Separate  Coach  Laws. 

30.  Posting  Time  of  Trains. 

31.  Laws   to  Promote  the  Security   and   Comfort    of   Passengers. 

32.  Laws  Limiting  or  Enlarging  the  Common  Lial)ility  of  (^arriers 

33.  Same  Subject.     Liability  to  Emjiloyeos. 


10  Tabf.e  of  Contents. 

34.  Same  Subject.     Liability  for  Loss  or  Damage  to  Shipments. 
?>4a.  Same   Subject.     Amendment   1920. 

35.  Penalties  for  Failure  to  Pay  Claim. 

3<).  Requiring  Railroads  to  Perform  Transportation  Service. 

37.  Sale  and  Regulation  of  Passenger  Tickets. 

38.  Same   Subject.     Mileage   Books. 

39.  Free  Transportation. 

40.  Routing  Freight. 

41.  When  Interstate  Transportation  Begins  and  Ends. 

42.  Attachments   and   Garnishments. 

43.  Rates. 

44.  Intrastate  Rates  Which  Affect  Interstate  Rates. 

45.  Limitations  on  the  Power  of  States  to  Regulate  Intrastate  Rates. 

46.  Property  Basis  for  Returns. 

47.  When  Does  a  Rate  Violate  Rights  under  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 

ment? 

48.  Rates.     Evidence  That  a  Rate  Is  Confiscatory.     Rates  on  a  Few 

Commodities. 

49.  Same  Subject.     Relative  Cost  of  Different  Kinds  of  Transporta- 

tion. 

50.  Testing   a   Rate   by    Use    to    Determine   Whether    or    Not    It    Is 

Confiscatory. 

51.  Issuance  of  Stocks  and  Bonds. 

52.  Long  and  Short  Haul. 

53.  Ferries. 

54.  Bridges. 

55.  Regulating  Charges  for  Transportation   by  Water. 

56.  Regulating  Pilotage,  Ports,   Harbors  and  Vessels. 

57.  Boards  of  Trade  and  Exchanges. 

58.  Inspection.     Quarantine,  Game.  Food,  Liquor,  and  Lottery  Laws. 

59.  Taxation,  Including  License  Taxes. 

GO.  Procedure  to  Test  the  Validity  of  State  Regulations. 


CHAPTER  II. 

VALIDITY  AND  SCOPE  OF  THE  ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE. 

S  61.  Common  Law  Obligations  of  Common  Carriers. 

62.  Power  of  Congress  over  Interstate  Commerce. 

63.  Constitutionality  of  the  Act  to   Regulate  Commerce. 
63a.  Same  Subject.     Transportation  Act  1920. 

64.  Reasons  for  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

65.  Carriers  Included  in  the  Act. 

66.  Carriers'  Duties  under  the  Act. 

67.  What  Transportation  Included  in  the  Act. 

68.  Transportation    Included   in    the   Act,    continued. 


Table  of  Contents.  11 

69.  Same  Subject. 

70.  Powers  and  Procedure  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

71.  Same  Subject. 

72.  Switch  Connections. 

73.  Damages  and  Penalties  for  Misquoting  a  Rate. 

74.  Penalties. 

75.  Investigations  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

76.  Additional  Power  Given  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

77.  Commission  May  Suspend  an  Advance  in  Rates. 

78.  Report  of  Carriers. 

79.  Court  Procedure  with  Reference  to  the  Orders  of  the  Commission. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ALL   CHARGES    FOR    SERVICES    RENDERED    BY    COMMON    CAR- 
RIERS  IN   THE  TRANSPORTATION  OF   PERSONS   OR 
PROPERTY  OR  IN  CONNECTION  THEREWITH 
MUST  BE  JUST  AND  REASONABLE. 

S     80.     All   Charges  Must  Be  Reasonable. 
80a.  Rule  Applies  to  Accessorial   Services. 

81.  Classification. 

81a.  Class  and  Commodity  Rates. 

82.  Cost  of  Carrier's  Equipment. 

83.  Cost  of  Carrier's  Equipment.     What   Is  a  Reasonable   Return. 

84.  Same   Subject.     Difficulties  in  Determining  the  Question. 

85.  Cost  of  Service. 

86.  Cost.     When  Carrier's  Duty  to  Furnish  Service. 

87.  Cost  of  Service.     Continued. 

88.  Value  of  Service. 

89.  Same   Subject.      Use   to   Which   Commodity    Put. 
89a.  Cost  of  Assembling  Theory. 

90.  Value  of  the   Commodity,   Its   General    Utility    and    Danger   of 

Loss. 

91.  Value   of   the   Commodity.      Difference   Between    the    Raw    and 

the  Manufactured  Product. 

92.  Competition   or   Its   Absence  Considered   in   Determining   Rea- 

sonable Rates. 

93.  Same  Subject. 

94.  Same  Subject.     Rule  Since  1910. 

95.  Same  Subject.     Conclusion. 

96.  Rates  Affected  by  Amount  of  Tonnage. 

97.  Same  Subject.     Limitations  on  Rule. 

98.  Density  of  Traffic. 

99.  Distance  and  Rate  per  Ton  Mile. 
99a.  Extra  Line  Haul. 

100.     General    Business    Conditions. 


12  Table  of  Contents. 

101.  Estoppel. 

102.  Rates  Long  in  Existence  Are  Presumed  to  Be  Reasonable. 

103.  Same  Subject. 

104.  Voluntary   Reduction   of  Rates. 

105.  Same  Subject.     Act  June  18,  1910. 

106.  Grouping  Territory  and  Giving  Each  Group  Same  Rate  Legal 

under  Some  Circumstances. 

107.  Grouping   Producing   Points  and   Making   Zones   Taking   Same 

Rates. 

108.  Basing  Point   System. 

109.  Same  Subject.     Breaking  Rates. 

110.  Comparison    Between    Different    Lines    as    a    Means    of    Deter- 

mining Correct  Rate. 

111.  Car  Load  and  Less  than  Car  Load  Movement.^  as  Affecting  the 

Rate. 

112.  Establishing  Car  Load  Rates. 

113.  Same  Subject.     Rule  in  Duncan  Case  Criticised. 

114.  Same    Subject.      Proper    Differential    Between    Rates    on    Car 

Load  and  Less  than  Car  Load   Freight. 

115.  Car  Load  Minima. 

116.  Train  Load  Rates. 

117.  Relation  of  Through  Rates  to  the  Sum  of  Local  Rates. 

118.  Proportional  Rates. 

119.  Through    Rate    Must    Not    Exceed    Aggregate    of    Intermediate 

Rates. 

120.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. 

121.  Same  Subject.     Amendments  of  1910  and   1912. 

122.  Rates   on  Commodities  Requiring  Refrigeration 

123.  Rates  on  Returned  Shipments. 

124.  The  Public   Interest  Must  Be  Considered   in  Making  Rates. 

125.  General    Principles    Applicable    to    the    Question.      What    Is    a 

Reasonable  Rate? 

126.  Same    Subject.      Some    Statements    of    the    Commission    as    to 

Such  General  Principles. 

127.  Same  Subject.     Illustrative  Cases. 

128.  Same    Subject.      Discussion    of    Principles     in    Chicago    Live 

Stock  Exchange  Case. 

129.  Same  Subject.     Rate  Considered  in  and  of  Itself. 

130.  Same  Subject.     Commission  Not  Bound  by  Technical  Rules. 

131.  Same  Subject.     Summary. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

EQUALITY  IN  RATES. 

^   132.     Scope  of  Chapter. 
133.     Common  Law  as  to  Equality  in  Rates  by  Carriers. 


Table  of  Contents.  13 

134.  Same  Subject.     Damages. 

135.  Comparison  of  the  English  Railway  and   Canal  Act   with  the 

Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

136.  Discrimination   Forbidden. 

137.  Discrimination   against   Individuals. 
13.8.     Same  Subject. 

139.  Same  Subject.     Construction  by  the  Commission. 
139a.  Same  Subject.     Independent  Contributing  Causes. 

140.  Same  Subject.     Allowances  to  Shippers. 

141.  Trap   Car  Service. 

142.  Peddler  Cars. 
142a.  Private  Cars. 

143.  Car  Spotting. 

144.  Undue  Preferences  in  Favor  of  Persons  or  Localities. 

145.  Same    Subject.      Application    of    Section    made    by    the    Com- 

mission. 
145a.  Differentials. 

146.  Discrimination   against   Traffic. 

146a.  Same  Subject.     Competition  between  Users  of  Related  Raves. 

147.  Same    Subject.      Discrimination    Beyond    the    Control    of    the 

Carrier. 

148.  Facilities    for   Interchange   of   Traffic   and    Rates   and    Charges 

to   Connecting   Lines  Must   Be   without    Undue   or   Unreason- 
able Preference. 

149.  Same  Subject.     Statute. 

150.  Same  Subject.     Statute  and  Proviso. 

151.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. 

152.  Discrimination  by  Charging  More  for  a  Shorter  than  a  Longer 

Haul. 

153.  Long    and    Short    Haul.      Old    Law    Construed.      Definite    Con- 

struction. 

154.  Long  and  Short  Haul  Clause  under  Act  of  1910. 
154a.  Long  and  Short  Haul  Clause  under  Act  of  I'jZO. 

155.  Fourth  Section.  Relationship  between  Through  Rates  and  In- 

termediate Rates. 

156.  Discrimination  between  Car  Loads  and  Less  than  Car  Loads. 

157.  Bulked  Shipments. 

158.  Car  Loads,  Ownership   of. 

159.  Train   Loads. 

160.  Classification    of    Commodities    Should    Be    without    Discrimi- 

nation. 

161.  Uniform  Classification. 

162.  Power  of  the  Commission  over  Classification. 

163.  Milling  in  Transit. 

164.  Rebilling. 

165.  Rebilling— Found  Illegal. 

166.  Rebilling  Illegal  Only  When  Unjustly  Discriminatory. 

167.  Rebilling.     Conclusion. 


14  Table  of  Contents. 

168.  Payment  of  Elevator  Allowances 

169.  Transit  Privileges— Generally. 

170.  Allowances  to  Tap  Line  Railroads. 

171.  Allowances  to  Industrial  Tracks. 

172.  Illegal    for    Carriers    to    Transport    Commodities    Produced    or 

Owned  by  Them  or  in  Which  They  Are  Interested. 

173.  Commodities  Clause  of  Act  of  1906. 

174.  Cars  Must  Be  Furnished  without  Discrimination. 

175.  Same  Subject.     Principles  Applied  by  the  Commission. 

176.  Freight  Charges  Must  Be  Collected   without   Discrimination. 

177.  Right   of   Carrier   to    Route    Shipments    Beyond    Its   Own    Ter- 

minus. 

178.  Discrimination  in  Billing. 

179.  Tariffs  of  Rates  Must   Be  Printed,  Posted  and   Maintained. 

180.  Same  Subject.     Misquoting  Rates. 

181.  Different   Rates   over   the   Same   Line    in    Opposite    Directions. 

182.  Discrimination  by  Granting  Free  Service. 

183.  Basing  Points,   Group   Rates   and   Zone   Rates. 

184.  How    Far   a   Rate  Made   by   a    State    Relieves   a   Carrier    from 

the  Duty  to  Serve  Communities  with  Legal  Equality. 

185.  Commutation,    Mileage    and    Party    Rate    Tickets. 

186.  Rebates. 

187.  Same  Subject.     Corporation   Punishable. 

188.  Summary. 


CHAPTER    V. 

ENFORCEMENT   BY   THE   COMMISSION   OF   THE   ACT   TO    REGU- 
LATE COMMERCE. 

§  189.  General    Statement   of    the   Functions   of   the    Interstate    Com- 
merce Commission. 

190.  Appointment  and  General  Duties  of  the  Commission. 

191.  Switch  Connections.     Duty  of  Carriers. 

192.  Switch  Connections.     Powers  of  the  Commis.-iion. 

193.  Industrial   Switches  and  Railways. 

194.  Switch  Connections  with  Carriers  by  Water. 

195.  Through  Routes. 

196.  Division  ot  Joint  Rates. 

197.  Allowances  to  Shippers  for  Services  and  Facilities. 

198.  Distribution  of  Cars. 

198a.  Furnishing  Cars,  Car  Service. 

199.  Long  and   Short  Haul  Provisions,  History   of. 

200.  Relationship   of  Intermediate  and   Through   Rates. 

201.  Water  Competition. 

202.  Power  of  the  Commission   under  the  Fourth  Section. 

203.  Ownership  of  Water  Carriers  by  Railroads. 


Table  of  Contents.  15 

204.  The    Commission's    Duties    with    Reference    to    Schedules    of 

Rates. 

204a.  Bills  of  Lading. 

205.  Damages. 

206.  Damages — Power  of  the  Commission  to  Make  Award  of. 

207.  Awards  of  Damages  for  Charging  an  Unjust  and  Unreasonable 

Rate. 

208.  Awards  of  Damages  for  Unlawful  Discrimination. 

209.  Damages  under  the  Fourth  Section. 

210.  Damages  for  Misrouting. 

211.  Damages — General    Statement. 

212.  Damages  for  Misquoting  a  Rate. 

213.  Damages,  to  Whom  Paid. 

214.  Damages,  by  Whom  Paid. 

215.  Damages — Protest  Unnecessary. 

216.  Damages — Interest  and   Attorney's   Fees. 

217.  Award  of  Damages  an  Inadequate  Remedy. 

218.  Damages,  Limitation  on  Complaint  for. 

219.  General  Investigation  by  the  Commission. 

220.  Same  Subject.    Amendments  of  1910  and  1920. 

221.  Commission   May  Ask    the  Aid   of  the   Courts   to    Enforce  the 

Law. 

222.  Commission  Has  Power  to  Prescribe  Rates  for  the  Future. 

223.  Suspension  of  Rates,  Re'gulations  and  Practices. 

224.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. 

225.  Allowances  for  Services  or  Instrumentalities. 

226.  Powers  Enumerated,  Not  Exclude  Others. 

227.  Effect  of  Commission's  Orders. 

228.  Commission's  Control  Over  Its  Orders. 

229.  Commission  May  Employ  Attorneys. 

230.  Records  of  Commission. 

231.  Valuation  of  Railroad   Property. 

232.  Valuation,   How    Made. 

233.  Finality  and  Effect  of  Valuation. 

234.  Office  of  Commission. 

235.  Annual  Reports  from  Carriers. 

236.  Examiners. 

237.  Reports  by  the  Commission. 

238.  Lake  Erie  and  Ohio  River  Ship  Canal. 

239.  Parcel  Post. 

240.  Government  Aided  Railroads  and  Telegraph  Companies. 

241.  Common  Law  Remedies. 

CHAPTER   VI. 

PROCEDURE    OF    THE    INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

§  242.  Scope  of  Chapter. 


J 6  Table  of  Contents. 

243.  Switch  Connections. 

244.  Relief  under  the  Fourth  Section. 

245.  Water  Competition. 

246.  Railroad   Owned    Steamships. 

247.  Changes  in  Tariffs. 

248.  Forms  of  Tariffs. 

249.  Through  Routes. 

250.  Complaints  for  Damages. 

251.  Same  Subject — Order  of  Commission. 

252.  General  Investigations. 

253.  Procedure  in  Formal  Cas^s — Complaint. 

254.  Notice  before  Hearing. 

255.  Formal  Complaints — Answer. 

256.  Hearings  by  the  Commission. 
256a.  Proposed  Reports. 

257.  Orders  Relating  to  Rates  and  Practices. 

258.  Suspension  of  Rates. 

259.  Practices   in   Suspension  Cases  Where   There   Exist    Intrastate 

Rates  Lower  than  Proposed  Interstate  Rates. 

260.  The  Weak  and  the  Strong  Roads. 

261.  Other  Orders. 

262.  Service  of  Orders  of  the  Commission. 

263.  Rehearings  by  the  Commission. 

264.  Valuation  of  Property. 

265.  Oral   Argument. 

266.  Estoppel  by  Former  Order  of  the  Commission. 

267.  Rules  of  Procedure  Prescribed  by  the  Commission. 

268.  Public  Sessions  and  Hearings. 

269.  Parties. 
269a.  Interventions. 

270.  Complaints. 

271.  Answers. 

272.  Reparation  Statements. 

273.  Service  of  Papers. 

274.  Amendment  to  Pleadings. 
275-.  Continuances. 

276.  Stipulations  Desirable  and  Must  Be  in  Writing. 

277.  Hearings. 

278.  Depositions,  How  Taken. 

279.  Witnesses  and   Subpoenas. 

280.  Documentary  Evidence. 

281.  Briefs  and   Oral  Argument. 

282.  Rehearings. 

283.  Free  Copies  of  Transcript  of  Testimony,  When  Furnished. 

284.  Orders    Must    Be    Compiled    with    and    Notice    Given    to    the 

Secretary  of  the  Commission. 

285.  Fourth  Section  Applications. 

286.  Suspension  of  Rate  Increases,  How  Obtained. 


Table  of  Contents.  17 


287.  Secretary   to  Give   Information   to   Parties. 

288.  Address  of  the  Commission. 

288a.  Specifications   As   to   Complaints,   etc. 
288b.  Office  and  Address  of  Commission. 

289.  Form   of  Complaints. 

290.  Form  of  Answer. 

291.  Intervening  Petition. 
291a.  Petition  for  Rehearing. 

291b.  Form  of  Reparation  Statement. 

291c.  Form  of  Complaint  Against  Federal  Agent. 


Conference   Rulings. 

Index  to  Conference  Rulings. 

End  of  Volume  One. 

VOLUME  II. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

ENFORCEMENT   BY   THE   COURTS   OF  THE   ACT   TO   REGULATE 

COMMERCE  INCLUDING  A  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  EFFECT 

GIVEN   BY   THE   COURTS   TO   THE    ORDERS   AND 

FINDINGS   OF  THE  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE 

COMMISSION. 

292.  Jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  of  the  States  to  Enforce  Provisions 

of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

293.  Same  Subject.     Statutory  Provisions. 

294.  Same  Subject.     Awards  of  Damages. 

295.  Same  Subject.     Suit  for  Damages  Against  an  Initial  Carrier. 

296.  Compelling  a  Common  Carrier  to  Transport. 

297.  Jurisdiction.     General  Statement. 

298.  Commerce    Court. 

298a.  General  Jurisdiction  of  Federal  Courts. 

299.  Jurisdiction    of    the    Courts    of    the    United    States    to    Compel 

the   Attendance    of   Witnesses    Before    the    Commission    and 
Enforce  Obedience  to  Act. 

300.  Enforcement  of  Forfeitures. 

301.  Mandamus. 

302.  To  Enforce  Rights  under  Act  to  Aid  Railroads  and  Telegraph 

Companies. 

303.  Injunctions  in  Aid  of  Enforcement  of  Act. 

304.  Injunctions  Against  Unlawful  Rates   and   Practices. 

305.  Same  Subject.     Conclusion. 

306.  Same  Subject.     Effect  of  Amendment  of  1910. 

307.  Same  Subject.     Venue. 

308.  Jurisdiction  of  Suits  to  Set  Aside  Orders  of  the  Commission. 
308a.  Right  of  Shipper  to  Set  Aside  a  Negative  Order. 

308b.  Parties. 


18  Table  of  Contents. 

309.  Grounds  upon  Which  Orders  of  the  Commission   May  Be  Set 

Aside. 

310.  Same  Subject.     Violations  of  the  Constitution — Fourth  Amend- 

ment. 

Sll.  Violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment. 

312.  Mistake  of  Law. 

313.  Lack  of  Jurisdiction. 

314.  The  Substance  and  Not  the  Form  of  the  Finding  Determines. 

315.  Disregard  of  the  Legal   Effect  of  Undisputed   Testimony. 

316.  Lack  of  Full  Hearing. 

317.  Awards  of  Damages. 

318.  Awards  of  Damages — Parties  and  Procedure. 

319.  Procedure  to  Enforce  or  Annul  Orders  of  the  Commission. 

320.  Interlocutory   Injunctions — Three   Judges   to   Hear   Application 

for. 

321.  Interlocutory  Injunctions — Notice  and  Hearing. 

322.  Interlocutory  Injunctions— Appeal  from. 

323.  Appeal  from   Final  Judgment. 

324.  Venue  of  Suits. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

ACTS  OF  CONGRESS  INDIRECTLY  AFFECTING  INTERSTATE 
TRANSPORTATION. 

325.  Scope  of  Chapter. 

326.  Quarantine  Laws  Relating  to   Transportation. 

327.  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Law. 

328.  Clayton  Anti-Trust  Law. 

329.  Federal  Trade  Commission  Law. 
329a.  Merchant  Marine. 

330.  Safety  Appliance  Law. 

331.  Hours  of  Service  Law. 

332.  Employers'  Liability  Law. 

333.  Arbitration  And   Labor  Laws. 

334.  Breaking  Seals  of  Railroad  Cars  Containing  Interstate  or  For- 

eign Commerce. 
334a.  Transportation  of  Stolen  Motor  Vehicles  Prohibited. 
334b.  Child  Labor  Law. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

ACTS  REGULATING  COMMERCE. 
Including  act  approved  February  4,  1887,  chapter  104,  effective  April 
5,  1887,  24  Stat.  L.  379,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  3154,  3  Fed.  Stat. 
Ann.  809,  et.  seq.    Known  as  the  CuUom  Act. 


Table  op  Contents.  19 

Amendment  of  March  2,  1889,  25  Stat.  L.  855,  Chap.  382,  U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  p.  3158,  3  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  852,  et.  seq. 

Amendment  of  February  10,  1891,  Chapter  128,  20  Stat.  L.  753,  U. 
S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  3163,  3  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  839. 

Amendment  of  February  8,  1895,  Chap.  61,  28  Stat.  U  643,  U.  S. 
Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  3171,  3  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  851. 

Act  February  11,  1893,  27  Stat.  L.  443,  Chap.  83,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  p.  3173,  3  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  855.     Known  as  the  Testimony  Act. 

Act  February  11,  1903,  Chapter  544,  32  Stat.  L.  823,  U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  Supp.  1907,  10  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  199.  Known  as  the  Expediting 
Act. 

Act  February  19,  1903,  Chap.  708,  32  Stat.  L.  847,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
Supp.  1907,  p.  880,  10  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  170.     Known  as  the  Blkin's  Act. 

Act  February  25,  1903,  Chap.  755,  32  Stat.  L.  903,  10  Fed.  Stat.  Ann. 
173,  being  section  one  of  the  Appropriation  Act. 

Act  June  29,  1906,  34  Stat.  L.  584,  Chap.  3591,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
Supp.  1907,  p.  892,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Supp.  1907,  p.  167.  Known  as  the 
Hepburn  Act. 

Act  June  30,  1906,  Chap.  3920,  34  Stat.  L.  798,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
Supp.  1907,  p.  900,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Supp.  1907,  p.  382. 

Act  April  13,  1908,  35  Stat.  L.  60,  Chap.  143. 

Act  of  June  18,  1910,  36  Stat.  L.  539.  Chap.  309,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
Supp.  1911,  p.  1288,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Supp.  1912,  pp.  Ill  to  127. 

Act  Aug.  24,  1912,  37  Stat.  L.  566,  Chap.  390,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Supp. 
1914,  p.  378.     Known  as' Panama  Canal  Act. 

Act  Mch.  4,  1913,  37  Stat.  L.  1013,  Chap.  160,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Supp. 
p.  226. 

Act  Mch.  1,  1913,  37  Stat.  L.  701,  Chap.  92,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Supp. 
1914,  p.  204. 

Act  Oct.  22,  1913.     Known  as  District  Court  Act. 

Government  Aided  Railroad  and  Telegraph  Lines  Act. 

Lake  Erie  and  Ohio  Ship  Canal  Act. 

Parcel  Post  Act. 

Witness  Acts. 

Transportation  Act  1920;    Act  February  28,  1920. 

Bill  of  Lading  Act;  Act  August  29,  1916,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1916, 
Sees.  8604aaa  to  8604w. 

334c.  Titles  of  Acts  and  Definitions. 

335.  Scope  of  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

336.  Not  Applicable  to  Intrastate  Transportation. 
336a.   Certain  Water  Transportation  Exempted. 

337.  Term    "Common    Carrier,"    "Railroad,"    and    "Transportation" 

Defined. 

338.  Duty  of  Carrier  to  Furnish   Transportation   and  to  Establish 

Through  Routes. 

339.  All  Transportation  Charges  Must  Be  Reasonable.  . 

340.  Classification  of  Telegraph,  Telephone  and  Cable  Messages. 

341.  Classifications,  Regulations  and  Practices  Must  be  Reasonable. 


20  Table  of  Contents. 

342.  Free  Service  with  Certain  Exceptions  Prohibited  and  Penalties 

Prescribed. 
342a.  Excepting  Cincinnati   Southern  Railway. 

343.  Railroad   Companies   Prohibited    from   Transporting   Commodi- 

ties in  Which  They  Are  Interested,  with  Certain  Exceptions. 

344.  Terms  under  Which  Switch  Connections  Shall  Be  Maae. 
344a.  Car  Service  Defined. 

344b.  Duty  of  Carrier  To  Furnish  Safe  and  Adequate  Car  Service. 

344c.  Duty  of  Carrier  To  Make  Reasonable  Distribution  of  Cars. 

344d.  Schedule  of  Car  Service  Must  be  Filed. 

344e.  Authority  of  Commission  to  Establish  Car  Service  Rules. 

344f.  Authority  of  Commission  to  Req^iire  Joint  Use  of  Terminals. 

344g.  Routing  Regulations. 

344h.  Commission  May  Act  by  Agents — Penalties. 

344i.  Extension  and  Abandonment  of  Present  Railroad  Facilities. 

344j.  Procedure  in  Applying  For  Extensions  or  Abandonments. 

344k.  Further  Procedural  Rules — Penalties. 

3441.  Commission  May  Require  Extension  of  Facilities. 

344m.  Facilities  Solely  Within  One  State  Exempted. 

344n.  Punishment  For  Obstructing  Interstate  or  Foreign  Commerce. 

344o.  Provisions  Relating  to  Duties  of  Carriers  During  War. 

345.  Definition  and  Prohibition  of  Unjust  Discrimination. 

346.  Undue  and  Unreasonable  Preference  Prohibited. 
346a.  Regulation  of  Collection  of  Transportation  Charges. 

347.  Carriers  Shall  Accord  Reasonable  and  Equal  Facilities  for  In- 

terchange of  Traffic. 
347a.  Joint  Use  of  Terminal  Facilities  May  be  Required. 

348.  Rule  as  to  Long  and  Short  Hauls. 

349.  Relief  From  Long  and  Short  Haul  Clause. 

350.  Changes  Not  Required  Until  Further  Orders. 

351.  Rates  Reduced   by   Competition   with   Water   Routes — Not   In- 

creased When. 

352.  Pooling  of  Freights  and  Division  of  Earnings  Regulated. 
352a.  Consolidation  of  Carriers. 

352b.  Commission  To  Adopt  A  Plan. 

352c.  Notice  of  Plan  To  Be  Given. 

352d.  Conditions  Under  Uhich  Consolidations  Must  Be  Made. 

352e.  Applications  To  Consolidate. 

352f.  Express  Companies  Consolidation  of. 

352g.  Anti-Trust  Laws  Not  to  Apply. 

353.  Rail  Carrier  Not  to  Own  Competing  Water  Carriers. 

354.  Whether  or  Not  Competition   Exists   to  be   Determined   by   the 

Commission. 

355.  Commission  May  Relieve  from  Provision. 

356.  Water  Carriers  to  File  Tariffs. 

357.  Violators    of    Sherman    Anti-Trust    Act    Not    to    Use    Panama 

Canal. 

358.  Carriers  Shall  File,  Print  and  Keep  Public  Schedules  of  Rates. 


Table  of  Contents.  21 

359.  Regulations  as  to  Printing  and  Posting  Schedules  of  Rates  tor 

Freight    Moving    Through    Foreign    Countries    from    and    to 
Any  Place  in   the   United   States. 

360.  No    Change    of   Schedules   of   Rates    Shall    Be    Made    Without 

Notice. 

361.  Names  of  All  Carriers  Parties  to  Schedules  Must  Be  Specified. 

362.  Carriers  Shall  File  Contracts  Relating  to  Traffic  Arangements. 

363.  Commission  May  Prescribe  Form  of  Schedules. 

364.  No   Carrier  Shall   Participate   in  Interstate   Commerce   Unless 

the    Charges    Therefor    are    Published,    and    No    Such    Car- 
rier Shall  Deviate  from  the  Published  Schedules. 

365.  Preference  and  Precedence  May  Be  Given  Military  Traffic   in 

Time  of  War. 

366.  The  Commission  May  Reject  Schedules. 

367.  Penalty  for  Failure  to  Comply  with  Orders  under  Section  Six. 

368.  Penalty  for  Misstating  or  Failure  to  State  Rate. 

369.  Must  Post  Name  of  Agent. 

370.  Corporations  Violating  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  Guilty 

as  Individuals  and  Punishment  Prescribed. 

371.  Rebate.     Punishment  for  Offering,  Granting,  Soliciting,  or  Ac- 

cepting. 

372.  Act  of  Officer  or  Agent,  When  Binding. 

373.  Carrier  Filing  or  Participating  in  Rate  Bound  Thereby. 

374.  Forfeiture  for  Rebating  in  Addition  to  Penalties.     Limitation 

of  Six  Years  Fixed. 

375.  Jurisdiction  over  Water  Carriers. 

376.  Physical  Connection  Betvi^een  Rail  Lines  and  Dock  of  Water 

Carriers. 

377.  Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates    Between    Rail    and    Water 

Carriers. 

378.  Proportional  Rates  to  and  from  Ports. 

379.  Through  Rates  via  Panama  Canal. 

380.  Conditions    under    Which    Through    Routes    and    Joint    Rates 

with  Water  Carriers  May  Be  Operated  to  Be  Prescribed  by 
the  Commission. 

381.  Contracts   and   Combinations   to   Prevent   Continuous    Carriage 

of  Freight  Prohibited. 

382.  Damages  and  Attorneys'  Fees  Allowed  for  Violations. 

383.  Where  to  Sue  for   Damages,   Compulsory   Attendance   of  Wit- 

nesses and  Production  of  Papers. 

384.  Penalties  for  Violations  of  the  Act. 

385.  Penalties  for  False  Billing,  False  Classification,  False   Weigh- 

ing, etc.,  by  Carriers. 

386.  Penalties  against  Shippers  for  False  Billing,  etc. 

387.  Penalties  and  Damages  for  Inducing  Discriminations. 

388.  Appointment  and  Term  of  Office  of  Commissioners. 

389.  Power   and   Duty  of  Commissioners. 


22  Table  of  Contents. 

390.  Power   of   Courts   to   Punish    for   Disobedience,   Witnesses   Not 

Excused   Because  Testimony   May   Incriminate. 

391.  Right    to    Talte    Testimony    by    Depositions    and    the    Manner 

Thereof  Prescribed. 

392.  Persons  Who  May  File  Complaints  with  the  Commission  an-l 

Practice  with  Reference  Thereto. 

393.  Commission  May  on  Its  Own  Motion  Institute  Investigations. 
393a.  Procedure   When   State   Rates   Involved. 

393b.  Order    of    Commission    Binding    Notwithstanding    State    Laws. 

394.  Reports    of    Commission    on    Investigations,    How    Made    and 

Published. 

395.  Power   of   Commission    to   Determine   and    Prescribe   Just   and 

Reasonable  Rates,  Regulations  and  Practices. 

396.  When    Orders    Take   Effect    and    How    Long   Continue    Unless 

Modified  or  Set  Aside  by  the  Commission  or  a  Court. 
396a.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates  May  Be  Established  by   the 

Commission. 
396b.  Limitations  on  the  Power  to  Prescribe  Through  Routes. 
396c.  Delivery  of  Ordinary  Live  Stock. 

397.  Division  of  Joint  Rate  May  Be  Prescribed  by  Commission. 

398.  Right  to  Suspend  Proposed  Increases  in  Rates. 

399.  Burden  of  Proof  to  Justify  Rates  Increased  after  Jan.  1,  1910. 

400.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates  May  Be  Established  by  the 

Commission. 

401.  Limitation  of  the  Power  to  Prescribe  Through  Routes. 

402.  Shippers  May  Designate  Routing. 

403.  Unlawful  to  Give  or  Receive  Information  Relative  to  Shipments. 

404.  Charges  for  Instrumentalities  Furnished  by  Shipper  Must  Be 

Reasonable. 
40.5.     Enumeration    of   Powers    of   Commission    Not    Exclusive. 
405a.  Meaning  of  Word  "Rates"  and  "Carriers". 
405b.  Commission's  Power  to  Initiate  Rates — Fair  Return. 
405c.  Percentage  Constituting  a  Fair  Return  To  Be  Determined  By 

Commission. 
405d.  Determination  of  Aggregate  Value  of  Property. 
405e.  Income  In  Excess  of  Fair  Return  a  Trust  Fund. 
405f.  Disposition  of  Excess  Over  Six  Per  Centum. 
405g.  Carriers'  Use  of  Reserve  Fund. 
405h.  Limit  of  Five  Per  Centum  for  Reserve  Fund. 
4051.  Rules  to  be  Prescribed  for  Recovery  of  Excess  Income. 
405j.  Administration  of  This  Trust  Fund  by  Commission. 
405k.  Applications  By  Carriers  for  Loan  of  Trust  Fund. 
4051.   Action  by  the  Commission  on  Applications   for  Loans. 
405m.  Applications    by    Carriers    for    Lease    of    Facilities    Controlled 

by  the  Commission. 
405n.  Procedure  on  Application  for  Lease. 
405o.  Commission  May  Purchase  Equipment. 
405p.  Commission  May  Make  Rules  of  Procedure. 
405q.  Section  Not  to  Deprive  Shippers  of  Right  to  Reparation. 


Table  of  Contents.  23 

405r.  Rights  of  Carriers  When  Undertaking  New   Construction. 

406.  Award    of    Damages    Shall    Be    Made    by    Commission    alter 

Hearing. 

407.  Carrier   Failing   to   Comply   with    Order   for   Reparation,    Suit 

May  Be  Brought  Thereon  in  United  States  and  State  Courts, 
the  Order  Being  Prima  Facie  Evidence  of  the  Right  to  Re- 
cover. 

408.  Limitation  on  Actions  for  Damages. 

409.  All   Parties  Jointly  Awarded   Damages  May   Sue   as   Plaintiffs 

Against  All  Carriers  Parties  to  the  Award. 

410.  Service  of  Orders  of  Commission. 

411.  Commission  May  Suspend  or  Modify  Its  Orders. 

412.  Punishment  for  Knowingly  Disobeying  an  Order  Issued  under 

Section  Fifteen. 

413.  Special  Attorneys  May  Be  Employed. 

414.  Courts   May   Enforce   Obedience   to   Commission's   Order,   Man- 

datory or  Otherwise. 

415.  Schedules,   Contracts,   etc..   Must   Be   Filed   with   the   Commis- 

sion, and,  When  Filed,  Original  or  Certified  Copy  Prima 
Facie  Evidence. 

416.  Rehearings  May  Be  Granted  by  Commission. 

417.  Procedure  before  the  Commission. 
417a.  Division  of  the  Commission. 

417b.  Functions  of  Commission  May  Be  Performed  by  Divisions. 
417c.  Procedure  of  Divisions — Rehearing  by  Whole  Commission. 

418.  Salaries  and  Expenses  of  the  Commission. 

419.  Principal  Office  of  Commission  in  Washington,  but  May  Prose- 

cute Inquiries  Elsewhere. 

420.  The  Commission  Is  Authorized   to   Investigate,   Ascertain  and 

Report   the  Value   of  Railroad  Property. 

421.  Method  of  Procedure  to  Be  Prescribed  by  the  Commission. 

422.  How  Such  Investigation  Is  Prosecuted. 

423.  Duty  of  Carriers  to  Aid  the  Investigation. 

424.  Valuations  to  Be  Revised  and  Corrected. 

425.  Carrier  to  Make  Reports. 

426..  Notice  of  Completion  of  Valuation. 

427.  Hearings  Before  Valuation  Fixed. 

428.  Effect  of  Valuation  as  Evidence. 

429.  Applicable   to  Receivers — Penalty. 

430.  Jurisdiction  of  Courts  to  Aid. 

431.  Requirements  as  to  Transportation  of  Employees  of  the  Com- 

mission with  Supplies  Therefor. 

432.  Annual    Reports    Required    and    What    They    Shall    Contain. 

Penalties  for  Failure  to  Make. 

433.  Commission    May    Prescribe    Form    of    Keeping    Accounts    and 

Inspect  Same. 

434.  Penalties  for  Failure  to  Keep  Accounts  and  for  Falsifying  the 

Record. 


24  Table  of  Contents. 

435.  The  Commission  May  Permit  the  Destruction  of  Papers. 

436.  Penalty   for  an  Examiner  Divulging  Information   Received   as 

Such. 

437.  United    States    Circuit    and    District    Courts    May,    Upon    Ap- 

plication   of   Attorney-General    at    Request    of    Commission, 

Enforce  Provisions  of  Act. 
43.8.     Commission  May  Employ  Agents  or  Examiners. 
439.     Receiving  Carrier  Liable  for  Loss,  Remedy  Cumulative. 
.     440.     Carriers  Liable  for  Full  Value  of  Property  Transported — ("um- 

mins  Amendment. 
440a.  Bills  of  Lading. 

440b.  Bill  of  Lading  Act — Transportation   Included   in  Act. 
440c.  Straight  Bill  of  Lading. 
440d.  Order  Bill  of  Lading;     Negotiable. 
440e.  Certain   Order   Bills. 
440f.  Indorsement  on  Order  Bill. 
440g.  Indorsement  on  Straight  Bill  of  Lading. 
440h.  Insertion  of  Name  of  Person  to  be  Notified. 
4401.  Liability  of  Carrier  to  Purchaser  of  Order  Bill. 
440j.  Person  To  Whom  Carrier  May  Deliver  Goods. 
440k.   Liability  of  Carrier   in  Case  of  Delivery   of   Goods   to   Wrong 

Person. 
4401.  Liability  of  Carrier  to  Purchase  of  Order  Bill. 
440m.  Liability  in  Case  of  Loss  of  Part  of  Goods. 
440n.  Alterations. 
440o.  Courts  May  Order  Delivery   of   Goods   on   Loss   of   Order   Bill 

of  Lading. 
440p.  Liability  of  Carrier  on  Bill  of  Lading  Indorsed  "Duplicate." 
440q.  Adverse  Claim  of  Title. 

440r.  Requiring  Conflicting  Claimants  to  Interplead. 
440s.  Delivery    By    Carrier    When    Informed    of    Adverse    Claim    to 

Goods. 
440t.  Claim  of  Third  Person  Enforced  by  Legal  Process. 
440u.   Shipper's  Weight,  Load  and  Count. 
440v.  Weight,  Load  and  Count. 

440w.  Liability  of  Carrier  on  Bill  of  Lading  Issued  By  Its  Agent. 
440x.  Attachment  by  Garnishment. 
440y.  Remedies  of  Creditor. 
440z.  Lien  of  Carrier. 

440aa.  Liability  of  Carrier  After  Sale  of  Goods. 
440bb.  Negotiation  of  Order  Bill  by  Delivery. 
440cc.  Transfer  of  Bill  by   Delivery. 

440dd.     Negotiation  of  Order  Bill  by  Person  in  Possession. 
440ee.  Title  and  Rights  Acquired  by  Transferee. 
440ff.  Rights  of  Transferee. 
440gg.  Compelling  Indorsement  of  Order  Bill. 
440hh.  Warranties  Extend  to  Negotiation  of  Bill   for  Value. 
440ii.  Liability  of  Indorser  for  Acts  of  Carrier  or  Previous  Indorsers. 


Table  of  Contents.  25 

440jj.  Warranties  by  Mortgagee. 

440kk.  Bona  Fide  Purchaser  of  Bill  Wrongly  Negotiated. 
44011.  Negotiation  of  Order  Bill  by  Mortgagor. 

440mm.  Superior  Rights  of  Bona  Fide  Purchaser  of  Order  Bill. 

440nn.  Lien  Valid. 

440oo.  Forgery  or  Counterfeiting  Bill  of  Lading;     Penalty. 

440pp.  Definitions. 

440qq.  Retroactive   Effect. 

440rr.   Invalidity  of  Part  of  Act. 

441.  Carrier,  As  Used   in  This  and  Next   Eleven   Sections,  Defined. 
441a.  Security  Issues  Regulated. 

441b.  Power  of  Commission  Over  Applications  to  Issue  Securities. 

441c.  Commission  To  Prescribe  Form  of  Applications. 

441d.  Notice  of  Sale  of  Securities  Required. 

441e.  Notice  of  Applications — How   Served. 

441f.  Exclusive  and  Plenary  Jurisdiction  Given   Commission. 

441g.  No  Guarantee  by  United  States. 

441h.  Not  Applicable  to  Notes — Rule  as  To  No  Par  Stock. 

441i.  Reports  of  Carriers   Showing  Security   Issues  Required. 

441j.  Securities  Not  Authorized  Void — Penalties. 

441k.  Interlocking  Railway   Directorates   Regulated. 

4411.  Annual  Reports  by  Commission  to  Congress. 

442.  Circumstances  under  Which  Reduced  or  Free  Fares  and  Rates 

May   Be  Given. 

443.  Existing    Remedies    Not    Abridged    or    Altered.      Pending   Liti- 

gation Not  Affected. 

444.  Interchangeable  Mileage  Tickets,  How  Issued. 

445.  Discrimination    May    Be    Prevented    by    Writ    of    Mandamus, 

Remedy   Cumulative. 

446.  Number,  Terms,  Qualification,  Salary  and  Appointment  of  Com- 

missioners. 
446a.  Certain  Water  Carriers  to  File  Schedules. 
446b.  Information  To  Be  Furnished  By  Water  Carriers. 
446c.  Change  of  Schedules  To  Be  Filed. 
446d.  Through  Bills  of  Lading  Required. 
44Ge.  Such    Through    Lading   Not    An   Arrangement    for    Continuous 

Service. 
446f.  Automatic    Trains — Control    Devices    May    Be    Required. 
446g.  Title  of  Act. 

447.  Existing  Laws  as  to  Obtaining  Testimony  Applicable  to  Act. 

448.  Repealing  Conflicting  Laws  Not  to  Affect  Pending  Suits. 

449.  Time  of  Taking  Effect  of  Act. 

450.  Carriers  Must   Designate   Agents   in  Washington. 

451.  Pending  Cases  Not  Affected. 

452.  Commission   to    Investigate    Questions    Pertaining   to   Issuance 

of  Stocks  and  Bonds. 

453.  Injunctions  against  Operation   of  State   Statutes. 

454.  When   Act   Effective. 


26  Table  of  Contents. 

455.  Parties  Defendant  Other  than  Carriers  in  Suit  to  Enforce  Pro- 

visions of  Act. 

456.  Equitable  Proceedings  May  Be  Instituted  by   the  Commission 

to   Restrain    Discrimination    or    Departures   from    Published 
Rates. 

457.  Immunity   and  Compulsory  Attendance  of  Witnesses,   Produc- 

tion of  Books  and  Papers. 

458.  Expediting  Act  Applicable   to   Suits   Brought   under   Direction 

of  Attorney-General. 

459.  Repealing    Clause    Not    Affecting    Pending    Suits    or    Accrued 

Rights. 

460.  Commerce  Court. 

461.  Commerce  Court  Abolished. 

462.  Venue  of  Suits  on  Orders  of  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

463.  Procedure  in  the  District  Courts. 

464.  Temporary  Restraining  Orders. 

465.  An  Appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  Interlocutory  Orders. 

466.  Appeals  from  Final  Judgments. 

467.  Pending  Causes   Transferred   to   District  Courts. 

468.  Certain  Cases  Given  Precedence  and  Hearing  E.xpedited,  Hear- 

ing Before  Three  Judges. 

469.  Direct  Appeal  to  Supreme  Court. 

470.  Government  Aided  Railroad  and  Telegraph  Lines. 

471.  Connecting  Telegraph  Lines. 

472.  Duties  Imposed  on  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

473.  Duty  of  the  Attorney-General. 

474.  Penalties  Provided. 

475.  Duty  of  Telegraph  and  Railroad  Companies  to  File  Contracts 

with  and  Make  Reports  to  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

476.  Right  of  Congress  to  Alter  or  Annul  Act. 

477.  Lake  Erie  and   Ohio  River   Ship   Canal. 

478.  Parcel  Post. 

479.  Compulsory   Attendance   of  Witnesses   and   Production   of   Pa- 

pers Provided  for. 

480.  Amendment  to  Compulsory  Attendance  Act. 

480a.  Policy  of  Congress  to  Encourage  Water  Transportation. 
480b.  Effective  Date  Section  Ten  Clayton  Act  Extended. 
480c.  Part  of  Act  Unconstitutional  Not  Invalidate  Other  Parts. 
480d.  Federal  Control. 


CHAPTER  X. 

ACTS  RELATING  TO  THE  TRANSPORTATION  OP  ANIMALS. 

Act  to  prevent  cruelty  to  animals  while  in  interstate  transit,  known 
as  the  28-hour  law,  Act  June  29,  1906,  Chapter  3594,  34  Stat.  L.  607, 
U.  S.  Comp.  St.  Supp.  1907,  p.  918,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  Sup.  1907,  p.  25, 


Table  of  Contents.  27 

Act  March  4,  1907,  Chapter  2907,  34  Stat.  L.  12G0  et  seq.,  requiriiife 
inspection  of  meat. 

Act  March  3,  1905,  33  Stat.  L.  1264,  Ch.  1496,  U.  S.  Comp.  St.  Supp. 
1909,  p.  1185,  relating  to  transportation  of  animals  from  quarantine 
territory. 

§  481.     Time    Prescribed    for    Feeding    and    Unloading    Animals    in 
Transit. 

482.  Feeding  Shall  Be  at  Expense  of  Owner,  Lien  Given  for  Food. 

483.  Penalty. 

484.  Meat  Inspection  Act. 

485.  Transportation  of  Animals  from  Quarantine  Territory. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

TRUSTS  AND  OTHER  COMBINATIONS  IN  RESTRAINT  OF  TRADE. 

§  486.     Contracts,  Combinations  and  Conspiracies  in  Restraint  of  In- 
terstate Commerce  Illegal. 

487.  Monopolies    and    Conspiracies    and    Combinations    to    Monopo- 

lize Interstate  Trade  Illegal. 

488.  Prohibition    Applies    to    Territories    and    Between    States    and 

Territories. 

489.  Courts  Given  Jurisdiction  to  Enjoin  Violations  of  Act. 

490.  Practice   with   Reference   to   Parties  and   Service   of   Subpoenas 

Thereon. 

491.  Property  Owned   under  a  Contract  Violating  This   Act  Being 

in  Course  of  Interstate  Transportation  May  Be  Seized  and 
Forfeited. 

492.  Measure  of  Damages  in  Favor  of  Person  Injured. 

493.  Person  Includes  Corporation  and  Association. 

494.  Act  of  August  28,   1894,   So   Far  as  It  Relates  to  Trusts  and 

Combinations  in  Restraint  of  Trade. 

495.  Clayton  Act.     Definitions. 

496.  Price  Discrimination  Prohibited. 

497.  Lease  or  Sale  of  Patented  Articles. 

498.  Damages  May  Be  Recovered  by  Person  Injured. 

499.  Effect  of  Final  Judgments  in  Criminal  Prosecutions. 

500.  Labor  Not  a  Commodity. 

501.  Acquisition   by   a  Corporation   of   Stock    in   Another   Corpora- 

tion, When  Prohibited. 

502.  Interlocking  Directorates,  When  Prohibited. 

503.  Punishment  of  Corporate  Officers. 

504.  Certain  Contracts  of  Common  Carriers  Must  Be  Let  by  Com- 

petitive   Bids. 

505.  Authority    to    Enforce    Certain    Provisions    of    Act    Vested    in 

Interstate   Commerce   Commission,    Federal    Reserve    Board 
and  Federal  Trade  Commission. 


28  Tablk  of  Contents. 

506.  Procedure    for   Hearings   by    Boards   Vested    with    Jurisdiction 

under  Act. 

507.  Effect  of  the  Orders  of  Boards. 

508.  Judicial  Proceedings  to  Enforce  the  Orders  of  the  Boards. 

509.  Venue  of  Suits. 

510.  Attendance  of  Witnesses. 

511.  Guilt  of  Corporation  Deemed  Guilt  of  Officers. 

512.  District   Courts   Invested   with   Jurisdiction   to    Prevent   Viola- 

tions of  the  Act. 

513.  Private  Persons  May  Obtain  Injunctive  Relief,  When. 

514.  Procedure  in  the  Issuance  of  Temporary  Restraining  Orders. 

515.  Security   Before   Issuing  Restraining   Orders,   When   Required. 

516.  What  Injunction  Orders  Shall  Contain. 

517.  Injunctions  in  Suits  Between  Employer  and  Employee. 

518.  Disobedience  of  Orders  of  Court. 

519.  Same  Subject.     Procedure  Prescribed. 

520.  Right  to  Trial  by  Jury  Provided  for. 

521.  Review  of  Convictions  for  Violation  of  Court  Orders. 

522.  Provision  for  Trial  for  Disobedience  to  Orders  of  Courts  Not 

Applicable  to  Contempt  Committed   in  the  Presence   of  the 
Court. 

523.  Limitation  in  Proceedings  for  Contempt. 

524.  That  Part  of  the  Act  Invalid,  Not  to  Affect  Validity  of  Other 

Portions. 

525.  Dumping   Prohibited. 


APPENDICES. 


Federal   Control   Act  and    Provisions   of   Transportation   Act   1920 
Terminating  Federal  Control. 

2. 

Labor   Provisions   of   the   Transportation   Act    1920    and    Adamson 
Eight  Hour  Law. 

A. 

Federal  Trade  Commission  Act. 

B. 

An  Act  to  promote  the  safety  of  employees  and  travelers  upon  rail- 
roads by  compelling  common  carriers  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce  to  equip  their  cars  with  automatic  couplers  and 
continuous  brakes  and  their  locomotives  with  driving-wheel 
brakes,  and  for  other  purposes. 

C. 

An  Act  to  amend  an  act  entitled  "An  act  to  promote  the  safety  of 
employees  and  travelers  upon  railroads  by  compelling  com- 
mon carriers  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  to  equip  their 
cars  with,  automatic  couplers  and  continuous  brakes,  and  their 
locomotives  with  driving-wheel  brakes,  and  for  other  purposes," 
approved  March  second,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-three, 
and  amended  April  first,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-six. 

D. 

Supplement  to  Safety  Appliance  Acts. 

E. 

An  act  requiring  common  carriers  engaged  in  interstate  commerce 
to  make  full  reports  of  all  accidents  to  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission. 

F. 

Medals  of  Honor  Act. 


(29) 


30  Appendices. 


An  Act  to  promote  the  safety  of  employees  and  travelers  upon  rail- 
roads by   limiting  the   hours   of   service   of  employees   thereon. 

H. 

Ash  Fan  Act. 


An  act  to  promote  the  safe  transportation  in  interstate  commerce 
of  explosives  and  other  dangerous  articles,  and  to  provide 
penalties  for  its  violation. 


Boiler  Inspection  Act. 

K. 

An  act  concerning  carriers  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  and  their 
employees.     Employers  Liability. 

L. 

Arbitration  Act. 

M. 
Breaking  Seals  of  Cars  Prohibited,  Act  providing  for. 

N. 
National  Motor  Vehicle  Theft  Act. 

O. 
The  Shipping  Act. 

P. 

National  Prohibition. 

GENERAL  INDEX. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


'•  [References  are  to  Sections.] 

A. 

Abby  Dodge,  The   (223  U.  S.  166,  56  L.  Ed.  390,  32  Sup.  Ct.  310),  53. 
Aberdeen    Group    Commercial    Asso.    v.    Mobile    &    O.    R.    Co.    (10    I. 

C.  C.  289),  346,  348. 
Acme  Belting  Co.  v.  A.  &  R.  Co.  (52  I.  C.  C.  15),  81. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  30),  146. 
Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.   (18  I.  C.  C.  376),  218. 

Adams  v.  Milwaukee  (228  U.  S.  572,  57  L.  Ed.  971,  33  Sup.  Ct.  610),  326. 
Adams  v.  Milwaukee    (144  Wis.   371,  129  N.  W.  518,   43   L.  R.   A.    (N. 

S.)   1066),  326. 
Adams  v.  Miss.  Lumber  Co.    (84  Miss.  29,  44  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)    257,  36 

So.  68),  58. 
Adams    Ex   Co.    v.    Commonwealth    (154    Ky.    462,    157    S.    W.    90S,    48 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  342),  58. 
Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Croninger    (226  U.   S.   491,   57   L.   Ed.   314,  33   Sup. 

Ct.  148),  34,  439. 
Adams  Ex.   Co.  v.   Kentucky    (206   U.   S.   129,   51   L.   Ed.   987,   27  Sup. 

Ct.  606),  58. 
Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Kentucky    (214   U.  S.   218,   53  L.   Ed.   972,  29   Sup. 

Ct.  633),  58. 
Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Mellichamp  (138  Ga.  443,  75  S.  E.  596),  34. 
Addyston  Pipe  &  Steel  Co.  v.  United   States    (175    (U.   S.   211,    14   L. 

Ed.  136,  20  Sup.  Ct.  96,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  1009),  486,  489,  491 
Advances  in  Rates— Eastern  Case    (20   I.   C.  C.  243),  82,   96,  98,  126, 

223,  231,  398,  399. 
Advances   in  Rates— Western  Case,   (20   I.   C.   C.  307),   80,   81,   82,   84, 

87,  88,  100,  126,  130,  223,  392,  398,  399. 
Advances  in  Rates— Western  Case— 1915   (35  I.  C.  C.  497)      (See  Wes- 
tern Rate  Advance  Case  1915). 
Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain  (21  I.  C.  C.  22),  88,  398,  399. 
i^dvances  on  Ground  Iron  Ore  (26  I.  C.  C.  675),  397. 
Aetna  Powder  Co.  v.  W.  R.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  199),  335. 
Alabama  &  N.  0.  Tr.  Co.  v.  Doyle  (210  Fed.  173),  58. 


(31) 


32  Table  of  Oases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Alabama  &   Vicksburg   R.   Co.  v.   Railroad   Com.    of   Miss.    (203    U.    S. 

496,    51    L.   Ed.   289,   27    Sup.   Ct.    163,    86    Miss.    667,    38    So.    356), 

36,  37,  166. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Fowler  (104  Ga.  148,  30  S.  E.  243),  15. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  McFadden  &  Bros.    (232  Fed.   1000,  241  Fed. 

562,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  41,  364. 
Alabama  Packing  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.    (47  I.  C.  C.  524),  209. 
Alan  Wood  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (22  I.  C.  C.  540),  43,  143.  193. 
Alaska  Investigation    (44   I.   C.  C.   680),   85,  343. 
Alaska  Steamship  Co.  v.  International  Longshoremen's  Asso.   (236  Fed. 

964),  384,  517. 
Alaska  Steamship  Co.  v.  United  State   (259  Fed.  713),  204a. 
Albree  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (22  I.  C.  C.  303),  122,  403. 
Aldrich  &  ^tna  Co.   (8  Wall.,  75  U.  S.  491,  19  L.  Ed.  473),  55. 
Alender  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  103),  383. 
Alexander  v.  United  States   (201  U.  S.  117,  50  L.  Ed.  686,  26  Sup.  Ct. 

356,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  945),  486. 
Algert  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  Co.   (20  I.  C.  C.  93),  346.. 
Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Live  Stock  (41  I.  C.  C.  514),  207. 
Alleged  Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meat   (28  I.  C.  C.  332),  408. 
Allen  V.  Louisiana  (103  U.  S.  80,  26  L.  Ed.  318),  480c. 
Allen  V.  Louisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  (1  I.  C.  C.  199,  1  I.  C.  R.  621),  348. 
Allen  V.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.   (98  Fed.  16),  339. 
Allen  V.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.    (230  U.  S.  553,  57  L.  Ed.  1625),  33 

Sup.  Ct.  1030),   45,  84. 
Allen  V.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.   (100  Tex.  825,  101  S.  W.  792),  24. 
Allowances  to  Kanawha,  Glen  &  Eastern   (41  ¥.  C.  C.  53),  343. 
Alpha  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  B.     &  O.  R.  Co.    (22  I.  C.  C.  446),  183. 
Alton  Board  of  Trade  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (28  I.  C.  C.  589),  348. 
American    and    Other    Express    Companies    v.    United    States    (212    U. 

S.  522,  53  L.  Ed.  635,  29  Sup.  Ct.  315),  66,  335,  442. 
American  Asphalt  Asso.  v.  Uintah  Ry.  Co.   (13  I.  C.  C.  196),  339. 
American  Banana  Co.  v.  United  Fruit  Co.    (160  Fed.  184),  492. 
American  Banana  Co.  v.  United  Fruit  Co.    (166  Fed.  261,  92  C.  C.  A. 

325),  486,  492. 
American  Banana  Co.   v.   United  Fruit  Co.    (213   U.   S.  347,  53   L.  Ed. 

826,  29  Sup.  Ct.  511),  486. 
American  Brake,   Shoe  &  Foundry  Co.  v.   Pere  Marquette  R.  Co.    (23 

L  C.  C.  519),  99. 
American  Ex.  Co.  v.  Iowa    (196  U.  S.  133,  49  L.  Ed.  417,  25  Sup.  Ct. 

182),  58. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.        .   38 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

American    Express    Co.    v.    United    States    (212    U.    S.    522,    53    L.    Ed. 
635,  29  Sup.  Ct.  S15),  33,  303. 

American  Ex.   Co.  v.   Miller    (104   Miss.   247,    61   So.   306,   45   L.   R.   A. 
(N.  S.)    120),   58. 

American  Ex.  Co.  v.  South  Dakota    (244  U.  S.  617,  61  L.  Ed.  1352,  37 

Sup.  Ct.  656),  44,  292. 
American  Insulated  Wire  &  Cable  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.    (26 

I.  C.  C.  415),  245,  351. 
American   National    Live    Stock   Asso.   v.   Tex.    &   Pac.   Ry.   Co.    (12    I. 

C.  C.  32),  338. 
American  Paper  &  Pulp  Asso.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (41  I.  C.  C.  506),  337,  358. 
American  Press  Asso.  v.  United  States    (245  Fed.  91),  486. 
American  Round  Bale  Press  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.    (32  I.  C.  C. 

458),   113,  345. 
American  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Union  P.  R.  Co.    (256  Fed.   737, 

—  C.  C.  A.  — ),  12. 
American  Steel  Co.  v.  American  Steel  &  Wire  Co.   (244  Fed.  300),  492. 
American    Sugar    Refining    Co.    v.    Delaware,    L.    &    W.    R.    Co.     (207 

Fed.  733,  125  C.  C.  A.   251),   197,   335,   345,   346,  358,  371,   395,   404. 
American    Sugar    Refining   Co.    v.    Delaware,    L.    &    W.    Ry.    Co.    (200 

Fed.  652),  140,  335,  345,  346,  371,  395,  404. 
American  Tie  and  Timber  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  So.  Ry.  Co.    (175   Fed. 

28),  383. 
Ames  V.  Kirby   (71  N.  J.  L.  446,  59  Atl.  558),  58. 
Ames  V.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (64  Fed.  165),  49,  84. 
Anaconda   Copper   Mining  Co.   v.   Chicago   &   E.   R.    Co.    (19    I.   C.   C. 

592),  195. 
Anadarko   Cotton   Oil   Co.   v.   A.   T.   &   S.   F.   R.   Co.    (20    I.   C.   C.   43), 

207,  383. 
Anderson  v.  Pacific  C.  S.  Co.    (225  U.  S.  187,  56  L.  Ed.  1017,  32  Sup. 

Ct.  526),  56. 
Anderson  Clayton  &  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  340),  140. 
Andrews  Bros.  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (38  I.  C.  C.  165),  346. 
Ann  Arbor  R.  Co.  v.  Fellows  (236  Fed.  387),  47,  60. 
Anson  Gilkey  &  Kurd  Co.  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.  (33  I.  C.  C.  332),  88,  147. 
Anthony  Salt  Co.  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (5  I.  C.  C.  299,  4  1    C.  R.  33),  90. 
Appalachian  Lumber  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (25  I.  C.  C.  193).  117, 

209. 
Application  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  (43  I.  C.  C.  286),  354. 
Application  of  the  Duluth  South  Shore  &  A.  R.  Co.  (34  I.  C  C.  229). 

335. 


34  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

FReferences  are  to  Sections.] 

Application  of  the  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C.  690,  S4  I.  C.  C.  648), 
335,  354. 

Application  of  the  Spokane  P.  &  S.  R.  Co.  (33  I.  C.  C.  462),  335. 

Application  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.   (34  I.  C.  C.  49),  354. 

Application  S.  P.  Co.  Operation  S.  S.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C  692),  203. 

Arkadelphia  Mill  Co.  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  (249  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — , 

39  Sup.  Ct.  237,  P.  U.  R.  1919  C  710),  41. 
Arkansas  Brokerage  Co.  v.  Dunn  (173  Fed.  899),  486. 
Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.    (25  I.  C.  C.  266, 

645),  398,  408. 
Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co.  v.  United  States  (193  Fed.  667),  218. 
Arkansas  Fuel  Co.   v.   C.   M.  &  St.   P.   Ry.  Co.    (16   I.   C   C.   95),  S39, 

364,  383,  392,  394. 
.vrliiigton  Heights  Freight  Ex.  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  88).  207. 
Arlington  Heights   Fruit  Exchange  v.   S.   Pac.   Co.    (20  I.   C.  C.    106), 

222,  398. 
Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Exchange  v.  S.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  149), 

107,  222,  311. 
Armour  &  Co.  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (258  Fed.  185,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  9. 
Armour  &  Co.   v.   Virginia    (246   U.    S.   1,   62   L.   Ed.   547,   38   Sup.   Ct. 

267),   59. 
Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  United  States   (209  U.  S.  56,  52  L.  Ed.  681,  28 

Sup.  Ct.  428),  64,  93. 
Asbell    V.    Kansas    (209    U.    S.    251,    52    L.    Ed.    778,    28    Sup.    485,    26 

L.  R.  A.    (N.   S.)    279,  14   Ann.  Cas.   1101),   58. 
Ashgrove  Cement  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  519),  99. 
Ashland  Fire  Brick  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  115),  345. 
Ashtabula-Port  Maitland  Car-Ferry   Service    (40   I.  C.  C.   143),  354. 
Associated  Jobbers  ot  Los  Angeles  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.    (18  I.  C. 

C.  310),  193,  197. 
Associated  Railways  Classification  Exceptions   (41  I.  C.  C.  561),  161. 
Association   of   Union   Made   Garment   Mfgr's   of   America   v.   Chicago 

&  N.  W.  R.  Co.   (16  L  C.  C.  405),  88,  89,  90,  91. 
Astoria  v.  S.  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.   (38  I.  C.  C.  16),  134. 
Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.   v.    Denver  &  N.   0.   R.   Co.    (110   U.    S. 

667,  28  L.  Ed.  291,  4  Sup.  Ct.  185),  148,  327. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Goetz   (51  111.  App.  151),  178. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harold   (241  U.  S.  371,  60  L.  Ed.  1050, 

36  Sup.  Ct.  665),  41. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Holmes  (18  Okla.  92,  90  Pac.  22),  ISO, 

213. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  35 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.    (188  Fed.  229).  193, 

197,  315. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (190  Fed.  591),  101,  311, 

312. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Robinson   (223  U.  S.  173,  58  L.  Ed.  90, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  556,  36  Okla.  435,  129  Pac.  20),  34. 

Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Spiller  (246  Fed.  1,  158  C.  C.  A.  227), 

129,  207,  211,  256,  317,  318,  383,  406. 
Atchison,  T.   &  S.   F.   R.   Co.  v.   State    (23   Ok.   210,   231,   100    Pac.    11, 

16),  9. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States   (191  Fed.  856),  63,  107, 

154,  202,  343,  346,  348. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States    (203  Fed.  56),  87.  222, 

311,  443. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.   Co.  v.   United   States    (231  U.   S.   736,   58  L. 

Ed.  460,  34  Sup.  Ct.  316),  87. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (170  Fed.  250,  95  C.  C.  A. 

446),  371. 
Atchison,   T.   &    S.   F.   R.   Co.   v.   United    States    (178    Fed.    12,    101    C. 

C.  A.  140),  481. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (204  Fed.  647),  398. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.   F.   R.   Co.  v.   United   States    (232   U.    S.    199,   58   L. 

Ed.  568,  34  Sup.  Ct.  291),  143,  222,  313,  315,  398. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Vosberg   (238  U.  S.  56,  59  L.  Ed.  1199, 

35  Sup.  Ct.  675),  407. 

Athanasaw  v.  United  States   (227  U.  S.  326,  57  L.  Ed.  528,  33  Sup.  Ct. 

285,  Ann.  Cas.  1913E,  911),  2. 
Atkins    V.   Fiber    Disintegrating   Co.    (18    Wall.,    85    U.    S.    272,    21    L. 

Ed.  841),  307. 
Atkinson  v.  Southern  Ex.  Co.  (94  S.  C.  444,  78  S.  E.  516,  48  L.  R.  A.  (N. 

S.)  349),  58. 
Atlantic  &  Pacific  Tea  Co.  v.  Cream  of  Wheat  Co.    (224  Fed.  566,  227 

Fed.  46),  496. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Florida  (203  U.  S.  256,  51  L.  Ed.  174,  27  Sup. 

Ct.  108),  48. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Glenn    (239  U.  S.  388,  60  L.  Ed.  344,  36  Sup. 

Ct.  154),  34. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Goldsboro  (155  N.  C.  356,  71  S.  E.  514),  15. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Goldsboro    (232  U.  S.  548,   58  L.   Ed.   721,  34 

Sup.  Ct.  364),  15. 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson   (131  Ga.  75,  61  S.  E.  1111), 

295. 


36  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.  (194  Fed.  449),  222,  443. 
Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.   Co.  v.  Macon   Grocery   Co.    (166   Fed.   206,   92 

C.  C.  A.  114),  304,  383,  443. 
Atlantic   Coast   Line   R.   Co.   v.    Mazursky    (216    U.    S.    122,    54   L.   Ed. 

411,  30  Sup.  Ct.  378,  78  S.  C.  36,  58  S.   E.  927,  125  Am.  St.  Rep. 

762),  35. 
Atlantic   Coast   Line   R.   Co.   v.    North    Carolina   Corporation    Commis- 
sion   (206   U.   S.   1,  51  L.   Ed.   933,   27   Sup.   Ct.   585,   11   Ann.  Cas. 
398),  12,  19,  45,  47,  49,  86,  87,  124,  311,  316,  396. 
Atlantic   C.   L.   R.    Co.   v.    Riverside   Mills    Co.    (219    U.    S.    186,    55    L. 

Ed.  167,  31  Sup.  Ct.  164,  31  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   7),  12,  439. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.   Co.   v.   State    (42   Fla.   358,  29    So.   319,   89   Am.    St. 

Rep.  233),  13. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  State  of  Ga.   (234  U.  S.  280,  58  L.  Ed.  312,  34 

Sup.  Ct.  829),  15,  22,  31. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.   v.   Wharton    (207   U.   S.   328,  52   L.   Ed.   230,   28 

Sup.  Ct.  121),  19,  21. 
Atlantic  S.  R.  &  G.  Co.  v.  State    (135  Ga.  545,  69  S.  E.  725,  32  L.  R. 

A.  (N.  S.)  20),  31. 
Attorney-General    (Mass.)    v.   Eastern   R.   Co.    (137   Mass.   45),   9. 
Attorney-General  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.   (29  L.  J.  Ch.   (N.  S.)   794), 

172. 
/Vttorney-General   v.   Old   Colony   R.   Co.    (160   Mass.   62,   35   N.   E.   252, 

22   L.   R.   A.    112),   38. 
Audley  Hill  &  Co.  v.  S.  R.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  225),  105. 
Augusta  &  Sav.   S.   S.  Co.  v.   O.   S.   S.   Co.    (26   I.  C.  C.   380),   65,   121, 

151,  194,  195,  375,  392. 
Augusta  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Wrightsville  &  T.  R.  Co.    (74   Fed.   522), 

108,    335,   345,   346,   347. 
Aurora,  The  (7  Cranch.  11  U.  S.  382,  3  L.  Ed.  378),  54. 
Austin  V.  Tennessee  (179  U.  S.  343,  45  L.  Ed.  224,  21  Sup.  132),  58. 

B. 

Babbitt  v.  G.  T.  W.  R.  Co.  (285  111.  267,  120  N.  E.  803),  440. 

Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.    (13  I.  C.  C.  329),  214, 

317,  383,  392. 
Baer  Bros.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  M.  P.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  225),  317,  383,  407. 
Baer  Bros.  v.  D.   &  R.  G.  R.  Co.    (233   U.   S.   479,  58  L.   Ed.  1055,  34 

Sup.  Ct.  641),  207,  215,  314,  317,  383,  407. 
Bailey  v.  W.  U.  Tel  Co.  (171  S.  W.  839),  340. 
Baker  v.  State  (54  Wis.  368,  12  N.  W.  12),  45. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  37 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Baker  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  605),  213. 
Baker-Whitely   Coal   Co.   v.   B.   &   O.   R.   Co.    (188   Fed.   405.   110   C.   C. 

A.  234,  176  Fed.  632),  327,  486. 
Balfour,  Guthrie  &  Co.  v.  0.  W.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  539),  140,  404. 
Ball,  The  Daniel   (10  Wall,  77  U.  S.  557,  19  L.  Ed.  999).     See  Daniel 

Ball. 
Baltic  Mining  Co.  v.  Mass    (231   U.   S.  68,   58  L.  Ed.  127,  34   Sup.  Ct. 

15,  207  Mass.  381,  93  N.  E.  831,  Ann.  Cas  19i3C  805),  59. 
Baltimore  &  C.  S.  S.  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (49  I.  C.  C.  176),  118,  121, 

151,  194,  249,  375,  376. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamburger  (155  Fed.  849),  358. 
Baltimore  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.   Com.   Com.    (145   U.   S.  263,   36  L.   Ed. 

699,  12  Sup.  Ct.  844),  38. 
Baltimore  &  0.   R.   Co.   v.   Int.   Com.   Com.    (221   U.   S.   612,   55  L.   Ed. 

878,  31  Sup.  Ct.  621),  3,  310,  311,  432. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Leach  (249  U.  S.  217,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct. 

— ),  440. 
Baltimore  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States    (200  Fed.  779),  140,  197,  312, 

335,   343,    404. 
Baltimore   &   O.    R.   Co.    v.   United    States    (215    U.    S.    481,    54    L.    Ed. 

292,  30  Sup.  Ct.  164),  145,  174,  198,  208,  296,  445. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (220   U.  S.  94,  55  L.  Ed.  384, 

31  Sup.  368),  483. 
Baltimore   &  O.    S.   W.   R.   Co.   v.   United    States    (195   Fed.    962),   191. 

222. 
Baltimore   Butchers  Abattoir  &  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  P.   B.  &  W.   R.  Co. 

(20  I.  C.  C.   124),  101,   104,  249. 
Baltimore  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (45  I.  C   C.  40),  340. 
Bancroft,   Whitney   &   Co.   v.   C.   N.    O.   &   T.    P.    R.   Co.    (24    I.    C.    C. 

557),  88. 
Bank  of  Hamilton  v.  Dudley  (2  Pet.  492,  7  L.  Ed.  496),  480c. 
Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C.  398),  226, 

266,  416. 
Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  31),  346. 
Bannon  v.  So.  Ex.  Co.  (13  I.  C  C.  516),  383 
Baran  v.  Goodyear  Tire  Co.   (256  Fed.  570),  486,  487. 
Barber  Asphalt  Co.  v.  Morris    (1^2  Fed.  945,  66  C.  C.  A.  55,  67  L.  R 

A.  761),  60. 
Barden  &  S.  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  193),  434. 
Barnes  Co.  v.  Berry  (156  Fed.  72),  487. 
Barnett  v.  Spokane,  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.   (210  Fed.  94),  332. 


38  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Barrett  v.  City  of  New  York   (183  Fe^.  793.  189  Fed.  aC8),  25,  6G. 
Barrett  v.   City  of   New  York    (232   U.   S.   14,   58   L.   Ed.   483,   34    Sup. 

Ct.  203),  4,  25,  337. 
Barrett  v.  Gimbel  Bros.  (226  Fed.  623,  141  C.  C.  A.  379),  297. 
Bascom  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  354),  118,  346. 
Bates  V.   C.   M.  &   St.   P.   R.   Co.    (60   Wis.   296,    19   N.   W.   72,  50   Am. 

St.  Rep.  369),  42. 
Bates  V.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (4  I.  C.  C.  281,  3  I.  C.  R.  296),  416. 
Bauer  &  Cie  v.   O'Donnell    (229   U.   S.  1,   57   L.   Ed.   1041,  33  Sup.   Ct. 

616),  486. 
Baxendale  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co.  (4  C.  B.  N.  S.  63),  133. 
Baxendale  v.  L.  &  S.  W.  Ry.    (4  H.  &  C.  130,  35  L.  J.  Ex.  108,  L.  H. 

1  Ex.  137,  12  Jur.   (N.  S.)   274,  14  L.  T.  26,  14  W.  R.  458),  157. 
Baxter  &  Co.  v.  Georgia  S.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  647),  119. 
Bay  State  Milling  Co.  v.  Transit  Corp.  (43  I.  C.  C.  338),  399. 
Beach-Nut  Packing  Co.  v.  Federal  Trade  Commission  ( —  Fed.  — ),  329. 
Beardsley  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (162  N.  Y.  230,  56  N.  E.  488),  38. 
Becker  v.  P.  M.  R.  Co.  (28  I.  C.  C.  645),  208. 

Beebe  &  Runyan  Furn.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (41  I.  C.  C.  464),  348. 
Beekman   Lumber   Co.   v.    St.    Louis,    I.   M.   &    S.   R.   Co.    (15    I.    C.   C. 

274),  218. 
Behlmer  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (71  Fed.  835),  335,  347. 
Behlmer  v.  Louisville  &  N.   R.  Co.    (83  Fed.   898,  28  C.  C.  A.  229,  42 

U.  S.  App.  581),  335,  348. 
Behlmer  v.  Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  257,  4  I.  C.  R.  520),  335,  347. 
Belfast,  The  (7  Wall,  74  U.  S.  624,  19  L.  Ed.  266),  55,  56. 
Bein  V.  United  States  (259  Fed.  822,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  486. 
Bell  Co.  V.  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (9  I.  C.  C.  632),  345. 
Bement   v.   National   Harrow    Co.    (186    U.    S.    70,    46   L.    Ed.    1058,   22 

Sup.  Ct.  747,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  109,  486. 
Bennett  v.  United   States    (227  U.   S.   333,   57  L.   Ed.   531,  33   Sup.   Ct. 

288),  2. 
Benson,  Ex  parte  (18  S.  C.  38),  133. 
Bernheim  v.  O.  R.  &  N.  Co.  (25  I.  C.  C.  156),  88. 
Berwind-White  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.   (235  U.  S.  371, 

59  L.  Ed.  275,  35   Sup.  Ct.   131),  356. 
Best  V.  Gt.  N.  R.  Co.  (33  I.  C.  C.  1),  383,  404. 

Best  V.  Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.    (72  S.  C.  479,  52  S.  E.  223),  35. 
Bigbee  &  Warrior  River  Packet  Co.  v.   Mobile  &  O.   R.   Co.    (60   Fed. 

545),  345,  346. 
Bigelow  V.  Calumet  &  Hecla  Mining  Co.   (155  Fed.  869),  489. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  39 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Bigelow  V.  Calumet  &  Hecla  Mining  Co.    (167  Fed.  704),  486,  489. 
Bigelow  V.   Calumet  &  Hecla  Mining  Co.    (167   Fed.   721,    94   C.  C.   A. 

13),  486,  489. 
Bills  of  Lading  (14  I.  C.  C.  346),  252. 
Bills  of  Lading  (29  L  C.  C.  417),  26,  252. 
Bills  of  Lading  (52  I.  C.  C.  671),  25,  34a,  204a,  440a. 
Binney  v.  Cumberland-Ely  Coffee  Co.   (183  Fed.  650),  486. 
Birmingham    Packing    Co.    v.    Texas    &    P.    Ry.    Co.    (12    I.    C.    C     29, 

500),  338. 
Birmingham  Water  Works  v.  Birmingham    (211  Fed.  497),  453. 
Bishop  V.  American   Preservers'   Co.    (51   Fed.   272,   1   Fed.   Anti-Trust 

Dec.  49),  492. 
Bishop  V.  American  Preservers'  Co.  (105  Fed.  845),  492. 
Bitterman  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.    (207   U.   S.   205.  52   L.   Ed.   171,   28   Sup. 

Ct.  91),  37. 
Bituminous  Coal  to  C.  F.  A.  Territory   (46  L  C.  C.  66),  88. 
Bitzer  v.  W.  V.  R.  Co.    (24  I.  C.  C.  255),  185. 

Black  Horse  Tobacco  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.    (17   L  C.  C.  588),   195,  214. 
Black  Mt.  Coal  Land  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  286),  345,  346. 
Blackwell   Milling  &   Elevator  Co.   v.   Mo.   K.   &  T.  Ry.   Co.    (12   I    C. 

C.  23),  245,  346. 
Blakely  S.  R.  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (26  I.  C.  C.  344),  344. 
Blindell  &  Hagan    (54  Fed.   40,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.   106),  489. 
Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.   (18  1.  C.  C.  430),  218,  406,  408. 
Block  V.  Standard  Distilling  &  D.  Co.   (95  Fed.  978,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust 

Dec.  993),  492. 
Blount  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Yale  &  Towne  Mfg.  Co.   (106  Fed.  555),  486. 
Bluefield  Shippers'  Ass'n  v.  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  519),  244. 
Bluetields  S.  S.  Co.  v.  United  Fruit  Co.   (243  Fed.  1,  155  C.  C.  A.  531;, 

492. 
Blume  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  53),  205,  209,  383,  406. 
Board  of  Bristol,  Tenn.  v.  Virginia  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (15  I.  C.  C.  453;, 

93,  486. 
Board   of  Trade   of   Carrollton   v.   Central   of   Ga.   Ry.    Co.    (28   I.   C. 

C.  154),  102,  108,  183,  346. 
Board   of   Trade   of   Chattanooga  v.    East   Tenn.,   Va.    &   Ga.   Ry.    Co. 

(5   L   C.   C.   546,   2   I.   C.   R.   798,   3   L   C.   R.   106,   4    I.   C.   R.   213), 

339,  348.  V 

Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.   Chicago   &  A.   R.   Co.    (4   L   C.  C.    158, 

3   I.  C.  R.   233),   147,  346. 
Board   of    Trade   of   Chicago    v.    A.    T.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    (29    I.    C.    C. 

438,    253. 


40  Table  of  Cases  Cited, 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.    (27   I.  C.  C.   530),  146, 

339,  345,  346. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  Christie   Grain  &   Stock  Co.    (121  Fed. 

608.  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  233),  486. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  v.  Christie  Grain  Co.    (198  U.   S.  236,   49 

L.  Ed.  1031,  25  Sup.  Ct.  637,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  717),  486. 
Board    of    Trade   of    Dawson    v.    Central    of    Ga.    Ry.    Co.    (8    1.    C.    C. 

142),  108. 

Board    of    Trade    of    Hampton    v.    Nashville,    C.    &    St.    L.    R.    Co.    (8 

I.  C.  C.  503),  108,  339,  346,  348. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Kansas  City  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C. 

297),  118. 
Board    of   Trade    of   Lynchburg   v.   Old    Dominion    S.    S.    Co.    (6    L    C. 

C.  6a2),  348,  383. 
Board  of  Trade  of  New  York  v.   Penn.   R.   Co.    (4   L   C.   C.   447,   2   L 

C.  R.  660,  734,  755,  800,  3  L  C.  R.  417),  339,  345,  358. 
Board  of  Trade  of  Troy  v.  Alabama  M.  R.  Co.    (6  I.  C.  C.  1,  4   I.  C. 

R.  348),   339,  348. 
Boards   of   Trade   Union   v.    Chicago,    etc.,    R.    Co.    (1    I.    C.    C.    215,    1 

I.   C.   R.   608),   346. 
Bobbs-Merrill    Co.    v.    Straus    (139    Fed.    155,    2    Fed.    Anti-Trust    Dec. 

755),  486. 
Bobbs-Merrill   Co.   v.   Straus    (147   Fed.    15,  77   C.   C.  A.    607,   15   L.   R. 

A.  766),  486. 
Bobbs-Merrill   Co.  v.   Straus    (210  U.   S.   339,   52   L.    Ed.   1086,   28    Sup. 

Ct.   722),   486. 
Bonney  v.  Cumberland-Ely  Coffee  Co.   (183  Fed.  650),  486. 
Bonvillian  v.  American  Sugar  Refining  Co.  (250  Fed.  641),  492. 
Booth  &  Co.  V.  Davis   (127  Fed.  875,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  318),  486. 
Boston   &   A.  R.   Co.  v.   Boston  &   L.   R.   Co.    (1    I.   C.   C.   158,    1    I.   C. 

R.  500,  571),  153,  199,  348,  392. 
Boston  &  Maine  Boat  Lines   (40  L  C.  C.  565),  3-54. 
Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Hooker  233  U.  S.   97,  58  L.|    Ed.   868,  34   Sup. 

Ct.  526),  34,  358,  439. 
Boston  &  Maine  R.  Co.  v.  Piper  (246  U.  S.  439,  62  L.  Ed.  820,  38  Sup. 

Ct.  354),  358,  440. 
Boston   Chamber  of  Commerce  v.   Lake    Shore   &   M.    S.   R.   Co.    (1    I. 

C.  C.  436,  1  I.  C.  R.  754),  3. 
Boston  Fruit  &   Produce  Exchange  v.    New   York  &  N.   E.   R.   Co.    (5 

I.  C.  C.  1.  3  I.  C.  R.  604),  335,  339. 
Boston  Fruit  &  Produce  Exchange  v.   New   York  &   N.   E.   R.   Co.    (4 

L  C.C.  664,   3   I.  C.  R.   493),   335,   339. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  41 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Boston  (Ga.)   v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (24  I.  C.  C.  50),  108,  346,  348. 
Boston  Store  v.  American  Graphophone  Co.  (246  U.  S.  8,  62  L.  Ed.  551, 

38  Sup.   Ct.  258),  486,  497. 
Bowling    Green    Bus.    Men's    Asso.    v.    L.    &    N.    R.    Co.    (24    I.    C.    C. 

228),  244,  348. 
Bowling  Green  Bus.  Men's  Asso.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (31  I.  C.  C.  1),  194. 
Bowling    Green    Bus.    Men's    Asso.    v.    L.    &    N.    R.    Co.    (31    I.    C.    C. 

301),  375. 
Bowman   v.   Ciiicago  &   N.   W.   R.   Co.    (125    U.   S.   465,   31   L.  Ed.   700, 

8  Sup.  Ct.  689),  58. 
Boyle  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (222  Fed.  539,  P.  U.  R.  1916A  49),  47. 
Boyle  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (222  Fed.  539),  4,  49. 
Boyle  V.  United  States   (259  Fed.  803,  —  CCA.—),  486. 
Bracey  v.  Darst  (218  Fed.  482),  58. 
Brady  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (4  I.  C  R.  283),  416. 
Brady  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (2  I.  C  C  131,  2  I.  C  R.  78),  339. 
Brass   v.    North    Dakota   ex   rel.    Stoesser    (153   U.    S.    391,    38    L.    Ed. 

757,  4  I.  C  R.  670,  14  Sup.  Ct.  857),  45. 
Breechbill  v.  Randall   (102  Ind.  528,  52  Am.  Rep.  695,  1  N.  E.  362),  45. 
Brenner  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  Co.   (34  I.  C  C  630),  383. 
Brewer  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.   (84  Fed.  258),  153,  199,  346,  348. 
Brick  from  New  Hampshire   (42   I.  C  C.  231),  207. 
Brig  Aurora,  The   (7  Cranch.  11  U.  S.  382,  3  L.  Ed.  378),  54. 
Brodnax  v.  Missouri  (219  U.  S.  285,  55  L.  Ed.  219,  31  Sup.  Ct.  238),  57. 
Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co.  v.  Straus   (245  Fed.  132),  45. 
Brook-Rauch    Mill   &   Elevator   Co.   v.    M.   &    P.    Ry.    Co.    (17    I.    C    C 

158),   139,  346. 
Brook-Rauch    Mill    &   Elevator   Co.    v.    St.    L.    &    I.    M.    Ry.    Co.    (21    1. 

C  C.  651),  337,  400. 
Brooks  Coal  Co.  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.   (39  I.  C  C.  426),  208. 
Brown  &  Sons  Lumber  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (37  I.  C  C  507),  204,  360. 
Brown  Drug  Co.  v.  United  States    (235  Fed.  603),  319. 
Brown  v.  Clayton  (12  Ga.  564),  55. 

Brown  v.  Denver  Omnibus  &  Cab  Co.   (254  Fed.  560),  486. 
Brown  v.  Walker  (161  U.  S.  591,  40  L.  Ed.  918,  16  Sup.  Ct.  644),  299. 
Bruner  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.   (40  I.  C  C.  549),  400. 
Bryant  Lumber  Co.  v.   Fourche  River  Lumber  Co.    (97  Ark.   623,  135 

S.  W.  796),  371. 
Brymer  v.  Butler  Water  Co.  (179  Pa.  St.  331,  36  Atl.  249),  46.  (Book  2). 
Buchanan  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.    (5  I.  C  C  7,  3  I.  C.  R.  655),  8?, 


42  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Buckeye   Buggy   Co.   v.   Cleveland,   etc.,   R.   Co.    (9    I.   C.   C.   620),   331), 

345,  385. 
xiuckeye  Powder  Co.  v.  Dupont  De  Nemours  Powder  Co.  (248  U.  S.  55,  63 

L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  38),  492,  499. 
Buckeye   Powder   Co.   v.    Du    Pont    Nemours    (196    Fed.    514,    223    Fed. 

887),  492,  499. 
Buck  Stove  Co.  v.  Vickers    (226  U.   S.  205,  57  L.  Ed.   189,  33   Sup.  Ct. 

41),  8. 
Budd  v.  New  York    (143   U.   S.   517,  36   L.  Ed.   247,  4   I.   C.  R.   45,   12 

Sup.  Ct.   468),  43,  45. 
Buffalo  R.  &  P.  R.  Co.  Operation  Car  Ferry  (34  I.  C.  C.  52),  354. 
Buffalo  R.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  ?.  R.  Co.   (29  I.  C.  C.  114),  347. 
Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co.  v  .L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.   (44  I.  C.  C.  267), 

208. 
Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  620), 

149,  346. 
Bulah  Coal  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.   (20  I.  C.  C.  52),  175,  208. 
Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  351),  91,  99. 
Burdick  v.   People    (149    111.    600,   36   N.   E.   948,   24   L.   R.   A.    152,   41 

Am.  St.  Rep.  329),  37. 
Buren  v.  S.  P.  Co.   (26  I.  C.  C.  332),  358. 
Burgess    v.    Transcontinental    Freight    Bureau    (13    I.    C.    C.    668),    96, 

212,  346,  383. 
Burleson  v.  Dempey  (250  U.  S.  191,  63  L.  Ed.  929,  39  Sup.  Ct.  511),  335. 
Burlington,  C.  R.  &  N.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Northwestern   Fuel   Co.    (31   Fed. 

652),  156,  345. 
Burnham-Hanna-Munger    Dry   Goods   Co.   v.    Chicago   R.    &   P.   R.   Co. 

(14  I.  C.  C.  299),  109,  117,  207,  222,  339. 
Burnett  v.  Spokane,  P.  &  S.  Co.  (210  Fed.  94),  332. 
Burritt  Co.  v.  C.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (45  I.  C.  C.  195),  169. 
Burrows  v.  Interborough  Met.  Co.   (156  Fed.  389),  487. 
Burson  Knitting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  G.  R.  Co.   (42  I.  C.  C.  739),  253. 
Burton  Stock  Car  Co.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (1  I.  C.  C.  132,  1  I. 

C.  R.  329),  337,  345,  347. 
Business  Men's  Asso.   v.   Chicago  &   X.   W.  Ry.   Co.    (2   I.   C.   C.   73,   2 

I.  C.  R.  48),  99,  110. 
Business    Men's   Asso.   v.   Chicago,   St.    P.,   M.   &   O.    R.    Co.    (2    I.   C. 

C.  52,  2  I.  C.  R.  41),  99,  105,  138,  339,  345. 
Business  Men's  League  of  St.   Louis  v.  Atchison,   T.  &   S.   F.  Ry.  Co. 

(9  I.  C.  C.  318j,  95,   114,   156,  339,  346,  348. 
Business  Men's  League,  St.  Louis,  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (41  I.  C.  C. 

13,  503,  44  I.  C.  C.  308,  49  I.  C.  C.  713),  44. 
Butchers'   etc..   Stock   Yards   Co.   v.   Louisville    &   N.   R.    Co.    (67    Fed. 

35,  14  C.  C.  A.  290),  197,  346. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  4.3 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Butfield  V.  Stranahan  (192  U.  S.  470,  48  L.  Ed.  525,  24  Sup.  Ct.  349),  54. 
B.  V.  D.  Co.  V.  Isaac  (257  Fed.  709),  486. 

C. 

Cadillac  Lumber  Ex.  v.  A.  A.  R.  Co.    (43  I.  C.  C.  636),  181. 

Cairo  Board  of  Trade  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.    (46  I.  C.  C.  S43), 

163,  254. 
Caldwell  Co.  v.  C.  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.   (20  I.  C.  C.  412),  90. 
Caldwell  v.  Sioux  Falls  Stock  Yards   (242  U.  S.  559,  61  L.  Ed.  493,  37 

Sup.  Ct.  224),  58. 
ralhoun  v.  Seattle  (215  Fed.  226),  453. 
California  Com.  Asso.  v.  Wells-  Fargo  Ex.  Co.    (14  I.  C.  C.  422),   156, 

157,  345,  383. 
California  Com.  Asso.  v.  Wells-Fargo  Ex.  Co.   (16  I.  C.  C.  458),  383. 
California  Com.  Asso.  v.  Wells-Fargo  Ex.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  300),  345. 
California  Corrugated  Culvert  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  Ry.  Co.   (38  I.  C.  C.  568), 

208. 
California  Pole  &  Piling  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.   (27  I.  C.  C.  670),  146. 
Calloway  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (7  I.  C.  C.  431),  346,  348. 
Camden    Iron    Works   v.   United    States    (158    Fed.    561,    85    C    C.    A. 

585),  371. 
Caminetti  v.  United  States  (242  U.  S.  470,  61  L.  Ed.  442,  37  Sup.  192),  2. 
Camors-McConnell  Co.  v.  McConnell   (140  Fed.  412,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust 

Dec.  817),  486. 
Campbell  v.  Northern  R.  W.  Co.  (26  Gr.  522),  352. 

Campbell's  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.  (29  I.  C.  C.  682),  338,  343. 
Canada  Atlantic   Transp.   Co.   v.   Chicago    (210   Fed.   7,   126   C.    C.   A. 

587),  55. 
Canada    S.    Ry.    Co.   v.    International    Bridge    Co.    (8    App.    Cas.    731), 

126. 
Cannon  v.  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  Co.    (11  I.  C.  C.  537),  110,  339,  345,  346. 
Cannon  Falls  Elevator  Co.  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (10  I.  C.  C.  650),  164, 

345,  346. 
Cape  Girardeau  Commercial  Club  v.  111.  C.  R.  Co.  (51  I.  C.  C.  105),  101. 
Capeheart  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.    (4   I.  C.  C.  265,  3  I.  C.  R.  278), 

335,  338,   347. 
Capital  City  Gas  Co.  v.  Central  V.  R.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  104),  139,  345. 
Capital  City  Oil  Co.  v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C    141),  99a. 
Cardiff  Coal   Co.  v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St.   P.   Ry.  Co.    (13   I.   C.   C.   460), 

145,  195,  338,  347. 
Cardwell  v.  Am.  Bridge  Co.   (113  U.  S.  205,  28  L.  Ed.  959,  5  Sup.  Ct. 

423),  54. 


44  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Carey  .Mfg.  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (3.6  I.  C.  C.  203),  65. 

Carey  v.  So.  Dak.  (250  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  58. 

Car  Ferry  Allowance   (32  I.  C.  C.  578),  171,  193. 

Carl  V.  K.  C.  S.  R.  Co.    (91  Ark.  97,  121  S.  W.  932,   134  Am.   St.   56), 

439. 
Carlisle  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (168  Mo.  656,  68  S.  W.  898),  405. 
Carlowitz  v.  C.  P.  R.  Co.  (46  I.  C.  C.  290),  65. 
Carnegie  Board  of  Trade  v.  ?.  R.  Co.   (28  I.  C.  C.  122),  442. 
Carolina  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  R.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  533),  213. 
Car   Peddling  Case    (45   I.   C.   C.   494),   337. 
Carr  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.   (9  I.  C.  C.  1),  116,  345,  358. 
Carstens  Packing  Co.  v.  O.   S.  L.   R.  Co.    (17   I.   C.   C.   125,   324),   159, 

205,  206,   348. 
Carter  v.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.   (143  Fed.  99,  74  C.  C.  A,  293), 

218,  383. 
Carter-Crume  Co.  v.   Peurrung   (86   Fed.   439,   30  C.   C.   A.   174,  1  Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  844),  486. 
Carter-White  Lead  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  41),  89. 
Car  Spotting  Charges  (34  I.  C.  C.  609),  140,  143,  193. 
Gary  v.  Eureka  Springs  Ry.  Co.   (7  I.  C.  C.  286),  335,  345,  395. 
Casket  Mfgrs.  Asso.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.   (49  I.  C.  C.  327),  81. 
Cassatt  V.  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  (150  Fed.  32,  10  L.  R.  A.,  N.  S.,  99, 

81  C.  C.  A.  80),  335. 
Cator  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  113,  4  I.  C.  R.  397),  345. 
Cattle  Raisers'  Asso.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (10  L  C.  C.  83),  218, 

383,  392,  406,  408,  416. 
Cattle  Raisers'  Asso.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.    (11  L  C.  C.  277),  9, 

80,  129,  197,  383. 
Cattle  Raisers'  Asso.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.    (12   I.  C.  C.   6),  80. 

263,  392,  416. 
Cattle  Raisers'  Asso.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.  507),  80, 

392,  416. 
Cattel   Raisers'    Asso.   v.    Ft.    Worth   &   D.   R.   Co.    (7    I.   C.   C.   555a), 

335,  337,  345,  346,  416. 
Cattle   Raisers'   Asso.   of  Texas  v.   Fort   Worth   &   D.   C.   R.   Co.    (7   L 

C.  C.  513),  335,  345,  346. 
Cattle  Raisers'   Asso.   of  Texas   v.   Galveston,   H.   &   S.   A.   R.   Co.    (12 

L  C.  C.  20),  338. 
Cattle  Raisers'  Asso.  v.  Missouri,  Kansas  &  Tex.  R.  Co.    (11   I.  C.  C. 

296,  13  I.  C.  C.  418),  339,  383,  486. 
Cattle  Raisers'   Asso.   v.   Missouri,   Kan.   &   Tex.  Ry.   Co.    (12    L   C.   C. 

1),  392,  395,  416. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  45 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Cavanaugh  Bros.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (75  N.  H.  243,  72  Atl.  694),  42. 
Cedar  Hill  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Colorado  &  Southern  R.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C. 

C.  606,  16  I.  C.  C.  387,  179  C.  C.  A.  479),  49,  195,  383. 
Cedar   Hill   Coal   &   Coke   Co.   v.   Colorado   &    Southern   R.    Co.    (17    T. 

C.  C.  479),  195. 
Cedar    Rapids    Gas.    Co.   v.    Cedar   Rapids    (223    U.    S.   655,    56    L.    Ed. 

594,  32  Sup.  Ct.  389),  47. 
Cement  Rates  from  Mason  City  (30  I.  C.  C.  426),  121,  401. 
Central  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Hartman    (111  Fed.  96,  49  C.  C.  A.  244,  2 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  94),  492. 
Central  Com.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  114),  395. 
Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Augusta   Brokerage  Co.    (122  Ga.   046,   50   S. 

E.  473,  69  L.  R.  A.  119),  37,  3-8. 
Cent,  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Blount  (238  Fed.  292),  345. 

Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  Mills  Co.  (128  Ga.  841,  58  S.  E.  197),  295. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Evans   (133  Ga.  639,  66  S.  E.  788),  42. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McLendon,  et  al.  (157  Fed.  961),  50,  60. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Murphey   (116  Ga.  863,  43  S.  E.  265,  60  L.  R. 

A.  817),  32. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Murphey    (196   U.  S.   194,  49  L.  Ed.  444,  25 

Sup.  Ct.  218),  32. 
Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ala.   (209  Fed.  75),  43,  45. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ga.  (215  Fed.  421),  45. 
Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State   (104  Ga.  831,  31  S.  E.  531).  9. 
Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  Yesbik  (146  Ga.  769),  34a,  295,  440. 
Central  of  N.  J.  R.  Co.  v.  Hite  (166  Fed.  976),  297. 
Central  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Gallatin   (99  U.  S.  9  Otto  727,  25  L.  Ed.  504),  3. 
Central  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.  v.  United  States  (229  Fed.  501,  143  C.  C.  A.  569), 

371,  404. 
Central  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (112  Fed.  823),  383, 

406. 
Central    Stock    Yards    Co.    v.    Louisville    &   N.    R.    Co.    (118    Fed.    113, 

55  C.  C.  A.  63,  63  L.  R.  A.  213),  12,  14,  197,  347,  406. 
Central    Stock    Yards   Co.   v.   Louisville   &   N.   R.   Co.    (192   U.    S.    568, 

48  L.  Ed.  565,   24   Sup.  Ct.  339),  14,  17,  197,  304,   347. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  P.,  etc.,  R.  Co.    (101  N.  Y.   Supp    837,   114   A  pp. 

Div.  907),  343,  492. 
Central  Vermont  Boat  Lines   (40  I.  C.  C.  589),  354. 
Central  Yellow  Pine  Asso.  v.  Hlinois  Cent.  R.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  505),  85, 

90,  92,  100,  102,  207,  339,  345,  346,  395,  486. 
Central  Yellow   Pine  Asso.  v.  Vicksburg,   S.  &  P.  R.  Co.    (10   I.  C.  C. 
193),  163,  170,  345,  358. 


46  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Ashburn  v.  G.  S.  &  F.  R.  Co.    (23  I.  C.  C. 

140),  145. 
Chamber   of   Commerce    of    Chattanooga    v.    Southern    Ry.    Co.    (10    I. 

C.  C.  Ill),  348. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  Johnson  City  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.  (4G  I.  C.  C.  527),  99, 

346. 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Milwaukee  v.   Chicago,   M.   &   St.  P.  R.  Co. 

(7  I.  C.  C.  481),  34G. 
Chamber  of  Commerce   of  Milwaukee  v.   Flint  &  P.   M.   R.  Co.    (2   1. 

C.  C.  553,  1  I.  C.  R.  774,  792,  2  I.  C.  R.  393),  345. 
Chamber   of   Commerce   of  Newport   News   v.    S.    R.   Co.    (23    I.   C.   C. 

345),  95,  222. 
Chamber   of  Commerce   of  New   York   v.   N.   Y.   C.   &   H.   R.   Co.    (24 

1.  C.  C.  55),  401. 

Champion  v.  Ames    (188   U.   S.  321,   47  L.   Ed.   492,   23   Sup.   Ct.   321). 

2,  58. 

Chappell    V.    United    States    (160    U.    S.    499,    40    L.    Ed.    510,    16    Sup. 

Ct.  397),  7. 
Charleston  &  Norfolk  Steamship  Co.  Case  (40  I.  C.  C.  382,  47  I.  C.  C. 

365). 
Charleston  &  W.   S.  C.   R.  Co.  v.  Varnville   Furniture  Co.    (237    U.   S. 

597,  59  L.  Ed.  1137,  35  Sup.  Ct.  715,  98  S.  C.  63,  79  S.  E.  700),  34,  35. 
Chattanooga  Packet  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (33  I.  C.  C.  384),  375. 
Cheese  Dealers  Asso.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (40  I.  C.  C.  1),  80a. 
Cheney  Bros.  Co.  v.  Massachusetts  (246  U.  S.  147,  62  L.  Ed.  632,  38  Sup. 

Ct.  295),  59. 
Cherokee  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (27  I.  C.  C.  438),  98. 
Cherokee  Nation  v.  Sou.  Kansas  Ry.  Co.   (135  U.  S.  641,  34  L.  Ed.  295, 

10  Sup.  Ct.  965),  7. 
Chesapeake  &  0.  C.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Toledo  &  O.  C.  Ry.  Co.   (245  Fed.  917), 

297. 
Chesapeake   &   Ohio   Fuel    Co.   v.   United    States    (115    Fed.   610,    53   C. 

C.  A.  256,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  151),  486. 
Chesapeake  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Conley    (230  U.  S.  513,   57  L.  Ed.  1597,  33 

Sup.  Ct.  985),  45,  84. 
Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.   Co.   v.   Int.   Com.   Com.    (200   U.   S.   361,   50   L. 

Ed.  515,  26  Sup.  Ct.  272),  345. 
Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  Kentucky   (179  U.  S.  388.  45  L.  Ed.  244, 

21  Sup.  Ct.  101),  29. 
Chesterton  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Comrs.  (1  Ohio  St.  77),  54. 
Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.  (173  Fed.  930),  309,  346,  395. 
Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  Kirby    (225  U.   S.  155,  56   L.   Ed.   1033,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  648),  346,  358,  371. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  47 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Chicago   &   Alton   R.   Co.   v.   New   York,   L.   E.   &   W.   R.   Co.    (24   Fed. 

516),  304. 
Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.  v.  Penn.  Co.    (1   I.  C.  C.  8G,   1  I.   C.  R.  357), 

338,  347. 
Chicago  &  Alton  R.   Co.  v.  United   States    (156   Fed.   558,   84   C.   C.  A. 

324),  358. 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins  Produce  Co.    (235  Fed.   857,   149   C. 

C.  A.  169,  249  U.  S.  186,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  189),  440. 
Chicago  &  G.   T.   R.   Co.  v.   Wellnian    (143   U.   S.   339,   36   L.   Ed.    176, 

12  Sup.  Ct.  400),  45. 
Chicago  &  Mil.  Elec.  Ry.  Co.  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.    (13  I.  C.  C.  20),  335, 

338,  400. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Forest  Co.   (95  Wis.  80,  70  N.  W.  77),  42. 
Chicago  &  North  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Junod    (52  Fed.  912,  3  C.  C.  A.  347), 

383. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ochs  (250  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup. 

Ct.  — ),  12. 
Chicago  &  North  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Osborne   (52  Fed.  912,  3  C.  C.  A.  347), 

348,  383. 
Chicago   &   North   W.    R.    Co.   v.    Osborne    (146    U.    S.    364,    36    L.    Ed. 

1002;     13  Sup.  Ct.  281),  383,  389,  397. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith   (210  Fed.  632),  43,  45. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Tectonius   (262  Fed.  715),  346a. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United   States    (246  U.   S.  512,  62   L.  Ed. 

859,  38  Sup.  Ct.  351,  234    Fed.  268,  272,  148  C.  C.  A.  170),  481,  483. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ziebarth  (245  Fed.  334),  364. 
Chicago  Board  of  Trade  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.   (4  I.  C.  C.  158),  91. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson   (72  Neb.  586,  101  N.  W.  1019),  52. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Cram   (228  U.  S.  70,  57  L.  Ed.  784,  33  Sup. 

Ct.  437),  20. 
Chicago,  B.   &   Q.   R.   Co.   v.    Drainage   Comrs.    (200    U.    S.    561,    50    L. 

Ed.  596,  26  Sup.  Ct.  341),  54. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Feintuch    (191  Fed.  482,  112  C.  C.  A.  126), 

207,  216,  317. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa   (v.  Cutts)    (94  U.  S.  155,  24   L.  Ed. 

94),  45. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Kyle   (228  U.  S.  85,  57  L.  Ed.  741,  33  Sup 

Ct.  440),  20. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.   Miller    (226   U.   S.   513,   57   L.   Ed.   323,  33 

Sup.  Ct.  155),  439. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Nebraska    (170  U.  S.  57,  42  L.  Ed.  948,  18 

Sup.  Ct.  513),  15. 


48  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Oglesby   (198  Fed.  153),  453. 

Chicago,   B.   &   Q.   R.   Co.   v.   Railroad   Com.    of   Wis.    (237    U.    S.    220, 

59  L.  Ed.  926,  35  Sup.  Ct.  560),  19. 
Chicago,  B  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com.  of  Wis.    (237   U.   S.   220,  59 

L.  Ed.  926,  35  Sup.  Ct.  460,  P.  U.  R.  1915C,  309).  20,  21. 
C.  B.  &  Q.  V.  U.  S.   (157  Fed.  830,  85  C.  C.  A.  194),  67,  186,  335. 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (195  Fed.  241,  115  C.  C  A. 

193),  481. 
Chicago,   B.   &   Q.   R.   Co.   v.   U.    S.    (209   U.    S.   90,   52    L.   Ed.    698,   28 

Sup.  Ct.  439),  186,  371. 
Chicago    Fire    Proof,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Chicago   &    N.    W.    R     Co.    (8    I.    C. 

C.  316),   340,  348. 
Chicago,  I.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Hackett    (228  U.  S.   559,  57   L.  Ed.  966,  33 

Sup.  Ct.  581),  33. 
Chicago,  I.   &  L.   R.   Co.   v.   R.   R.   Com.   of   Ind.    (175   Ind.   630,   85   N. 

E.   364),   14. 
Chicago,   I.  &   L.   R.   Co.   v.   United   States    (219   U.    S.   486    55   L.   Ed. 

305,  31  Sup.  Ct.  272),  38.  303,  358. 
Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Pontius    (157  U.  S.  209,  39  L.  Ed.  675,  15 

Sup.   Ct.   585),    12,   33,    332. 
Chicago   Live   Stock   Ex.  v.   Chicago  G.  W.   R.   Co.    (10   I.   C.   C.    428), 

91,  128,  339,  346. 
Chicago,.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ackley  (94  U.  S.  179,  24  L.  Ed.  99),  45. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Becker    (32  Fed.   849,  35   Fed.  883,  10, 

335. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Geo.  A.  Hormel  &  Co.    (240  Fed.  381, 

153  C.  C.  A.  307),  394. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa   (152  Iowa  317,  130  N.  W.  802). 
Chicago,  M.   &  St.   P.   R.   Co.  v.   Iowa    (145   U.   S.   632,  36   L.   Ed.   857, 

12   Sup.  Ct.   978).   335. 
Chicago,   M.  &  St.  P.   R.   Co.  v.   Iowa    (233   U.    S.   334,   58   L.   Ed.   988. 

34  Sup.  Ct.  592),  41,  68,  296,   335. 
Chicago,   M.   &   St.   P.   R.   Co.   v.   Kennedy    (232   U.    S.   626,   58   L.   Ed. 

762,  34   Sup.  Ct.   463,  28  S.   D.   94,   132   N.  W.   802),  35. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Keyes    (91  Fed.  47),  49. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Minneapolis    (232  U.  S.  430.  58  L.  Ed. 

671,   34    Sup.    Ct.    400,    115    Minn.    400,    133    N.    W.    169,    Ann.    Cas. 

1912  D.  1027).  15. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.   P.   R.  Co.  v.   Minnesota    (134   U.   S.   418    33   L.    Ed. 

970,  3  I.  C.  R.  209,  10  Sup.  Ct.  462,  702),  45,  60,  63.  339. 
Chicago,   M.   &   St.   P.   R.   Co.  v.   Polt    (232   U.    S.   165,   58   L.   Ed.   554, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  301,  26  S.  D.  378,  128  N.  W.  472),  35. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  49 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Public  Util.  Com.  111.  (242  U.  S.  33:i,  61 

L.  Ed.  341,  37   Sup.  Ct.   173),  45. 
Chicago,  M.  &   St.   P.  R.  Co.  v.   Solan    (160  U.   S.   133,   42   L.   Ed.   688, 

18  Sup.  Ct.  289),  32. 
Chicago,  M.   &   St.  P.  R.   Co.   v.   Tompkins    (176   U.   S.   167.   44   L.   Ed. 

417,  20  Sup.  Ct.  336),  45,  49. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Arkansas   (86  Ark.  412,   111   S.  W.   456, 

219  U.   S.  453,  55  L.  Ed.  290,  31   Sup.  Ct.  275),  22. 
Chicago,   R.   I.   &   P.   R.   Co.   v.   Chicago  &   A.   R.   Co.    (3    I.   C.   C.   450, 

2  I.  C.  R.  581,  721),  345. 

Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cramer    (232  U.   S.   490,   58  L.   Ed.   697, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  383,  153  Iowa  103,  133  N.  W.  387),  32,  439. 
Chicago,  R.   I.  &  P.  R.   Co.  v.  Hardwick  Farmers'  Elevator  Co.    (226 

U.  S.  426,  57  L.  Ed.  284,  33  Sup.  Ct.  174),  3,  4,  9,  25,  68. 
Chicago,  R.   I.  &  P.  R.   Co.   v.   Hubbell    (54   Kan.   232,   38   Pac.   266,   5 

I.  C.  R.  241),  180,  212. 
Chicago,   R.    I.   &   P.   R.   Co.   v.    Int.   Com.   Com.    (171    Fed.    680),    107, 

207,  222,  395,  462,  465. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ketchum  (212  Fed.  986),  38. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lena  Lumber  Co.    (99  Ark.   105,  137  S. 

W.   562),   297. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  ?.  R.  Co.  v.  Maucher   (248  U.  S.  359,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39 

Sup.   Ct.  — ),  295,   440. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com.  of  Ind.    (175  Ind.  630,  95 

N.  E.  364),  13. 
Chicago,   R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.   of  Neb.    (85   Neb.   818,   124 

N.  W.  477),  49. 
Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Latta  (226  U.  S.  519,  57  L.  Ed.  328, 

33  Sup.  Ct.  155,  184  Fed.  987,  106  C.  C.  A.  664),  439. 
Chicago,    St.    P.,    M.    &   O.    R.    Co.    v.    United    States    (162    Fed.    835), 

358,  371. 
Chicago    Sash    &    Door    Asso.    v.    Norfolk    &    W.    R.    Co.    (14    I.    C.    C. 

594),  348. 
Chicago,  T.  H.  &   S.  Ry.   Co.  v.   Anderson    (242   U.   S.   283,   61   L.    Ed. 

302,  37  Sup.  Ct.  124),  15. 
Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.  v.  Chicago  (199  111.  579,  65  N.  E.  470),  49. 
Chicago   Wall    Paper    Mills   v.    General    Paper    Co.    (147    Fed.    491.    78 

C.  C.  A.  607,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  1027),  486. 
Chicago  Wool  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.   (40  I.  C.  C.  101),  114,  156. 
Chiles  V.   Chesapeake  &   O.   R.   Co.    (218  U.   S.   71,   54   L.    Ed.   936,   30 

Sup.  Ct.  067),  29. 
Chin  Yow  v.  United   States    (208  U.   S.   8,  52   L.   Ed.   369,   28   Sup.  Ct. 

201),  316. 


50  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

r  References  are  to   Sections.] 

China  &  Japan  Trading  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.   Co.    (12   I.  C.   C.   236),  93, 

339,  346,  486. 
Christie  Grain  &  Stock  Co.  v.  Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago    (125   Fed. 

161,  61  C.  C.  A.  11),  486. 
Cilley  V.  United  Shoe  Mach.  Co.  (152  Fed.  726).  492. 
Cilley  V.  United  Shoe  Mach.  Co.   (202  Fed.  598),  492. 
Cincinnati  v.  Louisville  &   N.  R.  Co.    (223   U.   S.   390.   56   L.   Ed.   481, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  267),  7. 
Cincinnati  &  C.  T.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.    (20  I.  C.  C,   486),  191,  222, 

400,  401. 
Cincinnati,  Freight  Bureau  of,  v.  Cincinnati,   N.  0.  &  T.  P.   Ry.  Co. 

(6  I.  C.  C.  195,  4  I.  C.  R.  592).  110. 
Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.   R.   Co.  v.   Int.  Com.   Com.    (206   U.   S.   142,   51  L. 

Ed.  995,  27  Sup.  Ct.  648),  162,  312,  317,  345,  394,  395,  406. 
Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.   v.  Int.  Com.  Com.    (5   I.  C.  R.   391, 

167  U.  S.  479,  42  L.  Ed.  243,  17  Sup.  Ct.  896),  389. 
Cincinnati,  N.   0.   &  T.  P.  R.  Co.   v.  Int.   Com.   Com.    (162   U.   S.   184, 

40   L.   Ed.   935,   16   Sup.   Ct.   700),   67,   128.   204,   312,   335,   339,   348, 

389,  395. 
Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Rankin    (241  U.  S.  319,  60  L.  Ed. 

1022,  36  Sup.  Ct.  555),  440. 
Cincinnati  Packet  Co.  v.  Catlettsburg  (105  U.  S.  559,  26  L.  Ed.  1169),  56. 
Cincinnati,   P.   B.    S.   &   ?.   P.   Co.   v.   Bay    (200   U.    S.   179,    50    L.   Ed. 

428,  26  Sup.  Ct.  208,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  867),  69,  486. 
Cist  V.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (10  I.  C.  C.  217),  335.  339. 
Citizens'  Wholesale  Supply  Co.  v.  Snyder  (201  Fed.  907),  486. 
City  Gas  Co.  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  Co.  (11  I.  C.  C.  371),  345,  346. 
City  of  Atchison  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  254),  416. 
City  of  Danville  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  571),  416. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  Nor.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  376),  339. 
Claflin  v.  Houseman  (93  U.  S.  3  Otto.  130,  23  L.  Ed.  833),  292. 
Clark  &  Co.  v.  Buffalo  &  S.  R.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  380),  40. 
Clark  Bros.  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (238  Fed.  642),  317. 
Clark  Co.   (Fred  G.)  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  558), 

397. 
Clark,  James,  Distilling  Co.  v.  W.  M.  R.  Co.   (242  U.  S.  311,  61  L.  Ed. 

326,  37  Sup.  Ct.  180),  58. 
Clark  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.  (119  N.  E.  539),  440. 
Clarke    (Rowena)    v.  Central  R.  &  Bkg.  Co.   of  Ga.    (50   Fed.   338,   15 

L.  R.  A.  683,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  17),  486. 
Classification— Western  No.  51— Suspension  of   (25  I.  C.  C.  442),  113. 

See  also  Western  Classification. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  51 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Class  Rates  between  Stations  in  La.   (S3  I.  C.  C.  302),  259,  398. 
Clegg  V.  St.  L.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  (203  Fed.  971,  122  C.  C.  A.  273),  358. 
Clement  v.  Louisville  v.  N.  R.  Co.   (153  Fed.  979),  383. 
Cleveland.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Dettlebach   (239  U.  S.  588,  60  L.  Ed. 

453,  36  Sup.  Ct.  177),  440. 
Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Hirsch    (204  Fed.  849,  123  C.  C.  A. 

145),  346,  358. 
Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois   (177  U.   S.  514,  44  L.  Ed. 

868,  20  Sup.  Ct.  722),  20. 
Clyde  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (23  I.  C.  C.  135),  107. 
Coal  Rates  from  Oak  Hills,  Colo.  (30  I.  C.  C.  505),  395,  398. 
Coal  Rates  from  Oak  Hills,  Colo.   (35  I.  C.  C.  193),  117,  397. 
Coal  Rates  from  Virginia   (30  I.  C.  C.  635),  85. 
Coal  Rates  Stony  Fork  Branch   (26  I.  C.  C.  168),  439. 
Coca-Cola  Co.  v.  Butler  &  Sons  (229  Fed.  224),  486. 
Coca-Cola  Co.  v.  Deacon-Brown  Bottling  Co.   (200  Fed.  105),  486. 
Coca-Cola  Co.  v.  Gay-Ola  Co.   (200  Fed.  720),  486. 
Coe'v.  Errol  (116  U.  S.  517,  29  L.  Ed.  715,  6  Sup.  Ct.  475),  41,  68,  303, 

304,  335. 
Coe  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (3  Fed.  775),  304,  305. 
Coffey ville   Commercial   Club   v.   A.   T.   &   S.   F.   R.    Co.    (33    I.   C.    O. 

122,  34  I.  C.  C.  231),  183. 
Coffeyville  Vitrified  Brick  &  Tile  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.    (12 

I.  C.  C.  498),  117,  329,   392. 
Coke  Producers'  Asso.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  125),  87,  345. 
Coles  V.  Cent.  R.  &  B.  Co.   (86  Ga.  251,  12  S.  E.  749),  14,  17. 
Cole  Motor  Car  Co.  v.  Hurst  (228  Fed.  280),  486. 
College    Arms    Hotel    Co.    v.    Atlantic    C.    L.    R.    Co.    (61    Fla.    553,    54 

So.  459),  9. 
Collins  V.  Kentucky    (234  U.   S.   034,  58  L.  Ed.  1510,  34   Sup.   Ct.   924, 

141  Ky.  564,  133  S.  W.  233),  486. 
Colonial  Nav.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (50  I.  C.  C.  625),  375. 
Colorado  Coal  Traffic  Asso.  v.  C.  &  S.  R.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  478),  350. 
Colorado  Free  Pass.  Situation  (26  I.  C.  C.  491),  342,  442. 
Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  v.  So.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (6  I.  C.  C.  488),  88,  90, 

339,  346,  S58,  363. 
Columbia  Grocery  Co.   v.   Louisville  &   N.   R.   Co.    (18   I.   C.   C.   502), 

108,  183. 
Commercial  Cable  Co.  v.  West.  Union  Tel.  Co.  (45  I.  C.  C.  33),  340. 
Commercial  Club  of  Duluth  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  639),  108,  183. 


52  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Commercial  Club  of  Mitchell,  S.  Dak.  v.  A.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.   (46  I.  C.  C. 

1,  48  I.  C.  C.  40),  99,  116,  147. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  A.  &  S.  R.  Co.    (27  I.  C.  C.  302),  207, 

211,  213,  404. 
Commercial    Club    of    Omaha   v.    Chicago    &    N.    W.    Ry.    Co.    (7    I.    C. 

C.  386),  339,  346. 
Commercial    Club    of    Omaha    v.    Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.    (6    T. 

C.  C.  647),  253,  338. 
Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  v.  S.  P.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  631),  105,  119. 
Commercial  Coal  Co.  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  11),  101,  104. 
Commercial  Milling   Co.    v.    Western    Union    Tel.   Co.    (151    Mich.    425, 

115  N.  W.  698),  2. 
Commodity  Rates  to  Pacific  Coast  Terminals   (32  I.  C.  C.  611),  118. 
Commodity  Rates  between  Mo.  River  Points    (28  I.  C.  C.  265),  399. 
Commonwealth  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.    (106  Va.  61,  55  S.  E.  572,  7  L.  R. 

A.   (N.  S.)   1086,  117  Am.  St.  Rep.  983),  424. 
Commonwealth  v.  Interstate  R.  Co.  (187  Mass.  436,  73  N.  E.  530),  185. 
Commonwealth  v.  Keary   (198  Pa.  St.  500,  48  Atl.  472),  37. 
Commonwealth  v.  Norfolk  v.  W.  R.  Co.  (Ill  Va.  59,  68  S.  E.  351),  13. 
Commutation  Rate  Case   (21  I.  C.  C.  428),  185,  345,  389,  395,  442. 
Commutation  Tickets  to  School  Children   (17  I.  C.  C.  144),  185,  345. 
Compagnie   Prancaise  v.   Board   of  Health    (186   U.   S.   380,   46   L.   Ed. 

1209,  22  Sup.  Ct.  811),  58. 
Compton  V.  Allen   (216  Fed.  537),  58. 
Concentration  of  Cotton   (26  I.  C.  C.  585),  403. 
Concord  &  M.  R.   Co.  v.   Boston  &  M.   R.   Co.    (68   N.   H.   464,   41  Atl. 

263),  9. 
Connery  v.  Q.  0.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  (92  Minn.  20,  99  N.  W.  365),  42. 
Connolly  v.  Union  Sewer  Pipe  Co.    (184  U.   S.   540,   46  L.   Ed.  679,  22 

Sup.  Ct.  431,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  118),  486. 
Connor  v.  Vicksburg  &  M.  R.  Co.  (36  Fed.  273,  1  L.  R.  A.  331),  294,  383. 
Consolidated  Classification  Case  (54  I.  C.  C.  1),  114,  156,  161. 
Consolidated  Forwarding  Co.   v.    Southern   Pac.   Co.    (9  I.   C.   C.   182), 

197,  338,  352,  358. 
Consolidated  Forwarding  Co.  v.   Southern  Pac.  Co.    (10   I.  C.  C.  590), 

197,  352,  432. 
Consolidated  Fuel  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  554),  343. 
Consolidated  Pump  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  519),  243. 
Continental  Securities  Co.  v.  Interborough  R.  T.  Co.  (165  Fed.  945),  486. 
Continental   Wall   Paper  Co.   v.   Lewis  Voight  &   Sons  Co.    (212   U.   S. 

227,  53  L.  Ed.  486,  29  Sup.  Ct.  280),  486. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  53 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Continental   Wall    Paper   Co.   v.   Lewis   Voight   &    Sons   Co.    (148   Fed. 

939,  78  C.  C.  A.  567),  486. 
Control  of  Water  Lines  by  Railroad  Carriers   (51  I.  C.  C.  436),  354. 
Cook  V.  Marshall  County  Iowa   (196  U.  S.  261,  49  L.  Ed.  471,  25  Sup. 

Ct.  233),  58. 
Cooke  V.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.  (133  Mass.  185),  54. 

Cooley  V.  Board  of  Wardens  (12  How.  53  U.  S.  299,  13  L.  Ed.  996),  56. 
Coomes  v.  Chicago,  St.  P..  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.   (13  I.  C.  C.  192),  383. 
Copp   V.    Louisville   &   N.    R.    Co.    (43    La.    Ann.    511,    9    So.    441,    3    1. 

C.  R.  625,  46  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cases  634,  12  L.  R.  A.  725,  26  Am. 

St.  Rep.  198),  383,  405. 
Corey  v.  Independent  Ice  Co.   (207  Fed.  459),  492. 
Corn    Belt   Meat   Producers'    Asso.    v.    Chicago,   M.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    (14 

L  C.  C.  376),  339. 
Corp.  Com.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (31  I.  C.  C.  532),  47. 
Corporation  Com.  of  N.  C.  v.  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  303),  183,  222. 
Corporation  Com.  of  N.   C.   v.   S.   A.  L.   R.   Co.-  (161   N.   C.   271,   76   H. 

E.  554),   9. 
Corporation  Com.  of  Ok.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.   F.  Ry.  Co.    (31  I.  C.  C.   532), 

3*  6,  44,  62,  68,  259,  336,  398,  399. 
Corp.  Com.  of  Va.  v.  C.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.   (40  I.  C.  C.  24),  339. 
Cosby  V.  Richmond  Trans.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  72),  346. 
Cosmopolitan    Shipping    Co.    v.    Hamburg-American    Packet    Co.    et    al. 

(13  I.  C.  C.  266),  335,  352. 
Cotting  V.  Godard  (183  U.  S.  79,  46  L.  Ed.  92,  22  Sup.  Ct.  30),  45. 
Cotton  Concentration  at  Weeleetka  (39  I.  C.  C.  181),  346. 
Cotton  from  New  Orleans   (49  I.  C.  C.  751),  399. 

Cotton  Seed  Products  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (53  I.  C  C.  574),  80a. 
Council  V.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  (1  I.  C.  C.  339,  1  I.  C.  R.  638),  216,  40b. 
Counselman  v.  Hitchcock    (142  U.  S.  547,  35  L.  Ed.  1110,  12  Sup.  Ct. 

195),  299,  389. 
Covington,  etc.,  Brdg.  Co.  v.  Kentucky    (154  U.  S.  204,  38  L.  Ed.  962. 

14  Sup.  Ct.  1087),  3,  5,  53. 
Covington    &    Lexington    Turnpike    Road    Co.    v.    Sanford    (164    IT.    S. 

578,  41  L.  Ed.  560,  17  Sup.  Ct.  198),  45,  49,  82,  88,  124,  125. 
Covington  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Keith    (139  U.  S.  128,  35  L.  Ed.  73,  11 

Sup.  Ct.  461),  41,  80a,  197. 
Cowan  &  Bond   (39  Fed.  54),  345. 
Coxe  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.    (4  I.  C.  C.  535,  2  I.  C.  R.  195, 

229,  3  I.  C.  R.  460),  339,  345,  395. 
Coyle  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.  (112  Ga.  121,  37  S.  E.  163),  37. 


54  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

(References  are  to   Sections.] 

Cozart  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (16  I.  C.  C.  226),  29,  346. 

Cram   v.   Chicago,    B.    &   Q.    R.    Co.    (84    Neb.    607,    122    N.    W.    ai.    26 

L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    1022,  85  Neb.   586,   123   N.  W.   1045,   26   L.   R.   A. 

(N.  S.)  1028,  19  Ann.  Cas.  170),  20,  25. 
Cramer  v.  C.  R.  &  I.  R.  Co.   (153  Iowa  103,  133  N.  W.  387),  439. 
Crane  Iron  Works  v.  C.  of  N.  J.  R.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  514),  171,  195,  338, 

400. 

Crane  Iron  Works  v.  United  States   (209  Fed.  238),  121,  171,  195.  249, 

313,  338,  400. 
Crane  R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.    (15  I.  C.  C.  248),  195,  338, 

400. 
Craven   v.   Carter   Crume    Co.    (92   Fed.    479,   34   C.   C.   A.   479,    1   Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  983),  487. 
Crescent   Brewing   Co.    v.   Or.    S.   L.   R.    Co.    (24    Idaho   106,   132   Pac. 

975),  58. 
Crescent  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.   C.   &   E.   I.   R.   Co.    (24   I.   C.   C.   149), 

339,  358. 
Crescent  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilson   (233  Fed.  282),  58. 
Crews  V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.    (1  I.  C.  C.  401,  1  I.  C.  R.  703),   12, 

163,  345. 
Crouch  V.  G.  N.  R.  Co.   (11  Ex.  742,  25  L.  J.  Ex.  137),  157. 
Crouch  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (41  I.  C.  C.  717),  440. 
Cudahy  Packing  Co.  v.  Frey  &  Son  (261  Fed.  65,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  497, 

498. 
Cudahy  Packing  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  R.  Co.  (215  Fed.  93),  337. 
Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Memphis  (198  Fed.  955),  453. 
Cummins  Amendment,  The   (33  I.  C.  C.  682),  34a,  440. 
Curry  v.  Kansas  &  C.  P.  Ry.  (58  Kan.  6,  51  Pac.  576),  342. 
Curry  &  Whyte  v.  D.  &  I.  R.  Co.  (30  I.  C.  C.  1),  208,  345,  383. 
Curry  «S:  Whyte  v  D.  &  I.  R.  Co.  (32  I.  C.  C.  162),  345. 
Cutting  V.  Fla.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.   (46  Fed.  641),  335. 
Dairyman's  Supply  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.   (28  I.  C.  C.  406),  442. 
Dakota  Cent.  Tel.  Co.  v.  S.  Dakota  (250  U.  S.  163,  63  L.  Ed.  910,  39  Sup. 

Ct.  507,  P.  U.  R.  1919  D.  717,  4  A.  L.  R.  1623),  28,  43,  335. 
Dallas  Freight  Bureau  v.  Austin  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (9  I.  C.  C.  68),  348. 
Dallas  Freight  Bureau  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.  223), 

110,  250,  339,  383,  392. 
Dallas  Freight  Bureau  v.  Missouri,  Kas.  &  Tex.  Ry.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C. 

427),   339,   392. 
Dallas  Freight  Bureau  v.  Texas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  33),  348. 
Daniel  Ball    (The)   v.  United  States   (10  Wall.  77  U.  S.  557,  19  L.  Ed. 

999),  3,  55,  67,  335. 


Table  or  Cases  Cited,.  55 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Daniels  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  et  al.  (6  I.  C.  C.  458),  304. 

Daniels  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  458),  153,  199,  346,  34)5. 

Danville  Va.  Class  &  Commodity  Rates  (38  I.  C.  C.  742),  259. 

Danville  v  S.  R.  Co.   (8  I.  C.  C.  571),  416. 

DanviHe  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (8  I.  C.  C.  409),  346. 

Darius  Coal   Trans.   Co.  v.   White   Star  Line    (186   Fed.   63,   108   C.   C. 

A.  165),  486. 
Darling  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  78),  88. 
Darnell  v.  Edvk^ards  (209  Fed.  99),  43. 

Darnell  v.  Edwards  (244  U.  S.  564,  61  L.  Ed.  1317,  37  Sup.  Ct.  701).  47. 
Darnell  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.  (190  Fed.  656),  407. 
Darnell  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (225  U.  S.  243,  56  L.  Ed.  1072,  32  Sup.  Ct.  760, 

190  Fed.  656),  294. 
Darnell-Taenzer  Lumber  Co.  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.    (13  I.  C.  C.  668,  190  Fed. 

659),  207. 
Darnell-Taenzer   Lumber    Co.   v.    So.    Pac.    Co.    (221    Fed.    890,    —    C. 

C.  A.  — ,  190  Fed.  659),  208,  383,  407. 
Darragh  v.  Wetter  Mfg.  Co.  (78  Fed.  7,  23  C.  C.  A.  609),  60. 
Davis  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  R.  Co.  (46  I.  C.  C.  501),  170. 
Davis  V.  Booth    (131  Fed.  31,  65  C.  C.  A.  269,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec. 

566),  486. 
Davis  V.  Booth  (196  U.  S.  636,  49  L.  Ed.  355,  25  Sup.  Ct.  793),  486. 
Davis  V.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  Louis  R.  Co.    (217   U.  S.   157,   54   L.   Ed.  708, 

30  Sup.  Ct.  463,  146  Fed.  403),  42,  56. 
Davis  V.  Gray  (16  Wall.,  83  U.  S.  203,  21  L.  Ed.  447),  60. 
Davis  v.  Pere  Marquette  R.  Co.  (10  I.  C.  C.  405),  178. 
Davis  V.  S.  A.  L.  R.  Co.   (136  Ga.  278,  71  S.  E.  428),  32. 
Davis  V.  So.  Pac.  Co.  (235  Fed.  731),  371. 
Davis  V.  State  (68  Ala.  58,  44  Am.  Rep.  128),  45. 
Davis  V.  United  States  (104  Fed.  136,  43  C.  C.  A.  448),  178,  386. 
Davis  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  257),  401. 
Dayton  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (239  U.  S.  446,  60  L. 

Ed.  375,  36  Sup.  Ct.  137),  361. 
De  Bary  v.  Louisiana  (227  U.  S.  108,  57  L.  Ed.  441,  33  Sup.  Ct.  239),  58. 
Debs,  Re   (158  U.  S.  564,  39  L.  Ed.  1092,  15  Sup.  Ct.  900,  1  Fed.  Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  565),  486. 
Decatur  Nav.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.    (31   I.  C.  C.   281),   121,   151,  338, 

375,  400,  401. 
Decker  v.  M.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.   (55  I.  C.  C.  453),  34a,  440. 
Delaware  &  Hudson  Boat  Lines  (40  I.  C.  C.  297),  354. 


56  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Delaware,  etc.,  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (46  I.  C.  C.  506),  207,  208. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Central   Stock  Yard   &  Transit  Co.    (45 

N.  J.  Eq.  50,  6  L.  R.  A.  855,  17  Atl.  146),  45. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Frank    (110  Fed.  689,  2   Fed.  Anti-Trust 

Dec.  81),  37,  486. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.  (155  Fed.  512),  465*. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.  (166  Fed.  498),  465. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.    (166  Fed.  499),  138,  157, 

344,  345,  S.95,  465. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kutter   (147  Fed.  51,  77  C.  C.  A.  315,  2 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  1021),  344,  386. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Public  Utilities  Com.    (85  N.  J.  L.  28,  88 

Atl.  849),  39. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Public  Utility  Comrs.   (84  N.  J.  L.  619,  8(t 

Atl.  801),  37,  38,  39. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Rutter   (203  U.  S.  588,  51  L.  Ed.  330,  27 

Sup.  Ct.  776),  344,  386. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States    (231  U.   S.  363,  58  L.  Ed. 

269,  34  Sup.  Ct.  65),  63,  343. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Santwood  (216  Fed.  252),  19. 
Delaware  State  Grange  v.  New  York,  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (2  I.  C.  C.  309,  2  I. 

C.  R.  187),  126,  392. 
Delaware  State  Grange  v.  New  York,  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.    (4  I.  C.  C.  588, 

3  I.  C.  R.  554),  88. 
Delaware  State  Grange  v.  New  York,  ?.  &  N.  R.  Co.    (5  I.  C.  C.  161, 

3  I.  C.  R.  828),  416. 
Delk  V.  St.   L.  &  S.   F.  R.  Co.    (220   U.   S.   580,   55   L.   Ed.   590,   31   Sup. 

Ct.  617),  41. 
Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  Michigan  C.  R.  Co.   (18  I.  C.  C.  268),  110. 
Deming  Lumber  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.   (24  I.  C.  C.  598),  213. 
Demurrage  Charges  State  of  Calif.  (25  I.  C.  C.  314),  345. 
Denaby   Main  Colliery  Co.  v.  Manchester,   etc.,   R.   Co.    (11   App.   Cas. 

97),  158. 
Denison  Light   &  Power   Co.   v.   Missouri,   K.   &  T.   Ry.   Co.    (10   I.   C. 

C.  337),  90. 
Dennehy  v.  McNulta  (86  Fed.  825,  30  C.  C.  A.  422,  41  L.  R.  A.  609,  1 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  855).  487. 
Denver  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (15  Fed.  650),  304. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  Co.  v.  Baer  Bros.    (187  Fed.   485,  109   C.  C.  A.   337), 

207,   317,   383,   407. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Baer  Bros.   (209  Fed.  577,  126  C.  C.  A.  399), 

215,  216,   317,  407. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  57 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Baer  Bros.  (200  Fed.  614),  407. 

Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (195  Fed.  968),  317. 

De  Rochemont  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (75  N.  H.  158,  71  Atl.  868),  42. 

Desel-Boettcher  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  So.  Ry.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  220),  110. 

Des  Moines  Commodity  Rates  (34  I.  C.  C.  281),  88. 

Des  Moines  Gas   Co.   v.   Des   Moines    (238   U.   S.   153,   59   L.   Ed.   1244. 

35  Sup.  Ct.  811),  47. 
Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Fletcher  Paper  Co.   (248  U.  S.  30,  63  L.  Ed.  — , 

39  Sup.  Ct.  250),  43. 
Detroit   Board   of  Trade   v.   Grand    Trunk    R.   Co.    (2    I.    C.   C.    315,    1 

I.  C.  R.  699,  2  I.  C.  R.  199),  345,  346. 
Detroit,   G.   H.   &  M.   Ry.  Co.  v.   Int.   Com.   Com.    (74   Fed.    803,   21    C. 

C.  A.  103,  43  U.  S.  App.  308),  339,  345,  346,  348,  392,  406. 
Dewey  Bros.  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  481),  177,  348,  383. 
Diamond  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (43  I.  C.  C.  65),  116. 
Diamond   Match   Co.   v.   Ontonagon    (188   U.   S.    82,    47    L.    Ed.   394,    23 

Sup.  Ct.  266),  55. 
Diamond  Mills  Co.  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  (9  I.  C.  C.  311),  163,  346,  348. 
Direct  Navigation  Co.   (46  I.  C.  C.  378),  354. 

Dixie  Dairymen's  Asso.  v.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  618),  88. 
Dixie  Tob.  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (Ill  Ga.  813,  69  S.  E.  1106),  439. 
Doctor  Miles  Medical  Co.  v.  Jaynes  Drug  Co.    (149  Fed.  838),  486. 
Doctor  Miles  Medical  Co.  v.  Jno.   D.  Park  &  Sons  Co.   (164   Fed    803, 

90  C.   C.   A.   579,   486. 
Douglas  &  Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  541),  395. 
Douglas,    Ga.,   Mayor   &   Council    of,   v.    Atlanta,   B.    &    A.    R.    Co.    (28 

I.  C.  C.  445),  108. 
Dow   V.    Beidelman    (125    U.    S.    680,   31   L.    Ed.    841,   2    I.    C.    R.    56,    8 

Sup.  Ct.  1028),  45,  82. 
Dowd  V.  United  Mine  Workers  ot  Am.   (235  Fed.  1,  148  C.  C.  A.  495), 

486,  492,   493,  517. 
Downie  Coal  Co.  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.  (31  I.  C.  C.  142),  121. 
Drayage  Absorption   (43  I.  C.  C.  472),  346. 
Dudley  v.  May  hew  (3  N.  Y.  9),  292. 
Dueber    Watch-Case    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Howard    Watch    &    Clock    Co.     (55 

Fed.  851,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  178),  492. 
Dueber    Watch-Case    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Howard    Watch    &    Clock    Co.     (66 

Fed.  637,  14  I.  C.  C.  A.  14,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  421),  489,  492 
Duffney  Brick  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  118),  101. 
Dugan  V.  Bridge  Co.   (27  Pa.  St.  303),  54. 
Duluth  Dockage  Absorption   (44  I.  C.  C.  300),  80a. 


5S  Table  of  Cases  Cited, 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Duluth  Log.  Co.  V.  Minn.  &  Int.  Ry.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  627),  140,  218. 

Duluth,  Minn.,  Log  Rates  (29  I.  C.  C.  420),  101. 

Duluth   Shingle   Co.  v.   Duluth   S.    S.   &   A.   R.   Co.    (10   I.   C.   C.   489), 

160,  346. 
Duncan  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.    (6  I.  C.  C.  85,  3  I.  C.  R.  256, 

4  I.  C.  R.  385),  181,  206,  339,  345,  346,  358,  383. 
Duncan  v.  Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  590),  112,  165,  345. 
Dunqan  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  186),  166. 
Duncan  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (35  I.  C.  C.  477),  166,  348. 
Duplex  Printing  Press  Co.  v.  Deering  (252  Fed.  722),  500. 
Durham  v.  Ill  Cent.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  37),  348. 

E. 

East-Bound-Transcontinental  Canned  Goods  (50  I.  C.  C.  62),  88. 

East  Jersey  R.  R.  &  T.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.  (36  I.  C.  C.  146),  399. 

East  St.   Louis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.   St.   L.  &   S.  F.   R.   Co.    (20   I.  C.  C. 

37),  91. 
East  Tenn.  Va.  &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.   Com.    (99   Fed.   52,   39   C. 

C.  A.  413),  147. 
East   Tenn.,  Va.   &  Ga.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Int.    Com.   Com.    (181   U.    S.   1,    45 

L.   Ed.   719,  21   Sup.   Ct.   516),   92,   93,   109,   128,   147,   153,   199,   312, 

346,  348,  406. 
Eastern  Oregon  Lumber  Producers  Assn.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C. 

C.  316,  338. 
Eastern   Shore   Development   S.   S.   Co.   v.   B.   &  O.   R.   Co.    (32   I.   C. 

C.  238),  401. 
Eastern  Shore,  etc.,  Produce  Ex.  v.  N.  Y.  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.    (40  I.  C.  C. 

328),  147. 
Eastern   States   Lumber   Dealers'   Asso.   v.   United    States    (234    U.    S. 

600,  58  L.  Ed.   1490,  34  Sup.  Ct.  95),  486,  492. 
Eastern  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com.  of  Texas  (242  Fed.  300),  44. 
Eastern  Wheel  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  &  V.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  370),  392. 
Eaton  V.  Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  619),  87,  383. 
Edwards  v.  Nashville,  C.  &  St.  Ry.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  247).  29. 
Edwards  &  Bradford  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  B.   &  Q.  R.   Co.    (25  I.  C.  C. 

93),  244,  348. 
Edmunds  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (80  Fed.  78),  213,  383. 
Eichenberg  v.   Southern   Pac.   Co.    (14   I.  C.   C.   250),   10,   68,   139,   222. 

335,  336,  337,  346. 
Eldred  Milling  Co.  v.  C.  N.  R.  Co.  (42  I.  C.  C.  215),  346. 
Elevation  Allowances  at  St.  Louis  (30  I.  C.  C.  096),  339. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  59 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Elgin,  J.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States  (253  Fed.  907,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ), 

385. 
Elk  Cement  &  Lime  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (22  I.  C.  C.  446),  183. 
Elliott  Machine  Co.  v.  Center   (227  Fed.  124),  497. 
Ellis  V.  Inman,   Poulsen  &  Co.    (124   Fed.  956,  2   Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec. 

268),  486. 
Ellis  V.  Inman,  Poulsen  &  Co.    (131  Fed.  182,  G5  C.  C.  A.  488,  2  Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  577),  486. 
Ellis  V.   Int.  Com.  Com.    (237   U.   S.   434,   59   L.   Ed.   1036.    35    Sup.   Ct. 

645),  220,  310,  389. 
El  Paso  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Gutierrez    (215  U.  S.  87,  54  L.  Ed.  106,  30 

Sup.  Ct.  21),  33. 
Elvey  V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (3  I.  C.  C.  652,  2  I.  C.  R.  804),  345,  346. 
Elwood  Grain   Co.   v.   St.   J.  &  G.   I.   R.   Co.    (202   Fed.   845,   121   C.   C 

A.  153),  371. 
Emerson  v.  B.-&  M.  R.  Co.  (75  N.  H.  427,  75  Atl.  529),  38. 
Emery  &  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (38  I.  C.  C.  636,  47  I.  C.  C.  200),  65,  346. 
Emlenton  Petroleum  Rates   (29.1.  C.  C.  519),  348. 
Empire  Coke  Co.  v.  B.  &  S.  R.  Co.  (31  I.  C.  C.  573),  399. 
Engemoen  v.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  0.  R.  Co.    (210  Fed.  896),  358. 
Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.    (16  I.  C.  C.  219),  111,  149,  338. 

347,  400. 
Enterprise  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  451),  93,  339,  346,  486. 
Enterprise  Transportation  Co.  v.  Penn.   R.  Co.    (12   I.  C.  C.   326),   14, 

195,  249,  335,  337,  338. 
Erb  V.  Morasch   (177   U.   S.   584,   44  L.  Ed.   897,  20   Sup.  Ct.   819),   20. 
Erie  R.  Co.  v.  New  York    (233  U.  S.  671,  58  L.  Ed.  1149,  34  Sup.  Ct. 

756,    198   N.   Y.   369,   91   N.   E.   849,   29   L.   R.   A.    (N.    S.)    240,    139 

Am.  Rep.  829,  19  Ann.  Cas.  811),  22,  33. 
Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Stone  (244  U.  S.  332,  61  L.  Ed.  1173,  37  Sup.  Ct.  633),  440. 
Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Stuart   (250  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  34a, 

440. 
Erie  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (200  Fed.  406),  481. 
Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Williams    (233  U.  S.  685,  58  L.  Ed.  1155,  34   Sup.  Ct. 

761,  199  N.  Y.  525,   92  N.  E.   1084,   136  App.  Div.   902,  120  N.   Y. 

Sup.  1023),  22,  23. 
Escabana  Co.   v.   Chicago    (107   U.    S.    678,    27   L.   Ed.    442,   2    Sup.   Ct. 

185),  54. 
Eschner  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  60),  38. 
Essex  V.  New  England  Tel.  Co.   (239  U.  S.  313,  60  L.  Ed.  301,  36  Sup. 

Ct.  102),  7,  470. 


60  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Evans  v.  0.  R.  &  N.  Co.   (1  I.  C.  C.  325),  88. 

Evans  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  520),  110,  339. 

Evens  &  Howard   Fire   Brick  Co.   v.   St.   L.,  I.   M.  &  S.  R.   Co.    (25   1. 

C.  C.  141),  394. 
Evershed  v.  London  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.    (33  App.  Cas.  1029),  158. 
Ewing   V.    Leavenwortli,    226    U.    S.    464,    57    L.    Ed.    303,    33    Sup.    Ct. 

157),  69. 
Excursion  Car  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.   (3  I.  C.  C.  577),  197. 
Ex  parte,  Benson   (18  S.  C.  38),  133. 
Ex  parte  Debs,  see  Debs,  re. 
Ex  parte  Koehler  (30  Fed.  867).  335,  345. 
Ex  parte  Koehler   (31  Fed.  315,  12   Sawy.  446),  442. 
Ex  parte  Lennon   (64  Fed.  320,  22  U.  S.  App.  561),  347. 
Ex  parte  Lennon  (166  U.  S.  548,  41  L.  Ed.  1110,  17  Sup.  Ct.  658),  347. 
Ex  parte   Metropolitan  Water  Co.    (220   U.  S.   539,   55   L.   Ed.   576,   31 

Sup.  Ct.  600),  320,  453. 
Ex  parte  McNeil  (80  U.  S.  13  Wall.  236,  20  L.  Ed.  624),  292. 
Ex  parte  Oklahoma  (220  U.  S.  191,  55  L.  Ed.  431,  31  Sup.  Ct.  426),  58. 
Ex  parte  O'Neill   (83  Pac.  104),  87. 
Ex  parte  Westbrook   (250  Fed.  636),  2. 
Ex  parte  Young   (209  U.  S.  123,  52  L.  Ed.  714.  28  Sup.  Ct.  441),  See 

Young  Ex  parte. 
Export  Rates  on  Grain  &  Grain  Products  (31  I.  C.  C.  616),  346. 
Export   Shipping   Co.   v.   Wabash   R.   Co.    (14   I.   C.    C.   437),    157,   345, 

383,  442,  444. 

Express  Rates  and  Practices   (43  I.  C.  C.  510),  34a,  440. 

F. 

Fabrication  in  Transit  Charges   (29  L  C.  C.  70),  169,  358. 
Fairmont  Creamery  Co.  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.   (43  I.  C.  C.  724),  335. 
Falls  &  Co.  V.  Chicago,  R.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  269).  205,  383. 
Fargo  Iron  &  Metal  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.   (46  I.  C.  C.  399),  169. 
Farmers'  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.   (47  I.  C.  C.  475),  174. 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust   Co.  v.   Northern   Pac.   R.   Co.    (83   Fed.   249), 

335,   348,   395,   406. 
Farmers',    Merchants'    &    Shippers'    Club    v.    Atchison,    T.    &    S.    F.    R. 

Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  351),  90,  91,  105. 
Farmers'  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.  457), 

339,  383. 
Farrar  v.  East  Tenn.,   Va.  &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.    (1   I.  C.  C.   480,   1  I.  C.   R. 

764),   99. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  61 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Farrar  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  632),  96,  3X9,  348. 

Farrar  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  640),  99. 

Federal  Glass  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (38  I.  C.  C.  331),  207. 

Federal   Sugar   Refining  Co.   v.   B.   &   O.   R.   Co.    (17    I.   C.   C.   40.   20 

I.  C.  C.  200),  9,  197,  335,  343. 
Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.   (20  I.  C.  C.  200),  140, 

197,  343,  404. 
Federal   Sugar  Refining  Co.   v.  C.   of  N.   J.  R.  Co.    (35   I.   C.   C.   488), 

121,  194,  338,  344,  375. 
Federal  Trade  Commission  v.  Gratz   (258  Fed.  314,  252  U.  S.  — ,  64  U 

Ed.  — ,  40  Sup    Ct.  — ),  329. 
Fels  V.  P.  R.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  483),  254,  a92,  408. 
Fels  V.  P.  R.  Co.  (25  I.  C.  C.  154),  90. 
Ferguson  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.   M.  &  S.   R.  Co.    (IS   I.  C.  C. 

396,  398),   107. 
Fewell  V.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.   (7  I.  C.  C.  354),  348. 
Field  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.    (117  Fed.  925,  2  Fed.  Auti-Trust 

Dec.  192),  486. 
Field  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.   (194  U.  S.  618,  48  L.  Ed.  1142,  24 

Sup.  Ct.  784,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  555),  486. 
Field  V.  Clark  (143  U.  S.  649),  36  L.  Ed.  294,  12  Sup.  Ct.  495),  54. 
Field  V.  So.  R.  Co.   (13  I.  C.  C.  298),  442. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.  v.  Gage  (12  Gray  393),  133. 
Fitzgerald   v.   Fitzgerald,   etc..    Construction   Co.    (41    Neb.    374,    59    N. 

W.  838),  383. 
Five  Per  Cent.  Case  (31  I.  C.  C.  351,  32  I.  C.  C.  325),  82,  88,  141,  171, 

223,   259,  342,   398,   399. 
Flaccus  Glass  Co.  v.  Cleveland,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (14  1.  C.  C.  333),  339. 
Fleitmann  v.  United  Gas  Improvement  Co.   (211  Fed.  103),  492. 
Fleitmann  v.  Welsbach  Co.   (240  U.  S.  27,  60  L.  Ed.  505),  36  Sup.  Ct. 

233),  513. 
Fletcher  v.  Peck  (6  Cranch  10  U.  S.  107,  3  L.  Ed.  162),  7. 
Flint  V.    Stone-Tracy  Co.    (220   U.   S.   107,   55   L.   Ed.   389,   31   Sup.   Ct. 

S42),  59. 
Florida  Citrus  Ex.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  325).  174. 
Florida  E.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (234  U.  S.  167,  58  L.  Ed.  1267, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  867),  309,  312. 
I  lorida  Fruit  &  Vegf.table  Asso.  v.  A.  C.  L.  P.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  552), 

126. 
Flour  City  S.  S.  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  R.  Co.    (24   I.   C.   C.   179),   338,   346, 

347,  400. 
Folmer  &  Co.  v.  Great  Nor.  Ry.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  33),  358. 


62  Table  op  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Foot  V.  Buchanan   (113  Fed.   156,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.   103),  486. 
Foote  V.  Stanley   (232  U.  S.  494,  58  L.  Ed.  698,  34  Sup.  Ct.  377),  58. 
Forbes  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  566),  383. 
Ford  V.  M.  C.  R.  Co.   (19  L  C.  C.  507),  81. 

Ford  Motor  Co.  v.  Union  Motor  Sales  Co.   (244  Fed.   156,  156  C.  C.  A. 
584),  486. 

Foreman  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  (64  Minn.  371,  9  N.  W.  737),  49. 

Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  A.  A.  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  118),  392. 

Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  A.  A.  R.  Co.   (18  I.  C.  C.  205),  81,  88. 

Forster  Bros.  v.  Duluth,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.    (14  L  C.  C.  232),  383,  391. 

Fort  Scott  Industrial  Asso.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (29  I.  C.  C.  629),  348. 

Fort  Smith  Traffic  Bureau  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.   Co.    (13   I.  C.  C. 

651),  339. 
Foster  v.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (56  Fed.  434),  336. 
Foster  v.  Davenport  (22  How.  63  U.  S.  244,  16  L.  Ed.  248),  56. 
Fourche  River  Lumber  Co.  v.   Bryant  Lumber  Co.    (97  Ark.   623,   135 

S.  W.  796),  186. 
Fourche   River    Lumber    Co.    v.    Bryant   Lumber    Co.    (2S0    U.    S.    816, 

57  L.  Ed.  1498,  33  Sup.  Ct.  887),  186,  197,  371. 
Fourth  Section  Violation  in  Rates  on  Sugar  (31  I.  C.  C.  511),  348. 
Fourth   Section  Violation   in  S.  E.    (30  I.   C.  C.   153,  32  I.   C.   C.   61), 

108,  244,  348. 
Francis  v.   United   States    (188  U.   S.   375,  47  L.   Ed.   508,  23   Sup.   Ct. 

334),  58. 
Franke  Grain  Co.  v.  111.  C.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  625),  212,  358,  359,  360. 
Franklin  v.  P.  &  R.  R.  Co.  (203  Fed.  134),  407. 
Fraser  v.  Duffey  (196  Fed.  900),  486. 
Freeman  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.  (42  I.  C.  C.  736),  169. 
Freight  Bills  (29  I.  C.  C.  496),  403. 
Freight  Bureau   of  Cincinnati   v.   Cincinnati,   N.   O.   &   T.   P.  Ry.   Co. 

(6  I.  C.  C.  195,  4  I.  C.  R.  592),  100,  339,  352,  395,  648. 
Freight  Bureau  of  Cincinnati  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.   (7 

I.  C.  C.  180),  339,  346. 
Freight  Rates  from  Minnesota  Points  (32  I.  C.  C.  361),  6,  44. 
Frey  &  Sons  v.  Cudahy  Packing  Co.    (232  Fed.  640,  243  Fed.  205,  261 

Fed.  65),  496,  498,  505. 
Friedman  v.  United  States   (233  Fed.  429),  334. 
Fruit  Dispatch  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.  (48  I.  C.  C.  634),  207. 
Fry  V.  State  (63  Ind.  552),  37. 
Fullerton  Lumber  &  Shingle  Co.  v.  B.  B.  &  B.  C  R.  Co.   (25  I.  C.  C. 

376),  68. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  63 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

G. 

Gaines  v.  Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  471),  29,  346. 
Gallagher  v.  Keating  (27  Misc.  Rep.  131,  58  N.  Y.  Sup.  366),  13. 
Gallogly  V.  Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  1),  175,  383. 
Galloway  Coal  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  Co.  (40  I.  C.  C.  311),  144,  145a. 
Galloway  Co.  v.  G.  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  (48  I.  C.  C.  455),  205. 
Galveston  Com.  Asso.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  (25  I;  C.  C.  216),  175. 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry.  v.  Crow  (117  S.  W.  170),  439. 
Galveston,   H.   &   S.   A.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Texas    (210   U.   S.   217,   52   L.    Ea. 

1031,  28  Sup.  Ct.  638),  59. 
Galveston,  H.   &   S.   A.   R.   Co.  v.   Wallace,   223   U.   S.   481,   56   L.   Ed. 

516,  32  Sup.  Ct.  205,  117  S.  W.  169),  34,  292,  295,  439. 
Gamble-Robinson   Com.   Co.   v.   C.   &  N.   W.   R.   Co.    (168   Fed.    161,   94 

C.  C.  A.  217,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  982,  16  Ann.  Cas.  613),  176. 
Gardner  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  342),  346,  348,  383. 
Gardner  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  (231  Fed.  405),  440. 
Garrison  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (150  N.  C.  575,  64  S.  E.  578),  25. 
Gatton   V.    Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.    (95    Iowa    112,    62    N.    W. 

589,  28  L.  R.  A.  556,  5  I.  C.  R.  474),  383,  443. 
Geddes  v.  Anaconda  Copper  Mining  Co.    (245  Fed.  225,  157  C.   C.   A. 

417),  513. 
Geer  v.  Connecticut  (161  U.  S.  519,  40  L.  Ed.  793,  16  Sup.  Ct.  600),  58. 
General  Electric  Co.  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C.  237), 

143,  171,  205,  206,  404. 
General  Electric  Co.  v.  Wise    (119   Fed.   922,   2   Fed.   Anti-Trust   Dec. 

205),  486. 
General  Film  Co.  v.  Sampliner   (252  Fed.  443,  255  Fed.  242,  —  C.  C. 

A.  — ,  259  Fed.  152,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ,  250  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39 

Sup.  Ct.  — ),  492. 
Georgetown  Ry.  &  L.  Co.  v.   N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.    (22   I.   C.  C.   144),   95. 
Georgia  F.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Blish  Milling  Co.   (241  U.  S.  190,  60  L.  Ed. 

948,   36    Sup.   Ct.    541,   15    Ga.   App.   142,    82    S.    E.    784),   295,   440. 
Georgia  Fruit  Exchange  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  623),  115,  122. 
Georgia  Peach  Growers'  Asso.  v.  Atlantic   C.  L.  R.  Co.    (10   I.   C.   C. 

255),  88,  339. 
Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Smith   (70  Ga.  694),  63. 
Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Smith   (128  U.  S.  174),  32  L.  Ed.  377,  9  Sup. 

Ct.  47),  63. 
Gerke  Brewing  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (5  I.  C.  C.  596,  4  I.  C. 

R.  267),  348. 


64  Table  of  Oases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

German  Alliance  Ins.  .Co.  v.  Lewis   (23a  U.  S.  389,  58  L.  Ed.  1011,  34 

Sup.  Ct.  612 j,  43,  61. 
Gibbons  v.  Ogden  (9  Wheat  1,  6  L.  Ed.  23,  70),  2,  4,  15,  54,  62. 
Gibbs  V.  McNeeley   (102  Fed.  594,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  25),  492. 
Gibbs  V.  McNeeley    (118  Fed.  120,  55  C.  C.  A.  70,  60  L.  R.  A.   152,   2 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  194),  492. 
Gibbs  V.  McNeeley   (107  Fed.  210,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  71),  492. 
Gibson  v.   United    States    (166   U.   S.   260,   41   L.    Ed.   996,   17    Sup.    Ct. 

578),  54. 
Gile  &  Co.  V.  Sou.  Pac.  Co.    (22  I.  C.  C.  298),  244. 
Gill  Engraving  Co.  v.  Doerr  (214  Fed.  Ill),  486,  489. 
Gilman  v.  Philadelphia  (3  Wall.  70  U.  S.  713,  18  L.  Ed.  96),  54. 
Girard  Point  Storage  Co.  v.  Southwark  Foundry  Co.  (105  Pa.  248),  45. 
Glade  Coal  Co.  v.   Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.    (10   I.  C.  C.   226),  175,  339, 

-346. 
Gladson   v.    Minnesota    (166    U.    S.    427,    41    L.    Ed.    1064,    17    Sup.    Ct. 

627),  21. 
Globe  Soap  Co.  v.  A.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  (40  I.  C.  C.  121),  399. 
Gloucester  Ferry  Co.  v.  Penn.    (114   U.   S.   196.  29   L.   Ed.   158,  5   Sup. 

Ct.   826),   53. 
Glucose,  From  Chicago  (36  I.  C.  C.  379),  91. 

Goff-Kirby  Coal  Co.  v.  Bessemer  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  553),  383. 
Goldfield  Con.  Mines  Co.  v.  Goldfield  Miners'  Union  (159  Fed    500),  487. 
Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.   (26  I.  C.  C.  423),  206,  210. 
Goodrich  Transit  Co.   v.   Int.   Com.    Com.    (190   Fed.    943),    63,    65,    69, 

220,  226,   235,  310. 
Goshen  Rubber  Works  v.  Single  Tube  A.  &  B.  Tire  Co.   (166  Fed.  431, 

92  C.  C.  A.  183),  4,  86. 
Grain  Elevation  Allowances,  Kansas  City   (34  I.  C.  C.  442),  168. 
Grain  from  Missouri  Points  (43  I.  C.  C.  737),  396b. 
Grain  Rates  C.  F.  A.  Territory  (28  I.  C.  C.  549),  398. 
Grain  Shippers'  Asso.  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.   (8  I.  C.  C.  158),  82,  339,  383. 
Grain  to  Arkansas  Points   (40  I.  C.  C.  49),  396b. 

Grand  Rapids  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hunt  (38  Ind.  App.  657,  78  N.  E.  358),  15. 
Grand  Rapids  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States  (212  Fed.  577),  371. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States  (229  Fed.  116,  143  C.  C.  A.  392 

Ann.  Cas.  1917  B.  1094,  248  Fed.  905,  161  C.  C.  A.  — ),  481,  483. 
Grand  Trunk  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ind.   (221  U.  S.  400,  55  L 

Ed.  786,  31  Sup.  Ct.  537),  14,  15. 
Grand  Trunk  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mich.  R.  R.  Com.    (231  U.  S.   457,  58  L. 

Ed.  310,  34   Sup.  Ct.  152,  198  Fed.  1009),  14,  192. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  65 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Grand  Trunk  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Operation  Car  Ferry  (34  I.  C.  C.  54),  354. 
Graustein  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.   (45  I.  C.  C.  393),  208. 
Gray  v.  Col.  So.  Ry.  Co.   (204  S.  W.  347),  440. 

Great  Atlantic  &  Pac.  Tea  Co.  v.  Cream  of  Wheat  Co.  (227  Fed.  46,  141 
C.  C.  A.  594),  486. 

Greater    Des    Moines    Com.    v.    Chicago    G.    W.    Ry.    Co.    (14    I.    C.    C. 
294),  348. 

Greater  Des  Moines  Com.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C    C.  54).  118. 

Greater  New  York  Film  Rental  Co.  v.  Biograph  Co.  (203  Fed.  39,  121  C. 

C.  A.  375),   486. 
Great   Northern    Ry.    Co.    v.    Kalispell    Lumber    Co.    (165    Fed.    25,    91 

C.  C.  A.  63),  304,  443. 

Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Minnesota    (238  U.  S.  340,  59  L.   Ed.   1337 

S5  Sup.   Ct.   753),   9. 
Great  Northern   Ry.   Co.   v.   O'Connor    (232   U.    S.   508,   58   L.   Ed.    703, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  380),  158,  371. 
Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.   v.   United   States    (155   Fed.   945,   84   C.   C.  A. 

93),  371,  448. 
Great   Northern   Ry.   Co.   v.   United    States    (208   U.   S.    452,   52   L.   Ed. 

569,  28   Sup.  Ct.  313),  371,  448. 
Great   Western   R.   W.   Co.    v.   Grand   Trunk   R.   W.   Co.    (25   U.    C.    R. 

37),  352. 
Great  Western  Ry.  v.  Sutton   (38  L.  J.  Ex.  177,  L.  R.  4  H.  L.  226,  22 

L.  T.  43,  18  W.  R.  92),  133,  137,   158,  205,  345. 
Green  &  Son  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.   (40  I.  C.  C.  157),  214. 
Green    Bay    Business    Men's   Asso.    v.    Baltimore    &    O.    R.    Co.    (15    I. 

C.  C.  59),  3S9. 
Greenbaum  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (30  L  C.  C.  699),  383. 
Greenbaum  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.   (38  I.  C.  C.  715),  208. 
Green  v.  A.  &  V.  Ry.  Co.   (43  I.  C.  C.  662),  105,  183. 
Greenwall  v.  Weir   (111  N.  Y.  Sup.  235,  59  Misc.  Rep.   431,  130  N.  Y. 

App.  Div.  696,  115  N.  Y.  Sup.  311),  34,  439. 
Greer,    Mills    &    Co.    v.    Stoller    (77    Fed.    1,    1    Fed.    Anti-Trust    Dec. 

620),  489,   490. 
Griffin  Grocery  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (11  I.  C.  C.  522),  346,  348. 
Grosbeck  v.  Duluth  S.  S.  &  A.  R.  Co.    (251  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40 

Sup.  Ct.  — ),  47. 
Gulf  Atlantic  S.  S.  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (46  I.  C.  C.  309),  375. 
(Julf  &  I.  R.  Co.  V.  T.  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.   (93  Tex.  482,  56  S.  W.  328),  13. 
Gulf  Coast  Nav.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City  So.  Ry.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  544),  195. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Dennis    (224   U.   S.   503,   56   L.  Ed.   860,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  542),  32. 


G6  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Gulf,   C.   &   S.   F.  R.   Co.   V.   Dwyer    (75   Tex.   572,   12   S.   W.   1001,   7   L. 

R.  A.  478),  32. 
Gulf,  C.   &  S.   F.   R.   Co.   V.   Eddins    (7   Tex.   Civ.   App.    116,   26    S.   W. 

161),  32. 
Gulf,  C.   &  S.  F.   R.   Co.   V.   Fort   Grain   Co.    (72   S.   W.   419,   73    S.  W. 

845),  335. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Hefley   (158  U.  S.  98,  39  L.  Ed.  910,  15  Sup. 

Ct.  802),  180,  204,  212. 
Gulf,  C.   &   S.   F.   R.    Co.   V.   Miami    S.   S.   Co.    (86   Fed.    407,   30   C.   C. 

A.  142,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  823),  149,  347,  492. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Moore  (98  Tex.  302,  83  S.  W.  362,  4  Ann.  Cas. 

770),  383,  405. 
Gulf,   C.   &  S.   F.   R.   Co.   V.   State    (56   Tex.   Civ.   App.    353,    120   S.  W. 

1028),  14. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Texas   (204  U.  S.  403,  246  U.  S.  58,  51  L.  Ed. 

540,  62  L.  Ed.  574,  27  Sup.  Ct.  360,  38  Sup.  Ct.  236),  21,  41,  67,  335. 
Gump  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C.  98),  339,  348. 
Gund  &  Co.  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (25  I.  C.  C.  326),  346. 
Gustin  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  F.  Ry.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  277),  49,  99. 
Gustin  V.  Burlington  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  481),  348. 
Gustin  V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.   (7  I.  C.  C.  376),  338,  339. 
Gutierrez   v.   El   Paso  &  N.   E.    R.   Co.    (215   U.    S.   87,    54  L.   Ed.   106. 

30  Sup.  Ct.  21),  33. 
Guyton  &  Harrington  Mule  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (50  I.  C.  C.  546),  192. 

H, 

Haddock  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (3  I.  C.  R.  410),  389. 

Haddock   v.   Delaware,    L.    &   W.    R.   Co.    (4    I.    C.    C.    296,   3    I.   C.   R. 

302),  416. 
Hadley-Dean    Plate    Glass   Co.   v.    Highland    Glass    Co.    (143    Fed.    242, 

74  C.  C.  A.  462,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  994),  486. 
Hagan  v.  Blindell   (56  Fed.  696,  6  C.  C.  A.  86,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec. 

182),  489. 
Hale  V.   Hatch   &   North.  Coal   Co.    (204   Fed.    433,    122   C.   C.    A.    619). 

486,  492. 
Hale  V.  Henkel    (201  U.  S.  43,  50  L.  Ed.  652,  26  Sup.  Ct.  370,  2  Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  874),  486. 
Hale  V.  New  Jersey  Nav.  Co.  (15  Conn.  539,  39  Am.  Dec.  398),  55 
Hale  v.  O'Connor  Coal  Sup.  Co.   (181  Fed.  267),  492. 
Hall  v.  DeCuir  (95  U.  S.  5  Otto.  485,  24  L.  Ed.  547),  3,  29. 
Hall  v.  Geiger-Jones  Co.  (242  U.  S.  539,  61  L.  Ed.  480,  37  Sup.  Ct.  217), 

58. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  C7 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Halliday  Milling  Co.  v.  Louisiana  &  N.   W.   R.   Co.    (80   Ark.   5'M'.   1)8 

S.  W.  S74),  383. 
Hamilton  &  Brown  v.  Chattanooga,  R.  &  C.  R.  Co.    (4  I.  C.  C.   686,  3 

I.  C.  R.  482),  348. 
Hamlen  &  Sons  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  Co.    (212  Fed.  324),  358. 
Hammer  v.  Dagenhart   (247  U.  S.  251,  62  L.  Ed.  1101,  38  Sup.  Ct.  529, 

3  A.  L.  R.  649),  2,  41,  334b. 
Hammond    Packing  Co.   v.    Arkansas    (212    U.    S.   322,    53   L.    Ed.    530, 

81   Ark.   519,   26   Am.    St.   Rep.    1047,    100    S.    W.    407,    29   Sup.    Ct. 
370),  486. 
Hammond,  Standish  &  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.   (42  I.  C.  C.  102),  326. 
Hampton  Mfg.  R.  Co.  v.  Old  Dominion  S.  S.  Co.   (27  I.  C.  C.  666),  207. 
Hampton  v.   St.  L.   I.   M.  &  S.   R.  Co.    (227   U.   S.   456,   57   L.   Ed.   596, 

33  Sup.  Ct.  263),  26. 
Ilanley  v.   Kansas  City   S.   R.   Co.    (187   U.   S.   617,   47   L.    Ed.   333,   23 

Sup.  Ct.  214),  69,   335. 
Hannibal   Bridge  Co.  v.  United  States    (221  U.  S.   194,  55  L.  Ed.   699, 

31  Sup.  Ct.  603),  54. 
Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  v.  Husen  (95  U.  S.  465,  24  L.  Ed.  527),  58. 
Hans  Rees'  Sons  v.  S.  R.  Co.   (30  I.  C.  C.  585),  259. 
Hardaway  v.  S.  R.  Co.   (90  S.  C.  485,  75  S.  E.  1020),  297. 
Hardenberg,  D.  &  G.  v.  Northern  ?ac.  Ry.  Co.    (14  I.  C.  C.  579),  383. 
Hardwick  Farmers'   Elevator  Co.   v.   Chicago,  R.   I.   &  P.  R.   Co.    (110 

Minn.  25,  124  N.  W.  819,  19  Ann.  Cas.  1088),  4,  25. 
Hare  v.  L.  &  N.  W.  R.  W.  Co.  (2  J.  &  H.  480,  30  L.  J.  Ch.  817),  352. 
Harriman  Bros.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (128  S.  W.  932),  439. 
Harriman  v.   Int.   Com.  Com.    (211   U.   S.   407,   53   L.  Ed.   253,   29   Sup. 

Ct.  115),  78,  219,  299,  310,  389,  390,  432,  441,  447. 
Harriman  v.  Northern  Securities  Co.   (132  Fed.  464,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust 

Dec.  587),  489. 
Harriman  v.   Northern   Securities  Co.    (197   U.   S.   244,   49   L.  Ed.   739, 

25  Sup.  Ct.  493,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  669),  489. 
Hartman  v.  John  D.  Park  Sons   (145  Fed.  358,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec. 

999),  486. 
Hartman   Furniture   &   Carpet   Co.   v.   Wisconsin   Cent.   R.   Co.    (15   I. 

C.  C.  530),  218. 
Harvard  v.  Penn.  Co.  (4  I.  C.  C.  212,  3  I.  C.  R.  257),  111,  346. 
Harvey  v.   Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.    (5   I.   C.   C.  153,   2   I.   C.   R.   662,  3 

L  C.  R.  793),  342,  442. 
Harwell  v.  Columbus  &  W.  R.  Co.  (1  I.  C.  C.  236,  1  I.  C.  R.  631),  348. 
Haskell  v.  Kansas  Natural  Gas  Co.  (172  Fed.  545),  7. 


68  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Hastings   Malting   Co.   v.   Chicago,    M.   &   St.    P.   Ry.   Co.    (11   I.    C.   C. 
675),  339,  348,  395. 

Hatch  V.  Reardon   (204  U.  S.  152,  51  L.  Ed.  415,  27  Sup.  Ct.  188).  57. 

Hawkins  v.  Wheeling,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (9  I.  C.  C.  212),  175. 

Hayden  Bros.  Coal  Corp.  v.  D.  &  S.  L.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  94),  99a. 

Hays  V.  Penn.  Co.   (12  Fed.  309),  345,  346. 

Heard  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.   (1  I.  C.  C.  428,  1  I.  C.  R.  719),  346. 

Heard  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.   (3  I.  C.  C.  Ill,  2  I.  C.  R.  508).  346 

Heated  Car  Service  Regulations   (50  I.  C.  C.  620),  440. 

Heath  v.  Sandersville  R.  Co.  (Ga.)    (98  S.  E.  92),  440. 

Heckle  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (46  I.  C.  C.  513),  129. 

Heck  V.    East   Tenn.,   Va.   &   Ga.   Ry.   Co.    (1    I.   C.   C.    495,    5   I.  C.   R. 

775),  206,  335,  383,   403. 
Heider  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  556),  181. 
Heileman  Brewing  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  R.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  396),  348. 
Henderson  Cotton  Mills  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  399),  346. 
Hendrick  v.  Maryland    (235  U.  S.  610,  59  L.  Ed.  38.5,  32   Sup.  Ct.  140, 

4,  59. 
Hennepin  Paper  Co.  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  535),  177,  383. 
Hennington    v.    Georgia    (163    U.    S.    299,    41    L.    Ed.    106,    16    Sup.    Ct. 

1086),  17,  18. 
Herndon  v.   C.   R.  I.   &  P.   R.   Co.    (218   U.   S.   135,   54   L.   Ed.   970,   30 

Sup.  Ct.  633),  21. 
Herrick  Refrigerator  &  Cold  Storage  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  R.  Co.   (46  I.  C.  C.  ' 

421),  116. 
Hewins  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  221),  181,  346. 
Hewitt  &  Conner  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  431),  348. 
Heymann  v.    So.   Ry.   Co.    (203  U.   S.   270,   51   L.   Ed.    178,   27   Sup.   Ct. 

104),  58. 
Higbee  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  (179  Mo.  App.  195,  166  S.  W.  825),  340. 
Hill  V.  W.  S.  R.  Co.   (128  Ga.  705,  57  S.  E.  795),  43. 
Hill  &  Bro.  V.  Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.   (6  I.  C.  C.  343),  348. 
Hill,   (Audley),  &  Co.  v.  S.  R.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  225),  105. 
Hill   &  Morris   v.    St.   L.    S.   W.   R.    Co.    (—   Tex.    Civ.   App.  — ,   75    S, 

W.  874),  25. 
Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.   P.  R.  Co.    (19   I.  C.  C.   356,  23   I.  C.   C. 

186),   175,   208,   222,  266,   346,   383,   392,   394,   445. 
Hillsdale  Coal  and  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  186),  208. 
Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (229  Pa.  61,  78  Atl.  28),  208,  383. 
Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (237  Fed.  272),  383,  407. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  69 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Hilton  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.   Co.    (9   I.   C.  C.   17),  339, 

345,  346,  348. 
Hipolite  Egg  Co.   v.   United    States    (220   U.    S.    45,   55    L.   Ed.   3G4,   31 

Sup.  Ct.  364),  58,  383. 
Hires  Condensed  Milk  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.   (38  I.  C.  C.  441),  207.  266. 
Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Mitchell   (202  Fed.  512),  486. 
Hocking  Domestic  Coal  Co.  v.  K.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.   (44  I.  C.  C.  392),  346. 
Hocking  Valley  R.   Co.  v.   Lackawana   Coal   &  Lumber   Co.    (224    Fed 

930,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  lis. 
Hocking  V.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States    (210  Fed.  735,  127  C.  C.  A.  285), 

126,  345,  358,  370,  371. 
Hoke  V.  United  States   (227  U.  S.  308.  57  L.  Ed.  523.,  33  Sup.  Ct.  281, 

43  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    906.  Ann.  Cas.  1912  B,  669,  Ann.  Cas.  1913E, 

905),  2,  34. 
Holbrook    v.    St.    Paul,    M.   &    M.    R.    Co.    (1    I.    C.    C.    102,    1    I.    C.    R. 

323),  392. 
Holdzkom  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.   (9  I.  C.  C.  42),  346,  348. 
Holmes  &  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  561),  102,  339. 
Holmes  &  Hollowell  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  (37  I.  C.  C.  627),  6. 
Home   Tel.    Co.   v.    Granby    &   N.    Tel.    Co.    (114    Mo.    1111,    126    S.    W. 

773),  14,  327. 
Home  Tel.  Co.  v.  Peoples  Tel.  Co.  (125  Tenn.  270,  141  S.  W.  845),  a27. 
Home  Tel.  Co.  v.  Sarcoxie  Light  &  Tel.  Co.    (236  Mo.   114,   139   S.    VV. 

108),  327. 
Honolulu   R.   T.   &   L.   Co.   v.   Hawaii    (211    U.    S.   282,   53    L.   Ed.    186, 

29  Sup.  Ct.  55),  63. 
Hooker  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.    (209  Mass.  598,  95  N.  E.  945,  23  Ann.  Cas. 

699),  34,  439. 
Hooker   v.    Int.    Com.    Com.    (225    U.    S.    302,    56    L.    Ed.    1099,   32    Sup. 

Ct.  769),  308,  314,  460. 
Hooker  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.  (188  Fed.  242),  308,  314. 

Hope  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  696),  335,  383. 
Hope  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  265),  339. 
Hopkins  v.  United   States    (171  U.   S.   578,  43   L.   Ed.   290,  19   Sup.  Ct. 

40,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  941),  486. 
Horton  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.   (173  Ala.  231,  55  So.  531),  9. 
Horton  v.  T.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.   (225  Fed.  406),  337,  358. 

House  V.   Mays    (219   U.   S.   270,   55   L.   Ed.   213,   31    Sup.   Ct.   234).   57 
Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Dumas  (43  S.  W.  609),  180,  212. 
Houston  &   T.   C.   R.   Co.  v.  Mayes    (36   Tex.  Civ.   App.    606,   83   S.   W, 
53),  24. 


^^J  Table  of  Oases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Mayes  (201  U.  S.  321,  50  L.  Ed.  772,  26 
Sup.  Ct.  491),  24. 

Houston,  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (234  U.  S.  342,  58  L. 
Ed.  1341,  34  Sup.  Ct.  833),  2,  3,  9,  44,  62,  68,  140,  145,  184,  222,  259, 
336,  346. 

Howard  v.   111.   Cent.   R.   Co.    (207   U.   S.   463,   52   L.   Ed.   297,   28    Sup. 

Ct.  141),  22,  33,  62,  332. 
Howard  Mills  Co.  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  258),  91,  346. 
Howard  Supply  Co.  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.   (162  Fed.  688),  407. 
Howell  V.  New  York,  L.   E.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (2   I.  C.  C.  272,  2   I.   C.   R. 

162),  80,  88,  90,   105,  339,  346. 
Hoxie  V.   New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.    (73  Atl.  754,  82  Conn.  373), 

293. 

Hozier  v.  Caledonia  R.  Co.  (17  Sess.  Cas.  303,  1  Nev.  &  McN.  R. 
Cas.  27),  144. 

Hubinger  Bros.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  672),  345. 

Hudson  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.    (45  Misc.  520,  92  N.  Y  Sup. 

928.  106  App.  Div.  375,  94  N.  Y.  Sup.  545),  17. 
Hudson  V.  C.  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.    (226  Fed.  38),  440. 
Huerfano  Coal  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  (28  I.  C.  C.  502),  338,  344. 
Hughes  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  K.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (29  I.  C.  C.  671),  195,  401. 
Hull  Vehicle  Co.  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.   (28  I.  C.  C.  619),  181. 
Humboldt  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.  (39  Wash.  L.  Rep.  386),  335. 
Humboldt  S.  S.  Co.  v.  White  Pass  &  Y.  Route  (25  I.  C  C.  136),  195. 
Humphrey  Brick  &  Tile  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  (50  I.  C.  C    457),  106. 
Humphries  v.  Hopkins   (81   Cal.  551,  22  Pac.  892),  42. 
Hurlburt  v.   Lake   Shore  &  M.    S.   R.   Co.    (2   I.   C.   C.   122,   2   I.   C.   R. 

81),  392,  455. 

Huse  V.  Glover  (119  U.  S.  543,  30  L.  Ed.  487,  7  Sup.  Ct.  313),  56. 
Hussey  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.    (14  I.  C.  C.  215),  416. 
Hutchinson  Traffic  Bureau  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (43  I.  C.  C.  689),  139a. 
Hydraulic  Press  Brick  Co.  v.  M.  &  0.  R.  Co.    (19  I.  C.  C.  530),  96. 
Hydraulic  Press   Brick  Co.  v.   St.  Louis  &  S.  F.   R.   Co.    (13   I.  C.   C. 
342),  346. 

I. 
111.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Brooks-Scanlon  Co.  (241  Fed.  445,  154  C.  C.  A.  277),  170. 
111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson  Elevator  Co.    (138  Ky.   220    127  S.  W. 
779),  212. 

111.   Cent.   R.    Co.   v.    Henderson    Elevator    Co.    (226    U.    S.    441,    57    L. 

Ed.  290,  33  Sup.  Ct.  176),  204,  212,  358. 
111.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Hoppes  &  Sons   (233  Fed.  135,  358),  346a. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  71 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois    (163  U.  S.  142,  41  L.  Ed.  107,  16  Sup.  Ct. 

1096),  21. 
111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (206  U.  S.  441,  51  L.  Ed.  1128,  27 

Sup.  Ct.  700),  63,  90,  92,  102,  109,  170,  197,  207,  308,  312,  339,  346, 

395,  406,  486. 
111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (173  Fed.  930),  222    309. 
111.    Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Louisiana    R.    R.    Com.     (236    U.    S.    157,    59    L. 

Ed.  517,  35  Sup.  Ct.  275),  12,  14,  41,  192. 
111.  C.  R.  Co.  V.   Messina    (240   U.  S.   395,   60  L.   Ed.   709,   36    Sup.   Ct. 

368),   342. 
111.   Cent.   R.   Co.   v.   Mississippi   R.   R.   Com.    (138   Fed.   327,   70   C.   C. 

A.  617),  9. 
111.   Cent.   R.    Co.   v.    Mulberry   Hill    Coal    Co.    (257    111.    80,    100    N.   E. 

151),  174,  296,  405. 
111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Mulberry  Hill  Coal  Co.    (238  U.  S.  275,  59   L.   Ed. 

1306,  35  Sup.  Ct.  760),  25,   174,   175,  198,  296. 
111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Public  Utilities  Com.  of  111.  (245  U.  S.  493,  62  L.  Ed. 

425,  38  Sup.  Ct.   170),   44,  308b,  323,  335. 
Ilwaco  Ry.   &   Nav.    Co.   v.   Oregon    S.   R.    &    U.   N.    Ry.    Co.    (57    Fed. 

673,  6  C.  C.  A.  495),  346,  347. 
Imperial   Coal   Co.  v.  Pittsburg  &  L.   E.  R.   Co.    (2   I.   C.   C.   618,   2    I. 

C.  R.  436),  105,  348. 
Imperial  Film  Exchange  v.  General  Film  Co.  (244  Fed.  985),  492. 
Import  Rates  on  Manganese  Ore    (25  I.  C.  C.  663),  345. 
Independent  Refiners'   Asso.   v.   Penn.   R.   Co.    (6    I.   C.   C.    52,   4    1.   C. 

R.  162,  5  I.  C.  C.  415,  2  I.  C.  R.  294),  214,  345,  416. 
Independent   Refiners'   Asso.   v.   Western    N.   Y.    &   P.    R.    Co.    (5    I.   C. 

C.  415,  4  I.  C.  R.  162),  345,   352. 
Independent   Refiners'   Asso.   v.   Western    N.   Y.   &   P.   R    Co.    (6    I.   C. 

C.  378),  335,  345,  383,  407,  408. 
Indiana  Mfg.  Co.  v.  J.  I.  Case  Threshing  Mach.  Co.  (148  Fed.  21),  486. 
Indiana  Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.   (16  I.  C.  C.  155),  145, 

345. 
Indianapolis    Freight    Bureau    v.    Cleveland,    C.    C.    &    St.    L.    Ry.    Co. 

(15  I.  C.  C.   504),  118,   346. 
Industrial   Railways    Case    (29    I.    C.    C.    212,    32    I.    C.    C.    129,    34    I. 

C.  C.  596),  140,  171,   193,  232,  346. 
Ingersoll  &  Bro.  v.  McColl   (204  Fed.  147),  486. 
Inland  Nav.  Co.   v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.    (43   I.'C.   C.   588),   375. 
mman  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  Co.   (14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  39,  37  S.  W.  37),  17. 
Inman,  Akers  &  Inman  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C.  146),  404. 
Interior  Iowa  Cities  Case  (28  I.  C.  C.  64),  118. 


72  Table  of  Cases  Cited, 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Intermountain  Rates  Cases    (234   U.   S.   476,   58   L.  Ed.    1408,   34    Sup. 

Ct.  986),  244. 
Int.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  V.  Anderson  County   (246  U.  S.  424.  62  L.  Ed.  807, 

38  Sup.  Ct.  370),  9. 
International  &  G.   N.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Tex.    (99  Tex.  332.  89 

S.  W.  961,  86  S.  W.  16),  13,  17. 
International  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.    (152  Fed.  551),  383. 
International  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.    (162  Fed.  996),  134. 
Incernational  Harvester  Co.  v.  Kentucky   (147  Ky.  564,  795,  144  S.  W. 

1064,  146  S.  W.  12,  148  Ky.  572,  147  S.  W.  1199),  486. 
International   Harvester   Co.    v.    Ky.    (234    U.    S.    216,    58   L.    Ed.    1284, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  853),  486. 

International    Harvester    Co.    v.    Missouri    (237    Mo.    369,    141    S.    W. 
672),   486. 

International    Harvester   Co.    v.    Missouri    (234    U.    S.    199,    58    L.    Ed. 

1276,  34  Sup.  Ct.  854),  486. 
International  Harvester  Co.  v.  Oliver   (192  Fed.  59),  486. 
International  Paper  Co.  v.  D.  &  H.  Co.  (33  I.  C.  C.  270)    65,  335. 
International  Paper  Co.  v.  Massachusetts  (246  U.  S.  135.  62  L.  Ed.  624, 

38  Sup.  Ct.  292),  59. 

International  Text  Book  Co.  v.  Lynch   (81  Vt.  101,  60  Atl.  541),  2. 
International  Text  Book  Co.  v.  Pigg   (217  U.  S.  91,  54  L.  Ed.  678.  30 
Sup.  Ct.  481),  2. 

Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Ala.  Mid.  R.  Co.   (69  Fed.  227).  339,  346,  348. 
Int.  Com.   Com.   v.  Ala.  Mid.  R.  Co.    (74  Fed.   715,  21   C.   C.   A.   51,  41 

U.  S.  App.  453,  5  I.  C.  R.  685),  93,  339,  345,  346,  348. 
Int.   Com.    Com.   v.   Ala.   Mid.   R.   Co.    (168   U.    S.    144,   42    L.    Ed.   414, 

18  Sup.  Ct.  45),  93,   128,   137,  139,  153,  183,   199,   309.   312,  339,  345, 

346,  348,  406. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (50  Fed.  295),  248,  406. 
Int.    Com.    Com.   v.   Atchison,    T.    &    S.   F.    R.    Co.    (149    U.    S.    264.    37 

L  Ed.  727,  13  Sup.  Ct.  837),  388. 
Int.    Com.    Com.    v.    Atchison,    T.    &   S.   F.    R.    Co.    (234   U.    S.    294,    58 

L.  Ed.  1319,  34  Sup.  Ct.  814),  193,  197. 
Int.    Com.   Com.   v.   Baird    (194   U.   S.   25,    48   L.    Ed.    860,   24   Sup.   Ct. 

563),  130,  219,  299,  310,  389,  392,  458,  469. 
Int.    Com.    Com.   v.    Baltimore    &   O.    R.    Co.    (43    Fed.    37,    3    I.    C.    R. 

192),  88,  128,  144,  339,  345,  346,  358,  442,  444. 
Int.   Com.   Com.  v.   Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.    (145   U.   S.   263.    36   L.   Ed. 

699,   4   I.   C.   R.   92,    12   Sup.   Ct.   844),    93,   128.    133.    135,    136,    144, 

185,  339,  345,  346,  358,  S88,  442,  444. 
Int.   Com.  v.   Baltimore  &  O.   R.   Co.    (225   U.   S.   326,   57    L.   Ed.   1107, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  742),  138,  313,  345,  460. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  73 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Bellaire,  Z.  &  C.  Ry.  Co.    (77  Fed.  942),  335,  432. 
Int.   Com.   Com.   v.   Brimson    (154  U.   S.   447,  38   L.   Ed.    1047,   14   Sup. 

Ct.  1125),  63,  219,  299,  310,  335,  389,  390. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (128  Fed.  59),  .3.45. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.   (215  U.  S.  479.  54  L.  Ed.  291, 

30  Sup.  Ct.  163),  175,  198,  222,  313,  395. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (94  Fed.  272),  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (98  Fed.  173),  335,  337. 
Int.   Com.   Com.   v.   Chicago,   B.   &  Q.   R.   Co.    (103   Fed.   249,   43   C.   C. 

A.  209),  335,  337. 
Int.    Com.    Com.    v.    Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    (186    U.    S.    320,    46    L. 

Ed.  1182,  22  Sup.  Ct.  824),  10,  80,  80a,  358,  406. 
Int.   Com.    Com.    v.    Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.    (218    U.    S.    113,    54    L. 

Ed.  959,  30  Sup.  Ct.  660),  226,  463. 
Int.   Com.   Com.   v.   Chicago,   G.    W.   Ry.   Co.    (141    Fed.    1003),    85,    88, 

90,  91,  128,  339,  346. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago,   G.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (209   U.   S.   108,  52   L.  Ed. 

705,  28  Sup.  Ct.   493),   85,   93,  102,  105,  128,  339,  3-46,  348. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.   Chicago,  R.   I.   &  P.  Ry.  Co.    (218   U.   S.   88,   54   L. 

Ed.   946,   30   Sup.    Ct.    651),    107,    109,    125,    130,   207,   222,    226,   312, 

313,  463. 
Int.   Com.   Com.   v.   Cincinnati,    H.   &   D.    R.    Co.    (146   Fed.    559),    102, 

339,  345,  394,  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.   v.   Cincinnati,  H.  &   D.   R.   Co.    (206  U.   S.   142,   51   L. 

Ed.  995,  27  Sup.  Ct.  648),  102,  339. 
Int.   Com.  Com.  v.   Cincinnati,  N.   O.   &  T.   P.   Ry.   Co.    (56   Fed.   925), 

335,  348,  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.    (64  Fed.  981,   13 
U.  S.  App.  700),  335,  389,  394,  406. 
Int.   Com.   Com.  v.  Cincinnati,  N.   O.   &   T.   P.   Ry.   Co.    (76   Fed.    183), 

339,  352,  395. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.   Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.   P.   Ry.  Co.    (162   U.   S.   184, 

40  L.  Ed.  935,  16  Sup.  Ct.  700),  152,  199,  335,  348. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.    (167  U.  S.  479,  42  L.  Ed. 

243,  17  Sup.  Ct.  896),  61. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.    (167  U.   S.   479, 

42  L.  Ed.  243,  17  Sup.  896),  5,  43,  61.  63,  80,  222,  239,  389,  395. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Cincinnati,  P.  &  V.  R.  Co.  (124  Fed.  624),  346. 
Int.   Com.   Com.  v.   Clyde   S.  S.   Co.    (181   U.    S.   29,   45   L.   Ed.   729,   21 

Sup.  Ct.  512),  153,  199,  345,  346,  348,  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (64  Fed.  723),  346.  386,  406. 
]nt.  Com.  Com.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (166  Fed.  499),  346. 


74  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (216  U.  S.   531,  54   L.  Ed.   605, 

30  Sup.  Ct.  415),  191,  312,  338,  344,  345. 

Int  Com.  Com.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (220   U.   S.   235,   55   L.   Ed.   448, 

31  Sup.  Ct.  392),  138,  159,  222,  313,  344,  463. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  &  M.  R.  Co.   (167  U.  S.  633,  17  Sup. 

Ct.  986,  42  L.  Ed.  306),   128,  137,  153,   199,  335,  339,  345,  348,  358, 

392. 
Int.   Com.   Com.  v.  Diffenbaugh    (222   U.   S.   42,   56   L.   Ed.   83,  32   Sup. 

Ct.  22),  16,  168,  197,  312,  346,  404. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  East  Tenn.,  Vt.  &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.    (85  Fed.  107),  339, 

346,  348,  406. 
Int.   Com.    Com.   v.    East   Tenn.,   Va.    &   Ga.    Ry.    Co.    (99    Fed.    52,    39 

C.  C.  A.  413),  346,  348. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Goodrich  Transit  Co.   (224  U.  S.  194,  56  L.  Ed.  729, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  436),  27,  63,  65,  69,  220,  226,  235,  301,  310,  313,  314,  432. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Harriman  (157  Fed.  432),  390,  432. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Humboldt  S.  S.  Co.    (224  U.   S.  474,  56  L.  Ed.  849, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  556),  68,  301,  335. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (215  U.  S.  452,  54  L.  Ed.  280,  30  Sup. 

Ct.  155),  174,  175,  198,  222,  309,  311,  313,  346,  395,  396. 
Int.   Com.   Com.  v.   Lake   Shore  &   M.    S.   R.   Co.    (134   Fed.   942),   266, 

339,  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.   S.  R.  Co.    (202  U.   S.   613,   50  L. 

Ed.  1171,  26  Sup.  Ct.  865),  266. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Ry.  Co.  (49  Fed.  177),  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  V.  Lehigh  Valley  Ry.  Co.   (74  Fed.  784),  339,  395. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (73  Fed.  409),  339,  345,  346, 

392,  395,  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (101  Fed.  146),  406. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (102  Fed.  709),  346,  438,  406, 
Int.   Com.   Com.   v.   Louisville  &   N.   R.   Co.    (118    Fed.    613),   181,   214, 

346,  406. 
Int.   Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.    (190   U.   S.   273,   47   L.  Ed. 

1047,  23  Sup.  Ct.  687),  93,  128,  153,  183,  199,  346,  348. 
Int.   Com.   Com.  v.   Louisville  v.   N.   R.   Co.    (227   U.   S.   88,   57   L.   Ed. 

431,  33  Sup.  Ct.  185),  63,  103,  105,  222.  254,  256,  308a,  309,  313,  315, 

316,  392,  395,  396,  443,  463. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Nashville,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.   (120  Fed.  934),  339, 

346,  443,  463. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.   (216  U.  S.  538,  54  L.  Ed.  608,  30  Sup. 

Ct.  417),  120,  195,  313,  400,  463. 
Int.   Com.   Com.   v.    Peavy    (222   U.    S.    42,   56    L.   Ed.   83,   32    Sup.   Ct. 

22),  197. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  75 

[  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  (123  Fed.  9G9),  392. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Reichmann  (145  Fed.  2.>5),  335. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (74  Fed.  42),  462. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (123  Fed.  597),  338,  352,  40t;. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (132  Fed.  829),  352,  353,  358,  406. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  (137  Fed.  606),  352,  406. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (105  Fed.  703),  348,  406. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (117  Fed.  741),  346. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.    (122  Fed.  800,  60  C.  C.  A.  540), 

346. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Stickney    (215  U.  S.  98,  54  L.  Ed.   112,  30  Sup.  Ct. 

66),  10,  312,  358. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (52  Fed.  187),  339,  345,  346,  358. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.    (57  Fed.  948,  6  C.  C.  A.  653, 

20  U.  S.  App.  1,  4  I.  C.  R.  408),  339,  345,  346,  350,  358,  462. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Union  P.  R.  Co.    (222  U.  S.  541,  56  L.  Ed.  308,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  108),  309,  311,  315,  316,  463. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  United  States  ex  rel.  Humboldt  S.   S.  Co.    (224   U. 

S.  474,  56  L.  Ed.  849,  32  Sup.  Ct.  556),  68,  301,  308a,  335. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.    (88  Fed.  186).   153,  199,  345, 

346,  348. 
Int.    Com.    Com.   v.    Western    &   A.    R.    Co.    (93    Fed.    83,    35    C.    C.    A. 

217),  345,  346,  348,  389. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  (181  U.  S.  29,  45  L.  Ed.  729,  21 

Sup.   Ct.   512),   183,   345,   346,   389. 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (82  Fed.  192),  406. 
Interstate  Packing  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.   (42  I.  C.  C.  189),  169. 
Interstate  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mass.    (207  U.  S.  79,  52  L.  Ed.   Ill,  28  Sup.  Ct. 

26),  185,  345. 
Interstate  Remedy  Co.  v.  Am.  Ex.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  436).  358. 
Interstate  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Indianapolis  U;  Ry.  Co.    (99  Fed.  472), 

304,  335,  346. 
Investigation    &    Suspension    Docket    26     (Coal    Rates)     (22    I.    C.    C. 

604),  88. 
Investigation  of  Advances  in  Rates  on  Grain  (21  I.  C.  C.  22),  88,  91,  99. 
Investigation   of   Alleged   Unreasonable   Rates   on   Meat    (22    I.   C.   C. 

160),  91. 
Investigation    of    Alleged    Unreasonable    Rates    on    Meat    (23    I.    C.    C. 

656),  142. 
Iowa  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C.  172,  42  I.  C.  C. 

389),  143,  347,  391b. 


76  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Iowa  Railroad  Com.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (36  I.  C.  C.  79),  440. 

Iowa  V.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.  (46  I.  C.  C.  595),  118. 

Iron  Ore  Rate  Cases  (41  I.  C.  C.  181),  85,  89a,  358. 

Irvine  v.  Postal  Tel.  &  Cable  Co.   (173  Pac.  487),  182. 

Irving  V.  Neal  (209  Fed.  471),  489. 

J. 
Jackson  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  Co.  (42  I.  C.  C.  155),  396b. 
Jackson  v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (1  I.  C.  C.  184,  1  I.  C.  R.  599),  392. 
Jacobson  v.  Wis.  M.  &  P.  R.  Co.    (71   Minn.  519,  74   N.  W.   893,  40  L. 

R.  A.  389,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  358),  13,   14,  49. 
Jacoby  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  392),  175,  208,  408. 
James  &  Abbott  v.  Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co.    (5   I.  C.  C.   612,   4   I.   C.   R. 

274),  383. 
James   &   Mayer   Buggy   Co.   v.   Cincinnati,   N.    0.   &   T.   P.    R.    Co.    (4 

I.  C.  C.  744,  2  I.  C.  R.  625,  3  I.  C.  R.  682),  335,  348. 
James  v.  W.  &  O.  D.  Co.  (44  I.  C.  C.  570),  337,  396a. 
Janesville  Clothing  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.    (26   I.   C.   C.   628),  209, 

244,  348. 
Jannen    v.    State    (42    Tex.    Civ.    App.    631,    51    S.    W.    1126,    62    S.    W. 

419),  37. 
Jayne  v.   Loder    (149    Fed.   21,   78   C.   C.   A.    653,    7   L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.) 

984),  492. 
Jerome  Hill  Cotton  Co.  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  601),  49, 

339,  348. 
Jewett  Bros.  &  Jewett  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.    (156  Fed.  160), 

304,  442. 
John  D.  Park  &   Sons  Co.  v.  Hartman    (153  Fed.  24,  82  C.  C.  A.   158, 

12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)   1135),  486. 
Johnson-Brown  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (239  Fed.  590),  182,  346a,  358. 
Johnson  v.  Chicago  &  P.  El.  Co.   (119  U.  S.  388,  30  L.  Ed.  447,  7  Sup. 

Ct.  254),  56. 
Johnson  v.  Chicago,   St.   Paul,  etc.,  R.  Co.    (9   I.  C.   C.   221),    346,  350, 

358,  383. 
Johnson  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (Ill  Me.  263,  88  Atl.  988),  371. 
Johnson  v.  Pensacola  &  P.  R.  Co.    (16  Fla.  623),  133. 
Johnson  v.  Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  (73  S.  C.  36,  52  S.  E.  644),  9,  30. 
Johnson  v.   Southern   Pac.   Co.    (196   U.   S.   1,   49   L.   Ed.    363,   25    Sup. 

Ct.  158),  403. 
Johnson  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (69  S.  C.  322,  48  S.  E    260),  34. 
Johnson  v.  United  States  (215  Fed.  679),  2. 
Johns-Pratt  Co.  v.  Sachs  &  Co.  (176  Fed.  738),  486. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  77 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Johnston-Larimer   Dry   Goods   Co.   v.   Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.   R.   Co.    (6 

I.  C.  C.  568),  346,  348. 
Johnston-Larimer  Dry   Goods  Co.  v.   Atchison,   T.  &   S.   F.   R.   Co.    (1^ 

I.  C.  C.  47),  346,  348. 
Johnston-Larimer    Dry    Goods    Co.    v.    Atchison,    T.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co. 

(12  I.  C.  C.  188),  416. 
Johnston-Larimer    Dry    Goods    Co.    v.    New    York    &    Tex.    S.    S.    Co. 

(12  L  C.  C.  58),  346,  348. 
Johnston-Larimer  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.    (12   L  C.  C.   51), 

346. 
Joice  &  Co.  V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  239),  383. 
Joint  Rates  with  Birmingham  S.  Ry.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C.  110),  170. 
Joint   Traffic  Asso.   Case    (171   U.   S.   505,   569,   43   L.   Ed.   259,   19   ^up. 

Ct.  25,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  859),  92,  327,  352. 
Jones  V.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co.   (3  C.  B.  N.  S.  718),  144. 
Jones  V.  Van  Winkle  (131  Ga.  336,  62  S.  E.  2S6),  489. 
Joynes  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  361),  208,  395. 
Jubitz  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  44),  117,  213. 
Junod  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (47  Fed.  290),  348,  383. 
Jurisdiction  Over  Urban  Elec.  Lines  (33  I.  C.  C.  536),  337. 

K. 
Kalispel  Lumber  Co.  v.  Great  N.  R.  Co.  (157  Fed.  845),  304,  307,  442. 
Kambeitz  v.  United  States  (262  Fed.  378,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  334. 
ICane  v.  New  Jersey  (242  U.  S.  160,  61  L.  Ed.  222,  37  Sup.  Ct.  30),  594. 
Kanotex  Refining  Co.   v.   A.   T.   &  S.   F.  R.   Co.    (34  I.   C.   C.   271),  41, 

68,  335. 
Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  073),  99. 
Kansas-California  Flour  Rates  (29  I.  C.  C.  459,  32  I.  C.  C.  G02),  91. 
Kansas,  C.  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Stile    (242  U.  S.  Ill,  61  L.  Ed.  176.  37 

Sup.  Ct.  58),  59. 
Kansas  City  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (46  I.  C.  C.  464), 

146a. 
Kansas  City  v.  K.  C.  V.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (24  I.  C.  C.  22),  337.  400 
Kansas  City  Hay  Dealers'  Asso.  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.    (14  I.  C.  C. 

597),  115,  339. 
Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Albers  Com.  Co.    (79  Kan.  59.  99  Pac.  819), 

212. 
Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Albers  Com.  Co.    (223   U.   S.   573,  56  L.   Ee. 

556,  32  Sup.  Ct.  316),  204,  212,  358. 
Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson    (233  U.  S.  825.   58  L.  Ed.  983,  34 

Sup.  Ct.  599,  104  Ark.  500,  148  S.  W.  58),  35. 


78  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carl    (227  U.  S.  639,   57  L.  Ed    68S,  33  Sup. 
Ct.  391),  32,  439. 

Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  State  (27  Ok.  806,  117  Pac.  207),  30. 

Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Tonn   (102  Ark.  20,  143  S.  W.  577),  216,  297. 

Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (231  U.  S.  423,  58  L.  Ed.  296, 

34   Sup.   Ct.   125,   204   Fed.   G41),   27,   G3,   64,   66,   220,   226,   235.   252. 

301,  313,  314,  335. 

p:ansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (204  Fed.  641,  250  U.  S.  — ,  64 

L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  233,  264,  432. 
Kansas   City   S.   W.   R.   Co.   v.   Kaw-Valley   Drainage   Dist.    (233   U.   S. 

75,  58  L.  Ed.  857,  34  Sup.  Ct.  564),  ^4. 
Kansas-Iowa  Brick  Rate    (28  I.  C.  C.  285),  399. 

Kansas  City  Traffic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  491),  266. 
Kansas  City  Transp.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  195,  204), 

107,  118. 
Kauffman  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (4  I.  C.  C.  417,  3  I.  C.  R.  400),  346. 
Kauffman   Commercial   Club  v.   T.   &  N.   O.   R.  Co.    (31   I.   C.   C.   167), 

183. 
Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  of  G.  R.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  450),  170,  211. 
Kaw  River  Sand  &  Material  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.    (42  I.  C.  C. 

504),  399. 

Kellogg  Toasted  Corn  Flakes  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  Co.  (24  I.  C.  C.  604),  244, 
348. 

Kellogg  Toasted  Corn  Flake  Co.  v.  Buck   (208  Fed.  383),  486. 
Kemble  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.   (8  I.  C.  C.  110),  335,  345,  348,  358. 
Kendall  v.  United  States  (12  Pet.  37  U.  S.  584,  9  L.  Ed.  1181),  301. 
Kennebec  Water  Co.  v.  Waterville  (97  Me.  185,  54  Atl.  6),  84. 
Kentucky   &  Indiana   Bridge  Co.  v.    Louisville  &   N.   R.   Co.    (37    Fed. 

567,  2  L.  R.  A.  289,  2  I.  C.  R.  351),  65,  149,  294,  335,  337,  345,  347, 

389,  395,  397,  406. 
Kentucky   &  Indiana   Bridge   Co.   v.   Louisville   &   N.   R.    Co.    (2    I.   C. 

C.  162,  2  I.  C.  R.  102),  335,  337,  347. 
Keokuk  Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk   (95  U.  S.  80,  24  L.  Ed.  377),  56. 
Ketchum  v.  Denver  &  R.  G.  Co.  (248  Fed.  106,  160  C.  C.  A.  246),  343, 

492,  513. 
Kiel  Woodenware  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.   (18  I.  C.  C.  242),  358. 
Kile  &  Morgan  v.  Deepwater  Ry.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  235).  218,  408. 
Kindel  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  475),  83,  90,  111,  339,  346. 
Kindel  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (9  I.  C.  C.  606),  83,  346,  348 
Kindel  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  608),  346,  348. 
Kindel  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  555),  117. 


Table  op  Cases  Cited.  79 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

King  V.   New   York,   N.   H.   &   H.    R.   Co.    (4    I.   C.   C.   251,   3    I.  C.   R. 
272),    348. 

Kinnavey  v.  Terminal  R.  Assu.  of  St.  Louis    (81   Fed.   802),  339,  345, 
358,  383. 

Kinsley  v.  Buffalo,  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (37  Fed.  181),  345,  346. 

Kinzell  v.  C.  M.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.   (—  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct. 

— ),  24. 
Kirby  v.  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (241  111.  418,  90  N.  E.  252),  346. 
Kirkpatrick  v.  State   (138  Ga.  794,  76  S.  E.  53),  58. 
Kiser  v.  Cent,  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.   (158  Fed.  193),  304,  395,  442. 
Knauer  v.  United  States  (2.^7  Fed.  8,  150  C.  C.  A.  210),  486,  500. 
Knott  V.   C.   B.   &   Q.   R.   Co.    (230   U.    S.   474,    57   L.   Ed.    1571,   33   Sup. 

Ct.  975),  45,  84,  480c. 
Knoxville  v.  Knoxville  Water  Co.   (212  U.  S.  1,  53  L.  Ed.  371,  29  Sup. 

Ct.  148),  45,  47,  50,  82,  85. 
Knoxville  Water  Co.   v.   Knoxville    (189   U.    S.   434,   47   L.   Ed.   887,   23 

Sup.  Ct.  531),  45. 
Knudsen     Ferguson  Fruit  Co.  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.    (149 

Fed.  973,  79  C.  C.  A.  483),  80,  205,  215,  383. 
Knudsen-Ferguson  Fruit  Co.   v.   Chicago,   St.   P.  M.   &   O.   R.   Co.    (204 

U.  S.  670,  51  L.  Ed.  672,  27  Sup.  Ct.  786),  205,  383. 
Knudsen-Ferguson  Fruit  Co.   v.   Mich.   Cent.   R.   Co.    (148  Fed.   968,   79 

C.  C.  A.  483),  358,  383. 
Koch    Secret    Service    v.    Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    (13    I.    C.    C.    523), 

346,  383. 
Koehler,  Ex  parte  (30  Fed.  867),  335,  340. 
Koehler,  Ex  parte  (31  Fed.  315,  12  Sawy.  446),  346,  348. 
Kohl  V.  United  States   (91  U.  g.  367,  23  L.  Ed.  449).  7. 
Kroger  Grocery  &  Baking  Co.  v.  Retail  Clerks  (250  Fed.  890),  486,  517. 
Kyle  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (84  Neb.  621,  122  N.  W.  37),  20. 

L. 

La  Crosse  Mfrs.  &  Jobbers  Union  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.    (11 

L  C.  C.  629,  2  I.  C.  R.  9),  106,  339. 
La  Crosse  Shippers'  Assn.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.   (38  I.  C.  C.  453,  44  I. 

C.  C.  512),  44,  134. 
LaFarier  v.  G.  T.  R.  Co.   (84  Me.  284,  24  Atl.  848),  37. 
LaFayette  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  A.  &  V.  Ry.  Co.   (39  L  C.  C.  619), 

399. 
LaFayette  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  L.  W.  R.  Co.  (41  I.  C.  C.  297),  348. 
La  Grange  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  A.  &  W.  P.  R.  Co.    (28  I.  C    C. 

178),  108. 


80  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Laird  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (121  Md.  193,  88  Atl.  348),  51. 

Lake  &  Rail  Rate  Cancellations   (44  I.  C.  C.  745,  42  I.  C.  C.  513),  65, 

396b. 
Lake  Cargo  Coal  Rate  Case  (22  I.  C.  C.  604),  99. 
Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Cluggish  (143  Ind.  347),  42  N.  E.  743),  54. 
Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (61  Fed.  885),  54. 
Lake  Line  Applications  Panama  Canal  Act  (33  L  C.  C.  699),  354. 
Lake   Shore   &  M.   S.   R.   Co.   v.   Cincinnati,    S.   &   C.   R.   Co.    (30   Ohio 

St.  604),  45. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ohio   (165  U.  S.  305,  41  L.  Ed.  747,  17 

Sup.  Ct.  357),  53. 
Lake   Shore  &  Mich.   So.   R.    v.   Ohio    (173   U.    S.   285,    43   L.    Ed.    702, 

19  Sup.  Ct.  465),  21. 
Lake   Shore  &  Mich.   So.  R.   Co.  v.   Smith    (173  U.   S.   684,   43   L.   Ee. 

858,  19  Sup.  Ct.  565),  38,  442. 
Lake   Shore  &   Mich.    So.   R.   Co.   v.   Smith    (114   Mich.   460,   72   N.   W. 

328),  38. 

Lakewood  Engr.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  Co.   (259  Fed.  61),  364. 

Lamar  v.  United  States   (260  Fed.  561,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ,  251  U.  S.  — ,  64 

L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  486. 
Lamb-Fish  Lumber  Co.  v.  Transcontinental  Frt.   Bureau    (53   L   C.   C. 

217. 
Lamb,  McGregor  &  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  346),  213. 
Landon  v.  Public  Util.  Com.  of  Kansas  (234  Fed.  152,  242  Fed.  658,  245 

Fed.  950),  2,  44,  45,  46,  335. 
Lane  v.  Leiter   (237  Fed.  149),  486. 
Langdon  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (194  Fed.  48G),  140. 
Laning-Harris    Coal    &    Grain    Co.    v.    Me.    ?ac.    Ry.    Co.    (13    L    C.    C. 

154),  117,  339,  383. 
Laning-Harris  Coal   &   Grain   Co.   v.    St.    Louis   &   S.   F.   R.   Co.    (15   I. 

C.  C.  37),  205,  207,  383. 
Larabee  Flour   Mills   Co.   v.   Mo.   Pac.   Ry.   Co.    (74   Kan.    808,   88   Pac. 

72),  9,  296. 
larrison  v.  Chicaoo,  etc.,  R.  Co.    (I'l.  C.  C.  1-47,  1  L  C.  R.  369),  345, 

368,  444. 
Larsen   Canning   Co.    (Wm.)    v.   Chicago   &   N.    W.   Ry.    Co.    (13    I.    C. 

C.  286),  383. 
Larson  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  N.  R.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  474),  358. 
Larus  &  Bros.  Co.  v.  American  Tob.  Co.   (163  Fed.  712),  486. 
La  Salle,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  610),  205, 

206,  358,   383,  392. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  81 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Laser  Grain  Co.  v.  United  States   (250  Fed.  826),  385. 

Lathrop  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  250),  69,  210. 

Latta  V.  C,  St.  P.,  M.  &  0.  R.  Co.  (172  Fed.  850,  97  C.  C.  A.  198),  439. 

Laughter  &  Fisher  v.  McLain  (229  Fed.  280),  58. 

Laundrymen's  Nat'l.  Assn.  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.   (45  I.  C.  C.  361),  146a. 

Lawlor  v.  Loewe  (209  Fed.  721,  126  C.  C.  A.  445),  486,  492. 

Lawlor    v.    Loewe    (235    U.    S.    522,    59    L.    Ed.    341,    35    Sup.    Ct.    170) 

486,   492. 
Leech  v.  Louisiana   (214  U.  S.  175,  29  S.  Ct.  552,  53  L.  Ed.  956),  56. 
Legality  of  Express  Franks  (50  I.  C.  C.  599),  342. 
Lehigh  C.  &  N.  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.   (50  I.  C.  C.  543),  404. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.   Am.   Hay  Co.    (219   Fed.   539,  135   C.   C.   A.   307), 

208,  383,  394. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark   (207  Fed.  717,  125  C.  C.  A.  235),   206,  208, 

251,  317,  383,  394,  407. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Meeker   (211  Fed.  785),  317,  383,  394,  407,  408. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.   Penn.    (145  U.   S.   192,  36   L.   Ed.  672,  4   1.   C.   R. 

87,  12   Sup.  Ct.  806),  69,  335. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Rainey  (112  Fed.  487),  345,  346,  383. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (187  Fed.  1006,  109  C.  C.  A.  211),  481. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (188  Fed.  879),  25,  138,  186,  371. 
Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (243  U.  S.  412,  444,  61  L.  Ed.  819.  839, 

37  Sup.  Ct.  397),  308a,  309,  312,  354,  364. 
Lehmann-Higginson   Gro.    Co.   v.   Atchison,   T.    &    S.   F,   R.    Co.    (10    I. 

C.  C.  460),  346,  348. 
Lehmann,   Higginson  &  Co.   v.    Southern   Pac.   Co.    (4   I.   C.   C.  1,   3   I. 

C.  R.  80),  339,  358,  361. 
Lehmann,    Higginson    &    Co.    v.    Tex.    &    Pac.    Co.    (5    I.    C.    C.    44,    3 

I.  C.  R.  706),  348,  350,  356,  358. 
Leisy  v.  Hardin   (135  U.  S.  100,  34  L.  Ed.  128,  10  Sup.  Ct.  681),  58. 
Lennon,  Ex  parte  (G4  Fed.  320,  22  U.  S.  App.  561),  347 
Lennon,  Ex  parte  (166  U.  S.  548,  41  L.  Ed.  1110,  17  Sup.  Ct.  658),  347. 
Leonard  v.  Chicago,  M.  St.  P.  Ry.  (12  L  C.  C.  492),  383. 
Leonard  v.  Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  573),  335. 
Leovy  v.  United   States    (92   Fed.   344,  34  C.  C.  A.  392.   177   U.   S.  021, 

44  L.  Ed.  914,  20  Sup.  Ct.  797),  53. 
Lexington  Gro.  Co.  v.   So.  Ry.  Co.    (136  N.  C.  396,   48   S.  E.  801),  25. 
Lighterage  &  Storage  Regulations  at  New  York    (35  L  C.  C.  47),  140. 
Lilly  Co.  V.  N.  P.  R.  Co.  (64  Wash.  689,  117  Pac.  401),  297. 
Lincoln  Board  of  Trade  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.    (2  L  C.  C.  147,  2   I.  0. 

R.  95),  346. 


82  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Lincoln  Creamery  Co  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.    (5  I.  C.  C.  15G,  3  I.  C.  ll. 

794),  110,  339. 
Lindsay  Bros.  v.  B.  &  0.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  6),  209. 
Lindsay  Bros.  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  Ind.  Ry.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  182),  339. 
Lippman  &  Co.  v.  111.   Cent.   R.  Co.    (2   I.   C.  C.   584.  2   I.  C.   R.   414), 

105,  339,  345. 

Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.   East  Tenn.,   Va.   &  Ga.   Ry.   Co.    (3   I.  C. 

C.  1,  2  I.  C.  R.  454),  338. 
Little  Rock  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  East  Tenn.,   Va.   &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.    (47   Fed. 

771),  338,  346,  347,  389. 
Little   Rock    &    M.    R.    Co.    East    Tenn.,    Va.    &    Ga.    Ry.    Co.    (159    U. 

S.  698,  40  L.  Ed.  311,  16  Sup.  Ct.  189),  346,  347. 
Little  Rock,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.    (41  Fed.   559),  347, 

389,  397. 
Little  Rock  &  M.   R.   Co.   v.    St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.   Ry.   Co.    (59   Fed. 

400),  149,  346,  347. 
Little  Rock  &   M.  R.   Co.  v.    St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.   Ry.    Co.    (63    Fed. 

775,  11  C.  C.  A.  417,  26  L.  R.  A.  192),  149,  189,  346,  347. 
Little   Rock   Chamber  of  Commerce   v.   C.   M.   &   St.   R.  Co.    (26    I.   C. 

C.  341),  99. 

Little  Rock  Freight  Bureau  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.   (51  I.  C.  C.  23),  181. 
Live  Poultry  &  Dairy  Shippers'  Traffic  Asso.  v.  A.  T.  &  S   R.  Ry.  Co.  (49 

I.  C.  C.  228),  259. 
Live  Stock  Classification   (47  I.  C.  C.  335),  34a,  440. 
Live  Stock  from  Nashville   (48  I.  C.  C.  277),  109. 
Live  Stock  Rates  from  Colorado  (35  I.  C.  C.  682),  259,  398. 
Loch-Lynn  Construction  Co.  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  396),  346. 
Locke's  Appeal   (72  Pa.  St.  491),  54. 
Locomobile   Co.   v.   Massachusetts    (246   U.    S.    146,    62    L.    Ed.    631,   38 

Sup.  Ct.  298),  59. 
Loder  v.  Jayne   (142  Fed.  1010,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  563,  142  Fed. 

216,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  854),  486. 
Loeb  v.  Eastman  Kodak  Co.  (183  Fed.  704,  106  C.  C   A.  142),  492. 
Loewe  v.  Lawlor   (130  Fed.  633,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  563,  142  Fed. 

216,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  854),  486. 

Loewe  v.  Lawlor   (209  Fed.  721),  486,  492. 

Loewe  V.  Lawlor  (208  U.  S.  274,  52  L.  Ed.  488,  28  Sup.  Ct.  301),  486. 
492. 

Loewe  v.  Lawlor   (223  U.  S.  729,  56  L.  Ed.  633,  32  Sup.  Ct.  527),  492. 

Loewe  v.  Lawlor  (235  U.  S.  522,  59  L.  Ed.  341,  35  Sup.  Ct.  170),  486,  492. 

Loftus  v.  Pullman  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  135),  88,  124. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  83 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Loftus  V.  Pullman  Co.   (19  I.  C.  C.  102),  50. 

Logan  et  al.  Com.  of  Northwestern  Grain  Asso.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

R.  Co.   (2  I.  C.  C.  604,  2  L  C.  R.  431),  102,  339,  346. 
Logan  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (154  Fed.  497),  175,  395. 
Long  V.  Miller   (262  Fed.  362),  53. 
Long  V.  So.  Ex.  Co.   (201  Fed.  441),  304,  443. 
Loomis  V.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.   (240  U.  S.  43,  60  L.  Ed.  517,  36  Sup.  Ct. 

228),   292,   294,   404. 
Looney  v.  Eastern  Texas  R.  Co.  (247  U.  S.  214,  62  L.  Ed.  1084,  38  Sup, 

Ct.  460),  44,  321. 
Lord  V.  Goodall,  N.  &  P.  S.  Co.  (102  U.  S.  541,  26  L.  Ed.  224),  335. 
Los  Angeles  Switching  Case    (234  U.  S.  294,  58  L.  Ed.  1319,  34   Sup. 

Ct.  814),  113. 
Lotsfreich  v.  C.  R.  &  B.  Co.    (73  Ala.  306),  14. 

Loud  V.  South  Caro.  R.  Co.  (5  I.  C.  C.  529,  4  I.  C.  R.  205),  88,  339,  383. 
Louisiana  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (209  Fed.  244),  140. 
Louisiana   R.   &   N.    Co.    v.   R.   R.   Com.    of   La.    (121    La.    849,    49    So. 

884),  9. 
Louisiana  v.  Texas  (176  U.  S.  1,  44  L.  Ed.  347,  20  Sup.  Ct.  251),  58. 
Louisiana  State  Rice  Milling  Co.  v.  M.  L.   &  T.  R.  Co.    (34   I.  C.   C. 

511),    440. 
Louisville  B.  of  T.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (40  I.  C.  C.  679),  12,  192,  338,  347. 
Louisville  v.  Cumberland  Tel.  Co.    (225  U.   S.  430,  56  L.  Ed.  1151,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  741),  47,  50. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Alabama  (208  Fed.  35),  60. 
Louisville  v.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Behlmer    (169  U.  S.  644,  42  L.  Ed.  889,  18 

Sup.  Ct.  502),  93,  153,  199,  335,  406. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Behlmer    (175  U.  S.   648,  44  L.  Ed.  309,  20 

Sup.  Ct.  209),  92,  109,  128,  199,  312,  335,  348,  406. 
Louisville  N.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Bitterman   (144  Fed.  34,  75  C.  C.  A.  192),  37. 
Louisville   &   N.   R.   Co.   v.   Central   Stock   Yards   Co.    (212    U.    S.    132, 

53  L.  Ed.  441,  29  Sup.  Ct.  246,  133  Ky.  148,  97  S.  W.  778),  13,  14. 
Louisville   &   N.    R.'  Co.   v.    Cook    Brewing   Co.    (223    U.    S.    70,    56    L. 

Ed.  355,  32  Sup.  Ct.  189,  172  Fed.  117,  96  C  C.  A.  322,  40  L.  R. 

A.   (N.  S.)   798),  58,  296. 
Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v.    Dickerson    (191    Fed.    705,    112    C.    C.    A. 

295),  218. 
Louisville   &  N.   R.   Co.  v.   Eubank    (184   U.   S.   27,  46   L.   Ed.   416,   22 

Sup.  Ct.  277),  44,  52,  259. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Finn   (235  U.  S.  601,  59  L.  Ed.  379,  35  Sup. 

Ct.  147),  48,  101,  103. 


84  Table  of  Cases   Ctted. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Louisville   &  N.   R.   Co.   v.  Garrett    (231   U.   S.   298,   58   L.   Ed.   229,   34 

Sup.  Ct.  48),  45,  47,  52,  84,  320,  453. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.   v.   Georgia    (140   Ga.   817,   80   S.   E.   327,  ^nn. 

Gas.  1915A,  1018),  38. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.   v.  Higdon    (234   U.   S.   592,   58   L.   Ed.    1484.   34 

Sup.  Ct.  948),  344. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes  (201  Fed.  727),  9. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   v.   Int.  Com.  Com.    (108   Fed.   988,  46  C.  C.  A. 

685),   511. 

Louisville   &    N.   R.    Co.    v.    Int.    Com.   Com.    (184    Fed.    118),    63,    105, 
254,  392. 

Louisville  v.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (195  Fed.  541),  63,  105.  222, 

254,  392,  395. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kentucky    (21  Ky.  Law  Rep.  232,   51  S.  W. 

164,  1012,  106  Ky.  633,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  236),  52. 
Louisville   &   N.   R.   Co.   v.   Kentucky    (161   U.    S.    677,   40   L.    Ed.    849, 

16  Sup.  Ct.  714),  11. 

Louisville  &   N.    R.    Co.    v.   Kentucky    (183   U.    S.    503,   46    L.    Ed.   298, 
22   Sup.  Ct.  95),  52. 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Louisville  Cement  Co.  (50  I.  C.  C.  538),  217. 
Louisville   &   N.   R.   Co.   v.   Melton    (218    U.    S.    36,    54    L.    Ed.    921,    30 

Sup.  Ct.  676).  33. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.    v.   Mottley    (211  U.   S.   149,   53   L.   Ed.    126,   29 

Sup.  Ct.  42),  39,  342. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.   Mottley    (219   U.   S.   467,   55  L.   Ed.  297,   31 

Sup.   Ct.    265,    34   L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.)    671),    38,    176,    182,    186,    303, 

342,  358. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ohio  Valley  Tie  Co.   (242  U.  S.  288,  61  L.  Ed. 

305,  37  Sup.  Ct.  120),  207,  383,  393,  406. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ala.  (208  Fed.  35),  320. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice   (247  U.  S.  201,  62  L.  Ed.  1071,  38  Sup. 

Ct.  429),  295. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott   (219  U.  S.  209,  55  _L,  Ed.  183,  SI  Sup 

Ct.  171),  439. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (197  Fed.  58),  166. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (207  Fed.  591).  222. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.   (225  Fed.  571),  348,  349. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States    (238  U.  S.  1,  59  L.  Ed.  1177, 

35  Sup.  Ct.  696),  102,  150,  309,  320,  347,  392,  395,  465. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (242  U.  S.  60,  61  L.  Ed.  152,  37 

Sup.  Ct.  01,  245  U.  S.  463,  62  L.  Ed.  400,  38  Sup.  Ct    141),  150,  154, 

313,  321,  346,  347,  348. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  85 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Louisville  &   N.   R.   Co.   v.   West   Coast  Naval    Stores    Co.    (198    U.    S. 

483,  49  L.  Ed.  1135,  25  Sup.  Ct.  745),  149,  327. 
Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.   v.  Western   Un.   Tel.   Co.    (207   Fed.    1,   124   C. 

C.  A.  573),  7. 
Louisville  Board  of  Trade  v.  I.  C.  &  S.  T.  Co.    (27  I.  C.  C.  499,  34  I, 

C.  C.   640),   195,  338,  381,   397. 
Louisville,    N.    0.    &    T.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Mississippi    (66    Miss.    662,    5    L. 

R.  A.  132,  6  So.  203,  2  I.  C.  C.  615.  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  509),  29. 
Louisville,   N.   0.   &   T.   Ry.    Co.  v.    Mississippi    (133    U.    S.    587,   33   L. 

Ed.  784,  10  Sup.  Ct.  348,  2  I.  C.  R.  801),  29. 
Loup  Creek  Colliery  Co.  v.   Virginian  Ry.  Co.    (12  I.   C.  C.   471),   120, 

338,  339. 
Lourie  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C  N.  R.  Co.  (42  I.  C.  C.  448),  338. 
Love  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.    (185  Fed.  321,  107  C.  C.  A.  403,  220  U. 

S.    618),   49,   50. 
Lovelace   Flour  Mills  Co.  v.   Mo.   Pac.   Ry.   Co.    (74   Kan.   808,   88   Pac. 

72),  296. 
Low   Wah    Suey    v.    Backus    (225   U.   S.    460,   56   L.    Ed.    1165,    32    Sup. 

Ct.  734),  316,  396. 
Lowe  v.  S.  A.  L.  R.  Co.  (63  S.  C.  248,  41  S.  E.  297,  90  Am.  St.  678),  17. 
Lowenstein  v.  Evans   (69  Fed.  908,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  598),  4S6. 
Lowry    v.    Tile,    Mantel    &    Grate    Asso.    (98    Fed.    817.    1    Fed.    Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  995),  486. 
Lowry  v.  Tile,  Mantel  &  Grate  Asso.    (106  Fed.  38,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust 

Dec.  53),  486,  492. 
Lull  Carriage  Co.  v.  K.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.   (19  I.  C.  C.  15),  117. 
Lum  V.  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (21  L  C.  C.  558),  254,  255,  393. 
Lumber  Rates  from  Helena,  Ark.  (41  I.  C.  C.  565),  100. 
Lumber  Rates  from  North  Pacific  Coast   (30  I.  C.  C.  Ill),  121,  401. 
Lumber    Rates    Oregon    &    Washington    to    Eastern    Points    (29    I.    C. 

C.  609),  375,  401. 
Lumber  Rates  from  Texas   (28  I.  C.  C.  471),  400. 
Lundquist  v.  Grand  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.   (121  Fed.  915),  345. 
Lykes  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Commercial  Union   (13  I.  C.  C.  310).  335. 
Lykins  v.  C.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (209  Fed.  573,  126  C.  C.  A.  395),  453. 
Lyne  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (170  Fed.  847),  383,  408. 
Lysaght  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  (254  Fed.  351),  230,  440. 

M. 

Mac  Loon  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.   (9  I.  C.  C.  642),  181,  339,  345,  346. 
MacLoon  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.    (5  I.  C  C.   84,  3  I.  C.  R.  711), 
206,  383,  406. 


86  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

McAlister   v.   Henkel    (201   U.   S.  90,   50   L.   Ed.   671,    26   Sup.   Ct.   385, 

2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  919),  486. 
nicCabe  v.  A.   T.   &   S.   F.  Ry.  Co.    (235   U.   S.   151,   59    L.   Ed.   169,  35 

Sup  Ct.  69),  29. 
McCaull-Dinsmore  Co.   v.   Chicago,   G.   W.   Ry.   Co.    (14    I.   C.   C.    527), 

206,  210,  383. 
McCaull-Dinsmore  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Co.  (252  Fed.  664,  260  Fed.  835, 

—  C.  C.  A.  — ,  250  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  32,  34a, 

204a,  440. 
McCauU-Dismore  Co.  v.  M.  P.  R.  Co.   (35  I.  C.  C.  69),  383.' 
McClelen  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  588),  348. 
McClung  &  Co.  V.  S.  R.  Co.  (22  I.  C.  C.  582),  81. 
McCluskey  v.  Marysville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (243  U.  S.  36,  61  L.  Ed.  578    37 

Sup.  Ct.  374),  2. 
McConnell    v.   Camors-McConnell   Co.    (140   Fed.    987,   72   C.   C.   A.   681, 

2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  825),  486. 
McConnell  v.  Camors-McConnell  Co.    (152  Fed.  321,  81  C.  C.  A.  429), 

486. 
McCormick  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  611),  344. 
McCormick  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.    (37  I.  C.  C.  234),  256a. 
McCoy  V.  Cincinnati,  I.  St.  L.  &  C.  R.  Co.  (13  Fed.  3),  9. 
McCullough  V.  Maryland  (17  U.  S.  4  Wheat  316,  4  L.  Ed.  579),  63. 
McDermott  v.  State  (143  Wis.  18,  126  N.  W.  888),  58. 
McDermott  v.  Wise.   (228  U.  S.  115,  57  L.  Ed.  754,  21  Ann.  Cas.  1315, 

33  Sup.  Ct.  431),  3,  58. 
McDonald  v.  Hovey  (110  U.  S.  619,  28  L.  Ed.  269,  4  Sup.  Ct.  142),  144. 
McDonald  v.  Sou.  Ex.  Co.   (134  Fed.  282),  58. 

IVicDuffie  V.  Portland  &  R.  R.  Co.   (52  N.  jr_.  430,  13  Am.  Rep.  72),  304. 
McFadden  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  Co.   (241  Fed.  562,  154  C.  C.  A.  338),  335. 
McGowan-Foshee  Lumber  Co.  v.  F.  A.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.   (43  I.  C.  C.  581), 

208 
McGregor  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.   (172  N.  W.  841,  4  A.  L.  R.  1635),  298a. 
McGrew  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (8  I.  C.  C.  630),  217,  346,  383. 
McGrew  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  (230  Mo.  496,  132  S.  W.  1076),  52. 
McLatchey  v.  King   (250  Fed.  920),  492,  513. 

McLean  Lumber  Co.  v.  United  States  (237  Fed.  460),  61,  100,  308a,  309. 
McLean   v.   Denver   &   R.   G.   R.    Co.    (203   U.    S.   38,   51   L.   Ed.   78,   27 

Sup.  Ct.  1),  58. 
McMorran  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.   (3  I.  C.  C.  252,  2  I.  C.  R.  604),  339, 

345,  346. 
McNeil,  Ex  parte  (80  U.  S.  13  Wall.  236,  20  L.  Ed.  624),  292. 
McNeill  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.    (202  U.  S.  543,  50  L.  Ed.  1142,  26   Sup. 

Ct.  722),  12,  14. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  87 

I  References  are  to  Sections.] 

McRae  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  270).  344. 

Macon  Grocery  Co.  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (215  U.  S.  501,  54  L.  Ed. 

300,  30  Sup.  Ct.  184),  304,  307,  308a. 
Macon  Grocery  Co.  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  (163  Fed.  738),  304,  383,  443. 
Maier  &  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.   (29  I.  C.  C.  103),  348,  383. 
Maine  Central  Boat  Lines  (40  I.  C.  C.  272),  354. 

Maine  v.  G.  T.  R.  Co.  (142  U.  S.  217,  35  L.  Ed.  994,  12  Sup.  Ct.  121),  59. 
Majestic  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (162  Fed.  810),  445. 
Malone  v.  N.  Y.  Tel.  Co.   (40  I.  C.  C.  185),  340. 

Manigault  v.  Springs  (199  U.  S.  473,  50  L.  Ed.  274,  26  Sup.  Ct.  127),  53. 
Manigault  v.  Ward  &  Co.  (123  Fed.  707),  53. 
Manufacturers'  &  Jobbers'  Union  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.   Ry.   Co.    (4 

I.  C.  C.  79,  3  I.  C.  R.  115),  99,  110. 
Manufacturers'  &  Merchants'  Asso.  v.  A.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.    (37  I.  C.  C. 

350),  208. 
Manufacturers'  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v.  Ind.  Natural  Gas  &  Oil  Co.    (155  Ind. 

545,  58  N.  E.  706,  53  L.  R.  A.  135),  58. 
Manufacturers'  Ry.  Co.  v.  -St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.    (21  I.  C.  C.  304), 

10,  66,  404. 
Manufacturers'  Ry.  Co.  v.   St.  L.   I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.    (28  I.  C.  C.  93), 

193,  338,  400. 
Manufacturers'   Ry.   Co.  v.   St.   Louis   I.   M.   &    S.   R.   Co.    (32   I.   C.   C. 

578),  193. 
Manufacturers'   Ry.   Co.   v.   U.    S.    (246    U.    S.    457,    62    L.    Ed.    831,   38 

Sup.  Ct.  383),  139,  171,  193,  309,  345,  399. 
Manufacturers'  Railways  Case  (32  I.  C.  C.  100),  171,  193. 
Marian  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (27  I.  C.  C.  441),  250,  408. 
Marienelli  v.  United  Booking  Offices  of  America  (227  Fed.  165),  2,  492. 
Marshall  Wells  Hdw.  Co.  v.  S.  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  (53  I.  C.  C.  684),  351. 
Marten  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.    (9  I.  C.  C.  581),  110,  346,  348. 
Martin  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (2  I.  C.  C.  25,  1  I.  C.  R.  32),  392. 
Martin  v.  Hunter   (14  U.  S.  1  Wheat.  304,  4  L.  Ed.  97),  292. 
Martin  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.    (2  I.  C.  C.  1,  2  I.  C.  R.  1),  339,  348. 
Martin  v.  West    (222  U.   S.  191,   56  L.  Ed.  159,  32   Sup.   Ct.   42,  36   L. 

R.  A.   (N.  S.)    592),  56. 
Massee  &  Felton  Lumber  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.  (23  I.  C.  C.  110),  91. 
Mathews  v.  Board  of  Comrs.  of  North  Caro.  (106  Fed.  9),  84. 
Matter  Private  Cars  (50  I.  C.  C.  652),  142a. 
Mattingly  v.  Penn.  Co.  (3  I.  C.  C.  592,  2  I.  C.  R.  806),  335. 
May    v.    New    Orleans    (178    U.    S.    496,    44    L.    Ed.    1165,    20    Sup.    Ct. 

976).  58. 


88  Table  of  Cases  Cited, 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Mayfield  &  Graves  County  Commercial  Club  v.  B.  &  O.  11.  Co.   (48  I.  C. 

C.  45),  119. 
Maynard  Coal  Co.  v.  Fed.  Trade  Commission  ( —  Sup.  Ct.  of  D.  C.  — ), 

329. 
Mayor  of  Boston,  Ga.  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  (24  I.  C.  C.  50),  108,  348. 
Mayor  of  Bristol  v.  Virginia  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  453),  339. 
Mayor  of  Douglas,  Ga.  v.  Atlantic  B.  &  A.  R.  Co.  (28  I.  C.  C.  445),  108. 
Mayor  of  New   York  v.   New  Eng.  Transp.   Co.    (14   Blatch.    159,   Fed. 

Cas.  10197),  53. 
.Vayor  of  New  York  v.   Starin   (106  N.  Y.  1,   12  N.   E.  631),  53. 
.Alayor,  etc.,  of  Tifton  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.    (9   L  C.  C.  160),  339. 
Mayor  of  Vienna  v.  Ga.  S.  &  F.  R.  Co.   (28  I.  C.  C.  173),  108. 
Mayor,  etc.,   of  Wichita   v.  Atchison,  T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.    (9   I.   C.   C. 

534),  90,  91,  164,  339,  346,  348,  486. 
Mayor,   etc.,   of   Wichita    v.    Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    R.    Co.    (9    I.    C.    C. 

569),  346. 
Meeds  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  C.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  337),  169. 
Meeker  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  (21  L  C.  C.  129,  23  I.  C.  C.  480),  208. 
Meeker  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.   (162  Fed.  354),  383,  486. 
Meeker  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.   (175  Fed.  320),  394,  492. 
Meeker  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  (183  Fed.  548,  106  C.  C.  A.  94),  492. 
Meeker  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.    (211  Fed.  785,  128  C.  C.  A.  311),  208. 
Meeker  v.   Lehigh   V.   R.   Co.    (236   U.   S.   412,   59   L.   Ed.   644,  35   Sup. 

Ct.   328),  208,   216,   218,   317,   318,   383,   394,   408. 
Memphis  v.  Chicago  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  256,  43  I.  C.  C.  121), 

44,  47,  81. 
Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  L  C.  R.  Co.   (17  L  C.  C.  313),  77,  102. 
Memphis   &   L.    R.    R.    Co.    v.    Southern    Ex.    Co.    (117    U.    S.    1,    29    L. 

Ed.  791,  6  Sup.  Ct.  542),  303,  347,  397. 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (27  L  C.  C.  507),  98. 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  K.  C.  S.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  90),  207. 
.Memphis    Freight    Bureau    v.    St.    L.    L    M    &    S.   R.   Co.    (24    I.    C.    C. 

547,  39  L  C.  C.  224),  145a,  348,  408. 
Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  Co.    (18  L  C.  C.  67),  408. 
Memphis  Merchants'  Exchange  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (43  I.  C.  C.  378),  44 
Menacho  v.  Ward    (27  Fed.  529,  23  Blatchf.  502),  77,  102,  303. 
Menasha  Paper  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (241  U.  S.  55.  60  L.  Ed.  885, 

36  Sup.  Ct.  501),  174,  338. 
Menefee  Lumber  Co.  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  49),  101,  383. 
Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (216  Fed.  225),  8,  104. 
Merchants'  &  Mfrs'.  Asso.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (23  L  C.  C  474),  150,  347. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited,  89 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Merchants'  &  Mfrs.  Asso.  v.  C.  of  N.  J.  R.  Co.   (30  I.  C.  C.  ?>9G),  400. 

Merchants'  &  Miners'  Transp.  Co.  v.  United  States  (199  Fed    902),  371. 

Merchants'  Coal  Co.  v.  Fairmont  Coal  Co.  (160  Fed.  769,  88  C.  C.  A. 
23),  392,  445. 

Merchants'  Coal  Co.  v.  Fairmont  Coal  Co.   (163  Fed.  1021),  445. 

Merchants'  Cotton  Compress  &  Storage  Co.  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (17 
I.  C.  C.  98),  102. 

Merchants'  Cotton  Compress  &  Storage  Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  North 
American  (1.51  U.  S.  368,  38  L.  Ed.  195,  14  Sup.  Ct.  367),  345. 

Merchants  Ex.  of  St.  Louis  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (34  I.  C.  C.  341),  3,  44. 

Merchants  Freight  Bureau  v.  Mo.  ?ac.  R.  Co.   (50  I.  C.  C.  247),  181. 

Merchants'  Freight  Bureau  of  Little  Rock  v.  Midland  Valley,  etc.,  R. 
Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  243),  346. 

Merchants'  Freight  Bureau  of  Little  Rock  v.  M.  P.  R.  Co.  (21  1. 
C.  C.  573),  348. 

Merchants'  Traffic  Asso.  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C. 
C.    225),    338. 

Merchants'  Union  of  Spokane  Palls  v.  No.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (5  I.  C.  C. 
478,  4  I.  C.  R.  183),  105,  335,  348,  395. 

Meridian  Fertilizer  Factory  v.  T.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  351),  195,  401. 

Merrick  v.  Halsey  &  Co.  (242  U.  S.  568,  61  L.  Ed.  498,  37  Sup.  Ct. 
227),    58. 

Mershon  v.  Cent.  R.  of  N.  J.  (10  I.  C.  C.  456),  346. 

Metcalf  V.  American  School  Fur.  Co.  (108  Fed.  909,  2  Fed.  Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  75),  492. 

Metcalf  V.  American  School  Fur.  Co.  (113  Fed.  1020,  51  C.  C.  A.  599. 
2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  Ill),  492. 

Metcalf  V.  American  School  Fur.  Co.  (122  Fed.  115,  2  Fed.  Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  234),  606. 

Metropolis  Commercial  Club  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.    (30  I.  C.  C.  40),  346. 

Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v.  A.  A.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  197),  88,  442. 

Metropolitan  Trust  Co.  v.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.   (90  Fed.  683),  84. 

Michie  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.   (151  Fed.  694),  339. 

Michigan  Box  Co.  v.  Flint,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (6  I.  C.  C.  335),  346. 

Michigan  Buggy  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  Ind.  R.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C. 
297),  339. 

Michigan  C.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  L.  S.  R.  Co.   (1  111.  App    399),  42. 

Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott  (256  Fed.  18,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  383. 

Michigan  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Mich.  R.  Com.  (236  U.  S.  615,  59  L.  Ed.  750,  35 
Sup.  Ct.  423),  12,  192. 

Michigan  Hardwood  Mfrs.  Asso.  v.  Transcontinental  Freight  Bu- 
reau  (27  I.  C.  C.  32),  250,  408. 


90  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Midland  V.  R.  Co.  v.  State  (35  Ok.  672,  130  Pac.  803),  58. 

Miles  Medicine  Co.   (Dr.)   v.  Jaynes  Drug  Co.  (149  Fed.  838),  486. 

Miles  Medicine  Co.    (Dr.)   v.  John  D.  Park  &  Sons  Co.    (164  Fed.  803, 

90  C.  C.  A.  579),  486. 
Miles  Medicine  Co.  v.  John  D.  Park  &  Sons  Co.    (220  U.  S.  373,  55  L,. 

Ed.  502,  31  Sup.  Ct.  376),  486. 
Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.   (18  L  C.  C.  144), 

117. 
Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v.  T.  St.  L.  &  M.  R.  Co.   (27  I.  C.  C.  63),  99. 
Milk  Producers'  Asso.   v.   Delaware,  etc.,  R.   Co.    (7   L  C.   C.  92),  335, 

339,  346,  348,  392. 
Millar  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  Co.   (19  L  C.  C.  78),  105. 
Miller  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (85  Neb.  458,  123  N.  W.  449),  439. 
Miller  v.  Mayor  of  New  York    (109  U.   S.  385,   27   L.  Ed.  971,  3   Sup. 

Ct.  228),  54. 
Miller  v.  S.  P.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  129),  90. 
Milling  Logs  in  Transit  (40  I.  C.  C.  597),  145. 
Mills  V.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.    (238  U.  S.  473,  59  L.  Ed.  1414,  35  Sup.  Ct. 

888),  206,  208,  216,  251,  317,  318,  383. 
Milwaukee,    etc..    Brewing   Co.    v.    Chicago,    M.    &    St.    P.    Ry.    Co.    (13 

I.  C.  C.  28),  339. 
Mines  v.  Schribner   (147  Fed.  927,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  1035),  486. 
Minneapolis   &    St.   L.    R.   Co.   v.    Herrick    (127    U.   S.    210,   32    L.   Ed. 

109,  8  Sup.  Ct.  1176),  S3,  332. 
Minneapolis     &St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.   Minnesota    (186   U.   S.   257,   46  L.   Ed. 

1151,  22  Sup.  Ct.  900),  14,  17,  49,  86,  87,  124,  311,  339. 
Minneapolis  &  St.   S.  M.   R.   Co.  v.   Railroad   Com.   of  Wis.    (136  Wis. 

146,  116  N.  W.  905),  49. 
Minneapolis   Civic   &  Com.   Asso.  v.   C.   M.   &   St.   P.   R.   Co.    (30   L   C. 

C.  663),  393. 
Minneapolis   Threshing   Mach.    Co.   v.    Chicago,   M.    &    St.    P.   Ry.   Co. 

(14  I.  C.  C.  536),  383. 
Minneapolis   Traffic   Asso.    v.    C.    &   N.    W.   R.    Co.    (23    I.    C.    C.    432), 

88,  123. 
Minnesota  v.  Barber  (136  U.  S.  313,  34  L.  Ed.  455,  10  Sup.  Ct.  862),  58. 
Minnesota   v.    Northern    Securities    Co.    (123    Fed.    692,    2    Fed.    Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  246),  486. 
Minnesota  v.   Northern   Securities  Co.    (194   U.  S.   48,   48   L.   Ed.   870, 

24  Sup.  Ct.  598,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  533),  486,  489. 
Mississippi  Railroad   Com.  v.   111.  Cent.   R.   Co.    (203   U.   S.   335,  51   L. 

Ed.  209,  27  Sup.  Ct.  90),  9,  21. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  91 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Mississippi  River  Case,  The  (28  I.  C.  C.  47),  99a. 

Missouri  &  111.  Coal  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  39),  151,  195. 

Missouri   &  111.   Rd.,   Tie   &   Lumber   Co.   v.   Cape,   etc.,   R.   Co.    (1   I. 

C.  C.   30,  1  I.   C.  R.   607),  3.35. 
Missouri   &  Kansas   Shippers'  Asso.  v.   Atchison,   T.   &  S.   F.   Ry.   Co. 

(13  I.  C.  C.  411),  218,  383,  392. 
Missouri   &    Kansas    Shippers'    Asso.    v.    Missouri,    K.    &    T.    Ry.    Co. 

(12  I.  C.  C.  483),  348.  S83,  392. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ashinger    (162   Pac.  814),  41. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Cade    (233   U.   S.  642,  58  L.  Ed.  1135,  34 

Sup.  Ct.  678),  35. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Fookes   (40  S.  W.  858),  37. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Haher    (169  U.  S.  613,  42  L.   Ed.  878,  18 

Sup.  Ct.  488),  58. 
Missouri,    K.    &   T.    R.    Co.    v.    Harriman    (227    U.    S.    657,    57    L.    Ed. 

690,  33  Sup.  Ct.  397),  32,  439. 
Missouri,  K.  &   T.   R.   Co.   v.  Harris    (234   U.    S.   412,   58  L.   Ed.   1377, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  790),  35. 
Missouri,K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (164  Fed.  645),  396. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Love  (177  Fed.  493),  49,  84. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.   McCann    (174  U.   S.   580,  43   L.   Ed.   1U93, 

19  Sup.  Ct.  755),  32. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Mahaffey  (105  Tex.  394,  150  S   W.  881),  35. 
Missouri,  K.   &  T.   R.  Co.   v.   May    (194   U.   S.   267,   48   L.   Ed.   971,   24 

Sup.  Ct.  638),  15. 
Missouri,   K.  &  T.  R.   Co.   v.    Sealy    (248   U.   S.   363,   63   L.   Ed.  — ,  39 

Sup.  Ct.  — ),  295,  317. 
Missouri,    K.   &   T.    R.    Co.    v.    Simonson    (64    Kan.    802,    68    Pac.    653, 

57  L.  R.  A.  765),  32. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas  (245  U.  S.  484,  62  L.  Ed.  419,  38  Sup. 

Ct.  178),  20,  21. 
Missouri.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Trinity  Co.   v.  Lumber  Co.    (1   Tex.   Civ. 

App.  553,  21  S.  W.  290),  178. 
Missouri,   K.   &   T.   R.   Co.   v.   United    States    (178    Fed.    15,    101    C.    C. 

A.   14S),   481. 
Missouri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.    v.    United    States    (231    U.    S.    112,    58    L. 

Ed.  144,  34  Sup.  Ct.  26),  331. 
Missouri,   K.   &   T.   R.   Co.   v.   Withers    (16   Tex.    Civ.   App.   506,   40   S. 

W.  1073),  32. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Castle    (224  U.  S.  541,  56  L.  Ed.  875,  32   Sup. 

Ct.  606),  33. 


92  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Missouri  Pac.  R.   Co.  v.  Ferguson   Sawmill  Co.    (235  Fed.   474.   149   C. 

C.  A.  20),  214m,  215,  217,  383,  406. 
Missouri   Pac.    R.    Co.   v.   Harper    Bros.    (201    Fed.    671,    121    C.    C.    A. 

570),  407. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Kansas  ex  rel.  Taylor  (216  U.  S.  262.  54  L.  Ed. 

472,  30  Sup.  Ct.  330),  19. 
Missouri   Pac.   R.   Co.  v.   Larabee   Flour   Mills   Co.    (211   U.    S.   612,   53 

L.  Ed.  352),  29  Sup.  Ct.  214),  9,  13,  344. 
Missouri   Pac.   R.   Co.  v.   Larabee   Flour   Mills   Co.    (211   U.   S.   612,   53 

L.  Ed.  352,  29  Sup.  Ct.  214),  296. 
Mo.   Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lovelace  Flour   Mills  Co.    (211   U.   S.   612,    53    L. 

Ed.  352,  29  Sup.  Ct.  214),  296. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mackey    (127  U.  S.  205,  32  L.  Ed.  107,  8  Sup 

Ct.  1161),  33,  332. 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  McGrew  Coal  Co.   (244  U.  S.  191,  61  L.  Ed.  1075, 

37   Sup.  Ct.   518),  52. 
Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Nebraska   ex    rel.    Board    of    Transportation 

(164  U.  S.  403,  41  L.  Ed.  489,  17  Sup.  Ct.  130),  12. 
Missouri  Pac.   R.   Co.  v.   Nebraska    (217   U.   S.   196,   54   L.   Ed.   727,  30 

Sup.  Ct.  461),  12. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.    (31  Fed.  862),  348. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Tucker   (230  U.  S.  340,  57  L.  Ed.  1507,  33  Sup. 

Ct.  961),  35. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States    (189  U.  S.  274,  47  L.   Ed.  811, 

23  Sup.  Ct.  507),  389,  456,  459. 
Missouri  River  Nebraska  Cases,  The  (40  T.  C.  C.  201),  44,  346. 
Missouri   River  Rate   Case    (Chicago,  R.    I.   &  P.  R.   Co.   v.    Int.   Com. 

Com.)    (171  Fed.  680),  462,  464. 
Mitchell  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.   324),  105. 
Mitchell  V.  Hitchman  Coal  &  Coke  Co.    (214  Fed.  685),  489. 
Mitchell   Coal   &   Coke   Co.   v.   Cassatt    (207   U.   S.    181,    52   L.    Ed.   160, 

28  Sup.  Ct.  108),  335. 
Mitchell   Coal   &  Coke  Co.  v.   P.   R.   Co.    (181  Fed.   403.    183   Fed.   908, 

192  Fed.   475,   112  C.   C.  A.   637).   215,   345,   383. 
Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (230  U.  S.  247,  38  I.  C.  C.  40,  57 

L.  Ed.  1472,  33  Sup.  Ct.  916),  97,   138,  171,  197,  215,  245,  294,  345, 

383,  404,  405,  443. 
Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Dismukes    (94  Ala.   131,  10   So.  289,  4  I.  C.  R. 

200),  180,  212. 
Mobile   Chamber  of  Commerce   v.   M.  &   O.  R.   Co.    (23    I.   C.   C.   417), 

139,  400. 
Mobile  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C.  272),  116, 

400. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  93 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Mobile  County  v.  Kimball  (102  U.  S.  691,  26  L.  Ed.  238),  3. 
Moers  v.  City  of  Reading  (21  Pa.  St.  188),  54. 
Moise  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (16  I.  C.  C.  550).  348. 
Molasses  Rates  to  Knoxville  (30  I.  C.  C.  613),  88. 

Momsen   &   Co.   v.   Gila   Valley,   etc.,   Ry.   Co.    (14    I.   C.    C.    614),    206, 
210,  383. 

Monarch  Tobacco  Works  v.  American  Tob.  Co.    (165  Fed.  774),  492. 
Mondoii   V.    N.    Y.    N.    H.    &    H.    R.    Co.    (Employers'    Liability   Cases) 
(223  U.  S.  1,   56  L.  Ed.  327,  32   Sup.  Ct.   169,  38  L.  R.  A.    (N.   S.) 

44),  3,  6,  33,  58,  293,  332. 
Monongahela  Bridge  Co.   v.   United   States    (216   U.   S.   117,   54   L.   Ed. 

435,  30   Sup.  Ct.  356),  54. 
Montague   v.   Lowry    (193    U.   S.    38,    48   L.    Ed.    608,    24    Sup.    Ct.   307, 

2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  327),  486,  492. 
Montague  v.  Lowry    (115  Fed.  27,  52  C.  C.  A.  621,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust 

Dec.  112),  486,  494. 
Montana  v.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (48  I.  C.  C.  728),  344. 
Montana  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (164  Fed.  400,  90  C.  C.  A.  388), 

481. 
Montana  Free  Pass  Situation   (29  L  C.  C.  411),  342. 
Montgomery  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (143  C.  C.  A.  138,  228  Fed.  616),  207, 

297,  346,  383. 
Jlontrose  Pickle  Co.  v.  Dodson    (76  Iowa  172),  40  N.  W.  705,  2  L.  R. 

A.  417,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  213),  42. 
Moore  v.  Duncan   (237  Fed.  780,  150  C.  C.  A.  534),  364.  440. 
Moore    v.    United    States    (85    Fed.    465  ,    29    C.    C.    A.    269),    1    Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  815),  488. 
Morgan  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  525),  335,  361,  383. 
Morgan    Grain    Co.    (A.    P.)    v.    Atlantic    C.    L.    R.    Co.    (19    I.    C.    C. 

460),  7. 
Morgans  L.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Joseph  Iron  Co.   (243  Fed.  149),  207. 
Morgans  R.  &  S.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  La.  (109  La.  247,  33  So.  214),  49. 
Morgans  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Louisiana   (118  U.  S.  455,  30  L.  Ed.  237,  6  Sup. 

Ct.  1114),  58. 
Morgantown  &  Kingwood  Divisions   (40  I.  C.  C.  509,  49  I.  C.  C.  540), 

195,  397. 
Morrell  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.   (6  I.  C.  C.  121,  4  I.  C.  R.  469),  339. 
Morris  v.  United  States  (229  Fed.  516,  143  C.  C.  A.  582,  584),  334. 
Morrisdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.    (176  Fed.  748,   183   Fed. 

929,  106  C.  C.  A.  269),  208,  346,  407,  443. 
Morrisdale   Coal  &  Coke  Co.   v.   P.   R.   Co.    (230   U.    S.   304,  57   L.   Ed. 

1474,  33  Sup.  Ct.  938),  174,  198,  208,  218,  340,  443. 


94  Table  of  Cases  Cited, 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Morris  Draying  Co.  v.   Greenville  &  H.  R.   Co.    (62  N.   J.   Eq.   768,  48 

Atl.  568,  59  N.  J.  Eq.  372,   46  Atl.  638),  13. 
Morris  Iron  Co.  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  240),  191,  192,  347. 
Morris-Scarboro   Moffitt   Co.   v.    So.   Ex.   Co.    (146   N.   C.  167,   59    S.   E. 

667),  9,  110. 
Morse  Produce  Co.  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  334),  383. 
Moseley  v.  United  States   (35  Ct.  Claims  355),  418. 
Moses  Taylor  (The)    (71  U.  S.  4  Wall  411,  18  L.  Ed.  397),  292. 
Moshassuck  Valley  R.  R.  Case  (37  I.  C.  C.  566),  176. 
Moss  V.  Bett'3  (4  Hlsk.   (Tenn.)   661,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  1),  54. 
Motion  Picture  Patent  Co.  v.  Eclair  Film  Co.   (208  Fed.  416),  486,  492. 
Motion  Picture  Patent  Co.  v.  Ullman  (186  Fed.  174),  486. 
Motion  Picture  Patents  Co.  v.  Universal  Film  Mfg.  Co.    (235  Fed.  398, 

148   C.   C.   A.   660,   243   U.   S.   502,   61   L.   Ed.   871,   37   Sup.   Ct.    416, 

L.  R.  A.  1917E.  1187,  Ann.  Cas.  1918A.  959),  497. 
Mottley  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.    (150  Fed.  406),  342. 
Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  45),  250,  383. 
Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  596),  213 
Munn   V.    Illinois    (94   U.    S.,   4    Otto,    113,   24    L.    Ed.    77),    16,    45,    61, 

63,  80. 
Murphy,  Wasey  &  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.    (5   I.   C.   C.   122,  3   I.   C.  R. 

725),   395. 
Murray  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.   (62  Fed.  24),  383. 
Murray  v.  Chicago   &   N.   W.   R.   Co.    (92   Fed.   868,   35   C.    C.   A.    62), 

583. 

Musco  V.  United   Surety   Co.    (132   App.   Div.   300,    117  N.   Y.   Sup.   21, 

196  N.  Y.  459,  90  N.  E.  171),  37. 
Muser  v.  Magone  (155  U.  S.  240,  39  L.  Ed.  135,  15  Sup.  Ct.  77),  396. 
Muskogee  Commercial  Club  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.    (13  I.  C.  C. 

68),  416. 
Muskogee  Traffic  Bureau  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  169),  99. 
Mutual   Rice    Trade    &    Development   Asso.    v.    International    &    G.    N. 

R.  Co.  (23  I.  C.  C.  219),  112. 
Mutual  Transit  Co.  v.  United  States   (178  Fed.  664),  65. 
Myers  v.  Penn.  Co.   (2  I.  C.  C.  573,  2  I.  C.  R.  403,  544),  263,  392,  416. 

N. 

Nash  v.  Page  (80  Ky.  539,  44  Am.  Rep.  490),  45. 
Nash  V.  United  States   (186  Fed.  489,  108  C.  C.  A.  467),  486. 
Nash  V.   United    States    (229    U.    S.   373,    57   L.    Ed.   1232,    33    Sup.   Ct. 
780),  486. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  95 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Nashville,  Chatta.  &  St.  L.   Ry.   Co.  v.  Alabama    (128  U.   S.  96,  32  L. 
Ed.  352,  9   Sup.  Ct.  28),  22. 

Nashville  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Burnside  Mills    (219  U.  S.  186,   55  L. 

Ed.  167,  31  Sup.  Ct.  164,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.),  7),  439. 
Nashville  Flour  Transit  Rules   (41  I.  C.  C.  483),  163. 
Nashville  Grain  Ex.  v.  United  States   (191  Fed.  37,  234  Fed.  699),  166, 

315. 

Nashville  Lumbermen's  Club  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (40  I.  C.  C.  59),  109. 
Nashville  Tie  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (40  I.  C.  C.  377),  88,  89a. 
Nashville  Switching  (40  I.  C.  C.  474),  144. 
National   Elevator   Co.   v.   C.   M.   &   St.   P.   Ry.   Co.    (246    Fed.    588,   — 

C.  C.  A.  — ),  297. 
National   Fire  Proofing  Co.  v.   Masons   Builders  Asso.    (169  Fed.   259, 

94  C.  C.  A.  535,  26  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)    148),  486,  489,  492. 
National    Folding    Box    &    Paper    Co.    v.    Robertson    (99    Fed.    985,    2 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  4),  486. 
National  Harrow  Co.  v.  Hench    (76  Fed.   667,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec. 

610),  486. 
National  Harrow  Co.  v.  Hench   (83  Fed.  36,  27  C.  C.  A.  349,  39  L.  R. 

A.  299,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  742),  486. 
National  Harrow  Co.  v.  Hench    (84  Fed.   226,   1   Fed.   Anti-Trust  Dec. 

746),  486. 
National  Harrow  Co.  v.  Quick   (74  Fed.  236,  20  C.  C.  A.  410),  486. 
National  Harrow  Co.  v.  Quick  (67  Fed.  130.  1  Fed.  Anti-Thust  Dec.  443, 

608),  486. 
National  Hay   &   Grain    Shippers'   Asso.   v.    L.    S.    &  M.    S.    R.    Co.    (9 

I.  C.  C.  264),  88. 
National  Hay  Asso.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.    (9  I.  C.  C.  264),  80,  88, 

266,  339. 
National  Hay  Asso.  v.  M.  C.  R.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  34),  96,  99,  266. 
National  Implement  &  Vehicle  Asso.  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.  (42  I.  C.  C.  461), 

124. 
National  Live  Stock  Ex.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (47  I.  C.  C.  380),  169. 
National    Machy.    &   Wrecking   Co.   v.    Pittsburg,    etc.,    R.    Co.    (11    L 

C.  C.  581),  88,  346. 
National  Pole  Co.  v.  C.  &  M.  O.  R.  Co.  (211  Fed.  65),  317,  383,  407. 
National  Refining  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.    (18  I.  C.  C.  389),  215. 
National  Society  of  Record  Asso.  v.  A.  &  R.  R.  Co.  (40  I.  C.  C.  347),  81, 

161,  440. 
National  Surety  Co.  v.  State  Bank   (120  Fed.  593,  56  C  C.  A.  657,   61 

L.  R.  A.  394),  60. 


96  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

National  Tube  Co.  v.  L.  T.  R.  Co.,  (53  I.  C.  C.  469,  56  I.  C.  C.  272),  171, 

193,  397,  404. 
National  Water  Works  Co.  v.  Kansas  City   (62  Fed.  853),  84. 
National  Wool  Growers  Asso.  v.  O.  S.  R.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  151),  207. 
Naylor  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  Co.    (15   I.  C.  C.  9,   18   I.  C.  C.   624),  208,  383, 

394,  407. 
Nebraska-Iowa  Grain  Co.  v.  United  Pac.  Ry.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  90),  168. 
Nebraska  State  R.  R.  Com.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  121),  99. 
Nebraska  State  R.  R.  Com.  v.  C.  V.  R.  Co.  (32  I.  C.  C.  41),  88. 
Nelson   v.    United    States    (201   U.    S.   92,    50   L.    Ed.    673,    26    Sup.    Ct. 

358,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  920),  486. 
New  Albany  Furniture  Co.  v.  Mobile,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  594),  383. 
New   Jersey   Fruit    Ex.    v.    Cent.    R.    Co.    of   N.    J.    (2   I.    C.    C.    142,   2 

I.  C.  R.  84),  335. 
Newland  v.  Nor.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (6  I.  C.  C.  131,  4  I.  C.  R.  474),  105. 
Newman  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  Co.   (26  I.  C.  C.  97),  206,  210. 
New  Mexico  Coal  Rates  (28  I.  C.  C.  328),  397. 
New  Mexico  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  (12  N.  M.  425,  78  Pac.  74),  58. 
New    Mexico    Wool    Growers'    Asso.    v.    A.   T.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    (—   N. 

M.  — ,  145  Pac.  1077),  9. 
New  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  231),  63, 

222,  392,  395. 
New  Orleans   Board  of  Trade  v.   I.  C.   R.   Co.    (23  I.   C.   C.   465),  169, 

208,  346. 
New   Orleans   Board   of  Trade   v.   I.   C.   R.   Co.    (29   I.   C.   C.   32),   134, 

208,  383. 
New   Orleans   Cotton   Ex.    v.   Cincinnati,   N.   O.    &   T.   P.   R.   Co.    (2   I. 

C.  C.  375,  2  I.  C.  R.  289),  335,  339,  346. 
New    Orleans   Cotton    Ex.   v.   111.    Cent.    R.    Co.    (3    I.    C.    C.    534,    2    I. 

C.  R.   777),  335,  339,   345,  346. 
New  Orleans  Cotton  Ex.  v.  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.   R.  Co.    (4   I.  C.  C. 

694,  3  I.  C.  R.  523),  513. 
New  Orleans  Gas  Light   Co.   v.   Drainage  Com.    (197   U.   S.   453,   49  L. 

Ed.  831,  25  Sup.  Ct.  471),  54. 
New  Orleans  Live  Stock  Ex.  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  327), 

346. 
New  Orleans,  N.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  (55  I.  C.  C.  113),  170. 
New  Orleans  Terminal  Allowances    (42  I.  C.  C.  748),  404. 
Newport  N.   &  M.  V.   R.   Co.   v.   United   States    (Gl   Fed.   488,   9   C.   C. 

A.  579),  481. 
Newton  Gum  Co.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (16  I.  C.  C.  341),  358. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  97 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

New  York  &  N.   E.   R.   Co.   v.   Bristol    (151    U.   S.   556,   38   L.   Ed.   269, 
14  Sup.  Ct.  437),  15. 

New   York    &    N.    Ry.    Co.    v.    New    York   &    N.    E.    Ry.    Co.    (50    Feci. 
867),  149,  347. 

New  York   &   N.   Ry.   Co.   v.   New   York   &   N.   E.   Ry.  Co.    (4    I.   C.   C. 

702,  3  I.  C.  R.  542),  347. 
New   York   Board   of  Trade   v.    Penn.   R.   Co.    (4    I.   C.   C.   447,   2    I.   C. 

R.  660,  734,  755,  800,  3  I.  C.  R.  417),  339,  345,  358. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Beaham   (242  U.  S.  148.  61  L.  Td.  210,  37 

Sup.  Ct.  43),  415,  440. 
New  York  C.   &   H.   R.   Co.  v.   Gray    (239   U.   S.   583,   60   L.   Ed.   451,   36 

Sup.  Ct.  176),  182,  342. 
New   York   C.   &   H.   R.   Co.   v.   Hudson  County    (227   U.    S.   248,   57   L. 

Ed.  499,  33  Sup.  Ct.  269,  76  N.  J.  L.  664,  74  Atl.  954),  13,  43. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Co.  (168  Fed.  131),  309. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Murphy  (224  Fed.  407,  140  C.  C.  A.  Ill), 

394. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New  York    (165  U.  S.  628>  41  L.  Ed 

853,  17  Sup.  Ct.  418,  142  N.  Y.  646,  37  N.  E.  568),  15. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   United   States    (165    Fed.   833,   91  C. 

C.  A.  519),  481. 
New  York  C.   &  H.   R.  R.   Co.  v.   United   States    (166   Fed    267,   92   C. 

C.  A.  331),  371. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  United   States    (212  U.   S.  481.  53  L. 

Ed.  613,  29  Sup.  Ct.  304),  63,  86,  187,  335,  371,  372,  480c. 
New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (212  U.  S.     500,  5.'^>  L. 

Ed.  624,  29  Sup.  Ct.  309),  204,  212,  371. 
New    York    C.    R.    Co.    v.    Lockwood     (17    Wall    84    U.    S.    357,    21    L. 

Ed.  627),  201. 
New  York  City  v.  New  England  Transp.  Co.    (14  Blatch.   159,   13  Fed. 

Cas.  10197),  53. 
New  York  Commutation  Fares  (42  I.  C.  C.  354),  345,  364. 
New  York  Dock  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (32  I.  C.  C.  568),  121. 
New    York   Life    Ins.    Co.   v.    Deer    Lodge   County    (231   U.    S.    495.    58 

L.  Ed.  332,  34  Sup.  Ct.  167),  2. 
New  York  Harbor  Case,  The   (47  I.  C.  C.  643),  129. 
New  York  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  Co.    (31  App.   Div.  378,   52   N. 

Y.  Sup.  318,  157  N.  Y.  674,  51  N.  E.  1092),  13. 
New  York  Mercantile  Co.  v.  B.  &  0.  R.   (36  I.  C.  C.  156),  306. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Ballou  &  Wright    (242  Fed.  862,  155 

C.  C.  A.  450,  P.  U.  R.  1918A.  149),  207. 
New  York,  N.  H.   &  H.   R.  Co.  v.  Int.   Com.  Com.    (200   U.   S.  361,  50 

L.  Ed.  515,  26  Sup.  Ct.  272),  66,  172,  186,  345. 


98  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

New   York,   N.   H.   &   H.   R.   Co.   v.    New   York    (165   U.    S.    628,    41    L. 

Ed.  853,  17  Sup.  Ct.  418),  31. 
New   York,   N.   H.   &   H.   R.   Co.   v.   New   York    (142   N.   Y.   646,   37   N. 

E.  568),  312. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Piatt  (7  I.  C.  C.  323),  345,  359,  361. 
New  York,   P.   &  N.   R.   Co.   v.   Peninsula   Produce   Ex.    (240   U.   S.   34, 

60  L.  Ed.  511,  36  Sup.  Ct.  230),  440. 
New  York  Produce  Ex.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (7  I.  C.  C.  612),  346,  358. 
New  York  Produce  Ex.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  Co.    (3  I.  C.  C.   137,  2  I. 

C.  R.  13,  28,  353),  345,  346,  360. 
Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C.  199), 

204,  207,  213,  214,  218,  222,   383,  395,  408,   449. 
Nichols  &  Cox  Lumber  Co.  v.  United  States   (212  Fed.  588),  371,  385. 
Nicholson  v.  Great  W.  Ry.  Co.  (5  C  B.  N.  S.  366),  509. 
Niles-Bement-Pond  Co.  v.  Iron  Molders  Local  Bo.  68  (246  Fed.  851),  501. 
Nineteen    Hundred    and    Fifteen    Western    Rate    Advance    Case.      See 

Western  Rate  Advance  Case  1915n. 
Nitro  Powder  Co.  v.  W.  S.  R.  Co.   (44  L  C.  C  596),  207. 
Nix  &  Co.  V.  S.  R.  Co.  (31  I.  C.  C.  145),  383. 
Nobles    Bros.    Gro.    Co.    v.    Ft.    Worth    &    D.    C.    R.    Co.    (12    I.    C.    C. 

242),  346 
Nolen  v.  Riechman    (225  Fed.  812),  337. 

Nollenberger  v.  Missouri  ?ac.  R.  Co.    (15  I.  C.  C.  595),  218,  392. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Conley   (236  U.  S.  605,  59  L.  Ed.  745,  35  Sup. 

Ct.   437),   48,   87,  311. 
Norfolk    &   W.    R.    Co.    v.    Dixie    Tobacco    Co.    (228    U.    S.    593,    57    L. 

Ed.  980,  33  Sup.  Ct.  609,  111  Va.  813,  69  S.  E.  1106),  295,  439. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.   Pennsylvania    (136   U.   S.   114,  34   L.  Ed.  394. 

10  Sup.   958),  335. 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (195  Fed.  953),  122. 
Norfolk  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Chatman   (244  U.  S.  276,  61  L.  Ed.  1131,  37  Sup. 

Ct.  499),  362. 
Norfolk  Truckers  Ex.  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  (82  S.  E.  92),  340. 
Northampton  &  Bath  R.  R.  Case  (41  I.  C.  C.  68),  176. 
Northbound  Rates  on  Hardwood   (32  I.  C.  C.  521),  101. 
North   Carolina   Corp.   Com.   v.   A.   C.   L.   Ry.  Co.    (137   N.   C.   1,   49   S. 

E.  191,  115  Am.  St.  Rep.  636),  12,  19. 
North  Carolina  R.  Co.  v.  Zachary    (232   U.   S.   248,  58   L.  Ed.   591,  34 

Sup.  Ct.  305,  156  N.  C.  496,  72  S.  E.  858),  22. 
North  Dakota  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.   (17  N.  D.  223,  116  N.  W.  92),  50. 
Northern  C-  R-  Co.  v.  United  States  (241  Fed.  25,  154  C.  C.  A.  25),  371. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  99 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Minnesota    (208  U.   S.  583,  52  L.   Ed.  630.  28 

Sup.  Ct.  341),  54. 
Nortliern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  North  Dakota   (216  U.  S.  579,  54  L.  Ed.   624, 

30  Sup.  Ct.  423),  50. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  North  Dakota   (236  U.  S.  585,  59  L.   Ed.  735, 

35  Sup.  Ct.  429),  48,  50,  88,  90,  100,  101,  311. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  North  Dakota  (250  U.  S.  135,  63  L.  Ed.  897,  3'J 

Sup.  Ct.  505,  P.  U.  R.  1919D.  705),  335. 
Northern    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Pacific    Coast    Lumber    Mfrs.    Asso.     (165 

Fed.  1,  91  C.  C.  A.  39),  304,  307,  443,  490. 
Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Solum  (247  U.  S.  477,  62  L.  Ed.  1221,  38  Sup.  Ct. 

550),  210. 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wall  (241  U.  S.  87,  60  L.  Ed.  905,  36  Sup.  Ct. 

493),   440. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Washington   (13  Pac.  604),  9. 
Northern  Pac.   R.   Co.   v.   Washington   ex   rel.   Dustin    (142    U.    S.   492, 

35  L.  Ed.  1092,  12  Sup.  Ct.  283),  9,«347. 
Northern   Pac.   R.   Co.  v.   Washington    (222   U.   S.   370,   56   L.   Ed.   237, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  160),  4,  22,  58. 
Northern  Pac.  T.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  (184  Fed.  603,  106  C.  C.  A,  583),  481. 
Northern  Potato  Traffic  Asso.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (43  I    C.  C.  545),  346. 
Northern    Securities    Co.    v.    Harriman     (134    Fed.    331,    67    C.    C.    A. 

245,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  618),  489. 
Northern  Securities  Co.  v.  United   States    (193  U.  S.   197,  24   Sup.  Ct. 

436,  48  L.  Ed.  679,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  338),  11,  58,  486. 
North   Lonsdale  Iron   &   Steel  Co.  v.   Furriers'  L.   &  N.  W.   &   M.   Ry. 

Co.  (7  Ry.  &  Canal  Traffic  Cas.  146,  60  L.  J.  Q.  B.  419),  94. 
Northwestern    Consolidated    Milling    Co.    v.    Callam    &    Son    (177    Fed. 

786),  486. 
Northwestern  Cooperage  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  St.  P.  &  S.  St.  M.  R. 

Co.   (43  I.  C.  C.  629),  99a. 
Noyes  v.  Parsons  (245  Fed.  689,  158  C.  C.  A.  91),  492. 

O. 

O'Brien  Com.  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.   (20  I.  C.  C.  68),  213. 
Ocean-and-Rail  Rates  to  Charlotte,  N.  C.    (38  I.  C.  C.  405),  121. 
Ocean  Steamship  Co.  of  Savannah    (37  I.  C.  C.  422),  354. 
Ocheltree  Grain  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  46),  105. 
Ogden  Gateway  Case   (35  I.  C.  C.  131),  401. 
O'Halloran  v.  Am.  Sea  preen  Slate  Co.   (207  Fed.  187),  486. 
Ohio  Milk  Products  Shippers  v.  E.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  522),  89. 


100  Table  op  Oases  Cited. 

I  References  are  to  Sections.] 

Ohio  R.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dittey   (232  U.  S.  576,  58  L.  Ed.  737,  34  Sup. 

Ct.  372,  203  Fed.  537),  59. 
O'Keefe  v.  United  States  (240  U.  S.  294,  60  L.  Ed.  651,  36  Sup.  Ct.  313), 

315,  397. 
Oklahoma   v.   Kans.   Natural   Gas   Co.    (221    U.   S.   229,   55   L.    Ed.    716, 

31  Sup.  Ct.  564),  7. 
Oklahoma  Operating  Co.  v.  Love,  251  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup. 

Ct.   — . 
Oliver  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (89  Ark.  466,  117  S.  W.  238),  25,  26. 
Olson  V.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (250  Fed.  372,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  440. 
Omaha  Alfalfa  Milling  Co.  v.  P.  U.  R.  Co.   (43  I.  C.  C.  264),  208. 
Omaha  &  C.  B.   St.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.   Com.  Com.    (191  Fed.   40,   179   Fed. 

243),   66,  226,  337,  400. 
Omaha  &  C.   B.   St.   R.   Co.   v.   Int.   Com.   Com.    (230    U.   S.   324,   57  L. 

Ed.   1501,  33   Sup.  Ct.  890,  40  L.  R.  A.    (N.   S.)    385),  66,   226,  313, 

337,  400. 
Omaha  Elevator  Co.  v.  Union  Pac.  Co.   (249  Fed.  827,  162  C.  C.  A.  61), 

168,  404. 
Omaha  Grain  Ex.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.   (47  I.  C.  C.  532),  339. 
Omaha  Grain  Ex.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  553),  401. 
Operation  Car  Ferry  Boats  A.  A.  R.  Co.  (34  I.  C.  C.  83),  354. 
Operation   Car    Ferry    Boats    P.    M.   &    B.    L.    E.    R.    Co.    (34    I.    C.    C. 

86),  354. 
Oregon  R.   &  N.   Co.  v.   Campbell    (230   U.   S.   525,   57   L.  Ed.    1604,   33 

Sup.  Ct.  1026,  173  Fed.  957,  177  Fed.  318,  180  Fed.  253),  45,  68,  84. 
Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Fairchild    (224  U.  S.   510,  56  L.  Ed.  863,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  535),  13,  14,  396. 
Oregon   Short  Line  v.   Northern   Pac.   R.   Co.    (3  I.  C.   C.   264,  2   I.   C. 

R.  639),  392. 
Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.    (51   Fed.  465), 

149,  346,  347. 
Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Ry.  Co.  v.   Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.    (61   Fed.   158, 

9  C.  C.  A.  409),  149,  346,  347. 
Oregon-Washington  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wilkinson   (188  Fed.  363),  486. 
Osborne  v.  Bank   (9  Wheat.  738,  6  L.  Ed.  204),  292. 
Osborne  v.  Chicago  &  North  W.  Ry.  Co.    (48  Fed.  49),  214,  248.  383. 
Oshkosh  Logging  Tool  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (14  I.   C.   R. 

109),  408. 
Otis    Elevator    Co.    v.    Geiger    (107    Fed.    131,    2    Fed    Anti-Trust    Dec. 

66),  486. 
Ottumwa   Bridge   Co.    v.    Chicago,   M.    &    St.    P.    Ry.    Co.    (14    I.    C.    C 

121),  101,  104,  339,  383. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited,  101 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Ottumwa  Com.  Asso.  v.  Chicago.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  413),  118. 
Ouachita  Packet  Co.  v.  Aikin   (121  U.  S.  444,  30  L.  Ed.  976.  7  Sup.  Ct. 

907),  56. 
Oxlade   v.   North   Eastern   R.   Co.    (1   C.   B.    N.   S.    454.   20   L.   J.   C.   P. 

129,  1  N.  &  Mac.  72),  144. 
Ozark   Fruit    Growers'    Asso.    v.    St.   L.    &   S.    F.    R.   Co.    (16    I.    C.   C. 

134),  96. 
Ozark  Fruit  Growers'  Asso.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (16  I.  C  C.  1U6), 

122. 

P. 

Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  Crenshaw   (198  U.  S.  17,  49  L.  Ed.  925,  25  Sup. 
Ct.  552),  58. 

Pacific  Coast  Beef  &  Prov.  Co.  v.  O.  S.  L.  R.  Co.  (46  I.  C   C.  401),  481. 
Pacific  Coast  Gypsum  Co.  v.  O.  W.  R.  Co.  (30  I.  C.  C.  135),  181. 
Pacific  Coast  Jobbers'   &   Mfrs.   Asso.    v.    Southern   Pac.   Co.    (12    I.    C. 

C.  319),  358. 
Pacific  Coast   Lumber   Mfrs.'   Asso.   v.  N.   P.   R.   Co.    (14    I.   C.   C.   51), 

195,  400. 
Pacific    Coast    Lumber    Mfrs.'    Asso.    v.    Northern    Pac.    R.    Co.    (14    I. 

C.  C.  23),  400. 
Pacific  Coast  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (173  Fed.  448),  66,  103. 
Pacific   Coast    S.    S.    Co.    v.    Railroad    Comrs.    (9    Sawy,    253,    18    Fed. 

10),  335. 
lacific    Creamery    Co.    v.    A.    T.    &    S.    F.    Ry.    Co.    (29    I.    C.    C.    405, 

408),  107. 
Pacific  Creamery  Co.  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.   (42  L  C.  C.  93),  205. 
Pacific  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  373),  211. 
Pacific   Fuel    and    Supply    Co.    v.    Grand    T.    W.    Ry.    Co.    (27    L    C.    C. 

34),  399. 
Pacific  Nav.  Co.  v.  So.  Pac.   Co.    (31  I.  C.  C.  472),  121.  194,  338,   346, 

347,  375,  401. 
Pacific  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Anderson   (196  Fed.  699),  327,  486 
Paducah  Board  of  Trade  v.  L  C.  R.  Co.  (43  L  C.  C.  537),  396a. 
Page  V.   Delaware,  L.   &  W.   R.   Co.    (6   I.   C.   C.   148,   4   L   C.  R.   525), 

346,  387,  392. 
Page   V.    Delaware,   L.    &   W.    R.   Co.    (6    L   C.    C.    148,    548),    339,    346, 

386,  392,  416. 
Paine  Bros.  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.    (7  L  C.  C.  218),  116,  156,  345. 
Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  Neal  (214  Fed.  82,  30  C.  C.  A.  522),  489. 
Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  Neal  (214  Fed.  82,  C.  C.  A.  522),  489. 


102  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  Neal    (244  U.  S.  459,  61  L.  Ed.  1256,  37  Sup.  Ct. 

718),  486. 
Pankey  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.   (3  L  C.  C.  658),  3  I.  C.  R.  33),  383. 
Pankey  &  Holmes  v.  Central  N.  E.  R.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  578),  110. 
Pardee  Works  v.  C.  of  N.  J.  R.  Co.   (29  I.  C.  C.  500),  88. 
Pardee  Works  v.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.    (39  I.  C.  C.  162),  139a. 
Parfrey  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  104),  110. 
Park  &  Sons  (John  D.)  v.  Hartman  (153  Fed.  24,  82  C.  C.  A.  158,  12  L. 

R.  A.   (N.  S.)   1135),  48ti. 
Parkersburg  &  O.  R.  T.  Co.  v.  Parkersburg   (107  U.  S.  691.  27  L.  Ed. 

584,  2  Sup.  Ct.  732),  56. 
Parks  V.  Cincinnati  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  47),  175. 
Parsons   v.   Chicago   &   N.   W.   R.   Co.    (167   U.    S.  447,   42   L.    Ed.   231, 

17  Sup.  Ct.  887),  34,  134,  153,  199,  205,  345,  346,  383. 

Parsons   v.   Chicago  &   N.   W.  R.   Co.    (63   Fed.   903,    11   C.   C.   A.   489. 

37  U.  S.  App.  394),  346,  348,  383. 
Partridge  &  Son  v.  ?.  R.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  484),  145. 
Patapsco  Guano  Co.  v.  North  Carolina   (171  U.  S.  345.  43  L.  Ed.  191, 

18  Sup.  Ct.  862),  58. 

Patterson   v.   United    States    (Cash    Register   Case)     (222    Fed.    599,  — 

C.  C.  A.  — ),  487. 
Paxton  Tie  Co.  v.  Detroit  So.  R.  Co.  (10  I.  C.  C.  422).  383. 
Payne-Gardner  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (13  I.  C.  C.  638),  339. 
Peale,  Peacock  &  Kerr  v.  C.  of  N.  J.  R.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  25),  10,  25. 
Pearsall  v.   G.   N.   R.   Co.    (161   U.   S.   646,  40   L.   Ed.   838,   16   Sup.  Ct. 

705),   11. 
Pearson  v.  Duncan  &  Sons  (Ala.)    (73  So.  406,  3  A.  L.  R.  242),  486. 
Peavy  &  Co.    (F.  H.),  Omaha  Elevator  Co.  et  al.  v.  U    P.  R.  Co.  and 

Martin    A.    Knapp,    et    al.,    composing    Int.    Com.    Com.    (176    Fed. 

409,  410),  168,  197,  314,  331,  346. 
Pecos  &  N.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com.  of  Texas    (56  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

422.  120  S.  W.  1055),  9. 
Pecos   Mercantile   Co.   v.    Atchison.    T.   &    S.   F.    Ry.    Co.    (13    I.   C.    C. 

173),  348. 
Peik  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (94  U.  S.  164,  24  L.  Ed.  97),  43.  45. 
Pelham,  Ga.  Town  of,  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (28  I.  C.  C.  433),  108. 
Pfninsular  &  Occidental   S.   S.  Co.    (37  I.  C.  C.  432,  38  I.  C.   C.   662), 

337,  354. 
Penn  Refining  Co.  v.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.   (208  U.  S.  208,  52  L. 

Ed.  456,  28  Sup.  Ct.  268),  317,  383,  389,  406,  407. 
Pennsylvania   v.   Wheeling   Bridge   Co.    (13   How.   54   U.   S.   518,   14    L. 

Ed.  249),  54. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited,  103 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Louisville,   N.   A.   &  C.  R.  Co.    (3  I.   C.  C.  223,  2 

I.  C.  R.  603),  392. 
Pennsylvania  Paraffine  Works  v.  P.  R.  Co.   (34  I.  C.  C.  179),  175. 
Pennsylvania  Millers'   State   Asso.   v.   Philadelphia   &   R.   R.   Co.    (8    I. 

C.  C.  531),  80,  335,  33.9,  348,  358. 
Penn.    R.    Co.    v.    Clark    Bros.    Coal    Co.    (241    Pa.    515     88    Atl.    754), 

317,  383. 
Penri.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark  Bros.  Coal  Co.   (238  U.  S.  456,  59  L.  Ed.  140G,  35 

Sup.  Ct.  896),  198,  317,  383. 
Penn.   R.   Co.   v.   Hughes    (191   U.   S.   477,   48   L.    Ed.   268,   24    Sup.   Ct. 

132),  32,  34. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  International  Coal  Co.    (173  Fed.  1,  97  C.  C.  A.  383), 

138,  205,  208,  215,  383. 
Penn.  R.   Co.   v.   International  Coal  Mining  Co.    (230   U.  S.   184,   57  L. 

Ed.  1446,  33  Sup.  Ct.  893),  134,  137,  138,  205,  208,  215,  297,  317,  383, 

443. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (193  Fed.  81),  208,  383. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacoby  (239  U.  S.  631,  60  L.  Ed.  476,  36  Sup.  Ct.  166), 

408. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacoby   (242  U.  S.  89,  61  L.  Ed.  165,  37  Sup.  Ct.  49), 

208,  317,  407,  408. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Kittaning  Iron  &  Steel  Mfg,  Co.  (252  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed. 
— ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  -25. 
Penn.    R.    Co.    v.    Knight    (192    U.    S.    21,    48    L.    Ed.    325,    24    Sup.    Ct. 

202),  55. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Minds   (250  U.  S.  368,  63  L.  Ed.  665,  39  Sup.  Ct.  531), 

208,  383. 
Penn  R.  Co.  v.  Olivit  Bros.    (243  U.  S.  574,  61  L.  Ed.  908,  37  Sup.  Ct. 

468),  371,  440. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Puritan  Coal  Co.    (237  Pa.  420,  85  Atl.  426,  Ann.  Cas. 

1914B,  37),  174,  296,  405. 
Penn.  R.   Co.   v.   Puritan  Coal   Co.    (237   U.   S.  121,  59   L.   Ed.   867,   35 

Sup.  Ct.  484,  214  Fed.  445),  61,  174,  198,  292,  296,  407. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Sonman  Shaft  Coal  Co.  (242  U.  S.  120,  61  L.  Ed.  188, 

37  Sup.  Ct.  46),  2,  24,  292,  383. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Stineman  Coal  Mining  Co.  (242  U.  S.  298,  61  L.  Ed.  316. 

37  Sup.  Ct.  118),  208,  292,  297. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Swift  &  Co.  (242  Fed.  92,  249  Fed.  315),  481. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Towers  (245  U.  S.  6,  62  L.  Ed.  117,  38  Sup.  Ct.  2),  43. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (257  Fed.  261,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  371. 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (236  U.  S.  351,  59  L.  Ed.  616,  35  Sup.  Ct. 

370,  P.  U.  R.  1915B,  261),  73,  150,  192,  195,  347,  396b,  404. 
Pennsylvania    Sugar   Refining   Co.    v.    Am.    Sugar   Ref.    Co.    (160    Fed. 

144),  492. 


104  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Pennsylvania    Sugar   Refining  Co.    v.    Am.    Sugar   Ref.    Co     (166    Fed. 

254,  92  C.  C.  A.  318),  492. 
Pennsylvania  Tob.   Co.  v.  Old   Dominion    S.   S.   Co.    (18   I.   C.   C.   197). 

101 
Pensacola  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Florida  (25  Fla.  310,  5  So.  833),  49. 
.^ensacola    Tel.    Co.    v.    Western    U.    Tel.    Co.    (96    U.    S.    1,    24    L.    Ed. 

708),   2. 
People  V.  Board  of  R.  R.  Comrs.   (53  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   Gl),  49. 
People  v.  Booth  &  Co.   (42  Misc.  327,  86  N.  Y.  Sup|  272).  58. 
People  V.  Bootman   (180  N.  Y.  1.  72  N.  E.  505),  58. 
People  V.  Budd   (117  N.  Y.  1,  5  L.  R.  A.  559,  22  N.  E.  670),  45. 
People   V.    Buffalo   Fish   Co.    (164   N.   Y.   93,   58   N.    E.    34,  79   Am.    St. 

Rep.  622,  52  L.  R.  A.  803),  58. 
People  V.  Caldwell   (71  N.  Y.  Sup.  C54,  64  App.  Div.  46),  37. 
People  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  (57  111.  436,  93  N.  E.  112),  13. 
People  V.  Chicago,  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.   (223  111.  581,  79  N.  E.  144),  432. 
People    V.    D.    &    H.    Canal    Co.    (32    N.    Y.    App.    Div.    120,    52    N.    Y. 

Supp.  850,  165  N.  Y.  362,  59  N.  E.  138),  9. 
People  V.  Erie  R.  Co.  (135  App.  Div.  767,  119  N.  Y.  Supp    893),  4. 
People  V.  Erie  R.  Co.   (198  N.  Y.  369,  91  N.  E.  849),  4. 
People  V.  Joline  (65  Misc.  Rep.  394,  121  N.  Y.  Sup.  857),  27. 
People  V.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (104  N.  Y.  58,  9  N.  E.  856),  9. 
People  V.  New  York,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (55  Hun  409,  8  N.  Y.  Sup.  673),  31. 
People  V.  O'Neal  (110  Mich.  324,  68  N.  W.  227,  33  L.  R.  A.  697),  33. 
People  V.  St.  L.  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  (176  111.  512,  52  N.  E.  292),  49. 
People  V.  Stevens  (197  N.  Y.  1,  90  N.  E.  60),  51. 
People  V.  Warden  of  City  Prison   (157  N.  Y.  116,  51  N.  E.  1006,  43  L. 

R.  A.  264,  68  Am.  St.  763),  37. 
People's  Fuel  &  Supply  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  24).  399. 
People's  Fuel  Co.  v.  G.  T.  W.  R.  Co.   (30  I.  C.  C.  657),  397. 
People's    Tobacco    Co.    v.    Am.    Tob.    Co.    (170    Fed.    396,    96    C.    C.    A. 

566),  486. 
Perishable  Freight  Investigation  (56  I.  C.  C.  499),  81,  161. 
Perry  v.  Florida,  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (5  I.  C.  C.  97,  3  I.  C.  R.  740),  348,  383. 
Pettibone  v.  United  States    (148  U.  S.  197,  37  L.  Ed.  419,  13  Sup    Ct. 

542),  486. 
?helps  V.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  36,  4  I.  C.  R.  44),  345. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  United   States    (240  U.   S.   334,  60  L.  Fd 

675,  37  Sup.  Ct.  61,  247  Fed.  406,  159  C.  C.  A.  523),  346,  481. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States   (219  Fed.  988).  393. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  105 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Philadelphia  B.   &  W.   R.   Co.   v.   Schubert    (224   U.   S.    603.   56    L.   Ed. 

911,  32  Sup.  Ct.  589),  56,  332. 
Philadelphia  Co.  v.  Stimson   (223  U.  S.  605,  56  L.  Ed.  570,  32  Sup.  Ct. 

340),  56. 

Philadelphia   Veneer   Lumber  Co.   v.   C.   of   N.   J.   R    Co.    (25   I.   C.   C. 

653),  398. 
Phillips  V.  Grand  Trunk  Western  R.  Co.  (11  I.  C.  C.  659),  181,  346. 
Phillips  V.   G.   T.   W.   R.   Co.    (236   U.   S.   662,   59   L.   Ed.   774,   35   Sup. 

Ct.  444),  383,  385,  449. 

Phillips  V.  lola  Portland   Cement  Co.    (125   Fed.   593,   61   C.  C.   A.    19, 

2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  284),  487. 
Phillips  V.   lola  Portland   Cement  Co.    (192   U.   S.   606,   48   L.   Ed.   585. 

24  Sup.  Ct.  850),  487. 
Phillips,  Bailey  &  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  93),  346,  348. 
Phillips-Trawick-James  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.    (13  I.  C.  C.  644),  5. 
Phoenix  Printing  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (31  I.  C.  C.  289),  383. 
Phoenix  Ry.  v.  Geary  (239  U.  S.  277,  60  L.  Ed.  287,  36  Sup.  Ct.  45),  12. 
Pickering  Phipps  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.   (2  Q.  B.  D.   (1882)   229), 

128,  348. 
Pictorial  Review  v.  Curtis  Pub.  Co.   (255  Fed.  206),  486. 
Pierce  Co.  v.  Wells-Fargo   Ex.  Co.    (236   U.   S.   278,   59   L.   Ed.   576,  35 

Sup.  Ct.  351),  439. 
Pig  Iron  Rates  from  Va.  to  Penn.   (27  I.  C.  C.  343),  351. 
Pipe  Line  Case   (204  Fed.  798),  381. 
Pipe  Line  Cases   (See  United  States  v.  Ohio  Oil  Co.)    (2M  U.   S.  548, 

58  L.  Ed.  1459,  34  Sup.  Ct.  95),  381,  486. 
Pitts  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  684),  358. 
Pittsburg,   etc.,    R.   Co.   v.    Baltimore   &   O.    R.    Co.    (3    I.    C.    C.    465,    2 

I.  C.  R.  572),  345,  358.  444. 
Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Fink   (250  U.  S.  577,  63  L.  Ed.  1151, 

39  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  295,  346a,  440. 
Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunt  (171  Ind.  189,  86  N.  E.  328), 

9,  13. 
Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood  (84  N.  E.  1009),  297. 
Pittsburg  Steel  Co.  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  312),  208. 
Pittwood  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.    (51  I.  C.  C.  535),  205. 
Planters'   Compress   Co.   v.   Cleveland,   etc.,   Ry.   Co.    (11    I.   C.   C.    382, 

606),  116,  339,  345. 
Planters'   Gin  &  Compress  Co.  v.   N.   Y.  &   M.  V.   R.   Co.    (16   I.   C.   C. 

131),  346. 
Piatt  V.  Le  Cocq    (150   Fed.   391,   158   Fed.   723,   85   C.   C.   A.   621,   15  L. 

R.  A.   (N.  S.)   558),  8,  60. 


106  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

1  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Plessy  V.  Ferguson  (163  U.  S.  537,  41  L.  Ed.  256,  16  Sup.  Ct.  1138),  29. 
Plynaouth  Coal  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.   (56  I.  C.  C.  689),  383. 
Pneumatic  Scale  Corp.  v.  A.  &  R.  R.  Co.   (51  I.  C.  C.  686),  346. 
Poehlman  Bros.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  ?.  Ry.  Co.   (30  I.  C.  C.  89),  254. 
Pollock  V.  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.   (158  U.  S.  601,  39  L.  Ed.  1108, 

15  Sup.  Ct.  912),  407. 
Ponca  City  Milling  Co.  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.  26), 

345,  346. 

Pond-Decker  Lumber  Co.  v.   Spencer    (86  Fed.   846,   30  C.   C.   A.   430), 

180,  212,  358. 
Pooling  Freights,  Re   (115  Fed.  588),  352,  384. 
Poor  V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  469),  416. 
Poor   Grain   Co.   v.    Chicago,    B.   &   Q.   R.    Co.    (12    I.    C.    C.    418),   180, 

212,  339,  358,  361,  383. 
Port  Huron  &  Duluth   S.   S.   Co.   v.   P.   R.   Co.    (35   I.  C.  C.   475),   151, 

194,  338. 
Port  Huron  &  Duluth  S.  S.  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (35  I.  C.  C.  475),  194. 
Port   Richmond    Ferry    v.    County    of    Hudson    (234    U.    S.    317,    58    L. 

Ed.  1330,  34  Sup.  Ct.  821,  82  N.  J.  L.  536,  82  Atl.  729),  53. 
Porter  v.  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (78  Ark.  182,  95  S.  W.  953),  40. 
Portland   Ry.   L.   &   P.   Co.  v.   R.   R.   Com.   of   Oregon    (229   U.    S.   397, 

57  L.  Ed.  1248,  33  Sup.  Ct.  820,  56  Ore.  468,  105  Pac.  709),  43. 
Post  V.  A.  C.  L.  Co.   (138  Ga.  763,  76  S.  E.  45),  34,  295. 
Post  V.  Buck  Stove  &  Range  Co.   (200  Fed.  918),  486. 
Post  Prtg.  &  Pub.  Co.  V.  Brewster  (246  Fed.  321),  2. 
Postal    Tel.    Cable    Co.   v.    Adams    (155    U.    S.    688,    39    L.   Ed.    311,    15 

Sup.  Ct.  360),  314. 
Postal  Tel.-Cable  Co.  v.  Mobile   (179  Fed.  955),  2,  28. 
Postal  Tel.  &  Cable  Co.  v.  Warren-Godwin  Lumber  Co.    (251  U.  S.  27, 

64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  440. 
Potlack  Lumber   Co.  v.   Spokane  Falls   &  B.   Ry.   Co.    (157   Fed.   588). 

304,  443. 

Pound  V.  Turck  (95  U.  S.  459,  24  L.  Ed.  525),  54. 

Powhattan  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.    (13  I.  C.  C.  69), 
175,  346. 

Prairie  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v.  United  States  (204  Fed.  798),  67,  335,  387,  486. 
Prentis   v.   Atlantic   C.   L.   R.   Co.    (211    U.    S.   210,    53    L.    Ed.    150,   29 

Sup.  Ct.  67),  60,  63. 
Prescott  &  A.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (73  Fed.  438,  1 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  604),  149,  347,  486. 
Private  Wire  Contracts  (50  I.  C.  C.  731),  116,  340. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  107 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Procter  &   Gamble   v.   Cincinnati,   H.   &  D.   R.   Co.    (4   I.   C.   C   443,   ?> 

I.  C.  R.  374),  102,  416. 
Procter  &  Gamble  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  R.  Co.   (y  I.  C.  C.  440,  19  I.  C.  C.  556), 

142a,  162,  178,  339. 
Procter  &  Gamble  v.  United  States  (188  Fed.  221),  308. 
Procter  &   Gamble   v.   United    States    (225   U.    S.   282,   56   L.    Ed.    1091, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  761),  26,  222,  308a. 
Producers'    Pipe    Line    Co.    v.    St.    Louis,    L    M.    &    S.    Ry.    Co.    (12    I. 

C.  C.  186),  392. 
Propeller  Niagara  v.  Cordes  (21  How.  62  U.  S.  7,  16  L.  Ed.  41),  55. 
Proportional  Rates  to  Gulf  Ports   (44  I.  C.  C.  543),  348 
Protection  of  Potatoes  in  Winter  (26  L  C.  C.  681),  337. 
Providence   Coal   Co.  v.    Providence   &   W.    R.    Co.    (1    I.   C.    C.    107,    1 

I.  C.  R.  316,  363),  345,  346. 
Provident  Institution  v.  Massachusetts  (6  Wall.,  72  U.  S    611,  18  L.  Ed. 

907),  59. 
Public  Service  Com.  of  Wash.  v.  A.  &  V.  Ry.  Co.   (42  I.  C.  C.  54),  346. 
Public  Utilities  Com.  v.  Landon   (249  U.  S.  236,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup. 

Ct.  — ),  335. 
Public  Utilities  Com.  v.  New  England  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.    (232  Mass.  465, 

122  N.  E.  567,  P.  U.  R.  1919D,  49,  4  A.  L.  R.  1662m.  250  U.  S.  195, 

63  L.  Ed.  934,  39  Sup.  Ct.  511),  335. 
Pueblo  Transportation  Asso.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  82),  358. 
Paget    Sound    Traction    Light    &    Power    Co.    v.    Reynolds    (233    Fed. 

371),  43. 
Pullman    Co.    v.    Croom    (231    U.    S.    571,    58    L.    Ed.    375,    34    Sup.    Ct. 

182),  453. 
Pullman   Co.    v.    Kansas    (216    U.    S.    56,    54    L.    Ed.    378,    30    Sup.    Ct. 

232).  59. 
Pullman  (  c.  v.  Linke    (203  Fed.  1017),  42,  335. 
Pullman    Palace    Car    Co.    v.    Missouri    Pac.    Co.    (115    U.    S.    587,    29 

L.  Ed.  499,  6  Sup.  Ct.  194),  347. 
Puritan  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.    (237  Pa.  448,  85  Atl    426,  Ann. 

Cas.  1914P,  37),  405. 
Purity   Extract   Co.   v.   Lynch    (226    U.   S.    192,   57   L.   Ed.   84,   33    Sup. 

Ct.  44,   Ku  Misp.   650,  56   So.   316),   58. 

Q. 

Queen,  The  (184  Fed.  537,  206  Fed.  148,  124  C.  C.  A.  214),  56. 

Quimby  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  392),  346. 

Quintal  &  Lynch  v.  Florida  E.  C.  R.  Co.    (57  I.  C.  C.  289),  68. 


108  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

IReferences  are. to   Sections.] 

R. 

Rahway   V.    R.   Co.   v.    Delaware,   L.   &   W.   R.   Co.    (14    I.   C.   C.    191) 
66,  344,  347. 

Rail   &  River   Coal    Co.    v.    Baltimore   &   O.   R.    Co.    (14    I.    C.   C.    86), 

175,  395. 
Rail  &  River  Coal  Co.  v.  Yaple  (214  Fed.  273),  453. 
Railroad    Commission    Cases    (See    Stone    v.    Farmers'    L.    &    T.    Co.) 

(116   U.   S.   307,   29   L.   Ed.   636,  6   Sup.  Ct.   334). 
Railroad  Com.  of  Ala.  v.  Cent,  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  (170  Fed.  225),  50. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Ark.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  (24  I.  C.  C.  293),  347. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Ark.  v.  M.  &  N.  A.  R.  Co.  (30  I.  C.  C.  488),  98. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Fla.  v.  F.  E.  C.  R.  Co.   (42  I.  C.  C.  616),  337. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Fla.  v.  Savannah,  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (5  I.  C.  C.  13,  3 

I.  C.  R.   688),  335,  392,  394. 
Railroad  Com.   of  Fla.  v.  Savannah,   F.   &  W.   R.  Co.    (5  I.  C.  C.  136, 

3  I.  C.  R.  750),  335,  416. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Ga.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (148  Ga.  442).  11. 
Railroad   Com.   of  Ga.,   Trammell,  et   al.,   v.   Clyde    S.   S.   Co.    (5   I.   C. 

C.  324,  4  I.  C.  R.  120),  See  Trammell  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co. 
Railroad  Cora,  of  Ga.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (140  Ga.  817,  80  S.  E.  327),  442. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Iowa  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  181),  126. 
Railroad   Com.    of  Kansas   v.   Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.    (8    I.   C. 

C.  304),  346,  348. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Kansas  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (22  I.  C.  C.  407),  124. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Kansas  v.  M.  P.  R.  Co.  (71  Kan.  193,  80  Pac.  53),  9. 
Railroad   Com.   of   Kentucky  v.    Cincinnati,   N.   O.   &   T.    P.   R.   Co.    (7 

I.  C.  C.  380),  348. 
Railroad    Com.    of   Kentucky   v.    Louisville  &    N.    R.    Co.    (10    I.   C.    C. 

173),   197,  347. 
Railroad   Com.    of   Kentucky   v.    Louisville   &    N.   R.   Co.    (13   I.    C.   C. 

300),  348. 
Railroad   Com.   of  Ky.   v.   Louisville   &  N.   R.   Co.    (192    U.   S.    568,   48 

L.  Ed.  565,  24  Sup.  Ct.  339),  9. 
Railroad  Com.  of  La.  v.  A.  H.  T.  Ry.  Co.    (41  I.  C.  C.  83,  43  I.  C.  C. 

45),  44,  139a. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Louisiana  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (23  I.  C.  C.  31), 

3,  44,  62,  68,  145,  184,  222,  336,  346. 
Railroad  Com.  of  La.  v.  T.  &  P.  R.  Co.   (229  U.  S.  336,  57  L.  Ed.  1215, 

33  Sup.  Ct.  837),  68. 
Railroad    Com.    of    Mississippi    v.    111.    Cent.    R.    Co.    (203    U.    S.    335, 

51  L.  Ed.  209,  27  Sup.  Ct.  90),  21. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  109 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Railroad   Com.   of   Mississippi   v.   Gulf   &   S.    I.   R.    Co.    (78   Miss.    750, 

29  So.  789),  27. 
Railroad  Com.   of  Montana  v.   B.   A.   &   P.   Ry.   Co.    (31   I.  C.   C.   641), 

88,  98,  100. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Nevada  v.  S.  P.  Co.    (21  I.  C.  C.  329),  63,   145,  154, 

202,  244,  345,  346,  348. 
Railroad  Com.   of  Ohio  v.   Hocking  Valley   R.   Co.    (12   I.   C.   C.    398). 

S46,  395. 
R.  R.  Com.  of  Ohio  v.  Worthington   (225  U.  S.  101,  5G  L.  Ed.  1004,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  G53),  25. 

Railroad   Com.   of  Ohio   v.   Worthington    (187    Fed.    965,    110    C.    C.    A. 

85,  225  U.  S.  101,  56  L.  Ed.  1004,  32  Sup.  Ct.  053),  25,  66,  68,  335. 
Railroad   Com.    of   S.    C.   v.    Columbia    &   G.    R.    Co.    (26    S.    C.    353,    2 

S.  E.  127),  9. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Tex.  v.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  (40  S.  W.  829),  27. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Tenn.  v.  A.  A.  R.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  418),  345,  346. 
Railroad  Co.  of  Tex.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.F.  R.  Co.   (20  I.  C.  C.  463),  95,  124. 
Railroad  Com.   of  Tex.   v.   C.   R.   I.   &   P.   R.   Co.    (114    S.   W.   192.   102 

Tex.  393,  17  S.  W.  794),  9. 
Ralston  Townsite  Co.  v.  M.  P.  R.  Co.  (22  I.  C.  C.  354),  192. 
Randolph  Lumber  Co.   v.   Seaboard   A.   L.   Ry.   Co.    (13   I.   C.   C.   601), 

117,  346. 
Randolph   Lumber  Co.   v.   Seaboard   A.  L.   Co.    (14    I.   C.   C.   338),   416. 
Ransome  v.    Eastern   Counties   Ry.   Co.    (1857),    (1   C.    B.    N.   S.    437). 

(26  L.  J.  C.  P.  91),  128,  144. 
Rasmussen  v.  Idaho  (181  U.  S.  198,  45  L.  Ed.  820,  21  Sup.  Ct.  594),  58. 
Rast  V.   Van   Deman  &  Lewis  Co.    (240   U.   S.   342.   60   L.   Ed.   679,   36 

Sup.  Ct.  370),  58. 
Rates  and  Rules  on  Shipments  of  Packing  House  Products    (36  I.  C. 

C.  62),  81a,  142. 
Rates  for  Transportation  of  Anthracite  Coal   (35  I.  C.  C.  220),  66. 
Rates  for  Transportation  of  Fresh  Meats  and  Packing  House  Products 

(23  I.  C.  C.  652),  145. 
Rates  from  the  Walsenberg  Coal  Field   (26  I.  C.  C.  85),  145. 
Rates  on  Barley  from  Cal.  (24  I.  C.  C.  664),  398. 
Rates  on  Beer  and  Other  Malt  Products    (31   I.  C.  C.   544),   6,  44,   62, 

119,  254,  336,  398,  399. 
Rates  on  Car  Load  Stone  (29  I.  C.  C.  136).  223,  399. 
Rates  on  Cement  from  Md.  to  Va.  (24  I.  C.  C.  290),  398,  399. 
Rates  on  Corn  (25  I.  C.  C.  46),  399. 
Rates  on  Cotton  Seed  and  Its  Products  (28  I.  C.  C.  219).  401. 


no  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

r References  are  to   Sections.] 

Rates  on  Flax  Seed  (29  I.  C.  C.  G33,  23  I.  C.  C.  272),  88,  95. 

Rates  on  High  Explosives  (33  I.  C.  C.  567),  335. 

Rates  on  Lumber  and   Other   Forest  Products    (30   L   C.   C.  371),  397, 

398,  400. 
Rates  on  Lumber  by  V.  S.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (21  L  C.  C.  16),  398. 
Rates  for  Transportation  of  Locomotives  (21  I.  C.  C.  103),  399. 
Rates  on  Live  Poultry  (32  I.  C.  C.  380),  119,  259,  336,  398. 
Rates  on  Meats   (23  I.  C.  C.  656),  401. 
Rates  on  Tropical  Fruits  (30  L  C.  C.  621),  348. 
Rates  on  Sugar  (31  L  C.  C.  495),  348. 
Rates  on  Slag  (34  L  C.  C.  337),  358. 
Ratican  v.  Terminal  R.  Asso.   (114  Fed.  666),  218,  383. 
Raworth  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.   (5  I.  C.  C.  234,  3  I.  C.  R.  857),  335, 

348. 
Rawson  v.  Newport  News  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.    (3  I.  C.  C.  266,  2  L  C.  R. 

626),  206,  383,  406. 
Raymond  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.    (1  I.  C.  C.  230,  1  I.  C.  R. 

627),  339,  345,  346. 
Rayner  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (33  L  C.  C.  595),  383. 
Re  Advances  on  Coal  to  Lake  Ports   (22  L  C.  C.  604),  81. 
Re  Advances  Class  &  Commodity  Rates  (25  I.  C.  C.  401),  398. 
Re  Advances  Class  Rates   (25  L  C.  C.  268),  398. 
Re  Advances  on  Crushed  Stone   (29  I.  C.  C.  136),  223. 
Re  Advances  on  Furniture   (25  L  C.  C.  299),  398. 
Re  Advances  on  Hay   (25  L  C.  C.  680),  378,  393. 
Re  Advances  on  Hops  (25  I.  C.  C  16),  398. 

Re  Advances  on  Knitting  Factory  Products  (25  L  C.  C.  034),  398. 
Re  Advances  on  Live  Stock   (25  I.  C.  C.  63),  398. 
Re  Advances  on  Lumber  (21  I.  C.  C.  455),  258,  399. 
Re  Advances  on  Manganese  Ore  (25  I.  C.  C.  663),  138,  398. 
Re  Advances  on  Oil    (25   L  C.  C.  349),  398. 
Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Potatoes   (23  I.  C.  C.  69),  399. 
Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Potatoes  (25  L  C.  C.  159),  175. 
Re  Advances  in  Rates  between  Miss.  &  Mo.  River  (21  I.  C.  C.  546),  207. 
Re  Advances  in  Rates  on  Soft  Coal   (23  L  C.  C.  518),  258,  399. 
Re  Alleged   Disturbance  in  Passenger  Rates  by  Canadian   Pacific  Ry. 

Co.   (8  I.  C.  C.  71),  348. 
r;e    Alleged    Excessive  Rates   on   Food   Products    (4    I.    C.   C.    48,    116, 

3  L  C.  R.  93,  151),  82,  85,  88,  90,  101,  339,  392. 
Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Vegetables    (8   I. 

C.  C.  585),  358. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  Ill 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Coal  (5  I.  C. 
C.  466,  4  I.  C.  R.  157),  345. 

Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Discrimination  against  Enterprise  Transporta- 
tion Co.  (11  I.  C.  C.  587),  397. 

Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  and  Practices  (7  I.  C.  C.  240),  67,  165. 

}\e  Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  and  Practices  in  Transportation  of  Coal 
(10  I.  C.  C.  473),  358. 

Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  and  Practices  in  Transportation  of  Cot- 
ton (8  I.  C.  C.  121),  335. 

Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  and  Practices  in  Transportation  of  (Jrain 
(7  I.  C.  C.  33),  164,  345. 

Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  and  Practices  in  Transportation  of  Grain 
and  Grain  Products  (7  1.  C.  C.  240),  345,  358. 

Re  Alleged  Violations  of  tlie  Act  by  the  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry  Co. 
(8  I.  C.  C.  290),  335,  346,  348. 

Re  Alleged  Violation  of  Fourth  Section   (7  I.  C.  C.  61),  348. 

Re  Allowances   (12  I.  C.  C.  85),  197,  404. 

Re  Allowances  for  Transfer  of  Sugar  (14  I.  C.  C.  619),  140. 

Re  Allowances  to  Elevator  by  Union  Pacific  R.  Co,  (10  I.  C  C. 
309),  197. 

Re  A^llowances  to  Elevator  by  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C. 
85),  197,  395,  416. 

Re  Allowances  to  Elevators  by  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  498), 
416. 

Re  Allowances  to  Elevators  by  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C. 
315),  168,  337. 

Re  Amsterdam  (33  N.  Y.  Supp.  1009),  49. 

Re  Application  of  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (7  I.  C.  C.  593),  348. 

Re  Application  of  F.  W.  Clark  (3  I.  C.  C.  649,  2  I.  C.  R.  797),  397. 

Re  Application  of  Fremont,  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  et  al.  (6  I.  C.  C.  293), 
348. 

Re  Application  of  Rome,  W.  &  O.  R.  Co.   (6  I.  C.  C.  328),  348. 

Re  Application  of  Southern  Pacific  4th  Sec.   (22  I.  C.  C.  366),  244 

Re  Arkansas  Rates   (163  Fed.  141,  187  Fed.  290),  49. 

Re  Atlanta  &  West  Point  R.  Co.    (3   I.  C.  C.   19,  46,  2  I.  C.  R.   461), 

348,  358. 
Re  Belknap  (96  Fed.  614),  386. 
Re  Bills  of  Lading  (14  I.  C.  C.  346),  252. 
Re  Bills  of  Lading  (29  I.  C.  C.  417),  36,  252. 
Re  Carriage  of  Persons  Free   (5  I.  C.  C.  69,  3  I.  C.  R.  613,  717),  342, 

345,  442. 


112  Table  of  Oases   Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Re  Charge  to  Grand  Jury   (66  Fed.  146).  345,  346,  442. 

Re  Charge  to  Grand  Jury  (151  Fed.  834),  486. 

Re  Charges  for  Transportation  and  Refrigeration  of  Fruit   (10  I.  C.  C 

360),  358. 
Re  Charges  for  Transportation  and   Refrigeration   of   Fruit    (11   I.   C. 

C.  129),  80,  335,  358. 
Re  Chicago,  St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.  (2  I.  C.  C.  231,  2  I.  C.  R.  137),  339. 
Re  Class  and  Commodity  Rates  from  St.  Louis  to  Texas   (11   I.  C.  C. 

238),  83,  92,  96,  100,  103,  339,  486. 
Re  Classification   of   Atlanta  &   West    Point   R.    Co.    (3    I.   C.   C.   19,    2 

I.  C.  R.  461),  348,  358. 
Re  Coal  Rates  on  Stony  Fork  Branch   (26  L  C.  C.  168),  151,  175. 
Re  Commutation  Tickets  to  School  Children  (27  I.  C.  C.  144),  138. 
Re  Complaint  of  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.  7).  342,  442. 
Re  Contracts  of  Express  Companies    (16  I.  C.  C.  246).  342. 
Re  Contracts  for  Free  Transportation  (16  I.  C.  C.  246),  342,  358. 
Re  Corning   (51  Fed.  205,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  33),  487. 
Ke  Debs    (158  U.  S.  564,  39  L.  Ed.  1092,  15  Sup.  Ct.  900,  1  Fed.  Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  565),  486. 
Re  Deininger   (108  Fed.  623),  58. 
Re  Demurrage  Investigation   (19  I.  C.  C.  496),  25. 
Re   Differential    Freight    Rates    To    and    From    North    Atlantic    Porta 

(11  I.  C.  C.  13),  346. 
Re  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates  and  Other  Allowancess  to  Terminal  Roads 

(10  I.  C.  C.  385),  345. 
Re  Elevation  Allowances    (24   I.  C.  C.   197).  337. 
Re  Exchange  of  Free  Transportation   (12  I.  C.  C.  39),  335,  342. 
Re  Export  and  Domestic  Rates  on  Grain   (8  I.  C.  C.  214),  358. 
Re    Export   Rates    from    Points    East   and    West    of    Mississippi    River 

8  I.  C.  C.  185),  358. 
Re  Export  Rates  of  Flax  Seed  Products    (27  I.  C.  C.  246),  99. 
Re  Express  Companies   (1  I.  C.  C.  349,   1   I.  C.  R.  677),  335,  337,  357. 
Re    Filing   Copies   of   Joint   Tariffs   by    Traffic   Combinations    (1    I.    C. 

C.  76),  358. 
Re  Filing  of  Joint  Tariffs   (1   I.  C.  C.  657,  2  I.  C.  R.  9),  358. 
Re  Form  and  Contents  of  Rates  Schedules   (6  I.  C.  C.  267,  4  I.  C.  R. 

698).  358,  366. 
Re  Free   Transportation    of   Newspaper    Employees    (12    I.    C.    C.    15), 

342,  442. 
Re  Freight  Bills   (29  I.  C.  C.  496).  403. 
Re  Freight   Rates   Between  Memphis   and    Points    in   Arkansas    (11    I. 

C.  C.  180),  346,  392. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  113 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Re  Grand  Jury    (62  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  301),   486. 

Re  Greene   (52  Fed.  104,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  54),  487. 

Re  Gregory   (219  U.  S.  210,  55  L.  Ed.  184,  31  Sup.  Ct.  143),  58. 

Re  Hale   (139  Fed.  496,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  804),  486. 

Re  Hohorst   (150  U.  S.  653,  37  L.  Ed.   1211,  14  Sup    Ct.  221),   307. 

Re  Huntington   (68  Fed.  881),  346. 

Re   Indian  Supplies  (1  I.  C.  C.  15,  1  I.  C.  R.  22),  442. 

Re  Investigation  of  Acts  of  Grand   Trunk  Ry.  of  Canada    (3   I.  C.  C. 

89,  2  I.  C.  R.  490),  65,  335,  358,  392. 
Re  Investigation   of  Advances   on  Transportation   of  Locomotives   and 

Tenders   (21  I.  C.  C.  103),  127. 
Re  Interstate  Commerce  Commission.     Application   for  Order  Against 

Brimson,  et  al.    (53  Fed.  476),  389,  390. 
Re  Issuance  and  Use  of  Passes  (26  I.  C.  C.  491,  29  I.  C.  C.  411),  182. 
Re  Joint  Rates  vi^ith  The  Birmingham  Southern   (32  I.  C.  C.  110),  171. 
Re  Jurisdiction  in  Alaska   (19  I.  C.  C.  81),  335. 
Re  Jurisdiction  Over  Water  Carriers   (15  I.  C.  C.  205),  69,  335. 
Re  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (1  I.  C.  C.  84,  1  I.  C.  R.  287),  108,  199. 
Re  Louisville  Underwriters   (134  U.  S.  488,  33  L.  Ed.  991,  10  Sup.  Ct. 

587),  307. 
Re  Lumber  Rates   (21  I.  C.  C.  455),  399. 

Re  Lumber  Rates  to  Ohio  River  Crossings    (25  I.  C.  C.  50),  244. 
Re  Mileage  Books    (28  I.  C.  C.  318),  442. 

Re  Mileage  Excursion  and  Commutation  Tickets   (23  I.  C.  C.  95),  442. 
Re  Party  Rate  Tickets   (12  I.  C.  C.  95),  345,  444. 
Re  Through  Passenger  Routes  via  Portland  (16  I.  C.  C.  300),  120. 
Re  Passenger  Tariffs  (2  I.  C.  C.  649,  2  I.  C.  R.  445),  345,  358,  361,  444. 
Re  Passenger  Tariffs  and  Rates  Wars   (2  I.  C.  C.  513,  2  I.  C.  R.  340), 

358,  361. 
Re  Passes  to  Clergymen  (15  I.  C.  C.  45),  342. 
Re  Peasley    (44  Fed.  271),  384,  390. 
Re  Petition   of  Cincinnati,   H.   &   D.   R.   Co.   for   Relief  Under    Section 

Four   (6   I.  C.  C.   323),  348. 
Re  Petition  of  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  and   Southern   Ry.  &  S.   S.  Co. 

1  I.  C.  C.  57,  1  I.  C.  R.  278).  152,  339,  348. 
Re  Petition   of  Order   of   Railway   Conductors    (1    I.    C.   C.    8,    1    I.    C. 

R.  18),  392. 
Re  Petition  of  Produce  Exchange   (2  I.  C.  C.  588,  2  I.  C.  R.  412),  263, 

392,  416. 
Re  Pig  Iron  Rates  from  Va.    (27  I.  C.  C.  343),  24G. 


114  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Re  Pipe  Lines   (24  L  C.  C.  1),  335,  381. 

R.:   Pooling  Freights    (115    Fed.   588),   352,   384. 

Re  Powers   and   Procedure   of  the   Commission    (1   I.   C.   C.   223,   1   I. 

C.  R.  408),  392. 
Re  Practices  Governing  Sale  of  Mileage  Books    (28  I.  C.   C.  318),  38. 
Re  Precooling  and  Preicing   (23  I.  C.  C.  267),  222,  398. 
Re   Proposed  Advance  in   Freight  Rates    (9   I.   C.   C.   382),   82,   85,   99, 

100,  339. 
Re  Publication  of  Joint  Tariffs    (1  I.  C.  R.   598),  358. 
Re  Railroad-Telegraph  Contracts   (12  I.  C.  C.  10),  342,  442. 
Re  Rate  Sheets  (1  I.  C.  R.  316),  358. 
Re  Rates  and  Practices  of  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  Co.   (9  L  C.  C.  373), 

345. 
Re  Rates  on  Corn  and  Corn  Products   (11  I.  C.  C.  212,  220),  346. 
Re  Rates  on  Crushed  Stone   (29  I.  C.  C.  136),  223. 
Re  Rates  on  Crushed  Stone   (24  I.  C.  C.  192),  244. 
Re  Rates  on  R.  R.  Fuel  and  Other  Coal  (36  L  C.  C.  1),  89. 
Re  Rates  on  Salt  (24  I.  C.  C.  192),  348. 
Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Returned  Shipments    (19   I.   C.  C.   409),   88,   90, 

123,  345. 

Re  Relative  Tank  &  Barrel  Rates  (2  I.  C.  C.  365,  2  L  C.  R.  245),  392. 

Re  Released  Rates  (13  I.  C.  C.  550),  34,  88,  90,  339,  358.  439. 

Re  Religious  Teachers   (1  I.  C.  R.  21),  346. 

Re  Restricted  Rates  (20  I.  C.  C.  426),  89,  137,  185,  346. 

Re  Right    of    Railroad    Companies    to    Exchange    Free    Transportation 

with  Local  Transfer  Companies  (12  I.  C.  C.  39),  337,  442. 
Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  in  Transit  Points  (18  L  C.  C.  280),  164. 
Re  Southern  Pacific  Co.  (155  Fed.  1001),  333. 
Re  Southern  Pacific  Co.   (1  L  C.  R.  16),  199. 
Re   Southern   Ry.  &   S.   S.   Asso.    (Re   Petition   of   Louisville   &   N.   R. 

Co.)    (1  I.  C.  C.  31,  1  I.  C.  R.  278),   199. 
Re  Suspension   of  Western   Classification,    See   Western   Classification. 
Re  Tariffs  and   Classification   of   Atlanta   &  West   Point  R.   Co.    (3    I. 

C.  C.  19,  24,  2  I.  C.  R.  461),  108,  348,  358. 
Re  Tariffs  of  Transcontinental  Lines    (2  I.  C.  C.  324,  2  I.  C.  R.  203), 

110,  346,  358. 
Re  Tariffs  on  Export  and  Import  TraflSc    (10  I.  C.  C.  55),  35. 
Re  Terrell   (51  Fed.  213,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  46),  487. 
Re  Through  Passenger  Routes  via  Portland   (16  I.  C.  C.  300),  120. 
Re  Through  Routes  and  Through  Rates  (12  I.  C.  C.  163),  338,  358,  361. 
Re  Transportation  of  Fruit  (10  I.  C.  C.  360),  197. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  115 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Re  Transportation  of  Immigrants  (10  I.  C.  C.  IS),  352. 

Re  Transportation  of  Lime    (24  I.  C.  C.  170),  244. 

Re  Transportation  of  Newspaper  Employees  (12  I.  C.  C.  15),  342. 

Re  Transportation  of  Salt   (10  I.  C.  C.  148),  345. 

Re  Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts  (23  I.  C.  C.  151),  244. 

Re  Underbilling  (1  I.C.  C.  633,  1  I.  C.  R.  813),  385. 

Re    Unlawful    Charges    for    Transportation    of    Coal    by    Louisville    & 

N.  R.  Co.   (5  I.  C.  C.  466,  4  I.  C.  R.  157),  345. 
Re  Unlawful   Rates  and   Practices    (7   I.   C.  C.   240),   67. 
Re  Unlawful  Rates  in  the  Transportation  of  Cotton  (8  I.  C.  C.  121),  163. 
Re  Wharf  Facilities  Pensacola,  Fla.   (27  I.  C.  C.  252),  241,  343. 
Re  Wharfage  Charges  at  Galveston   (23  I.  C.  C.-535),  196. 
Re  When  a  Cause  of  Action  Accrues    (15  I.  C.  C.  201),  218,  408. 
Re  Wichita  Palls  System  Joint  Coal  Rates   (26  I.  C.  C.  215),  145. 
Re  Winn   (213  U.  S.  458,  53  L.  Ed.  873,  29  Sup.  Ct.  515),  292. 
Re  Wool  Hides  &  Pelts  (25  I.  C.  C.  675),  207. 
Rea  V.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.  (7  I.  C.  C.  43),  105,  358,  383. 
Reagan    v.    Farmers'    Loan    &    Trust    Co.    (154    U.    S.    362,    38    L.    Ed. 

1014,  4  I.  C.  R.   560,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1047),  45,  49,  60,  63,  84. 
Rearick  v.   Pennsylvania    (203   U.   S.   507,   51    L.   Ed.   295,   27   Sup.   Ct. 

159),  58. 
Receivers'    &    Shippers'    Asso.    of   Cincinnati   v.    C.    N.    O.    &   T.    P.    R. 

Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  440),  266. 
Red  "C"  Oil  Co.  v.  North  Carolina    (222  U.  S.  380,  56  L.   Ed.  240,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  152,  172  Fed.  695),  58. 
Red  River  Oil  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  438),  116. 
Red  Rock  Fuel  Co.  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.    (11  I.  C.  C.  438),  344. 
Reduced  Rates  on  Returned  Shipments   (19  I.  C.  C.  409),  88,  90,  123, 

345. 
Red   Wing   Linseed    Co.   v.   Chicago,   M.   &    S.    P.   R.   Co.    (15    I.    C.   C. 

47),  309. 
Reeser  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Ry.  Co.    (215  Pa.  136,  64  Atl.  376),  13. 
Reeves  v.  Tex.  &  P.  R.  Co.   (32  S.  W.  920),  32. 
Regulations  Restricting  the  Dimensions  of  Baggage   (26  I.  C.  C.  292). 

341,  358. 
Reid  V.  Colorado   (187  U.  S.  137,  47  L.  Ed.  108,  23  Sup.  Ct.  92),  58. 
Rend   V.  Chicago  &  N.   W.   R.   Co.    (2   I.   C.  C.   540,   1   I.   C.   R.  793,   2 

I.  C.  R.  313),  345. 
Reno  Grocery  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  400),  254. 
Reynolds  v.  Southern  Ex.  Co.   (13  I.  C.  C.  536),  346. 


116  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Reynolds  v.   Western   N.   Y.  &   P.   R.  Co.    (1   I.   C.   C.   393,   1   I.   C.  R. 
685),  339. 

Reynolds  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v.  T.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (42  I.  C.  C.  421),  400. 
Reynolds  Tob.  Co.  v.  A.  &  So.  Ry.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  371),  345. 
Rhinelander  Paper  Co.  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  633),  346. 
Rhodes  v.  Iowa  (170  U.  S.  412,  42  L.  R.  A.  1088,  18  Sup.  Ct.  664),  58. 
Rice  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (4  I.  C.  C.  228,  3  I.  C.  R.  263),  348. 
Rice  V.  Cincinnati,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  (5  I.  C.  C.  193,  3  I.  C.  R.  841), 
145a,  345,  346. 

Rice  V.  Cincinnati,  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  (3  I.  C.  C.  186,  2  I.  C.  R.  584),  389, 
Rice  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.   (1  I.  C.  C.  503,  722,  1  I.  C.  R.  354),  142a,  345. 
Rice    V.    Standard    Oil    Co.     (134    Fed.    464,    2    Fed.    Anti-Trust    Dec. 
633),  492. 

Rice  V.  Western   N.   Y.   &   P.   R.   Co.    (1  I.   C.  C.   503,   1   I.   C.   R.   354, 

376,  443,  722),  345. 
Rice  V.  Western  N.  Y.   &  P.  R.  .Co.    (2   I.   C.  C.  389,  2   I.  C.  R.  298), 

339,   345,  346,   416. 
Rice   V.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P.   R.  Co.    (4   I.  C.  C.   131,  3   I.  C.  R.  162), 

345,  346. 
Rice  V.  Western  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (6  I.  C.  C.  455),  346,  383,  392,  416. 
Rice  From  Texas  and  La.  (40  I.  C.  C.  285),  99. 

Richmond  &   A.   R.   Co.   v.   Patterson    (1G9   U.    S.   311,    42    L.   Ed.    759, 

18  Sup.  Ct.  335),  32. 
Richmond  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  S.  A.  L.  R.  Co.   (30  I.  C.  C.  552, 

44  I.  C.  C.  455),  345,  346. 
Richmond  Elevator  Co.   v.   Pere  Marquette  R.   Co.    (10   I.   C.   C.   629), 

175,  383. 

Richmond,   F.    &   P.    R.    Co.    v.    Richmond    (96    U.    S.    521,    24    L.    Ed. 

734),  20. 
Rickards  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (23  I.  C.  C.  239),  116. 
Riddle,  Dean  &  Co.  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.    (1  I.  C.  C.  372,  1  I.  C. 

R.  701),  206,  263,  392. 
Riddle,  Dean  &  Co.  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (1  I.  C.  C.  594, 

1   I.  C.  R.  787),  206,  383,  406. 
Riddle,  Dean  &  Co.  v.  Pittsburgh  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.    (1  I.  C.  C.  490,  1  I. 

C.  R.  773),  263,  392,  416. 
Ridgewood  Coal  Co.  v.  L.  V.  R.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  183),  192. 
Riter  v.  0.  S.  L.  R.  Co.   (19  I.  C.  C.  443),  353. 

Riverside  Mills  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.    (168   Fed.  987),  14,  295,  439 
Riverside  Mills  v.  Ga.  R.  Co.   (20  I.  C.  C.  423),  408. 
Riverside  Mills  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  388),  339. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  117 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Robb  V.  Connally  (111  U.  S.  624,  28  L.  Ed.  542,  4  Sup.  Ct.  .544),  295. 
Roberts  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  248),  107. 
Robert  W.  Parson,  The  (191  U.  S.  17,  48  L.  Ed.  73,  24  Sup.  Ct.  8),  55. 
Robinson  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (36  Ok.  435,  129  Pac.  20),  439. 
Robinson  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.    (64  W.  Va.   406,  63   S.  E.   323),   208,  230, 

249,  405,  443. 
Robinson  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.   (222  U.   S.  506,  56  L.  Ed.  288,  32  Sup.  Ct. 

114),  145,  208,  230,  294,  317,  383,  405,  443. 
Robinson  v.    Suburban    Brick   Co.    (127    Fed.    804,    62   C.   C.   A.    484,    2 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  312),  486. 
Robinson  Land  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (26  L  C.  C.  427),  105. 
Rock  Hill  Buggy  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  229),  348. 
Rock  Spring  Distilling  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (27  I.  C.  C.  54),  99. 
Rogers  &  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  308),  383. 
Rollins  V.  S.  A.  L.  R.  R.  Co.   (146  N.  C.  218,  59  S.  E.  671),  25. 
Rosenberger   v.    Pac.  Ex.   Co.    (241   U.    S.   48,    60   L.    Ed.   880,    36    Sup. 

Ct.  510),  58. 
Rosenblatt  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.   (18  I.  C.  C.  261),  213. 
Roswell  Commercial   Club  v.   Atchison,  T.   &  F.  Ry.   Co.    (12   I.   C.   C. 

339),  339. 
Roth  V.  Texas  &  Pacific  Ry.  Co.   (9  I.  C.  C.  602),  392. 
Rowland  v.   Boyle    (244   U.   S.   106,  61   L.   Ed.   1022,  37    Sup.   Ct.   577), 

47,  50. 
Royal  Brewing  Co.  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  255)    346. 
Royal  C.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (13  L  C.  C.  440),  346. 
Royster  Guano  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.  (50  I.  C.  C  34),  44,  99a. 
Rubber   Tire   Wheel    Co.   v.    Milwaukee   Rubber   Co.    (142    Fed.    531,    2 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  855),  486. 
Rubber  Tire  Wheel   Co.   v.   Milwaukee   Rubber   Co.    (154   Fed.   358,   83 

C.  C.  A.  336),  486. 
Rules    and    Regulations    Governing    Checking    Baggage     (35    I.    C.    C. 

157),  37,  38. 
Rules  Governing  Shipment  in  Peddler  Cars    (32   I.  C.  C.  428),   142. 
Russe  &  Burges  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.  (193  Fed.  678),  207,  406,  407. 
Ruttle  V.  Pere  Marquette  R.  Co.   (13  I.  C.  C.  179),  346. 

S. 

St.  Clair  Co.  v.  Int.  Transp.  Co.   (192  U.  S.  454,  48  L.  Ed.  518,  24  Sup. 

Ct.  300),  53. 
St.   Joseph   Stock   Yards   Co.   v.   United   States    (187  Fed.   104,   110   C 

C.  A.  432),  481. 


118  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen   (181  Fed.  710),  39. 

St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Gill   (156  U.  S.  649,  3-9  L.  Ed.  567,  15  Sup. 

Ct.  484),  45,  49,  86,  87,  311. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Grayson  (89  Ark.  154,  115  S.  W.  933),  34. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hadley  (168  Fed.  317,  155  Fed.  220),  49,  50. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  McNamare  (91  Ark.  515,  122  S.  W.  102),  15. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R  Co.  v.  Newell  (25  Ok.  502,  106  Pac.  818),  30. 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.   Co.  v.   United   States    (169   Fed.   69,  94   C.   C.  A. 

437),  481. 
St.  Louis  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  P.  &  P.  N.  Ry.  Co.   (26  I.  C.  C.  226),  400. 
St.  Louis  Drayage  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (65  Fed.  39),  347. 
St.  Louis   Hay  &  Grain   Co.  v.   Chicago,   B.  &  Q.   R.   Co.    (11   I.  C.   C. 

82),   82,  335. 

St.    Louis    Hay    &    Grain    Co.    v.    Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co.    (11    I.    C.    C. 

486),  345. 
St.  Louis  Hay  &  Grain  Co.  v.  H.  &  O.  R.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  90),  163. 
St    Louis  Hay  &  Grain  Co.   v.    Southern   Ry.   Co.   149   Fed.    609),   345, 

346,  394. 

St.  Louis,  L  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Arkansas    (240  U.   S.   518,  60   L.   Ed. 

776,  36   Sup.  Ct.  443),  15,  21. 
St.    Louis,    I.    M.    &   S.    R.    Co.    v.    Edwards    (94    Ark.    394,    127    S.    W. 

713),  3. 
St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.   R.   Co.   v.   Edwards    (227   U.    S.   265,   57   L.   Ed. 

506,  33  Sup.  Ct.  262),  3,  9,  25. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hampton   (162  Fed.  693),  26. 
St.  Louis,   I.   M.   &  S.   R.   Co.  v.    RIcNamare    (91  Ark.   515,   122    S.   W. 

102),  15. 
St.  Louis,   I.   M.  &  S.  R.   Co.  v.   Southern  Express  Co.   Express  Cases 

(117  U.  S.  1,  29  L.  Ed.  791,  6  Sup.  Ct.  542),  327. 
St.  Louis,   I.  M.  &  S.   Ry.   Co.  v.    Starbird    (243  U.    S.   592,   61   L.   Ed. 

917,  37  Sup.  Ct.  462),  440. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  State  (31  Ok.  509,  122  Pac.  217),  9. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor   (210  U.  S.  281,  52  L.  Ed.  1061, 

28  Sup.  Ct.  616),  54. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  (217  Fed.  80),  121. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Wynne    (224  U.  S.  354,  56  L.  Ed.  799, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  493),  35. 
St.  Louis,  Mo.-Illinois  Passengers  Fares  (41  I.  C.  C.  584),  185,  337,  442. 
St.  Louis,  Mo.  Terminal  Regulations   (40  I.  C.  C.  425),  345. 
St.  Louis,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  P.  &  P.  N.  R.  Co.    (26  I.  C.  C.  226),  150, 

151,  191,  338,  347,  381,  400. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  119 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

St.  Louis,   S.  W.  R.  Co.   v.  Alexander    (227   U.   S.   218,   57   L.   Ed.   486, 

33  Sup.  Ct.  245),  295. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Arkansas    (217  U.  S.  136,  54  L.  Ed.  698,  30 

Sup.  Ct.  476),  25. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Carden  (34  S.  W.   (Texas)    145),  204. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hadley   (155  Fed.  220),  50. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill  &  Morris  (97  Tex.  506,  80  S.  W.  368),  25. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewellen  Bros.  (192  Fed.  540),  180,  205,  212. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Samuels  &  Co.   (211  Fed.  588),  383,  407. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  State  (97  Ark.  473,  134  S.  W.  970),  9. 
St.  Louis,  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States  (245  U.  S.  136,  62  L.  Ed.  199, 

38  Sup.  Ct.  49),  139a,  147,  150,  338,  396a,  396b. 
St.  Louis  Terminal  Case   (34  I.  C.  C.  453),  171. 
St.  P.  &  S.  Ste.  M.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Wis.    (136  Wis.   146,   116 

N.  W.  905),  49. 
Samuels  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  646),  383. 
Samuelson  v.   State    (116  Tenn.  470,  95  S.  W.   1012,  115  Am.   St.  Rep. 

805),  37. 
San   Bernardino   Board   of  Trade   v.   Atchison,   T.   &    S.    F.    R.    Co.    (4 

I.  C.  C.  104,  3  I.  C.  R.  138),  348,  350,  358. 
San   Diego    Land    &   Town    Co.    v.    Jasper    (189    U.    S.    439,    47    L.    Ed. 

892,  23   Sup.  Ct.  571),  45,  47,  84. 
San  Diego  Land  &  Town  Co.  v.  National  City   (74  Fed.  79),  84. 
San    Diego    Land    &   Town    Co.    v.    National    City    (174    U.    S.    739,    43 

L.  Ed.   1154,  19   Sup.   Ct.  804),   45,  47,  49,   88. 
Sands  v.    Manistee   R.    1.    Co.    (123   U.   S.   288,    31    L.    Ed.    149,   8   Sup. 

Ct.  113),  56. 
Santa   Fe   P.  &   P.   R.   Co.   v.   Grant   Bros.   Construction    Co.    (13    Ariz. 

186,  108  Pac.  467),  358. 
Santa  Fe  P.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Grant  Bros.  Construction  Co.    (228  U.   S. 

177,  57  L.  Ed.  787,  33  Sup.  Ct.  474),  358. 
Sault   Ste.   Marie  v.   International   Transit   Co.    (234    U.    S.   333,   58   L. 

Ed.  1337,  34  Sup.  Ct.  826),  53. 
Savage  v.  Jones  (225  U.  S.  501,  56  L.  Ed.  1182,  32  Sup.  Ct.  715),  58. 
Savannah  Bureau  of  Freight  &  Transportation  v.  Charleston  &  S.   R. 

Co.    (7  I.  C.  C.  458),  348. 
Savannah    Bureau    of    Freight    &    Transportation    v.    Charleston    &    S. 

R.  Co.  (7  I.  C.  C.  601),  339. 
Savannah    Bureau    of    Freight    &    Transportation    v.    Louisville    &    N. 

R.  Co.   (8  I.  C.  C.  377),  346. 
Savannah  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Florida  Fruit  Exchange    (167  U.  S.   512. 

42  L.  Ed.  257,  17  Sup.  Ct.  998),  335. 


120  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Savery  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.   (2  I.  C.  C.  3S8,  1  I.  C.  R.  695, 

2  I.  C.  R.  210),  345. 
Sawyer  v.  Davis   (136  Mass.  239,  49  Am.  Rep.  27),  309. 
Sclalemmer  v.  Buffalo,  R.  &  P.  R.  Co.    (205  U.  S.  1,  51  L.  Ed.  681,  27 

Sup.  Ct.  407),  330. 
Schultz-Hansen  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  234),  111,  358. 
Schulz  V.  Parker  (158  Iowa  42,  139  N.  W.  173),  38. 
Schumacher   Milling  Co.   v.   Chicago,   R.    I.   &   P.   Ry.   Co.    (6    I.   C.   C. 

61,  4  I.  C.  R.  373),  85,  339,  392. 
Schutte  V.  Weir  (111  N.  Y.  Sup.  240,  59  Misc.  Rep.  438),  439. 
Schwager  &  Nettleton  v.  Great  Nor.  Ry.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  521),  358. 
Schweig  V.  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.    (205  Fed.  96),  331. 
Scofield  V.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.    (2  I.  C.  C.  90.  2  I.  C.  R.  67). 

142a,  156,  345,  346. 
Scofield  V.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.    (43  Ohio  St.  571,  3  N.  E.  907, 

54  Am.  Rep.  846),  304. 
Scott  V.  Cape  Charles  R.  Co.   (38  I.  C.  C.  467),  207. 
Scott  V.  Donald   (165  U.  S.  58,  41  L.  Ed.  632,  17  Sup.  Ct.  265),  58. 
Scott-Meyer  Com.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Co.   (28  I.  C.  C.  529),  118. 
Scott  Paper  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (44  I.  C.  C.  503),  348. 
Scott  Paper  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  601),  145. 

Scranton  v.  Wheeler  (179  U.  S.  141,  45  L.  Ed.  126,  21  Sup.  Ct.  48),  58. 
Scrap  Iron  Rates   (28  I.  C.  C.  525),  88. 
Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Blackwell   (244  U.  S.  310,  61  L.  Ed.  1160,  37 

Sup.  Ct.  640,  L.  R.  A.  1917F,  1184),  20,  24. 
Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis  (139  Ga.  547,  77  S.  E.  795),  32. 
Seaboard   A.   L.   R.   Co.    v.   Florida    (203   U.    S.   261,   51   L.   Ed.    175.  27 

Sup.  Ct.  109),  130. 
Seaboard   A.   L.   R.   Co.    v.  North  Carolina    (245   U.   S.   298,    62    L.   Ed. 

299,  38  Sup.  Ct.  96),  58,  403. 
Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ga.  (206  Fed.  181),  13,  14,  453 
Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ga.  (213  Fed.  27),  320,  453. 
Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ga.    (240  U.  S.  324,  60  L.  Ed. 

669,  36  Sup.  Ct.  260),  12. 
Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Seegers   (73  S.  C.  71,  52  S.  E.  797),  35. 
Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ga.  (213  Fed.  27),  320,  453. 
Seaboard   A.   L.   R.   Co.   v.    Seegers    (207   U.    S.    73,   52   L.   Ed.    108,   28 

Sup.  Ct.  28),  35. 
Seaboard,   A.  L.   R.  Co.  v.  United   States    (249   Fed.   389),   345. 
Sears,  Roebuck  &  Co.  v.  Federal  Trade  Com.   (258  Fed.  307),  329. 
Seattle  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  G.  N.  R.  Co.   (30  I.  C.  C.  683),  347. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  121 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Seibels  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.   (80  S.  C.  133,  61  S.  E.  435),  42. 

Selkirk  v.  Stevens  (72  Minn.  336,  75  N.  W.  386,  40  L.  R.  A.  760),  59. 

Separation  of  Operating  Expenses  (30  I.  C.  C.  676),  27,  49,  85,  432,  433 

Serry  v.  S.  P.  Co.   (18  I.  C.  C.  554),  118. 

Shapard  v.  Lesser  (127  Ark.  590,  193  S.  W.  262,  3  A.  L.  R.  247,  250),  480. 

Shawnee   Compress   Co.    v.   Anderson    (209    U.    S.   423,   52   L.    Ed.    865, 

28  Sup.  Ct.  572),  486. 
Slieldon  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.    (105  Fed.  785),  294. 
Shepard  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.    (184  Fed.  765),  47,  49,  50. 
Sheridan  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (26  I.  C.  C.  638), 

99a. 
Shiel  &  Co.  V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  210),  205,  206,  358,  383. 
Shinkle,  etc.,  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (62  Fed.  690),  406. 
Shippers'  &  Receivers'  Bureau   of  Newark   v.  New  York,   0.   &  W.   R. 

Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  2G4),  339. 
Shoecraft  &  Sons  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (19  I.  C.  C.  492),  406,  408. 
Shoemaker  v.  Chesapeake  &  P.  Tel.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  614),  2,  28,  335,  346. 
Shore  &  Bros.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (76  S.  C.  472,  57  S.  E.  526),  42. 
Silk  Asso.  of  America  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (44  I.  C.  C.  578,  50  I.  C.  C.  50),  34a. 
Silverman  &  Weir  (114  N.  Y.  Supp.  6),  439. 

Silz  v.  Hesterberg  (211  U.  S.  31,  53  L.  Ed.  75,  29  Sup.  Ct.  10),  58. 
Simpson  v.  Shepard   (230  U.  S.  352,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  729), 

2,  3,  4,  9,  11,  16,  17,  18,  29,  33,  34,  42,  43,  45,  47,  52,  54,  55,  56,  58, 

59,  61,  64,   69,   84,   125,  145. 
Sinclair  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  490),  91,  253. 
Sinking  Fund   cases    (U.   P.   R.   Co.   v.  U.    S.)     (99   U.    S.   9   Otto.    700, 

25  L.  Ed.  496),  63. 
Sinnot  v.  Davenport  (22  How.  63  U.  S.  227,  16  L.  Ed.  243),  56. 
Sioux   City   Terminal  Tel.   Co.  v.   C.   M.  &  St.   P.   R.   Co.    (27   I.  C.   C. 

457),  109. 
Skaggs  V.  Kansas  City  Ter.  Ry.  Co.   (233  Fed.  827),  347. 
Skinner  Eddy  Corp.  v.  United  States    (250  U.   S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  40 

Sup.  Ct.  — ),  102,  351. 
Slater  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.    (2  I.  C.  C.  359,  2   I.  C.  R.  243),  342. 

384,  442. 
Siigh  V.  Kirkwood    (237  U.  S.  52,  59  L.  Ed.  835,  35  Sup.  Ct.  501),  58. 
Sligo  Iron  Stove  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  139),  90. 
Sligo  Iron  Stove  Co.  v.  U.  P.  R.  Co.   (19  I.  C.  C.  527),  90. 
Smeltzer  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (158  Fed.  649),  439. 
Smith  V.   Alabama    (124   U.    S.   465,   31   L.   Ed.   508,   8   Sup.   Ct.   564,   1 

I.  C.  R.  804),  3,  22. 


122  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

I  References  are  to   Sections.] 

Smith  V.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (245  U.  S.  3S,.  62  L.  Ed.  135,  38  Sup.  Ct.  30), 

78,  220,  235,  432. 
Smith  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  (1  I.  C.  C.  208,  1  I.  C.  R.  611),  345. 
Smith  V.  Texas    (233  U.  S.  630,  146  S.  W.  900,  58  L.  Ed.  1129,  34   Sup. 

Ct.   681,   63  Tex.   Cr.   App.   183),   22. 
Smyth  V.  Ames    (169  U.  S.  466,  42  L.  Ed.   819,   18   Sup.  Ct.   418),  45, 

47,  49,  82,  88,  123,   231. 
Snyder  v.  King  (Mich.)    (165  N.  W.  840,  1  A.  L.  R.  893),  440,  481. 
Snyder-Malone     Donahue  Co.  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.    (18  I.   C.  C. 

498),  110. 
Society    of    American    Florists    v.    United    States    Express    Co.    (12    I. 

C.  C.  120),  88,  339. 
Solvay  Process  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  246),  171. 
Sondhelmer  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  606),  213,  408. 
South  Covinngton  &  Cincinnati  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Comm.  of  Ky.   (250  U.  S. 

— ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  29. 
South  Covington  Ry.  v.  Covington    (234   U.   S.   537,   59   L.  Ed.   350,   35 

Sup.  Ct.  158),  3,  20,  66,  331. 
Southeastern  Cotton  Goods   (43  I.  C.  C.  530),  114,  156. 
Southeastern  Lumber  (42  I.  C.  C.  548),  100,  102,  116. 
Southern  Bitulithic  Co.  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  300),  146. 
Southern  Cal.  Sugar  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  R.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  6),  195. 
Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.   (228  Fed.  335),  364, 

404. 
Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  S.  K.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  79),  90. 
Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Long  (202  Fed.  462,  120  C.  C.  A.  568),  443. 
Southern    Ex.    Co.   v.    St.    Louis,    I.    M.    &    S.    R.    Co.    (10    Fed.    210,    3 

McCrary  147),  303. 
Southern   Express   Co.  v.    Memphis  &  L.   Ry.   Co.    (8   Fed.   799,   2    Mc- 
Crary 570),  303. 
Southern  Flour  &   Grain  Co.  v.  N.   P.  R.  Co.    (127   Ga.   626,   56   S.  E. 

742,  9  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    853,  119  Am.  St.  Rep.  356),  42. 
Southern    Furniture    Mfrs.    Asso.    v.    So.    Ry.    Co.    (25    I.    C.    C.    379), 

145,  244. 
Southern  Gro.  Co.  v.  Ga.  N.  R.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  299),  346. 
Southern  Ind.  Ex.  Co.  v.  United  States  Ex.  Co.    (88  Fed.  659,   1  Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  862),  347,  492. 
Southern  Ind.  Ex.  Co.  v.   United   States  Ex.  Co.    (92  Fed.   1022,  35  C. 

C.  A.  172,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  992),  492. 
Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Arizona    (249  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39   Sup.   Ct. 

— ),  41. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  123 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Arnett  (126  Fed.  75,  61  C.  C.  A.  131),  483. 

Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Bartime   (170  Fed.  725),  49. 

Southern   Pac.    Co.   v.    California   Adjustment   Co.    (237    Fed.    954,    150 

C.  C.  A.  604,  248  U.  S.  595,  63  L.  Ed.  226,  3-9  Sup.  Ct.  182),  52,  209. 
Southern   Pac.    Co.    v.    Campbell    (230    U.    S.    537,    57    L.   Ed.    1610,    33 

Sup.  Ct.  1027),  84. 
Southern    Pac.    Co.    v.    Colorado    Fuel    &    Iron    Co.    (101    Fed.    779,    42 

C.  C.  A.  12),  339,  346,  350,  358. 
Southern   Pac.   Co.   v.   Crenshaw    (5   Ga.   App.   675,   63    S.   E.    865),   34, 

295,  439. 
Southern    Pac.    Co.    v.    Darnell-Taenzer    Lumber    Co.    (245    U.    S.    531, 

62   L.    Ed.    451,   38   Sup.   Ct.    186,   221   Fed.   890,    137    C.    C.    A.    460, 

229  Fed.  1022,  3  C.  C.  A.  663),  207,  407. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Goldfield  Con.  Milling  &  Transp.   Co.    (220   Fed. 

14),  208,  383. 

Southern  Pac.   Co.  v.   Int.  Com.   Com.    (177   Fed.   963),  222,   395. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.   Int.  Com.   Com.    (200  U.   S.   536,   50  L.   Ed.   585, 

26   Sup.  Ct.  330),   177.  352,  358,  406. 
Southern   Pac.  Co.  v.   Int.   Com.   Com.    (215   U.   S.   226,  54   L.   Ed.   169, 

30  Sup.  Ct.  89),  395. 

Southern  Pac.  Co.   v.   Int.   Com.   Com.    (219  U.   S.   433,   55   L.   Ed.   283. 

31  Sup.  Ct.  288),  95,   101,  222,  312,  314,  395,  396. 
Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Stevens   (258  Fed.  165,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  24. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  Ownership  Atlantic  S.  S.  Lines  (4a  I.  C.  C.  168),  354. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  Ownership  of  Oil  Steamers   (37  I.  C.  C.  529),  354. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  Ownership  of  Oil  Steamers  (34  I.  C.  C.  77),  203,  354. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  Ownership  S.  S.  Pasadena  (33  I.  C.  C.  476),  354. 
Southern  P.  Co.  v.  Stewart   (233  Fed.  956,  147  C.  C.  A.  630,  245  U.  S. 

359,   62   L.   Ed.   345,   38   Sup.  Ct.   130,   248   U.   S.   446,   63   L.   Ed.  — . 

39  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  34a,  44d,  481. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  Steamboat  Sacramento  River  (34  I.  C.  C.  174),  354. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ore.  (119  Pac.  727),  49. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ore.   (208  Fed.  926),  43. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  United  States  (171  Fed.  360,  96  C.  C.  A.  252),  481. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  United  States    (237  U.  S.  202,  59  L.  Ed.  916,  35 

Sup.   Ct.   573),  476. 
Southern    Pac.    Ter.    Co.    v.    Int.   Com.    Com.    (166    Fed.    134),    41,    222, 

335,  336,  346,  395,  465,  468. 
Southern   Pacific   Ter.    Co.    v.    Int.    Com.   Com.    (219    U.    S.    498,   55    L. 

Ed.   310.   31   Sup.   Ct.   279),   10,   41,   66,    68,   138,   139.   222,   313,   335, 

3.36,  346,  395. 


124  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Southern  Photo  Material  Co.  v.   Eastman   Kodak  Co.    (234   Fed.   955), 

492,  508. 
Southern   Pine   Lumber   Co.    v.   Southern    Ry.    Co.    (14    L    C.    C.    195), 

215,  222,  383,  392,  395. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Stove  Works   (128  Ga.  207,  57  S.  E.  429), 

38,  43,  49,  60. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Brown   (131  Ga.  245,  62  S.  E.  177),  42. 
Southern    Ry.    Co.    v.    Burlington    Lumber    Co.    (225    U.    S.    99,    56    L. 

Ed.   1001,  32   S.  Ct.   659),  41. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Frank  (5  Ga.  App.  574,  63  S.  E.  656),  295. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Greensboro  Ice  &  Coal  Co.  (134  Fed.  82),  14. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Indiana  (179  Ind.  23,  100  N.  E.  337),  4,  415. 
Southern   Ry.    Co.    v.   King    (217    U.    S.    524,    54    L.    Ed.    868,    30    Sup. 

Ct.  594),  23. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Love   (139  Ga.  362,  77  S.  E.  44),  35. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Melton  (133  Ga.  277,  65  S.  E.  665),  24. 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Prescott  (240  U.  S.  632,  60  L.  Ed.  836,  36  Sup.  Ct. 

469),  440. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Puckett    (244  U.  S.   571,  61  L.  Ed.   1321,  37   Sup. 

Ct.  703),  33. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com.  of  Indiana    (236  U.   S.   439,  59   L. 

Ed.   661,   35   Sup.  Ct.   304),   4,   15,  31. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ragsdale  (119  Ga.  773,  47  S.  E.  179),  32. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid    (222  U.  S.  424,  56   L.  Ed.   257,  32   Sup.   Ct. 

140),  5,  6,  13,  25,  58. 
Southern  Ry.   Co.   v.   St.   Louis   Hay  &  Grain   Co.    (149   Fed.   609,   153 

Fed.  728,  82  C.  C.  A.  614),  14,  80,  383,  394. 
Southern  Ry.   Co.  v.   St.   Louis   Hay   &   Grain   Co.    (214   U.   S.   297,   53 

L.  Ed.  1004,  29  Sup.  Ct.  678),  10,  14,  192,  312,  346,  383,  394. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tift  (148  Fed.  1021),  50,  90,  93,  207,  304,  339,  352, 

406,  443,  445,  486. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tift    (206  U.  S.  428,  51  L.  Ed.  1124,  27   Sup.  Ct. 

709),  50,  90,  93,  102,  207,  222,  241,  304,  305b,  339,  352,  383,  406,  443, 

445. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States  (205  Fed.  465),  222,  346,  392. 
Southern   Ry.    Co.   v.    United    States    (222   U.   S.   20,   56   L.   Ed.   72,   32 

Sup.  Ct.  2),  3. 
Southwestern  Mo.  Millers'  Club  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.    (26  I.  C.  C. 

245),  337,  341. 
Southwestern  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  T.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (41  I.  C.  C.  39), 

205.  211. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  125 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Southwestern   Produce   Distributors  v.   W.   R.   Co.    (20   I.   C.   C.   458), 

149,  345. 
Southwestern  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Houston  (256  Fed.  690 );  335. 
Spartanburg  Board  of  Trade  v.  R.  &  D.  R.  Co.    (2   I.  C.  C.   304,  2   I. 

C.  R.  198),  153,  199,  348. 
Speigle  Co.  (Geo.  M.)  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co.  (11  I.  C.  C.  367),  348. 
Sperry  &  Hutchinson  Co.  v.  Fenster  (219  Fed.  755),  497. 
Sperry-Hutchinson  C.  Co.  v.  Tacoma   (190  Fed.  682),  453. 
Spillers  &  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  364),  361. 
L'pokane  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.    (15  I.  C.  C.  376),  339,  346,  348. 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.   (19  I.  C.  C.  162),  50,  156. 
Spokane  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (21  1.  C.  C.  400),  63,  154,  202,  345,  348. 
Spratlin  v.  S.  L.  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.  (76  Ark.  82,  88  S.  W.  836),  204. 
Sprigg  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  (8  I.  C.  C.  443),  444,  486. 
Spring  Hill  Coal  Co.  v.  E.  R.  Co.  (18  L  C.  C.  508),  195. 
Spring   Valley   Water   Works   v.   San   Francisco    (82  Cal.   286,   22    Pac. 

910),  49. 
Spring  Valley   Water   Works   v.   Schlotter    (110   U.    S.    347,    28   L.   Ed. 

173,  4  Sup.  Ct.  48),  45. 
Squire  &  Co.  v.  A.  S.  Ry.  Co.  (44  L  C.  C.  509),  214. 
Squire  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.   (4  I.  C.  C.  611,  3  I.  C.  R.  515),  91,  446. 
Standard  Ency.  of  Procedure    (Vol.  5,  p.  153.). 
Standard  Fashion  Co.  v.  Magrane  Houston  Co.  (251  Fed.  559,  163  C.  C. 

A.  558,  254  Fed.  493,  259  Fed.  793,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  486,  497. 
Standard   Lime  &  Stone   Co.   v.   Cumberland   V.   R.   Co.    (15   I.   C.   C. 

620),  346,  445. 
Standard  Mirror  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (27  L  C.  C.  200),  251. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  C.  T.  T.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  460),  408. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  P.  Co.   (29  I.  C.  C  524),  348. 
Standard   Oil   Co.    v.    United    States    (164   Fed.   376,   90   C.   C.   A.   364), 

335,  361,  371,  449. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  United  States   (179  Fed.  614),  67,  371. 
Standard  Oil   Co.   v.    United    States    (221   U.    S.    1,   55   L.    Ed.    619,   31 

Sup.  Ct.  502,  34  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    834,  Ann.  Cas.  1912D,  734),  486. 
Standard    Sanitary    Mfg.    Co.   v.    United    States    (226    U.    S.    20,    57    L. 

Ed.  107,  33  Sup.  Ct.  9),  486. 
Stanley  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.    (100  Mo.  435,  13  S.  W.  709,  8 

L.  R.  A.  549),  25. 
Star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (14  L  C.  C. 

364),  196,  249,  338,  397. 


126  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Starks  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  Ry.  Co.    (165   Mich.   642,   131   N.  W. 
143),  297. 

State  V.  Atlantic  C.   L.   R.  Co.    (61   Fla.  799,  54   So.   900,  56  Fla.   617, 

47  So.  969),  5. 
State  (of  Iowa)  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (24  I.  C.  C.  134),  91. 
State  V.  Bernheim  (19  Mont.  512,  49  Pac.  441),  37. 
State  V.  Boneval  (128  La.  702,  55  So.  569,  Ann.  Cas.  1912C.  837),  442. 
State    V.    Brodnax    (228    Mo.    225,    128    S.    W.    177,    137    Am.    St.    Rep. 

613),   57. 

State  V.  Cadwallader  (172  Ind.  619,  87  N.  E.  644,  89  N.  E.  319),  327. 
State  of  Iowa  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.   (4  I.  C.  R.  425,  33  Fed. 
391),  335. 

State  of  Iowa  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.    (145  U.  S.  632,  36  L.  Ed.  857, 

12  Sup.  Ct.  978),  335. 
State  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (11  S.  D.  282,  77  N.  W.  104),  19. 
State  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (38  Minn.  281,  37  N.  W.  782),  49. 
State  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (152  Iowa  317,  130  N.  W.  802),  68. 
State  V.  C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  (47  Ohio  St.  130,  23  N.  E.  928),  175. 
State  V.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  (157  Ind.  288,  61  N.  E.  669),  30. 
State    ex    rel.    Attorney-General    v.    Columbus    Gaslight    &    Coke    Co. 

(34  Ohio  St.  572,  32  Am.  Rep.  390),  45. 
State  V.  Corbett  (57  Minn.  345,  59  N.  W.  317,  24  L.  R.  A.  498),  37. 
State  V.  De  Barry  (130  La.  1090,  50  So.  892),  58. 
State  V.  Eighteen  Casks  of  Beer   (24  Ok.  786,  104  Pac.  1093),  58. 
State  V.  Florida  E.  C.  R.  Co.  (58  Fla.  524,  50  So.  425),  13. 
State  V.  G.  N.  R.  Co.   (17  N.  D.  370,  116  N.  W.  89),  442. 
State  V.  Grier  (88  Atl.  579),  58. 
State  V.  Harbourne    (70  Conn.   484,  40  Atl.  179,   66  Am.   St.   Rep.   126, 

40  L.  R.  A.  607),  58. 
State   V.    Harper    (48    Mont.    456,    138    Pac.   495,    51    L.   R.   A.    (N.    S.) 

157),  2. 
State  V.  I.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (71  S.  W.  994),  335. 
State  V.   Indiana  &   I.   S.   Ry.   Co.    (133    Ind.   69,   32   N.   E.   817,    18   L. 

R.  A.  5.02),  30. 
State  V.  Intoxicating  Liquors   (104  Me.  502,  71  Atl.  758),  58. 
State  V.  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (83  Fed.  284),  15. 
State  V.  Leech  (119  La.  522,  44  So.  285),  56. 

State  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (177  Ind.  553,  96  N.  B.  340),  15. 
State  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (57  Fla.  526,  49  So.  39),  27. 
State  v.Lowry  (166  Ind.  372,  77  N.  E.  728,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  532).  58. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  127 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

State  V.  Mallory  (73  Ark.  236,  83  S.  W.  955,  67  L.  R.  A.  773),  58. 
State  v.Martyn  (82  Neb.  225,  117  N.  W.  719),  39. 
State  V.  Miller  (66  W.  Va.  436,  66  S.  E.  522),  58. 

State  V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.    (80  Minn.   191,  83  N.  W.  60,  89 
Am.  St.  Rep.  514),  14. 

State  V.    Mo.    Pac.    R.    Co.    (76    Kan.    467,    92    Pac.    606),    49. 

State  V.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.   (242  Mo.  339,  147  S.  W.  118),  22. 

State  V.  Ogden  Rapid  Transit  Co.   (38  Utah  242,  112  Pac.  120),  9. 

State  V.  Otis   (60  Kan.  248,  56  Pac.  14),  38. 

State  V.  Railroad  Com.  of  Washington  (52  Wash.  17,  100  Pac.  179),  14. 

State  V.  Republican  V.  R.  Co.  (26  N.  W.  205,  24  N.  W.  329),  9. 

State  V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (105  Mo.  App.  207,  79  S.  W.  714),  21. 

State  V.  S.  A.  L.  R.  Co.   (48  Fla.  114,  37  So.  652),  49. 

State  V.  So.  Kan.  R.  Co.   (49  S.  W.  252),  335. 

State  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.    (122  N.  C.  1052,  30   S.  E.  133,  41  L.  R.  A. 

246),  38. 
State  V.    Thompson    (47    Ore.    639,    84    Pac.    476,    4    L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.) 

480),  37. 
State  V.  U.  P.  R.  Co.   (89  Neb.  29,  126  N.  W.  859),  39. 
State  V.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.   (138  Ga.  835,  76  S.  E.  577),  43. 
State  V.  Wilmar  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (88  Minn.  448,  93  N.  W.  112),  47. 
State  V.  Wrightsville  &  T.  R.  Co.   (104  Ga.  437,  30  S.  E.  891),  14,  17. 
State  V.  Yazoo  &  V.  R.  Co.  (87  Miss.  679,  40  So.  263),  9. 
State  V.  Young  (29  Minn.  474,  9  N.  W.  737),  47. 
Steamer  Lines  from  Norfolk  to  Baltimore  (41  I.  C.  C.  285),  354. 
Steamer  Lines  on  Chesapeake  Bay  (35  I.  C.  C.  692),  203,  354. 
Steamer  Lines  on  Long  Island  Sound   (50  I.  C.  C.  634),  354. 
Stedman  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  167),  338,  383. 
Steenerson  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.  (69  Minn.  353,  72  N.  W.  713),  49. 
Steele  v.  United  Fruit  Co.   (190  Fed.  631),  486. 
Stephens  v.  Cent,  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.    (138  Fed.   625,   75   S.   B.   1041,  42   L. 

R.  A.  (N.  S.)   541,  1913E.  Ann.  Cas.  609),  17,  36,  43,  61,  80. 
Sterling  &  Sons  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  Co.   (21  I.  C.  C.  451),  404. 
Stevens  Gro.  Co^  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.   (42  I.  C.  C.  396),  118,  254. 
Stewart  v.  Michigan  (232  U.  S.  665,  58  L.  Ed.  786,  34  Sup.  Ct.  476),  58. 
Stickney  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.   (164  Fed.  638),  358,  395,  462. 
Stiritz  V.  N.  0.  M.  &  C.  R.  Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  578),  98. 
Stoddard  Lumber  Co.  v.  Or.-Wash.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.   (84  Or.  399,  105  Pac. 

363,  4  A.  L.  R.  1275),  295,  440. 
Stone  V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.  (144  N.  C.  220,  56  S.  E.  932).  25. 


128  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Stone  V.  Detroit,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (3  I.  C.  C.  613,  3  I.  C.  R.  60),  348. 

Stone  V.   Farmers'   Loan  &  Trust  Co.    (116   U.   S.   307,   29   L.   Ed.   631, 

6  Sup.  Ct.  334,  338,  1191),  5,  45,  63. 
?tate  V.   111.  Cent.   R.   Co.    (116   U.  S.   347,   29    L.   Ed.   650.   6   Sup.   Ct. 

348,   1191),   45. 
Stone  V.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.    (116   U.  S.  352,   29   L.  Ed.  651, 

6  Sup.  Ct.  349).  45. 
Stone  V.  Wisconsin  (94  U.  S.  181,  24  L.  Ed.  102),  45. 
Stonega  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.    (39  I.  C.  C.  523),  48,  99a, 

101,  416. 
Storr  V.  Pensacola  R.  Co.   (29  Fla.  617,  11  So.  226),  49. 
Stowe-Fuller  Co.  v.  Penn.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.  215),  160. 
Strait  V.   National   Harrow  Co.    (51   Fed.    819,   1   Fed.    Anti-Trust  Dec. 

52),  486. 
Straus  V.  Am.   Pub.   Asso.    (177  N.   Y.   473,   64  L.   R.   A.   701,   101  Am. 

St.  Rep.  819,  69  N.  E.  1107),  486. 
Straus  V.  Am.  Pub.  Asso.    (231  U.   S    222,  58  L.   Ed.   192,  34   Sup.  Ct. 

84),  486. 
Straus  V.  Am.  Pub.  Asso.   1193  N.  Y.  496,  86  N.  E.  525),  486. 
Straus  V.  Am.  Pub.  Asso.   (144  N.  Y.  548,  93  N.  E.  1133),  486. 
Straus   V.   Victor   Talking   Mach.   Co.    (243    U.    S.    490,   61   L.   Ed.    866, 

37  Sup.  Ct.  412),  497. 
Streever  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (34  I.  C.  C.  1),  481. 
Strough  V.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.    (87  N.  Y.   Sup.  30,   92  App. 

Div.  584),  383. 
Strough   V.   New  York  C.   &   H.   R.  R.   Co.    (181  N.   Y.   533),   73   N.  E. 

1133),  383. 
Strout  V.  United  Shoe  Mach.  Co.   (195  Fed.  313),  492. 
Strout  V.  United  Shoe  Mach.  Co.    (202  Fed.  602),  492. 
Stuarts  Draft  Milling  Co.  v.  S.  Ry.  Co.  (31  I.  C.  C.  623),  392. 
Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  111.  C.  R.  Co.  (22  I.  C.  C.  178),  140. 
Suffern,  Hunt  &  Co.   v.   Ind.  D.  &  W.   Ry.   Co.    (7   I.   C    C.   255),   180. 

212,  358. 
Sulphuric  Acid  From  New  Orleans,  La.   (42  I.  C.  C.  200.  347),  81a,  161. 
Sun  Co.  V.  I.  S.  R.  Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  194),  107. 
Sunday  Creek  Co.  v.  United  States  (210  Fed.  747),  345,  358,  371. 
Sunderland  Bros.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (158  Fed.  877),  443. 
Sunderland  Bros.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (23  I.  C.  C.  259),  81. 
Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  425),  115. 
Sunnyside  Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  20),  213. 
Superior  Commercial  Club  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (25  I.  C.  C.  342),  398. 


Table  of  Cases   Cited.  129 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Suspension  of  Advance  on  Soft  Coal  (23  I.  C.  C.  518),  399. 

Suspension  of  Rates  on  Packing  House  Products   (21  I.  C.  C.  68),  398. 

Swaney  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.   (49  I.  C.  C.  345),  346. 

Swayne  &  Hoyt  v.  Barsch   (226  Fed.  581,  141  C.  C.  A.  337),  33. 

Swift  &  Co.  V.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  701),  169. 

Swift  V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.   (58  Fed.  858),  339,  383. 

Swift  V.  Philadelphia  &  R.  R.  Co.   (64  Fed.  59),  383. 

Swift  V.  United  States   (196  U.  S.  375,  49  L.  Ed.  518,  25  Sup.  Ct.  276, 

2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  641),  2,  456,   469,  486. 
Switching  Ice  in  Chicago  (24  I.  C.  C.  660),  399. 
Sylvester  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C.  573),  339,  343,  383. 


Tampa  Board  of  Trade  v.  A.  &  V.  R.  Co.   (33  I.  C.  C.  457).  375. 
Tampa  Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (30  I.  C.  C.  377),  375. 
Tampa  Fuel  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.  (43  I.  C.  C.  231),  336a. 
Tang  Tun  v.   Edsell    (223  U.   S.   673,  56  L.   Ed.   606,  32   Sup.  Ct.  359), 

316,  396. 
Tap  Line  Cases  (23  I.  C.  C.  277,  549,  31  I.  C.  C.  490,  34  I.  C.  C.  116,  35 

I.  C.  C.  458,  209  Fed.  244,  234  U.  S.  1,  58  L.   Ed.  1185,  34   Sup.  Ct. 

741),  170,  193,  197,  211,  346,  404. 
Taylor  v.  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (25  I.  C.  C.  613),  398. 
Taylor,  The  Moses  (71  U.  S.  4  Wall.  429,  18  L.  Ed.  397).  292. 
Taylor  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  M.  P.  R.  Co.  (28  I.  C.  C.  205),  112,  156. 
Tecumser  Celery  Co.  v.   Cincinnati,  J.   &  M.   Ry.  Co.    (5   I.  C.  C.   663, 

4  I.  C.  R.  318),  392. 
Texarkana  Freight  Bureau  v.   St.  L.   I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.    (43   I.  C.  C 

224),  44,  146a. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gulf  &  L  Ry.  Co.   (54  S.  W.  1031),  13. 
Texas  &  N.  O.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sabine  Tram  Co.    (227  U.  S.  Ill,  57  L.  Ed. 

442,  33  Sup.  Ct.  229),   68,  335,   336. 
Texas   &   Pac.   Ry.   Co.  v.   Abilene   Cotton   Oil   Co.    (204    U.    S.   426,   51 

L.  Ed.  553,  27  Sup.  Ct.  350,  9  Ann.  Cas.  1075),  58,  61,  64.  69,  70,  145, 

204,  241,  297,  317,  358,  405,  407,  443. 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews    (54   Tex.   Civ.   App.   418,   55   Tex.   Civ. 

App.  302,  118  S.  W.  1101),  24. 
Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cisco  Oil  Mill    (204  U.  S.  449.  51  L.  Ed.  562, 

27  Sup.  Ct.  358),  241,  358. 
Texas   &  Pac.  Ry.   Co.  v.   Int.   Com.   Com.    (162   U.   S.    197,   40  L.   Ed. 

940,  16  Sup.  Ct.  666,  5  I.  C.  R.  405),  64,  85,  95.  125.  128,  153,  179, 

312,  339,  345,  358,  388,  389,  394,  395,  406. 


13u  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Leatherwood  (250  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup. 

Ct.  — ),  440. 
Texas   &   Pac.   Ry.   Co."  v.    Mugg    (202    U.    S.    242,    50   L.   Ed.    1011,   26 

Sup.  Ct.  628),  180,  204,  212,  358,  361. 
Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  La.  (183  Fed.  1005),  68. 
Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  La.    (192   Fed.  280,  112  C.  C. 

A.  528),  87. 

Texas    &   P.    R.    Co.    v.    Taylor    (42    Tex.    Civ.    App.    418,    118    S.    W. 

1097),  24. 
Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United   States    (205  Fed.  380),  3,   44,  62,   68, 

184,  222,  336,  346. 

Texas  Cement  Plaster   Co.   v.   St.   Louis   &  S.    F.   R.   Co.    (12   L   C.   C. 
68),  346,  383. 

Texas   Cement   Plaster   Co.  v.   St.   Louis   &   S.  F.   R    Co.    (26   1.   C.   C. 

508),  897. 
Texas  Cement  Prod.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  508),  400. 
Texas  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hannay-Frerichs  &  Co.  (130  S.  W.  250),  25. 
Texas  Common  Point  Case  (26  I.  C.  C.  528),  105. 
Texico  Transfer  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (20  I.  C.  C.  17),  195. 
Texo-cide  Chemical  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.   (40  I.  C.  C.  594),  89a. 
Thomas  v.   Cincinnati,   N.   O.   &   T.   P.   Ry.   Co.    (62   Fed.   803,    1   Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  266),  486. 
Thompson  v.  M.  K.   &  T.  Ry.  Co.    (105   Tex.   372,  126   S.  W.   257,  128 

S.   W.   109),   14. 
Thompson  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  640),  175. 
Thompson    Lumber    Co.    v.    111.    Cent.    R.    Co.    (13    I.    C.    C.    657),    126, 

339,  406. 
Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  566),  416. 
Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.    (193  Fed.   682),  406,   407. 
Thomsen  v.  Cayser  (243  U.  S.  66,  61  L.  Ed.  597,  37  Sup.  Ct.  353),  486, 

492. 
Thomson  v.  Union  Castle  Mail  S.  S.  Co.   (149  Fed.  933),  486. 
Thomson  v.  Union  Castle  Mail   S.   S.  Co.    (166   Fed.  251,   32   C.   C.   A. 

315),  486. 
Through  Rates  to  Points  in  La.  and  Texas   (38  I.  C.  C.  153),  348. 
Thurber  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.    (3   I.  C.   C.   473,  2   I.   C.  R. 

742),  88,   111,  156,   339,   346. 
Tift  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  548),  50.  88,  90,  92,  96,  100,  102, 

207,  327,  339,  352,  395,  486. 
Tift  V  .Southern  Ry.  Co.   (123  Fed.  789),  50,  61,  64,  304,  339,  442,  445. 
Tift  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (138  Fed.  753,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec  733),  50, 

64,  92,  102,  207,  304,  327,  339,  352,  406,  445,  486. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  131 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
Tift  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (159  Fed.  555),  50,  339,  383. 
Tileston  Milling   Co.   v.   Northern   Pac.   R.   Co.    (8   I.   C.   C.  346)     129, 
339,  348. 

Tilley  v.  Railroad  Co.   (5  Fed.  641,  4  Woods  427),  50. 

Toledo  &  0.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Coal  &  Coke  Co.   (238  Fed. 
629),  364. 

Toledo,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Penn.  Co.   (54  Fed.  730,  19  L.  R.  A.  387,  5  I.  C. 

R.  545,  22  U.  S.  App.  561),  304,  307,  347,  381,  383,  384. 
Tomlin-Harris  Mach.  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  133),  346. 
Topeka  Banana  Dealer^'  Asso.  v.   St.  L.   &  S.  F.   R.  .Co.    (13  I.  C.  C. 

620),  348. 

Topeka  Traffic  Asso.  v.  A.  &  V.  R.  Co.   (27  I.  C.  C.  428),  145. 
Tozer  v.  United  States  (52  Fed.  917),  345,  346,  371,  384. 
Traer  v.   Chicago  &  A.   R.   Co.    (13    I.   C.  C.   451),    175,   222,   309,   336, 
346,  395. 

Traffic   Bureau   Merchants'   Exchange   of   St.    Louis   v.    Chicago,   B.    & 

Q.  R.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C.  317),  142a,  168,  312,  337. 
Traffic    Bureau    Merchants'   Exchange    of   St.    Louis    v.    Chicago,    B.    & 

Q.  R.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  551),  312,- 411. 
Traffic    Bureau   Merchants'   Exchange    of   St.    Louis    v.   C.    B.   &   Q.    R. 

Co.   (22  I.  C.  C.  496),  140,  337. 
Traffic  Bureau  Merchants'  Exchange  of  St.  Louis  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 

Co.  (13  I.  C.  C.  11),  346. 
Traffic  Bureau  of  Nashville  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  (43  I.  C.  C.  366),  266. 
Traffic  Bureau  of  Sioux  City  v.  American  Ex.  Co.   (39  I.  C.  C.  703),  44. 
Traffic  Bureau  of  Toledo  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.  (43  I.  C.  C.  446),  147,  346. 
Trammell  Railroad  Comrs.  of  Ga.  v.  Clyde  S.   S.  Co.    (5  I.  C.  C.  324, 

4  I.  C.  R.  120),  135,  153,  199,  335,  345,  346,  348,  392. 
Transcontinental  Commodity  Rates  (32  I.  C.  C.  449),.  375,  398. 
Transcontinental  Rates  (46  I.  C.  C.  236),  348. 
Transit  Case  (24  I.  C.  C.  340),  169,  433. 
Transportation  Bureau  of  Wichita  v.   S.  L.   L   M.  &  S.   R.   Co.    (23    I. 

C.  C.  679),  107. 

Transportation  of  Fresh  Meats  (23  I.  C.  C.  652),  346. 

Transportation  of  Lime  in  Car  Loads  (24  I.  C.  C.  170),  348. 

Transportation  of  Wool,  Hides  &  Pelts   (23  I.  C.  C.  151),  169. 

Trap  or  Ferry  Car  Service  (34  I.  C.  C.  516),  141,  193. 

Traugott  Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  (23  I.  C.  C.  684),  265. 

Travis  v.  Wells  Fargo  Ex.  Co.  (79  N.  J.  L.  83,  74  Atl.  444),  34. 

Trenton  &  M.  C.  T.  Corp.  v.  New  Jersey  Pub.  Util.  Com    (229  Fed.  140), 
60. 


132  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Trenton  &  M.  C.  T.  Corp.  v.  Trenton   (227  Fed.  502,  229  Fed.  140,  143 

C.  C.  A.  316),  43. 
Trexler  Lumber  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.   (42  L  C.  C.  719),  205. 
Trier  v.  C.  St.  ^.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.   (30  L  C.  C.  352),  6,  44,  336. 
Tripp  V.  M.  C.  R.  Co.   (238  Fed.  449,  151  C.  C.  A.  385),  182,  342. 
Truckers   Transfer  Co.  v.   C.  &   W.   C.   R.  Co.    (27   I.  C.   C.   275),   121, 

195,  224,   249,   313,   338,   375,   400. 
Tucker  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.    (82  Kan.  222,  108  Pac.  89),  35,  42. 
Tullis  V.  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (175  U.  S.  348,  44  L.  Ed.  192,  20  Sup. 

Ct.  136),  33.- 
Tulsa  Traffic  Asso.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (49  L  C.  C.  644),  347. 

U. 

Ullman  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.    (14  I.  C.  C.  585),  265. 

Ulrick  V.  Lake  Shore,  etc.,  R.  Co.  (9  L  C.  C.  495),  348. 

Union    Bridge    Co.    v.    United    States    (204    U.    S.    364,    51    L,    Ed.    523, 

27  Sup.  Ct.  367),  53,  54. 
Union  Lime  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (233  U.  S.  211,  58  L.  Ed.  924, 

34  Sup.  Ct.  522),  12,  195,  344,  396b. 
Union  Lumber  Co.  v.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (41  L  C.  C.  411),  208. 
Union  Made  Garments  Mfgrs.   Asso.   v.   C.  &  N.   W.   R.   Co.    (16   L  C. 

C.  405).     See  Association  of  Union  Made  Garments. 
Union  Pacific   Coal    Co.   v.   United    States    (173   Fed.   737,  97   C.   C.   A. 

578),  486. 
Union  Pac.  Co.  v.  Frank  (226  Fed.  906,  141  C.  C.  A.  510),  513. 
Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Goodridge    (149   U.   S.   680,  37   L.   Ed.   896,  13 

Sup.  Ct.  970),  145. 
Union    Pac.   R.    Co.   v.   Oregon   &   Washington    L.    M.    Asso.    (165    Fed. 

13,  91  C.  C.  A.  51),  443. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States   (59  Fed.  813,  8  C.  C.  A.  282),  327. 
Union   Pac.   R.    Co.   v.    United    States    (Sinking   Fund    Cases),    (99    U. 

S.  9  Otto.  700,  25  L.  Ed.  496),  63. 
Union  Pac.   R.   Co.  v.   United    States    (117    U.    S.    355,   29    L.   Ed.    920, 

6  Sup.  Ct.  772),  345,  389. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Updike  Grain  Co.   (222  U.  S.  215,  56  L.  Ed.  171, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  39),  16,  140,  168,  197,  337,  346,  404. 
Union  Pac.  Tea  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  545),  88. 
Union   Sewer   Pipe   Co.    v.   Connelly    (99   Fed.   354,   2    Fed.   Anti-Trust 

Dec.  1),  486. 
Union  Stock  Yards  &  Transit  Co.  v.  United  States   (192  Fed.  330),  66. 
Union  Tanning  Co.  v.  S.  R.  Co.  (26  I.  C.  C.  159),  88,  90. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  133 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

United  States  v.   Adams  Ex.  Co.    (229   U.    S.   3S1,   57    L.    Ed.    1237,    33 

Sup.  Ct.  878),  63,   66,  384. 
United    States    v.    Addyston    Pipe    &    Steel    Co.    (78    Fed.    712,    1    Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  631),  603. 
United    States   v.    Addyston  Pipe   &   Steel   Co.    (85   Fed.   271,   29   C.   C. 

A.  141,  46  L.  R.  A.  122,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  772),  486,  489,  491. 
United  States  v.  Agler  (62  Fed.  824,  11  Anti-Trust  Dec.  294).  489. 
United  States  v.  Alaska  (251  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed.  — .  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ), 

204a. 
United  States  v.  American  Can  Co.  (234  Fed.  1019),  486. 
United  States  v.  American  Naval  Stores  Co.    (172  Fed.  455).   486. 
United  States  v.  American  Naval  Stores  Co.   (186  Fed.  592),  486. 
United  States  v.  American  Tobacco  Co.    (164  Fed.  700),  486. 
United  States  v.    American    Tobacco    (221    U.    S.    106,    55    L.    Ed.    663, 

31  Sup.  Ct.  632),  486. 

United    States    v.    Armour     (142    Fed.    808,    2    Fed.    Anti-Trust    Dec. 

951),   486. 
United  States  v.  Associated  Bill  Posters    (235  Fed.   540),   486. 
United  States  v.  Atchison,  T.   &  S.  F.   Ry.   Co.    (142   Fed.   176,   2   Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  831),  456,  489. 
United   States  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (16a  Fed.  Ill),  371. 
United  States  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (166  Fed.  160),  483. 
United  States  v.   A.   T.   &   S.   P.   R.    Co.    (185    Fed.    105,    107   C.    C.    A. 

323),  481. 
United  States  v.   Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.   R.   Co.    (234   U.   S.   476,    58   L. 

Ed.  1408,  34  Sup.  Ct.  986),  63,  lo4,  20L,  308a,  345,  346,  348. 
United  States  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.   (153  Fed.  997),  384. 
United  States  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.   (154  Fed.  108).  175,  395,  445. 
United   States  v.    B.    &    O.    R.    Co.    (225    U.    S.    306,    56    L.    Ed.    1100, 

32  Sup.  Ct.  817),  303,  321. 

United  States  v.    B.    &   O.    R.    Co.    (226    U.    S.    14,    57    L.    Ed.    104,    3S 

Sup.   Ct.   5),    191,   195,   222,   396. 
United  States  v.   B.   &   O.   R.   Co.    (231    U.    S.    274,   58   L.    Ed.    218.    34 

Sup.  Ct.  75),  9,  40,  140,  197,  312,  3-21,  335,  343,  371,  404. 
United  States  v.  Basic  Products  Co.  (260  Fed.  472),  329. 
United  States    ex    rel.    Pitcairn    Coal    Co.    v.    Baltimore    &    O.    R.    Co. 

(165  Fed.  113,  91  C.  C.  A.  147),  174,  296,  347,  445. 
United  States  v.    Baltimore   &    O.    S.    W.    R.    Co.    (159    Fed.    33,    86    C. 

C.  A.  223),  483. 
United  States  v.    Baltimore   &    0.    S.    W.    R.   Co.    (222    U.    S.    8,    56    L. 

Ed.  68,  32  Sup.  Ct.  6),  58,  326. 
United  States  v.  B.  &  O.   S.  W.  Co.    (226  U.  S.  14,  57  L.  Ed.   104,  S3 

Sup.  Ct.  5),  256,  396. 


134  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

United  States  v.  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.   (184  Fed.  546),  371. 

United  States  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.  (15  Fed.  209),  481.  483. 

United  States  v.  Bunch   (105  Fed.  736),  371. 

United  States  v.  Camden  Iron  Works   (150  Fed.  214),  371. 

United  States  v.  Cassidy  (67  Fed.  698,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  449),  486. 

United  States  v.    Chesapeake   &   Ohio   Fuel   Co.    (105   Fed.    93,    2    Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  34),  486. 
United  States  v.  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  Co.   (148  Fed.  646),  358. 
United  States  v.    Chicago    &   N.   W.    Ry.    Co.    (127    Fed.    785,    62   C.   C. 

A.   465),   345. 
United  States  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.   (184  Fed.  984),  481. 
United  States  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  (234  Fed.  178),  371. 
United  States  v.  Chicago,  I.  &  L.  R.  Co.  (163  Fed.  114),  342.  442,  456. 
United  States  v.  Chicago,  I.  &  L.  R.  Co.   (163  Fed.  114),  38. 
United  States  v.  Chicago  J.  R.  Co.   (211  Fed.  724),  481. 
United  States  v.  Chicago,  K.  &  S.  R.  Co.  (81  Fed.  783),  335,  432. 
United  States  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.    (234  Fed.  386.  245   Fed.   179, 

250  Fed.  442),  481. 
United  States  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.    (211  Fed.  770),  481. 
United  States  v.  Chicago,  St.   P.,  M.  &  O.  R.   Co.    (151   Fed.   84),  358, 

371,  447. 
United  States  v.  Coal   Dealers'  Asso.    (85   Fed.  252,   1   Fed.   Anti-Trust 

Dec.   749),  486,   489. 
United  States  v.  Colgate  &  Co.   (253  Fed.  522,  250  U.  S.  300,  63  L.  Ed. 

570,   39  Sup.  Ct.  465),  329,  486,  492,  497. 
United  States  v.  Colorado  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.   (157  Fed.  321,  342,  85  C.  C. 

A.  27,  48),  67,  335,  432. 
United  States  v.  Corn  Products  Refining  Co.   (234  Fed.  964),  486. 
United  States  v.  Cowell   (243  Fed.  730),  486. 

United  States  v.  Debs    (64  Fed.  724,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  322),  486. 
United  States  v.  DeCoursey   (82  Fed.  302),  358,  384. 
United  States  v.  Delaware  &  Hudson  Co.    (164  Fed.  215),  173. 
United  States  v.   Delaware   &   Hudson   Co.    (213   U.   S.   366,   53   L.   Ed. 

836,  29  Sup.  Ct.  527),  63,  173,  303,  343. 
United  States  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  Co.   (40  Fed.  101),  197,  345,  346. 
United  States  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (152  Fed.  269),  335,  371,  447. 
United  States  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (238  U.  S.  516,  59  L.  Ed. 

1438,  35  Sup.  Ct.  873,  213  Fed.  240),  63,  173,  343,  486. 
United  States  v.  Discher   (255  Fed.  719),  486. 
United  States  v.  Du  Pont  De  Nemours  &  Co.   (188  Fed.  127),  486,  489. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  135 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

United  States  v.  Egan   (47  Fed.  112),  345. 

United  States  v.  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.   (13  Fed.  642),  481. 

United  States  v.   Eastern   States   R.   L.   D.   Asso.    (201   Fed.   581),    486. 

United  States  v.  Eastman  Kodak  Co.    (226  Fed.  62),  487. 

United  States  v.  E.  R.  Co.   (191  Fed.  941),  481. 

United  States  v.  E.  R.  Co.    (209  Fed.  283),  176,  358. 

United  States  v.  E.  R.  Co.   (213  Fed.  391),  442. 

United  States  v.  Elliott  (62  Fed.  801,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  262),  486. 

United  States  v.    Elliott    (64    Fed.    27,    1    Fed.    Anti-Trust    Dec.    311), 

486,  489,  490. 
United  States  v.  El  Paso  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  (178  Fed.  846),  485. 
United  States  v.  Ferger   (250  U.  S.  — .  63  L.  Ed.  — .  39  Sup.  Ct.  — ). 

25,  34a,  204a,  440a,  440oo. 
United  States  v.  Fowkes    (53  Fed.  13,  3  C.  C.  A.  394),  384. 
United  States  v.  Geddes   (131  Fed.  452,  65  C.  C.  A.  320),  335. 
United  States  v.   Gettysburg  Elec.   Ry.   Co.    (160   U.   S.   068,   40    L.  Ed. 

576,  16  Sup.  Ct.  427),  7. 
United   States  v.  Grand  T.  R.  Co.   (225  Fed.  283),  359,  371. 
United  States  v.  Grand  T.  R.  Co.   (208  Fed.  733),  486. 
United  States  v.  Great  Lakes  Towing  Co.   (217  Fed.  656),  56,  65,  486. 
United  States  v.  Great  Nor.  R.  Co.   (151  Fed.  84),  448. 
United  States  v.  Great  Nor.  R.  Co.   (157  Fed.  288),  63,  371,  448. 
United  States  v.   Greenhut    (50   Fed.  469,   1   Fed.   Anti-Trust   Dec.   30). 

487. 
United  States  v.  Hamburg-Am.  ?.  F.  &  Geselschaft  (200  Fed.  806),  486. 
United  States  v.  Hanley   (71  Fed.  672),  345,  384,  386,  387. 
United  States  v.  Harris   (85  Fed.  533),  481. 

United  States  v.    Harris    (177    U.    S.    305,    44    L.    Ed.   780,   20    Sup.    Ct. 
609),  481. 

United  States  v.  Hill  (248  U.  S.  420,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  58. 

United  States  v.  H.  V.  R.  Co.    (194  Fed.  234),  176,  345,  358,  370,  371. 

United  States  v.  Hollis    (246  Fed.   611),  486. 

United  States  v.  Hopkins    (82  Fed.   529,   1  Fed.  Anti-Trust   Dec.   725), 

486. 
United  States  v.  Howel    (56  Fed.  21),  384,  386. 
United   States  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.   (230  Fed.  940),  335. 
United  States  v.    111.   Cent.   R.   Co.    (244   U.   S.   82,  61   L.    Ed.   1007.   37 

Sup.  Ct.  584),  309. 
United  States  v.    Int.    Com.    Com.     (Cement    Case)     (246    U.    S.    638, 

62  L.  Ed.  914,  38  Sup.  Ct.  408),  308a,  312,  408. 


136  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

United  States  v.    Int.    Com.    Com.    (Valuation    Case)     (251    U.    S.    — , 

64  L.  Ed.  —,40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  430. 
United  States  v.   International  Harvester  Co.    (214   Fed.   987),    486. 
United  States  v.   Jellico   Mountain   Coal   &   Coke    Co.    (43    Fed.    898,    1 

Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  1),  489. 
United   States  v.    Jellico    Mountain    Coal    &    Coke    Co.     (46    Fed.    42.2, 

12  L.  R.  A.  753,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  9),  486. 
United  States  v.  John  Reardon   Sons  Co.    (191   Fed.   454),  486, 
United  States  v.  Johnston   (232  Fed.  970),  2. 

United     States  v.  Joint  Traffic  Asso.,  see  Joint  Traffic  Asso.  case. 
United  States  v.   Joint  Traffic  Asso.    (76    Fed.    895,    1    Fed.   Anti-Trust 

Dec.  615),  352,  389,  489. 
United   States  v.   Joint   Traffic   Asso.    (80   Fed.   1020,   32   C.   C.   A.    491. 

45  U.  S.  App.  726,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  869),  352,  389,  489. 
United  States  v.  Joint  Traffic  Asso.    (171  U.  S.  505,  19  Sup.  Ct.  25,  43 

L.    Ed.    259,    1    Fed.    Anti-Trust   Dec.    869),    See    Joint    Traffic    As- 
sociation Case. 
United  States  v.    Jones    (109    U.    S.    513,    27    L.    Ed.    1015,    3    Sup.    Ct. 

346),  7. 
United  States  v.   Ju   Toy    (198   U.   S.   253,   25    Sup.   Ct.   644,   49   L.   Ed. 

1040),  63. 
United  States  v.  Kellogg  Toasted  Corn  Flake  Co.   (222  Fed.  725),  487. 
United  States  v.  King   (229  Fed.  275,  250  Fed.  908),  486,  500. 
United  States  v.  Kissell   (173  Fed.  823),  486. 
United  States  v.   Kissell    (218   U.   S.  601,   54   L.   Ed.   1168,   31   Sup.  Ct. 

124),  486. 
United  States  v.   Knight  &  Co.    (60  Fed.   306,   1   Fed.   Anti-Trust    Dec. 

250),  486. 
United  States  v.    Knight   &   Co.    (60   Fed.   93-4,    9    C.    C.    A.   297,    24    U 

R.  A.  428,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  258),  486. 
United  States  v.  Knight  &  Co.   (156  U.  S.  1,  11,  39  L.  Ed.  325,  15  Sup. 

Ct.  24  9,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  379,  387),  486. 
United  States  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  (203  Fed.  295),  486. 
United   States  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.   S.  Ry.   Co.    (197   U.   S.   536,   49   L. 

Ed.  870,  25  Sup.  Ct.  538),  301,  432,  437,  441,  445. 
United  States  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.   (115  Fed.  373),  335. 
United  States  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.    (184  Fed.   546),   186,  371. 
United  States  v.   Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.    (184   Fed.   971,   187   Fed.   1006. 

254  Fed.  332),  371,  481. 
United   States  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.   (225  Fed.  399),  63,  173. 
United  States  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.    (220  U.  S.  257,  55  L.  Ed.  458, 

31  Sup.  Ct.  3^7),  63,  173,  186,  303,  343. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  137 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

United  States  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.    (18  Fed.  480).  481. 
United  States  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (157  Fed.  979),  481. 
United  States  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  (212  Fed.  486),  220,  389,  437. 
United  States  v.   Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    (235    U.    S.    314,    59    L.    Ed. 

245,  35  Sup.  Ct.  113),  154,  347,  348. 
United   States  v.    Louisville   &   N.    R.    Co.    (236   U.    S.    318,    59    L.    Ed. 

598,  35  Sup.  Ct.  363),  220,  310,  389. 
United  States  v.  MacAndrews  &  Forbes  Co.   (149  Fed.  823,  836),  493. 
United  States  v.  Martin   (176  Fed.  110),  342. 
United  States  v.  Matthews  (68  Fed.  880),  345. 
United  States  v.  McCullagh   (221  Fed.  288),  58. 
United  States  v.  Mellen    (53  Fed.  229),  348,  384. 
United  States  v.  Merchants  &  M.  Traffic  Asso.  (242  U.  S.  178,  61  L.  Ed. 

233,  37  Sup.  Ct.  24),  154,  308b,  348,  393. 
United  States  v.  Metropolitan  Lumber  Co.   (254  Fed.  335),  371. 
United  States  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.    (43  Fed.  26),  371,  384. 
United  States  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  (122  Fed.  544),  64,  456,  459. 
United  States  v.  Miller    (187  Fed.  375),  371. 
United  States  (v.  Miller   (187  Fed.  369),  361. 
United  States  v.  Miller  (223  U.  S.  599,  56  L.  Ed.  568,  32  Sup.  Ct.  323), 

358,  364,  371. 

United  States  v.  Milwaukee  Rfgr.  Transit  Co.   (142  Fed.  247),  370. 

United  States  v.   Milwaukee   Rfgr.    Transit   Co.    (145    Fed.    1007),    303, 
456. 

United  States  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.    (65  Fed.  903,  5  I.  C.  R.   106), 
389,   456. 

United   States  v.   Mooney    (116    U.    S.   104,    29    L.    Ed.    550,    6    Sup.    Ct. 
304),  307. 

United  States  v.  Morsman  (42  Fed.  448),  335. 

United  States  v.  Moseley    (187   U.   S.   322,   47  L.   Ed.    198,   23   Sup.   Ct. 
90),  418. 

United  States  v.  Motion  Picture  Patents  Co.  (225  U.  S.  800),  487. 

United  States  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  (217  Fed.  254),  220. 

United  States  v.  Naval  Stores  Co.    (172  Fed.  455),  486. 

United  States  v.  Naval  Stores  Co.   (186  Fed.  592),  486. 

United  States  v.  Nelson  (52  Fed.  646,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  77),  487. 

United  States  v.  New  Departure  Mfg.  Co.    (204  Fed.  107),  486. 

United  States  v.    New   England    Fish    Exchange    (258    Fed.    732),    486, 

500,  501. 

United  States  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.   (146  Fed.  298).  370. 


138  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

United  States  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (153  Fed.  630),  335, 
361,  371,  447. 

United  States  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.   (157  Fed.  293),  371. 
United  States  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.   (164  Fed  324),  371 
United  States  v.  New  York  C.   &  H.  R.   R.   Co.    (168   Fed.   699,   94   C. 

C.  A.  76),  483. 
United  States  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.    (212  U.   S.  509,  53  L. 

Ed.  629,  29  Sup.  Ct.  313),  204,  371,  373. 
United  States  v.  Norfolk  &  Western  Ry.  Co.  (109  Fed.  831),  175,  445. 
United  States  v.  Norfolk  &  Western  Ry.  Co.   (114  Fed.  682),  445. 
United  States  v.  Norfolk  &  Western  Ry.  Co.   (138  Fed.  849),  445. 
United  States  v.    Norfolk    &    Western    Ry.    Co.    (143    Fed.    266,    74    C. 

C.  A.  404),  175,  445. 
United  States  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.   (28  I.  C.  C.  518),  401. 
United  States  v.    N.    P.    Ry.    Co.    (242    U.    S.    190,    61    L.    Ed.    240,    37 

Sup.  Ct.  22),  432. 

United  States  v.  Norris   (255  Fed.  423),  486,  517. 

United  States  v.  Northern  Securities  Co.  (120  Fed.  721,  2  Fed.  Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  215),  58,  486. 

United  States  v.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  (Pipe  Line  Cases)  (234  U.  S.  548,  58 
L.  Ed.  1394,  14^9,  34  Sup.  Ct.  956),  65,  67,  335,  381,  486. 

United  States  v.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.   (159  Fed.  975),  346. 

United  States  v.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.   (210  Fed.  378),  58. 

United  States  v.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.   (163  Fed.  640),  481. 

United  States  v.  Oregon  S.  L.  R.  Co.   (160  Fed.  526),  481,  483. 

United  States  v.  Pacific  &  A.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  (228  U.  S.  87,  57  L.  Ed. 
742,  33  Sup.  Ct.  443),  64,  145,  195,  241,  327,  383,  486. 

United  States  v.  Patten   (187  Fed.  664),  486. 

United  States  v.  Patten  (226  U.  S.  525,  57  L.  Ed.  333,  33  Sup.  Ct.  141), 
486. 

United  States  v.  Patterson  (55  Fed.  605,  640,  641,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust 
Dec.  133,  176,  177),  487. 

United  States  v.  Patterson  (59  Fed.  280,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  244), 
487. 

United  States  v.  Patterson   (201  Fed.  697),  486. 

United  States  v.  Patterson   (205  Fed.  292),  486. 

United   States  v.  P.  R.  Co.   (153  Fed.  625),  361. 

United  States  v.  P.  M.  R.  Co.   (171  Fed.  586),  481. 

United  States  v.  P.  &  R.  Co.   (184  Fed.  543),  186,  371. 

United  States  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (235  Fed.  961),  326. 

United  States  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Co.   (223  Fed.  202),  481. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  139 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

United  States  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.    (232  Fed.  946),  4i,  364. 

United  States  v.  Philadelphia   &   R.   Co.    (247   Fed.    469,   159   C.   C.   A. 

523),  481. 
United  States  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Co.    (238  Fed.  428),  483. 
United  States  v.  Piowaty  &  Sons    (251  Fed.  375),  486. 
United  States  v.  Pomeroy   (152  Fed.  279),  371. 
United  States  v.  P.  R.  Co.    (242  U.  S.  208,  61  L.  Ed.  251,  37  Sup.  Ct. 

95,  227  Fed.  911),  24,  142a,  174,  309,  312,  338,  389. 
United   States  </.  Reading  Co.  (183  Fed.  427,  226  Fed.  229),  487. 
United  States  v.  Reading  Co.    (226   U.   S.  324,   57  L.   Ed.  243,  33   Sup. 

Ct.  90),  327,  486,  489. 
United  States  v.  Reading    (228  U.   S.   158,  57  L.   Ed.   779,  33   Sup.  Ct. 

509),  486,  489. 
United  States  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (107  Fed.  870),  483. 
United  States  v.    St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.   R.   Co.    (177   Fed.   205,   101    C. 

C.  A.  375),  481. 
United  States  v.  Schra?der  (—  U.  S.  — ,  —  L.  Ed.  — ,  —  Sup.  Ct.  — ), 

329,  486,  492. 
United   States  v.  Schurz   (102  U.  S.  378,  26  L.  Ed.  167).  301. 
United  States  v.  Seaboard  Ry.  Co.   (82  Fed.  563),  335. 
United  States  ex   rel.   Int.   Com.    Com.   v.    Seaboard    Ry.   Co.    (85   Fed. 

955),  432. 
United  States  v.  Simpson  (250  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  58. 
United  States  v.  Sioux  City  Stock  Yards  Co.    (162  Fed.  556)   335,  337 

481. 
United  States  v.  Sioux  City  Terminal  Ry.  Co.    (234  Fed.  663),  481. 
United  States  v.  Six  Cases    (239  U.  S.  510,  60  L.  Ed.  411,  36   Sup.  Ct. 

190),   58. 
United   States  v.  Sltinner  (218  Fed.  870),  310,  390. 
United  States  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (157  Fed.  459),  481. 
United  States  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (162  Fed.  412),  481. 
United  States  v.   Southern   Whol.  Grocers'   Asso.    (207   Fed.   434),   486, 

489. 
United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Co..  (148  Fed.  719),  371,  448,  449. 
United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.   (152  Fed.  290),  307,  490. 
United   States  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.   (155  Fed.  305),  335,  361,  371. 
United  States  v.    Standard   Oil    Co.    (164    Fed.   376,   90   C.    C.   A.    364), 

335,  448. 
United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.    (170  Fed.  988),  371. 
United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.   (173  Fed.  177),  486. 
United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.   (183  Fed.  223),  371. 


140  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  (192  Fed.  438),  186,  371. 

United   States  v.  Standard  Sanitary  Mfg.  Co.   (191  Fed.  172),  486. 

United  States  v.  Stearns  Salt  &  Lumber  Co.    (165  Fed.  735),  371. 

United  States  v.  Sterling  Salt  Co.    (200  Fed.  593),  371. 

United  States  v.  Sunday  Creek  Co.  (194  Fed.  252),  138.  371. 

United  States  v.  Sunday  Creek  Co.   (210  Fed.  747),  138. 

United    States  v.   Swift  &  Co.    (122  Fed.   529,   2   Fed.   Anti-Trust   Dec. 

237),  2  469,  486. 
United  States  v.  Swift   (188  Fed.  92),  486. 
United  States  v.  Terminal  R.  R.  Asso.    (224  U.  S.  S.83,  56  L.  Ed.  810, 

31  Sup.  Ct.  507),  486. 
United  States  v.  Tozer  (37  Fed.  635,  2  L.  R.  A.  44),  371,  384. 
United  States  v.  Tozer   (39  Fed.  369),  345,  384. 
United  States  v.  Tozer   (39  Fed.  904),  345. 
United  States  v.    Trans-Missouri   Freight   Asso.    (53    Fed.    440,    1    Fed. 

Anti-Trust  Dec.  80),  352,  486. 
United  States  v.   Trans-Missouri    Freight  Asso.    (58   Fed.    58,    7   C.   C. 

A.  15,  97.  24  L.  R.  A.  73,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  186),  352,  486. 
United  States  v.   Trans-Missouri   Freight   Asso.    (166  U.   S.   290,   41   L. 

Ed.    1007,   17   Sup.   Ct.  540,   1   Fed.   Anti-Trust   Dec.    648),   92.   327, 

S52,  486. 
United  States  v.  Union  Bridge  Co.    (143  Fed.  377),  53. 
United  States  v.  Union  Mfg.  Co.  (240  U.  S.  605,  60  L.  Ed.  822,  36  Sup. 

Ct.  420),  385. 
United  States  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (169  Fed.  65,  94  C.  C.  A.  438),  481. 
United  States  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (188  Fed.  102),  481,  486. 
United  States  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (213  Fed.  332,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ),  481. 
United  States  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.    (160   U.   S.  1,  16   Sup.  Ct.   190,   40 

L.  Ed.  319),  302. 
United  States  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.    (226  U.   S.   61,  57   L.   Ed.   124,  33 

Sup.  Ct.  53),  327,  486. 
United  States  v.  Union  Stock  Yards  of  Omaha  (161  Fed.  919),  335. 
United  States  v.  Union  Stock  Yards  Co.    (192  Fed.  330),  66,  221,  345, 

358. 
United  States  v.  Union  Stock  Yards  &  Transit  Co.    (226  U.  S.  286,  57 

L.  Ed.  226,  33  Sup.  Ct.  83),  10,  13,  41,  66,  186,  221,  345,  358. 
United  States  v.   United    Shoe   Machinery   Co.    (232   Fed.   1023,   247   U. 

S.  32,  62  L.  Ed.  968.  38  Sup.  Ct.  473,  264  Fed.  138),  486,  497. 
United  States  v.    United    States    Steel    Corporation    (250    U.    S.   — ,    64 

L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — ),  486. 
United  States  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.   (153  Fed.  598),  358,  371. 
United  States  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.    (158  Fed.  536),  361,  371. 


Table  of  Gases  Cited.  141 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

United  States  v.  Virginia-Carolina    Chemical    Co.    (1(J3    Fed.    06),    490. 
United  States  v.  Wells-Fargo  Ex.  Co.  (161  Fed.  606),  a03,  335,  342. 

371,  442. 
United  States  v.  West  Va.  N.  R.  Co.   (125  Fed.  252),  175,  445. 
United  States  v.  Whelpley    (125    Fed.    617),    58. 
United  States  v.  Whiting    (212   Fed.   466),   486. 
United  States  v.  Winslow    (195  Fed.  578),  486. 
United   States  v.  Winslow    (227   U.   S.  202,   57  L.   Ed.   481,  33   Sup.  Ct. 

253),   486. 
United  States  v.  Wood    (145  Fed.  405),  07,  68,  335,  358,  371. 
United  States  v.  Workingman's  Amalg.  Council  (54  Fed.  994,  26  L.  R. 

A.  158,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  110),  486,  489. 
United  States  Button  Co.  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C.  149),  401. 
United  States  Cons.    Seeded    Raisin    Co.    v.    Griffin    (120    Fed.    364,    61 

C.  C.  A.  334,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  288),  486. 
United  States  Ex.  Co.  v.  Minnesota   (223  U.  S.  335,  56  L.  Ed.  459,  32 

Sup.  Ct.  211),  59. 

United  States  Ex.  Co.  v.  State  (164  Ind.  196,  73  N.  E.  101),  8. 
United  States  Fire    Escape    Co.    v.    Joseph    Halstead    Co.     (195    Fed. 
295),  486. 

United  States  Leather  Co.   v.    S.   R.    Co.    (21   I.   C.   C.    323),    105,    392, 

399. 
United  States  Securities   Co.   v.   Amalgamated   Copper   Co.,    (232    Fed. 

574,  140  C.  C.  A.  532),  492. 
United  States   Tel.   Co.  v.  Central   Union  Tel.   Co.    (171   Fed.    130,   202 

Fed.  66,  122  C.  C.  A.  86),  486. 
United  States  Tobacco  Co.  v.   American  Tobacco  Co.    (163  Fed.  701), 

486. 
Unrepeated  Message  Case  (44  I.  C.  C.  670),  340. 
Updike  Grain  Co.  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.  (178  Fed.  223,  101  CCA.  583),  168, 

337,  346. 
Utah  Wholesale  Grocery  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  (39  I.  C  C  345)   368. 

V. 
Valley  &  Silez  R.  R.  v.  S.  P.  Co.  (53  1.  C  C  397,  399),  2. 
Valley  Smokelesss  Coal  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  (43  I.  C  C  654)   208. 
Vance  v.  Vandercook  Co.    (170  U.  S.  438,  42  L.  Ed.  1100,  18   Sup.  Ct. 

674),  58. 
Vandalia  R.  Co.  v.  Public  Service  Com.  of  Ind.,    (242  U.  S.  255,  61  L. 

Ed.  270,  37   Sup.   Ct.   93),  22,  31. 
Vandalia  R.  Co.  v.  United   States,    (226   Fed.   713,   141   C   C.   A.   409), 

371. 
Van  Patten  v.  Chicago,  M.  ^  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (74  Fed.  981),  294,  307,  383. 


142  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[Relerences  are  to  Sections.] 

Van  Patten  v.  Chicago,   M.   &   St.   P.   R.   Co.    (81   Fed.    545).   294,   307, 

339,  383. 
Venner  v.  Penn.  Steel  Co.  (250  Fed.  292),  492,  513. 

Venus  V.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  136),  218,  383,  408. 
Verner  v.  N.  Y.  Co.  &  H.  R.  Co.   (158  N.  Y.  S.  602,  94  Misc.  Ref.  671, 

164  N.  Y.   S.  626,  177  App.   Div.  296),   512. 
Victor  Fuel  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   (14  I.  C.  C.  119),  358. 
Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  222),  399. 
Victor  Mfg.  Co.  v.     So.  Ry.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  661),  105,  383. 
Village  of  Goodhue  v.  Chicago  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.    (11  I.  C.  C.   683),  346, 

348. 
Virginia  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (106  Va.  61,  55  S.  E.  572.  7  L.  R.  A. 

(N.  S.),  1086),  442. 
Virginia-Carolina  Chem.  Co.  v.  C.  R.  &  P.  R.  Co.   (18  I.  C.  C.  3),  25^ 
Virginia-Carolina  Chem.  Co.  v.   St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.    (18  L  C.  C. 

1),  96,  253. 
Virginia  Rate  Case   (211  U.  S.  210,  53  L.  Ed.  150,  29  6up.  Ct.  67).  See 

Prentis  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co. 
Virtue   v.    Creamery    Package    Mfg.    Co.    (179    Fed.    115,    102    C.    C.    A. 

413),  486. 
Virtue  v.  Creamery  Package  Mfg.  Co.    (227  U.  S.  8,  57  L.  Ed.  393,  33 

Sup.  Ct.  202),  486. 
Vulcan  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  111.  C.  R.  Co.    (33  I.  C.  C.  52),  174,  175, 

198,  346. 

W. 
Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois    (118  U.  S.   557,  30  L.  Ed.  244, 

1  L  C.  R.  31,  7  Sup.  Ct.  4),  43. 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v|  Sloop  (200  Mo.  198,  98  S.  W.  607),  383. 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  United  States    (178  Fed.  5,  101  C.  C.  A.  133),  481. 
Waco  Freight  Bureau  v.  H.  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.   (19  I.  C.  C.  22),  266. 
Wadley  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Georgia    (235  U.  S.  651,  59  L.  Ed.  405,  35  Sup. 

Ct.   214),    17,   442. 
Wadley  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State   (137  Ga.  497,  73  S.  E.  741),  14.  17. 
Wainright  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.    (253  Fed.  459),  512. 
Wallingford  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (30  I.  C.  C.  19),  383. 
Wall   V.   N.   &  W.   R.   Co.    (52   W.   Va.    485,   44    S.   E.   294,   64   L.   R.   A. 

501),  42. 
Walsh  V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (173  Fed.  694),  293. 
Ware-Kramer  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Am.  Tob.  Co.   (178  Fed.  117),  492. 
Ware-Kramer  Tob.  Co.  v.  Am.  Tob.    (180  Fed.  160),  486. 
Warnock  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.    (21  I.  C.  C.  546),  266. 
Warren  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  381),  339,  486. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  143 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  147),  210,  383. 

387,  392,  394,  395,  406. 
Warreu  Webster  &  Co.  v.  P.  S.  R.  Ry.  Co.   (38  I.  C.  C.  499),  161. 
Washington  &  0.  D.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Royster  Guano  Co.    (122  Va.   397,  90, 

94  S.  E.  963),  12. 
Washington  Milling  Co.  v.  N.  &  W.  R.  Co.   (27  I.  C.  C.  546),  117. 

546),  117. 
Wasteful  Service  By  Tap  Lines,   (53  L  C.  C  656),  170. 
Waterhouse   v.    Conner    (55    Fed.    149,   19    L.   R.   A.    403,    1    Fed.   Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  119), 384,  486.     . 
Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas  (48  Civ.  App.  163,  106  S.  W.  918),  486. 
Waters-Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas  (212  U.  S.  86,  53  L.  Ed.  417,  29  Sup.  Ct. 

220),  486. 
Water-Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  United  States   (222  Fed.  69,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ). 

371. 
Watson  v.  Sutherland  (5  Wall  74,  72  U.  S.  74,  18  L.  Ed.  580),  303. 
Waxelbaum  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.   (12  I.  C.  C.  178),  346. 
Wayman  v.  Southard   (10  Wheat.  23  U.  S.  1,  6  L.  Ed.  253   ),  54. 
Weber  v.  Freed,    (239  U.  S.  325,  60  L.  Ed.  308,  36   Sup.  Ct.  131,  Ann. 

Cas.  1916  C  317),  2. 
Weber   Club  Intermountain  Fair  Asso.   v.   O.   S.   L.  R.   Co.    (17   I.   C. 

C.  212),  442. 
Webster  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Cassatt   (207  U.  S.  181,  52  L.  Ed.  160,  2S 

Sup.  Ct.  108),  335. 
Webster  Grocery  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  493),  lYi. 
Webster  Grocery  Co.  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  20),  214. 
Weeks  v.   United   States    (232   U.   S.   383,   58   L.  Ed.   652,   34    Sup.    Ct. 

341),  310. 

Weeks   v.   United    States    (245   U.   S.    618,   02   L.   Ed.   513,   38   Sup.    Ct. 

219),  58. 
V.'eems    Steamboat    Co.    v.    Peoples's    Co.    (214    U.    S.    345,    53    L.    Ed. 

1024,  29  Sup.  Ct.  661),  139,  327,  346. 
Weil  V.  Penn.  R.  Co.   (11  1.  C.  C.  627),  181,  346. 
Weinman   v.    De   Palma    (232    U.    S.    571,    58    L.   Ed.   733,   34    Sup.    Ct. 

370),  208. 
Weisert  Bros.  Tobacco  Co.  v.  Am.  Tob.  Co.    (163  Fed.  712),  486. 
Weleekta  Light  &  Water  Co.  v.  Ft.  S.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (12  I.  C.  C.  503), 

344. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Cuneo   (241  Fed.  726,  730),  182,  346a,  358. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Neiman-Marcus  Co.    (227  U.  S.  469,   57  L.  Ed. 

600,  33  Sup.  Ct.  267,  125  S.  W.  614),  295,  439. 


144  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Wells-Fargo  Ex.   Co.  v.  United   States    (212  U.   S.   522,   53   L.   Ed.   63E^, 

29   Sup.  Ct.   315),   346. 
Wellington  Mines  Co.  v.  C.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  202),  99a. 
Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  Co.  (19  I.  C.  C.  487),  117 
Wenon  v.  Missouri  (91  U.  S.  275,  23  L.  Ed.  347),  3,  29. 
Werner  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  111.  C.  R.  Co.  (17  I.  C.  C.  388),  218. 
West   Chicago   St.  R.   Co.  v.   Chicago    (201    U.    S.   506,   50   L.    Ed.    845, 

26  Sup.  Ct.  518),  54. 
West  Coast  Lumber  Mfrs.  Asso.  v.  T.  E.  R.  R.  Co.    (45  I.  C.  C.  227), 

396b. 
West   End   Improvement   Club  v.   O.   &   C.  B.   St.   R.   Co.    (17   I.   C.   C. 

239),  66,  337,  400. 
Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.   Summerour    (138  Ga.   545,  77   S.   E.   802),  25. 
Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  White  Provision  Co.   (—  Ga.  — ,  82  S.  E.  644;, 

405. 

Western  Cement  Rates    (48  I.  C.  C.  201),  99. 

Western  Classification   (25  I.  C.  C.  442),  81,  88,  90,  161,  162,  341. 

Western  Gro.  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.    (40  I.  C.  C.  53),  207. 

Western    New    York    &    P.    R.    Co.    v.    Penn    Refining    Co.     (137    Fed. 

343,  70  C.  C.  A.  23),  317,  335,  383,  389  406,  407. 
Western  New  York  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Penn.  Refining  Co.    (208  U.  S.  208, 

52  L.  Ed.  456,  28  Sup.  Ct.  268),  317,  335. 
Western  Oregon  Lumber  Mfrs.  Asso.  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.    (14  I.  C.  C.  61), 

101,  222,  395. 
Western  P.  R.  Co.  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.  (55  I.  C.  C.  71),  196. 
Western  Rate  Advance  Case  1915    (35  I.  C.  C.  497).  81,  82,  88,  91,  99, 

113,  115,  163,  233,  259,  260,  398. 
Western  Transit  Co.   v.   Leslie   &  Co.    (242    U.   S.   448,    61   L.   Ed.    423, 

37  Sup.  Ct.  133),  41. 
Western  Trunk  Line  Rules  (34  I.  C.  C.  554),  161,  341. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Boegli   (250  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup. 

Ct.  — ),  340. 
Western   Union   Tel.   Co.   v.    Call    Pup.    Co.    (181    U.    S.    92,   45   L.    Ed. 

765,  21   Sup.  Ct.  561),  61,  62,  64,   128,   133,  339,  346,  383. 
Western  Union  Tel.   Co.  v.   Chiles    (214   U.   S.   274,   53   L.   Ed.   994,   29 

Sup.  Ct.  613),  28. 
Western   Union  Tel.   Co.   v.    Commercial   Milling   Co.    (218    U.    S.    403, 

54  L.  Ed.  1088,  31  Sup.  Ct.  59),  2,  28. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Compton  (Ark.)    (169  S.  W.  946),  340. 
Western   Union   Tel.   Co.   v.  Crovo    (220   U.   S.   364,   55   L.  Ed.   498,   31 

Sup.  Ct.  399),  2,  28. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  145 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Western    Union   Tel.   Co.   v.   First   Nat.   Bank   of   Berryville    (83.   S.   E. 
424),    340. 

Western  Union  Tei.  Co.  v.  Foster    (247  U.   S.  105,   62  L.  Ed.   lOOG,  38 

Sup.  Ct.  438),  2. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  James    (162  U.   S.   650,  40   L.  Ed.   1105,   16 

Sup.  Ct.  934),  3,  5,  28. 
Western  Union   Tel.    Co.   v.   Kansas    (216    U.    S.   1,    54   L.    Ed.    355,   30 

Sup.  Ct.  190),  8,   59. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Pendleton    (122  U.  S.  347,   30  L.  Ed.   1187. 

7  Sup.  Ct.  1126),  2,  28. 
Western   Union   Tel.    Co.   v.   Penn.    R.   Co.    (195    U.    S.    540,    49    L.   Ed. 

312,  25  Sup.  Ct.  133,  1  Ann.  Cas.  517),  7. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Texas  (105  U.  S.  460,  20  L.  Ed.  1067),  2. 
Westheimer  v.  Weisman  (8  Kan.  App.  78,  54  Pac.  332),  58. 
Westinghouse   Air   Brake   Co.    v.    Great   N.    Ry.   Co.    (88    Fed.    258,    31 

C.  C.  A.  525),  307. 
Westport  Stone  Co.  Industrial  Case   (38  I.  C.  C.  316),  171. 
West  Virginia  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States    (134   Fed.   198,   67  C.   C.  A. 

220),  175.  445. 
Weyl-Zuckerman  Co.  v.  C.  M.  R.  Co.  (27  I.  C.  C.  493),  402. 
Weyman-Bruten  Co.  v.  Old  Indian  Snuff  Mills   (197  Fed.  1075),  486. 
Wharfage  Facilities  Pensacola   (27  I.  C.  C.  252),  375. 
Wharton  Steel  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (25  I.  C.  C.  303),  398. 
Wheat  Rates  From  Oklahoma  (30  I.  C.  C.  93),  91. 
Wheeler  Lumber   Bridge   &   Sup.   Co.   v.   A.   &   C.   R.   Co.    (20   I.   C.   C. 

10),  207. 
Wheeler  Lumber   Bridge   Supply  Co.   v.   A.   T.   &   S.    F.    R.    Co.    (30    1. 

C.  C.  343),  121. 
Wheeler-Stenzel    Co.    v.    National    Window    Glass    Jobbers'    Asso.    (152 

Fed.  864,  81  C.  C.  A.  658),  492. 
Whitcomb  v.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  27),  89. 
White  V.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.   (3  I.  C.  C.  281,  2  I.  C.  R.  641),  392. 
White  V.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  (33  I.  C.  C.  500),  335,  340. 
White  Bros.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.   (17  I.  C.  C.  288),  117. 
White    Dental    Mfj,-.    Co.    v.    Mass.    (212    Mass.    35,   98    N.    E.    1056,    28 

Am.  St.  2,  Ann.  Cas.  805),  59. 
Whiteland  Canning  Co.  v.  P.  C.   C.  &  St.     L.R.  Co.    (23  I.  C.  C.  92), 

254. 
Whitewell   v.    Continental    Tob.    Co.    (125   Fed.    454,    60   C.    C.   A.    290, 

64  L.  R.  A.  689,  2  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  271),  487,  492. 
Wholesale   Fruit  &  Producers'   Asso.   v.    Atchison,   T.   &   S.    F.    R.    Co. 

(14  I.  C.  C.  410),  111,  395. 


146  Table  of  Cases   Cited. 

[References  are  to   Sections.] 

Wichita   Board   of  Trade  v.  A.   T.   &  S.   F.  R.   Co.    (25   I.   C.   C.   625), 
398. 

Wichita  Falls  System  Joint  Coal  Rates  (26  I.  C.  C.  215),  838,  346,  400. 

Wickwire  Steel  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  Co.   (30  I.  C.  C.  415),  392,  398. 

Wight  V.   United    States    (167   U.    S.    512,   42   L.   Ed.    258,   17    Sup.   Ct. 

822),  13,  137,  139,  345. 
Wilcox  V.  Consolidated  Gas.  Co.   (212  U.  S.  19,  53  L.  Ed.  382,  29  Sup. 

Ct.  192,  15  Am.  Cas.  1034),  47,  49,  50,  82. 
Wiley  V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.    (227  Fed.  127),  342. 
Wilhoit  V.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  (12  I.  C.  C.  138),  339. 
Wilkes  &  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  Ry.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  447),  208. 
Wilkes-Barre   v.    Spring    Brook    Water    Co.    (4    Lack.    Pa.    Leg.    News 

367),  46. 
Williamette   Valley   Lumbermen's   Asso.    v.    So.    Pac.   Co.    (51    I.   C.    C. 

250),  480d. 
Williams    v.    Talladega    (226    U.    S.    404,    57    L.    Ed.    275,    33    Sup.    Ct. 

116),  7. 
Williams  Co.  v.  H.  &  N.  Y.  T.  Co.   (48  I.  C.  C.  269),  34a,  440. 
Willson  V.  Rock  Creek  Ry.  Co.   (7  L  C.  C.  83),  66,  335,  345. 
Wilmington   Tariff   Asso.    v.    Cincinnati,    Portsmouth,    etc.,    R.    Co.    (9 

I.  C.  C.  118),  346,  348. 
Wilmington   Trans.   Co.   v.   R.   R.   Com.    of   Calif.    (236    U.    S.    151,    59 

L.  Ed.  508,  35  Sup.  Ct.  276),  53,  55. 
Wilson  V.  Blackbird  Creek  Marsh  Co.    (2   Pet.  27   U.  S.  245,  7  L.  Ed, 

412),  54. 
Wilson  V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  549),  383. 
Wilson  V.  New   (243  U.  S.  332,  61  L.  Ed.  755,  37  Sup.  Ct.  298),  2,  63a, 

331. 
Wilson  V.  P.  &  R.  Co.   (50  I.  C.  C.  571),  205. 
Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (14  I.  C.  C.  170),  10,  25. 
Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (16  L  C.  C.  116),  25. 
Wilson  V.  United   States    (221   U.   S.  361,   55  L.   Ed.  771,   31   Sup.   Ct. 

538),  311. 
Winchester   &    Strasburg   R.    Co.    et    al.    v.    Commonwealth    (106    Va. 

264,  55  S.  B.  692),  63. 
Windsor  Turned  Goods  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (18  I.  C.  C.  162),  117,  209. 
Winona  &  St.  Paul  R.  Co.  v.  Blake   (94  U.  S.  180,  24  L  .Ed.  99),  45. 
Winona  Carriage  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co.  (18  1.  C.  C.  334),  117. 
Winsor  Coal  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  (52  Fed.  716),  3  3. 
Winters    Metallic    Paint    Co.    v.    C.    M.    &   St.   P.    R.    Co.    (16    I.    C.    C. 

687),  192,  344. 


Table  of  Cases  Cited.  147 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Wisconsin  &  Ark.  Lumber  Co.  v.   St.  L.   I.  M.  &  S.  R.   Co.    (3?  I.   C. 

C.  33),  346. 
Wisconsin  Cent.  RJ^   Co.   v.   United   States    (169   Fed.   76,   94   C.   C.   A. 

444),  371,  481. 
Wisconsin  M.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Jacobson  (71  Minn.  519),  49. 
V\^isconsin   M.   &   P.    Co.    v.   Jacobson    (179   U.    S.   287,   45   L.    Ed.    194, 

21  Sup.  Ct.  115),  13,  14,  49,  148,  316,  344,  S96. 
Wisconsin  State  Millers'  Asso.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.    (23   I.  C.   C. 

494),  399. 

Wisconsin  Steel  Co.  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.  (27  L  C.  C.  152),  99. 

Wisewall,  The  Chas.  E.  (74  Fed.  802,  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  608),  486. 

Wisewall,  The  Charles  E.  (86  Fed.  671,  30  CCA.  339,  1  Fed.  Anti- 
Trust  Dec.  850),  486. 

Wistar,  Underbill  &  Nixon  v.  C.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  (4a  L  C.  C.  254).  400. 

Wolverhampton  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (43  L. 
J.  Ch.  131,  L.  R.  16,  Eq.  433),  304. 

Wood  V.  Vandalia  R.  Co.  (231  U.  S.  1,  58  L.  Ed.  97,  34  Sup.  Ct.  7),  45.  84. 

Woodward-Bennett  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  F.  R.  Co.  (29  I.  C.  C.  664),  116. 

Woodward  &  D.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.   (15  I.  C.  C.  170),  218,  383. 

Woolson  Spice  Co.  v.  P.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  583),  141. 

Worcester  Excursion  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (3  L  C.  C.  577,  1  I.  C.  R. 
811,  2  I.  C.  R.  12,  792),  197,  345. 

Workingman's  Amal.  Council  v.  United  States  (57  Fed.  85,  6  C.  C. 
A.  258,  1  Fed.  Anti  Trust  Dec.  184),  489. 

Vv?orn  V.  B.  &  L.  R.  Co.   (32  I.  C.  C.  58),  383. 

Wright  Wire  Co.  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.  (21  I.  C.  C.  64),  244,  348. 

Wrigley  v.  Cleveland,  etc.,  R.  Co.   (10  I.  C.  C.  412),  345. 

Wyeth  Hdw.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  (39  I.  C.  C.  697),  156. 

Wylie  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.   (11  I.  C.  C.  145),  335,  337. 


Yawmann  &  Erbe  Mfg.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  (15  I.  C.  C.  260),  81. 
Yazoo   &  M.   V.   R.   Co.   v.   Greenwood   Grocery   Co.    (227   U.    S.   1,   57 

L.  Ed.  389,  33  Sup.  Ct.  213,  96  Miss.  403,  51  So.  450),  25. 
Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  V.  Jackson  Vinegar  Co.    (226  U.   S.  217,  57   L. 

Ed.  193,  33  Sup.  Ct.  40),  34,  45. 
Yazoo   &   M.   V.   R.   Co.   v.   Keystone   Lumber    Co.    (90   Miss.    391,    43 

So.  605),  25. 
Yellow  Taxicab  Co.  v.  Gaynor  (82  Misc.  R.  94,  143  N.  Y.  Sup.  279),  25. 
York  Mfg.  Co.  V.  I.  C.  R.  Co.  (3  Wall.,  70  U.  S.  107,  18  L.  Ed.  170),  34, 

60,  63,  453. 


148  Table  of  Cases  Cited. 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

Young,  Ex  parte   (209  U.  S.  123,  52  L.  Ed.  714,  28  Sup.  Ct.  441).  50, 
35,  40. 

Z. 

Zakonaite  v.  Wolf   (22G  U.  S.  272,  57  L.  Ed.  218,  33  Sup.  Ct.  31),  316, 

396. 
Zeterberg  v.  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (117  Minn.  495,  136  N.  W.  295),  25. 


Shippers  and  Carriers  of  Interstate  and 
Intrastate  Freight 


CHAPTER  I. 


STATE  REGULATION  OF  CARRIERS   ENGAGED  IN  INTERSTATE 

COMMERCE. 

§     1.  Scope  of  Chapter. 

2.  Interstate  Commerce  Defined. 

3.  Power  of  Congress  Exclusive,  When. 

4.  Power  of  the  States  Indirectly  to  Affect  Interstate  Commerce. 

5.  Commerce   Exclusively   Within   the   Control   of  the   States. 

6.  Ail  Commerce  Subject  to  Regulation. 

7.  Eminent  Domain. 

8.  States  May   Establish   ]\leans   for  Interstate  Transportation. 

9.  Regulation  of  Facilities — Depots. 

10.  Regulation  of  Facilities — Terminal  Roads. 

11.  State  Laws  Forbidding  the  Consolidation  of  Competing  Carriers. 

12.  Regulation  of  Facilities — Spur  Tracks. 

13.  Requiring  Physical  Connections  Between  Carriers. 

14.  Delivery  over  Connecting  Tracks. 

15.  Regulating  Crossings. 

16.  Elevator  Charges. 

17.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. 

18.  Regulation  of  the  ^Movement  of  Trains.     Sunday  Law. 

19.  Same  Subject.     Requiring  the  Operation  of  a  Particular  Train. 

20.  Same  Subject.     Speed  of  Trains. 

21.  Requirement  That  Trains  Shall  Stop  at  Particular  Stations. 

22.  State   Regulation   of  Carriers   and   Their  Employees. 

23.  Blowing  Whistle  and  Checking  Speed  at  Crossings. 

24.  Furnishing  Cars  for  the  Receipt  and  Delivery  of  Shipments. 

25.  Same   Subject.     Rule   Since    Hepburn   Act. 

26.  Same  Subject.     Rule  Established. 

27.  Requirements  as  to  Accounting  and  Reports. 

28.  Transmission  and  Delivery  of  Telegraph  and  Telephone  Messages. 

29.  Separate  Coach  Laws. 

30.  Posting  Time  of  Trains. 

31.  Laws  to  Promote  the  Security  and  Comfort  of  Passengers. 

32.  Laws  Limiting  or  Enlarging  the  Common  Liability  of  Carriers. 

33.  Same  Subject.     Liability  to  Employees. 

34.  Same  Subject.     Liability  for  Loss  or  Damage  to  Shipments. 
34a.  Same    Subject.     Amendment    1920. 

35.  Penalties  for  Failure  to  Pay  Claim. 

36.  Requiring  Railroads  to  Perform  Transportation  Service. 

149 


150  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  1 

37.  Sale  and  Regulation  of  Passenger  Tickets. 

38.  Same   Subject.     Mileage   Books. 

39.  Free  Transportation. 

40.  Routing  Freight. 

41.  When  Interstate  Transportation  Begins  and  Ends. 

42.  Attachments  and  Garnishments. 

43.  Rates. 

44.  Intrastate  Rates  Which  Affect  Interstate  Races. 

45.  Limitations  on  the  Power  of  States  to  Regulate  Intrastate  Rates. 
iC>.  Property  Basis  for  Returns. 

47.  When  Does  a  Rate  Violate  Rights  under  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 

ment ? 

48.  Rates.     Evidence  That  a  Rate  Is  Confiscatory.     Rates  on  a  Few 

Commodities. 

49.  Same  Subject.     Relative  Cost  of  Different  Kinds  of  Transporta- 

tion. 

50.  Testing   a   Rate   by   Use    to    Determine   Whether    or    Not    It    Is 

Confiscatory. 

51.  Issuance  of  Stocks  and  Bonds. 

52.  Long  and  Short  Haul. 

53.  Ferries. 

54.  Bridges. 

55.  Regulating  Charges  for  Transportation   by  Water. 

56.  Regulating  Pilotage,  Ports,   Harbors  and  Vessels. 

57.  Boards  of  Trade  and  Exchanges. 

58.  Inspection.     Quarantine,  Game,  Food,  Liquor,  and  Lottery  Laws. 

59.  Taxation,  Including  License  Taxes. 

60.  Procedure  to  Test  the  Validity  of  State  Regulations. 

§  1.  Scope  of  Chapter. — Pavagrapli  3,  section  8,  Article  1, 
of  the  Constitutiori  of  the  Ignited  States  contains  the  grant  of 
power  to  Congress  over  interstate  commerce  and  gives  Con- 
gress the  power  "to  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations, 
among  the  several  states,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes." 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  book  to  treat  of  the  subject  of  in- 
terstate commerce  in  its  widest  scope,  the  work  being  confined 
to  a  discussion  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  shippers  and  carriers. 
To  determine  what  these  rights  and  duties  are  it  is  necessary  to 
discuss  what  is  interstate  commerce,  when  a  carrier  is  engaged 
therein,  and  to  what  regulations  an  interstate  carrier  is  subject. 
That  such  carrier  may,  as  to  that  portion  of  its  business  which 
is  within  a  particular  state,  be  subjected  to  some  state  regula- 
tion is,  under  the  present  laws  of  Congress,  indisputable.  The 
extent  of  this  regulation  by  the  state  is  the  subject  of  this 
chapter. 


<§  2]  Engaged  in  Interstate  Commeece.  151 

It  may  be  said,  as  a  general  rule,  that  the  proper  state 
authorities,  duly  acting,  may  pass  all  reasonable  laws  for  the 
regulation  of  the  health,  happiness  and  safety  of  its  citizens; 
and  such  laws  and  regulatio;is  are  not  invalid  merely  because 
they  may  incidentally  affect  interstate  commerce.  It  may  be 
further  stated  that  the  mere  existence  of  power  in  Congress 
to  regulate  interstate  commerce  does  not  exclude  the  states 
from  the  exercise  of  power  over  such  commerce.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  congressional  legislation,  or  in  the  absence  of 
action  b.y  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  where 
the  matter  has  been  delegated  to  it,  states  may  indirectly 
legislate  affecting  interstate  commerce. 

§  2.  Interstate  Commerce  Defined. — Interstate  commerce, 
as  defined  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  is  com- 
merce "among  the  several  states,"  but  the  Constitution  does 
not  define  commerce.  What  "commerce"  includes  cannot 
be  definitely  stated  or  limited.  Its  primary  meaning  is  traffic, 
purchase  and  sale,  but  it  means  also  intercourse,  interchange 
or  mutual  exchange  of  commodities.  It  includes  the  carrying 
by  independent  carriers  of  things  or  commodities  which  are 
ordinarily  the  subject  of  traffic  and  which  have  in  themselves 
a  recognized  value  in  money.  This  intercourse  includes  all 
the  preliminary,  intervening  and  consummating  acts,  instru- 
mentalities and  dealings  that  bring  about  the  sale  or  exchange 
of  commodities.  It  embraces  transportation  by  land  and 
water  and  the  means  and  appliances  necessary  thereto,  in- 
cluding transportation  of  persons  and  property.^ 

Products  of  farm,  mine,  forest  or  factory  can  not  be  said 
to  have  entered  the  field  of  interstate  commerce  until  ac- 
tually launched  on  the  way  to  another  state  or  committed  to 
a  carrier  for  transportation  to  such  state. ^     The  sale  of  such 

1.     Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9  Wheat,  fied  and  subject  discussed,  Swift  & 

1,  22  U.  S.  1,  6  L.  Ed.  23   (1824);  Co.    v.    United    States,    196    U.    S. 

Lottery  case,  Champion  V.  Ames,  375,  49  L.  Ed.  518,  25  Sup.  Ct.  276. 

188  U.  S.  321,  345,  47  L.  Ed.  492,  For   a    discussion    of   what    trans- 

23  Sup.  Ct.  321;  Simpson  et  al,  R.  poration    is    included    within    the 

R.  Com.  of  Minnesota  v.  Shepard  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate 

("Minnesota  Rate  Cases")   230  U.  Commerce,  see,  post,  Sec.  67. 
S.  352,  57  L.  Ed.  1511.  33  Sup.  Ct.  2.  McCluskey     v.     Marysville    &. 

729,  and  cases  cited;  United  States  N.  R.  Co.  243  U.  S.  36,  61  L.  Ed. 

V.  Swift  &  Co.,  122  Fed.  529,  Modi-  578;  37  Sup.  Ct.  374,  quoting  from 


152  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  2 

products  and  their  delivery  to  the  purchaser  free  on  board  ears 
in  the  state  of  primary  production  for  transmission  to  another 
state  is  equivalent  to  a  committment  to  a  carrier  and  con- 
stitutes the  transaction  one  of  interstate  commerce/  The 
Supreme  Court'  in  holding  that  the  transmission  of  information 
by  telegraph  was  interstate  commerce  stated  as  a  principle  to 
be  applied:  "Practice,  intent  and  the  typical  course,  not  title 
or  niceties  of  form,  were  recognized  as  determining  the  char- 
acter" of  any  particular  transaction. 

A  transaction  not  itself  within  the  meaning  of  the  term 
interstate  commerce  may  be  regulated  by  Congress  under  the 
commerce  clause.  This  on  the  principle  that  Congress  has 
the  power  to  protect  interstate  commerce  from  burdens, 
although  the  thing  which  causes  the  burden  is  not  such  com- 
merce.* 

The  transmission  of  intelligence  by  telegraph  or  telephone 
is  an  agency  of  commerce  and  intercommunication.  The 
powers  of  Congress  over  interstate  commerce  must  "keep 
pace  with  the  progress  of  the  country,  and  adapt  themselves 
to   the   new    development   of   time   and    circumstances,*     The 

The  Daniel  Ball,  10  Wall  557,  19  L.  3.      Penn.    R.    Co.    v.    Sonman 

Ed.  999  and  Coe  v.  Errol  116  U.  S.  Shaft  Coal  Co.,  242  U.  S    120,   61 

517,     29     Led.     715,     6     Sup.     Ct.  L.  Ed.  188,  37  Suj;,.  Ct.  4G. 

475.     In  the     Daniel     Ball     "com-  4.      Western   Union    Tel.    Co.    v. 

mon"     was  used     before     carrier,  Foster,    247   U.   S.   105,   6:L    L.   Ed. 

but      it      is      not     believed      that  1006;    38    Sup.    Ct.    i.lS     See    also 

such  a  restriction  is  legally  sound.  Valley  and  Siletz  R.  R.  v.  S.  P.  Co. 

In   U.    S.   V.   Burch   226   Fed.   974,  53  I.  C.  C.  397.  P9:). 

975     District    Judge     Dooling     in  5.     Houston  E    &  W.  T.  R.  Co. 

holding  that  taking  a  woman    in  v.    United    States,    234    U.    S.    342, 

an  automobile  across  a  state  line  58    L.    Ed.    1341,   34   Sup.   Ct.    833. 

was     interstate     commerce     said:  This    principle     seemingly     appli- 

"Interstate     commerce     then     is,  cable,     (See     article     by     present 

among  other  things,  the  passage  of  writer   Case  and   Comment   April, 

persons     or     property     from     one  1917,  P.   906)    was  disregarded  in 

state  to  another.  It  does  not  nee-  the  Child  Labor  Case,  Hammer  v. 

essarily,  or  indeed  at  all,  involve  Dagenhart,  247  U.  S.  251,  62  L.  Ed. 

the  idea  of  a  common   carrier,  or  1101,  38  Sup.  Ct.  529,  3  A.  L.  R. 

the  payment  of  freight   or   ii.re".  649. 

This  rule  was  applied  to  tht  Tran-  6.     Pensacola  Tel.  Co.   v.  West- 

sportation  of    liquors.    Ex    parte,  ern  Union  Tel.  Co.,  96  U.  S.  1,  9; 

Westbrook  250  Fed.  636.  24  L.  Ed.  708;  Western  Union  Tel. 

Co.  v.  Texas,  105  U.  S.  460,  26  L. 


§  3] 


Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commeece. 


decisions  in  the  White  Slave  cases'  are  but  an  adaptation  to 
nuKlern  day  developmertf,  of  the  principles  stdted  in  Gibbons 
V.  Ogden,  Note  1  Supra. 

The  importation  of  films  showing  a  prize  fight  and  the 
transportation  tliereof  in  interstate  commerce  may  be  pre- 
vented imtler  the  eoniniet-cc  claiisps". 

§  3.  Power  of  Congress  Exclusive,  When. — Congress  alone 
has  power  directly  to  regulate  or  burden  interstate  commerce, 
and  as  to  svu-h  direct  burden  or  regulation  the  power  of  Con- 
gress is  plenary,  all  pei'vading,  exclusive  and  indivisible.     In 


Ed.  1067;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Pendleton,  122  U.  S.  347,  30  L. 
Ed.  1187,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1126;  teaching 
by  correspondence  schools  com- 
merce, International  Text  Book 
Co.  V.  Lynch,  81  Vt.  101,  69  Atl. 
541.  Shoemaker  v.  Chesapeake  & 
Potomac  Tel.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  614; 
regulation  by  interstate  commerce 
commission  of  an  interstate  tele- 
phone line;  Postal  Tel.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Mobile,  179  Fed.  955,  960;  "Tele- 
graph business  is  commerce." 
Messages  passing  from  one  state  to 
another  Is  interstate  commerce 
and  subject  to  Federal  and  free 
from  state  regulations,  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co..  v.  Crovo,  220  U.  S. 
364,  55  L.  Ed.  498,  31  Sup.  Ct.  399; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Commer- 
cial Milling  Co.,  218  U.  S.  406,  54 
L.  Ed.  1088,  31  Sup.  Ct.  59,  Affirm- 
ing Commercial  Milling  Com- 
pany V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co., 
151  Mich.  425,  115  N.  W.  698.  In- 
surance is  not  commerce,  New 
York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Deer  Lodge 
County,  231  U.  S.  495,  58  L.  Ed. 
332,  34  Sup.  Ct.  167  and  cases 
cited.  Wages  of  railroad  em- 
ployees are  within  the  regulatory 
power  granted  by  the  Commerce 
Clause.  Wilson  v.  >New  243  U.  S. 
332,  61  L.  Ed.  755,  .37  Sup.  Ct.  298. 


Other  illustrations  are:  Contracts 
for  vaudeville  artists  who  travel 
and  transport  their  necessary 
equipment  ami;ng  the  states, 
Marienelli  v.  U.  S.  Booking  Offices, 
227  Fed.  165;  Piping  gas  from  one 
state  to  another,  Landon  v.  Public 
Utilities  Co.  of  Kansas,  242  Fed. 
658;  printing,  publishing  and  dis- 
tributing a  newspaper  among  the 
states.  Post  Printing  &  Pub.  Co., 
V.  Brewster,  146  Fed.  321. 

7.  Hoke  V.  United  States,  227 
U.  S.  308,  57  L.  Ed.  523,  33  Sup.  Ct. 
281,  43  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.),  906,  Ann. 
Cas.  1913E  905;  Athanasaw  v.  Uni- 
ted States,  227  U.  S.  326,  57  L.  Ed. 
528,  33  Sup.  Ct.  285;  Ann.  Cas. 
1913E,  911;  Bennett  v.  United 
States,  227  U.  S.  333,  57  L.  Ed.  531, 
33  Sup.  Ct.  288;  Johnson  v.  United 
States,  215  Fed.  679.  That  a  state, 
Congress  having  acted,  may  not 
forbid  the  importation  of  women 
for  immoral  purposes,  is  held  in 
State  V.  Harper,  48  Mont.  456, 
138  Pac.  495,  51  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.). 
157.  See  also  Caminetti  v.  U.  S. 
242  U.  S.  470,  61  L.  Ed.  442,  :^7  Sup. 
Ct.  192. 

8.  Weber  v.  Freed,  239  U.  S. 
325,  60  L.  Ed.  308,  36  Sup.  Ct.  131, 
Ann.  Cas.  1916C  317;  United 
States  V.  Johnston,  232  Fed   970. 


154  State  Regulation  of  Carrieks.  [^  3 

tlie  absence  of  federal  regulation  interstate  commerce  is  free 
from  direct  regulation.  Says  IVlr.  Justice  Hughes  in  the  Minne- 
sota Rate  Cases :" 

'There  is  no  room  in  our  scheme  of  government  for  the  as- 
sertion of  state  power  in  hostility  to  the  authorized  exercise 
of  federal  power.  The  authority  of  Congress  extends  to  every 
part  of  interstate  commerce,  and  to  every  instrumentality  or 
agency  by  which  it  is  carried  on ;  and  the  full  control  by  Con- 
gress of  the  subjects  committed  to  its  regulation  is  not  to  be 
denied  or  thwarted  by  the  commingling  of  interstate  and  in- 
trastate operations.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  nation  may 
deal  with  the  internal  concerns  of  the  state,  as  such,  but  that 
the  execution  by  Congress  of  its  constitutional  power  to 
regulate  interstate  commerce  is  not  limited  by  the  fact  that 
intrastate  transactions  may  have  become  so  interwoven  there- 
with that  the  effective  government  of  the  former  incidentally 
controls  the  latter.  This  conclusion  necessarily  results  from 
the  supremacy  of  the  national  power  within  its  appointed 
.sphere.  *  *  *  The  grant  in  the  Constitution,  of  its  own 
force,  that  is,  without  action  by  Congress,  established  the  essen- 
tial immunity  of  interstate  commercial  intercourse  from  the 
direct  control  of  the  states  with  respect  to  those  subjects  em- 
braced within  the  grant  which  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  de- 
mand that^  if  regulated  at  all,  their  regulation  should  be  pre- 
scribed by  a  single  authority.  It  has  repeatedly  been  declared 
by  this  court  that  as  to  those  subjects  which  require  a  general 
system  or  uniformity  of  regulation  the  power  of  Congress  is  a 
exclusive. ' ' 

9.     Simpson  et  al.,  R.  R.  Co.  of  States,  222  U.  S.  20,  26,  27,  56  L. 

Minnessota  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  S.  Ed.  72,  32  Sup.  Ct.  2;    Mondou  v. 

352,  399,  57  L.  Ed.  1151,  33  Sup.  Ct.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co., 

729,  citing  McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  223  U.  S.  1,  47,  54,  55,  56  L.  Ed. 

4   Wheat   316,    17   U.   S.,   316,   405,  327,  32   Sup.  Ct.  169,  38  L.  R.  A. 

426,    4    L.    Ed.    579;    The    Daniel  (N.  S.),  44;  Chicago  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 

Ball,  10  Wall,  77  U.  S.  557,  565,  19  Co.  v.  Hardwick  Farmers  Elevator 

L.  Ed.  999;  Smith  v.  Alabama,  124  Co.,  226  U.  S.  426,  57  L.  Ed.  284, 

U.   S.   465,   473,   31   L.   Ed.   508,    8  33  Sup.  Ct.  174;   St.  Louis  I.  M.  & 

Sup.  Ct.  564;  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  Co.  S.   R.   Co.   v.   Edwards,   227   U.   S. 

V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  221  U.  S.  265,  57  L.  Ed.  506,  33  Sup.  Ct.  26; 

612,  618,  G19,  55  L.  Ed.  878,  31  Sup.  Reversing  same  style  case,  94  Ark. 

Ct.   621;    Sou.    Ry.    Co.   v.    United  394,  127  S.  W.  713.  In  McDermott 


<§.  3]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commeece.  155 

The  statement  of  this  rule  in  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co. 
V.  James"  shov>'S  that  as  to  "those  matters  relating,  to  com- 
merce -which  are  not  of  a  nature  to  be  affected  by  locality, 
but  which  necessarily  ought  to  be  the  same  over  the  whole 
country,"  failure  of  Congress  to  act  is  "a  declaration  that 
in  those  respects  commerce  should  be  free  and  unregulated 
b}''  any  statutory  enactment." 

Street  railways  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  cannot  be 
regulated  as  to  their  interstate  rates  by  state  authority."  In 
the  Shreveport  case^"  rates  established  under  authority  of  the 
laws  of  the  state  of  Texas  were  maintained  by  the  carriers 
on  intrastate  traffic,  which  rates  unlawfully  discriminated 
against  interstate  rates  maintained  by  the  same  carriers. 
Fpon  comi")laint  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  it 
was  found  from  the  evidence  of  record  that  such  relationship 
of  rates  resulted  in  undue  preference  and  unjust  discrimina- 
tion, in  violation  of  section  3  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 
Tlie  carriers  defendant  contended  that  the  unlawful  dis- 
eriminati(m,  if  any,  resulted  from  rates  made  under  authority 
of  the  laws  of  Texas,  and  that  such  rates  so  made  were  not 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission. The  contention  of  the  carriers  was  not  adopted,  the 
F^upreme  Court  holding  that  section  3  prohibited  all  unjust 
discrimination,  and  that  the  fact  that  the  discrimination  arose 
from  intrastate  rates  did  not  deprive  Congress  of  the  power 

V.  Wisconsin  22S  U.  S.,  115,  128,  57  nOo;  16  Sup.  Ct.  934,  and  see 
L.  Ed.  754,  33  Sup.  Ct.  431.  it  was  Welton  v.  Missouri,  91  U.  S.  275. 
said,  that  Congress  has  ample  282,  23  L.  Ed.  247;  Hall  v  De 
power  "not  only  to  pass  laws  Cuir,  95  U.  S.  5  Otto  485  24  L 
which  shall  regulate  legitimate  gd.  547:  Mobile  County  v  Kim- 
commerce  among  the  states  and  i^^ll,  102  U.  S.  691,  26  L.  Ed  238; 
with  foreign  nations,  but  has  full  Covington,  etc.,  Bridge  Co.  v.  Ken- 
power  to  keep  the  channels  of  such  tucky,  154  U.  S.  204,  38  L.  Ed. 
commerce  free  from  the  trans-  gg2  14  Sun  Ct  3  087 
portation  of  illicit  or  harmful  arti- 
cles, to  make  suoh  as  are  injurious 
to  the  public  health  outlaws  of 
such   commerce  and   to  bar   them 


11.  South  Covington  Ry.  v.  Cov- 
ington, 235  U.  S.  537,  59  L.  Ed. 
350,  35  Sup.   Ct.   158. 


the  facilities  and  privileges  there-  ^2.    Houston  K.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co. 

of.,  V.    United    States.    234    U.    S.    342, 

10.     Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  ^^  ^-  ^^-   l-^,   1341,  34   Sup.   Ct. 

James,   162   U.    S.   650,    40   L.   Ed.  ^^^'  affirming  Tex.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 


156  State  Regulation  of  Carkiees.  [<^  4 

to  remove  it.  and  that  "in  removing  the  injurious  discrimina- 
tions against  interstate  traffic  *  *  *  Congress  is  not 
bound  to  reduce"  interstate  rates  "below  what  it  may  deem 
to  be  a  proper  standard,  fair  to  the  carrier  and  to  the  public." 
§  4.  Power  of  the  States  Indirectly  to  Affect  Interstate 
Commerce. — That  Congress  alone  may  directly  regulate  or 
burden  interstate  commerce  does  not  mean  that  the  states  may 
not  in  the  absence  of  federal  action  and  under  the  police 
power  of  the  state  pass  regulations  which  may  indirectly 
affect  such  commerce.  AVhere  diversity  of  treatment  is  pos- 
sible, until  Congress  acts  there  is  room  for  state  regulation 
which  may  have  an  indirect  effect  on  interstate  commerce. 
The  power  of  Congress  being  supreme,  when  there  is  federal 
action  state  regulations  are  thereby  superseded.  As  to  all 
external  concerns  Congress  alone  may  act.  As  to  "internal 
concerns  which  affect  the  states  generally,"  ^^  Congress  having 
failed  to  act,  a  state  may  legislate  in  "safeguarding  life  and 
property  and  promoting  comfort  and  convenience  within  its 
jurisdiction,"  although  such  legislation  may  extend  incident- 
ally to  the  operation  of  the  carrier  in  the  conduct  of  interstate 
business."  " 

U.  S.,  205  Fed.  380,  and  sustain-  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  100  Minn, 
ing  order  of  the  commission  in  25,  124  N.  W.  819.  When  Con- 
Railroad  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  L.  S.  gress  acts  prior  state  laws  in  con- 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  L  C.  C.  31.  See  flict  are  superseded,  Northern  Pac. 
also,  Corp.  Com.  of  Okla.  v.  A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State  of  Washington, 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  31  I.  C.  C.  222  U.  S.  370,  56  L.  Ed.  237,  32 
532;  Merchants  Exchange  of  St.  Sup.  Ct.  160;  Barrett  v.  City  of 
Louis  V.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  34  I.  New  York,  232  IJ.  S.  14,  58  L.  Ed. 
C.  C.  341.  483,  34  Sup.  Ct.  203.  The  question 

13.  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9  Wheat,  is  well  discussed  and  properly  de- 
22  U.  S.  1,  6  L.  Ed.  23   (1824).  cided  in  People  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  135 

14.  Simpson  et  al.,  R.  R.,  etc.,  App.  Div.  767,  119  N.  Y.  Supp. 
Com.  of  Minnesota  v.  Shepard,  893;  it  was  there  held  that  the 
("Minnesota  Rate  Cases")  230  U.  fact  that  Congress  had  legislated, 
S.  352,  410,  57  L.  Ed.  1151,  33  although  the  legislation  was  sus- 
Sup.  Ct.  729,  citing  cases;  see  also  pended,  superseded  the  state  law; 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  the  case  was  reversed  on  appeal, 
Hardwick  Farmers'  Elevator  Co.,  although  it  would  seem  that  the 
226  U.  S.  426,  57  L.  Ed.  284;  33  lower  court  correctly  stated  the 
Sup.  Ct.  174,  reversing  Hardwick  law;  People  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  198  N. 
Farmers'  Elevator  Co.  v.  Chicago,  Y.  369,  91  N.  E.  849.  For  an  elabo- 


§  5] 


Engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce. 


157 


In  holding  that  motor  vehicles  could  be  regulated  by  a 
state  although  owned  in  and  licensed  by  another  state,  the 
Supreme  Court  followed  the  principle  above  and  said:  "In 
the  absence  of  National  legislation  covering  the  subject,  a 
State  may  rightfully  prescribe  uniform  regulations  necessary 
for  public  safety  and  order  in  respect  to  the  operation  upon 
its  highways  of  all  motor  vehicles  moving  in  interstate  com- 
ujcrce  as  well  as  others."  ^^ 

§  5.  Commerce  within  the  Exclusive  Control  of  the  States. 
— We  have  seen  that  there  is  a  commerce  over  which  Congress 
has  exclusive  control.  There  is  also  a  commerce  which,  in 
the  absence  of  federal  regulation,  may  be  indirectly  affected 
by  slate  legislation.  There  is  also  a  commerce  which  is  wholly 
intrastate,  the  regulation  of  which  does  not  atfect  directly  or 
indirectly  interstate  commerce.  This  commerce  the  states 
alone  may  regulate.  In  the  Railroad  Commission  cases,"  at 
p.  334.  tlie  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  said: 


rate  discussion,  if  not  a  correct 
conclusion,  see  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Indiana,  179  Ind.  23,  100 
N.  E.  337.  This  case  was  reversed 
because  Congress  had  acted.  So. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Railroad  Com.  of 
Indiana,  236  U.  S.  439,  59  L.  Ed. 
661,   35   Sup.   Ct.   304. 

15.  Hendrick  v.  Maryland,  235 
U.  S.  610,  59  L.  Ed.  385,  35  Sup. 
Ct.  140;  Kane  v.  New  Jersey,  242 
U.  S.  160,  61  L.  Ed.  222,  37  Sup. 
Ct.   30. 

16.  Stone  v.  Farmers  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.,  116  TI.  S.  307,  334,  29 
L.  Ed.  636,  6  Sup.  Ct.  191,  334, 
338.  This  case  was  quoted  with 
approval  in  the  Minnesota  Rate 
Cases,  page  415,  for  which  see 
note  9,  supra.  For  summary  of 
state  legislation,  see  Interstate 
Com.  Com.  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  & 
T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  167  U.  S.  479,  495, 
42  L.  Ed.  243,  17  Sup.  Ct.  896, 
also  cited  at  page  414  of  the  opin- 
ion in  the  Minnesota  Rate  Cases. 


The  classification  of  power  made 
herein  in  sections  3,  4  and  5  is 
made  by  Mr.  Justice  McKenna 
in  Southern  Ry.  v.  Reid,  222  U. 
S.  424,  43-5  56  L.  Ed.  257,  32  Sup. 
Ct.  140,  where  he  said  "Tlie  power 
of  the  state  over  the  general 
subject  of  commerce  has  been 
divided  into  three  classes:  First, 
those  in  which  the  power  of  the 
state  is  exclusive;  Second,  those 
in  which  the  state  may  act 
in  the  absence  of  legislation 
by  Congress;  Third,  those  in 
which  the  action  of  Congress 
is  exclusive  and  the  state 
cannot  act  at  all.''  Covington,  etc.. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Kentucky,  154  U.  S. 
204,  209,  38  L.  Ed.  962,  14  Sup. 
Ct.  1087;  Western  Union  Tele- 
graph Co.  V.  James,  162  U.  S.  650, 
655,  40  L.  Ed.  1105,  16  Sup.  Ct.  934. 
State  V.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  C,  61 
Fla.  799,  54  So.  900;  State  v. 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  56  Fla.  617, 
47  So.  969. 


158  State  Regulation  of  Careiebs.  ['^  5 

"Every  person,  every  corporation,  everything  within  the 
territorial  limits  of  a  state  is,  while  there  subject  to  the  con- 
stitutional authority  of  the  state  government.  Clearly  under 
this  rule  Mississippi  may  govern  this  corporation,  as  it  does 
all  domestic  corporations,  in  respect  to  every  act  and  every- 
thing within  the  state  which  is  the  lawful  subject  of  state 
government.  It  may,  beyond  all  question,  by  the  settled  rule 
of  decision  in  this  court  regulate  freights  and  fares  for  busi- 
ness done  exclusively  within  the  state,  and  it  would  seem  to 
be  a  matter  of  domestic  concern  to  prevent  the  company  from 
discriminating  against  persons  and  places  in  Mississippi.  So 
it  may  m.ake  all  needful  regulations  of  a  police  character  for 
the  government  of  the  company  while  operating  its  road  in 
that  jurisdiction.  In  this  way  it  may  certainly  require  the 
company  to  fence  so  much  of  its  road  as  lies  within  the  state; 
to  stop  its  trains  at  railroad  crossings ;  to  slacken  speed  while 
running  in  a  crowded  thoroughfare ;  to  post  its  tariffs  and 
time-tables  at  proper  places,  and  other  things  of  a  kindred 
character  affecting  the  comfort,  the  convenience,  or  the  safety 
of  those  who  are  entitled  to  look  to  the  state  for  protection 
against  the  wrongful  or  negligent  conduct  of  others." 

In  the  same  case,  at  p.  331,  the  court  showed  that  this 
exclusive  jurisdiction  to  act  does  not  mean  that  the  extent  of 
the  regulation  is  itself  unlimited.  The  court  said:  ''From  what 
has  thus  been  said,  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  this  power  of 
limitation  or  regulation  is  itself  without  limit.  This  power 
to  regulate;  is  not  a  power  to  destroy,  and  limitation  is  not  the 
equivalent  of  confiscation.  Under  pretence  of  regulating  fares 
and  freights  the  state  can  not  require  a  railroad  corporation 
to  carry  persons  or  property  without  reward ;  neither  can  it 
do  that  which  in  law  amounts  to  a  taking  of  private  property 
for  public  use  without  just  compensation  or  without  due 
process  of  law." 

States  may  regulate  the  commerce  within  their  respective 
jurisdictions  by  legislating  directly,  or  they  may,  as  has  been 
done  in  nearly  all  of  the  states,  delegate  to  a  board  or  com- 
mission certain  powers  to  prescribe  rules  and  regulations,  to 
fix  rates  and  to  exercise  a  general  supervision  over  the  cor- 
porations or  persons  within  the  regulative  jurisdiction.  The 
legislative    acts    creating    commissions    and    prescribing   the 


§  6]  Engaged  in  Interstate  Commeece.  159 

powers  and  duties  thereof  must  of  necessity  speak  in  more  or 
less  general  terms,  for  as  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Florida:"  "The  difficulty  of  making  a  specific  enumeration  of 
all  such  powers  as  the  Legislature  may  intend  to  confer  upon 
Railroad  Commissioners  for  the  regulation  of  common  carriers 
in  the  interest  of  the  public  welfare  renders  it  necessary  to 
confer  some  power  in  general  terms ;  and  general  powers  in 
general  terms ;  and  general  powers  given  are  intended  to 
confer  other  powers  than  those  specially  enumerated." 

§  6.  All  Commerce  Subject  to  Regulation. — The  divisions 
showing  where  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  rests  in  the 
different  classes  named  in  the  three  preceding  sections,  as 
said  by  the  Supreme  Court,  "express  but  the  extreme  bound- 
aries of  the  subject."**  More  definite  principles  must  be  ap- 
plied to  particular  cases.  But  in  all  cases  the  power  to 
regulate  rests  somewhere. 

It  must  of  necessity  be  burdensome  to  interstate  carriers  to 
be  subject  to  regulation  by  two  governments  acting  independ- 
ently of  each  other,  and  it  is  frequently  a  difficult  question  to 
determine  which  has  the  power  to  require  a  particular  act  or 
to  make  a  particular  rule.  That  Congress  may  extend  its 
power  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases  and 
the  Shreveport  case,  cited  supra,  and  that  the  extent  of  the 
power  of  Congress  under  the  Constitution  may  include  a 
scope  much  wider  than  has  been  exercised  under  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  and  acts  supplemental  thereto  and  amend- 
atory thereof,  is  shown  by  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court 
under  the  Employers'  Liability  Acts." 

Some  of  the  delicate  and  difficult  questions  which  arise  from 
the  dual  regulation  of  carriers,  appear  from  the  result  of  the 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases. 
Sec.  3  supra.  Duluth.  Minnesota,  and  Superior,  Wisconsin, 
are  about  3  miles  apart,  and  each  is  located  on  Lake  Superior. 
Rates  from  and  to  these  ports  must  of  necessity  be  the  same. 
From  Duluth  to  Minnesota  points  over  one  line  is  an  intra- 

17.  Goods  manufactured  by  child  18.     Southern   Ry.    Co.    v.   Reid, 

labor    could   not    for   that   reason  supra. 

alone  be  denied  shipment  or  sale  19.     Sec.    332,   post.   Mondou   v. 

in   interstate  commerce.  See  note  N.   Y.,   N.   H.    H.    R.   Co.,    Second 

5  supra.  Employers'  Liability  Cases,  223  U. 


160  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  7 

state  inoveiiient ;  over  other  lines  such  movement  is  interstate. 
All  shipment';  from  Superior  to  Minnesota  points  move  inter- 
state. That  the  paramount  authority  of  Congress  may  be  ex- 
ercised, the  regulation  of  rates  from  these  cities,  whether 
interstate  or  intrastate,  must  be  by  national  authority.  Under 
the  decisions  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,  the  Minnesota  rate 
schedule  to  Duluth  intrastate  became  effective.  Higher  rates 
having  been  paid  pending  the  litigation,  shippers  intrastate 
received  a  refund  of  part  of  the  rate  paid  by  them,  and  in 
complaints  before  the  Tnterstale  Commerce  Commission  it 
was  contended  that  the  refunds  paid  on  intrastate  shipments 
should  be  adopted  as  the  measure  of  refunds  on  interstate 
shipments.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  applied  the 
paramount  authority  of  the  national  government  regarding  the 
state,  prescribed  rates  as  a  fact  to  be  considered,  but  deter- 
mined the  question  for  itself.'" 

§  7.  Eminent  Domain. — The  right  of  eminent  domain  is  an 
incident  to  sovereignty.  The  right  has  been  defined  as  the 
power  to  compel  an  owner  to  sell  and  convey  property  when 
the  public  necessities  require."'  The  right  must,  of  course,  be 
exercised  within  constitutional  limits.  The  right  may  be  ex- 
ercised for  a  public  purpose  and  upon  payment  of  a  proper 
compensation,  after  due  process  of  law,  against  the  right  of 
way  of  an  interstate  carrier.  Tt  has  been  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States""  that  the  power  of  eminent  domain 
was  not  surrendered  by  the  states  to  the  United  States  nor 
affected  by  the  federal  Constitution,  except  that  it  must  be 
exercised  in  accordance  with  due  ]iorcess  of  law  upon  pay- 
ment of  compensation.     Tlie  jiower  of  eminent  domain  extends 

S.    1,   56    L.    Ed.   327,   32   Sup.   Ct.  21.    United  States  v.  Jones,  109 

169,  38  L.  R.  A.    ( N.  S.)    44.  U.   S.   513,  27   L.   Ed.   1015,   3   Sup. 

20.     Freight   rates  from   Minne-  Ct.    346;    Cincinnati    v.    Louisville 

sota  points,  32  T.  C.  C.  361.  Rates  &  N.  R.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  390,  56  L. 

on  Beer  and  Other  Malt  Products,  Ed.  481,  32  Sup.  Ct.  267;   Fletcher 

31    I.    C.    C.    544.     Compare    Corp.  v.  Peck,  6  Cranch,  10  U.  S.  87,  3  L. 

Com.  of  Okla.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Ed.  162. 

Co.,   31  I.   C.   C.   532;    Trier  v.   C.  22.     Cincinnati    v.    Louisville    & 

St.  P.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  30  L  C.  C.  N.  R.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  390,  56  L.  Ed. 

352.     Holmes  &  Hallowell  Co.  vs.  481,  32  Sup.  Ct.  267,  and  also  see, 

G.    N.    Ry.    Co.,    37    I.    C.    C.    627.  Western   Union  Tel.   Co.  v.   Penn- 


§  7]  Engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce.  IGi 

to  tanc-ibles  and  intangibles,  including  ehoses  in  action,  con- 
tracts and  charters.  An  appropriation  of  a  contract  under 
the  right  of  eminent  domain,  with  compensation,  neither  chal- 
lenges its  validity  nor  impairs  the  obligation  thereunder.  It 
is  a  taking  of  property,  not  an  impairment  of  an  obligation. 
Every  contract,  whether  between  the  state  and  an  individual 
or  between  individuals  only,  is  subject  to  the  law  of  eminent 
domain,  for  there  enters  into  every  engagement  the  unwritten 
condition  that  it  is  subject  to  appropriation  for  public  use. 

Congress  has  made  all  railroads  governmental  post  roads" 
and  riuthorized  te]egrai)h  companies,  under  certain  conditions, 
to  construct,  maintain  and  operate  lines  thereover."*  These  acts 
alone  gave  no  i-ight  to  telegraph  companies  to  acquire  the  use 
of  the  railroads'  right  of  way,  but  a  state  statute  giving  such 
right  against  the  right  of  way  of  an  interstate  carrier  is  not 
invalid  as  an  attempted  regulation  of  interstate  commerce; 
it  being  the  opinion  of  the  Circuit  Judges  of  the  Sixth  Circuit 
that  "it  was  the  intention  of  Congress  to  leave  to  the  states 
the  question  of  granting  or  withholding  the  right  of  eminent 
domain.""'^  The  right  arising  under  a  state  law  comes  within 
that  division  of  the  state's  powers  which  may  be  exercised 
in  the  absence  of  federal  regulation. 

IMunicipalities  and  states  may  not  regulate  or  tax  messages 
for  the  Federal  government,  nor  deny  telegraph  companies 
whi'-h  have  accepted  the  terms  of  the  Act  of  July  24.  1866 
the  right  to  continue  the  use  of  streets.  Reasonable  local 
regulations  jiot  in  conflict  with  these  principles  and  not  a 
regulation  of  interstate  commerce  are  permitted."" 

sylvania  R.  R.  Co.  et  al.,  195  U.  S.  3579,  3580)).  Cincinnati  v.  Loiiis- 

540,  49  L.  Ed.  312,  25  Sup.  Ct.  133.  ville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  390,  56 

1  Ann.  Cas.  517.  L.  Ed.  481,  32  Sup.  Ct.  267,  West.- 

23.  Acts  June  15,  1866,  c.  124,  14  ern  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Penn.  R. 
Stat.  66  (Rev.  Slat.  Sec.  5258  U.  R.  Co.,  195  U.  S.  540,  49  L.  Ed. 
S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  3565),  and  312,  25  Sup.  Ct.  133,  1  Ann.  Cas. 
Acts  June  8,  1872,  c.  335,  17  Stat.  517. 

308,  209  (Rev.  Stat   Sec.  3964,  U.  S.  25.     Louisville   &    N.    R.    Co.    v. 

Comp.  St.   1901,  p.   2707);    5   Fed.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co..  207  Fed. 

Stat.  Ann.  900.  1.  124  C.  C.  A.  573. 

24.  Acts  July  •'!.  1866,  c.  230,  14  26.  See  also  Williams  v.  Talla- 
Stat.  221  (Rev.  Stat.  Sees.  5263-  dega,  226  U.  S.  404.  57  L.  Ed.  275, 
5269    (U.    S.    Comp.    St.    1901.    pp.  33  Sup.  Ct.  116,  holding  that  the 


1.62  State  Regulation  of  Carriees.  [§  8 

That  tho  United  States  may  exercise  the  power  to  condemn 
land  "whenever  it  is  necessary  or  appropriate  *  *  *  in 
tl^e  execution  of  any  of  the  powers  granted  *  *  *  by  the 
Constitntion,'"'  can  not  he  doubted.  Nor  can  the  state  "by 
action  or  inaction,  prevent,  unreasonably  burden,  discriminate 
against  or  directly  regulate  interstate  commerce  or  the  right 
to  carry  it  on.""'  This  quotation,  read  in  the  light  of  the 
case  in  which  the  language  was  used,  is  a  declaration  that  a 
state,  by  refusing  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  can  not  pro- 
hi])it   interstate   commerce. 

§  8.  States  May  Establish  Means  for  Interstate  Transporta- 
tion. — The  states  may  grant  corporate  franchises,  and  the 
corporations  so  created,  being  authorized  so  to  do  by  the  law 
of  their  creation,  may  engage  in  inter^-tate  transportation. 
Tt  is  also  true  that  a  state  may,  as  a  general  rule,  exclude  a 
coi'poration  of  another  state  from  transacting  ordinary  busi- 
ness not  interstate  commerce,  within  its  limits,  or  permit  the 
engaging  in  such  business  on  terms.  The  state  creating  a  cor- 
poration does  not  confer  thereon  the  right  to  engage  in  inter- 
state commerce,  nor  can  a  state  "exclude  from  its  limits  a 
corporation  engaged  in  such  commerce."""  In  Oklahoma  v. 
Kansas  Natural  Gas  Co.,'"  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  held  invalid  a  law  of  Oklahoma  which  prohibited  a 
corporation  of  another  state  from  engaging  in  the  transporta- 
tion of  oil  from  Oklahoma  in  interstate  commerce.  The  law 
was  sought  to  be  sustained  upon  the  theory  that  it  was  made 
to  "conserve"  the  natural  resources  of  the  state.  In  denying 
the  validity  of  this  contention  the  court  argued  that,  if  Okla- 
homa   could    exercise   such    power,    other   states    might,    and. 

federal    statute    v/as    merely    per-  S.  499,  40  L.  Ed.  510,  16  Sup.  Ct. 

missive    and    citing    cases.    Essex  397. 

v.  New  England  Tel.  Co.  239  U.  S.  28.     Oklahoma,    West,    Attorney 

313,  60  L.  Ed.  301,  36  Sup.  Ct.  102.  General    v.    Kansas    Natural    Gas 

27.    United  States  v.  Gettysburg  Co.,  221  U.  S.  229,  262,  55  L.  Ed. 

Elec.  Ry..  160  U.  S.  668,  679,  40  L.  716,    31    Sup.    Ct.    564;    affirming 

Ed.  576,  16  Sup.  Ct.  427;    Kohl  v.  Haskell    v.    Kansas    Natural    Gas 

United    States.    91    U.    S.    367,    23  Co.,  172  Fed.  545. 

L.    Ed.    449;    Cherokee   Nation    v.  29.    See  note  28  suj)ra.  221  U.  S. 

Kansas  Railway,  135  U.  S.  641,  656,  at  p.  260  and  cases  cited  through- 

34    L.    Ed.    295,    10    Sup.    Ct.    965;  out  opinion. 
Chappell  V.  United  States,  160  U. 


§  9]  Engagkii  in  Interstate  Commerce.  163 

said  the  court,  ''a  complete  annihilation  of  interstate  com- 
merce might  result."  Mr.  Justice  McKenna,  at  p.  261  of  the 
opinion,  quotes  with  approval  these  propositions: 

"No  state  by  the  exercise  of,  or  by  the  refusal  to  exercise, 
any  or  all  of  its  powers,  may  prevent  or  unreasonably  burden 
interstate  commerce  within  its  borders  in  any  sound  article 
thereof. 

"No  state  by  the  exercise  of,  or  by  the  refusal  to  exercise, 
any  or  all  of  its  powers,  may  substantially  discriminate  against 
or  directly  regulate  interstate  commerce  or  the  right  to  carry 
it  on." 

A  corollary  to  this  statement  of  the  law  is,  "that  a  cor- 
poral ion  of  ouf  state  authorized  by  its  charter  to  engage  in 
lawful  commerce  among  the  states  )nay  not  be  prevented  by 
another  state  from  coming  into  its  limits  for  all  the  legitimate 
purposes  of  such  commerce."  '^^  This  is  true  because  the  right 
to  carry  on  interstate  commerce  is  not  a  privilege  granted  by 
a  state  but  is  one  of  the  privileges  of  every  citizen  of  the 
T^nitc'l  States,  "and  the  accession  of  mere  corporate  facilities 

*  *  *  cannot  have  the  effect  of  depriving  them  of  such 
right.  ""^  A  fortiori  Congress  might  create  or  license  a  cor- 
poration to  engage  in  commerce  "among  the  states"  and  no 
state  could  prevent  such  corporation  "from  coming  into  its 
limits  for  all  the  legitimate  purposes  of  such  commerce." 

Non incorporation  does  not  prevent  the  regulation  of  a  com- 
mon carrier.*" 

§  9.  Regulation  of  Facilities — Depots. — The  Acts  of  Con- 
gress    regulating     interstate     commerce    applv    to    "common 

*  *  *  carriers  engaged  in  the  transportation  of  passengers 
or  property     *     *     *     by  railroad.""'     "Railroad"  includes 

30.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  be  excluded  by  a  state  from  do- 
Kansas,  216  U.  i^.  1,  27,  54  L.  Ed.  ing  business  within  its  borders. 
355,  30  Sup.  Ct.  190.  32.    Piatt  v.   Le  Cocq,   150   Fed. 

31.  Buck  Stove  Co.  v.  Vickers,  391,  reversed  on  another  point, 
226  U.  S.  205,  215,  57  L.  Ed.  189,  Piatt  v.  LeCocq,  158  Fed.  723,  85 
33  Sup.  Ct.  41.  See  also,  Mercan-  C.  C.  A.  621,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.), 
tile  Trust  Co.  v.  Tex.  &  P.  Ry.  558;  United  States  Express  Co.  v. 
Co.,  216  Fed.  220— holding  that  State,  164  Ind.  196,  73  N.  E.  101. 
a  railroad  company  incorporated  33.  Sec.  1  Act  to  regulate  Com 
under  an  act  of  Congress  can  not  merce,  post,  Sec.  335. 


164  State  Rkgulation  of  Carriers.  [§  9 

"bridges,  ear  floats,  lighters  and  ferries  *  *  *  and  also 
all  switches,  spurs,  tracks  and  terminal  facilities  of  every 
kind  used  or  necessary  in  the  transportation  of  *  *  *  per- 
sons or  property  *  *  *  and  also  all  freight  depots."^* 
The  act  does  not  apply  to  "transportation  of  passengers  or 
property     *     *     *     wholly  within  one  state." ''^ 

A  station  for  the  accommodation  of  passengers  and  for  the 
receipt  and  delivery  of  freight  is  necessary  both  for  interstate 
and  inti'astate  transportation,  and  generally  such  stations 
serve  the  needs  of  each  class  of  transportation.  It  has  been 
held  that  the  provision  limiting  the  scope  of  the  Acts  of  Con- 
gress regulating  interstate  transportation  applies  to  all  por- 
tions of  the  act ;''"  although  the  limiting  proviso  does  not 
justify  a  state  in  discriminating  against  interstate  commerce."' 

From  this  it  follows  that  there  is  a  field  in  which  the  states 
may  act  in  regulating  carriers,  although  such  carriers  may  be 
engaged  in  both  interstate  and  intrastate  transportation.  The 
boundaries  of  the  respective  powers  of  the  state  and  federal 
governments  are  not  distinctly  marked.  Jt  has  been  said  that 
the  Act  of  Congress,  "excludes  the  right  of  a  state  to  regulate 
*  *  *  the  obligation  of  furnishing  the  means  of  interstate 
transportation."^' 

In  the  Larabee  Mills  case'"  it  was  held  that  the  mere  grant 
by  Congress  of  power  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
does  not,  in  the  absence  of  action  by  the  Commission,  change 
the  rule  that  the  states  "may  regulate  many  matters  which 
indirectly  aifcct  interstate  commerce."  There  is,  as  said  by  Mr. 
Justice  Hughes  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  Cases,'"  an  "interblend- 
ing  of  operations  in  the  conduct  of  interstate  and  local  busi- 

34.  Id.,  Sec.  a37,  iwst.  57  L.  Ed.  284,  33  Sup.  Ct.  174;   St. 

35.  Id.,  Sec.  33o,  post.  Louis   I.   M.   &   S.   Ry.   Co.   v.   Ed- 

36.  Simpson  ei  al.,  R.  R.  Com.  wards,  227  U.  S.  265,  269,  270,  57 
of   Minnesota  v.   Sliepard,   230   U.  L.  Ed.  506,  33  Sup.  Ct.  26. 

S.   352,   432,   433,   57   L.   Ed.    1511,  39.   Missouri  P,ic.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lar- 

33  Sup.  Ct.  729.  abee    Flour    Mills    Co.,    211    U.    S. 

37.  Houston  &  Texas  Railway  v.  612,  623,  53  L.  Ed.  352,  29  Sup. 
U.  S.,  234  U.  S.  342,  58  L.  Ed.  1341,  Ct.    Rep.    214,    affirming    Larabee 

34  Sup.  Ct.  8.3.3.  Flour   Mills   Co.   v.   Missouri   Pac. 

38.  Demurrage    Cases,    Chicago  Ry.,  74  Kan.  808,  88  Pac.  72. 
R.  I.   &  P.   Co.  V.   Hardwick   Far-  40.    Note  36,  SKpra. 
mers  Elevator  Co.,  226  U.  S.  426, 


§  9]  Engaged  IN  Interstate  Oommeece.  16o 

ness  by  interstate  carriers.  *  *  *  The  same  right-of-way, 
terminals,  rails,  bridges,  are  provided  for  both  classes  of  traffic ; 

*  *  *  the  proportion  of  each  sort  of  business  varies  from 
year  to  year  and,  indeed,  from  day  to  day ;  *  *  *  no  divi- 
sion of  tlie  plant,  no  apportionment  of  it  between  interstate 
and  local  traffic,  can  be  made  today  which  will  hold  tomorrow ; 

*  *  *  terminals,  facilities  and  connections  in  one  state  aid 
the  carrier's  entire  business  and  are  an  element  of  value  with  re- 
spect to  the  whole  property  and  the  bnsiness  in  other  states." 
But  notwithstanding  this  is  true,  Congress  has  not  occupied 
the  whole  field,  and  the  states  may  act  so  as  indirectly  to 
affect  interstate  transportation  where,  "congressional  action 
leaves  room  without  a  conflict  for  the  operation  of  the  state 
law  in  the  same  field."" 

A  statute  in  Mississippi  required  railroads  to  "establish 
and  maintain  such  depots  as  shall  be  reasonably  necessary  for 
the  public  convenience."  and  to  "stop  such  of  the  passenger 
and  freight  trains  at  any  depot  as  the  business  and  public 
convenience  shall  require."  The  Railroad  Commission  of  Miss- 
issiiipi  having  ordered  a  carrier  to  stop  an  interstate  train  at 
a  particular  depot,  Mr.  Justice  Peckham  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  [ifter  citing  eases,  said:"  "Upon  the  principle 
decided  in  these  cases,  a  state  railroad  commission  has  the 
right,  undf^r  a  state  statute,  so  far  as  railroads  aro  concerned, 
to  compel  a  company  to  stop  its  train  under  the  circumstances 
already  referred  to,  and  it  may  order  the  stoppage  of  such 
trains  if  the  company  does  not  otherwise  furnish  proper  and 
adequate  accommodation  to  a  particular  locality,  and  in  such 
cases  the  order  may  embrace  a  through  interstate  train  ac- 
tually running  and  compel  it  to  stop  at  a  locality  named. 
In  such  case,  in  the  absence  of  congressional  legislation 
covering  the  subject,  there  is  no  illegal  or  improper  inter- 
ference with  the  interstate  commerce  right."  The  order, 
however,  was  lield  invalid  as  unreasonable. 

A  carrier  may  not  be  compelled  by  mandamus  to  build  a 
station  at  a  particular  place  in  the  absence  of  a  specific  statu- 

41.  LouisviUe  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  .344,  .51  L.  Ed.  209,  27  Sup.  Ct. 
Hughes,  201  Fed.  727,  742.  Rep.    90,    affirming    Illinois    C.    K. 

42.  Mississippi  R.  R.  Com.  v.  Co.  v.  Mississippi  R.  R.  Com., 
Illinois  C.   R.   Co.,   203   U    S.   335,  13S  Fed.  327,  70  C.  C.  A.  617. 


1,66 


State  Regulation  of  Carriees. 


[§  '^ 


tory  duty  so  to  do/'  but  when  the  statute  so  authorizes, 
mandamus  will  lie  to  compel  the  construction  of  a  depot." 
It  may  be  said  that  the  proper  governmental  authority, 
whetJier  legislative  or  administrative,  the  latter  being  by 
statute  authorized,  may  regulate  the  location  and  require 
the  construction  of  depots  and  the  maintenance  of  necessary 
depot  facilities.  Such  regulation  must  in  all  cases  be  reason- 
able and  must  be  made  upon  proper  consideration  of  the 
rights  of  both  the  carriers  and  the  pul)lic.  Whether  such 
regulation  can  be  enforced  by  mandamus  or  by  suits  for  pen- 
alties depends  upon  the  terms  of  the  particular  regulating 
statute.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  has  exercised 
the  right  to  regulate  the  use  of  freight  terminals,*^  and  such 
regulation  is  within  its  statutory  power.  It  would  seem  that 
regulations  as  to  the  construction,  location,  operation  and  main- 
tenance of  depots,  being  regulations  which  can  best  be  made  by 
a  local  tribunal,  are  at  least  in  the  present  state  of  the  federal 
law  and  in  view  of  non-action  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,   within  the   cognizance   of   state  laws  and   state 


43.  Northern  ?ac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Washington  Territory,  142  U.  S. 
4&2,  3.5  L.  Ed.  1092,  12  Sup.  Ct. 
283,  but  see  the  vigorous  dissent 
of  Mr.  Justice  Urewer  concurred 
in  by  Justice  Field  and  Harlan. 
The  majority  opinion  is  sustained 
by  a  well-reasoned  argument 
quoted  from  People  v.  N.  Y.  L. 
E.  &  W.  R.,  104  N.  Y.  58,  9  N. 
E.  856,  although  there  is  authority 
supporting  the  dissenting  view, 
Concord  &  M.  R.  Co.v.  Boston  & 
M.  R.  Co.,  68  N.  H.  464,  41  Atl.  263. 

44.  People  v.  Delaware  &  H. 
Canal  Co.,  32  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
120,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  850,  affirmed 
in  165  N.  Y.  362.  59  N.  E.  138; 
Central  of  Georgia  Ry.  Co.  v. 
State,  104  Ga.  831,  31  S.  E.  531; 
Railroad  Commissioners  of  South 
Carolina  v.  Columbia  &  G.  R.  Co., 
26  S.  C.  353  2  S.  E.  127;  Northern 
Pao.    R.   Co.    v.   Territory    (Wash. 


T.),  13  Pac.  604;  McCoy  v.  Cin- 
cinnati I.  St.  L.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  13 
Fed.  3;  State  v.  Republican  Val. 
R.  Co.  (Neb.),  26  N.  W.  205  and 
24  N.  W.  329.  The  right  of  a 
commission  to  locate  a  station 
dees  not  authorize  a  requirement 
that  separate  freight  and  passen- 
ger depots  be  maintained.  State 
V.  Yazoo  Valley  R.  Co.,  87  Miss. 
679,  40  So.  2G?. 

45.  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  40,  47.  20  I.  C.  C.  200;  Cattle 
Raisers'  Asso.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  K. 
R.  Co.,  11  I.  C.  C.  277;  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Ky.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
Co.,  192  U.  S.  568,  48  L.  Ed.  565, 
24  Sup.  Ct.  339. 

In  United  States  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 
Co.,  231  U.  S.  274,  58  L.  Ed.  218,  34 
Sup.  Ct.  75,  the  order  of  the  Com- 
mission was  set  aside  but  the  right 
to  regulate  conceded. 


§  10] 


Engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce. 


167 


cnminissions/"  Such  regulation  does  not  burcien  or  impede, 
l)nt  aids  and  facilitates  intercourse  and  traffic  " 

It  -is  not  an  unconstitutional  interference  with  interstate 
commerce  for  a  State  statute  to  prohibit  any  change  in  loca- 
tion of  shops,  roundhouses  and  general  offices  of  a  railway 
company  which  had  located  and  agreed  to  maintain  them  for 
a  valuable  consideration/' 

Taider  these  principles,  a  railroad  may  be  compelled  to  in- 
stall a  teb'phone  in  a  depot  to  facilitate  its  business^"  but  not 
for  general  commercial  purposes.^" 

The  business  of  a  railroad  is  transportation,  and  it  cannot 
be  compelled  to  provide  scales  at  local  stations  for  the  con- 
venience of  stock  shippers." 

§  10,  Regulation  of  Facilities — Terminal  Roads. — Short 
lines  of  railroad  engaged  as  common  carriers  in  the  business 
of  transporting  freight  between  the  termini  of  other  common 


46.  Cases  illustrating  the  exer- 
cise of  the  power  by  state  au- 
thority are:  Atty.  Gen.  of  Mass. 
V.  Eastern  R.  Co..  137  Mass.  45; 
Board  of  R.  R.  Com'rs  of  Kansas 
V.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.,  71  Kan. 
193,  80  Pac.  r>3;  Corporation 
Commission  of  N  C.  v.  Seaboard 
A.  L.  Ry.,  161  N.  C.  270,  76  S.  E. 
554;  St.  Louis  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  State,  31  Okla.  509,  122  Pac. 
217;  Horton  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  173 
Ala.  231,  55  So.  531;  College 
Arms  Hotel  Co.  v.  Atlantic  C. 
L.  R.  Co.,  61  Fla.  553,  54  So.  459; 
St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  State, 
97  Ark.  473,  134  S.  W.  970;  State 
V.  Ogden  Rapid  Transit  Co.,  38 
Utah  242,  112  Pac.  120;  Pecos  & 
N.  T.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Railroad  Cora,  of 
Texas,  56  Tex.  C.  A.  422,  120  S. 
W.  1055;  R.  R.  Com.  of  Tex.  v. 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  114 
S.  W.  192,  reversed  102  Tex.  393. 
117  S.  W.  794;  Louisiana  R.  &  IL 
Co.  V.  R.  R.  Com.  of  La..  121  La. 
849,  49  So.  884. 


47.  Morris-Scarboro-MofRtt  Co. 
V.  Southern  Express  Co.,  146  N. 
C,  167,  59  S.  E.  667;  Pittsburg 
C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  V.  Hunt, 
171  Ind.  189,  86  N.  E.  328. 

48.  International  &  G.  N.  R.  Co. 
V  Anderson  Co.,  246  U.  S.  424,  62 
L.  Ed.  807,  38  Sup.  Ct.  370.  But 
"the  court  will  never  order  a  rail- 
road station  to  be  built  or  main- 
tained contrary  to  the  public  inter- 
est"; Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
Washington,  142  U.  S.  492,  35  L. 
Ed.  1092,  12  Sup.  Ct.  293  and  see 
Armour  &  Co.  v.  Texas  &  Pacific 
Ry.  Co.  258  Fed.  185,  —  C.  C. 
A.   — . 

49.  Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  State,  23  Okla.  210,  100  Pac.  11. 

50.  Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co, 
V.  State,  23  Okla.  231,  100  Pac.  16. 
See  as  to  right  to  require  rates  to 
be  posted,  Johnson  v.  Seaboard  A. 
L.  Ry.,  78  S.  C.  361,  52  S.  B.  644. 

51.  New  Mex.  Wool  Growers' 
Asso.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co., 
N.  M.,  145  Pac.  1077;  G.  N.  R.  Co.v. 


168  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  10 

carriers  and  industries  not  directly  on  the  lines  of  the  princi- 
pal carriers  are  designated  as  terminal  railroads.  Generally 
this  terminal  railroad  is  located  in  only  one  state  and  is  a 
state  corporation.  It  delivers  freight  which  may  be  brought 
to  it  by  other  carriers  or  delivers  freight  from  industries  to 
other  carriers,  such  freight  being  destined  from  o.r  to  points 
both  within  and  without  the  state  in  which  the  terminal  rail- 
road is  located. 

In  a  federal  case  decided  in  1887  it  was  held  that  a  "switch- 
ing" service  was  local  and  might  be  regulated  by  a  state  com- 
mission." but  it  cannot  now  be  doubted  that,  where  a  deliv- 
ery service  by  a  terminal  road  relates  to  freight  which  moves 
in  interstate  commerce,  as  to  such  transportation  the  carrier 
is  not  legally  subject  to  any  regulation  by  state  authority. 
The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  has  regulated  rates  of 
terminal  charges,  holding  that,  "A  state  statute  fixing  termi- 
nal charges  is  not  controlling  with  respect  to  interstate  trans- 
portation." ^"  Discrimination  by  a  terminal  company  was 
prohibited.""  Through  routes  and  joint  rates  with  terminal 
roads  have  been  ordered."""  That  such  roads,  as  to  interstate 
transportation  of  which  the  terminal  haul  is  a  part,  are  with- 
in the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  has  been  recognized  and 
established  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States/" 
In  the  Southern  Pacific  Terminal  case,"  Mr.  Justice  McKenna 
(piotes  approvingly  language  of  the  Commission  aptly  express- 
Minnesota,  238  J.  S.  340,  59  L.  Ed.  and  see  Peale  v.  Cent  R.  Co. 
1337,  35  Sup.  Ct.  753.  of  N.  J.,  18  I.  C.  C.  25,  and  cases 

52.  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.      cited,  at  p  33. 

V.   Becker,   32  Fed.   849;    the  rate  56.   Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago  B. 

prescribed     by     the     State     Com-  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  186  U.  S.  320,  46  L. 

mission  was  enjoined  as  being  too  Ed.  1182,  22  Sup.  Ct.  824;   So.  Ry. 

low,  same  case  35  Fed.  883.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  Hay  &  G.  Co.,  214  U. 

53.  Wilson  Produce  Co.  v.  Pen-  S.  297,  53  L.  Ed.  1004,  29  Sup.  Ct. 
na.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  170.  678;    Int.  Com.  Com.  v.   Stickney, 

54.  Eichenberg  v.  So.  Pac.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  98,  54  i..  Ed.  112,  30  Sup. 
14  I.  C.  C.  250;  order  approved,  Ct.  66;  United  States  v.  Union 
So.  Pac.  Terminal  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Stock  Yards  &  Transit  Co.,  226  U. 
Com.,  219  U.  S.  498,  55  L.  Ed.  S.  286,  57  L.  Ed.  226,  33  Sup.  Ct. 
810,  31  Sup.  Ct.  279.  83.  Railroad  Com.   of  Ga.  v.  L.  & 

55.  Mfgrs.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  N.  R.  Co.,  148  Ga.  442,  445. 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  304;  57.    Note  54,  :mpra. 


§  11]  Engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce.  169 

ing  the  rule.  He  there  quoted:  "The  Terminal  Company  is 
part  and  parcel  of  the  system  engaged  in  the  transportation 
of  commerce,  and  to  the  extent  that  such  commerce  is  inter- 
state the  Commission  has  jurisdiction  to  supervise  and  con- 
trol it  within  statutory  limits.  To  hold  otherwise  would  in 
effect  permit  carriers  generally,  through  the  organization  of 
separate  corporations,  to  exempt  all  of  their  terminals  from 
our  regulating  authority." 

Terminal  roads,  therefore,  as  to  all  questions  of  rates  and 
regulations,  are  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state  or  the 
federal  government  in  the  same  way  as  other  common  carri- 
ers. When  the  regulation  relates  to  intrastate  transportation 
and  does  not  affect  interstate  commerce,  a  state  commission 
may  act.  otherwise  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  alone 
has  power  to  prescribe  rates,  rules  and  regulations. 

§  11.  State  Laws  Forbidding  the  Consolidation  of  Compet- 
ing' Carriers. — A  constitutional  provision  of  the  state  of  Ken- 
tucky prohibiting  the  consolidation  of  stocks,  franchises  or 
property,  as  well  as  the  purchase  and  lease,  of  parallel  or 
competing  lines  of  railroad  does  not  so  interfere  with  inter- 
state commerce  as  to  be  invalid.  The  "instruments  of  com- 
merce" may  be  regulated  by  the  states.  In  sustaining  the 
foregoing  law  of  Kentucky.  Mr.  Justice  Brown,  announcing 
the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court,  said :" 

"The  power  to  construct  them  (railroads)  involves  necessa- 
rily the  power  to  impose  such  regulations  upon  their  opera- 
tion as  a  sound  regard  for  the  interests  of  the  public  may 
seem  to  render  desirable.  In  the  division  of  authority  with 
respect  to  interstate  railways  Congress  reserved  to  itself  the 
superior  right  to  control  their  commerce  and  forbid  interfer- 
ence therewith ;  while  to  the  states  remains  the  power  to 
create  and  to  regulate  the  instruments  of  such  commerce,  so 
far  as  necessary  to  the  conservation  of  the  public  interests. 

58.     Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v.  v.   Great  Northern  R.  Co.,   161   L'. 

Kentucky,  161  U.  S.  677,  40  L.  Ed.  S.  646,  40  L.  Ed.  838,  16  Sup.  Ct. 

849,    16    Sup.    Ct.    714.    Explained,  705.   Simpson,   et  a!.,   R.   R.   Com. 

Northern  Securities  Co.  v.  Unitefi  of  Minnesota  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  S. 

States,  193  U.  S.  197,  348,  48  L.  Ed.  352,    432,    433,   57   L.    Ed.    1511,   33 

679,  705,  24  Sup.  Ct.  436,  Pearsall  Sup.  Ct.  729. 


170  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  12 

"If  it  bo  assumed  that  the  states  have  no  riglit  to  forbid  the 
consolidation  of  competing  lines,  because  the  whole  subject  is 
within  the  control  of  Congress,  it  would  necessarily  follow 
that  Congress  would  have  the  power  to  authorize  such  con- 
solidation in  defiance  of  state  legislation — a  proposition  which 
needs  onlj^  to  be  stated  to  demonstrate  its  unsoundness." 

The  concluding  language  of  Mr.  Justice  Brown  has  a  signi- 
ficant application  to  the  provisions  of  section  407  of  the 
Transportation  Act  1920,  which  section  amends  section  5  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  The  paragraphs  added  by  the 
amendment  authorize  the  consolidation  of  the  properties  of 
two  or  more  railroads.  Practically  all  the  railroads  subject 
to  these  enactments  were  incorporated  under  State  laws,  they 
are  creatures  of  the  States ;  but  are  instrumentalities  of  inter- 
state commerce.  The  constitutionality  of  this  provision  of  the 
amendment  is  discussed  Section  63a,  post. 

§  12.  Regulation  of  Facilities — Spur  Tracks. — Where  an 
order  of  a  state  tribunal  affects  onl}^  intrastate  commerce,  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  it  was  arbitrary  and  anreasonable 
is  for  the  state  courts,  and  it  is  proper  to  require  a  carrier  to 
furnish  facilities  for  making  the  necessary  connections  for 
passenger  travel ;  even  if,  in  doing  so,  that  service  must  be 
furnished  at  a  loss."" 

A  state  statute  authorizing  a  state  commission  to  require  a 
railroad  to  permit  the  erection  of  an  elevator  upon  its  road  bed 
was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  to  be  in- 
valid;"" and  the  same  court  held  void  a  law  compelling  all 
railroads  upon  application  and  when  a  specified  elevator  ca- 
pacity exists,  to  "erect,  equip  and  maintain  a  side  track  or 
switch  of  suitable  length  to  approach  as  near  as  four  feet  of 
the  outer  edge  of  their  right  of  way  when  necessary,  and  in 
all  cases  to  approach  as  near  as  necessary  to  approach  an 
elevator  that  may  be  erected  by  the  applicant  or  applicants 
adjacent  to  their  right   of  way  for  the  purpose   of   loading 

59.     Atlantic    C    L.    R.    Co.    v.  N.  C.  1,  49  S.  E.  191,  11.5  Am.  St. 

North  Carolina  Corp.  Com.,  206  U.  Rep.  636. 

».    1,    51   L.   Ed.   933,   27    Sup.   Ct.  60.    Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  :;e- 

585,  affirming  North  Carolina  Cor  j.  braska,   164   U.   S.   403,   41   L.   Ed. 

Com.  V.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  137  489,  17  Sup.  Ct.  130. 


§  12]  Engaged  in  Intei^state  Commerce.  17.1 

grain  into  ears  from  said  elevator,  and  for  handling  and 
shipping  grain  to  all  persons  or  associations  so  erecting  or 
operating  such  elevators,  or  handling  and  shi])ping  -grain, 
v^-ithont  favoritism  or  discrimination  in  any  respect  what- 
ever." One  of  the  contentions  made  in  the  argument  against 
the  validity  of  this  law  was  that  it  conflicted  with  the  com- 
merce clause  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  This 
contention  was  not  determined,  as  the  law  M'as  held  invalid 
because  it  failed  to  provide  indemnity  to  the  carrier." 

A  regulation  requiring  a  carrier  to  deliver  cars  beyond  its 
tracks  to  a  private  switch  is  illegal."'  In  McNeill  v.  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  cited  note,  supra,  the  North  Carolina  Corporation 
Commission  entered  an  order  requiring  the  railway  company, 
upon  payment  of  freight  charges,  to  make  delivery  of  the  cars 
beyond  its  •  right  of  way  on  the  siding  of  a  private  coal  comp- 
any. The  order  was  held  invalid  as  "amounti.vig  to  an  unlaw- 
ful interference  with  interstate  commerce." 

That  a  spur  track  ordered  by  a  state  commission  may  be  for 
the  present  benefit  of  only  one  industry,  does  not  make  the  con- 
demnation of  property  necessary  for  the  conf^truction  of  the 
spur  track  the  taking  of  property  for  a  private  purpose."''  A 
state  has  no  power  to  compel  a  carrier  to  switch  cars  from  a 
connection  with  a  competing  road  to  a  designated  side  track 
within  its  own  terminals  for  the  purpose  of  being  laden  with 
freight  for  immediate  transportation."  If  the  transportation 
is  intrastate,  different  carriers  may  be  compelled  by  state  au- 
thority to  interchange  freight."^ 

The  Supreme  Court  has  not  always  given  consideration  to 
the  fact  that  spur  tracks  serve  both  interstate  commerce  and 

61.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nc-  58  L.  Ed.  924,  34  Sup.  Ct.  522. 
braska,  217  U.  S.  196,  54  L.  Ed.  727,  Judge  Gilbert  of  the  Supreme 
30  Sup.  Ct.  461.  Court  of  Georgia  cites  and  follows 

62.  Central  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  the  text.  Railroad  Com.  of  Ga.  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  118  Fed.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  148  Ga.  442,  445. 
113,  55  C.  C.  A.  63,  63  L.  R.  A.  213;  64.  111.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad 
McNeill  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  202  U.  S.  Com.  of  La.,  236  U.  S.  157,  59  L. 
543,    50    L.    Ed.    1142,   26    Sup.   Ct.  Ed.  517,  35  Sup.  Ct.  275. 

722.  65.    Mich.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Mich.  R. 

63.  Union  Lime  Co.  v.  Chicago  Com.,  236  U.  S.  C15,  59  L.  Ed.  750, 
&    N.   W.   Ry.   Co.,    233    U.   S.    211,       35  SuD.  Ct.  423. 


172  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  12 

intrastate  commerce.  The  same  statement  applies  to  the  cases 
relating  to  pliysical  connections  discnssed  in  the  succeeding 
sections.  The  principle  applied  in  cases  like  the  McNeill  Case, 
supra,  seems  to  be  overlooked  in  other  cases. 

The  Congress  has  regulated  spur  tracks  and  the  interstate 
Commerce  Commission  has  frequently  entered  orders  author- 
ized by  such  regulations.""  The  field  having  been  occupied 
by  Congress,  it  would  seem  under  well  established  rules,  that 
the  power  of  the  states  to  regulate  such  tracks  presently  or 
intended  to  be  used  to  serve  interstate  shipments,  was  ex- 
cluded. The  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  do  not  in  terms 
deny  the  existence  or  the  application  of  the  principle,  they  do 
in  some  cases  ignore  the  principle.  That  Court  properly 
holds  that  an  enforced  discharge  by  a  common  carrier  of  its 
duty  to  provide  reasonably  adequate  extensions  of  a  sidetrack 
leading  to  an  adjacent  manufacturing  plant  is  not  in  viola- 
tion of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  but 
the  Court  there  ignored,  if  the  question  was  raised,  the  really 
important  issue  of  the  competency  of  a  State  Commission  to 
enforce  such  duty.  It  is  practically  universally  true  that 
such  tracks  must  serve  interstate  commerce"  In  holding 
that  the  Georgia  Commission  was  authorized  to  require  a  con- 
necting track  between  two  railroads,  no  reference  was  made 
to  the  issue  of  interference  with  interstate  commerce,  whieft, 
as  the  present  writer,  who  was  of  counsel,  knows,  was  dis- 
tinctly raised  by  the  testimony  and  which  was  the  substantial 
question  presented  on  brief  and  in  oral  argument."*  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Virginia  holds  that  although  a  side  or  spur 
track  may  be  used  for  interstate  commerce,  as  well  as  for 
intrastate  commerce,  the  Corporation  commission  of  that 
State  has  iurisdiction  to  compel  its  construction.'"'^  This 
decision  is  in  accord  with  judgments  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  Ignited  States,  but  the  Supreme  Court  has  never  defi- 

66.  Louisville  Board  of  Trade  68.  Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  40  L  C.  C.  679  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ga.  240  U.  S.  324,  60 
and  cases  cited  pp.  688,  689.  L.  Ed.  669,  36  Sup.  Ct.  260. 

67.  Chicago  St.  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  69.  Washington  &  0.  D.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ochs,  —  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Royster  Guano  Co.,  122  Va.  397. 
Sup.  Ct.  — .  94  S.  E.  763. 


§  13]  Engagep  in  Interstate  Commerck.  173 

nitely  stated  the  principle  and  has  in  some  of  the  cases  cited 
above  fipplied  an  opposing  principle. 

A  donble  track  may  be  reqnired  where  the  facts  so  justify/" 
It  may  be  accepted  as .  law  under  the  authorities  as 
they  now  stand  that  where  there  is  a  "full  hearing"  and  a 
reasonable  justification  for  the  order,  a  State  Commission  has 
jurisdiction  to  compel  a  common  carrier  to  construct  and 
maintain  a  spur  track  to  a  private  plant,  when  such  track 
furnishes  additional  trackage  for  a  public  use,  even  though 
interstate  commerce  as  well  as  intrastate  commerce  is  served 
thereby.  This  statement,  although  supported  by  the  highest 
authority  is  of  doubtful  soundness  as  thereby  states  are 
given  concurrent  jurisdiction  over  matters  constitutionally 
committed  by  the  Congress  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, and  over  which  that  Commission  has  frequently 
exercised  jurisdiction.'^ 

The  Transportation  Act  1920  enlarges  the  powers  of  the 
connnission,  giving  it  authority  to  require  the  joint  use  of 
terminals.'"  With  these  enlarged  powers  the  Supreme 
Court  may  apply  correct  principles  and  hold  that  the  states 
may  no  longer  regulate  terminals,  spurs,  tracks  and  connec- 
tions. 

The  decision  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the 
Eighth  Circuit  that  an  interplant  switching  service  may  be 
performed  by  an  interstate  carrier  for  a  consideration  of  the 
lease  of  land'"  seems  contrary  to  a  sound  rule  of  law 
and  policy.^*  The  Supreme  Court  in  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Public 
Serv.  Com.  of  Penn.,  —  U.  S.  —  64  L.  Ed.  —  40  Sup.  Ct.  — . 
correctly  says  that  "States  no  more  can  supplement  its 
(Federal)    requirements  than  they  can  annul  them." 

§  13.  Requiring  Physical  Connections  between  Carriers. — 

In   the  Jacobson  case/^  under  authority  of  a  law  of  ]\Iinne- 

70.  Phoenix  Ry.  Co.  v.  Geary,  74.  poi^t  Sec.  182.  Louisville  & 
239  U.  S.  277,  60  L.  Ed.  287,  36  Sup.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Mqttley,  219  U.-  S. 
Ct.  45.                                                              467,  55  L.  Ed.  297,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265, 

71.  See  notes  G6  and  67,  sxipra.  34  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    671,  Chicago 

72.  Sec.  344f  Post.  I.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  219  U.  S. 

73.  Am.  Smelting  &  Ref.  Co.  v.  486,  55  L.  Ed.  305,  31  Sup.  Ct.  272, 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  —  C.  C.  A.  — ,  affirming  163  Fed.  114. 

256  Fed.  737.  75.    Wisconsin  M.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 


174  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  13 

sota,  the  State  Railroad  Commission  ordered  a  connection 
between  two  common  carriers  of  the  state,  and  this  order 
tlie  courts  enforced.  The  carriers  contended  that  the  order 
was  void  as  an  unreasonable  regulation  of  commerce,  and 
that  in  requiring  the  construction  of  the  connecting  track, 
the  order  and  judgment  took  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  Tn  the  brief  the  contention  was  made  that  the  law 
upon  which  the  proceedings  were  had  was  "an  ill-disguised 
attempt  to  control  and  regulate  interstate  traffic."  The  court 
did  not  construe  the  order  as  directly  afit'ecting  interstate 
commerce  and  overruled  the  other  contentions  of  the  plain- 
tiff in  error.     The  opinion  concludes  as  follows : 

"In  this  case  the  provision  is  a  manifestly  reasonable  one. 
tending  directly  to  the  accommodation  of  the  public,  and  in 
a  manner  not  substantially  or  unreasonably  detrimental  to 
the  ultimate  interests  of  the  corporation  itself. 

"Although  to  carry  out  the  judgment  may  require  the 
exercise  by  the  plaintiff  in  error  of  the  power  of  eminent 
domain,  and  will  also  result  in  some,  comparatively  speaking, 
small  expense,  yet  neither  fact  furnishes  an  answer  to  the 
application  of  defendant  in  error." 

The  Jaeobson  case  differs  from  the  McNeill  case.  Sec.  12, 
supra,  in  that  in  the  McNeill  case  there  was  an  order  to  con- 
nect with  a  private  plant,  while  in  the  Jaeobson  case  two  state 
common  carriers  were  directed  to  make  a  physical  connec- 
tion. In  the  Jaeobson  ease,  the  Supreme  Court  said  arguendo 
that  the  order  for  the  connection  there  did  not  affect  inter- 
state commerce,  and  Mr.  Justice  Peckham,  for  the  court, 
said : 

"But  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  in  the  opinion  de- 
livered therein  said  that  there  was  ample  evidence  in  the  case 
of  a  necessity  for  such  track  connection  resulting  from  the 
benefit  which  would  accrue  to  exclusively  state  commerce, 
when  considered  alone,  to  justify  the  ordering  of  the  connec- 
liwn  in  question." 

In  the  Jaeobson  case  the  regulation  only  incidentally 
affected  interstate  commerce ;  in  the  McNeill  case  the  regu- 
lation had  direct  reference  to  interstate  commerce.  In  dis- 
cussing the  IMcNeill  case.  Mr.  Justice  White  said : 

Jaeobson,  179  U.  S.  287,  45  L.  Ed.      194.  21  Sup.  Ct.  115. 


<§  13]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce,  175 

"The  cars  of  coal  not  having  been  delivered  to  the  con- 
signee, but  remaining  on  the  tracks  of  the  railway  company 
in  the  condition  in  which  they  had  been  originally  brought 
into  North  Carolina  from  points  outside  of  that  state,  it 
follows  that  the  interstate  transportation  of  the  property  had 
not  been  couipleted  when  the  corporation  commission  made 
the  order  complained  of." 

These  facts  clearly  differentiate  the  two  cases,  and  make 
the  respective  opinions  harmonious. 

The  more  recent  case  of  the  Larabee  Mills'"  is  interesting 
and  instructive.  In  that  case  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas 
compelled,  by  mandamus,  the  Missouri  Pacific  Railway  Com- 
pany to  deliver  cars  from  another  road  over  existing  transfer 
tracks  to  the  mill  of  the  Larabee  Mills,  that  the  mill  might  be 
enabled  to  ship  out  its  manufactured  product,  three-fifths  of 
which  went  to  points  outside  the  state  of  Kansas.  It  ap- 
peared that  the  railway  company  accorded  similar  privileges 
to  other  flour  mills  along  its  right  of  way.  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  the  railroad  relied  strongly  on 
the  ]\IcNeill  case.  The  two  cases  are  much  alike.  In  the  Mc- 
Neill case  the  delivery  of  loaded  cars  was  sought  over  a  pri- 
vate track  to  a  coal  yard;  who  built  the  track  is  not  disclosed. 
In  the  Larabee  Mills  case  the  delivery  of  empty  cars  was 
sought  over  a  track,  the  ownership  of  which  is  not  disclosed, 
but  which  was  essentially  for  the  private  use  of  the  mill.  In 
the  McNeill  case  it  appears  that  the  coal  cars  were  brought 
from  another  state,  although  it  must  have  been  true  that 
at  times  the  spur  track  was  used  in  intrastate  transportation; 
in  the  Larabee  Mills  case  there  was  both  interstate  and  intra- 
state transportation  from  the  mill.  Thus  far  there  seems 
to  be  no  legal  distinction  between  the  two  cases.  There  is, 
however,  one  clear  distinction.  The  order  in  the  Larabee 
Mills  case  was  made  to  prevent  discrimination ;  such  fact 
does  not  appear  in  the  McNeill  case.  In  the  Larabee  Mills 
case  it  was  contended  by  the  railroad  "that  no  duty  w^as 
imposed  on  the  railroad  company  by  act  of  the  legislature  or 
mandate  of  commission  or  other  administrative  board,"  To 
this  argument  ]\Ir.  Justice  Brewer  answered : 

76.   Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lara-      53  L.  Ed.  352,  29  Sup.  Ct.  214. 
bee  Flour  Mills  Co.,  211  U.  S.  612, 


1/G  StATK    Rl-KiULATION    OK    CARRIERS.  [*^    13 

"No  legislative  enactment,  no  special  mandate  from  any 
commission  or  other  administrative  board  was  necessary,  for 
the  duty  arose  from  the  fact  that  it  was  a  common  carrier. 
This  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  law  of  common  carriers. 
Whenever  one  engages  in  that  business  the  obligation  of  equal 
service  to  all  arises,  and  that  obligation,  irrespective  of  legis- 
lative action  or  special  mandate,  can  be  enforced  by  the 
courts.  *  *  *  AH  these  questions  are  disposed,  of  by  one 
well-established  proposition,  and  that  is,  that  a  party  engaging 
in  the  business  of  a  common  carrier  is  bound  to  treat  all  ship- 
pers alike  and  can  be  compelled  to  do  so  by  mandamus  or 
other  proper  writ." 

What,  then,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas  did  was  to  en- 
force the  common-law  dutj^  of  the  carrier  to  treat  all  shippers 
alike.  This  it  had  the  right  to  do  prior  to  action  by  Congress 
or  the  Commission  appointed  by  Congress,  even  though  in 
doing  so  interstate  commerce  might  be  affected.  This  prin- 
ciple ifr.  Justice  Brewer  states : 

"This  case  does  not  rest  upon  any  distinction  between  inter- 
state commerce  and  that  wholly  within  the  state.  It  is  the 
contention  of  counsel  for  the  mill  company  that  it  comes 
within  the  oft-rejieated  rule  that  the  state,  in  the  absence  of 
express  action  by  Congress,  may  regulate  many  matters  which 
indirectly  aflfect  interstate  commerce,  but  which  are  for  the 
comfort  and  convenience  of  its  citizens.  Of  the  existence  of 
such  a  rule  there  can  be  no  question.  It  is  settled  and  il- 
lustrated in  many  cases.  *  *  *  Tlie  mere  grant  by  Con- 
gress to  the  commission  of  certain  national  powers  in  respect 
to  interstate  commerce  does  not  of  itself  and  in  the  absence 
of  action  by  the  commission  interfere  with  the  authority  of 
the  state  to  make  those  regulations  conducive  to  the  welfare 
and  convenience  of  its  citizens." 

In  discussing  the  McNeill  case.  Mr.  Justice  Brewer  said : 

"There  are  many  points  of  resemblance  between  that  case 
and  this,  but  there  is  this  substantial  distinction :  In  that 
was  presented  and  determined  solely  the  power  of  a  state 
commission  to  make  orders  respecting  the  delivery  of  cars 
engaged  in  interstate  commerce  beyond  the  right  of  way  of 
the  cari-ier  and  to  a  private  siding — an  order  which  affected 
the    movement   of   the   cars   prior   to   the   completion   of   the 


§  13]  Kngaokii  in   Interstate  Commerce.  177 

transportation,  while  here  is  presented,  as  hereinbefore  in- 
dicated, the  question  of  the  power  of  the  state  to  prevent 
discrimination  between  shippers,  and  the  common-law  duty 
resting  upon  a  carrier  was  enforced.  This  common-law  duty, 
the  state,  in  a  case  like  the  present,  may,  at  least  in  the  ab- 
sence of  congressional  action,  compel  a  carrier  to  discharge." 

Mr.  Justice  Moody  dissented,  placing  his  dissent  on  the 
McNeill  case,  between  which  and  the  instant  case  he  saw 
no  legal  distinction. 

These  cases  Avere  determined  prior  to  the  passage  of  the 
Hepburn  Act,"'  which  act  extended  the  power  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission. 

Since  the  passage  of  that  act,  the  Supreme  Court  has  held 
void  a  state  regulation  recpuring  a  physical  connection  be- 
tween common  carriers  of  the  state  of  Washington.'*  In 
this,  the  Fairehild  ease,  the  order  to  make  the  connection 
was  held  void,  the  reason  for  so  holding  being  stated  by  Mr. 
Justice  Lamar  as  follows : 

"There  is  nothing  by  which  to  compare  the  advantage  to 
the  public  with  the  expense  to  the  defendant  and  nothing 
to  show  that  within  the  meaning  of  the  law  there  is  such 
public  necessity  as  to  justify  an  order  taking  property  from 
the  company." 

The  effect  of  the  order  on  interstate  commerce  was  not 
discussed,  nor  was  that  question  raised,  it  seemingly  being 
assumed  that  the  order  related  to  intrastate  commerce. 

It  appears  from  the  authorities  and  in  view  of  the  enlarged 
powers  of  the  federal  commission  under  the  Acts  of  1906  and 
1910.  that  a  physical  connection  could  not  be  ordered  by 
authority  of  the  states  when  the  purpose  of  the  connection 
was  wholly  or  partly  to  accommodate  interstate  commerce."' 

77.  Act  June  29,  1906,  34  Stat.  Yard  &  Transit  Co.,  226  U.  S.  286, 
L.  584,  c.  3591,  U.  S.  Comp.  St.  57  L.  Ed.  226,  33  Sup.  Ct.  83; 
Supp.  1907,  p.  892,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  New  York  C.  «i  H.  R.  Co.  v. 
Supp.  1907,  p.  168,  Sees.  338,  400.  Hudson  County,  227  U.  S.  248,  57 

78.  Oregon  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  L.  Ed.  499,  33  Sup.  Ct.  269;  Sea- 
Pairchild,  224  U.  S.  510,  56  L.  Ed.  board  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com. 
863,  a2  Sup.  Ct.  5?5.  of  Georgia,  206  Fed.  181;  see  also 

79.  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid,  222  U.  Atlantic  S.  R.  &.  G.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
S.  424,  56  L.  Ed.  257,  32  Sup.  Ct.  State.  42  Fla.  358.  29  So.  319,  89 
140;  United  States  v.  Union  Stock  Am.  St.  Rep.  233.  At  common  law 


178 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  1-t 


It  has,  however,  been  held,  and  npon  what  appears  to  be 
sound  reasoning  based  npon  authority,  that  such  connections 
may  be  required  when  made  to  accommodate  intrastate  com- 
mei'ce,  the  requirement  being  one  for  a  facility  for  trans- 
portation and  in  no  way  burdening  interstate  commerce/" 
The  use  of  terminal  facilities  could  not  prior  to  Transportation 
Act  1920  be  taken  from  one  carrier  for  the  benefit  of 
another."*'  This  does  not  mean  that  one  road  could  not  in  a 
proper  case  be  required  to  switch  the  cars  of  another  and 
connecting  carrier.*' 

Transportation  Act  1920  authorizes  the  Commission  to  re- 
quire that  terminals  be  opened  to  a  joint  use.*^ 

§  11.  Delivery  over  Connecting  Tracks. — Railroads  are  or- 
ganized for  a  public  ])urpose  and  to  serve  primarily  the  public 


individuals  could  not  force  the 
right  to  connect  private  tracks, 
People  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry..  57 

111.  436;  State  v.  Willmar  &  S.  F. 
Ry.  Co.,  88   Minn.    448,   93   N.   W. 

112.  No  objection  that  connection 
is  with  main  line.  Morris  Draying 
Co.  V.  Greenville  &  H.  Ry.  Co.,  G2 
N.  J.  Eq.  768,  48  Atl.  568,  affirming 
59  N.  J.  Eq.  372,  46  Atl.  638.  Law 
may  apply  to  contiguous  roads 
which  do  not  cross.  New  York  L. 
&  W.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Erie  R.  Co.,  31 
App.  Dlv.  378,  52  N.  Y.  Supp.  318. 
appeal  dismissed  157  N.  Y.  674,  51 
N.  E.  1092;  Gallagher  v.  Keating, 
28  Misc.  Rep.  131,  58  N.  Y.  Supp. 
366.  Statute  authorizing  plant 
tracks  to  connect  valid,  Reeser  v. 
Philadelphia  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  215  Pa. 
136,  64  Atl.  376.  May  require  con- 
nections though  roads  do  not  cross 
at  grade,  International  &  G.  N.  R. 
Co.  V.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Texas,  99  Tex. 
332,  89  S.  Y/.  961,  affirming  86  S. 
W.  16,  —  Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ;  Jacob- 
son  V.  Wisconsin,  M.  &  P.  R.  Co., 
71  Minn.  519,  74  X.  W.  893,  40  L.  R. 
A.  389,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  358.  A  rail- 


road company  is  not  compelled  to 
switch  freight  which  was  not  con- 
signed over  its  lines  from  the  line 
of  one  railroad  to  that  of  another 
in  the  same  city,  Texas  &  N.  O. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Gulf  &  I  Ry.  Co.  of 
Texas,  54  S.  W.  1031,  affirmed. 
Gulf  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Texas  &  N.  0. 
Ry.  Co.,  56  S.  W.  328,  93  Tex.  482. 

80.  Pittsburg,  C  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Hunt,  171  Ind.  189,  86  N. 
E.  328;  State  v.  Florida  E.  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  58  Fla.  524.  50  So.  425;  Chi- 
cago, I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Indiana,  175  Ind.  630,  95 
N.  E.  364. 

81.  Louisville  f.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Stock  Yards,  212  U.  S.  132, 
53  L.  Ed.  441,  29  Sup.  Ct.  246,  re- 
versing same  styled  case,  133  Ky. 
148,  97  S.  W.  77S;  Commonwealth 
V.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Ill  Va. 
59,  68  S.  E.  351. 

82.  Penna.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  266  IT. 
S.  3.51,  59  L.  Ed.  616,  35  Sup.  Ct. 
370. 

83.  Note  72,  supra:  see  also  Sec. 
12  suirra. 


§  14]  Engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce.  179 

good  and  convenience.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
has  power  to  require  physical  connections  between  interstate 
carriers,  and  like  power  exists  in  the  states  so  far  as  the 
requirements  of  intrastate  commerce  may  reasonably  demand. 

That  these  connections  may  serve  the  public  demands  and 
needs,  it  is  necessary  that  they  be  used.  How  far  then  may 
a  carrier  be  compelled  to  receive  and  deliver  cars  over  these 
connections  when  established? 

There  is  a  commerce  which  is  intrastate  and  a  commerce 
which  is  interstate.  Each  may  be  served  by  these  connections, 
and  both  state  and  federal  authorities  may  act  for  the  purpose 
of  requiring  adequate  service  for  the  transportation  within 
their  respective  jurisdictions.  Neither  the  state  government 
nor  the  federal  government  may  require  the  establishment  of 
facilities  for  transportation  which  are  not  within  its  proper 
sphere.  This  situation  makes  carriers  subject  to  independent 
regulation  from  separate  tribunals  and  it  sometimes  is  a  dif- 
ficult question  to  determine  which  tribunal  may  require  a 
particular  facility,  the  facility  required  by  either  being 
usually  for  the  benefit  of  the  commerce  of  both. 

While  this  duplication  of  control  over  carriers  is  frequently 
burdensome,  until  Congress  acts,  the  courts  must  adjust  the 
conflicting  regulations  as  best  they  may.  Applying  these 
principles  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  the  states  may,  in  proper 
cases,  require  carriers  of  intrastate  commerce  to  receive  and 
deliver  cars  from  and  to  other  carriers  over  the  connections. 
This  service  must  be  necessary  and  must  be  reasonably  com- 
pensated for,  and  provision  must  exist  for  the  protection 
of  the  carrier  in  its  compensation  and  for  the  return  of  its 

84 

cars. 

84.  Central  Stock  Yards  v.  Lou-  133  Ky.  148,  97  N.  W.  778;  So. 
isville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  568,  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Hay  &  Grain 
48  L.  Ed.  565,  24  Sup.  Ct.  339,  af-  Co.,  214  U.  S.  297,  53  L.  Ed. 
firming  Central  Stock  Yards  Co.  1004,  29  Sup.  Ct.  678,  reversing 
V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co..  118  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Hay  & 
Fed.  113,  55  C.  C.  A.  63,  63  L.  R.  Grain  Co.,  153  Fed.  728,  82  C.  C. 
A.  213;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  A.  614.  Indemnity  may  be  re- 
Central  Stock  Yards  Co.,  212  U.  quired  of  an  irresponsible  carrier, 
S.  132,  53  L.  Ed.  441,  29  Sup.  Ct.  Enterprise  Transportation  Co.  v. 
246,  reversing  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  12  I.  C.  C. 
Co.    V.    Central    Stock    Yards    Co.,  326;    Wisconsin,    M.    &   P.    R.   Co. 


180  State  Regulation  of  Carrieks.  [§  14 

That  a  carrier  may  be  compelled  to  transport  freight  over 
the  connection  between  the  terminus  of  another  line  to  a 
team  track  or  other  siding  on  its  own  line,  was  determined 
by  the  Supreme  Conrt  in  Grand  Trunk  Kailway  Co.  v.  Mich- 
igan Railroad  Commission/"  In  this  case  discrimination  was 
alleged  before  the  Commission,  which  made  an  order  re- 
quiring that  the  discrimination  be  removed  and  that  a  new 
tai'iff  1)6  filed  and  made  effective  granting  "like  charges  for 
the  movement  of  a  carload  shipment  received  from  an  in- 
dustry in  the  city  of  Detroit,  upon  said  Grand  Trunk  Western 
Railway,  consigned  for  delivery  upon  a  team  track  or  other 
siding  of  said  road,  within  the  same  city,  and  for  a  like 
shipment  received  by  said  Grand  Trunk  Western  Railway 
from  a  connecting  carrier  at  a  junction  point  within  the 
corporate  limits  of  the  city  of  Detroit,  consigned  to  a  team 
track  or  other  siding  upon  said  road  within  the  same  city." 

The  carrier  filed  a  tariff  which  the  Commission  suspended 
and  an  injunction  was  sought.  The  question  arising  in  the 
suit  was 'stated  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  follows: 

"The  question  in  the  case  is  whether,  under  the  statutes 
of  the  state  of  Michigan,  appellants  can  be  compelled  to  use 
the  tracks  it  owns  and  operates  in  the  city  of  Detroit  for 
the  interchange  of  intrastate  traffic ;  or,  stating  the  question 
more  specifically,  whether  the  companies  shall  receive  cars 
from  another  carrier  at  a  junction  point  or  physical  connec- 

V.  Jacobson,   179   U.   S.  287,  45  L.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Washington, 

Ed.  194,  21  Sup.  Ct.  115,  affirming  52  Wash.  17,  100  Pac.  179. 

Jacobson    v.    Wisconsin,    M.    &    P.  85.    Grand    Trunk    Ry.    Co.    v. 

R.    Co.,    71    Minn.    519,    74    N.    W.  Michigan  R.     Com.    231  U.  S.  451, 

893,   40   L.   R.  A.   389,   70  Am.   St.  58      L.    Ed.   310,   34   Sup.   Ct.   152. 

Rep.    358;    Minneapolis    &    St.    L.  affirming    same    styled    case,    198 

R.    Co.    V.    Minnesota,    186    U.    S.  Fed.    1009.    To    same    effect    see 

257,   46   L.   Ed.   1151,   22   Sup.   Ct.  Chicago,    I.    &    L.    Ry.    Co.    v.    R. 

900,  affirming  State  v.  Minneapo-  R.    Com.  of  Indiana,  175  Ind.  630. 

lis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  80  Minn.  191,  95    N.    E.   364;    Thompson   v.  Mis- 

82.  N.  W.  60,  89  Am.  St..  Rep.  514;  souri,   K.  &  T.  Ry.   Co.,   105    Tex. 

Oregon    R.    &    Nav.    Co.    v.    Fair-  372,  126   S.  W.   257,  on  rehearing 

child,    224    U.    S.    510,    56    L.    Ed.  128    S.   W.   109,   2   Ann.  Rep.   Ind. 

863,    32    Sup.    Ct.    535,    reversing  Pub.    Ser.    Com.    107   et  seq..   Sea- 

State    ex    rel.    Oregon    R.    &    N.  board  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com. 

of  Ga..  206  Fed.  181,  213  Fed.  27. 


§  14]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  181 

tion  Avitli  such  earrier  within  the  corporate  limits  of  Detroit 
for  transportation  to  the  team  tracks  of  the  companies;  and 
whether  the  companies  shall  allow  the  use  of  their  team 
tracks  for  cars  to  be  hanled  from  their  team  tracks  to  a 
junction  point  or  physical  connection  with  another  carrier 
within  such  limits  and  be  required  to  haul  such  cars  in 
either  of  the  above-named  movements  or  between  industrial 
sidings." 

The  question  thus  stated  was  resolved  in  favor  of  the  validity 
of  the  order  of  the  state  commission,  although  throughout 
the  opinion  emphasis  is  laid  upon  the  fact  of  "the  exceptional 
situation  of  Detroit"  where  the  service  required  by  the  order 
covered  an  area  of  twenty-two  miles. 

To  the  contention  that  the  last  order  suspending  the  tariff, 
which  was  the  order  involved,  interfered  with  interstate 
commerce,  the  court  said,  "the  contention  is  premature,  it 
not  without  foundation."  The  question  as  stated  related  to 
intrastate  commerce,  and  the  answer  must  be  similarly  limited. 
The  Jacobson  case,  cited  note  snpra,  was  relied  on,  and  the 
second  of  the  Stock  Yards  cases,  cited  note  supra,  was  dis- 
tinguished. Had  the  order  of  the  Michigan  Commission  re- 
quired the  transportation  or  delivery  of  commodities  moving 
to  or  from  another  state,  it  would  have  been  a  direct  at- 
tempt to  regulate  interstate  commerce,  and  void  under  the 
decisions  in  the  cases  of  McNeill  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.^"  and  111. 
C.  R.  Co.  V.  Railroad  Commission  of  Louisiana.  The  Michigan 
case  referred  to  a  transportation  service  to  be  performed 
by  the  carrier  for  a  fixed  compensation  and  (U/es  not  answer 
the  qufere  in  the  Riverside  Mills  case"  as  to  whether  or  not 
"a  carrier  can  be  compelled  to  accept  goods  for  transportation 
beyond  its  own  lines  or  be  required  to  make  a  through  or 
joint  rate  over  independent  lines."     The  Supreme  Court  of 

86.     McNeill  v.  So.  Ry.,  202   U.       La.  236  U.   S.   1.57,   .59  L.  Ed.  517, 
S.    543,    50    L.    Ed.    1142,    26    Sup.       ^5    Sup    Ct.    275. 
Ct.  722,  modifying  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  87.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Riv- 

Greensboro    Ice   &   Coal     Co.,    134       ^^^*^^  ^""^-  219  U.   S.  186,  55  L. 
Fed.    82.    See    Sec.    13    supra,    111.       ^d.    167.    31    Su;,.    Ct.    164,    31   L. 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com.  or      ^-    ^-    <^-    ^"^    '^'   affirming   Riv- 
erside  Mills  V.   Atlantic  C.   L.   R. 
Co.,  168  Fed.  987. 


182  State  Regulation  oe  Caeeiers.  [^  15 

Georgia  has  answered  the  question  negatively/^  the  Judge 
delivering  tlie  ()j)inion  using  this  language: 

"A  corporation  may  voluntarily  make  a  contract  of  this 
sort,  but  there  is  no  law  that  we  know  of  which  compels  it 
to  make  one  against  its  wishes.  And,  speaking  for  myself, 
J  doubt  very  much  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  enact  a 
law  compelling  a  railroad  to  make  a  contract  for  a  through 
bill  of  lading  beyond  its  terminus." 

Under  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  (sees.  338  and  400. 
post),  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  is  given  the 
power,  which  is  frequently  exercised,  to  require  connecting 
carriers  to  establish  through  routes  and  .joint  rates,  and 
there  appears  no  reason  why  a  state  should  not,  as  to  intra- 
state commerce  in  a  proper  case,  compel  carriers  to  inter- 
change freight. 

§  15.  Regulating  Crossings. — The  state  may  regulate  pub- 
lie  railroad  crossings.  The  police  powers  of^  the  state  are 
sut!icient  to  enable  them  to  protect  the  public  from  danger 
at  places  where  railroads  cross  public  streets  and  roads  and 
where  one  railroad  crosses  another.  Such  regulation,  al- 
though atfeeting  interstate  railroads,  falls  within  the  class 
of  legislation  "which,"  as  w^as  said  by  Chief  Justice  Marshall, 
"can  be  most  advantageously  exercised  by  the  states  them- 
selves."^" Congress  has  not  attempted  to  legislate  on  the 
subject,  and  that  state  legislation  "relating  to  railway  cross- 
ings" is  valid  has  been  determined  so  frequently  as  to  make 
extensive  citation  of  authorities  unnecessary."" 

88.  Coles  V.  Central  R.  &  B.  Co.,  89.  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9  Wheat. 

86    Ga.   251,    12    S.    E.    749;    State  22  U.  S.  1,  6  L.  Ed.  23. 

V.    Wrightsville    &    Ten.    R.    Co.,  90.  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  v.  Bris- 

104  Ga.  437,  30  3.  E.  891;  Wadley  tol,  151  U.  S.  556,  38  L.  Ed.  269, 

So.  Ry.  Co.  V.  State,  137  Ga.  497,  14    Sup.    Ct.    437,     extension     of 

,3  S.  E.  741.  To  the  same  effect,  grade    crossings;     Chicago,    B.    & 

see    Lotsfreich    v.    Central    R.    &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Nebraska,   170  U.   S. 

B.    Co.,    73    Ala.    306;    Gulf,    C.    &  57,    42    L.    Ed.    948,    18    Sup.    Ct. 

S.    F.    Ry.    Co.    V.    State.    56    Tex.  513,  viaduct  over  a  street;   Grand 

Civ.    App.    353,    120    S.    W.    1028;  Trunk   Ry.   Co.   v.   R.   R.   Com.  of 

Home    Tel.     Co.     v.     Granby     &  Indiana,  221  U.  S.  400,  55  L.  Ed. 

Neosho    Telephone    Co.,    114    Mo.  786,  31   Sup.  Ct.  537.  interlocking 

1111,   126   S.  W.   773.  plant    at    crossing    of    two    rail- 


§  15]  Engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce.  133 

Similar  to  the  power  of  the  states  to  regulate  crossings  is 
tlie  power  to  exercise  a  control  over  the  right  of  way.  A 
law  of  Texas  prescribing  the  duty  of  preventing  the  growth 
of  particular  vegetation  was  held  valid."  Regulations  requir- 
ing guard  posts  on  railroad  trestles  and  bridges,  and  stock 
gaps  at  crossings,  are  within  the  police  power  of  a  state."" 

A  law  of  the  state  of  Georgia  requires  railway  locomotives 
running  on  the  main  line  to  be  equipped  with  electric  head- 
lights of  a  certain  prescribed  character.  Locomotives  thus 
required  to  be  equipped  were  used  in  hauling  interstate 
freight,  and  it  was  urged  that  the  statute  constituted  an  un- 
warrantable interference  with  interstate  commerce.  The 
validity  of  the  statute  w^as  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Georgia."''  and  upon  a  writ  of  error  to  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  the  judgment  of  the  state  court  was  af- 
firmed. The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  cited  as 
controlling,  the  case  of  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H,  R.  Co.  v.  New 
York,  165  U,  S.  628,  41  L.  Ed.  853,  17  Sup.  Ct.  418,  supra, 
where  a  law  prescribing  regulations  concerning  the  heating 
of  cars  was  held  valid,  and  stated  the  principle  applicable 
to  be:  "In  the  absence  of  legislation  by  Congress,  the  states 

roads;      Grand    Rapids    &    I.    Ry.  61  L.  Ed.  302,  37  Sup.  Ct.  124. 

Co.  V.  Hunt,  38  Ind.  App.  657,  78  92.    Alabama   Great   So.    R.    Co. 

N.   E.  358;    St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.  v.   Fowler,   104   Ga.   148,   30    S.   E. 

R.    Co.     V.     McNamare,     91     Ark.  243;   New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

515,     122     S.     W.     102,     blocking  Co.  v.  New  York.  165  U.  S.  628,  41 

frogs;   State  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  L.    Ed.    853,    17    Sup.    Ct.    418,    af- 

Co.,    177    Ind.   55;-!,   96   N.    E.    340;  firming   142    N.    Y.    646,   37   N.    E. 

Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Goldsboro,  568,  holding  valid  a  law  relating 

232   U.   S.   548.   58   L.  Ed.   721,   34  to    heating   trains.      See   the   case 

Sup.  Ct.  364,  regulating  operation  of  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 

of   cars    in    streets    and    affirming  Minneapolis,  232  U.   S.   430,  58  L. 

same  styled  case,  155  N.  C.  356,  71  Ed.    671,    34    Sup.    Ct.    400;    samb 

S.  E.  514.  styled  case  115  Minn.  460,   133  N. 

St.   Louis  I.   M.   &  S.  R.   Co.  v.  W.   169,   Ann.    Cas.    1912D,     1027, 

Ark.,  240  U.  S.  518,  60  L.  Ed.  776,  and  cases  cited  in  the  opinion  of 

36  Sup.  Ct.  443.  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 

91.  Mo.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  May,  States. 

194   U.   S.   267,   48  L.    Ed.   971,   24  93.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Geor- 

Sup.  Ct.  638;    Chicago  T.  H.  &  S.  gia,  135  Ga.  545,  69  S.  E.  725,  32 

Ry.  Co.  V.  Anderson,  242  U.  S.  283,  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  20. 


184  State  Recjulatton  of  Carriers.  [§  161 

are  not  denied  the  exercise  of  their  power  to  secure  safety 
in  the  physical  operation  of  railroad  trains  within  their 
territory,  even  though  such  trains  are  used  in  interstate  com- 
merce.'"" Having  in  mind  that  Congress  has  enacted  several 
safety  appliance  acts,"^  it  would  seem  that  there  is  reason 
supporting  the  argument  that  Congress  has  already  "oc- 
cupied the  field"  wherein  "safety  in  the  physical  operation 
of  railroad  trains"  is  provided.  This  decision  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  can  with  difficulty  be  reconciled  with  a  subse- 
quent decision  of  the  Court,  holding  that  a  law  of  Indiana 
requiring  hand-holds  on  freight  cars  used  in  interstate  com- 
merce was  void.^' 

§16.  Elevator  Charges. — Transportation,  as  defined  by 
the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  post,  Sec.  337,  includes  all 
services  in  connection  with  the  receipt,  delivery,  elevation, 
and  transfer  in  transit,  ventilation,  refrigeration  or  icing, 
storage,  and  handling  of  property  transported. 

The  charges  for  elevating  products  as  a  part  of  an  inter- 
state transportation  of  such  products  is  clearly  not  subject  to 
state  regulation,  but  must  be  prescribed  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission."^ 

In  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,  at  pp.  41:?,  414,  of  the  opinion, 
]\rr.  Justice  Hughes  cited  the  Granger  cases  and  the  Railroad 
Commission  cases,  and  in  referring  to  the  Munn  case,***  said : 

"The  court  had  before  it  the  statute  of  Illinois  governing 
the  grain  warehouses  in  Chicago.  Through  these  elevators, 
located  Avith  the  river  harbor  on  the  one  side  and  the  railway 
tracks  on  the  other,  it  was  necessary,  according  to  the  course 
of  trade,  for  the  product  of  seven  or  eight  states  of  the  West 

See  as  sustaining  the  comment  N.  E.  337.  Note  112  j)ost. 

in  the  text.  Notes  94  and  123,  post.  97.   Int.  Com.    Com.    v.    Diffen- 

94.    Atlantic    C.    L.    R.    Co.    v.  baugh,  222  U.  S.  42,  56  L.  Ed.  83, 

Georgia,  234  U.  S.  280,  58  L.  Ed.  32  Sup.  Ct.  22;   Union  Pac.  R.  Co. 

312,  3.4  Sup.  Ct.  829.    See  note  130.  v.  Updike  Grain  Co.,  222  U.  S.  215, 

95.  Sec.  330,  post,  appendices  B  56  L.  Ed.  171,  32  Sup.  Ct.  39. 

to  J.  98.  Simpson  et  al.,  R.  R.  Com.  of 

96.  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Minnesota  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  S. 
Com.  of  Ind.,  236  U.  S.  439,  59  L.  352,  432,  433,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  3S 
Ed.  661,  35  Sup.  Ct.  304;  reversing  Sup.  Ct.  729;  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94 
same  styled  case,  179  Ind.  23,  100  U.  S.  (4  Otto)   113,  24  L.  Ed.  77. 


§  17]  Engaged;  in  Interstate  Commerce.  185 

to  pass  on  its  way  to  the  states  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  In 
addition  to  the  denial  of  any  legislative  authority  to  limit 
charges  it  was  urged  that  the  act  was  repugnant  to  the  ex- 
clusive power  of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  commerce. 
The  court  answered  that  the  business  was  carried  on  exclu- 
sively within  the  limits  of  the  state  of  Illinois,  that  its  regula- 
tion was  a  thing  of  domestic  concern  and  that  'certainly, 
until  Congress  acts  in  reference  to  their  interstate  relation, 
the  state  may  exercise  all  the  powers  of  government  over 
them,  even  though  in  so  doing  it  may  indirectly  operate  upon 
commerce  outside  its  immediate  jurisdiction.'  In  the  deci- 
sion of  the  railroad  cases,  above  cited,  the  same  opinion  was 
expressed." 

Congress  did  act  in  1906,  and  now  the  states  may  not  regu- 
late grain  and  similar  elevators  save  as  to  elevation  not 
affecting  interstate  commerce. 

§  17.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates.— The  statute  pro- 
vides that,  as  to  transportation,  within  the  Act  to  Regulate 
Commerce,  the  interstate  Commerce  Commission  nXay  require 
cai-riers  to  establish  through  routes,  the  Commission  having 
the  power  to  prescribe  the  rate  and  determine  the  divisions."'' 
A  state  legislative  act  under  which  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  are  prescribed,  is  valid  when  interstate  commerce  is 
not  directly  affected  and  when  the  requirement  therefor  is 
reasona])!e."*''  In  the  absence  of  a  statute,  through  routing 
could  not  be  enforced,""  and.  as  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Holmes,'"" 

99.  Sec.  399,  jwst;  and  a  state  101.  In  Wadley  So.  Ry.  v. 
commission,  as  to  intrastate  com-  State,  137  Ga.  497,  507,  73  S.  E. 
merce,  may  apportion  a  joint  rate,  741,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia 
State  V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  said:  "It  is  true  tliat  railroad 
Co.,  80  Minn.  191,  83  N.  W.  60,  89  companies  can  not  be  required  to 
Am.  St.  Rep.  514,  affirmed  Minne-  issue  through  bills  of  lading,  or 
apolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  State  of  to  contract  to  forward  goods  be- 
Minnesota,  186  U.  S.  257,  46  L.  yond  their  own  lines.  Coles  v. 
Ed.  1151,  22  Sup.  Ct.  900.  Central  R.  Co.,  86  Ga.   251,  12  S. 

100.  But  such  a  statute  affecting  E.  749;    State  v.  W.  &  T.  R.  Co., 
interstate   transportation   is    void,  104  Ga.  437,  30  S.  E.  891." 
Lowe  V.  Seaboard   A.   L.   Ry.   Co.,  102.     Central     Stock     Yards     v. 
63  S.  C.  248,  41  S.  E.  297,  90  Am.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  192  U.  S. 
St.  Rep.  678.  568,  571,  48  L.  Ed.  565,  24  Sup.  Ct. 

339. 


186  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [^  18 

"the  requirement  to  deliver,  transfer  and  transport  freight 
to  any  point  where  there  is  a  physical  connection  between 
the  tracks  of  the  railroad  companies  must  be  taken  to  refer 
to  cases  Avhere  the  freight  is  ciestined  to  some  further  point 
by  transportation  over  a  connecting  line." 

As  to  intrastate  commerce,  a  state  may  prohibit  discrimina- 
tion by  a  eari'ier  against  another,  and  where  a  joint  rate  is 
established  it  is  subject  to  governmental  regulation.'""  This 
does  not  mean  that  a  carrier  may  be  compelled  to  make  a 
,conlraet  to  deliver  over  another  road,  bat  carriers  may  be 
compelled  to   deliver  freight  to   and  receive   freight  from  a 

104 

conneering  carrier. 

States,  hoAvever,  have  nor  power  to  compel  a  carrier  to  switch 
cars  between  a  connection  with  a  comlpeting  interstate  car- 
rier and  a  designated  side  track  within  its  own  terminals, 
when  such  movement  is  for  the  accommodation  of  interstate 
traffic."' 

§  18.  Regulation  of  the  Movement  of  Trains.    Sunday  Law. 

— The  legislature  of  the  state  of  Georgia  prohibited  the  run- 
aiing  of  freight  trains  on  any  road  in  the  state  on  Sunday. 
There  were  certain  exceptions  referring  to  trains  carrying 
live  stock  and  delayed  trains.  A  conviction  being  had  under 
the  statute,  and  an  affirmance  thereof  by  the  highest  state 
court,  the  case  was  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court.  That 
court  sustained  the  Georgia  statute.'""  Mr,  Justice  Harlan, 
concluding  the  opinion,  said : 

103.  Stephens  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Tex.,  —  Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ,  86  S.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  138  Ga.  625,  631.  75  S.  16,  affirmed  same  styled  case.  99 
E.  1041,  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  541,  Tex.  3.?.2,  89  S.  W.  961;  Inman  v. 
1913E,  Ann.  Cas.  609;  Wadley  St.  L.  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  14  Tex.  Civ. 
Southern    Ry.    Co.    v.    State,    137  App.  39,  37  S.  W.  37. 

Ga.   497,  73    S.   E.   741.    Affirmed:  105.     Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rail- 

Wadley   S.  R.  Co.  v.  Georgia,  235  road  Com.  of  La.,  236  U.  S.  157,  59 

U.   S.   651,   59  L.   Ed.   405,   35   Sup.  L.  Ed.  517,  35  Sup.  Ct.  275. 
Ct.  214.  106.  Hennington  v.  Georgia,  163 

104.  §  14,  supra,  Hudson  V.  R.  U.  S.  299,  41  L.  Ed.  166,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
Co.  v.  Boston  &  M  R.  Co.,  45  Misc.  1086;  Simpson,  et  al.,  R.  R.  Com. 
520,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  928,  affirmed  of  Minnesota  v.  Shepard,  230  U. 
same  styled  case,  106  App.  Div.  375,  S.  352,  432,  433,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33 
94  N.  Y.  Supp.  545;   International  Sup.   Ct.   729. 

&  G.  N.  R.  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Com.  of 


§  19]  Engaged  ix  Interstate  Commerce.  187 

"The  statute  of  Georgia  is  not  directed  against  interstate 
commerce.  It  establishes  a  rule  of  civil  conduct  ap[)licable 
alike  to  all  freight  trains,  domestic  as  well  as  interstate.  It 
applies  to  the  transportation  of  interstate  freight  the  same 
rule  Drecisely  that  it  applies  to  the  transportation  of  domestic 
fi'eight.  And  it  places  the  business  of  transporting  freight  in 
the  same  category  as  all  other  secular  business.  It  simply 
declares  that,  on  and  during  the  day  fixed  by  law  as  a  day 
of  rest  for  all  people  within  the  limits  of  the  state  from  toil 
and  ]al)(>r  incident  to  their  callings,  the  transportation  of 
freight  shall  be  suspended. 

"We  are  of  the  opinion  that  such  a  law,  although  in  a 
limited  degree  affecting  interstate  commerce,  is  not  for  that 
reason  a  needless  intrusion  upon  the  domain  of  federal  juris- 
diction, nor  strictly  a  regulation  of  interstate  commerce,  but, 
considered  in  its  own  nature,  is  an  ordinary  police  regulation 
designed  to  secure  the  well  being  and  to  promote  the  general 
welfare  of  the  people  within  the  state  by  which  it  was  es- 
tablished, and  therefore  not  invalid  by  force  alone  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States." 

§  19.  Same  Subject.  Requiring  the  Operation  of  a  Par- 
ticular Train. — An  order  of  a  railroad  commission  made  un- 
der adequate  statutory  authority,  which  requires  a  railroad 
company  to  furnish  transportation  between  two  points  in  the 
state,  and  to  arrange  its  schedule  to  make  connections  with 
through  interstate  trains,  is  not.  when  required  by  puWic 
convenience,  illegal.  Nor  is  such  order  unreasonable  because 
the  operation  of  the  particular  train  required  by  the  order 
may  entail  some  pecuniary  loss  to  the  carrier.^"' 

Tlie  Railroad  Commission  of  Kansas,  after  hearing,  ordered 
an  interstate  railroad  to  operate  a  passenger  service  from  a 
point  within  the  state  to  the  state  line,  although  the  railroad 
had  no  station  at  the  state  line.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the 
Ignited  States,  having  found  that  the  order  was  not  arbitrary 

107.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  involved  in  this  case  was  not  con- 
North  Carolina  Corp.  Com.,  206  U.  sidered.  This  decision  affirms 
S.  1,  51  L.  Ed.  9a3,  27  Sup.  Ct.  585,  North  Carolina  Corp.  Com.  v.  At- 
11  Ann.  Cas.  398.  The  effect  on  lantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  137  N.  C.  1,  49 
interstate  commerce  of  the  order  S.  E.  191,  115  Am.  St.  Rep.  636. 


188  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [^  19 

or  unreasonable,  discussed  and  determined  the  contention 
made,  tliat  the  order  was  void  because  it  operated  as  a  direct 
burden  u])on  interstate  commerce.  In  support  of  the  con- 
tention the  carrier  urged  "that  the  charter  of  the  Interstate 
Raih'oad  Company,  the  buikler  of  the  branch,  provided  for  a 
road  not  only  in  Kansas  l)ut  to  extend  into  Texas  and  Mis- 
souri, and  therefore  for  an  interstate  railroad." 

The  court  held  that  the  charter  of  the  railroad  "did  not 
change  the  nature  and  character  of  our  constitutional 
system  and,  therefore,  did  not  destroy  the  power  of  Kansas 
over  its  domestic  commerce."  and  that  the  order  being  reason- 
able was  not  void;  and.  in  concluding  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  Mr.  Justice  (later  Mr.  Chief  Justice)  "White  said  :'°^ 

"Even  if  the  performance  of  the  duty  of  furnishing  ade- 
(jnatn  local  facilities  in  some  respect  affected  interstate  com- 
merce, it  does  not  necessarily  result  that  thereby  a  direct 
burden  on  interstate  commerce  would  be  imposed." 

When  it  was  sought  to  enjoin  an  order  of  the  New  York 
Public  Service  Commission,  wliich  required  the  carrier  to 
restore  certain  trains  which  had  been  discontinued,  the  dis- 
trict judge  held,  under  the  facts  there  of  record,  that  such 
an  order  was  void.  It  appeared  that,  without  the  trains 
Avhich  had  been  discontinued,  the  service  accommodated  the 
necessities  of  the  people,  and  that  to  operate  the  additional 
trains  would  mean  a  loss  to  the  carrier.  Under  the  facts  the 
judge  aptly  said:  "What  is  reasonalj^e  and  what  is  reason- 
ably necessary  is  not  to  be  determined  by  the  occasional  wants 
and  wishes  and  convenience  of  a  very  few  people  living  at 
points  along  the  line. "  '"''  In  holding  void  a  statute  of  AViscon- 
sin  requiring  "that  every  village  having  two  hundred  or  more 
inhabitants  and  a  post  office,  and  being  within  one-eighth  of 
a  mile  of  a  railroad,  must  be  given  by  such  railroad  the  ac- 
commodation of  at  least  two  passenger  trains  each  way  each 
day,  if  four  or  more  passenger  trains  are  run  each  way  daily." 

108.    Missouri    Pac.    Ry.    Co.    v.  28   Sup.   Ct.    121.     See   also    State 

Kansas,    216   U.    S.    262,    283,    284,  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  11 

54  L.  Ed.  472,  30  Sup.  Ct.  330,  cit-  S.  D.  282,  77  N.  W.  104. 
ing  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Whar-  109.  Delaware  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 

ton.  207  U.  S.  328,  52  L.  Ed.  230,  Van  Santwood,  216  Fed.  252. 


§  20]  Engaged;  in  Intekstate  Commerce.  189 

the  authorities  are  cited  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  prin- 
ciples established  by  the  authorities  given  as  follows:  "(1) 
It  is  competent  for  a  state  to  require  adequate  local  facilities, 
even  to  the  stoppage  of  interstate  trains  or  the  rearrange- 
ment of  their  schedules.  (2)  Such  facilities  existing — that 
is,  the  local  conditions  being  adequately  met — the  obligation 
of  the  railroad  is  performed,  and  the  stoppage  of  interstate 
trains  becomes  an  improper  and  illegal  interference  with  in- 
terstate commerce.  (3)  And  this,  whether  the  interference 
be  directly  by  the  legislature  or  by  its  command  through  the 
orders  of  an  administrative  body.  (4)  The  fact  of  local 
facilities  this  court  may  determine,  such  fact  being  necessarily 
involved  in  the  determination  of  the  federal  question  whether 
,an  order  concerning  an  interstate  train  does  or  does  not 
directly  regulate  interstate  commerce,  by  imposing  an  arbi- 
trary requirement.""" 

Sub-divisions  1  and  2  above  are  illogical.  Whether  or  not 
a  requirement  that  trains  shall  stop  is  reasonable  is  determin- 
able in  part  from  the  extent  of  existing  facilities;  but  inter- 
state commerce  is  interstate  commerce  regardless  of  the  ade- 
quacy or  inadequacy  of  local  facilities. 

§  20.  Same  Subject.  Speed  of  Trains. — In  the  absence  of 
legislation  by  Congress,  a  city  ordinance  regulating  the  speed 
limit  of  trains  within  the  city  limits,  is  not  as  to  interstate 
trains  unconstitutional.  This  law  was  announced  by  Mr. 
J'ahtice  Brewer  (Erb  v.  Morasch,  177  U.  S.  584,  44  L.  Ed. 
897,  20  Sup.  Ct.  819),  who  said: 

"A  city,  when  authorized  by  the  legislature,  may  regulate 
the  speed  of  railroad  trains  within  the  city  limits.  Kichmond, 
F.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Richmond.  96  U.  S.  521,  24  L.  Ed.  734; 
Cleveland.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois  ex  rel.  Jett,  177 
U.  S.  514,  44  L.  Ed.  868,  20  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  722.  Such  act  is, 
even  to  interstate  trains,  one  only  indirectly  affecting  inter- 
state commerce,  and  is  within  the  power  of  the  state  until 
at  least  Congress  shall  take  action  in  the  matter." 

110.  Chicago.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Gulf  C.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Texas, 
Railroad  Com.  of  Wis.,  237  U.  S.  246  U.  S.  58,  62  L.  Ed.  574,  38  Sup. 
220,  59  L.  Ed.  926,  35  Sup.  Ct.  560.       Ct.  236. 


lilO  State  Regulatiox  of  Cakrieks.  [§  21 

A  statute  of  Nebraska  fixing  a  rate  of  speed  for  cattle 
trains  moving  between  points  within  the  state  and  providing  a 
sum  as  liquidated  damages  for  its  violation,  is  valid,  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  having  held  that  the  legis- 
lature had  power  "to  impose  a  limitation  of  the  time  for  the 
transportation  of  live  stock"  and  "to  provide  a  definite 
measure  of  damages,"  such  damages  being  "difficult  to  esti- 
mate or  prove."  ^" 

Confusing  unreasonableness  of  the  requirement  with  the 
fact  that  there  was  a  regulation  of  interstate  commerce,  and 
not  citing  tlie  case  of  Erb  v.  ]\Iorasch,  supra,  tlie  Supreme  Court 
held  unconstitutional  as  a  regulation  of  interstate  commerce 
a  statute  of  Texas  applicable  to  interstate  trains  which  re- 
quires railway  companies  to  start  passenger  trains  at  the 
point  of  origin  and  at  local  stations  on  schedule  time,  with 
a  margin  of  thirty  minutes."' 

§  21.  Same  Subject.  Requirement  That  Trains  Shall  Stop 
at  Particular  Stations. — In  determining  whether  or  not  a 
state  statute  or  a  regulation  of  a  state  commission  indirectly 
affecting  interstate  commerce  is  valid,  the  Supreme  Court 
looks  to  the  facts  to  see  whether  or  not  the  regulation  is 
reasonabHe.  To  require  a  train  to  run  at  a  low  rate  of  speed 
through  a  city  may  cause  more  delay  than  to  require  such 
train  to  stop  at  a  particular  station  three  minutes.  We  have 
just  seen  in  the  preceding  section  that  the  limitation  of  speed 
w^as  held  legal.     This  was  because  the  regulation  was  neces- 

111.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Ed.  and  Seaboard  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cram,  228  U.  S.  70,  84,  57  L.  Ed.  Blackwell,  244  U.  S.  310,  61  L.  Ed. 
734,  33  Sup.  Ct.  437,  affirming  1160,  37  Sup.  Ct.  640,  L.  R.  A. 
Cram  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  1917P,  1184;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
84  Neb.  607,  122  N.  W.  31,  26  L.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com.  of  Wis..  237 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  l(rz-^,  85  Neb.  586,  U.  S.  220,  59  L.  Ed.  926,  35  Sup. 
123  N.  W.  1045,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  Ct.  560,  P.  U.  R.  1915C  309;  Le- 
S.)  1028,  19  Ann.  Cas.  170;  Chi-  high,  Covington  &  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
cago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Kyle,  228  Covington,  235  U.  S.  537,  59  L.  Ed. 
U.  S.  85,  57  L.  Ed.  741,  33  Sup.  Ct.  350,  35  Sup.  Ct.  l58,  L.  R.  A.  1915F, 
440,  affirming  Kyle  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  792,  P.  U.  R.  1915A.  231,  In 
R.  Co.,  84  Neb.  621,  122  N.  W.  37.  the    Seaboard    A.    L.    R.    Co.    case 

112.  Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  infra,  the  Georgia  Blow  Post  law 
Texas,  245  U.  S.  484,  62  L.  Ed.  419,  is  held  Invalid.  See  also  note  110, 
38  Sup.  Ct.  178,  see  also  note  L.  supra. 


§  21]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  191 

sary  and  reasonable.  A  regulation,  however,  to  stop  an  in- 
terstate train  at  a  point  where  reasonable  facilities  for  travel 
already  exist  is  unreasonable  and  an  invalid  attempt  to  regu- 
late interstate  commerce."''  This  is  true  because  the  regula- 
tion was  not  a  i-easonable  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the 
state.    The  opinion  w^ritten  by  Mr.  Justice  Peckham  concludes : 

"The  transportation  of  passengers  on  interstate  trains  as 
rapidly  as  can  with  safety  be  done  is  the  inexorable  demand 
of  the  public  who  use  such  trains.  Competition  between 
great  trunk  lines  is  fierce  and  at  times  bitter.  Each  line  must 
do  its  best  even  to  obtain  its  fair  share  of  the  transportation 
betAveen  states,  both  of  passengers  and  freight.  A  wholly  un- 
necessary, even  though  a  small,  obstacle,  ought  not,  in  fair- 
ness, to  be  placed  in  the  way  of  an  interstate  road,  which  may 
thus  be  unable  to  meet  the  competition  of  its  rivals.  We  by 
no  means  intend  to  impair  the  strength  of  the  previous  deci- 
sions of  this  court  on  the  subject,  nor  to  assume  that  the  in- 
terstate transportation,  either  of  passengers  or  freight,  is 
to  l)e  regarded  as  overshadowing  the  rights  of  the  residents 
of  the  state  through  Avhich  the  railroad  passes  to  adequate 
railroad  facilities.  Both  claims  are  to  be  considered,  and  after 
the  wants  of  the  residents  within  a  state  or  locality  through 
which  the  road  passes  have  been  adequately  supplied,  regard 
being  had  to  all  the  facts  bearing  upon  the  subject,  they 
ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  demand  more,  at  the  cost  of  the 
ability  of  the  road  to  successfully  compete  with  its  rivals  in 
the  transportation  of  interstate  passengers  and  freight.'' 

A  requirement  of  the  law  of  the  state  of  Illinois  that  an  in- 
terstate mail  and  passenger  train  should  run  to  a  county  seat 
three  and  a  half  miles  off  the  main  line  is  an  unconstitutional 
interference  and  obstruction  of  interstate  commerce."'  A 
purely  local  ti'ain,  however,  although  carrying  passengers 
and  mail  destined  to  points  beyond  the  state,  may  properly 

113.    Mississippi    Railroad   Com.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  105  Mo. 

V.  III.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  203  U.  S.  335,  App.  207,  79  S.  W.  714. 
51  L.  Ed.  209,  27  Sup.  Ct.  90.    See  114.    III.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Illinois, 

notes  54  L.  Ed.  U.  S.  Reports  970,  163   U.   S.   142,   41   L.   Ed.   107,   16 

14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  293,  and  State  Sup.  Ct.  1096. 


l.!)2  Statk.  Rk(julati()n  of  Carhikbs.  [§  21 

be  required  to  stop  at  oonnty  seats  directly  on  the  line  trav- 
ersed by  such  train. "^ 

Tbe  ]\lississippi  ease,  supra,  vmay.  upon  a  casual  reading, 
appear  in  conflict  with  a  former  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Ccnu-t.'"'  The  cases,  however,  are  easily  distinguishable.  In 
tlie  ]\Tississi})pi  case  the  facts  showed  that  there  were  reason- 
able facilities  for  travel  without  enforcing  the  order  therein 
under  investigation.  In  the  Ohio  case  all  trains  up  to  three 
each  way  each  day  were  required  to  stop.  Ultimately  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  a  particular  police  regulation  is 
reasonablle  must  be  passed  upon  by  the  courts  and  in  one 
case  the  Supreme  Court  held  the  regulation  to  stop  unneces- 
sary a)id.  therefore,  unreasonable.  In  the  other,  under  the 
facts,  the  regulation  was  necessary  and,  therefore,  reasonable. 
The  Ohio  case  cites  and  discusses  the  authorities,  and  the 
conclusion  of  the  opinion  makes  reference  to  the  rule  adopted 
subsequently  in  the  Mississippi  ease.  This  conclusion  is  as 
follows : 

"Our  present  .judgment  has  reference  only  to  the  case 
before  us,  and  when  other  eases  arise  in  which  local  statutes 
are  alleged  not  to  be  Legitimate  exertions  of  the  police  powers^ 
of  the  state,  but  to  infringe  upon  national  authority,  it  on 
then  be  determined  Avhether  they  are  to  be  controlled  b}^ 
the  decision  now  rendered.  It  would  be  impracticable,  as  well 
as  uuAvise,  to  attempt  to  lay  down  any  rule  that  would  govern 
every  conceiva1)le  ease  that  might  be  suggested  by  ingenious 
minds." 

The  Mississippi  case  Avas  followed  upon  similar  facts."'' 

The  conclusion  quoted  above  leaves  the  decision  of  each 
case  to  be  determined  by  the  court  from  its  view  of  the 
particular  facts,  the  principle  applied  being  that  interstate 
commerce  may  be  indirectly  aff'ected  to  the  extent  necessary 
to  furnish  "adequate  and  reasonable  facilities."  This  in 
effect  gives  the  states  some  control  over  interstate  commerce, 

115.  Gladson  v.  Minnesota,  166  117.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
U.  S.  427,  41  L.  Ed.  1064,  17  Sup.  Wharton,  207  U.  S.  328,  52  L.  Ed. 
Ct.  627.  230,  28  Sup.  Ct.  J 21;    Herndon  v. 

116.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  218  U. 
Ohio,  173  U.  S.  285,  43  L.  Ed.  S.  135,  54  L.  Ed.  970,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
702,  19  Sup.  Ct.  465.                 .  633. 


§  22]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  193 

the  Supreme  Court  having  the  power  in  each  particular  case 
to  say  whether  or  not  that  control  shall  be  permitted.  As 
indicated  in  sections  19  and  20  above,  it  seems  that  a  more 
logical  conclusion  could  be  reached  by  enforcing  the  con- 
stitutional right  of  interstate  transportation,  fully  regulated 
by  Congress,  to  be  free  of  state  regulation.  The  difficulties 
of  applying  the  rule  are  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  McKenna  in  a 
decision  holding  a  Wisconsin  statute  invalid"*  and  are  illus- 
trated when  that  decision  is  read  wnth  a  later  one  holding  a 
Texas  regulation  valid."" 

§  22.  State  Regulation  of  Carriers  and  Their  Employees. 
— A  state  statute  requiring  engineers  to  be  examined  and 
licensed  is  not  void,  although  it  may  incidentally  and  re- 
motely affect  interstate  commerce.^"" 

A  law  of  a  state  forbidding  those  affected  w^ith  color  blind- 
ness from  acting  as  locomotive  engineers  is  a  valid  exercise 
of  the  state's  police  power.^"^  In  sustaining  the  above  prin- 
ciple, Mr.  Justice  Field  said : 

''It  is  conceded  that  the  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  inter- 
state commerce  is  plenary;  that,  as  incident  to  it,  Congress 
may  legislate  as  to  the  qualifications,  duties  and  liabilities  of 
employees  and  others  on  railway  trains  engaged  in  that  com- 
merce; and  that  such  legislation  wall  supersede  any  state 
action  on  the  subject.  But  until  such  legislation  is  had,  it  is 
clearly  within  the  competency  of  the  state  to  provide  against 
accidents  on  trains  whilst  within  their  limits.  Indeed,  it  is 
a  principle  fully  recognized  by. decisions  of  state  and  federal 
courts,  that  wherever  there  is  any  businiess  in  which,  either 
from  the  products  created  or  the  instrumentalities  used,  there 
is  danger  to  life  or  property,  it  is  not  only  within  the  power 

118.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  159;  in  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  821 
R.  R.  Com.  of  Wis..  237  U.  S.  220,  and  in  14  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  293;  and 
59  L.  Ed.  926,  35  Sup.  Ct.  560,  P.  see  INIissouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
U.  R.  1915C,  309.  Texas,  245  U.  S.  484,  62  L.  Ed.  419, 

119.  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  38  Sup.  Ct.  178,  note  112,  supra. 
Texas,  246  U.  S.  58,  62  L.  Ed.  574,  120.  Smith  v.  Alabama,  124  U.  S. 
38  Sup.  Ct.  236.  See  also  note  112  465,  31  L.  Ed.  508,  8  Sup.  Ct.  564, 
and    sections    19    and    20,    supra.  1   I.  C.  R.  804. 

notes  in  59  L.  Ed.   926;    in  62  L.  121.   Nashville,    C.    &    St.    L.    R. 

Ed.  574,  575;    in  44  L.  R.   A.    (N.      Co.  v.  Alabama,  128   U.   S.  96,   32 
S.)    478;    in   29   L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.)       L.  Ed.  352,  9  Sup.  Ct.  28. 


1.94 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  22 


of  the  states,  but  it  is  among  their  plain  duties,  to  make  pro- 
vision against  a(!cidents  likely  to  follow  in  such  business, 
so  that  the  dangers  attending  it  may  be  guarded  against  so 
far  as  is  practicable." 

Under  this  principle,  a  state  law  requiring  a  certain  num- 
ber of  employees  to  a  train,  known  as  the  Full  Crew  Law, 
is  valid.'""  A  law  requiring  an  electric  head  light  on  engines 
has  been  held  valid,  although  it  is  near  the  margin  of  the 
power  of  a  state  if  it  does  not  offend  against  the  commerce 
clause  of  the  federal  Constitution.'"'' 

If  a  state  can  not  regulate  the  employees  of  railroads  in  so 
far  as  they  are  engaged  in  intrastate  commierce,  they  can 
not  be  regulated.'"* 

Congress  having  in  1908  passed  a  second  Employees'  Lia- 
bility Act,  which  is  valid,  the  passage  of  that  act  removed  that 
subject  from  the  sphere  of  state  action.'^®  There  being  nothing 
in  the  federal  laws  to  conflict  therewith,  it  is  within  the  power 
of  a  state  legislature  to  require  carriers  to  pay  employees  wages 


122.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Arkansas,  86  Ark.  412,  111  S. 
W.  456;  for  note  see  32  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  22;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Arkansas,  219  U.  S. 
45.?.,  55  L.  Ed.  290,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
275.  But  a  law  of  Texas  pro- 
hibiting anyone  from  acting  as  a 
conductor  on  a  railway  train  with- 
out previous  service  as  a  brake- 
man  is  void  as  a  denial  of  the 
equal  protection  of  the  law.  Smith 
V.  Texas,  233  U.  S.  630,  58  L.  Ed. 
1129,  34  Sup.  Ct.  681;  reversing 
same  styled  case,  63  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
183,  146  S.  W.  900.  The  require- 
ment of  a  specified  crew  in  switch- 
ing across  streets  sustained.  St. 
Louis  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Arkan- 
sas, 240  U.  S.  518,  60  L.  Ed.  776, 
36    Sup.   Ct.   443. 

123.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
State  of  Georgia,  135  Ga.  545,  69 
S.  E.  725,  32  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  20; 
same  styled   case,   234   U.   S-   280, 


58  L.  Ed.  1312,  34  Sup.  Ct.  829. 
The  Supreme  Court  has  indicated 
that  since  the  pnssage  of  the  Act 
of  March  4,  1915  (Chap.  168,  38 
Stat.  L.  1192,  Fed.  Stat.  Ann. 
8638a)  this  decision  may  not  be 
controling.  Vandalia  R.  Co.  v. 
Pub.  Serv.  Com.  of  Ind.,  242  U. 
S.  255,  61  L.  Ed.  276,  37  Sup.  Ct. 
93. 

124.  Howard  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co., 
207  U.  S.  46.3.,  52  L.  Ed.  297,  28 
Sup.  Ct.  141.  See  a  discussion  of 
Smith  V.  Alabama  and  similar 
cases  in  dissenting  opinion  of  Mr. 
Justice  Moody. 

125.  For  a  discussion  of  this  Act 
see  post.  Sec.  332:  see  also  North- 
ern ?ac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Washington, 
222  U.  S.  370,  56  L.  Ed.  237,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  160;  North  Carolina  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Zachary,  232  U.  S.  248, 
58  L.  Ed.  591,  34  Sup.  Ct.  305; 
reversing  same  styled  case,  156 
N.  C.   496,   72   S.   E.   858;    Erie  R. 


^  23]  Engaged,  in  Inteestate  Commeece.  195 

s<?ini-monthly,  altliongh  the  carriers  and  employees  are  en- 
gag^ed  in  interstate  commerce/"" 

Congress  having  acted  upon  the  subject  of  the  hours  of 
labor  of  interstate  railway  employees/"  the  subject  is  be- 
yond state  control,  and  a  state  law  fixing  such  hours  for  a 
shorter  period  than  those  fixed  by  the  federal  statute,  is  void.'" 

§  23.  Blowing  Whistle  and  Checking-  Speed  at  Crossings. — 
In  the  absence  of  congressional  action  upon  the  same  subject 
matter,  states  may  regulate  "the  manner  in  w'hich  interstate 
trains  shall  approach  dangerous  crossings,  the  signals  which 
shall  be  given,  and  the  control  of  the  train  which  shall  be 
required  under  such  circumstances.  Crossings  may  be  so 
situated  in  reference  to  cuts  or  curves  as  to  render  them 
highly  dangerous  to  those  using  the  public  highways.  They 
may  be  in  or  near  toAvns  or  cities,  so  that  to  approach  them 
at  a  high  rate  of  speed  would  be  attended  with  great  danger 
to  life  or  limb.  On  the  other  hand,  highway  crossings  may  be 
so  numerous  and  so  near  together  that  to  require  interstate 
trains  to  slacken  speed  indiscriminately  at  all  such  crossings 
would  be  practically  destructive  of  the  successful  operation 
of  such  passenger  trains.  Statutes  which  require  the  speed 
of  such  trains  to  be  checked  at  all  crossings  so  situated  might 
not  only  be  a  regulation,  but  also  a  direct  burden  upon  inter- 
state commerce,  and  therefore  beyond  the  power  of  the  state 
to  enact." 

This  quotation  states  a  general  rule,  the  application  of  which 
to  a  Georgia  statute  requiring  an  interstate  carrier  to  check 
its  trains  at  public  crossings  resulted  in  a  holding  that  the 
statute  was  valid.'"" 

In  this  decision   the  question  was  not   fully  presented  and 

R.  Co.  V.  Williams,  233  U.  S.  685,  128.  Erie   R.   Co.   v.   New   York. 

58  L.   Ed.   1155,   34   Sup.  Ct.   761;  233  U.  S.  671,  58  L.  Ed.   1149.  34 

affirming  same  styled  case  199  N.  Sup.  Ct.  756,  reversing.  Erie  R.  Co. 

Y.    525,    92   N.   E.    1084,    136    App.  v.  New  York,  198  N.  Y.  369,  91  N. 

Div.  902,  120  N.  Y.  Sup.  1023.  E.   849,   29   L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.)    240, 

126.  State  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  139  Am.  St.  Rep.  829,  19  Ann. 
Co.,  242  Mo.  339,  147  S.  W.  118.  Cas.  811. 

127.  Appendix  F,  Sec.  331,  post.  129.  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  King,  217  U. 
Wilson  V.  New,  243  U.  S.  332,  61  L.  S.  524,  533,  534,  54  L.  Ed.  868,  30 
Ed.  755,  S7  Sup.  Ct.  298.  Sup.  Ct.   594. 


196  State  Recjulation  of  Cakriers.  [§  24 

the  conclusion  was  not  followed  w^hen  the  same  Georgia  stat- 
ute came  again  under  review."" 

§  24.  Furnishing  Cars  for  the  Receipt  and  Delivery  of  Ship- 
ments.— Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Hepburn  Act'"'  the  Texas 
legislature  passed  a  law  prescribing  rules  under  w^hich  carriers 
should  furnish  cars  to  shippers.  A  penalty  was  fixed  as  fol- 
lows : 

""When  cars  are  applied  for  under  the  provisions  of  this 
chapter,  if  they  are  not  furnished  the  railway  company  so 
failing  to  furnish  them  shall  forfeit  to  the  party  or  parties 
so  applying  for  them  the  sum  of  $25  per  day  for  each  car 
failed  to  be  furnished,  to  be  recovered  in  any  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction,  and  all  actual  damages  such  applicant 
may  sustain." 

The  only  excuse  which  the  carrier  could  give  to  escape  the 
penalty  was  "strikes  or  other  public  calamity."  The  Texas 
Court  of  Civil  Appeals  having  sustained  a  judgment  for  a 
penalty  under  the  statute^^^  the  cause  was  appealed  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  and  that  court  determined  the  question  of 
whether  the  regulation  was  reasonable,  as.  it  had  a  right  to 
do,  the  regulation  affecting  interstate  commerce.  The  Texas 
statute  was  held  void  as  being  an  unreasonable  regulation  of 
interstate  commerce.  JMr.  Justice  Brown,  delivering  the  opin- 
ion said  i"'' 

"AVhile  there  is  much  to  be  said  in  favor  of  laws  requiring 
railroads  to  furnish  adequate  facilities  for  the  transportation 
of  both  freight  and  passengers,  and  to  regulate  the  general 
subject  of  speed,  length,  and  frequency  of  stops,  for  the  heat- 
ing, lighting,  and  ventilation  of  passenger  cars,  the  furnish- 
ing of  food  and  water  to  cattle  and  other  live  stock,  we  think 
an  ab.solute  requirement  that  a  railroad  shall  furnish  a  certain 
number  of  cars  at  a  specified  day,  regardless  of  every  other 
consideration  except  strikes  and  other  public  calamities, 
transcends  the  police  power  of  the  state,   and  amounts  to  a 

130.  Seaboard    A.   L.    R.   Co.   v.       609,  83  S.  W.  53,  55. 
Blackwell,  244  U.  S.  3.10.  61  L.  Ed.  133.    Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
1160,  37  Sup.  Ct.  640.                                Mayes,    201    U.    S.   321,    50   L.   Ed. 

131.  Post.  Sees.  335  to  338.  772,  26  Sup.  Ct.  491.  See  also,  So. 

132.  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Melton,  133  Ga.  277,  65 
Mayes,     36     Tex.     Civ.     App.    606,       S.  E.  665. 


§  25]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  197 

burden  upon  interstate  commerce.  It  makes  no  exception  in 
cases  of  a  sudden  congestion  of  traffic,  an  actual  inability  to 
furnish  cars  by  reason  of  their  temporary  and  unavoidable 
detention  in  other  states,  or  in  other  places  within  the  same 
state,  it  makes  no  allowance  for  interference  of  traffic  oc- 
casioned by  wrecks  or  other  accidents  upon  the  same  or  other 
roads,  involving  a  detention  of  traffic,  the  breaking  of  bridges, 
accidental  fires,  washouts,  or  other  unavoidable  consequences 
of  heavy  weather." 

Had  the  regulation  allowed  all  proper  excuses  for  failing 
to  furnish  the  cars,  it  would  have  been  reasonable  and,  there- 
fore valid.   In  concluding  the  opinion,  Mr.  Justice  Brown  said: 

"Although  it  may  be  admitted  that  the  statute  is  not  far  from 
the  line  of  proper  police  regulation,  we  think  that  sufficient 
allowance  is  not  made  for  the  practical  difficulties  in  the 
administration  of  the  law,  and  that,  as  applied  to  interstate 
commerce,  it  transcends  the  legitimate  powers  of  the  legis- 
lature." 

The  Texas  courts  have  held  that  the  law  discussed  above 
was  valid  as  to  intrastate  commerce. ''^^ 

§  25.  Same  Subject.  Rule  Since  Hepburn  Act. — In  South- 
ern Kailway  Co.  v.  Reid/'''  a  statute  of  the  State  of  North 
Carolina  requiring  that  freight  be  received,  when  tendered, 
and  forwarded  by  a  route  selected  by  the  shipper  under  pen- 
alty of  (1^50  a  day  and  actual  damages,  was  Iield  invalid  when 
applied  to  an  interstate  shipment.  This  decision  was  placed 
upon  the  ground  that  there  was  a  conflict  bietween  the  federal 
and  the  state  statutes,  although  the  court  cited  the  Mayes  case, 
supra,  and  pointed  out  that  the  state  statute  and  the  state 
decisions  relating  thereto  left  no  doubt  as  to  what  excuses  or 

134.    Allen  v.  Tex.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  general  question,  Penn.  R.  Co.  v. 

100   Tex.    825,   101   S.   W.    792,   re-  Sonman  Shaft  Coal  Co.,  242  U.  S. 

versing    same    styled    case,    Texas  120,  61  L.  Ed.  188,  37  Sup.  Ct.  46; 

Civ.    App.,    98    S.    W.    450;    Texas  U.   S.   v.   Penn.   R.   Co.,   242   U.   S. 

&  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Taylor,  42  Tex.  Civ.  208,  61  L.  Ed.  251,  37  Sup.  Ct.  95; 

App.  331,   118   S.  W.   1097;    Texas  Sou.    Pac.    Co.    v.    Stevenson.    258 

&  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Andrews,  54  Tex.  Fed.  165,  —  C.  C.  A.  — . 
Civ.  App.  418,  118  S.  W.  1101,  55  135.    So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reid,  222  U. 

Tex.    Civ.    App.    302.    See    Section  S.  424,  56  L.  Ed.  257,  32  Sup.  Ct. 

197a,  post,  and  as  bearing  on  the  140. 


1.98  State  Regulation  of  Oarriees.  ['§'25 

defenses  might  be  offered  for  a  failure  to  comply  with  the  law. 
In  the  course  of  the  opinion,  Mr.  Justice  McKenna  took  oc- 
casion to  describe  the  wide  scope  of  the  Acts  to  Regulate 
Commerce.     He  said  (p.  440)  : 

"There  is  scarcely  a  detail  of  regulation  which  is  omitted 
to  secure  the  purpose  to  which  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
is  aimed.  It  is  true  that  words  directly  inhibitive  of  the  ex- 
ercise of  state  authority  are  not  employed,  but  the  subject  is 
taken  possession  of." 

In  the  Hardwick  Elevator  case'""  the  Chief  Justice,  after 
referring  to  Sections  1,  8,  9  and  10'"  of  the  Act  to  Regulate 
Commerce  as  amended  by  the  Hepburn  Act,  said : 

"As  legislation  concerning  the  delivery  of  cars  for  the  car- 
riage of  interstate  traffic  was  clearly  a  matter  of  interstate 
commerce  regulation,  even  if  such  subject  was  embraced 
within  that  class  of  powers  concerning  which  the  state  had 
a  right  to  exert  its  authority  in  the  absence  of  legislation  by 
Congress,  it  must  follow  in  consequence  of  the  action  of 
Congress  to  which  we  have  referred  that  the  power  of  the 
state  over  the  subject-matter  ceased  to  exist  from  the  moment 
that  Congress  exerted  its  paramount  and  all  embracing  au- 
thority over  the  subject.  We  say  this  because  the  elementary 
and  long  settled  doctrine  is  that  there  can  be  no  divided 
authority  over  interstate  commerce  and  that  the  regulations  of 
Congress  on  that  subject  are  supreme." 

The  application  of  this  principle  to  the  Minnesota  Recipro- 
cal Demurrage  Law  there  involved  resulted  in  holding  that 
law  void.  The  state  court  held  that  the  law  applied  to  both 
interstate  and  intrastate  commerce  and  that  the  regulation  was 
valid  and  within  the  principle  that  Congress  not  having  acted, 
the    state    might."*      The   principle    was    not    denied    bty    the 

136.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  16  I.  C.  C.  116,  121;  Peale,  Peacock 
V.  Hardwick  Farmers  Elevator  &  Kerr  v.  Cent.  R.  Co.  of  N.  J.,  18 
Co.,  226  U.  S.  426,  57  L.  Ed.  284,  I.  C.  C.  25,  35;  Re  demurrage  in- 
33  Sup.  Ct.  174;  Sec.  22,  supra.  vestigation,  19  I.  C.  C.  496,  498; 
Sec.  306  first  edition  was  cited  in  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  United 
the  argument  in  this  case,  p.  431.  States,  188  Fed.  879,  887. 

137.  Post.  $§  335,  338,  382,  383.  138.  Hardwick  Elevator  Co.  v. 
For  regulation  of  demurrage  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  110 
charges  by  the  Int.  Com.  Com.  see:  Minn.  25,  124  N.  W.  819,  9  Ann. 
Wilson  Prod.  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  Cas.  1088. 


<^  25]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  199 

Supreme  Court,  but  it  was  held  that  Congress  had  acted,  and 
that  as  Congress  had  covered  the  whole  field  the  state  was 
thereby  rendered  "impotent  to  deal  with  a  subject  over  which 
it  had  no  inherent  but  only  permissive  power." 

Following  the  Elevator  case,  the  Supreme  Court  has  held 
void  a  Mississippi  regulation  concerning  the  "delivery  of  cars 
at  the  termination  of  interstate  commerce  transportation,""" 
and  an  Arkansas  statute  relating  to  reciprocal  demurrage.'*" 

The  states  may  not  regulate  rates  "on  that  part  of  inter- 
state carriage  which  includes  the  actual  placing  of  the  ship- 
ment into  vessels  ready  to  be  carried  beyond  the  state."'" 

A  state  may  regulate  the  parking  of  taxicabs  and  the  rate 
of  charges  within  the  state,  although  at  times  such  vehicles 
may  be  used  in  interstate  commerce.'" 

There  is  nothing  in  the  federal  law  which  would  make  in- 
valid a  state  law  which  permits  the  recovery  of  damages 
for  failure  to  deliver  or  transport  interstate  freight  in  a 
reasonable  time,  such  law  being  merely  a  statement  of  the 
common  law  on  the  subject  and  being  in  no  way  in  conflict 
with  any  provision  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.'" 

A  municipal  ordinance  compelling  an  express  company  to 
give  a  bond  conditioned  "for  the  safe  and  prompt  delivery 
of  all  baggage,"  etc.,  intrusted  to  it  or  its  agents,  in  so  far 
as  it  applied  to  interstate  commerce  was  held  to  be  void,  be- 

139.  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co..  100  Mo. 
Greenwood  Grocery  Co.,  227  U.  435,  13  S.  W.  709,  8  L.  R.  A.  549, 
S.  1,  57  L.  Ed.  389,  33  Sup.  Ct.  where  is  found  numerous  cita- 
213,    reversing   same   styled    case,  tions  of  authorities. 

96  Miss.  403,  51  So.  450.  142.    Yellow  Taxicab  Co.  v.  Gay- 

140.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  v.  nor  (Taxicab  cases).  82  Miss.  R. 
Edwards,  227  U.  S.  265,  57  L.  Ed.       94,  143  N.  Y.  Supp.  279. 

506,  33  Sup.  Ct.  26;   see  also  Ark-  143.  Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Sym- 

ansas  statute  as  to  distribution  of  merour,  139  Ga.  545,  77  S.  E.  802; 

cars,    St.    Louis   Ry.    Co.    v.    Ark-  Oliver  v.   Chicago,   R.   I.  &  P.   R. 

ansas,    217    U.    S.    136,    54    L.    Ed.  Co.,   89   Ark.   466,   117    S.   W.   238, 

698,  30  Sup.  Ct.  476.  holding  law  valid  as  to  intrastate 

141.  Oregon  R.  R.  Com.  v.  and  invalid  as  to  interstate  com- 
Worthington,  225  U.  S.  101,  56  L.  merce;  Yazoo  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ed.  1'087,  *32  Sup.  Ct.  653.  Requir-  Keystone  Lumber  Co.,  90  Miss, 
ing  double  decked  cars  on  inter-  391,  43  So.  605,  no  interstate  com- 
state  shipments  is  an  illegal  regu-  merce  was  here  moved ;  Zetter- 
lation    by    a    state;     Stanley     v.  berg    v.    Great    IS.    Ry.    Co.,    117 


20O  Statk  Rp:uulatton  of  Carriers.  [§  2t') 

cause  as  said  in  the  opinion  of  the  court:  "Congress  has  ex- 
ercised its  authority  and  has  provided  its  own  scheme  of 
regulation."  "* 

A  state  statute  which  merely  required  a  railroad  company 
to  furnish  cars  w^ithin  a  reasonable  time  after  demand  and 
which,  as  construed,  left  the  question  of  what  was  a  reasonable 
time  to  be  determined  in  view  of  the  requirements  of  inter- 
state commerce,  is  not  a  direct  bdirden  thereof  and  is  valid. 
This  statute  is  nothing  but  a  statement  of  the  carrier's 
common  law  duty  to  furnish  the  necessary  equipment  ena- 
bling it  to  perform  its  undertaking  of  public  transportation.*" 

§  26.  Same  Subject.  Rule  Established. — Where  a  state 
statute  or  regulation  conflicts  with  a  federal  regulation  affect- 
ing interstate  commerce,  the  state  law  is  void.  In  the  absence 
of  a  federal  statute  the  states  may  not  make  regulations 
directly  burdening  interstate  commerce.  Congress  has  taken 
possession  of  the  field  of  regulation  as  to  the  receipt  and  deliv- 
ery of  freight  moving  in  interstate  commerce  and  no  direct 
control  with  reference  thereto  can  be  exercised  by  state  auth- 
ority. Any  regulation  by  a  state  of  an  interstate  carrier 
affects  to  some  extent  interstate  commerce,  and  it  is  clearly 
intimated  by  Mr.  Justice  Hughes  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases, 

Minn.  495,  136  N.  W.  225,  decided  of   the   statute,    St.   L.    S.   W.   Ry. 
before    Hardwick    Elevator    case,  Co.      of      Texas      v.      Hill      & 
note.    Supra.     Statutes    providing  Morris,      97      Tex.      506,      80      S. 
penalties    for    unreasonable    delay  W.  368;  Tex.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hannay- 
of     intrastate      shipments     valid,  Frerichs     &     Co.,     — ,  Tex.     Civ. 
Lexington  Grocery  Co.  v.  So.  Ry.  App.     — ,     13.0     S.     W.     250.     de- 
Co.,  136  N.  C.  396,  48   S.   E.  801;  lay      caused      by      not      shipping 
Stone   V.    Atlantic   C.    L.   Ry.   Co.,  on      Sunday      no      ground      for 
144  N.   C.   220,   56   S.  E.   932,   and  recovering      penalty.      Cram      v. 
cases    cited;    Rollins    v.    Seaboard  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.   R.  Co.,  84  Neb. 
A.  L.  Ry.,  146  N.  C.  218,  59  S.  E.  607,  122  N.  W.  31,  rehearing  denied 
671;    but   carrier   relieved    if   con-  123  N.  W.  1045,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
ditions  causing  delay  results  from  1028,  19  Ann.  Cas.  170. 
causes    for    which    it    is    not    re-  144.   Barrett  v.  New  York,  232  U. 
sponsible,  Garrison  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  S.   14,   58  L.  Ed.  483,   34   Sup.  Ct. 
150  N.  C.  575,   64   S.  E.   578.   Dis-  203,    reversing    same    styled    case, 
crimination  in  order  of  shipments  183  Fed.  793,  189  Fed.  268. 
prohibited:  Hill  &  Morris  v.  St.  L.  145.    111.  C.   R.  Co.   v.  Mulberry 
S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  75  S.  W.  Hill  Coal  Co.,  238  U.  S.  275,  59  L. 
874,  reversed  on  the  construction  Ed.  1306,  35  Sup.  Ct.  760. 


§  26]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  201 

supra,  that  Congress  might  so  extend  the  scope  of  Federal 
regulation  as  to  exclude  even  this  remote  efiPect  of  state  legis- 
lation. Hut  in  the  same  cases  it  was  shown  that  Congress  has 
not  as  yet  exercised  the  full  power  that  it  might  under  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  that  the  proviso  ex- 
empting intrastate  commerce  from  the  Acts  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce leaves  a  tield  for  state  action.""  The  Commerce  Acts 
amendatory  and  supplementary  are  not  so  inclusive  nor  so 
exclusive  as  are  the  laws  relating  to  the  rights  and  protection 
of  employees,"'  and  the  decision  under  the  Employees  Protec- 
tive Acts  go  further  than  they  do  under  the  commerce  regulat- 
ing acts.  The  decision  relating  to  furnishing  cars  and  holding 
state  statutes  on  the  subject  illegal  do  not  go  so  far  as  to 
hold  that  a  state  may  not  legislate  as  to  the  furnishing  and 
the  delivery  of  cars  used  in  the  shipment  of  freight  between 
points  in  the  state.  But,  while  there  is  left  to  the  states  a 
power  of  regulation  as  to  intrastate  transportation,  such  power 
must  not  be  exercised  in  a  way  to  burden  interstate  trans- 
portation. 

A.  state  may  not  require  that  cars  be  furnished  for  intrastate 
commerce  Avhen  the  requirement  would,  if  obeyed,  prevent  a 
carrier  from  furnishing  cars  for  interstate  commerce  in  like 
proportion.  The  state  regulation  m.ust  not  discriminate  in 
favor  of  intrastate  commerce  or  against  interstate  commerce. 

These  principles  were  illustrated  by  the  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  in  Hampton  v.  St.  Louis  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co./" 
where  a  law  of  Arkansas  was  involved  requiring  an  interstate 
carrier  to  fnrnish  cars  on  demand,  the  section  of  the  law 
making  the  requirement  concluding  with  the  proviso: 

"Interstate  railroads  shall  furnish  cars  on  application  for 
interstate  shipments  the  same  in  all  respects  as  other  cars  to 
be  fvirnis1\ed  by  intrastate  railroads  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act." 

146.  For  proviso,  see  Sec.  336.  14  8.  Hampton  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  & 
post.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  227  U.  S.  456,  57  L.  Ed. 

147.  Employers'  Liability  Acts,  596,  33  Sup.  Ct.  263,  reversing  St. 
Sec.  332,  post.  On  this  subject  the  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hampton, 
Sup.  Ct.  Kinzell  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  162  Fed.  693. 

R.  Co.,  248  U.  S.  552,  63.  L.  Ed,  30 
Sup.  Ct.  — , 


202  State  RE:n:LATioN  of  Carriers.  [§  2G 

The  Supreme  Covirt  of  the  state  said  :^" 

"The  failure  to  furnish  cars  under  the  terms  of  the  act  un- 
der investigation  will  establish  prima  facie  a  breach  of  dutj' 
on  the  part  of  the  railroad  companies.  This  will  not  preclude 
their  right  to  set  up  such  defense  as  will  excuse  or  justify  the 
failure.  That  a  fair  division  of  cars  with  interstate  business 
made  it  impossible  to  answer  all  demands  made  for  cars  for 
intrastate  business  would  apparently  be  M'ithin  the  limdt  of 
proper  defenses  in  crses  of  demands  too  unusual  to  be  fore- 
seen; and,  viewed  in  this  way,  the  act  is  relieved  of  the  im- 
putation of  burdening  interstate  commerce." 

Mr.  Justice  Lurton,  speaking  for  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  said  that  the  proviso  probably  meant  no  more 
than  that  there  should  be  "no  discrimination  against  demands 
for  cars  for  interstate  shipments,"  but  should  the  act  be  con- 
strued "as  extending  the  act  so  as  to  regulate  the  furnishing 
of  cars  for  interstate  shipments,  it  would  be  invalid  by  reason 
of  the  provisions  of  the  Hepburn  Amendment  to  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  of  June  29,  1906." 

Construing  the  act  as  applying  only  to  intrastate  commerce 
and  as  permitting  the  defenses  stated  by  the  court  of  the 
state,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that,  under  the  pleadings,  the 
agreement  of  the  parties  and  the  ruling  of  the  court  below, 
there  Avas  no  showing  by  the  railroad  "that  in  the  operation  of 
the  act  interstate  commerce  has  been  illegally  restrained  or 
burdened,  or  that  any  defense  which  it  may  have  for  the 
neglect  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  act  as  to  furnish- 
ing cars  has  been  or  will  be  denied  by  virtue  of  its  obligation 
as  an  interstate  railroad,"  and  that  the  act  should  not  have 
been  enjoined.""  ' 

Bills  of  lading  are  but  contracts  for  carriage,  and  when  they 
refer  to  interstate  transportation  the  federal  government  may 
make  regulations  wath  reference  thereto,  and  when  the  trans- 
portation is  intrastate  the  regulations  are  within  the  power 
of  the  states.'" 

149.    Oliver  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Ct.  761. 

P.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Ark.   466,  470,   117  150.    See  Mulberry  Hill  Coal  Co. 

S.    W.    238.    See    also    Proctor    &  case.  Sec.  2.5,  supra. 

Gamble  v.  Uniterl  States,  225  U.  S.  151.    Bills  of  Lading,  29  I.  C.  C. 

282,  286,  56  L.  Ed.   1091,  32  Sup.  417;    Bill   of  Lading,    52   I.   C.    C. 


§  27]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commeece.  203 

§  27.  Requirements  as  to  Accounting  and  Reports. — The 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  has  the  statutory  power  to 
require  of  carriers  within  its  jurisdiction  to  keep  such  ac- 
counts as  may  be  prescribed  and  make  reports  to  the  Com- 
mission upon  certain  prescribed  forms."^  These  statutory 
requirements  are  valid. '^"^  As  all,  or  at  least  practically  all. 
carriers  Avithin  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  are  at  the  same  time  engaged  in  both  interstate 
and  intrastate  commerce,  these  accounts  and  reports  must  of 
necessity  include  matter  relating  to  each  kind  of  commerce. 

It  is  frequently  necessary  to  consider  the  cost  of  both  inter- 
state and  intrastate  commerce  in  order  to  determine  what  is 
a  fair  rate  on  either. 

The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  stated  the  reasons  for 
the  Federal  statute  as  follows :"' 

"It  is  true  that  the  accounts  required  to  be  kept  are  general 
in  their  nature  and  embrace  business  other  than  such  as  is 
necessary  to  the  discharge  of  the  duties  required  in  carrying 
passengers  and  freight  in  interstate  commerce  by  joint  ar- 
rangement between  the  railroad  and  the  water  carrier,  but 
the  Commission  is  charged  under  the  law  with  the  supervision 
of  such  rates  as  to  their  reasonableness  and  with  the  general 
duty  of  making  reports  to  Congress  which  might  require  a 
knowledge  of  the  business  of  the  carrier  Ueyond  that  which 
is  strictly  of  the  character  mentioned.  If  the  Commission 
is  to  successfully  perform  its  duties  in  respect  to  reasonable 
rates,  undue  discriminations  and  favoritism,  it  must  be  in- 
formed as  to  the  business  of  the  carriers  by  a  system  of  ac- 
counting which  will  not  permit  the  possible  concealment  of 
forbidden  practices  in  accounts  wdiich  it  is  not  permitted  to 
see  and  concerning  Avhich  it  can  require  no  information.     It 

671;    United   States   v.   Ferger,  —  Co.,  224  U.  S.  194,  211,  56  L.  Ed. 

U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  729,  32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  See  the  Com- 

152.  Sec.  433,  post.  Separation  mission's  discussion  of  the  quest- 
of  Operating  Expenses,  30  I.  C.  C.  ion  in  the  Twenty-seventh  Annual 
676.  Report  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 

153.  Kansas    C.    S.    Ry.    Co.    v.  Commission,  pp.  37,  38. 

United  States,  231  U.  S.  423,  58  L.  154.     Interstate    Com.    Com.    v. 

Ed.  296,  34  Sup.  Ct.  125;  Interstate       Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  su2)ra. 
Com.    Com.    v.    Goodrich    Transit 


204  State  Regulation  of  Cakriees.  [§28 

is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  requiring  of  information  con- 
eernin^'  the  business  methods  of  sueh  corporations,  as  shown 
in  their  accounts,  is  a  regulation  of  business  not  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission,  as  seems  to  be  argued  for  the 
complainants.  The  object  of  requiring  such  accounts  to  be 
kept  in  a  uniform  way  and  to  be  open  to  the  inspection  of  the 
Commission  is  not  to  enable  it  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  the 
corporations'  not  within  its  jurisdiction,  but  to  be  informed 
concerning  the  business  methods  of  the  corporations  subject 
to  the  act  that  it  may  properly  regulate  such  matters  as  are 
really  within  its  jurisdiction.  Futher,  the  requiring  of  infor- 
mation concerning  a  business  is  not  regulation  of  that  busi- 
ness." 

Consistent  with  this  holding  is  the  decision  of  the  Court  of 
Civil  Appeals  of  Texas,  that  the  state  may  require  that  car- 
riers as  to  intrastate  commerce  shall  keep  accounts  supple- 
mentary to  those  required  bj-  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission.^^^ 

§  28.  Transmission  and  Delivery  of  Telegraph  and  Tele- 
phone Messages. — That  companies  engaged  in  the  telegraph 
and  teleplione  business  are,  where  their  lines  extend  from  one 
state  to  another,  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  is  undis- 
puted,'"" and  Congress  has  legislated  expressly  including  such 
within  the  Acts  relating  to  commerce.^" 

155.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Texas  v.  Ct.  399;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
Texas  &  P.  Ry.,  —  Tex.  Civ.  App.  v.  Pendleton,  122  U.  S.  347,  30  L. 
— ,  140  S.  W.  829.  To  the  same  Ed.  1187,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1126;  West- 
effect  see  R.  R.  Com.  of  Miss.  v.  ern  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  James,  162 
Gulf  &  S.  I.  R.  Co.,  8  Miss.  U.  S.  650,  40  L.  Ed.  1105, 
750,  29  So.  789;  People  v.  16  Sup.  Ct.  934;  Western 
Joline,  65  Misc.  Rep.  394,  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Com- 
121  N.  Y.  Supp.  857.  But  with-  mercial  Milling  Co.,  218  U.  S. 
out  statutory  authority  a  com-  403,  416,  54  L.  Ed.  1088,  31  Sup. 
mission  may  not  require  reports  Ct.  59;  Postal  Tel.-Cable  Co.  v. 
by  telegraph.  State  v.  Louisville  City  of  Mobile,  179  Fed.  955,  and 
&   N.   R.   Co.,   57  Fla.   526,   49    So.  cases  cited  at  page  960. 

39.  157.     Act    1910,    Sees.    335,    340, 

156.  Sec.  2,  note  2,  supra:  West-  post;  Shoemaker  v.  Chesapeake  & 
ern  Union  Tel.   Co.  v.  Crovo,  220  P.  Telephone  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  614. 
U.   S.   364,  55   L.   Ed.   498,  31   Sup. 


§  28]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce,  205 

Prior  to  the  Act  of  1910  enlarging  the  scope  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce,  state  statutes  regulating  the  delivery  of 
telegraph  messages  had  been  before  the  Supreme  Court.  The 
Indiana  statute  regulating  interstate  messages  sent  from  as 
well  as  into  the  state  was  held  void  because  the  state  law 
could  "not  extend  to  the  delivery  of  messages  in  other 
states." '^^ 

The  Georgia  statute  providing  a  penalty  for  failure  to  re- 
ceive and  deliver  in  the  state  telegraph  messages  was  held 
valid  although  applicable  to  interstate  messages.""" 

A  IMichigan  statute  which  prevented  the  telegraph  company 
from  contracting  to  relieve  itself  from  its  common  law  liabili- 
ty merely  gave  sanction  to  an  inherent  duty,  and  the  statute 
was  held  not  to  be  void  under  the  commerce  clause  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States.'"" 

A  state  law  relating  to  the  delivery  of  a  telegram  and  pro- 
viding a  penalty  was  held  void  when  the  default  occurred 
within  a  navy  yard/"  although  the  same  law  when  delivery 
was  made  in  the  territory  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state 
was,  in  an  opinion  following  the  Georgia  and  Michigan  cases, 
supra,  held  A'alid."' 

Tn  the  last  cited  case  the  court  said : 

"The  requirement  of  the  Virginia  statute  as  here  applied  is 
a  valid  exercise  of  the  power  of  the  state  in  the  absence  of 
legislation  by  Congress.  It  is  neither  a  regulation  of  nor  a 
hindrance  to  interstate  commerce,  but  is  in  aid  of  that  com- 
merce." 

Similiar  language  calling  attention  to  the  "absence  of 
legislation  by  Congress"  appears  in  the  eases  relating  to  the 
Georgia  and  Michigan  statutes.  As  the  Amendment  of  1910 
says  that  "telegraph,  telephone  and  cable  companies  (whether 
wire  or  wireless)  engaged  in  sending  messages  from  one  state, 
territory,  or  district  of  the  United  States  to  any  other  state, 
territory,  or  district  of  the  United  States  or  to  any  foreign 

158.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  161.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Pendleton,  supra.                                      Chiles,   214   U.    S.   274,   53    L.    Ed. 

159.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.       994,  29  Sup.  Ct.  613. 

James,  supra.  162.    Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v. 

160.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.       Crovo,  snpra. 
Commercial  Milling  Co.,  supra. 


iMK)  Statk  Regulation  of  Carriees.  [^  29 

country,  *  *  *  shall  be  considered  and  lield  to  be  com- 
mon carriers  Avithin  the  meaning  and  purpose  of  this  Act," 
there  is  legislation  by  Congress  and  it  would  seem  that  the 
decisions  relating  to  the  delivery  of  interstate  freight,  sections 
24  &  25,  supra,  would  be  applicaljle  to  interstate  messages, 
and  that  state  laws  regulating  the  receipt  and  delivery  of  tele- 
grams and  telephone  messages  from  points  in  one  state  to 
points  in  another  are  void. 

AVhen  tlie  President  under  authority  of  an  Act  of  Congress 
had  taken  over  telephone  and  telegraph  lines  rates  prescribed 
under  his  direction  superseded  intrastate  rates  prescribed  by 
state  authority."^ 

§  29.  Separate  Coach  Laws. — The  statute  of  Louisana, 
which,  as  construed  by  the  courts  of  that  state,  compelled  com- 
mon carriers  to  receive,  in  compartments  set  aside  for  whites 
only,  negro  passengers,  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  be 
invalid  in  so  far  as  it  aifected  interstate  commerce."*  The 
court  quoted  from  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Field,  in  "Welton 
v.  Missouri,"^  to  the  affect  that,  ''inaction  (by  Congress) 
*  *  *  is  equivalent  to  a  declaration  that  interstate  com- 
merce shall  remain  free  and  untrammeled,"  and  said: 

"Applying  that  principle  to  the  circumstances  of  this  case, 
congressional  inaction  left  Benson  at  liberty  to  adopt  such 
reasonable  rules  and  regulations  for  the  disposition  of  passen- 
gers upon  his  boat,  while  pursuing  her  voyage  within  Louisi- 
ana or  without,  as  seemed  to  him  most  for  the  interest  of  all 
concerned.  The  statute  under  which  this  suit  is  brought,  as 
construed  by  the  state  court,  seeks  to  take  away  from  him  that 
power  so  long  as  he  is  within  Louisiana ;  and  while  recogniz- 
ing to  the  fullest  extent  the  principle  which  sustains  a  statute, 
unless  its  unconstitutionality  is  clearly  established,  we  think 
this  statute,  to  the  extent  that  it  requires  those  engaged  in  the 
transportation  of  passengers  among  the  states  to  carry  colored 

163.    40   Stat,   at   L.    904,    Chap.  164.     Hall  v.  De  Cuir,  95  U.  S. 

154,  Comp.  Stat.  1918,  Sec.  3115-%.  485,  5  Otto  485,  24  L.  Ed.  547. 

Dakota    Cent.    Tel.    Co.    v.    South  165.  Welton  v.  Missouri,  91  U.  S. 

Dakota.    249   U.    S.   — ,   63   L.   Ed.  275,  282,  23  L.  Ed.  347,  350. 
— ,   Sup.  Ct.  — . 


§  1^9]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  207 

passengers  in  Louisiana  in  the  same  cabin  with  whites,  is  un- 
eonstitntional  and  void." 

While  this  decision  has  been  criticised  by  text  book  writers, 
it  is  sound  in  principle.  Carriers  may  not  unjustly  discrimi- 
nate between  those  who  patronize  them,  but  they  are  free, 
subject  to  that  rule  and  the  further  one  that  charges  must  not 
be  unreasonable,  to  regulate  the  general  conduct  of  their  busi- 
ness. It  can  not  be  held  an  unjust  discrimination  to  require 
whites  and  negroes  to  ride  in  separate  compartments  of  a  pub- 
lic conveyance,  the  accommodations  being  equal.  For  the  ne- 
gro to  contend  that  he  is  discriminated  against  in  favor  of  the 
white  man  would  be  a  contention  on  his  part  of  inferiority  to 
the  white  man.  The  separation  of  equals  discriminates  in 
favor  of  neither.  Whatever  may  be  said  as  to  the  actual  in- 
feriority of  the  negro,  he  is,  under  the  law,  entitled  to  equal 
rights  with  the  other  races. 

The  state  of  Mississippi  has  a  law  requiring  railroads  carry- 
ing passengers  to  give  "separate  accommodations  to  white  and 
colored  races,"  by  furnishing  either  separate  coaches  or  sepa- 
rate compartments  in  the  same  coach.  The  law  was  construed 
by  the  state  courts  as  applying  only  to  commerce  within  the 
state.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  the  law 
valid.""  The  decision  is  in  harmony  with  the  case  of  Hall  v. 
DeCuir,  supra.  In  the  Louisiana  case  the  regulation  affected 
interstate  commerce  and  was  invalid;  in  the  Mississippi  case 
the  regulation  did  not  affect  interstate  commerce  and  was 
valid.    In  the  Mississippi  case  the  court  said : 

"The  reason  for  this  is  that  both  the  charge  and  the  actual 
transportation  in  such  cases  are  exclusively  confined  to  the 
limits  of  the  territory  of  the  state,  and  is  not  commerce  among 
the  states,  or  interstate  commerce,  but  is  exclusively  commerce 
within  the  state.  So  far,  therefore,  as  this  class  of  transporta- 
tion, as  an  element  of  commerce,  is  affected  by  the  statute 
under  consideration,  it  is  not  subject  to  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision concerning  commerce  among  the  states.     It  has  often 

166.     Louisville    N.    O.    &   T.    ?.  styled  Louisville,  N.  0.  &  T.   Ry. 

Ry.   Co.  V.   Mississippi,   133   U.   S.  Co.  v.  Mississippi,  66  Miss.  662,  .5 

587,  33  L.  Ed.  784,  10  Sup.  Ct.  348,  L.  R.  A.  132,  6  So.  303,  2  I.  C.  R. 

2  I.   C.   R.   801.   This   case   in   the  615,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  509. 
Supreme  Court  of  Mississippi  was 


208  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  29 

been  held  in  this  court,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  about  it, 
that  there  is  a  commerce  wholly  within  the  state,  which  is  not 
subject  to  the  constitutional  provision,  and  the  distinction  be- 
tween commerce  among  the  states  and  the  other  classes  of 
commerce  betAveen  citizens  of  a  single  state,  and  conducted 
within  the  state.  So  far,  therefore,  as  this  class  of  transporta- 
recognized  in  this  court,  although  it  may  not  be  always  easy, 
where  the  lines  of  these  classes  approach  each  other,  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  one  and  the  other." 

Louisiana  subsequently  passed  a  separate  coach  law,  which 
the  Supreme  Court  sustained,  as  it  aflPected  only  commerce  in 
that  state."' 

A  similiar  law  in  Kentucky  was  also  sustained  by  the  Su- 
preme Court. "^ 

A  state  statute  requiring  the  separation  of  interstate  pas- 
sengers would  be  void  as  an  attempt  to  regulate  interstate 
commerce,  but,  as  said  in  Hall  v.  De  Cuir,  supra.  Congress  hav- 
ing failed  to  act,  to  subject  of  the  separation  of  the  races  in 
interstate  transportation  is  unregulated  and  interstate  carriers 
are  free  to  make  svich  reasonable  rules  with  reference  thereto 
as  they  see  fit;  reasonable  including  the  requirement  that 
there  be  no  discrimination  in  the  accommodation."" 

A  statute  of  Oklahoma  applying  to  intrastate  travel,  in  so 
far  as  it  gave  equal,  although  separate  accommodation  to  pas- 
sengers, members  of  the  white  and  negro  races,  was  held  valid 
by  the  Supreme  Court,  and  in  so  far  as  it  provided  accom- 
modations for  whites  not  accorded  to  negroes,  it  was  held  to 
be  invalid  ^'° 

167.  Plessy  v.  Ferguson,  163  U.  R.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  71,  54  L.  Ed. 
S.  537,  41  L.  E'l.  256,  16  Sup.  Ct.  936,  30  Sup.  Ct.  667;  Hall  v.  De 
1138.  Cuir,  supra,   is  cited  in   Simpson, 

168.  Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  v.  et  al.,  R.  R.  Com.  of  Minnesota  v. 
Kentucky,  179  U.  S.  388,  45  L.  Ed.  Stiepard,  230  U.  S.  352,  432,  435, 
244,  21  Sup.  Ct.  101.  See  also  Ed-  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  729. 
wards  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  170.  McCabe  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
12  I.  C.  C.  247;  Gaines  v.  Seaboard  Co.,  235  U.  S.  151,  59  L.  Ed.  169, 
A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  471;  35  Sup.  Ct.  69.  See  also  South 
Cozart  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  Covington  &  C.  St.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
226.  Kentucky  252  U.  S.  64  L.  Ed.   40 

169.  Chiles  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  Sup.  Ct- 


§  30]  Engaged,  ix  Inteestate  Commerce.  209 

§  80.  Posting  Time  of  Trains. — A  statute  of  the  state  of 
Indiana  requiring  all  railroads  to  "cause  to  be  placed  in  a 
conspicuous  place  in  each  passenger  depot  of  such  company 
located  at  any  station  in  this  state  at  which  there  is  a  tele- 
graph office,  a  blackboard  at  least  three  feet  long  and  two  feet 
wide,  upon  which  such  company  or  person  shall  cause  to  be 
written,  at  least  twenty  minutes  before  the  schedule  time  for 
the  arrival  of  each  passenger  train  stopping  upon  such  route 
at  such  station,  the  fact  whether  such  train  is  on  schedule  time 
or  not,  and  if  late,  how  much,"  and  providing  a  penalty  for 
violating  the  regulation,  is  within  the  legislative  power.  It  is 
true  that  the  regulation  may  apply  to  the  time  of  an  interstate 
train,  but  the  matter  is  one  of  local  concern,  one  upon  which 
Congress  has  not  acted,  and  one  which  does  not  directly  affect 
interstate  commerce.^' ^  If,  however,  the  regulation  is  unrea- 
sonable, or  is  made  by  a  commission  without  a  finding  of  facts 
or  evidence  showing  the  relation  between  the  receipts  and 
the  expense,  it  is  void.'"' 

§  31.  Laws  to  Promote  the  Security  and  Comfort  of  Passen- 
gers.— States  may  protect  the  personal  security  of  those  who 
are  passengers  on  cars  used  within  their  limits.  Under  this 
principle  a  law  of  New  York  prescribing  how  passenger  cars 
should  be  heated,  was.  in  the  absence  of  national  regulation  on 
the  subject,  valid.  This  was  true,  although  the  regulation  in- 
cidentally affected  interstate  commerce."^ 

The  statute  requiring  passenger  cars  to  be  heated,  supra, 
was  relied  upon  to  sustain  the  Georgia  statute  requiring  en- 
gines to  be  equipped  with  electric  head  lights.  Since  the  Su- 
preme Court  sustained  the  New  York  law,  supra,  Congress  has 

171.  State  V.  Indiana  &  I.  S.  Ry.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  New- 
Co.,  133  Ind.  69,  32  N.  E.  817,  18       ell,  25  Okla.  502,  106  Pac.  818. 

L.  R.  A.  502;    State  v.  Cleveland,  173.    New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R. 

C.   C.   &   St.   L.  Ry.   Co.,   157   Ind.  Co.   v.   New   York,   165   U.   S.    628, 

288,  61  N.  E.  669.  Posting  a  tariff  41  L.  Ed.  853,  17  Sup.  Ct.  418.  In 

of    rates    would    be    governed    by  a    note    to    the    decision    will    be 

the    same    principles,    Johnson    v.  found    cited    a    large    unmber    of 

Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry.   Co.,  78   S.  C.  cases  sustaining  the  general  prin- 

361,  52  S.  E.  644.  ciple  involved  in  the  statement  of 

172.  Kansas    C.    S.    Ry.    Co.    v.  law  in  this  section. 
State,  27  Okla.  806,  117  Pac.  207; 


210  State  Regulation  of  Carkiees.  [§  31 

passed  several  statutes  relating  to  safety  appliances,  and  even 
though  after  the  passage  of  these  statutes  the  heating  law 
might  be  sustained,  it  would  seem  that  the  electric  headlight 
law,  in  so  far  as  it  applies  to  a  locomotive  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce,  would  be  void."* 

This  contention  was  urged  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States ;  but  that  court  held  that  the  Georgia  statute 
Avas  valid.  In  the  course  of  the  opinion  reference  was  made 
to  the  different  Federal  Safety  Appliance  Acts,  and  it  was 
stated  that  none  of  these  acts  referred  to  headlights,  and  said 
the  court,  "The  intent  to  supersede  the  exercise  of  the  state's 
police  power  with  respect  to  this  subject,  can  not  be  inferred 
from  the  restrictive  action  which  thus  far  has  been  taken.""* 
This  appears  a  somewhat  narrow  vdew.  Congress  has  pre- 
scribied  certain  regulations  as  to  the  equipment  of  railway 
locomotives  used  in  interstate  transportation.  Presumably 
such  regulations  are  all  that  in  the  opinion  of  Congress  are 
necessary.  The  fact  that  Congress  has  not  prescribed  regula- 
tions for  each  part  of  the  locomotive  does  not  indicate  that  the 
"possession  of  the  field"  has  not  been  taken.  A  state  law 
should  not  lightly  be  set  aside,  and  every  presumption  should 
be  indulged  in  favor  of  its  validity,  but  state  regulations  of  the 
same  instrumentality  of  commerce  that  has  been  regulated  by 
Congress,  although  of  a  diflPerent  part  of  such  instrumentality, 
does  invade  the  field  already  occupied  by  federal  regulation, 
and  in  which,  as  has  so  frequently  been  said  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  the  national  authority  is  paramount  and  indivisible. 
The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  holding  void  the  statute  of 
the  state  of  Indiana  requiring  grab-irons  and  hand-holds  on 
cars,  seems  to  accord  with  the  text."" 

The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  the  hand-hold  law  of 
Indiana  indicates  that  with  present  Federal  statates  such  state 

174.     Atlantic    C.    L.    R.    Co.    v.  dix,  B  et  seg.  and  notes  112  ana 

State,  135  Ga.  54.5,  69  S.  E.  725,  32  123,  supra. 

L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   20,  citing  people  175.     Atlantic    C.    L.    R.    Co.    v. 

V.  N.  Y.,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  55  Hun.  409,  Georgia,  234  U.  S    280,   58  L.  Ed. 

608    (8  N.  Y.  S.  673);    N.  Y.,  etc.,  1312,  34  Sup.  Ct.  829. 

R.  Co.  V.  New  York,  165  U.  S.  628,  176.    So.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Railroad 

41    L.    Ed.    853,    17    Sup.    Ct.    418.  Com.  of  Ind.,  236  U.  S.  439,  59  L. 

See  Safety  Applijince  laws,  Appen.  Ed.  661,  35  Sup.  Ct.  304. 


§  32]  Engaoep,  in  Intfjih'I'ate  Commerce.  211 

laws  are  invalid.  In  all  cases  the  state  laws  must  not  infringe 
the  due  process  clause  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States/" 

§  82.  Laws  Limiting  or  Enlarging  the  Common  Law  Lia- 
bility of  Carriers. — The  question  of  the  right  of  a  railroad 
company  to  limit  hy  contract  its  common  law  liability  as  a  car- 
rier is  one  of  genera]  law  upon  which  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  will  exercise  its  judgment.  It  is  none  the 
loss  Avithin  the  province  of  the  states  and  any  state  may  pass 
laws  on  the  subject.  Therefore,  as  to  transportation  within  a 
stnte,  the  legislature  of  that  state  may  provide  that  a  contract 
of  a  common  carrier  by  which  it  exempts  itself  from  its  com 
mon  law  liability  is  void."* 

The  statute  of  Virginia  provides : 

"When  a  common  carrier  accepts  for  transportation  any- 
thing directed  to  a  point  of  destination  beyond  his  own  line  he 
shall  be  deemed  thereby  to  assum^r  an  obligation  for  its  safe 
carriage  to  such  point  of  destination,  unless,  at  the  time  of 
such  acceptance,  such  carrier  be  released  or  exempted  from 
such  liability  by  contract  in  writing  signed  by  the  owner  or 
his  agent." 

Suit  was  brought  against  the  carrier  issuing  the  bill  of 
lading  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  goods  shipped  from  Virginia 
to  Louisiana.  The  carrier  depended  on  a  clause  in  its  bill  of 
lading,  not  signed  by  the  shipper,  exempting  it  from  liability 
for  loss  beyond  its  own  line.  The  shipper  relied  on  the  statute, 
which  statute  was  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court.^'"'  Section 
twenty  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  it  will  be  remeim- 
bered,  contains  a  clause  similar  to  the  Virginia  law,  supra.  Post 
sections  439,  440. 

A  law  of  Missouri  similiar  to  the  Virginia  law  v/as  also  sus- 
tained by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.^*" 

177.  Vandalia  R.  Co.  v.  Public  Ed.  688,  18  Sup.  Ct.  289.  See  notes 
Serv.  Com.  of  Ind.,  242  U.  S.  255,      L.  Ed. 

61  L.  Ed.  276,  37  Sup.  Ct.  93.  See  179.    Richmond   &  A.   R.   Co.   v. 

also  note  to  Annotated  Law  Edi-  Patterson,    169    U.    S.    311,    42    L. 

tion.  Ed.  759,  18  Sup.  Ct.  335. 

178.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  180.  Missouri,  K.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Co.  V.  Solan,  169  U.  S.  133,  42  L.  McCann,  174  U.  S.  580,  43  L.  Ed. 

1093,  19  Sup.  Ct.  755. 


212  State  Regulation  of  Carrieks.  [§  3'2 

The  refusal  of  a  state  court  to  hold  valid  a  provision  of  a 
bill  of  lading  limiting  the  carrier's  liahility  to  a  stated  sum 
does  not  violate  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  interstate  com- 
merce act.'" 

A  provision  of  the  laAv  of  Georgia,  applicable  both  to  inter- 
state and  intrastate  commerce,  that  a  carrier,  in  order  to 
exempt  itself  from  liability  beyond  its  own  line,  should  in- 
form the  shipper,  in  writing,  w^hen,  where  and  how  and  by 
which  carrier  the  freight  was  lost  or  damaged  was  held  in- 
valid by  the  Supreme  Court."^  The  Georgia  case  is  distin- 
guished from  the  Virginia  case,  note""  supra,  although  the 
Virginia  case  required  the  carrier  to  show  that  the  loss  did  not 
occur  on  its  own  line,  when  the  shipper  had  signed  a  contract 
which  limited  the  liability  of  the  carrier  to  its  own  line.  It 
would,  therefore,  seem  that  the  Georgia  law  is  just  a  little  be- 
yond the  boundary  line  that  marks  the  difiference  between  a 
reasonable  and  an  unreasonable  regulation.  In  considering 
the  Virginia  case  the  court  said : 

"These  views  dispose  of  the  substantial  questions  which  the 
case  presents,  for  the  contention  which  arises  on  the  conclud- 
ing sentences  of  the  statute,  imposing  upon  a  carrier  a  duty 
where  the  loss  has  not  happened  on  the  carrier's  own  line  to 
inform  the  shipper  of  this  fact,  is  but  a  regulation  manifestly 
Avithin  the  power  of  the  state  to  adopt. ' ' 

Subsequently  to  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  held  that  the 
Georgia  statute  applied  only  to  intrastate  commerce  and  so 
limited  was  valid.^'^ 

A  law  of  Kansas  requiring  that  weights  be  specified  in  bills 
of  lading  and  that  the  weight  so  specified  should  b'.e  conclusive, 
was  held  not  to  violate  the  commerce  clause  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,  but  to  be  void  as  denying  due  pro- 

181.  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  191  183.  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ragsdale.  119 
U.  S.  477,  48  L.  Ed.  268,  24  Sup.  Ga.  773,  47  S.  E.  179;  Davis  v. 
Ct.  132.                                                         Seaboard   A.   L.    Ry.   Co.,  136   Ga. 

182.  Cent,  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  278,  71  S.  E.  419;  Seaboard  A.  L. 
Murphey,  196  U.  S.  194,  49  L.  Ed.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Davis,  139  Ga.  547,  77 
444,    25    Sup.    Ct.    218,    reversing       S.  E.  795. 

same  case,   116  Ga.   863,   43   S.  E. 
265,  60  L.  R.  A.  817. 


§  33]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commebce.  213 

cess  of  law/"*  As  to  shipments  in  interstate  commerce,  such 
law  wonld  be  void  since  the  legislation  extending  the  acts  to 
regulate  commerce. 

While  prior  to  the  Ilephurn  Act  a  legislative  prohibition  of 
any  contract  in  a  bill  of  lading  limiting  the  time  in  which  to 
sue  to  less  than  two  years  was  held  valid  as  to  an  interstate 
shipment,  such  state  law  it  is  believed  is  now  invalid  when  ap- 
plied to  interstate  commerce."^ 

It  is  true  that  the  so-called  Carmack  Amendment  contained 
in  the  Hepburn  Act,  relates  to  limitations  of  liability  and  not 
limitations  as  to  time  in  which  to  sue,  but  the  subject  of  the 
contract  for  interstate  shipments  is  included  within  the  amend- 
ment, and  it  may  well  be  argued  that  now  Congress  has  taken 
possession  of  the  field.  The  question  has  not  been  determined, 
but  it  w^ould  seem  that  an  "interstate  contract  of  shipment 

*     *     *     is  withdrawn  from  the  field  of  state  law."'^" 

The  Cummins  Amendments,  as  they  were  under  the  Act  of 
August  9,  1916/"  prescribed  a  minimum  time  for  giving  notice 
of  loss  or  damage,  for  making  claims  and  for  filing  suits. 
Statutes  of  a  state  in  conflict  with  this  statute  are  invalid.  In 
this  respect  Transportation  Act  1920,  sections  439,  441,  j)osl;, 
makes  no   change   from   the   Cummins   Amendments. 

§  33.  Same  Subject — Liability  to  Employees. — The  first 
Employers'  Liability  Act.  that  of  June  11,  1906,  chap.  3073,  34 
Stat.  L.  232,  was  declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 

184.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carl,  227  U.  S.  639, 
Simonson,  64  Kan.  802,  o5  Pac.  57  L.  Ed.  683,  33  Sup.  Ct.  391; 
653,  57  L.  R.  A.  765,  citing  Gulf.  Chicago  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Go.  v. 
C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Dwyer,  75  Cramer,  232  U.  S.  290,  58  L. 
Tex.  572,  12  S.  W.  1001,  7  L.  R.  Ed.  697,  34  Sup.  Ct.  383,  reversing 
A.   478.  same    styled    case,    153    Iowa    603, 

185.  Reeves  v.  Tex.  &  P.  R.  C,  133  N.  W.  387.  See  Sees.  34  and 
—   Tex.    Civ.    — ,    32    S.    W.    920;  35,  post. 

Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Eddins,  187.    Acts  March  4,  1915,  Chap. 

7  Tex.  Civ.  App.  116,  26  S.  W.  161;  176,  3S  Stat.  L.  1196;  Aug.  9,  1916 

Missouri,     K.     &    T.     Ry.     Co.     v.  Chap.  301,  39   Stat.  L.  441;    U.   S. 

Withers,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  506,  40  Comp.    Stat.    Vol.    8,    Sec.    8604    a, 

S.  W.  1073.  McCauU-Dinsmore      Company      v. 

186.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  252  Fed. 
Harriman,  227  U.  S.  657,  57  L.  Ed.  664,  Affirmed  260  Fed.  835;  —  C. 
690,    33    Sup.    Ct.   397;    Kansas   C.  C.  A.  — ,  252  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.   Ed. 

— ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — . 


214 


State  Regulation  of  Caekiers. 


[§  33 


States  to  be  unconstitutional,  because,  as  construed,  it  applied 
not  only  to  employees  of  carriers  engaged  in  interstate,  but 
also  to  employees  of  carriers  engaged  in  intrastate  commerce. 
Whether  the  act  violated  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  not 
decided,  but  reference  was  made  to  decisions  of  the  court  hold- 
ing valid  state  laws  making  a  special  regulation  as  to  a  car- 
rier's liability  to  its  employees. 

Later,  on  April  22,  1908,  the  present  Employers'  Liability 
Act  was  approved  and  this  act  has  been  held  valid  by  the  Su- 
preme Court. ^^^ 

In  the  labor  laws  of  the  United  States,  contained  in  the 
twenty-second  annual  report  of  the  Commission  of  Labor,  will 
be  found  all  the  state  laws  similiar  to  the  Federal  Employers' 
liiability  Act  up  to  the  time  that  report  was  prepared.  Since 
then  other  states  have  passed  laws  applying  to  intrastate  com- 
merce substantially  the  same  as  that  contained  in  the  Federal 
act.  That  the  states  may  do  this  is  clearly  shown  in  Howard  v, 
Illinois  Central  R.   Co.,  note'^'  supra.     That  these  state  laws 


188.  Employers'  Liability  cases, 
Howard  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  207 
U.  S.  463,  52  L.  Ed.  297,  28  Sup. 
Ct.  141.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mackay,  127  U.  S.  205,  32  L.  Ed. 
107,  8  Sup.  Ct.  1161;  Minneapolis 
&  St.  L.  R.  Co.  V.  Herrick,  127 
U.  S.  210,  32  L.  Ed.  109,  8  Sup. 
Ct.  1176;  Chicago  K.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  V.  Pontius,  157  U.  S.  209,  39 
L.  Ed.  675,  15  Sup.  Ct.  585.  In 
Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Castle,  224 
U.  S.  541,  56  L.  Ed.  875,  32  Sup. 
Ct.  006,  a  State  Employers'  Lia- 
bility Act  passed  prior  to  Act 
1908  was  held  valid.  See  also 
Tullis  V.  Lake  E.  R.  Co.,  175  U.  S. 
348,  44  L.  Ed.  192,  20  Sup.  Ct.  136; 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Melton, 
218  U.  S.  36,  54  L.  Ed.  921,  30  Sup. 
Ct.  676;  Chicago,  I.  &  L.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Kackett,  228  U.  S.  559,  57  L.  Ed. 
966,  33  Sup.  Ct.  581,  and  cases 
cited;  Minnesota  Rate  Cases,  230 
U.  S.  352,  at  pp.  408,  409,  57  L.  Ed. 


1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  729.  Mondou  v. 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 
(Second  Employers'  Liability 
Cases),  223  U.  S.  1,  56  L.  Ed. 
prior  to  1908  as  to  territories: 
Gutierrez  v.  El  Paso  N.  E.  R.  Co., 
215  U.  S.  87,  54  L.  Ed.  106,  30  Sup. 
Ct.  21.  State  law  regulating  hours 
of  labor  of  interstate  railroad 
employees  invalid.  Erie  R.  Co.  v. 
New  York,  233  U.  S.  671,  58  L. 
Ed.  1149,  34  Sup.  Ct.  756,  but  same 
law  requiring  payment  of  wages 
semi-monthly  is  valid:  Erie  R.  Co. 
V.  Williams,  233  U.  S.  685,  58  L. 
Ed.  1155.  34  Sup.  Ct.  761.  Repeal 
by  state  law  of  common  law  rule 
of  nonliability  for  negligence  of 
a  fellow  servant  valid  whether  the 
business  affected  "is  connected 
with  interstate  commerce  or  not". 
Swayne  &  Hoyt  v.  Barsch.  226  Fed. 
581,  141  C.  C.  A.  337.  For  a  list 
327,  32  Sup.  Ct.  169,  38  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)   44.  Act,  1906,  supra,  valid 


§  34J  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  215 

are  valid  can,  therefore,  be  safely  assumed.  It  is  always  a 
question  of  fact,  in  each  case,  as  to  whether  or  not  the  com- 
merce at  the  time  an  injury  may  occur  is  within  the  one  or  the 
other  law.  Questions  of  jurisdiction  will  also  be  determined 
upon  the  facts  in  each  case.  It  tends,  therefore,  to  harmony 
that  the  states  are  adopting  the  Federal  statute.  The  same  car- 
rier should  not,  in  performing  the  same  kind  of  service,  be 
subjected  to  conflicting  laws,  merely  because  in  one  case  the 
injury  is  caused  by  a  car  or  train  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce is  subject  to  regulation  by  the  Federal  government  but. 
state  commerce.  In  most  cases,  however,  it  will  be  found  that 
the  carrier  is  engaged  in  transporting  interstate  commerce. 
The  act  of  Congress  applies  only  to  common  carriers  while  en- 
gaged in  interstate  commerce  and  to  employees  while  em- 
ployed by  such  carriers  in  such  commerce."" 

§  34.  Same  Subject— Liability  for  Loss  or  Damage  to  Ship- 
ments. — The  carrier's  contract  to  transport  in  interstate  com- 
merce is  subject  to  regulation  by  the  Federal  government  but, 
in  the  absence  of  Congressional  action,  may  be  regulated  by 
the  states.'""  Judge  Powell,  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Geor- 
gia, in  an  opinion  quoted  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  described  the  condition  in    apt  language,  as  follows  :*"^ 

"Some  states  allowed  carriers  to  exempt  themselves  from  all 
or  a  part  of  the  common  law  liability,  by  rule,  regulation,  or 
contract ;  others  did  not ;  the  federal  courts  sitting  in  the 
various  states  were  following  the  local  rule,  a  carrier  being 
held  liable  in  one  court  when  under  the  same  state  of  facts  he 
would  be  exempt  from  liability  in  another ;  hence  this  branch 
of  interstate  commerce  was  hieing  subjected  to  such  a  diversity 
of  legislative  and  judicial  holding  that  it  was  practically  im- 
possible for  a  shipper  engaged  in  a  business  that  extended  be- 

of    cases    arising    under    Federal  190.   Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  191 

Liability   Act,    fee   briefs    in    Sou.  U.  S.  477,  48  L.  Ed.  268,  24  Sup. 

Ry.  Co.  V.  Puckett  244  U.  S.  571,  Ct.  132. 

61  L.  Ed.  1321,  :J7  Sup.  Ct.  703.  191.    So.  Pac.  Co.  v.  Crenshaw,  5 

189.    Appendiz  K;  Sec.  332,  post  Ga.   App.   675,    687,   63    S.    E.    863, 

discusses  the  scope  of  the  federal  quoted:    Adams   Ex.   Co.   v.   Cron- 

statule.  inger,    226    U.    S.    491,    505,    57    L. 

Ed.  314,  33  Sup.  Ct.  148. 


216 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  34 


yond  the  confines  of  his  own  state,  or  for  a  carrier  whose  lines 
were  extensive,  to  know  without  considerable  investigation 
and  trouble,  and  even  then  oftentimes  with  but  little  certainty, 
what  would  be  the  carrier's  actual  responsibility  as  to  goods 
delivered  to  it  for  transportation  from  one  state  to  another." 

To  meet  this  situation  Congress  enacted  what  was  called  the 
Carniack  Amendment/"'  wdiich  superseded  all  the  regulations 
and  policies  of  the  states  in  so  far  as  they  related  to  interstate 
commerce.  There  is,  however,  a  transportation  which  applies 
between  points  both  within  a  state  and  which  can  be  reached 
without  going  out  of  the  state.  As  to  such  transportation 
Congress  has  not  assumed  to  act,  and  contracts  relating  thereto 
are  subject  to  state  laws  and  regulations."'  Therefore,  state? 
may  legislate  and  the  state  commissions  may  make  regulations 
relating  to  a  carrier's  liability  on  a  contract  of  shipment  in 
intrastate  commerce. 

The  Carmack  Amendment  being  a  valid  law  within  the 
power  of  Congress  to  enact,  the  states  can  no  longer  legislate 
concerning  the  liability  of  carriers  under  interstate  contracts 
of  shipment.'"^ 


192.  See  Amendment,  changed 
somewhat  by  Transportation  Act 
1920,  Sees.  4S9,  440,  jwst.  Prior  to 
a  decision  by  the  Supreme  Court 
the  state  courts  disagreed  as  to  the 
construction  of  this  amendment. 
See  Post  V.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  C, 
138  Ga.  763.  76  S.  E.  45,  citing 
cases  as  follows:  "On  tnis  subject 
there  are  two  lines  of  authority. 
See  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Mellichamp, 
138  Ga.  443,  75  S.  E.  596:  Hooker 
V.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  209  Mass. 
598,  95  N.  E.  945,  23  Ann.  Cas. 
699,  and  note;  Travis  v.  Wells. 
Fargo  &  Co..  79  N.  J.  L.  83.  74 
Atl.  444;  Greenwald  v.  Weir,  130 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  696,  115  N.  Y. 
Supp.  311;  In  the  matter  of  Re- 
leased Rates,  13  I.  C.  C.  550,  552; 
Watkins  on  Shippers  and  Car- 
riers, 1st.  Ed.,  267,  Sec.  201;  Gal- 
veston,   etc..    R.    Co.    v.    AVallace, 


223  U.  S.  481,  491-2,  56  L.  Ed.  516. 
32  Sup.  Ct.  205;  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R. 
Co.  V.  Grayson,  89  Ark.  154,  115 
S.  W.  933. 

193.  Simpson,  et  al,  R.  R.  Com. 
of  Minnesota  v.  Shepard,  230  U. 
S.  352,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup. 
Ct.  729;  See  also  Yazoo  &  M.  V. 
R.  Co.  V.  Jackson  Vinegar  Co., 
226  U.  S.  217,  57  L.  Ed.  193,  3a 
Sup.  Ct.  40;  Johnson  v.  So.  Ry. 
Co.,  69  S.  C.  322,  48  S.  E.  260. 

194.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hooker.  233  U.  S.  97,  58  L.  Ed. 
808,  34  Sup.  Ct.  526.  reversing 
contra  styled  case,  209  Mass.  598. 
95  N.  E.  945,  Ann.  Cas.  1912B 
669;  Atchison  T.  &  S.  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Robinson,  233  U.  S.  173,  58  L. 
Ed.  90,  34  Sup.  Ct.  556.  revers- 
ing same  styled  case,  36  Okla. 
435,  129  Pac.  20;  Charleston  C.  R. 
Co.  V.  Varnville  Furniture  Co.,  237 


§  34A]       Engagep,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  217 

But  the  rights  of  the  states  to  legislate  concerning  intrastate 
commerce  remains  nnafiPected."^ 

§  34a.  Same  Subject — Cummins  Amendments. — Congress  by 
M'hat  is  usually  called  the  first  Cummins  Amendment^"'  sought 
further  to  lessen  the  exceptions  from  liability  for  which  the 
carrier  might  coutract.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion^"' in  construing  this  amendment  said:  "The  right  of  the 
carrier  to  initiate  its  rates  and  to  consider  value  of  the  prop- 
erty tendered  for  transportation  as  an  element  in  determining 
the  classification  thereof,  or  the  rate  applicable  thereto  has 
not  been  denied  by  the  Act  or  withdrawn  by  this  amendment." 
So  while  the  liability  of  the  carriers  was  increased  there  was  a 
consequent  and  probably  a  commensurate  increase  in  the 
charges.  To  prevent  increases  in  rates  on  ordinary  livestock 
and  to  avoid  the  annoyances  which  passengers  had  been  sub- 
jected to  with  reference  to  their  baggage,  Congress  passed 
what  has  come  to  be  called  the  Second  Cummins  Amend- 
ment.""* The  Carmach  and  the  two  Cummins  Amendments,  in 
tliis  respect  not  changed  by  Transportation  Act  1920,  deprive 
the  states  of  power  to  regulate  a  carrier's  liability  for  inter- 
state shipments. ^"^  and  leave  such  liability  to  be  determined  by 
the  Federal  law.  The  effect  of  the  amendments  is  to  protect 
shippers  and  give  a  right  of  recovery  "for  full  actual  loss"  of 
goods  "at  the  point  of  destination  at  the  time  they  should  have 

U.  S.  597,  59  L.  Ed.  1137,  35  Sup,  &  N.  Y.   T.   Co.,  48   I.   C.   C.   269; 

Ct.  715,  reversing  same  styled  case,  Silk  Assn.  of  Am.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co. 

98  S.  C.  63,  79  S.  E.  700;  American  44  I.  C.  C.  578;   50  I.  C.  C.  50 
Brake  Shoe  &  Foundry  Co.  v.  Pere  199.    The  need  for  statutes  pro- 

Marquette  R.  Co.,  223  Fed.  1018.  tecting  shippers  from  unjust  con- 

195.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  tracts  of  common  carriers  is  made 
Glenn,  239  U.  S.  388,  60  L.  Ed.  344,  apparent  by  an  examination  of 
36  Fed.  Ct.  154.  recent   decisions   of   the   Supreme 

196.  Sees.  439,  440,  post:  The  Court:  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Stew- 
Cummins  Amendment  33  I.  C.  C.  art,  248  U.  S.  446,  63  L.  Ed. , 

682.  39  Sup.  Ct. ;    Baltimore  &  O 

197.  The  Cummins  Amend-  R.  Co.  v.  Leach,  249  U.  S.  217,  63 
ment  33  I.  C.  C.  682,  694.  L.    Ed.    ,    39    Sup.    Ct.    ■ ; 

198.  Sec.     440     j^ost.      Express      Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  250  U.  S.  — , 

Rates    and    Practices    43    I.    C.    C.      63   L.   Ed.  ,    39    Sup.   Ct.   and 

510;   Live  stock  classifications,  47      cases  cited  in  the  opinions. 

I.  C.  C.  335;  Williams  Co.  v.  H.  C. 


218  State  Regulation  of  Carriees.  [^  35 

been  delivered.""""  The  1920  amendment  changes  the  limita- 
tions of  time  for  filing  suits  but  otherwise  substantially  fol- 
lows the  Cummins  Amendment  of  1916.""'  No  power  of  the 
states  over  contracts  of  interstate  transportation  exists  since 
the  Carmack.  Cummins  and  1920  amendments  and  Congress  by 
the  Bill  of  Lading  Law  has  further  extended  its  occupancy  of 
this  field.-'"= 

§  35.  Penalties  for  Failure  to  Pay  Claims. — A  law  of  South 
Carolina  provided  that  should  a  carrier  fail,  within  a  time 
therein  stated,  to  pay  a  claim  for  loss  or  damage,  such  carrier 
was  subject  to  a  penalty  of  fifty  dollars.  The  law  applied 
both  to  intrastate  and  interstate  commerce,  the  time  to  settle 
being  forty  days  in  the  former  and  ninety  days  in  the  latter. 
In  a  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  involving 
an  intrastate  shipment  where  judgment  had  been  entered  for 
fifty  dollars  penalty  and  one  dollar  and  seventy-five  cents 
damages,  the  law  was  sustained.'"'^  Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  deliv- 
ering the  opinion,  said : 

"Further,  the  matter  to  be  adjusted  is  one  peculiarly  within 
the  knowledge  of  the  carrier.  It  receives  the  goods  and  has 
them  in  its  custody  until  the  carriage  is  completed.  It  knows 
what  injury  was  done  during  the  shipment,  and  how  it  was 
done.  The  consignee  may  not  know  what  was  in  fact  delivered 
at  the  time  of  the  shipment,  and  the  shipper  may  not  know 

200.  McCaull-Dinsmore  Co.  v.  S.  C.  479,  52  S.  B.  223;  Yazoo  & 
Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  252  M.  V.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson 
Fed.  6G4,  affirmed  260  Fed.  835,  Vinegar  Co.,  226  U.  S.  217. 
—  CCA.—;  Decker  v.  M.  &  St.  57  L.  Ed.  193,  33  Sup.  Ct.  40; 
P.  R.  Co.  55  I.  C  C  453.  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Love,  139  Ga.  362, 

201.  Sec.  440,  2iOst.  77    S.    E.    44;    Kansas    C    S.    Ry. 

202.  Bills  of  Lading  Act,  Sec.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  233  U.  S.  825. 
440a,  to  440rr  j^ost.  United  States  58    L.    Ed.    993,    34    Sup.    Ct.    599, 

V.    Ferger,    250    U.     S.    ,     63  affirming    same    styled    case,    104 

L.  Ed. ,  39  Sup.  Ct. .  Bills  Ark.  500,  148  S.  W.  58;   Missouri 

of  Lading,  52  L  C  C  675.  Decker  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Cade,  233  U.  S. 

case  note  200,  supra.  642,  58  L.  Ed.  113,  34  Sup.  Ct.  678, 

203.  Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  following  Missouri  K.  &  T.  R. 
Seegers,  207  U.  S.  73,  52  L.  Ed.  108.  Co.  v.  Mahaffey,  105  Tex.  394,  150 
28  Sup.  Ct.  28.  Same  case  below,  S.  W.  881,  and  explaining  Gulf  C 
73  S.  C  71,  52  S.  E.  797.  See  also  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Dennis,  224  U.  S. 
Best  V.  Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  72  503,  56  L.  Ed.  860,  32  Sup.  Ct.  542. 


§  35]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  219 

what  was  delivered  to  the  consignee  at  the  close  of  the  trans- 
portation. The  carrier  can  determine  the  amonnt  of  the  loss 
more  accurately  and  promptly  and  with  less  delay  and  expense 
than  any  one  else,  and  for  the  adjustment  of  loss  or  damage 
to  shipments  within  the  state  forty  days  can  not  be  said  to 
be  an  unreasonably  short  length  of  time." 

The  same  statute  was  held  valid  when  applied  to  an  inter- 
state shipm,ent.  The  Supreme  Court  of  South  Carolina,  dis- 
cussing the  statute  tlms  sought  to  be  applied,  said  :"°* 

"The  penalty  imposed  is  for  a  delict  of  duty  appertaining 
to  the  business  of  a  common  carrier,  and  in  so  far  as  it  may 
affect  interstate  commerce,  it  is  an  aid  thereto  by  its  tend- 
ency to  promote  safe  and  prompt  delivery  of  goods,  or  its 
legal  equivalent — prompt  settlement  of  proper  claim  for  dam- 
ages. No  penalty  can  attach  except  upon  the  establishment  in 
a  court  of  a  default  of  duty  imposed  by  statute." 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  quoted  the  lan- 
guage just  copied  in  the  opinion  holding  that  the  state  statute 
was  valid. 

Such  statutes  when  unreasonable  are  void,  whether  affecting 
interstate  commerce  or  not,  and  so  held  of  an  Arkansas  statute 
providing  for  heavy  penalties,  when  the  shipper  recovered 
the  amount  for  which  he  sued,  although  previous  to  his  suit 
he  had  demanded  a  larger  amount.""^ 

In  a  ease  involving  the  validity  of  a  Texas  statute  providing 
for  attorneys'  fees  where  judgments  were  rendered  for  loss  of 
or  damage  to  freight,  it  was  urged  that  such  statute  affected 
interstate  commerce,  and  was  void  because  of  conflict  witli 
the  Carmack  Amendment.    This  contention  the  Supreme  Court 

204.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Ma-  232  U.  S.  165,  58  L.  Ed.  554,  34 
zursky,  216  U.  S.  122,  132,  54  L.  Ed.  Sup.  Ct.  301,  reversing  same  styled 
411,  30  Sup.  Ct.  378,  affirming  case,  26  S.  D.  378,  128  N.  W.  472; 
same  styled  case,  78  S.  C.  36,  58  Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
S.  E.  927,  125  Am.  St.  Rep.  762.  Kennedy,  232  U.  S.  626,  58  L.  Ed. 
See.  discussion  and  cases  cited  762,  34  Sup.  Ct.  463,  reversing 
Dickinson  v.  Stile,  246  U.  S.  631,  same  styled  case,  28  S.  D.  94,  132 
62  L.  Ed.  908,  911,  38  Sup.  Ct.  415.  N.  W.  802.  Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co. 

205.  St.  Louis,  T.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tucker,  230  U.  S.  3.40,  57  L.  Ed. 
V.  Wynne,  224  U.  S.  354,  56  L.  Ed.  1507,  33  Sup.  Ct.  961,  reversing 
799,  32  Sup.  Ct.  493.  Followed  in  Tucker  v.  Mo.  Kan.  &  Tex.  R.  Co., 
Chicago  M.  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Polt,  82  Kan.  222,  108  Pac.  89. 


220  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  36i 

met  by  saying:  "But  the  Texas  statute  now  under  considera- 
tion does  not  in  any  way  either  enlarge  or  limit  the  responsi- 
l)ility  of  the  carrier  for  the  loss  of  property  intrusted  to  it 
in  transportation,  and  only  indirectly  affects  the  remedy  for 
enforcing  that  responsibility." '°° 

Congress  has  dealt  with  the  contract  in  the  Carmack  Amend- 
ment. These  penalty  statutes,  as  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
do  not  affect  the  contract  but  refer  to  the  remedy  for  a  breach 
thereof.""' 

This  distinction  must  not  be  overlooked.  In  the  Texas  case 
supra,  the  loss  for  wdiich  suit  was  brought  occurred  on  the 
line  of  the  delivering  carrier,  and  other  than  this  presumption 
there  was  no  evidence  to  show  which  of  the  carriers  trans- 
l)orting  the  commodity  caused  the  damage  thereto.  The  Car- 
mack  Amendment  giA^es  a  right  of  action  against  the  initial 
carrier.  So  a  later  South  Carolina  judgment  was  reversed,""* 
not  because  of  the  provision  for  the  recovery  of  an  attorney's 
fee,  but  because  the  right  to  recover  both  damages  and  at- 
torney's fees  was  based  upon  a  statute  in  conflict  with  the 
Federal  law.  With  this  distinction  in  mind,  the  later  South 
Carolina  case  is  in  harmony  with  the  decision  in  the  Texas 
case.  In  the  South  Carolina  case,  the  Texas  case  and  other 
cases  are  cited  and  the  applicable  principle  stated  as  follows  :^** 
""When  Congress  has  taken  the  particular  subject-matter  in 
hand,  coincidence  is  as  ineffective  as  opposition,  and  a  state 
law  is  not  to  be  declared  a  help  because  it  attempts  to  go 
farther  than  Congress  has  seen  fit  to  go." 

§  86.  Requiring-  Railroads  to  Perform  Transportation  Serv- 
ice.— It  is  axiomatic  that  a  common  carrier  is  not  at  liberty 
to  accept  or  decline  shipments  or  to  accept  or  decline  the  duty 
of  transporting  passengers.  Reasonable  rules  as  to  the  time, 
place  and  manner  of  receiving  freight  and  passengers  may 

206.    Missouri  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  207.   Sec.  32  ante. 

Harris,  234  U.   S.   412,    58   L.  Ed.  208.   Charleston  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co. 

1377,  34  Sup.  Ct.  790,  and  see  cases  v.    Varnville    Furniture    Co.,    237 

cited  affecting  the  question  arising  V.  S.  597,  59  L.  Ed.  1137,  35  Sup. 

on   state   legislation   and   question  Ct.  715. 
arising  under  the  Carmack  Amend- 
ment. 


§  37]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  221 

be  made  by  the  carrier,  but  these  are  subject  to  the  govern- 
mental x)ower  of  regulation.  The  regulation  of  interstate 
trans])ortation  in  this  respect  is  for  Congress,  but  the  states 
have  jurisdiction  o^■er  intrastate  transportation  of  persons 
and  property.  These  principles  were  stated  by  Mr.  Justice 
Brewer,  as  follows  :""* 

"The  question  we  have  to  consider  is  the  power  of  the  state 
to  enforce  an  equality  of  local  rates  as  between  all  parties 
shipping  for  the  same  distance  over  the  same  road.  That  a 
state  has  such  power  can  not  be  doubted,  and  it  can  not  be 
thwarted  by  any  action  of  a  railroad  company  which  does  not 
involve  an  actual  interstate  shipment,  although  done  with  a 
A'iew  of  promoting  the  business  interests  of  the  company.  Even 
if  a  state  may  not  compel  a  railroad  company  to  do  business 
at  a  loss  and  conceding  that  a  railroad  company  may  insist,  as 
against  the  power  of  the  state,  upon  the  right  to  establish 
such  rates  as  will  afford  reasonable  compensation  for  the  serv- 
ices rendered,  yet  when  it  voluntarily  establishes  local  rates  for 
some  shippers  it  can  not  resist  the  power  of  the  state  to  en- 
force the  same  rates  for  all." 

Mr.  Justice  Hill,  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia,  in  holding 
valid  a  statute  of  that  state  preventing  discrimination  in  the 
sale  of  passenger  tickets  by  connecting  carriers,  showed  how 
ancient  is  this  right  to  regulate.    He  said  :^" 

"The  principle  of  the  right  of  a  state  or  government  to  reg- 
ulate carriers  and  rates  for  public  services  performed  is  not 
new,  but  seems  to  date  back  to  a  very  ancient  period.  So  far 
as  the  writer's  research  extends,  it  goes  at  least  as  far  back  as 
2250  years  before  the  birth  of  Christ,  to  the  reign  of  Ham- 
jnurabi,  the  King  of  ancient  Babylon,  who  had  a  complete 
code  of  laws  for  that  time.  Indeed,  our  laws  of  the  present 
day  have  few  underlying  principles  that  do  not  seem  to  be 
contained  in  this  primitive  code." 

§  87.  Sale  and  Regulation  of  Passenger  Tickets. — The  con- 
tract or  ticket  for  transportation  of  a  person  over  a  railroad 

209.    Ala.  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Missis-  210.   Stephens  v.  Cent,  of  Ga.  Ry. 

sippi   R.  R.   Com.,   203    U.    S.   406,  Co.,    138   Ga.    625,   628,    629,   75    S. 

501,  51  L.  Ed.  289,  27  Sup.  Ct.  163,  E.  1041,  42  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    541, 

affirming  same  styled  case,  86  Miss.  1913E,  Ann.  Cas.  609. 
667,  38  So.  356. 


222 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[^  37 


is  subject,  like  the  rate,  to  reasonable  regulation.  The  power 
to  regulate  rests,  as  to  travel  among  the  states  and  with  for- 
eign countries,  with  the  Federal  government ;  and  as  to  travel 
in  one  state,  with  the  state  government.  As  to  those 
contracts  within  their  regulating  power,  the  states  may  make 
all  reasonable  rules.  What  is  a  reasonable  rule  must  depend 
upon  the  facts  of  each  case.  Tt  is  not  unreasonable  to  require 
the  carrier  to  redeem  tickets  or  unused  portions  thereof.'" 
Nor  is  a  law  which  requires  that  tickets  may  not  be  sold  except 
by  authorized  agents  of  the  carrier  unreasonable,  and  such  a 
law  applying  to  the  acts  of  agents  within  a  state  has  no  direct 
effect  on  interstate  commerce  although  the  ticket  sold  may  be 
a  contract  authorizing  the  purchaser  to  travel  from  one  state 
to  another.  Congress  has  not,  as  yet,  attempted  to  regulate 
relating  to  this  sub'ject. 

Referring  to  a  statute  limiting  the  right  to  sell  tickets  to 
agents  of  the  carrier,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois,  in  deciding 
that  the  statute  referred  to  all  tickets,  accurately  stated  the 
reasons  why  interstate  commerce  was  not  interfered  with  as 
follows  r^'  "^ 


211.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Fookes,  —  Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ,  40  S. 
W.  858.  And  carriers  may  legally 
require  the  purchase  of  a  ticket 
and  in  default  charge  a  higher 
rate,  Coyle  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  112  Ga. 
121,  37  S.  E.  Iff3. 

212.  Burdick  v.  People,  149  111. 
600,  36  N.  E.  918,  24  L.  R.  A.  152, 
41  Am.  St.  Rep.  329.  To  same 
effect.  State  v.  Corbett,  57  Minn. 
345,  59  N.  W.  317,  24  L.  R.  A. 
498;  State  v.  Thompson,  47  Oreg. 
639,  84  Pac.  476,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  480;  Commonwealth  v.  Keary, 
198  Pa.  St.  500,  48  Atl.  472.  As 
to  the  validity  of  such  leo-islation 
as  to  state  transportation,  see 
Samuelson  v.  State,  116  Tenn. 
470,  95  S.  W.  1012,  115  Am.  St. 
Rep.  805;  Fry  v.  State,  63  Ind.  552 
Jannen  v.  State,  42  Tex.  Cr.  App. 
631,  51   S.  W.  1126,  62   S.  W.  419 


fright  to  regulate  sustained); 
State  V.  Bernheim,  19  Mont.  512, 
49  Pac.  441;  Ex  Parte  O'Neil,  83 
Pac.  104.  The  legislatures  of  many 
states  have  appreciated  the  un- 
lawful and  fraudulent  character 
of  the  ticket  scalpers'  business, 
and  statutes  have  been  enacted 
making  dealing  in  these  tickets 
by  others  than  an  authorized  agent 
of  the  carrier  a  violation  of  the 
criminal  law,  viz:  Pennsylvania, 
New  Jersey,  Illinois,  Indiana, 
Minnesota,  Georgia,  Maine,  Texas, 
North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  North 
Dakota,  Oregon,  Montana,  Florida 
and  New  York,  "Laws  of  New 
York,  1901,  c,  639,  prohibiting 
private  individuals  from  selling 
railroad  tickets,  and  forbidding 
the  officers  of  a  common  carrier 
from  supplying  tickets  for  sale  to 
any    other     than    an     authorized 


§  37]  Engaged,  in  Inteestate  Commerce.  223 

"State  legislation,  whicli  is  not  an  obstacle  to  interstate 
commerce,  and  imposes  no  burden  upon  it,  and  which  comes 
within  a  proper  exercise  of  the  police  power,  is  not  unconstitu- 
tional, as  infringing  upon  the  powers  of  Congress.  The  Act  of 
1875  is,  we  think,  such  a  species  of  state  legislation.  The 
duties  which  it  imposes  upon  the  carriers  therein  named,  and 
their  agents  can  not  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  interstate 
travel.  Such  travel  is  not  impeded  because,  tickets  are  re- 
quired to  be  purchased  from  agents  of  the  carrier  who  are 
provided  with  certificates  of  their  authority.  The  limitation 
of  the  sale  of  tickets  to  such  agents  may  be  a  restraint  upon 
the  business  of  scalpers  and  ticket  brokers,  but  can  not  be 
regarded  as  a  l)urden  upon  interstate  commerce." 

The  contract  of  interstate  transportation  can  not  be  con- 
trolled by  a  state  and  a  state  law  making  an  interstate  ticket 
binding  for  six  years  and  giving  stop-over  privileges,  no  such 
provision  being  in  the  contract,  is  void."^  and  so  is  a  law 
requiring  carriers  to  give  shippers  of  live  stock  free  trans- 
portation in  interstate  commerce. ^^*  A  state,  as  to  intrastate 
travel,  may  require  carriers  who  have  voluntarily  issued  com- 
mutation tickets  to  designate  specifically  both  termini  of  such 
tickets."'^     This  rule  of  law  has  support  in  the  principle  that 

agent,   has   been   declared   by   the  was    placed    upon    the    contention 

New  York  Court  of  Appeals  not  a  that  the  statute  violated  the  citi- 

valid  exercise  of  the  power  of  the  zens'  liberty  to  contract,  and  not 

legislature  to  regulate  the  conduct  upon  the  commerce  clause  of  the 

of  a  railroad  company's  business  federal    constitution.        The    New 

because    it    is    a    creation    of    the  York  court  is  not  in  accord  with 

legislature  and  a  common  carrier."  the   general    and    better    rule    an- 

People  V.  Caldwell,  71  N.  Y.  Supp.  nounced  in  the  cases  supra. 

654,    64    App.    Div.    46,    Musco    v.  213.     Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co. 

United    Surety   Co.,   132   App.   Dlv  v.  Frank,  110  Fed.  689;  Louisville 

300,  117  N.  Y.   Supp.  21,   affirmed  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Bitterman,  144  Fed. 

196  N.  Y.  459,  90  N.  E.  171.  Such  3.i,  75  C.  C.  A.  192,  affirmed  by  Su- 

a  regulation  was  held  invalid  by  preme  Court,  Bitterman  v.  Louis- 

the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York  ville  &  N.   R.   Co.,  207   U.   S.   205, 

in     People     ex     rel.     Tyroler     v.  52  L.  Ed.  171,   28  Sup.  Ct.  91. 

Warden  of  City  Prison,  157  N.  Y.  214.     La  Farier  v.  Grand  Trunk 

116,    54   N.    E.    1006,    43    L.    R.    A.  Ry.  of  Canada,  84  Me.  284,  286,  24 

264,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  763,  reversing  Atl.  848. 

the  same  case  in  26  App.  Div.  226,  215.   Deleware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 

50   N.  Y.   Supp.   56.    The  reversal  Public  Utility  Comr's,  84  N.  J.  619, 


224  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  ['§'38 

althoiij^h  a  special  rate  or  privilege  may  not  be  compelled,  if 
it  should  he  vohmtarily  granted  by  the  carrier,  the  privilege 
Avhile  existing  is  so  far  snhjiect  to  regulation  as  to  prevent 
discrimination  ;"*"  but  the  carrier  may  change  its  policy  and 
withdraw  the  privilege."'' 

§  88.  Same  Subject — Mileage  Books — Party  Rate  Tickets.— 
It  has  become  a  general  practice  for  railroads  to  sell  mile- 
age books  which  entitle  passengers  complying  with  the  terms 
stated  therein  to  transportation  at  a  rate  less  than  the  rate 
where  a  single  ticket  is  purchased.  By  a  mileage  ticket,  one 
person  gets  a  number  of  rides  at  less  than  the  usual  fare,  by 
a  party  rate  ticket  a  number  of  persons  get  one  ride  each  at 
less  for  each  one  than  would  be  the  rate  if  each  bought  a 
single  ticket.  The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  party  rate 
tickets  open  to  all  are  not  discriminatory  under  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce;""  and  in  the  same  case  it  was  held  that 
a  party  rate  ticket  was  neither  a  mileage  nor  a  commutation 
ticket.  Section  22  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  provides : 
"That  nothing  in  this  Act  shall  y)revent  *  *  *  fj^g  jg. 
suance  of  mileage,  excursion  or  commutation  passenger 
tickets.'' ''"  This  provision  indicates  that  there  was  a  necessity 
therefor  to  prevent  such  a  construction  of  the  Act  as  would 
prohibit  the  issuance  of  these  special  contracts. 

No  room  is  left,  if  there  ever  were  such,  for  the  states  to 
regulate  or  require  the  issuance  of  mileage. tickets  for  inter- 
state transportation.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
has  held  that,  as  to  interstate  transportation  of  passengers, 
"the  issuance  of  mileage  books  is  voluntary,"  but  if  they  are 
issued  there  must  be  no  discriminalion,  although  the  carrier 
may  "attach  to  the  contract  such  lawful  conditions  as  it 
chooses."  ■■" 

87  Atl.  801.  For  a  discussion  of  a  217.      Cent,    of    Ga.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

related     subject     see     Rules     and"  Augusta    Brokerage    Co.,    122    Ga. 

Regulations    Governing    Checking  646,  50  S.  E.  473,  69  L.  R.  A.  119. 

of  Baggage,  35  I.  C.  C.  157.  218.     Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 

216.     Alabama  &  V.  Ry.   Co.  v.  Int.    Com.    Com.,    145    U.    S.    263, 

R.    R.    Com.    of    Miss.,    203    U.    S.  36  L.  Ed.  699,  12  Sup.  Ct.  844. 

496,    51    L.    Ed.    298,    27    Sup.    Ct.  219.     Sec.  444,  post. 

163,    affirming    same    styled    case,  220.     Eschner   v.   Penn.   R.   Co., 

86  Miss.  667,  38   So.  356.  18  I.   C.  C.   60,   63,  64;     Re   Prac- 


§    38]  l^^NGAGED,    IN    INTERSTATE    CoMMERCE.  225 

Tt  is  believed  that  the  states  may  not  require  the  issuance  of 
these  contracts  and  may  not  prescribe  the  terms  th^'reof  further 
than  to  prevent  discrimination  in  their  issuance  and  use.  In 
1891  the  state  of  Michigan  attempted  to  compel  the  sale  by 
carriers  of  mileage  books  under  certain  prescribed  conditions 
and,  the  state  court  having  sustained  the  statute  limiting  its 
operation  to  intrastate  commerce/"  the  question  was  pre- 
sented to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  by  writ  of 
error  to  the  state  court.  The  questions  raised  in  the  Supreme 
Court,  as  stated  in  its  opinion,  were:  "(1)  whether  the  act 
violates  the  Constitution  of  the  TTnited  States  by  impairing 
the  obligation  of  any  contract  between  the  state  and  the  rail- 
i-oad  company;  (2)  if  not,  does  it  nevertheless  violate  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  by  depriving  the 
company  of  its  property  or  liberty  without  due  process  of  law 
or  by  depriving  it  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws."  Of 
these  contentions  the  court,  in  holding  the  Michigan  statute 
void,""'  said : 

"In  this  case  there  is  not  an  exercise  of  the  power  to  fix 
maximum  rates.  There  is  not  the  exercise  of  the  acknowledged 
p(»wer  to  legislate  so  as  to  prevent  extortion  or  unreasonable 
or  illegal  exactions.  The  fixing  of  the  maximum  rate  does 
that.  It  js  a  pure,  bald  and  unmixed  power  of  discrimination 
in  favor  of  a  few  of  the  persons  having  occasion  to  travel  on 
the  roac'  and  permitting  them  to  do  so  at  a  less  expense  than 
others,  provided  they  buy  a  certain  number  of  tickets  at  one 
time.  It  is  not  legislation  for  the  safety,  health  or  proper 
convenience  of  the  public,  but  an  arbitrary  enactment  in  favor 
of  the  persons  spoken  of,  who  in  the  legislative  judgment 
should  be  carried  at  a  less  expense  than  the  other  members  of 
elaborate  opinion  the  Supremo  Court  of  Georgia  has  held 
the  community." 

This  decision  would  appear  to  be  conclusive,  although  in  an 
valid  a  regulation  of  the  Railroad  Commission  of  Georgia  re- 
quiring railroads,  as  to  intrastate  transportation  from  cities 

tices  Governing  Sale  and  Exchange  221.    Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

of  Mileage  Books,  28  I.  C.  C.  318,  Smith,  114  Mich.  460,  72  N.  W.  328. 

and   cases  cited.     Rules  and  Reg-  222.    Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

ulations    Governing    Checking    of  Smith.  173  U.  S.  684,  698,  43  L.  Ed. 

Baggage,  35  I.  C  C.  157,  160.  858,  19  Sup.  Ct.  565. 


226 


State  Regulation  of  Caeriees. 


[§  39 


of  a  designated  size,  to  honor  mileage  books  on  their  trains 
and  prohiMting  the  requirement  in  the  contract  that  mileage 
shall  be  exchanged  for  a  ticket."* 

§  39.  Free  Transportation. — As  to  interstate  transportation, 
Congress  has  so  legislated  as  to  prevent  free  transportation 
except  as  to  certain  designated  persons  and  classes."'     One 


223.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  R. 
R.  Com.  of  Georgia,  140  Ga.  817, 
80  S.  E.  327,  Ann.  Cas.  1915A,  1018, 
As  sustaining  the  Georgia  court 
see  Delaware,  L.  &W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Public  Utility  Comr's. 
84  N.  J.  L.  Vroom  619,  87  Atl. 
801.  See  Beardsley  v.  New  York  L. 
E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  162  N.  Y.  232, 
.56  N.  E.  488,  holding  that  a 
statute  requiring  the  issuance  of 
mileage  books  was  void  and  re 
versing  same  styled  case,  17  Misc. 
Rep.  2.56,  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  1077, 
15  App.  Div.  251,  44  N.  Y.  Supp. 
175.  In  Attorney  General  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  62,  35  N. 
E.  252,  22  L.  R.  A.  112,  it  was  h^ld 
that  a  similar  statute  was  void, 
the  court  saying:  "The  objection 
that  the  statute  authorizes  one 
railroad  to  make  conditions  con- 
cerning the  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers which  must  be  per- 
formed by  other  railroads  seems 
to  us  valid..  The  objection  is 
not  that  the  legislature  has 
itself  attemped  to  declare  the 
rights  of  passengers  who  have 
purchased  mileage  tickets.  The 
legislature,  by    this    statute,    has 

not  determined  the  condition?; 
which  shall  be  incident  to  the 
carriage  of  passengers  under  these 
tickets;  nor  has  it  left  them  to  be 
determined  by  the  railroad  com- 
pany transporting  the  passengers. 
One  railroad  is,  in  effect,  authori- 
zed  to   make   a   contract   for   an- 


other, but  the  railroads  are  not 
in  fact  the  agents  of  each  other  in 
issuing  these  tickets.  It  has  been 
often  said  that  the  legislature  can 
not  make  a  contract  between  two 
or  more  persons  which  they  do 
not  choose  to  make,  although  it 
may  sometimes  impose  duties 
which  can  be  enforced  as  if  they 
arose  from  contract.  Without  deny- 
ing the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  determine  the  form  of  the  con- 
tracts which  common  carriers  of 
persons  or  merchandise  must  make 
concerning  transportation,  and 
without  considering  the  au- 
thority of  the  legislature  to  del- 
egate this  power  to  a  board  of 
public  officers,  we  are  of  the 
opinion  that  this  power  can  not 
be  delegated  to  private  persons 
or  corporations."  While  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Georgia  has  held 
that  it  could  regulate  the  use  of 
mileage  books,  the  principles  an- 
nounced by  the  same  court  in 
other  cases  would  permit  the  with- 
drawal by  the  carriers  of  such 
special  contracts.  See  Central  or 
Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Augusta  Brokerage 
Co.,  122  Ga.  646,  50  S.  E.  473,  69 
L.  R.  A.  119;  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Atlanta  Stove  Works,  128  Ga.  207, 
57  S.  E.  429.  For  a  discussion  of 
the  general  question,  see  Chicago 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ketchum, 
212  Fed.  986. 

224.     Sees.    182,    342,    442,    post, 
and  annotations. 


§  40]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  227 

purpose  of  governmental  regulation  of  coin;inon  carriers,  iS 
not  the  chief  and  most  beneficent,  is  the  prevention  of  favorit- 
ism, and  that  such  purpose  may  be  accomplished,  states  may, 
within  the  scope  of  the  commerce  subject  to  their  regulation, 
prevent  common  carriers  from  discriminating  by  giving  free 
transportation  of  persons  or  of  property.  Exceptions  to  the 
general  rule  may  lawfully  be  made  in  favor  of  certain  public 
or  charitable  purposes,  and  carriers  may  interchange  trans- 
portation service. ^"^ 

A  state  may  not  require  free  transportation  to  shippers  of 
cattle  in  interstate  commerce."' 

A  state  statute  authorizing  state  incorporated  railroads  to 
issue  transportation  in  payment  for  printing  and  advertising 
is  void  as  to  interstate  transportation."" 

§  40.  Routing-  Freight. — The  Railroad  Commission  of  Ar- 
kansas passed  this  regulation:  "In  case  of  failure  on  the 
part  of  the  shipper  to  give  routing  instructions,  it  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  railroad  receiving  the  shipment  to  forward  it  via 
such  route  as  will  make  the  lowest  rate." 

As  Congress  has  the  exclusive,  undivided  and  plenary  power 
to  regulate  interstate  commerce,  such  a  rule  as  to  that  com- 
merce is  void,  although  as  to  an  intrastate  haul  it  would  be 
reasonable  and  valid.^^^ 

22.5.     State  v.    Martyn,   82    Neb.  Atl.      849.      Free      transportation 

225,  117  N.  W.  719:  Schulz  v.  Park-  violates   statute    against   discrimi- 

er,  158  Iowa  42,  139  N.  W.  173.  Ex-  nation,  State  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

change  of  transportation  for  news-  122   N.   C.    1052,   30   S.  E.    133,    41 

paper    advertising    violates    Anti-  L.  R.  A.  246.     Purpose  of  Act  to 

Pass  law.  State  v.   Union  Pac.  R.  regulate   commerce   stated:    Rates 

Co.,  87  Neb.  29,  126  N.  W.  859.  A  for   Transportation   of   Anthracite 

valid  contract  for  a  pass  not  abro-  Coal,  35  I.  C.  C.  220,  289. 

gated  by  Anti-Pass  statute  subse-  226.    State  v.  Otis,  60  Kan.  248, 

quently  enacted.  Emerson  v.  Bost-  56  Pac.  14.     See  note,  214,  suj)ra. 

on  &  M.  R.  Co.,  75  N.  H.  427,  75  227.    Chicago.  I.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v. 

Atl.  529;   but  contra  as  to  federal  United   States,   219   U.   S.   486,   55 

statute,  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  L.    Ed.    305,    31    Sup.    Ct.    272,    af- 

Mottley,  219  U.  S.  467,  55  L.  Ed.  firming  United  States  v.  Chicago, 

297,  31   Sup.  Ct.  265.  34  L.  R.  A.  I.  &  L.  R.  Co.,  163  Fed.  114.  See 

(N.  S.)  671.  States  may  not  compel  also    Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v. 

free     transportation     to     officials,  Mottley,  211  U.  S.  149,  53  L.  Ed. 

Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Public  126,  29  Sup.  Ct.  42. 

Utility  Com'rs,  85  N.  J.  L.  28,  8S  228.    St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 


22S  State  Regulation  of  Carribes.  [§  ^l- 

§  41.  When  Interstate  Transportation  Begins  and  Ends. — 
Tn  determining  the  question  as  to  the  validity  of  a  particular 
regulation  made  by  the  Federal  or  state  governments,  it  is 
necessary  to  decide  Avhether  the  transportation  affected  by  the 
i-egulation  is  interstate  or  intrastate  transportation.  If  the 
transportation  is  to  be  interstate  it  is  subject  to  Federal  regu- 
lation and  excluded  from  state  regulation  from  the  time  it 
begins.  It  makes  no  difference  that  the  particular  service 
sought  to  be  regulated  is  performed  wholly  in  one  state  if 
the  transportation  is  interstate.  In  Coe  v.  Errol,""^  the  Su- 
preme Court  stated  negatively  when  the  interstate  transporta- 
tion began  by  saying  it  did  not  begin  until  the  goods  "have 
been  shipped,  or  entered  with  a  common  carrier  for  trans- 
portation to  another  state,  or  have  been  started  upon  such 
transportation  in  a  continuous  route  or  journey."  In  another 
part  of  the  opinion  it  was  said  that  goods  are  in  interstate 
commerce  when  they  have  "actually  started  in  the  course  of 
transportation  to  another  state,  or  delivered  to  a  carrier  for 
transportation." 

In  Covington  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Keith,"'"  the  rule  as  to 
both  the  beginning  and  ending  of  the  transportation  was  stated 
as  follows:  "The  transportation  of  live  stock  begins  with  their 
delivery  to  the  can'ier  to  be  loaded  upon  its  cars,  and  ends  only 
after  the  stock  is  unloaded  and  delivered,  or  offered  to  be  de- 
livered, to  the  consignee." 

Freight  tendered  for  through  transportation  is  within  the 
regulating  jiower  of  the  Federal  government,  although  a  bill 
of_lading  can  not  be  issued  until  the  agent  learns  from  his 
superiors  the  legal  rate.'^' 

Allen,  181  Fed.  810;   Porter  v.  St.  157,  .50  L.  Ed.  517,  35  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 

Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  78  Ark.  182,  275. 

95    S.    W.    953.     For    other    cases  230.    Covington  Stock  Yards  Co. 

see  Dec.  Dig.,  Key  No.  Title  Com  v.    Keith,    139    U.    S.    128,    136,    35 

merce,  Sees.  8  and  61.  L.  Ed.  73,  11  Sup.  Ct.  416.  quoted 

229.    Coe  V.  Errol,  116  U.  S.  517,  and    followed.    United     States    v. 

527,    29    L.    Ed.    715:    6    Sup.    Ct.  Union  Stock  Yard  &  Transit  Co., 

475,  followed.  Sou.  Pac.  Terminal  226   U.   S.   286,  57   L.   Ed.   226,   33 

Co.  V.   Interstate  Com.   Com.,  219  Sup.  Ct.  83. 

U.  S.  498,  527,  55  L.  Ed.  310,  31  231.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
Sup.  Ct.  279;  and  111.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  lington  Lumber  Co.,  225  U.  S.  99, 
Louisiana  R.   R.   Com.,   236   U.   S. 


<^  41]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commeece.  229 

A  car  containing  interstate  shipments  is,  prior  to  reaching 
its  destination,  engaged  in  interstate  commerce,  although  stop- 
ped for  repairs.""'  When,  however,  the  transportation  con- 
tract has  been  completed,  the  fact  that  such  completed  con- 
tract was  one  of  interstate  transportation  will  not  make  a 
subsequent  shipment  of  the  same  goods  to  a  point  in  the  same 
state  one  of  interstate  transportation.'''"' 

Goods  stored  for  more  than  two  months  under  a  provision 
of  an  interstate  tariff  permitting  storage  in  transit  retain 
the  character  of  an  interstate  shipment.""*  So  a  reshipment 
of  a  car  that  had  moved  in  interstate  commerce  from  one  to 
another  point  in  a  state  under  a  reconsignment  right  is  an 
interstate  shipment."''''  In  discussing  the  Child  Labor  Law  the 
Supreme  Court  said:  "The  making  of  goods  and  the  mining 
of  coal  are  not  commerce,  nor  does  the  fact  that  these  things 
are  to  be  afterwards  shipped  or  used  in  interstate  commerce 
make  their  production  a  part  thereof.""^"  Applying  this  prin- 
ciple, the  mere  intention  ultimately  to  continue  a  movement 
that  is  intrastate  to  a  point  beyond  the  state  does  not  con- 
situte  the  first  and  independent  movement  an  interstate  ship- 
ment."" 

56   L.  Ed.    1001,   32   Sup.   Ct.   657;  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Ry.  Co.  232 

and  cases  cited.  Fed.  946. 

232.  Delk  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  236.  Hammer  v.  Dagenhart  247 
R.  Co.,  220  U.  ri.  580,  55  L.  Ed.  U.  S.  251,  62  L.  Ed.  1101,  38  Sup  Ct. 
590,  31  Sup.  Ct.  617.  529  and  cases  cited  in  the  opinion. 

233.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Abstractly  the  principle  quoted  is 
Texas  204  U.  S.  403,  51  L.  Ed.  a  correct  one,  but  while  the  quest- 
540,  27  Sup.  Ct.  360,  cited  and  dis-  ion  is  not  here  important,  it  is 
tinguished  in  Southern  Pac.  Ter~  believed  that  the  Supreme  Court 
minal  Co.  v.  Interstate  Com-  should  have  applied  to  the 
merce  Commission,  supra;  Chi-  law  under  discussion  the  prin- 
cago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  V.  Iowa,  233  ciple  that  Congress  may  keep 
U.  S.  334,  58  L.  Ed.  988,  34  Sup.  the  field  of  interstate  commerce 
Ct.  592.  free  from  any  act  that  will  handi- 

234.  Western  Transit  Co.  v.  cap  any  one  wishing  to  cultivate 
Leslie  &  Co.,  242  U.  S.  448,  61  L.  that  field.  For  a  discussion  of  the 
Ed.  423,  37  Sup.  Ct.  133.  Child    Labor   Law   by    the   author 

235.  A.   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.   v.  hereof,  see  Case  &  Comment  Vol. 
Harold,   241   U.   S.   371,   60   L.   Ed.  23,  No.  11,  April  1917,  pp  906. 
1050,   S6   Sup.   Ct.    665.    "The  real  237.    ArkadelphJa  Mill  Co.  v.  St. 
and    ultimate    destination    of    the  L.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  249  U.  S.  134,  63 
shipment"  controls.    United  States       L.  Ed.  ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  237,  P.  U. 


230  State  Regulatiox  of  Carriers.  [§  42 

A  shipment  intended  for  a  point  in  another  state  can  not 
be  billed  to  a  point  in  the  state  in  which  the  shipment  origi- 
nated and  then  rebilled  to  tlie  destination  point  on  the  sum  of 
the  intermediate  local  rates.  The  throngih  interstate  rate 
mnst  he  applied.  In  discussing  this  question  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  said:"'"'  "This  commission,  as  herein- 
before stated,  has  steadfastly  adhered  to  the  proposition  that 
ou  any  through  carriage  of  traffic  between  interstate  points  the 
lawfully  published  interstate  rate  must  be  applied  by  the 
carrier  and  paid  by  the  shipper,  and  that  Avhere  the  through 
interstate  rate  in  effect  between  two  points  is  higher  than  the 
aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates  any  plan  of  first  billing  to 
an  intermediate  point  a  shipment  that  is  really  intended  to 
reach  a  destination  beyond  is  simply  a  device  for  defeating  the 
lawful  through  rate,  and  is  unlawful." 

§  42.  Attachments  a.nd  Garnishments. — Interstate  carriers 
must  of  necessity  interchange  cars,  and  from  this  interchange 
of  cars  and  from  the  transaction  of  through  business  credits 
arise  in  favor  of  one  carrier  against  another.  Whether  or 
not  these  cars  and  credits  belonging  to  a  railroad  of  another 
state  may  be  reached  by  process  of  attachment  and  garnish- 
ment was  a  mooted  question  in  the  state  courts.  Where  a 
railroad  company  of  a  state  received  the  cars  of  a  railroad 
company  of  another  state  under  a  contract  by  which  the  do- 
mestic company  had  the  right  to  carry  the  loaded  car  to  its 
destination  and  to  reload  and  return  the  car  to  the  owner 
in  another  state,  it  was  held  that  garnishment  served  on  the 
domestic  company  would  not  in  the  absence  of  a  lien  hold  the 
foreign  car.  This  decision  was  based  upon  the  local  law,  and 
in  the  same  case  it  was  held  that  such  garnishment  was  not 
illegal  on  the  ground  that  it  affected  interstate  commerce."^'' 

R.  1919C,  710.  Southern  Pacific  Co.       A. Missouri  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

V.  Arizona  249  U.  S. ,  63  L.  Ed.  Ashinger,  162  Pac.  814. 

,  39  Sup.  Ct.  ■ .  239.     Southern    Flour    &    Grain 

238.     Kanotex    Refining    Co.    v.  Co.  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  127 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  34  I.  C.  C.  Ga.   626.   56   S.  E.   742,   9   L.   R.  A. 

271,  276.  Applying  the  rule  quoted  (N.    S.)     853,     119    Am.    St.    Rep. 

see:       Alabama    G.    S.    R.    Co.    v.  356;    Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.   Brown, 

McFadden  &  Bros.,  232  Fed.  100;  131  Ga.  245,  62  S.  E.   177.  Agree- 

same  case  241  Fed.  562  C.  C.  ing    with    the    Georgia    court    on 


§  42]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  231 

The  same  court  subsequently  held  that  where  "the  car  was 
an  empty  freight  car,  and  all  use  thereof  by  the  claimant  under 
the  contract  had  ceased,  and  nothing  remained  to  be  done 
except  to  return  it  to  the  owner,"  that  the  levy  of  an  attach- 
ment upon  the  car  was  valid. "^'' 

The  questions  of  local  law  are  not  within  the  purview  of  this 
discussion  and  the  differences  between  the  state  courts  as  to 
the  Federal  question  have  as  to  the  general  right  been  settled 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

A  case  arose  where  certain  freight  cars  and  certain  credits 
of  a  corporation  of  Indiana  and  Ohio  were  sought  to  be  reached 
by  garnishment  against  a  carrier  in  Iowa  which  had  in  its 
possession  such  cars  and  credits.  The  cars  had  moved  to  Iowa 
in  interstate  commerce  and  the  credits  arose  from  such  com- 
merce. The  cars  had  been  unloaded  and  had  not  started  on 
the  return  trip.  The  trial  federal  judge  denied  effect  to  the 
garnishment  in  language  which  presents  that  view  as  forcibly 
as  it  can  be  expressed.'"  The  Supreme  Court  reversed  the 
lower  court  and  held  that  under  the  circumstances  of  that 
case  the  garnishment  was  valid.  The  opinion  of  the  court  writ- 
ten by  Mr.  Justice  McKenna  indicates  that  there  might  be 
circumstances  under  which  the  attachment  or  garnishment 
would  not  be  valid.'" 

the    right     growing    out    of     the  County,  95  Wis.  80,  70  N.  W.  77. 

contract  but  disagreeing  as  to  the  A  Negative  answer  has  been  given 

question   of    interstate   commerce,  in  the  following  cases:    DeRoche- 

see,  Wall  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  mont  v.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  Co., 

52    W.   Va.   485,   44    S.    E.   294,    64  75  N.  H.  158,  71  Atl.  868;    Cavan^ 

L.  R.  A.  501,  and  see  note,  94  Am.  augh  Bros.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

St.  Rep.  948.  Ry.  Co.,  75  N.  H.  243,  72  Atl.  694. 

240.     Cent,    of    Ga.    Ry.    Co.    v.  See   also   Humphries   v.    Hopkins, 

Evans,  133  Ga.  639,  66  S.  E.  788.  81  Cal.  551,  22  Pac.  892;   Montrose 

For    other    authorities    discussing  Pickle  Co.  v.  Dodson,  76  Iowa  172, 

the  question   see,  Michigan   C.   R.  40  N.  W.  705,  2  L.  R.  A.  417,  14 

Co.  v.  C.  &  M.  L.  S.  R.  Co.,  1  111.  Am.   St.   Rep.    213;    Bates  v.   Chi- 

App.   399,—  ;    Connery   v.   R.   R.  cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  60  Wis. 

Co.,   92   Minn.   20,    99  N.   W.   365;  296.  19  N.  W.  72,  50  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Shore   &   Bro.   v.    Baltimore    &   0.  369. 

Ry.  Co..  76  S.  C.  472,  57  S.  E.  526;  241.    Davis  v.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  & 

Seibels    v.    Northern    C.    Ry.    Co.,  St.    L.   R.  Co.,   146   Fed.   403.   411, 

80   S.   C.   133,   61    S.   E.    435;    Chi-  and  see  cases  cited, 

cago  &   N.   W.   Ry.    Co.   v.   Forest  242.    Davis  v.  Cleveland.  C.  C.  & 


232  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§43 

§  43.  Rates. — A  eommoii  carrier  is  so  far  engaged  in  the 
performance  of  a  pul)lie  service  that  its  rates  or  charges  may, 
within  certain  limitations,  be  fixed  by  governmental  agencies. 
This  principle  not  only  had  its  foundation  in  the  earliest 
known  laws,"'"  but  it  is  a  principle  which  has  been  exercised 
and  accepted  with  significant  uniformity.  The  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  said:  "State  regulation  of  railroad  rates 
began  with  railroad  transportation;"  and  in  the  same  opinion 
it  was  said:'"  "The  authority  of  the  state  to  limit  by  legisla- 
tion the  charges  of  common  carriers  within  its  borders  was 
not  confined  to  the  power  to  impose  limitations  in  connection 
with  grants  of  corporate  privileges.  In  view  of  the  nature  of 
their  business,  they  were  held  subject  to  legislative  control 
as  to  the  amount  of  their  charges  unless  they  were  protected 
by  their  contract  with  the  state." 

This  general  power  to  regulate  is  co-extensive  with  the 
need  of  regulation  and  is  not  limited  to  the  regulation  of 
those  businesses  for  the  regulation  of  which  there  is  legisla- 
tive precedent.  "The  underlying  principle,"  said  the  Su- 
preme Court,"'"  "is  that  business  of  certain  kinds  holds  such 
a  peculiar  relation  to  the  public  interest  that  there  is  superin- 
duced upon   it  the  right   of  public  regulation:"   or  to  use  a 

St.   L.    R.    Co.,   217    U.    S.    157,   54  slation  see,   Interstate  Com.  Com. 

L.  Ed.  708,  30  Sup.  Ct.  463,  cited  v.   Cincinnati,   N.  0.  &  T.   P,  Ry. 

in    Minnesota   Rate    Cases    at   pp.  Co.,  167  U.  S.  479,  495,  496,  42  L. 

409  and  410;  and  see  Pullman  Co.  Ed.  243,  17  Sup.  Ct.  896.  A  statute 

V.  Linke,  202  Fed.  1017.  See  Sect-  fixing  a   rate   on   one   commodity, 

ion  440-i,  post.  oil,  was  sustained  by  the  Supreme 

243.  Stephens  v.  Cent,  of  Ga.  Court  of  Kansas, — Tucker  v.  Mis- 
Ry.  Co.,  138  Ga.  625,  75  S.  E.  1041,  souri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  82  Kan.  222,  108 
42  L.  R.  A.  541,  Ann.  Cas.  191.3E,  Pac.  89;  and  see  German  Alliance 
609.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Lewis,  233  U.  S.  389,  58 

244.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  L.  Ed.  1011,  34  Sup.  Ct.  612, 
S.  352.  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  sustaining  a  law  of  Kansas  fixing 
729.  At  page  412  of  the  original  the  price  of  fire  insurance, 
opinion  is  given  a  list  of  early  245.  Quoted  from  Budd  v.  New 
state  laws,  which  list  is  followed  York  117  N.  Y.  27,  5  L.  R.  A.  559. 
by  a  history  of  the  decisions  of  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  460,  22  N.  Er. 
the  Supreme  Court  relating  to  rate  670,  143  U.  S.  517,  36  L.  Ed.  247, 
regulation  by  the  states.  For  a  4  I.  C.  R.  45,  12  Sup.  Ct.  468. 
further    summary    of    state    legi-  See   for  citations  58  L.  Ed.   1021. 


§  43]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  23^5 

briefer  statement  of  that  Court:  "The  basis  of  the  ready 
concession  of  the  poAver  of  regulation  is  the  public  interest/" 

In  the  early  history  of  state  regulation  of  railroad  rates, 
the  Supreme  Court  used  language  that  "went  further  than  to 
sustain  the  state  law  with  respect  to  rates  for  purely  intra- 
state carriage"  and  "treated  as  being  within  the  state  power" 
ra+es  on  interstate  transportation.  This  decision  was  very 
soon  modified  and  the  power  of  the  state  limited  to  regulating 
rates  on  intrastate  transportation."" 

It  has  been  held,  upon  what  seems  inconclusive  reasoning, 
that  where  a  state,  being  the  owner  of  an  interstate  railroad, 
leases  the  road  with  a  provision  reserving  to  the  state  the 
right  to  make  ".I'ust  and  reasonable  rules,  orders,  schedules 
of  freight  and  passenger  tariffs,"  that  such  reservation  so  far 
as  concerns  interstate  rates  is  void  as  in  conflict  with  the 
commerce  clause  of  the  Federal  constitution.  It  would  seem 
that  as  the  state,  as  owner,  like  other  owners,  had  the  right 
to  initiate  rates  intrastate  or  interstate,  such  right  could  be 
reserved  in  a  lease  of  its  road  and  that  in  the  first  instance 
the  state  could  require  its  lessee  to  comply  with  the  lease. 
The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  could  control  the  inter- 
state rate  so  fixed  in  like  manner  as  other  rates  made  by  other 
owners  of  carriers,  but  that  fact  should  not  prevent  the  state 
from  making  the  rate  in  the  first  instance.^** 

In  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,'^"  the  power  of  the  states  to 
regulate  railroad  rates  for  transportation  between  points  in 
the  same  state  is  reiterated  and  fully  stated.  This  power  is, 
therefore,  under  existing  Federal  statutes,  indisputable.  The 
]iower  is  not,  however,  unlimited  and  must  be  exercised  in 
such  way  as  not  to  infringe  the  carrier's  constitutional  rights 
undei-  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
Ignited  States. 

246.  German-Alliance  Ins.  Co.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  118 
V.  Kansas.  233  U.  S.  389,  58  L.  Ed.  U.  S.  557,  30  L.  Ed.  244,  7  Sup. 
ion,  34  Sup.  Ct.  612.  Ct.  4. 

247.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  248.  State  of  Georgia  v.  Western 
S.  352,  citing  as  supporting  the  &  A.  R.  Co.,  1S8  Ga.  835,  76  S.  E. 
statement  in  the  text,  Peik  v.  Chi-       577. 

cago   &  N.   W.   Ry.   Co.,    94    U.   S.  249.    Simpson  v.  Shepard,  supra, 

164,  24  L.  Ed.  97.  and  Wabash,  St.       and  Cent,  of  Ga.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R. 


234  State  Regulation  of  Carrjers.  [§  43 

Tliis  rifi:ht  to  prescribe  rates  ineludes  the  right  to  suspend 
proposed  increase  in  rates"'"'  and  to  require,  the  establish- 
ment, where  such  systems  had  been  voluntarily  established 
by  the  carrier,  of  commutation  rates/" 

Classification  of  commodities  is  a  necessary  preliminary  to 
any  system  of  rates,  and  the  right  to  prescribe  a  rate  for  the 
future  includes  the  right  to  classify  commodities.  This  classi- 
fication must  not  be  arbitrary  or  unreasonable  but,  in  making 
a  classification,  the  rate  making  body  "is  not  precluded  from 
the  consideration  of  economic  considerations  recognized  by 
the  carriers  in  the  conduct  of  their  business,"  but  "may  con- 
sider and  act  on  every  economic  or  industrial  factor  potentialI> 
influencing  the  operation  of  a  railroad  in  the  transportation 
of  freight."  ""''  Joint  rates  would,  if  the  whole  rare  is  intrastate 
be  within  the  regulating  power  of  the  states.""  The  right  to 
prescribe  rea.sonable  rates  includes  the  right  to  prohibit  rates 
which  are  unjustly  discriminatory.""' 

AVhile  the  Federal  government  had  control  and  operated 
interstate  railroads  and  telephone  companies  intrastate  rates 
were  withdrawn  from  the  regulatory  poAvers  of  the  states."" 

Com.  of  Ala.,  209  Fed.  75;  Darnell  253.    Hill,  et  al,  Com'rs.  v.  Wad- 

V.  Edwards,  209  Fed.  99;   Chicago  ley  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  128  Ga.  705,  57 

&  N.  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Smith,  210  Fed.  S.  E.  795. 

632;  Sou.  Pac.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  254.  Portland  Ry.  Light  & 
of  Oregon,  208  Fed.  926;  Puget  Power  Co.  v.  R.  P.  Com.  of  Oregon, 
Sound  Traction  Light  &  Power  Co.  229  U.  S.  397,  57  L.  Ed.  1248,  33 
V.  Reynolds,  223  Fed.  371;  Detroit  Sup.  Ct.  820,  affirming  same  styled 
&  Mackimac  R.  Co.  v.  Fletcher  case,  56  Or.  468,  105  Pac.  709. 
Paper  Co.,  248  U.  S.  30,  63  L.  Ed.  255.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  North 
,  39  Sup.  Ct.  .                            Dakota,  249  U.  S.  ,  63  L.  Ed. 

250.  Trenton  &  M.  C.  T.  Corp.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  — .  Construing  Fed- 
V.  Trenton,  227  Fed.  502,  Affirmed  eral  Control  Act,  Mar.  21,  1918,  40 
229    Fed.    140,    143    C.    C.    A.    316.  Stat.  L.  Chap.  25,  Comp.  Stat.  1918, 

251.  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Towers,  Sec.  311.5-3 /4A.  Dakota  Cent.  Tel. 
245  U.  S.  6,  62  L.  Ed.  117,  38  Sup.  Co.  v.  South  Dakota,  249  U.  S.  — , 
Ct.  2.  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  — .  Con- 

252.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  struing  Res.  of  June  16,  1918,  40 
Stove  Works,  128  Ga.  207,  57  S.  E.  Stat.  L.  904,  Chap.  154.  Comp. 
429,  an  able  opinion,  in  which  is  Stat.  1918,  Sec.  3115-3/4X.  See 
discussed   the   principles   of   regu-  Appendix  1. 

lation. 


<§>  44]  Engager  in  Interstate  Commerce.  235 

^  44.  Intrastate  Rates  Which  Affect  Interstate  Rates. — A 
state  may  not  regulate  intrastate  rates  by  the  standard  of  in- 
terstate rates  by  basing  a  rate  for  a  short  haul  within  the 
state  upon  the  carrier's  rate  for  the  long  haul  over  the  same 
line  when  the  long  haul  is  between  states/'"  And  when  local 
rates  are  made  for  the  purpose  and  have  the  etlfect  of  so  regula- 
ting transportation  that  commerce  which  might  be  interstate 
is  forced  to  move  intrastate,  and  when  the  local  rates  dis- 
criminate against  the  interstate  rates,  the  regulation  making 
^uch  local  rates  is  invalid. 

The  Eailroad  Ci^mmission  of  Texas  established  rates  between 
points  in  that  state  which  the  railroads  accepted,  and  which 
discriminated  in  favor  of  localities  in  Texas  and  against  lo- 
calities in  Louisiana.  Upon  petition  on  behalf  of  the  localities 
in  Louisiana  against  the  carriers,  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  held  that  this  discrimination  was  unlawful  and 
unjust.""  Suit  having  been  filed  in  the  Commerce  Court  to  set 
aside  the  order  of  the  Commission,  it  was  held  that  the  car- 
riers were  guilty  of  unlaAvful  and  unjust  discrimination,  and 
that  it  was  no  defense  that  such  discrimination  resulted  from 
the  orders  of  the  Texas  Commission."*  An  appeal  was  taken 
from  the  Commerce  Court  to  the  Supreme  Court,""  and  the 
order  of  the  Commission  was  sustained  in  an  opinion  written 
by  ]\Tr.  Justice  Hughes.  The  opinion  was  based  upon  the 
right  of  Congress  "to  keep  the  highways  of  interstate  com- 
munication open  to  interstate  traffic  upon  fair  and  equal 
terms."  The  opinion  of  the  Court  is  so  clear  and  cogent  that 
its  correctness  can  but  be  acknowledged.  To  permit  states  to 
prescribe  interstate  rates  under  which  citizens  of  the  states 
may  exclude  from  competition  with  themselves,  shippers 
located  in  other  states  from  whose  locations  the  transportation 
conditions  are  similar  to  those  from  points  in  the  state,  would 
be  to  efifectuate  the  purposes  to  prevent  which  was  the  prin- 
cipal object  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.     Not 

256.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  258.  Texas  &  P.  R.  C.  v.  United 
Eubanks,  184  U.  S.  27,  46  L.  Ed.  States.  Commerce  Court  Reports 
416,  22  Sup.  Ct.  277.  No.  68,  p.  655,  205  Fed.  380. 

257.  Railroad  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  259.  Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co. 
Louis  S.  W.  R.  Co.  23  I.  C.  C.  31.  v.  U.  S.,  234  U.  S.  342,  58  L.  Ed. 

1341,  34  Sup.  Ct.  833. 


236  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  45 

only  it  tlio  doeision  in  the  Slir2veport  case,  cited  in  notes  216, 
217  ;ind  218,  supra,  in  accord  with  the  Constitution,  any 
other  rule  would  result  in  endless  confusion  and  frequent  in- 
justice."*" 

The  principle  announced  in  the  Shreveport  Case,  supra,  has 
heen  followed  by  the  Commission  and  the  courts  and  there 
has  been  a  constantly  increasing  recognition  of  the  propriety 
of  the  decision.'"  So  far  is  this  true  that  the  Act  of  1920 
makes  statutory  the  Courts'  construction  of  the  original  Com- 
merce Act/*^. 

§  4r>.  Limitations  on  the  Power  of  States  to  Regulate  Intra- 
state Rates. — AVhen  private  property  is  devoted  to  a  public 
use,  organized  society  has  the  right  to  regulate  the  charges 
for  such  use.  This  right  may  be  exercised  by  or  under  the 
authority  of  state  laws  when  the  use  is  within  the  state, 
and  subject  to  th'^  further  limitation  that  the  regulation  does 
not  extend  to  a  taking  of  private  property  without  due  process 
of  law^  or  without  a  fair  compensation.  This  principle  as  we 
have  seen  (Section  86  supra)  is  old,  but  the  need  in  this  coun- 
try for  its  api)lication  is  comparatively  recent.  The  first  of 
the  important  applications  of  the  principle  was  made  in  ]\Iunn 

260.  Corporation  Com.  of  Okla.  U.  S.  214,  62  L.  Ed.  1084,  38  Sup. 
V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  31  I.  C.  Ct.  460.  The  rule  was  applied  to 
C.  532;  Trier  v.  C,  St.  P.  M.  &  express  rates.  Traffic  Bureau  v. 
0.  Ry.  Co.,  30  I.  C.  C.  352,  707;  American  Exp.  Co.  39  T:  C.  C.  703; 
Rates  on  Beer,  31  I.  C.  C.  544;  Amer.  Exp.  Co.  v.  South  Dakota, 
Points,  32  I.  C.  C.  361;  Merchants  244  T^  S.  617,  61  L.  Ed.  1352,  37 
Exchange  of  St.  Louis,  Mo.  v.  B.  &  Sup.  Ct.  656.  To  Passenger  Fares: 
O.  R.  Co.,  ?A  I.  C.  C.  S41.  Business     Men's     League     of     St. 

261.  Sees.  184,  335,  post.  Louis  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  41 

262.  For  a  general  discussion  of  I.  C.  C.  13,  503;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co. 
the  question  see  Federal  v.  State  v.  Public  Utilities  Com.  of  111.  245 
Regulations  of  Railroads  by  the  U.  S.  493,  62  L.  Ed.  425,  38  Sup. 
author  hereof,  Case  &  Comment,  Ct.  170;  Business  Men's  League 
Vol.  23,  No.  5,  Page  372  et.  cet.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  49  I.  C.  C. 
Subsequent  developments  of  the  713.  For  other  cases  see:  Mer- 
Shreveport  case  are  shown  in  chant's  Exchanoe  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co., 
Railroad  Com.  of  La.  v.  A.  H.  T.  34  I.  C.  C.  3^1;  The  Missouri 
Ry.  Co.,  41  I.  C.  C.  83;  43  I.  C.  C.  River-Nebraska  Cases.  40  I.  C.  C. 
45;  Eastern  Tex.  R.  Co.  v.  Rail-  201;  Memphis  v.  Chicago  R.  I.  & 
road  Com.  of  Texas.  242  Fed.  300;  P.  Ry.  43  I.  C.  C.  121;  Texarkana 
Looney  v.  Eastern  Tex.  R.  Co.  247  Frt.  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 


§  45] 


Engagep,  in  Interstate  Commerce. 


237 


V.  Illinois  and  the  other  Granger  cases,""  decided  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  in  1877,  Then  follow;  the 
Railroad  Commission  cases  of  1886,""*  Dow  v.  Beidelraan  of 
1888,'"'  the  Minnesota  case  ''"'•  of  1890,  the  Texas  Commission 
case  of  1894,^^"'  the  Turnpike  case"''  in  1896,  Smyth  v.  Ames'"" 
in  1898,  the  National  City  case  in  1899,"'°  the  Stock  Yard  case 
in  1901,'"  the  Water  Rate  cases  of  1903,'"  and  the  Water  and 
Gas  cases  of  1909."''  These  and  otlier  cases  will  be  found  in 
a  note  hereto."* 


Co.,.  43  I.  C.  C.  224;  Memphis  Mer- 
chants Exchange  v.  I.  C  R.  Co.  43 
I.  C.  C.  378;  Business  Men's 
League  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  44 
I.  C.  C.  308;  LaCrosse  Shippers 
Assn.  V.  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  44 
I.  C.  C.  512;  Royster  Guano  Co.  v. 
A.  C.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  50  I.  C.  C.  34; 
Landon  v.  Public  Utilities  Com.  of 
Kansas  234  Fed.  152,  242  Fed.  658, 
245  Fed.  950. 

263.  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S. 
(4  Otto.)  113,  24  L.  Ed.  77;  Chi- 
cago, B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  V.  Iowa  (v. 
Cutts),  94  U.  S.  155,  24  L.  Ed.  94; 
Peik  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
94  U.  S.  164,  24  L.  Ed.  97;  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Ackley,  94 
U.  S.  179,  24  L.  Ed.  99;  Winona 
&  St.  Paul  R.  Co.  V.  Blake,  94  U. 
S.  180,  24  L.  Ed.  99;  Stone  v.  Wis- 
consin, 94  U.  S.  ISl,  24  L.  Ed.  102. 

264.  Stone  v.  Farmers'  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.,  116  U.  S.  307,  29  L.  Ed. 
636,  6  Sup.  Ct.  334,  1191;  Stone  v. 
111.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  116  U.  S.  347,  29 
L.  Ed.  650,  6  Sup.  Ct.  348,  1191; 
Stone  V.  New  Orleans  &  N.  E.  R. 
Co.,  116  U.  S.  352,  29  L.  Ed.  651,  6 
Sup.  Ct.  349,  391. 

265.  Dow  V.  Beidelman,  125  U. 
S.  680,  31  L.  Ed.  841,  8  Sup.  Ct. 
1028. 

266.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  Paul  R. 
Co.  V.  Minnesota,  1S4  U.  S.  418,  33 
L.  Ed.  970,   10  SiiD.  Ct.  462. 


267.  Reagan  v.  Farmers'  Loan  & 
Trust  Cc.  154  U.  S.  362,  38  L.  Ed. 
1014,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1047. 

268.  Covington  &  L.  1  urnpike  R. 
Co.  V.  Sandford,  164  U.  S.  578.  41 
L.  Ed.  561,  17  Sup.  Ct.  198. 

"^«    42  L.  Ed.  819,  18  Sup.  Ct.  418. 

269.  Smythe  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S. 
Freight  Rates  fi-om  Minnesota 
Co.  V.  National  City,  174  U.  S.  739, 
43  L.  Ed.  1154,  19  Sup.  Ct.  804. 

271.  Cotting  V.  Godard,  183  U. 
S.  79,  46  L.  Ed.  92,  22  Sup.  Ct.  30. 

272.  Knoxville  Water  Co.  v. 
Knoxville,  189  U.  S.  434,  47  L.  Ed. 
887,  23  Sup.  Ct.  531;  San  Diego 
Land  &  Town  Co  v.  Jasper,  189 
U.  S.  439,  47  L.  Ed.  892,  23  Sup. 
Ct.    571. 

273.  Knoxville  v.  Knoxville 
Water  Co.,  212  U.  S.  1,  53  L.  Ed. 
371,  29  Sup.  Ct.  148;  Wilcox  v. 
Consolidated  Gas  Co.,  212  U.  S.  19, 
53  L.  Ed.  387,  29  Sup.  Ct.  392. 

274.  Budd  v.  New  York,  143  U. 
S.  517,  36  L.  Ed.  247,  4  I.  C.  R.  45, 
12  Sup.  Ct.  468;  Brass  v.  North 
Dakota  ex  rel.  Stoeser,  153  U.  S. 
391,  38  L.  Ed.  757,  4  I.  C.  R.  670, 
14  Sup.  Ct.  857.  See  also  the  follow- 
ing cases  in  state  and  federal 
courts:  People  v.  Budd,  117  N.  Y. 
1,  5  L.  R.  A.  599,  22  N.  E.  670; 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cincinnati,  S.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  30  Ohio 
St.    604;     State    ex    rel.    Attorney 


238 


State  Regut^tion  of  Carriers. 


[§  45 


Til  191 3,"'^  the  Supreme  Court,  in  a  series  of  eases  involving 
state  made  rates  relating  to  intrastate  transportation,  an- 
nounced principles  which  are  as  important  as  those  in  the 
Granger  and  Railroad  Commission  cases,  supra.     These  priii- 


General  v.  Columbus  Gaslight  & 
Coke  Co.,  34  Ohio  St.  572,  32  Am. 
Rep.  390;  Davis  v  State,  68  Ala. 
58,  44  Am.  Rep.  128;  Baker  v. 
State,  54  Wis.  368,  12  N.  W.  12; 
Nash  V.  Page,  80  Ky.  539,  44  Am. 
Rep.  490;  Girarci  Point  Storage 
Co.  V.  Southwalk  Foundry  Co.,  105 
Pa.  248;  Sawyer  v.  Davis.  136 
Mass.  239,  49  Am.  Rep.  27;  Brech- 
bill  V.  Randall,  102  Ind.  528,  52 
Am.  Rep.  695,  1  N.  E.  362;  Dela- 
ware, L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Central 
Stock  Yard  &  Transit  Co.,  45  N.  J. 
Eq.  50,  6  L.  R.  A.  855,  17  Atl.  146; 
Spring  Valley  Waterworks  v. 
Schottler,  110  U.  S.  347,  28  L.  Ed. 
173,  4  Sup.  Ct.  48;  Railroad  Com- 
mission Cases,  116  U.  S.  307,  sub. 
nom.  Stone  v.  Farmers'  Loan  & 
Trust  Co.,  29  L.  Ed.  636,  6  Sup.  Ct. 
334,  388,  1191;  Wabash,  St.  L.  &  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Illinois,  118  U.  S.  557,  30 
L.  Ed.  244,  1  I.  C.  R.  31.  7  Sup.  Ct. 
4;  Dow  V.  Beidelman,  125  U.  S. 
680,  31  L.  Ed.  841,  2  I.  C.  R.  56. 
8  Sup.  Ct.  1028;  Chicago,  M.  &  St. 
P.  R.  Co.  V.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S. 
418,  33  L.  Ed.  970,  3  I.  C.  R.  209. 
10  Sup.  Ct.  462,  702;  Chicago  & 
G.  T.  R.  Co.  V.  Wellman,  143  U.  S. 
339,  36  L.  Ed.  176,  12  Sup.  Ct.  400; 
Reagan  v.  Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co., 
154  U.  S.  362,  3S-L.  Ed.  1014,  4  I. 
C.  R.  560,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1047;  St. 
Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co  v.  Gill,  156  U. 
S.  649,  39  L.  Ed.  567.  15  Sup.  Ct. 
484;  Covington  &  L.  l^urnpike 
Road  Co.  V.  Sandford.  164  U.  S. 
578,  41  L.  Ed.  560,  17  Sup.  Ct.  198; 
Smyth  V.  Ames,  169  U.  S.  466,  42 
L.  Ed.  819,  18  Sup.  Ct.  418;    San 


Diego  Land  &  Town  Co.  v. 
National  City,  174  U.  S.  739,  43  L. 
Ed.  1154,  19  Sup.  Ct.  804;  Chicago, 
M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Tompkins, 
176,  U.  S.  167,  44  L.  Ed.  417,  20 
Sup.  Ct.  336;  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co. 
V.  North  Carolina  Corp.  Com.-,  206 
U.  S.  1,  51  L.  Ed.  933,  27  Sup.  Ct. 
585,  11  Ann.  Cas.  398.  Oklahoma 
Operating  Co.  v.  Love,  251  U.  S. 
— ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  — . 
275.  Minnesota  Rate  Cases. 
Simpson  v.  Shepard,  2.30  U.  S.  352, 
57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  729; 
Missouri  Rate  Cases,  Knott  v.  C.  B. 
&  Q.  R.  Co..  230  U.  S.  474,  57  L.  Ed. 
1571,  33  Sup.  Ct.  975;  West  Vir- 
ginia Cases,  Chesapeake  &  0.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Conley,  230  U.  S.  513,  57  L. 
Ed.  1597,  33  Sup.  Ct.  985;  Oregon 
Cases,  Oregon  R.  &  N.  Co.  v. 
Campbell,  230  U.  S.  525,  57  Fed. 
1625,  33  Sup.  Ct.  1011,  177  Fed. 
318.  180  Fed.  253;  Southern  Pac. 
Co.  V.  Campbell,  230  U.  S.  537; 
Arkansas  Cases,  Allen  v.  St.  Louis 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  230  U.  S.  553, 
57  L.  Ed.  1625,  33  Sup.  Ct.  1030; 
Indiana  Rate  Cases,  Wood  v. 
Vandalia  R.  Co.,  231  U.  S.  1,  58 
L.  Ed.  97,  34  Sup.  Ct.  7;  Kentucky 
Rate  Case,  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Garrett.  231  U.  S.  298,  58  L.  Ed. 
229,  34  Sup.  Ct.  48;  Cent,  of  Ga. 
R.  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ala.  209 
Fed.  75,  79;  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Smith,  210  Fed.  632;  Cent, 
of  Ga.  R.  Co.  V.  Georgia  R.  R. 
Com.,  215  Fed.  421.  For  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  Arkansas  Cases 
see  Boyle  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  222  Fed.  539. 


§  45]  Engagei>.  in  Interstate  Commerce.  239 

ciples  are  but  the  logieal  applicatio  n  of  prior  decisions  and  Mr. 
Justice  Hnghes,  in  writing  the  opinions  of  the  court,  has  ably 
and  exhaustively  discussed  the  question  and  vindicated  th? 
rights  of  the  states  to  regulate  rates  of  charges  of  public  car- 
riers within  their  respective  borders.  In  the  Minnesota  Rate 
cases,  the  learned  Justice  said : 

"If  this  authority  of  the  state  be  restricted,  it  must  be  by 
virtue  of  the  paramount  power  of  Congress  over  interstate 
commerce  and  its  instruments ;  and,  in  view  of  the  nature 
of  the  subject,  a  limitation  may  not  be  implied  because  of  a 
dormant  federal  power,  that  is,  one  which  has  not  been  exerted, 
but  can  oidy  be  found  in  the  actual  exercise  of  federal  con- 
trol in  such  measure  as  to  exclude  this  action  by  the  state 
which  otherwise  would  clearly  be  within  its  province." 

This  right  is  in  all  cases  subject  to  constitutional  limitations, 
and  there  is  a  clear  intimation,  as  shown  in  Sec.  6,  supra,  that 
the  federal  government  has  not  exercised  as  yet  all  its  powers 
under  the  commerce  clause  of  the  Constitution. 

The  right  of  Congress  was  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court 
in  sustaining  an  order  of  a  State  Commission  prescribing 
a  rate  where,  as  said  by  the  Court :  "  It  was  proper  for  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  \to  consider  the  rate  as 
part  of  a  through  rate  from  points  outside  of  the  state.  It 
was  equally  proper  for  the  State  Commission  to  consider  it 
as  part  of  the  intrastate  haul,  and  we  do  not  think  the  rates 
were  so  related  as  to  exclude  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  by 
the  State  Commission."^'"  This  statement  would  permit  for 
the  same  movement  one  rate  when  the  freight  originated  out 
of  the  state  and  another  rate  when  the  freight  originated  in 
the  state,  an  anomalous  situation  which  should  be  remedied. 
Congress  by  the  Transportation  Act  of  1920  regulated  intra- 

276.    Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  of    the    powers    of    the    states    in- 

V.  Public  Utilities  Com.  of  111.  242  directly    to   affect    interstate   com- 

U.  S.  333,  61  L.  Ed.  341,  37  Sup.  naerce.  These  powers  include  the 

Ct.    173.     Dist.    Judge     Booth     in  right  to  require  a  service  as  well 

Landon  v.  Public  Utilities  Com.  of  as     to     fix    a     charge.     Brooklyn 

Kansas  242  Fed.  658  Collates  and  Heights    R.    Co.    v.    Straus,    245 

intelligently    discusses    the    cases  Fed.  132. 
wherein  are  stated  the  limitations 


240  Statk  Regul.ation  of  Cakriebs.  [§  40 

state  rates  somoAvhat  more  than  theretofore,  but  then  did  not 
go  as  far  as  it  constitutionally  miglit. 

§  46.  Property  Basis  for  Returns. — Investors  are  entitled 
to  a  reasonable  return  on  the  fair  value  of  the  property  devoted 
to  the  public  use.  Until  there  shall  be  an  authoritative 
determination  of  the  value  of  railroad  property,  Commissioners 
and  Courts  must  as  best  they  may  arrive  at  this  value. 

In  applying  the  decisions  of  courts  to  the  question,  it  is 
necessary  to  keep  in  mind  the  different  functions  performed 
by  courts  and  by  quasi-legislative  tribunals. 

The  courts  usually  must  determine  the  strictly  legal  ques- 
tion, Is  the  rate  under  investigation  "so  unreasonably  low  that 
the  carriers  are  deprived  of  their  property  without  due  process 
of  lav/  and  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  law?"  Minne- 
sota Rate  Cases,  supra. 

"The  rate  making  power  is  a  legislative  power  and  neces- 
sarily implies  a  range  of  legislative  discretion ;  and  the  ques- 
tion to  be  determined  by  a  tribunal  to  which  this  DOwer  has 
been  delegated  is.  Is  the  rate  just  and  reasonable?    (Id.) 

Obviously  a  rate  may  be  less  than  just  and  reasonable  with- 
out being  confiscatory.  "While  a  tribunal  exercising  the  legis- 
lative function  may  not  make  a  rate  so  low  as  to  be  violative 
of  the  constitutional  restrictions  and  legal  prinoiples  an- 
nounced by  courts  of  binding  authority,  such  tribunal  may  not 
di.sregard  its  duty  to  exercise  its  "legislative  discretion,"  the 
power  to  apply  which,  said  Mr.  Justice  Moody,  "is  a  delicate 
and  dangerous  function,  and  ought  to  be  exercised  with  a 
keen  sense  of  justice."    Knoxville  v.  "Water  Co.,  supra. 

"Fair  value"  has  been  defined  as  "the  reasonable  value  of 
the  property  at  the  time,  it  is  being  used  for  the  public." 
San  Biego  Land  Co.  v.  National  City,  supra. 

This,  excepting  the  fact  that  it  fixes  the  time  at  which 
value  is  to  be  found,  is  more  a  restatement  of  the  question 
than  a  definition  of  the  term;  "reasonable"  being  as  inexact 
as  "fair." 

In  the  leading  and  much  cited  ease  of  Smyth  v.  Ames,  the 
court  had  for  determination  the  legal  question  of  whether  or 
not  a  legislative  act  violated  the  constitutional  rights  of  the 
carriers,  and  the  opinion  of  the  court  must  be  understood  as 


§  46]  EngageP;  jn  Interstate  Commerce.  241 

being  limited  by  the  question  involved.     The  court  held  that 
the  law  demanded  a  "fair  return"  on  the  fair  value  of  the 
property  used     *     *     *     for  the  convenience   of   the  public. 
What  was  the  "fair  value"  and  what  would  be  a  "fair  re- 
tvTrn,"   were    mixed    questions    of   law    and   "legislative    dis- 
cretion."   The  coTirt  determined  only  the  legal  question  and 
found  that  "the  act,  if  enforced,  would  have  deprived  each 
of  the  railroad  companies     *     *     *     of  the  just  compensation 
secured  to  them  by  the  Constitution."  (p.  547.)     In  reaching 
this    determination,    however,    the    court   stated    rules    which 
should  be  considered  in  "all  calculations  as  to  the  reasonable- 
ness of  rates."     (p.  546.)     These  rules  must  be  followed  by 
rate  making  bodies.     In  ascertaining  "value"  the  court  held 
that  consideration  must  be  given  to  the  following  facts: 
(1)  "The  original  cost  of  construction." 
(■2)   "The  amount  expended  in  permanent  improvements." 
(3    "The  amount  and  market  value  of  its   (the  carrier's) 
bonds  and  stock." 

(4)  "The  present   as   compared  with   the   original   cost   of 

construction." 

(5)  "The  probable  earning  capacity  of  the  property  under 

particular  rates  prescribed  by  statute." 

(6)  "The  sum  required  to  meet  operating  expenses." 

All  these  to  be  "given  such  weight  as  may  be  just  and  right 
in  each  case."    P.  547. 

In  the  Minnesota  Rate  Cases,  .^u^ra,  p.  433  of  the  opinion, 
the  "legislative  discretion"  is  distinguished  from  the  judicial 
question:  has  the  state  "overstepped  the  constitutional  limit?" 
While  the  court  in  that  case  cited  as  correct  "general  prin- 
ciples" those  announced  in  Sm.yth  v.  Ames  (p.  434)  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Hughes,  who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said : 
"The  ascertainment  of  value  is  not  controlled  by  artifiGial 
rules.  It  is  not  a  matter  of  formulas,  but  there  must  be  a 
reasonable  judgment  having  its  basis  in  a  proper  considera- 
tion of  all  relevant  facts."  fp.  434.)  He  then  applied  some- 
what more  restricted  rules  than  those  stated  in  Smyth  v. 
Ames.  In  so  doing,  however,  he  was  careful  to  state  that  he 
was  considering  "a  judicial  finding"  (p.  451)  ;  that  the  "judi- 
cial power  to  declare  legislative  action  invalid  upon  constitu- 
tional grounds  is  to  be  exercised  only  in  clear  cases"  (p.  452)  ; 


242  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§47 

and  "that  we  are  concerned  with  a  charge  of  confiscation  of 
property"  (p.  4'58).  So  the  court  held  that  the  Minnesota 
rates  had  not  been  proven  to  be  confiscatory,  but  it  was  not 
found  that  such  rates  were  just  and  reasonable. 

In  Pennsylvania  the  courts  have  authority  upon  complaint 
to  determine  whether  or  not  existing  rates  are  reasonable."' 

In  a  Pennsylvania  ease""^  it  was  said:  "The  primary  basis 
of  any  calculation  as  to  the  value  of  a  water  plant  must  be 
the  money  actually  invested  by  the  owners.  If  the  earnings  of 
the  company  have  been  used  to  improve  the  property,  it  is 
counted  as  so  much  more  cash  invested." 

When  the  commodity  shipped  is  natural  gas,  in  fixing  a  basis 
for  returns,  the  fact  that  the  supply  is  diminishing  must  be 
considered,  otherwise  there  is  confiscation."' 

§  47.  When  Does  a  Rate  Violate  Rights  under  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment? — That  "prescribing  rates  for  the  future  is  an 
act  legislative,  and  not  judicial,  in  kind"  cannot  be  disputed,"" 
but  whether  or  not  a  particular  rate  regulation  takes  property 
"without  just  compensation,"  is  at  least  in  part  a  question  of 
law. 

The  legislative  branch  of  the  government  must  obey  the 
constitution,  and  it  has  long  been  established  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  Ignited  States  that  when  it  is  called  upon  to 
determine  whether  or  not  an  act  of  the  legislative  branch 
shall  be  enforced,  it  can  and  must  decide  whether  the  passage 
of  such  act  was  authorized  by  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
Union.  What  is  just  compensation  is  a  flexible  term,  equally 
honest  and  equally  competent  men  may  materially  disagree 
on  this  subjject.  Should  the  net  income  on  the  investment  be 
2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  or  7  per  cent?  If  the  legislature,  or  a  board  duly 
created  and  acting  in  a  perfectly  legal  way.  fixes  a  particular 
amount    as  the  maximum  income  which  shall  be  earned  by  a 

277.  Brymer  v.  Butler  Water  facts  which  must  receive  con- 
Co.,   179  Pa.  St.   331,   36   Atl.   249.  sideration. 

278.  Wilkes-Barre     v.     Spring  279.    Landon  v.  Public  Utilities 
Brook  Water  Co.,  4  Lack.  Pa.  Leg.  Com.  of  Kansas  234  Fed.  152. 
News     367;     The     Transportation  280.    Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.  v. 
Act  1920,  Sec.  15  A  specifies  other  Garrett,  231  U.   S.  298,  58  L.  Ed. 

229,  34  Sup.  Ct.  48,  and  cases  cited. 


§  47]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  243 

pnhlic  carrier,  shall  the  courts  annul  such  action,  if  in  the 
opinion  of  the  particular  judge  or  judges  trying  the  case,  the 
amount  fixed  is  not  a  just  and  fair  compensation?  That  the 
courts  in  a  clear  case  where  there  can  be  little  or  no  doubt 
that  the  compensation  is  inadequate,  must  act  under  their  obli- 
gation to  support  and  enforce  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  such  cases  declare  the  rate  prescribed  illegal  will 
not,  as  has  sometimes  been  intimated,  make  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  the  supreme  legislative  tribunal 
in  this  country.  It  must  be  a  clear  case  to  justify  action  by  the 
courts,  but  as  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Moody  in  Knoxville  Water 
case,  fiipra : 

"The  courts,  m  clear  cases,  ought  not  to  hesitate  to  arrest 
the  operation  of  a  confiscatory  law,  but  they  ought  to  refrain 
from  interfering  in  cases  of  any  other  kind.  Regulation  of 
public  service  corporations,  which  perform  their  duties  under 
conditions  of  necessary  monopoly  will  occur  with  greater 
and  greater  frequency  as  time  goes  on.  It  is  a  delicate  and 
dangerous  function,  and  ought  to  be  exercised  with  a  keen 
sense  of  justice  on  the  part  of  the  regulating  body,  met  by 
a  frank  disclosure  on  the  part  of  the  company  to  be  regulated." 

What  percentage  on  the  amount  invested  in  the  public  use 
the  investors  are  entitled  to  receive  must,  of  course,  depend 
upon  many  considerations.  Some  of  which  are  stated  in  the 
Knoxville  Water  case  and  the  New  York  Gas  case.  In  the 
Knoxville  case,  where  the  proof  indicated  clearly  that  the 
earnings,  after  deducting  two  per  cent  for  depreciation,  would 
net  four  per  cent,  the  court  held  that  confiscation  had  not  been 
proved.  In  the  Gas  ease  ]\lr.  Justice  Peckham,  speaking  for 
the  court,  said:  "Taking  all  facts  into  consideration,  we  con- 
cur with  the  court  below  on  this  question,  and  think  com- 
plainant is  entitled  to  six  per  cent  on  the  fair  value  of  its 
property  devoted  to  the  public  use." 

The  Circuit  Judge,  in  the  Minnesota  Eate  cases,''"  held 
that  a  "net  income  of  7  per  cent  per  annum  on  the  value 
of  a  railroad  property  .  ,  ,  is  not  more  than  the  fair 
return    to    which    a    railroad    company   is    entitled   under   the 

281.  Shepard  v.  Northern  Pac.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  S.  352, 
Ry.    Co..    184    Fed.    765,    reversed,       57  L.  Ed.  1511.  33  Sup.  Ct.  729. 


244  State  Regulation  of  Carriees.  [^  47 

Fourteentli  Amendment  to  the  Constitution."  The  Supreme 
Court  reversed  the  Circuit  Judge,  on  the  ground  that  con- 
fiseation  had  not  been  shoAvn  but  did  not  determine  what  was 
a  reasonable  rate  of  return. 

In  discussing  telephone  rates,  the  Supreme  Court  declined 
to  express  an  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not  6  per  cent  on  the 
investment  was  confiscatory.^*'' 

In  another  case  where  the  property  of  the  corporation  was 
fix'ed  at  a  value  higher  than  the  cost  and  a  return  of  6  per 
cent  was  fixed  on  such  value,  the  Supreme  Court  refused  to 
set  aside  the  rate  yielding  such  return.  In  this  case,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  value  of  the  franchise  was  discussed  and  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Holmes  stated  the  difficulty  of  solving  the  problem  in 
this  language.''" 

"An  adjustment  of  this  sort  under  a  power  to  regulate 
rates  has  to  steer  between  Scylla  and  Charybdis.  On  the  one 
side  if  the  franchise  is  taken  to  mean  that  the  most  profitable 
return  that  could  be  got,  free  from  competition,  is  protected 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  then  the  power  to  regulate  is 
null.  On  the  other  hand  if  the  power  to  regulate  withdraws 
the  protection  of  the  Amendment  altogether,  then  the  property 
is  nought.  This  is  not  a  matter  of  economic  theory,  but  of 
fair  interpretation  of  a  bargain.  Neither  extreme  can  have 
been  meant.  A  midway  betAveen  them  must  be  hit."  In  the 
Des  Moines  Gas  case  '^*  the  court  said : 

"Nor  do  we  think  that  there  was  error  in  refusing  an  in- 
junction upon  the  conclusion  reached  that  a  return  of  6  per 
cent  per  annum  on  the  valuation  would  not  be  confiscatory. 
This  is  especially  true  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  ordinance 
was  attacked  before  there  was  opportunity  to  test  its  result  by 
actual  experience." 

None  of  tliese  cases  announces  a  general  rule,  and  it  is 
obvious  that  what  would  be  reasonable  in  one  case  might  be 
unjust  in  another.  A  railroad  which  must  from  its  very  nature 
be  more  or  less  of  a  monopoly  would  not  be  entitled  to  as  large 

282.  Louisville,  City  of,  v.  Cum-  Cedar  Rapids,  223  U.  S.  655,  56  L. 
berland  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  225  U.  S.      Ed.  594,  32  Sup.  Ct.  389. 

430,  56  L.  Ed.  1151,  32  Sup.  Ct.  741.  284.    Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  City 

283.  Cedar   Rapids   Gas    Co.   v.      of  Des  Moines,  238  U.   S.   153,   59 

L.  Ed.  1244,  35  Sup.  Ct.  811. 


§  47]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  245 

a  return  as  a  more  hazardous  business.  All  these  questions  are 
primarily  questions  of  policy  for  the  legislature,  and  it  is  only 
when  the  rate  prescribed  violates  the  constitutional  require- 
ment that  courts  may  act. 

Tn  San  Diego  Land  &  Town  Co.  v.  National  City,  it  was 
said  :^'^  "What  the  company  is  entitled  to  demand,  in  order 
that  it  may  have  just  compensation,  is  a  fair  retnrn  upon  the 
reasonable  value  of  the  property  at  the  time  it  is  being  used 
for  the  public." 

What  is  a  "fair  return"  is  primarily  a  legislative  question, 
and  ^Ir.  Justice  Hughes,  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,  supra. 
stated  the  power  of  the  courts  by  saying:  "We  do  not  sit  as 
a  board  of  revision  to  substitute  our  judgment  for  that  of 
the  legislature,  or  of  the  commission  lawfully  constituted  by 
it,  as  to  matters  within  the  province  of  either." 

Only  when  the  circumstances  are  exceptional  should  a 
finding  of  an  administrative  or  legislative  tribunal  be  set 
aside  ;^^^  and  the  carrier  must  have  shown  proper  efforts  to 
have  developed  traffic.^" 

Much  difficulty  is  experienced  in  distributing  operat- 
ing expenses  and  operating  revenues  betw^een  the  intra- 
state and  intei-state  biisiness  of  railroads.  Some  of  these  can 
be  allocated  but  a  large  part  must  be  distributed.  In  section 
45,  supra,  are  cited  cases,  especially  the  Minnesota  Rate 
Cases  and  the  1913  cases,  in  which  the  carriers  failed  to 
overcome  this  difficulty.  A  method  was  applied  in  the  Ar- 
kansas Rate  Case  which  perhaps  in  the  present  state  of  rail- 
road accounting  is  as  nearly  accurate  as  is  prssible.  Judge 
Trieber  ap])lifd  tlie  method  and  hi«  decision  was  affirmed.^** 

28.5.   San  Diego  Land  &  Town  Co.  lina    Corp.     Com.,     206     U.    S.     1, 

V.  National  city,  174  U.  S.  739,  43  26,  51  L.  Ed.  933,  27  Sup.  Ct.  585, 

L.  Ed.  1154,  19   Sup.  Ct.   804.  See  when  speaking  of  rate  making  the 

also  San  Diego  Land  &  Town  Co.  Chief     Justice     referred     to     the 

V.  Jasper,  189  U.  S.  43.9.  47  L.  Ed.  "flexible  limit  of  judgment  which 

892,  23  Sup.  Ct.  571;    Knoxville  v.  belongs  to  the  power  to  fix  rates." 

Knoxville  Water  Co.,  212  U.  S.  1,  286.  Ann  Arbor  R.  C.  v.  Fellows 

53    L.    Ed.    371,    29    Sup.    Ct.    148;  236  Fed.  387. 

Wilcox    V.    Consolidated    Gas    Co.,  287.    Darnell  v.  Edwards,  244  U. 

212    U.    S.    19,    53     L.     Ed.      382,  S.  564,  61  L.  Ed.  1317,  37  Sup.  Ct. 

29  Sup.  Ct.  192;   Smyth    v.  Amess,  701. 

169    U.    S.    466,    42    L.    Ed.    819,  288.    Boyle  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  P.  R 

18  Sup.  Ct.  418.  And  see  At-  Co.  222  Fed.  539,  P.  U.  R.  1916  A 
lantlc    C.  L.    R.    v.  North    Care- 


246  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§48 

The  quest  inn  depending  <o  largely  upon  the  special  facts 
of  each  ease,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Supreme  Court  will  ever 
prescribe  a  hard  and  fast  rule  as  to  the  percentage  of  income 
that  will  constitute  a  "fair  return."  Congress  exercising  its 
legislative  functions  has  by  Transpurtation  Act  1920,  adding 
section  15-a,  prescribed  51/2  and  6  per  cent  as  constituting  a 
fair  return  on  "aggregate  value." 

§  48.  Rates — Evidence  That  Rate  Is  Confiscatory — Rates  on 
a  Few  Commodities. — It  is  easy  to  say  that  a  railroad  is  en- 
titled to  earn  a  fair  return  upon  the  property  devoted  to  the 
business  of  common  carriage,  but  it  is  difficult  to  determine  in 
a  concrete  case  what  is  a  fair  return.  The  cost  of  moving  one 
commodity  cannot  be  definitely  ascertained,  much  of  such  cost 
not  being  capable  of  allocation.  When  a  rate  on  one  or  a 
few  commodities  is  fixed  by  legislative  act,  and  the  rates  are 
attacked  in  court,  the  presumption  is  that  the  rate  is  fair, 
and  in  ordinar,y  cases  the  presumption  cannot  be  overcome 
by  any  definite  proof,  when  the  rate  is  prescribed  by  a  com- 
mission. 

It  Avould,  therefor,  seem  that  when  the  commission,  after  a 
full  hearing,  and  aided  by  the  long  experience  and  special 
training  of  its  memb'ers,  fixes  a  rate  on  one  or  a  few  commodi- 
ties that  represent  in  comparison  a  very  small  part  of  the 
traffic  of  the  carrier,  such  rate  would  be  binding  on  all  courts, 
because  no  one  could  prove  it  did  not  yield  a  just  compensation. 
This  statement  has  reference  to  such  orders  as  the  commission 
will  issue.  Of  course,  a  rate  on  even  one  commodity  might  be 
so  low  as  to  be  clearly  illegal.  These  views  are  expressed  by 
Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  in  the  Florida  Phosphate  Rate  case,^*" 
as  follows : 

"The  order  of  the  commission  was  not  operative  upon  all 
local  rates,  but  only  fixed  the  rate  on  a  single  article,  to  wit, 

49;    Rowland   v.    Boyle   244   U.    S.      U.  S.  607,  fi4  L.  EM.  ,  40  Sup. 

106,  61  L.  Ed.  1022,  37  Sup.  Ct.  577.      Ct.  . 

See  also  Corp.  Com.  of  Okla.  v.  A.  289.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  31  I.  C.  C.  532;  Florida,  203  U.  S  256,  51  L.  Ed. 
Memphis  v.  Chicago  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  174,  27  Sup.  Ct.  108.  See  also  Sea- 
Co.  39  I.  C.  C.  256.  The  question  at  board  A.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Florida,  203 
present  is  one  of  fact,  Groesbeck  U.  S.  261,  51  L.  Ed.  175,  27  Sup. 
V.  Duluth  &  S.  S.  &  A.  R.  Co.  250  Ct.  109. 


§  48]  Engaged,  in  Inteestate  Commerce.  247 

phosphate.  There  is  no  evidence  of  the  amount  of  phosphates 
carried  locally;  neither  is  it  shown  how  much  a  change  in  the 
rate  of  carrying  them  will  affect  the  income,  nor  how  much 
the  rate  fixed  by  the  railroads  for  carrying  phosphate  has 
been  changed  by  the  order  of  the  commission.  There  is  testi- 
mony tending  to  shoAv  the  gross  income  from  all  local  freights 
and  the  value  of  the  railroad  property,  and  also  certain  dif- 
ficulties in  the  way  of  transporting  phosphates,  owing  to  the 
lack  of  facilities  at  the  terminals.  But  there  is  nothing  from 
which  we  can  determine  the  cost  of  such  transportation.  "We 
are  aware  of  the  dif^culty  which  attends  proof  of  the  cost  of 
transporting  a  single  article,  and,  in  order  to  determine  the 
reasonableness  of  a  rate  prescribed,  it  may  sometimes  be  neces- 
sary to  accept  as  a  basis  the  average  rate  of  all  transportation 
per  ton  per  mile.  We  shall  not  attempt  to  indicate  to  what 
extent  or  in  what  eases  the  inquiry  must  be  special  and  limited. 
It  is  enough  for  the  present  to  hold  that  there  is  in  the  record 
nothing  from  Avhich  a  reasonable  deduction  can  be  made  as  to 
the  cost  of  transportation,  the  amount  of  phosphates  trans- 
ported, or  the  effect  which  the  rate  established  by  the  com- 
mission will  have  upon  the  income.  Under  these  circumstances 
it  is  impossible  to  hold  that  there  was  error  in  the  conclusions 
reached  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state  of  Florida,  and  its 
judgment  is  affirmed." 

Notwithstanding  this  presumption,  rates  on  particular  com- 
modities may  be  shown  to  yield  such  a  return  as  amounts  to 
confiscation.  The  Supreme  Court  has  said  i^*"  "While  local 
interests  serve  as  a  motive  for  enforcing  reasonable  rates, 
it  would  be  a  very  different  matter  to  say  that  the  state  may 
compel  the  carrier  to  maintain  a  rate  upon  a  particular  com- 
modity that  is  less  than  reasonable,  or — as  might  equally  be 
asserted — to  carry  gratuitously,  in  order  to  build  up  a  local 
enterprise.  That  would  be  to  go  outside  the  carrier's  under- 
taking, and  outside  the  field  of  reasonable  supervision  of  the 

290.     Nor.   Pac.    R.  C.   v.   North  L.   Ed.   745,  35   Sup.   Ct.   437.   The 

Dakota,  236  U.   S.   585,  59  L.   Ed.  North    Dakota   case,    infra,    is  ex- 

73.5,  35   Sup.   Ct.  429;    and  to  the  plained      and      distinguished      in 

same  effect  see  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Stonega  Coke  &  Coal  Co.  v.  L.  & 

Co.   V.   Conley,   236    U.   S.    605,    59  N.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  523,  541. 


248  State  Regulation  op  Carriers.  [^  49 

conduct  of  its  business,  and  Avoiild  be  equivalent  to  an  ap- 
propriation of  the  property  to  public  uses  upon  terms  to  which 
the  carrier  had  in  no  way  agreed."  This  principle,  as  was 
shown  in  the  same  case,  does  not  deny  the  right  to  classify 
commodities;  making  rates  thereon  according  to  hazard,  value 
of  service  which  results  in  large  part  from  the  value  of  the 
comnu)dity.  and  other  well  known  considerations.  The  court 
said:  "The  legislature  undoubtedly  has  a  wide  range  of  dis- 
cretion in  the  exercise  of  power  to  prescribe  reasonable  charges, 
and  it  is  not  bound  to  fix  uniform  rates  for  all  commodities, 
or  to  secure  the  same  percentage  of  profit  on  every  sort  of 
business.  There  are  many  factors  to  be  considered — differences 
in  the  articles  transported,  the  care  required,  the  risk  assumed, 
the  value  of  the  service,  and  it  is  obviously  important  that 
there  should  be  reasonable  adjustments  and  classifications." 
Rates  voluntarily  established  by  a  common  carrier  may  be 
considered  in  determining  whether  or  not  the  same  rates  are 
reasonable  when  prescribed  by  a  state  rate-making  body.^" 

§  49.  Same  Subject — Relative  Cost  of  Different  Kinds  of 
Transportation. — The  same  track,  the  same  cars  and,  to  a 
large  extent,  the  same  employees,  are  used  or  engaged  in  both 
interstate  and  intrastate  commerce,  and  in  passenger  and 
freight  transportation.  When  a  state  prescribes  rates  on  in- 
trastate transportation,  and  it  is  sought  to  shoAv  that  such  rates 
are  confiscat«ory,  to  make  proof  thereof  requires  evidence  as  to 
the  cost  of  the  intrastate  movement  as  well  as  of  the  value  of 
the  property  devoted  thereto.  To  a  certain  extent  this  cost 
may  be  allocated,  but  much  of  the  cost  of  local  or  intrastate 
transportation  relates  to  the  use  of  property  and  the  cost  of 
service  which  are  employed  in  both  kinds  of  transportation. 

The  federal  trial  conrts  in  the  various  rate  cases  Avhich 
reached  the  Supreme  Court  in  1913  devoted  much  argument 
o  this  question,  and  the  witnesses  in  the  cases  expressed  widely 
difiPerent  opinions  with  reference  thereto.  All  agreed  that 
the  intrastate  movement  cost  more  than  the  interstate  move- 
ment.    Some  placed  this  excess  cost  as  low  as  fifty  per  cent 

291.    Louisville  &   N.   R.   Co.  v.       .35  Sup.  Ct.  147.  Sec.  102.  post. 
Finn,  23.5  U.  S.  601,  59  L.  Ed.  379, 


§  49]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  249 

and  some  as  liigh  as  seven  hundred  per  cent/*^  There  is  a  dif- 
ference between  the  cost,  as  related  to  the  receipts,  of  pais- 
senger  and  freight  business;  what  this  difference  is,  is  a  fact 
about  which  there  are  varying  opinions.  In  the  ^linnesota 
Rate  oases,  at  page  432,  Mr.  Justice  Hughes  speaks  of  "the 
extreme  difficulty  and  intricacy  of  the  calculations  whicn 
must  be  made  in  the  effort  to  establish  a  segregation  of  intra- 
state business  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  return  to 
M'hich  the  carrier  is  properly  entitled  therefrom;"  and  in 
the  course  of  the  opinion  in  that  and  the  related  cases  reported 
in  Volumes  230  and  231  of  the  Supreme  Court  Reports,  the 
methods  adopted  by  the  trial  courts  are  rejected  as  unsatis- 
factory, and  the  conclusion  as  Avell  as  the  true  method  is  indi- 
fiated  by  the  statement  in  the  opinion  at  page  465  of  Volume 
230,  as  follows : 

"We  are  of  the  opinion  that  on  an  issue  of  this  character 
involving  the  constitutional  validity  of  state  action,  general 
estimates  of  the  sort  here  subnitted,  with  respect  to  a  subject 
so  intricate  and  important,  should  not  be  accepted  as  adequate 
proof  to  sustain  a  finding  of  confiscation.  While  accounts 
have  been  kept  so  as  to  show  the  relative  cost  of  interstate 
and  intrastate  business,  giving  particulars  of  the  traffic  handled 
on  through  and  local  trains,  and  presenting  data  from  which 
such  extra  cost,  as  there  may  be,  of  intrastate  business  may 
be  suitably  determined,  it  would  appear  to  have  been  not 
impracticable  to  have  had  such  accounts  kept  or  statistics 
prepared  at  least  during  test  periods  properly  selected.  It  may 
be  said  that  this  would  have  been  a  very  difficult  matter,  but 
the  company  having  assailed  the  constitutionality  of  the  state 
acts  and  orders  was  bound  to  establish  its  case,  and  it  was  not 
entitled  to  rest  on  expressions  of  judgment  when  it  had  it  in 
its  power  to  present  accurate  data  which  would  permit  the 
court  to  draw  the  right  conclusion."^'* 

292.  Shepard  v.  Northern  Pac.  Minnesota,  186  U.  S.  257,  262,  46 
Ry.  Co.,  184  Fed.  765,  812  et  seq.  L.   Ed.  1151,  22  Sup.  Ct.  900;    St. 

293.  For  cases  relating  to  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Hadley, 
methods  to  be  adopted  in  deter-  168  Fed.  317,  348;  Ames  v.  Union 
mining  the  relative  cost  of  diff-  Pac.  R.  Co.,  64  Fed.  165;  Chicago, 
erent  kinds  of  transportation,  see  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Tompkins, 
Minneapolis    &    St.    L.    R.    Co.    v.  176   U.   S.   167,   44  L.   Ed.   417,  20 


250 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  49 


Seeking  to  conform  to  the  rule  stated  above  in  the  quotation 
from  the  opinion  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,  carriers  serv- 


Sup.  Ct.  33G;  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169 
U.  S.  466,  42  L.  Ed.  819,  18  Sup. 
Ct.  418;  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
R^  Co.  V.  Keyes,  91  Fed.  47,  55; 
Re  Arkansas  Rates,  163  Fed.  141; 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Love,  177  Fed.  493,  498,  499; 
Love  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R. 
Co.,  185  Fed.  321,  330,  331,  218 
U.  S.  675,  220  U.  S.  618;  Shepard 
V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  184  Fed. 
765,  810,  812;  Re  Arkansas  Rates, 
187  Fed.  290,  320,  344;  Cedar  Hill 
Coal  and  Coke  Co.  v.  Colorado 
&  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C. 
387,  393;  Gustin  v.  Atchison,  T. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  8  L  C.  C.  277; 
Wilcox  V.  Consolidated  Gas  Co., 
212  U.  S.  19,  53  L.  Ed.  382,  29 
Sup.  Ct.  192,  15  Am.  Cas.  1034; 
Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  North 
Carolina  Corp.  Com.  206  U. 
S.  1,  51  L.  Ed.  933,  27  Sup.  Ct. 
585;  St  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gill,  156  U.  S.  649,  663,  39  L. 
Ed.  567,  15  Sup.  Ct.  484;  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Stove  Works 
Co.,  128  Ga.  207,  233,  234,  57  S. 
E.  429;  Wisconsin  M.  &  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Jacobson,  71  Minn.  519,  7 
N.  W.  893,  40  L.  R.  A.  389,  70 
Am.  St.  Ry.  358,  179  U.  S.  287, 
302,  45  L.  Ed.  194,  21  Sup.  Ct. 
115;  State  v.  Missouri  P.  Ry.  Co., 
76  Kan.  467,  92  Pac.  606;  Pen- 
sacola  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Florida,  25 
Fla.  310,  5  So.  833;  Morgan's 
R.  &  S.  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Commission, 
109  La.  247,  33  So.  214;  People 
V.  St.  Louis  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co., 
176  111.  512,  52  N.  E.  292;  Chicago 
Union  Traction  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
199  111.  579,  65  N.  E.  470;  Reagan 
V.  Farmer's  L.  &  T.  Co.,  154  U. 
S.  362,  38  L.  Ed.  1014,  14  Sup.  Ct. 


1047;  San  Diego  Land  Co.  v.  Na- 
tional City,  174  U.  S.  739,  43  L. 
Ed.  1154,  19  Sup.  Ct.  804;  Coving- 
ton &  L.  Turnpike  Road  Co.  v. 
Sandford,  164  U.  S.  578,  596,  597, 
41  L.  Ed.  560,  17  Sup.  Ct.  198, 
Jerome  Hill  Cotton  Co.  v.  Mis- 
souri, K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  6  I.  C.  C. 
601;  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  v. 
Bartine,  170  Fed.  725.  Follow- 
ing the  suggestion  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  quoted  in  the  text, 
the  Commission  has  prescribed 
rules  relating  to  the  separation 
of  expenses.  Separation  of  Op- 
erating Expenses,  30  I.  C.  C. 
676.  For  cases  construing  the 
powers  of  State  Commissions 
generally,  see,  Steenerson  v. 
Great  N.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Minn.  353, 
375,  376,  67  N.  W.  207;  State  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  ?.  Ry.  Co.,  38 
Minn.  281,  298,  37  N.  W.  782; 
Foreman  v.  Board,  64  Minn.  371, 
67  N.  W.  207;  State  v.  Young, 
29  Minn.  474,  9  N.  W.  737; 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Oregon,  Ore.,  119  Pac. 
727;  Minneapolis,  St.  P.  &  S.  Ste. 
M.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com. 
of  Wisconsin,  136  Wis.  146, 
116  N.  W.  905;  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Railway  Com.,  85 
Neb.  818,  824-5,  124  N.  W.  477; 
Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v. 
San  Francisco,  82  Cal.  286,  306, 
22  Pac.  910,  1046;  Jacobson  v. 
Wisconsin  Ry.  Co.,  71  Minn.  519 
529,  74  N.  W.  893;  40  L.  R.  A. 
389,  70  Am.  St.  358;  Morgan's  L. 
&  T.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co.  V.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Louisiana,  109  Ga. 
247,  265,  33  So.  214;  In  Re 
Amsterdam,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  1009; 
People     V.      Board     of       R.     R. 


<^  50]  Engaged.  TxX  Interstate  Commerce.  251 

iii<;  the  state  of  Arkansas  have  from  data  carefiilh'  obtained 
formulated  rules  which  appear  to  be  more  nearly  accurattj 
than  any  previously  published,  and  which  rules  were  adopted 
by  the  trial  court  in  an  opinion  holding  that  the  Arkansas 
intrastate  rates  were  confiscatory/** 

The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  requires  carriers  to 
make  a  separation  of  operating  expense  between  freight  and 
passenger  service."'^ 

§  50.  Testing-  a  Rate  by  Use  to  Determine  Whether  or  Not 
It  Is  Confiscatory. — Circut  Judge  AYoods,  in  1881,  first  applied 
the  test  to  a  rate.  What  he  there  said  applies  with  great 
force  to  a  rate  fixed  by  an  administrative  commission.  He 
said/"* 

"The  ofificers  of  the  railroad  company  declares  that  the  rates 
fixed  by  the  commission  will  so  reduce  its  income  that  it  will 
not  suffice  to  pay  the  running  expenses  of  the  road  and  the 
interest  on  its  bonded  debt,  leaving  nothing  for  dividends  to 
its  stockholders.  The  railroad  commissioners  assert  that 
their  schedule  was  framed  to  produce  8  per  cent,  income  on 
the  value  of  the  road  after  paying  cost  of  maintenance  and 
running  expenses.  AAliich  view  is  the  correct  one,  it  is  im- 
possible to  decide  from  the  evidence  submitted.  There  is, 
however,  a  conclusive  way,  and  it  seems  to  me  it  is  the  only 
one,  by  which  this  controversy  can  \k  settled,  and  that  is  by 
experiment.  A  reduction  of  railroad  charges  is  not  always 
followed  by  a  reduction  of  either  gross  or  net  income.  It  can 
soon  be  settled  which  is  right — the  railroad  company's  officers 
or  the  railroad  commission — in  their  view  of  the  effect  of 
the  commission's  tariff  of  rates,  by  allowing  the  tariff  to  go 
into  operation.  If  it  turns  out  that  the  views  of  the  railroad 
company  are  correct,  and  that  the  schedule  fixed  by  the  com- 

Com'rs,   53   App.   Div.   61;    Pensa-  R.  Co.,  222  Fed.  539;  see  also  Sec. 

cola    &    A.    R.    Co.    V.    State,    25  47  Supm.  and  note  288. 

Pla.    310,    5    So.    833;    Storrs     v.  295.     Separation    of    Operating 

Pensacola    Ry.    Co.,    29    Fla.    617,  Expenses,  30  I.  C.  C.  676  and  rules 

11   So.  226;    State  v.   Seaboard  A.  adopted      by       the       Commission 

L.  Ry.  Co.,  48  Fla.   114.   150.   152,  June    15,    1915. 

37  So.  652,  658.  296.     Tilley  v.   Railroad     Co.,   5 

294.    Boyle  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Fed.   641,    662,   4  Woods    427. 


252  State  Regulation  of  Carriees.  [§  ^ 

mission  is  too  low  to  afford  a  fair  return  upon  the  value  of  the 
road,  the  remedy  is  plain  ;  for  the  law  makes  it  the  duty  of 
the  commissioners  'from  time  to  time,  and  as  often  as  circum- 
stances may  require,  to  change  and  revise  said  schedules.'  " 

This  test  was  followed  by  District  Judges  McPherson  and 
Newman  and  commended  by  Circuit  Judge  Shelby  and  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,'"  and  the  principle  has 
been  applied  by  the  Supreme  Court.""  The  Supreme  Court,  in 
the  1913  North  Dakota  ease,  referred  to  in  note,'""  supt^a,  gave 
as  a  reason  for  a  test,  "the  groat  difficulty  in  the  attempt  to 
measure  the  reasonableness  of  charges  by  reference  to  the  cost 
of  transporting  the  particular  class  of  freight  concerned."  On 
the  second  appeal  of  this  case  the  result  of  this  test  is  shown.""* 

Another  reason  for  the  test  and  why  great  care  should  be 
observed  in  enjoining  an  order  fixing  a  rate  is  that  the  ship- 
per can  not  be  protected  by  a  bond,  should  the  lower  rate  be 
finally  held  valid.  This  is  clearly  and  unanswerably  shown 
by  Circuit  Judge  Selby  in  the  Alabama  Rate  cases,^""  where 
he  says : 

"It  is  argued  that  the  injunction  should  be  issued  because 
the  rights  of  the  defendants  and  all  interested  are  secured  by 
bonds.     It  is  true  that  the  courts  have  held  that  the  fact  that 

297.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  192;  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Hadley,  155  Fed.  220;  Cent,  of  North  Dakota,  216  U.  S.  579,  54 
Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McLandon,  157  L.  Ed.  624,  30  Sup.  Ct.  423,  af- 
Fed.  961,  978;  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ala-  firming  North  Dakota  v.  North- 
bama  v.  Cent,  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  ern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  17  N.  Dak.  223, 
170  Fed.  225,  232,  233;  Loftis  v.  116  N.  W.  92;  Louisville  N.  R. 
Pullman  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  102;  Co.  v.  Cumberland  Tel.  &  Tel. 
City  of  Spokane  v.  Northern  Pac.  Co.,  225  U.  S.  4ao,  56  L.  Ed.  1151. 
Ry.  Co..  19  1.  C.  C.  162;  see  32  Sup.  Ct.  741.  The  Supreme 
Shepard  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Court  recognized  the  value  of 
Co.,  184  Fed.  765,  807;  Des  a  two  months  test  in  Rowland 
Moines  Gas  case  quoted  stipra.  v.  Boyle  244  U.  S.  106.  61  L.  Ed. 
sec.  46.  1022,   37   Sup.   Ct.   577. 

298.  Ex  Parte  Young,  209  U.  S.  299.  Nor.  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  North 
123,  52  L.  Ed.  714.  28  Sup.  Ct.  Dakota,  236  U.  S.  585,  59  L.  Ed. 
441:    Knoxville  v.  Knoxville  Wat-  735,    35    Sup.   Ct.    429. 

er  Co.,  212  U.  S.  1,  53  L.  Ed.  371,  300.    R.  R.  Com.  of  Ala.  v.  Cen. 

29    Sup.   Ct.    148;    Wilcox   v.   Con-  of  Ga.  R.   Co..   170  Fed.  225.  232. 

solidated   Gas   Co..    212    U.    S.    19.  233. 
53      L.      Ed.     382,      29      Sup.      Ct. 


§  51]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commeece.  253 

the  defendants"  rights  may  he  secured  by  hond  is  sometimes 
a  sound  reason,  in  cases  where  the  final  result  is  doubtful,  for 
exercising  judicial  discretion  in  favor  of  granting  the  pre- 
liminary injunction.  But  that  rule  is  not  always  controlling, 
and  clearly  it  should  not  be  applied  in  cases  where  the  bond 
does  not  afford  adequate  protection.  Here  the  bonds  given 
are  intended  to  secure  innumerable  passengers  and  shippers 
or  consignees.  It  is  not  at  all  probable  that  the  claims  of  the 
tenth  of  them,  on  breach  of  the  bonds,  would  ever  be  pre- 
sented, or.  if  presented,  would  be  paid,  and  to  enforce  pay- 
ment in  the  courts,  unless  those  injured  combined  in  their 
efforts,  would  cost  more  than  the  claim  is  worth.  Those  fam- 
iliar with  the  Tift  case  know  that  the  bond  proved  ineffectual 
as  complete  indemnity  in  that  case,  although  the  parties  sought 
to  be  protected  were  large  shippers  of  lumber.  Tift  et  al.  v. 
Southern  Railway  Company  et  al.  (C.  C.)  123  Fed.  789;  Id., 
10  I.  C.  C.  548;  Id.  (C.  C.)  138  Fed.  753;  Southern  Railroad 
Company  et  al.  v.  Tift  et  al.  (C.  C.  A.)  148  Fed.  1021 ;  Id.  206 
U.  S.  428,  27  Sup.  Ct.  709;  51  L.  Ed.  1124;  Tift  et  al.  v. 
Southern  Railway  Company  et  al-  (C.  C.)  159  Fed.  555. 
Where  the  injunction  is  granted,  the  bonds  should  of  course, 
be  required,  but  the  court  can  not  safely  exercise  its  discretion 
upon  the  theory  that  the  bojid  in  a  case  like  this  gives  com- 
plete indem.nity." 

The  fact  that  the  railroad  has  voluntarily  applied  the  test 
will  not  estop  it  from  enjoining  the  rate  where  the  test  shows 
scation. 

§  51.  Issuance  of  Stocks  and  Bonds. — Because  unfaithful 
financiers  have  caused  to  be  issued  stocks  and  bonds  of  public 
service  corporations  without  adequate  security  and  sometimes 
with  the  intention  of  using  the  proceeds  for  personal  rather 
than  corporate  purposes,  and  because  the  amount  of  the 
corporate  securities  of  such  corporations  is  a  fact  to  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  rates  to  be  charged,  a  number  of  the 
states  have  passed  laws  regulating  the  issuance  of  stocks  and 
bonds.    Some  of  the  reasons  for  such  statutes  are  given  b|y  the 

301.    Love.  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.       C.  C.  A.  403,  and  note  251,  supra. 
F.    Ry.    Co.,    185    Fed.    321,    107 


254  State,  Regulation  of  Carrieks.  [§  51 

Court  of  Appeals  of  Maryland  in  this  language :'"' 

"That  issue  of  stocks  and  bonds  have  been  made  fraudu- 
lently and  palmed  off  on  a  credulous  public  to  their  ultimate 
serious  loss  is  matter  of  common  knowledge.  Facts  in  relation 
to  such  issues,  especially  with  regard  to  local  public  utilities, 
have  been  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  obtain,  leaving  it  to 
the  stimulated  imagination  of  some  broker  or  syndicate  who, 
actuated  by  a  heavy  commission  to  be  realized  by  creating  a  mar- 
ket until  such  stock  or  bonds  could  be  unloaded,  have  reaped  a 
reward  in  dollars  and  cents  at  the  cost  of  those  who  were  induc- 
ed to  give  full  faith  and  credit  to  their  representations.  The 
legislotures  of  many  states  have  therefore,  through  the  media  of 
public  service  commissions  seen  fit  to  establish  a  qimsi 
guardianship  over  prospective  ini^estors." 

These  laws  are  valid  in  so  far  as  they  restrict  the  issuance 
of  corporate  securities  to  purposes  authorized  by  the  law  of  the 
corporation,  and  in  so  far  as  they  restrict  the  issuance  of  such 
securities  to  the  proper  corporate  purposes ;  but  such  laws  do 
not  empower  the  states  or  state  commissions  to  assume  the 
management  of  the  b^usiness  of  the  corporation  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  its  directors.  Such  legislation,  as  was  said  by  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York,  was  not  """  designed  to  make 
the  commissioners  the  financial  managers  of  the  corporation, 
or  that  it  empowered  them  to  substitute  their  judgment  fot* 
that  of  the  board  of  directors  or  stockholders  of  the  corpora- 
tion as  to  the  wisdom  of  a  transaction,  but  that  it  was  de- 
signed to  make  the  commissioners  the  guardians  of  the  public 
by  enabling  them  to  prevent  the  issue  of  stock  and  bonds  for 
other  than  the  statutory  purposes." 

No  state  can  regulate  or  prohibit  the  issuance  of  stock  and 
bonds  by  an  interstate  railroad,  when  the  stocks  or  bonds  are 
issued  against  lines  extending  beyond  the  limits  thereof.  The 
power  of  the  state  being  limited  to  bonds  and  stocks  on  prop- 
erty situated  in  the  state.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  even 
as  to  these,  a  state  might  require  the  interstate  railroad  to 
give  information  as  to  such  issue. ^°* 

302.   Laird   v.   Baltimore   &  O.   R.       H.    Co.    v.    Stevens,    197    N.    Y.    1, 
Co.,  88  Atl.  348,  350,  121  Md.  193,       90  N.  E.  60. 

303.    People  ex  rel.  Deleware  &  304.    Laird  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 

Co.,  88  Atl.  348,  121  Md.  193. 


§  52]  Engagep,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  255 

Acting  on  this  principle  and  in  accord  with  an  able  and  ex- 
haustive opinion  of  its  special  attorney,  the  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Georgia  refused  to  assume  jurisdiction  of  the  question 
of  the  issuance  of  bonds  by  the  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Railroad 
Company  on  its  interstate  lines. ^"^ 

Section  20a  added  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  b|y  Trans- 
portation Act  1920  gives  the  Commission  authority  over  the 
issuance  of  securities.  This  is  an  occupancy  of  the  field  by 
Congress  and  excludes  any  regulation  by  the  states  which  may 
affect  interstate  carriers  in  the  issuance  of  their  securities. 

§  52.  Long  and  Short  Hai?il. — The  law  of  the  state  of  Ken- 
tucky provided  that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  or  cor- 
poration owning  or  operating  a  railroad  in  the  state  to  charge 
or  receive  any  greater  compensation  in  the  aggregate  for  the 
transportation  of  passengers  or  of  property  of  like  kind,  under 
substantially  similiar  circumstances  and  conditions,  for  a 
shorter  than  for  a  longer  distance,  over  the  same  line,  in  the 
same  direction,  the  shorter  being  included  in  the  longer  dis- 
tance. 

The  Kentucky  court''""  having  affirmed  a  judgment  against 
the  Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad  Company  for  a  violation  of 
that  law.  an  appeal  was  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  where  the  decision  of  the  Kentucky  court  was 
afifirmed.^"'  In  this  case  both  the  long  and  short  haul  were 
within  the  state  of  Kentucky.  In  holding  that  the  Kentucky 
laAv  did  not  illegally  affect  interstate  commerce,  the  court 
said : 

"It  is  plain  that  the  provision  in  question  does  not  in  terms 
embrace  the  case  of  interstate  traffic.  It  is  restricted  in  its 
regulation  to  those  who  own  or  operate  a  railroad  within  the 
state,  and  the  long  and  short  distances  mentioned  are  evident- 
ly distances  upon  the  railroad  line  within  the  state.  The  par- 
ticular case  b'efore  us  is  one  involving  only  the  transportation 
of  coal  from  one  point  in  the  state  of  Kentucky  to  another  by 
a  corporation  of  that  state. 

a05.     Report    of    Railroad    Com.  51   S.   W.   164.   1012,   106   Ky.   633. 

of  Ga.  1912,  p.  222,  et  seq.  307.    Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.   v. 

306.    Louisville  &  N.  R.   Co.   v.  Kentucky,    183    U.    S.    503,    46    L, 

Kentucky,   21   Ky.  Law  Rep.   232,  Ed.  298,  22  Sup.  Ct.   95. 


25G  State  Rp:gulatton  of  Carriers.  [§  52 

"It  may  be  that  the  enforcement  of  the  state  regulation  for- 
bidding discrimination  in  rates  in  the  case  of  articles  of  a  like 
kind  carried  for  different  distances  over  the  same  line  may  some- 
what affect  commerce  generally;  but  we  have  frequently  held 
that  such  a  result  is  too  remote  and  indirect  to  be  regarded  as 
an  interference  with  interstate  commerce;  that  the  inter- 
ference with  the  commerce  power  of  the  general  government, 
to  be  unlawful,  must  be  direct,  and  not  the  merely  incidental 
effect  of  enforcing  the  police  powers  of  a  state." 

In  another  case  where  the  state  court  held  that  the  law  ap- 
plied where  the  long  haul  was  interstate  commerce,  the  Su- 
preme Court  reversed  the  state  coiu-t  and  held  that  the  Ken- 
tucky law  so  construed  was  invalid.  The  C(jurt,  Mr.  Justice 
Peekham  delivering  the  opinion  (and  ]\Ir.  Justice  Brewer  and 
Mr.  Justice  Gray,  dissenting),  said:''"" 

"Congress  does  not  directly  or  indirectly  interfere  with 
local  rates  by  adopting  their  sum  as  the  interstate  rate. 

"In  the  case  at  bar  the  state  claims  only  to  regulate  its  local 
rates  by  the  standard  of  the  interstate  rate,  and  says  the 
former  shall  ble  no  higher  than  the  latter,  but  the  direct  effect 
of  that  provision  is,  as  we  have  seen,  to  regulate  the  interstate 
rate,  for  to  do  any  interstate  business  at  the  local  rate  is  im- 
possible, and  if  so,  it  must  give  up  its  interstate  business  or 
else  reduce  the  rate  in  proportion.  That  ver^^  result  is  a  hind- 
rance to.  an  interference  with,  and  a  regulation  of,  commerce 
between  the  states,  carried  on,  though  it  may  be,  by  only  a 
single  company." 

In  the  Minnesota  Rate  Cases,'""  at  pages  428  and  429,  the 
Supreme  Court  reviewed  the  Kentucky  decisions  and  held  that 
the  first  case  was  not  affected  by  the  later  or  Bubanks  case. 
The  review  of  the  two  decisions  concludes  with  this  state- 
ment : 

308.     Louisville   &   N.   R.   Co.   v.  rett,  231  U.  S.  298,  58  L.  Ed.  229, 

Eubank,    184   U.    S.   27,    46   L.   Ed.  34   Sup.   Ct.   48,   51. 
416,   22    Sup.    Ct.   277.    See   Louis-  309.    Simpson,  et  al.,  R.  R.  Com. 

ville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Com.  of  Ky.,  of  Minnesota  v.    Shepard,   230  U. 

106   Ky.    633,   51   S.   W.   164,   1012,  S.  352,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  3a  Sup.  Ct. 

90    Am.     St.    Rep.     236,      183    U.  729.    See    also    Chicago,    B.    &    Q. 

S.  503,  46  L.  Ed.  298,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R.  Co.   v.  Anderson,  72   Neb.  586, 

95;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Gar-  101    N.    W.    1019.    For   a    full    dis- 


§  58]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  257 

"The  authority  of  the  former  decision  upholding  the  state 
law,  as  applied  to  places  all  of  which  were  within  the  state,  Avas 
in  no  way  impaired  and  the  court  fully  recognized  the  power  of 
the  state  to  prescribe  maximum  charges  for  intrastate  traffic 
although  carried  over  an  interstate  road  to  points  on  the  state 
line." 

The  reservation  in  this  quotation  has  been  applied  and  the 
right  to  recover  damages  for  a  violation  of  an  absolute  pro- 
hibition in  state  laws  of  a  greater  charge  for  the  shorter  hauls 
sustained  by  the  Federal  courts.''"' 

§  53.  Ferries. — The  Supreme  Court  quotes  as  a  definition  of 
an  ordinary  ferry  the  following  i''" 

"A  ferry  is  a  continuation  of  the  highway  from  one  side  of 
the  water  over  which  it  passes  to  the  other,  and  is  for  trans- 
portation of  passengers  or  of  travellers  with  their  teams  and 
vehicles  and  such  other  property  as  they  may  carry  or  have 
with  them." 

At  page  468  the  opinion  distinguishes  such  a  ferry  from  one 
used  by  a  railroad  as  a  means  of  transporting  cars,  passengers 
and  freight.  Whatever  doubt  there  may  have  been  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  right  of  regulation  by  a  state  of  a  railroad  ferry 
across  a  stream  which  is  the  boundary  between  two  states,  has 
been  set  at  rest  by  a  recent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court.  In 
this  decision  the  court  quotes  the  definition  of  "railroad" 
contained  in  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,^'"  and  says:''" 

cussion  of     the     general     subject  see   also    Mayor    of   New    York    v. 

and  of  discrimination  in  general,  New     England     Transp.     Co.,     14 

see     McGrew      v.      Missouri    Pac.  Blatch,  1.59,  Fed.  Cas.  10197. 
Ry.   Co.,   230   Mo.    496,    132    S.   W.  312.  post.  Sec.  337. 

1076.  313.    New   York   Cent.   &   H.   R. 

310.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc-  R.  Co.  v.  Board,  etc.,  of  Hudson 
Grew  Coal  Co.,  244  U.  S.  191,  61  County,  227  U.  3.  248,  263,  264, 
L.  Ed.  1075,  37  Sup.  Ct.  518;  Sou.  57  L.  Ed.  499,  33  Sup.  Ct.  269, 
Pac.  Co.  V.  California  Adjustment  reversing  same  styled  case.  7'6 
Co.,  237  Fed..  954,  150  C.  C.  A.  604.  N.  J.  Law  664,  74  Atl.  954.     This 

311.  St.  Clair  County  v.  Inter-  case  and  the  St.  Clair  case,  note 
state  Transp.  Co.,  192  U.  S.  454,  262,  supra,  cites  and  discusses 
466,  48  L.  Ed.  518,  24  Sup.  Ct.  many  authorities.  To  the  same 
300,.  citing  Mayor  of  New  York  v.  effect  see  Port  Richmond  &  B. 
Starin,  106  N.  Y.  1,  12  N.  E.  631;  P.  F.  Co.  v.  County  of  Hudson, 
Brodnax   v.    Bake,    94    N.    C.    675;  234  U.  S.  317,  58  L.  Ed.  1330,  34 


258  State  Regulation  of  Carriees.  [§  53 

"The  inclusion  of  railroad  ferries  within  the  text  is  so  cer- 
tain and  so  direct  as  to  require  nothing  but  a  consideration  of 
the  text  itself.  Indeed,  this  inevitable  conclusion  is  not  dis- 
puted in  the  argument  for  the  defendant  in  error,  but  it  is  in- 
sisted that  as  the  text  only  embraces  railroad  ferries  and  the 
ordinances  were  expressly  decided  by  the  court  below  only  to 
apply  to  persons  other  than  railroad  passengers,  therefore  the 
action  by  Congress  does  not  extend  to  the  subject  embraced  by 
the  ordi.nances.  But  as  all  the  business  of  the  ferries  between 
the  two  states  was  interstate  commerce  within  the  power  of 
Congress  to  control  and  subject  in  any  event  to  regulation  by 
the  state  as  long  only  as  no  action  was  taken  by  Congress,  the 
result  of  the  action  by  Congress  leaves  the  subject,  that  is,  the 
interstate  commerce  carried  on  by  means  of  the  ferries,  free 
from  control  by  the  state.  We  think  the  argument  by  which 
it  is  sought  to  limit  the  operation  of  the  act  of  Congress  to  cer- 
tain elements  only  of  the  interstate  commerce  embraced  in  the 
business  of  ferriage  from  state  to  state  is  wanting  in  merit. 
In  the  absence  of  an  express  exclusion  of  some  of  the  elements 
of  interstate  commerce  entering  into  the  ferriage,  the  assertion 
of  power  on  the  part  of  Congress  must  be  treated  as  being 
coterminous  with  the  authority  over  the  subject  as  to  which 
the  purpose  of  Congress  to  take  control  was  manifested." 

While  the  language  above  was  used  with  reference  to  a  rail- 
road ferry,  it  would  seem  to  be  board  enough  to  include  an  or- 
dinary ferry,  and  the  law  is  that  states  have  no  greater  power 
to  regulate  a  ferry  between  two  states  than  they  have  to  regu- 
late an  interstate  railroad.''"     Nor  can  a  state  close  naviga- 

Sup.     Ct.     821;      reversing     same  Lake    Shore    &   M.    S.   Ry.    Co.   v. 

styled   case,    82    N.    J.    L.    536,    82  Ohio,  165  U.  S.  365,  41  L.  Ed.  747. 

Atl.  729.  17    Sup.    Ct.    357;    United    States 

314.     See   Gloucester    Ferry    Co.  v.    Union    Bridge    Co.,    143    Fed. 

V.  Penna.,  114  U.  S.  196,  29  L.  Ed.  377,  affirmed,  204  U.  S.  364,  51  L. 

158,    5     Sup.    Ct.    826;    Covington  Ed.    523,    27    Sup.    Ct.    367;    Mani- 

Bridge    Co.    v.    Kentucky,    154    U.  gault   v.    S.   M.   Word   &   Co.,   123 

S.  204,  38  L.  Ed.  962,  14   Sup.  Ct.  Fed.    707,    affirmed,    Manigault    v. 

1087;    St.    Clair   County    v.    Inter-  Springs,  199  U.  S.  473,  50  L.  Ed. 

state   Transp.   Co.,   192   U.   S.   454,  274,  26   Sup.  Ct.   227. 
48    L.    Ed.    518,    24    Sup.    Ct.    300; 


§  54]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  259 

tion."^    Fish,  sponges,  oysters,  etc.,  in  local  waters  belong  to 
the  states  and  are  subject  to  their  control."' 

A  municipality,  and  by  parity  of  reasoning  a  state,  cannot 
lawfully  require  a  Canadian  corporation  operating  a  ferry  over 
a  boundary  stream  lying  between  Canada  and  the  state  in 
which  the  municipality  is  located  to  take  out  a  license  and  pay 
a  fee  as  a  condition  precedent  to  receiving  and  landing  passen- 
gers and  property  in  said  municipality.^"  The  rates  for  ferri- 
age between  two  ports  in  the  same  state  may  be  regulated  by 
the  state,  notwithstanding  the  transportation  is  over  a  course 
wdiich  traverses  the  open  sea,'''  but  a  ferry  across  the  Missis- 
sippi River  between  two  States,  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals 
in  Long  v.  Miller,  262  Fed.  362  holds,  is  subject  to  regulation 
only  by  Congress. 

§  54.  Bridges. — Bridges  across  a  stream  which  is  a  boundary 
between  two  states  accommodate  interstate  commerce,  and  like 
ferries,  are  included  in  the  definition  of  railroads  in  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce. '"'*  The  rules  of  law  stated  in  the  preced- 
ing section  as  applicable  to  ferries,  apply  equally  to  such 
bridges.  There  are,  however,  bridges  across  navigable  streams 
which  are  wholly  within  the  boundaries  of  a  state.  As  to  these, 
Mr.  Justice  Field  said  that  the  states  had  full  power"""  to  regu- 

315.  Levy  v.  United  States,  92  151,  59  L.  Ed.  508,  35  Sup.  Ct. 
Fed.    344,    34    C.    C.    A.    392,    re-       276. 

versed.    Levy    v.    United    States,  319.    Note   263,   supra. 

177  U.   S.   621,   44   L.   Ed.   914,   20  320.       Cardwell      v.      American 

Sup.    Ct.    797.    holding    tliat    the  Bridge    Co.,    113    U.    S.    205,    208, 

evidence  was  insufficient  to  show  209,    28    L.    Ed.    959,    5    Sup.    Ct. 

that  the  waters  were  used  in  in-  423.    See    also    Wilson    v.    Black- 

terstate    commerce.  bird    Creek    Marsh    Co.,    2    Pet., 

316.  The  Abby  Dodge,  223  U.  27  U.  S.  245,  7  L.  Ed.  412;  Penn- 
S.  166,  56  L.  Ed.  390,  32  Sup.  Ct.  sylvania  v.  Wheeling  Bridge  Co., 
310.  and  cases  cited  and  dis-  13  How.,  54  U.  S.  518,  564,  14  L. 
cussed  in  the  opinion.  Ed.  249;    Oilman  v.   Philadelphia, 

317.  Sault  Ste.  Marie  v.  Inter-  3  Wall.,  70  U.  S.  713,  18  L.  Ed. 
national  Transit  Co.,  234  U.  S.  96;  Pound  v.  Turck,  95  U.  S. 
333,  58  L.  Ed.  1337,  34  Sup.  Ct.  459,  24  L.  Ed.  525;  Escanaba  Co. 
826  v.    Chicago,   107   U.    S.    678,    27   L. 

318.  Wilmington  Trans.  Co.  v.  Ed.  442,  2  Sup.  Ct.  185;  Miller  v. 
R.    R.    Com.    of    Calif.,    236    U.    S.  Mayor    of    New    York,    109    U.    S. 

385,  27  L.  Ed.  971,  3  Sup.  Ct.  270. 


2H0  State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  54 

late  within  their  limits  matters  of  internal  police,  which  em- 
braces among  other  things  the  construction,  repair  and  main- 
tenance of  roads  and  bridges,  and  the  establishment  of  ferries ; 
that  the  states  are  more  likely  to  appreciate  the  importance  of 
these  means  of  internal  eonimnnieation  and  to  provide  for  their 
proper  management,  than  a  government  at  a  distance;  and 
that,  as  to  bridges  over  navigable  streams,  their  power  is  sub- 
ordinRte  to  that  of  congress,  as  an  act  of  the  latter  body  is,  by 
the  Constitution,  made  the  supreme  law  of  the  land;  but  that 
until  Congress  acts  on  the  subject  their  power  is  plenary. 
When  Congress  acts  directly  with  reference  to  the  bridges  au- 
thorized by  the  state,  its  will  must  control  so  far  as  may  be 
necessary  to  secure  the  free  navigation  of  the  streams." 

The  same  principle  is  announced  by  Mr.  Justice  Hughes  in 
the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,  as  follows :"'' 

"A  state  is  entitled  to  protect  its  coasts,  to  improve  its  har- 
])ors,  bays  and  streams,  and  to  construct  dams  and  bridges 
across  navigable  rivers  within  its  limits,  unless  there  is  conflict 
with  some  act  of  Congress.  Plainly,  in  the  case  of  dams  and 
bridges,  interference  with  the  accustomed  right  of  navigation 
may  result.  But  this  exercise  of  the  important  power  to  pro- 
vide local  improvements  has  not  been  regarded  as  constituting 
such  a  direct  burden  upon  intercourse  or  interchange  of  traffic 
as  to  be  repugnant  to  the  federal  authority  in  its  dormant 
state." 

Where,  under  authority  of  a  state,  a  bridge  has  been  erected 
over  a  navigable  stream  within  the  state,  the  owners  having 
erected  such  bridge  with  full  knoAvledge  of  the  paramount  au- 
thority of  Congress  cannot  complain  when,  under  authority  of 
the  federal  government,  such  bridge  is  required  to  be  removed 
as  an  obstruction  to  navigation.''"     Nor  is  this  rule  dififerent 

321.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  .3.06.  See  also,  The  Brig  Aurora, 
U.  S.  352,  403,  58  L.  Ed.  151,  33  7  Cranch,  11  U.  S.  382,  3  L.  Ed. 
Sup.  Ct.  729,  citing  authorities.  378;     Wayman     v.    Southard,     10 

322.  Union  Bridge  Co.  v.  Wheat.  23  U.  S.  1.  6  L.  Ed.  253; 
United  States,  204  U.  S.  364,  51  Field  v.  Clark,  143  U.  S.  649,  36 
L.  Ed.  523.  27  Sup.  Ct.  367,  L.  Ed.  294,  12  Sup.  Ct.  495;  C. 
followed  in  Monongahela  Bridge  W.,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Com'rs,  1  Ohio 
Co.  V.  United  States,  216  U.  S.  St.  77:  Moers  v.  City  of  Reading, 
177,    54    L.    Ed.    435,    30    Sup.    Ct.  21    Pa.    St.    188;    Locke's    Appeal, 


§  55] 


Engagkp.  in  Interstate  Commerce. 


261 


when  the  bride  has  been  erected  under  authority  of  an  Act  of 
Congress/'" 

A  state  court  may  not  compel  the  removal  of  abridge  over  a 
navigable  stream,  such  bridge  being  used  in  interstate  com- 
merce.''"' 

§  55.  Regulating  Charges  for  Transportation  by  Water. — 
The  Act  to  Kegulate  Commerce  applies,"'''  "to  any  common  car- 
rier or  carriers  engaged  in  the  transportation  of  passengers  or 
property  wholly  by  railroad  (or  partly  by  railroad  and  partly 
by  water  when  both  are  used  under  a  common  control,  manage- 
ment, or  arrangement  for  a  continuous  carriage  or  shipment,)  " 
and  since  the  enactment  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act  to  interstate 
transportation  by  water. 

There  is  a  transportation  service  which  is  performed  by 
vessels  over  inland  waters  wholly  within  one  state.  When  this 
transportation  service  is  open  to  all  who  apply  therefor,  that 
those  engaged  therein  are  common  carriers  is  too  well  settled  to 
justify  extensive  citation  of  authorities.'^"''   Being  common  car- 


72  Pa.  St.  491,  498;  Buttfield  v. 
Stranahan,  192  U.  S.  470,  48  L. 
Ed.  525,  24  Sup.  Ct.  3-49;  Gibbons 
V.  Ogden,  9  Wheat.  22  U.  S.  1,  6 
L.  Ed.  23;  Gibson  v.  United 
States,  166  U.  S.  269,  41  L.  Ed. 
996,  17  Sup.  Ct.  578;  Scranton  v. 
Wheeler,  179  U.  S.  141,  45  L.  Ed. 
126,  21  Sup.  Ct.  48;  New  Orleans 
Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Drainage  Com., 
197  U.  S.  453,  49  L.  Ed.  831,  25 
Sup.  Ct.  471;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.  V.  Drainage  Com'rs,  200  U.  S. 
561.  50  L.  Ed.  590,  26  Sup.  Ct. 
341;  West  Chicago  Street  R.  Co. 
V.  Chicago,  201  U.  S.  506,  50  L. 
Ed.  845,  26  Sup.  Ct.  518;  Dugan 
V.  Bridge  Co.,  27  ?a.  St.  303; 
Cooke  V.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.,  133 
Mass.  185;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R. 
Co.  V.  Cluggish,  143  Ind.  347; 
Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
61  Fed.  885;  State  of  Indiana  v. 
Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.,  83  Fed. 
284.  287;    St.   L.   &  I.  M.   &   S.  R. 


Co.  V.  Taylor,  210  U.  S.  281,  52  L. 
Ed.  1061,  28  Sup.  Ct.  610;  North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  V.  Duluth,  208 
U.  S.  583,  52  L.  Ed.  6.3.0,  28  Sup. 
Ct.   341. 

323.  Hannibal  Bridge  Co.  v. 
United  States,  221  U.  S.  194,  55 
L.  Ed.  699,  31  Sup.  Ct.  603.  The 
rule  as  to  bridges  would  apply 
to  dams,  Wilson  v.  Black  Bird 
Creek  Marsh  Co..  2  Pet.,  27  U.  S. 
245.  7  L.  Ed.  412;  Pound  v. 
Turck,  95  U.  S.  459,  24  L.  Ed.  525. 

324.  Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
K.  W.  Valley  Drainage  District, 
233  U.  S.  75,  58  L.  Ed.  837,  34 
Sup.  Ct.  564. 

325.  Sec.  335,  post,  and  the 
power  granted  by  the  Panalma 
Act,  jiost.   377. 

326.  Moses  v.  Bettes,  4  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  661,  13  Am.  Rep.  1;  Pro- 
peller Niagara  v.  Cordes,  21  How. 
62  U.  S.  7,  22,  23.  16  L.  Ed.  41; 
Brown  v.  Clayton,  12  Ga.  564.  In 


262 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  55 


riers,  the  rates  on  intrastate  transportation  to  be  charged  by 
them  are  subject  to  the  same  regulation  by  the  states  as  rates 
for  transportation  by  railroads. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  extends  the  judicial 
l)Ower  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States  "to  all  cases  of  admir- 
alty and  maritime  jurisdiction,''"'  and  boats  plying  between 
points  in  the  state  are  within  this  jurisdiction."'"  This,  however, 
does  not  exclude  the  states  from  regulating  rates  on  intrastate 
transportation,  although  the  transportation  may  be  by  water/^* 


Hale  V.  New  Jersey  Navigation 
Co.,  15  Conn.  539,  39  Am.  Dec. 
S98,  citing  Judge  Kent,  t&e  opin- 
ion classes  inland  carriers  as 
"carriers  by  land  or  water." 

327.  Art.  HI.  Sec.  2,  Constitut- 
ion United  States. 

328.  The  Belfast,  7  Wall.,  74 
U.  S.  624,  19  L.  Ed.  266;  Aldrich 
V.  ^tna  Co.,  S  Wall.,  75  U.  S. 
491,  19  L.  Ed.  473;  Tucker  on  the 
Constitution,  Sec.  370. 

329.  State  legislation  regulating 
or  prescribing  methods  of  regulat- 
ing common  carriers  show  in 
many  states  a  legislative  con- 
struction supporting  the  text.  As 
some  states  have  no  navigable 
streams,  their  failure  to  refer  to 
water  transportation  is  only 
natural.  Alabama:  carrier  in- 
cludes doing  business  "over  any 
navigable  stream  in  whole  or  in 
any  part  within  the  state  or  partly 
by  rail  and  partly  by  water;  but 
nothing  in  this  article  shall  be 
construed  as  a  regulation  of  or 
interference  with  interstate  com- 
merce;" Code  1907,  Sec.  5648. 
Arizona  laws  make  no  reference 
to  water  carriers;  Sessions  laws 
1912,  chap.  90.  The  same  is  true 
in  Arkansas:  Kirby's  Digest 
1904,  Sees.  6002,  6280.  Califor- 
nia: ''canaV  companies  are  men- 
tioned,    and     the     Act     includes 


"every  common  carrier,"  and 
common  carrier  comprehends 
owners  of  "  any  vessels  regularly 
engaged  in  the  transportation  of 
persons  or  property  for  compen- 
sation upon  the  waters  of  this 
state  or  upon  .he  high  seas,  over 
regular  routes  between  points 
in  this  state;"  Stat.  1911,  1st  Ex. 
Sess.,  Chap.  14.  Colorado:  No 
mention  of  water  carriers;  laws 
1910.  Sp.  Sess.,  chap.  5.  Con- 
n(cticut:  includes  all  "common 
carriers"  though  no  specific  ref- 
erence is  made  to  water  carriers; 
Acts  1911,  chap.  128.  Delaioare: 
has  no  commission.  Florida: 
includes  in  the  definition  of  com- 
mon carriers,  "all  companies  and 
any  person  or  persons  own,ing 
and  operating  steamships  en- 
gaged in  the  transportation  of 
freight  or  passengers  from  and 
to  ports  within  this  state;  all 
companies  and  any  person  or 
persons  owning  and  operating 
steamboats  used  in  the  transpor- 
tation of  freigh:  or  passengers 
upon  the  rivers  or  inland  waters 
of  this  state;"  Gen.  Stat.  1906, 
chap.  5,  Tit.  4,  Div.  4.  Georgia: 
"common  carriers."  No  specific 
mention  of  water  carriers:  Code 
1910,  sec.  2660,  et  seq.  .Idaho: 
water  carriers  not  named.  Illi- 
nois:   transportation   by    "rail   or 


§  55] 


Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce. 


263 


There  is  nothing  in  the  decision  in  The  Daniel  Ball""  that  mili- 
tates against  this  rule.    In  that  case,  the  commerce  was  inter- 


330.    The  Daniel  Ball  v.  United       States,  10  Wall.,  77  U.  S.  557,  1!J 

L.  Ed.  999. 


(29    Cont 
water;"    Revisal    1909,   chap.    114, 
sec.    368.   Indiana:     no     reference 
to     water     carriers;     Acts     1907, 
chap.  241.  sec.  18  loioas  id.;  Laws, 
1907,    chap.    98,    sec.    1.      Kansas: 
id.;    Laws    1911,    chap.    238.    Ken- 
tucky:    id.;    Carroll's    Stat.    1909, 
sec.      821,     et     seq.      .Louisiana: 
"steamboat      and       other      water 
craft;"  Stat.   1906,  No.  36,  sec.  1. 
Maine.     No     reference     to     water 
carriers;       Revised      Stat.      1903, 
chap.      1.       Maryland:       includes 
"steamboat,    powerboat    and    ves- 
sel-boat     and      ferry      companies, 
canal     companies;"     Laws     1910, 
chap.  180,  sec.   1;    Laird  v.   Balti- 
more &  0.  R.  Co.,  121  Md.  193,  88 
Atl.   348.       Massachusetts:      same 
power      over       steamship       com- 
panies   as    railroads;    Acts    1906, 
chap.  4il3,  pt.  1,  sec.  6.  Michigan' 
"wholly  by  rail  or  partly  by  rail 
and  partly  by  water;"  Pub.  Acts 
1909,   No.   300,   sec.  3.  Minnesota: 
id.;    Rev.    Laws    1905,     chap.     28, 
sec.    1953.     Mississij)pi:    no   ment- 
ion  of     water     carriers;      Const., 
Art.  7,  sees.  184,  195;   Laws  1908, 
chap.    82,    sec.     1.    Missoiiri:    id.. 
Acts   1909,   sees.   3189,   3251,   3252. 
Montana:    id.;    Rev.    Codes    1907, 
sees.    4373,    4373.    Nebraska:    id.; 
Stat.  1907,  Sec.  10650  (h). Nevada: 
"wholly  by  rail  or  partly  by  rail 
and     partly     by     water."      New 
Hampshire:    "all    common    carri- 
ers;"       public        utilities,        in- 
cludes   ferry    and    toll     bridges; 
Laws     1909,     chap.     126,     sec.  1; 
Laws      1911,    chap.      164,      sec.    1, 


inued.  ) 

New  Jersey:  canal  compamies; 
Laws  1911,  chap.  195,  sec.  15. 
New  Mexico:  no  mention  of 
water  carriers;  Const.,  Art.  XI 
sec.  7.  Neio  York:  common  car- 
riers; no  specific  mention  of  wa- 
ter carriers;  Laws  1910,  chap. 
480,  sec.  2.  North  Carolina:  all 
common  carriers,  steamboat 
companies  mentioned;  const., 
Art.  VII,  sec.  142;  Pell's  Re- 
visal 1908,  sec.  1094  (2),  1099. 
Ohio:  "wholly  by  rail  or  partly 
by  rail  and  partly  by  water  or 
wholly  by  water;  Code  1910, 
sec.  502;  Laws  ISll,  No.  325,  sec. 
1.  Oklahoma:  "canal,  steamboat 
line;"  Const.,  Art.  IX,  sec.  34. 
Oregon:  "wholly  by  rail  or 
partly  by  rail  and  partly  by  wa- 
ter;" Gen.  Laws  1907,  chap.  53, 
sec.  11.  Pennsylvania:  "by  water 
or  partly  by  railroad  and  partly 
by  water;"  Laws  1907,  No.  250, 
sec.  6.  Rhode  Island:  "stteam- 
boat,  powerboat  and  ferry  com- 
panies;" Acts  1912,  chap.  795. 
sec.  2.  Bouth  Carolina:  "railroad 
companies;"  Gen.  Stat.  1902,  sec. 
2082;  Const,  Art.  IX,  sec.  14. 
Sotth  .Dakota:  no  mention  of 
water  carriers;  Rev.  Pol.  Code 
1903,  sees.  431,  450;  Laws  1911, 
chap.  207,  sees.  1,  et  seq.  Ten- 
nessee: no  mention  of  v^^ater  car- 
riers; Laws  1897,  chap.  10,  sec. 
3;  Acts  1907,  chap.  390.  Tcras: 
id.;  Sayles'  Civ.  Stats.  1897,  Art. 
4562,  et  seq.  Utah:  no  commis- 
sion. Vc7-mont:  no  mention  of 
water    carriers;    Pub.    Stat.    1906, 


284 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  56 


state  and  the  language  of  the  opinion  must  be  construed  with 
reference  to  that  fact,  and  Mr.  Justice  Field,  in  the  course  of 
the  opinion,  was  careful  to  say  that  there  was  an  intrastate 
commerce  over  which  Congress  had  no  control-     He  said :"' 

"There  is  undoubtedly  an  internal  commerce  which  is  sub- 
ject to  the  control  of  the  states.  The  power  delegated  to  Con- 
gress is  limited  to  commerce  'among  the  several  states,'  with 
foreign  nations,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes.  This  limitation 
necessarily  excludes  from  federal  control  all  commerce  not  thus 
designated,  and  of  course  that  commerce  which  is  carried  on 
entirely  within  the  limits  of  a  state,  and  does  not  extend  to  or 
affect  other  states." 

§  56.  Reg'Tilating  Pilotage,  Ports,  Harbors  and  Vessels. — Al- 


3:il.  The  Daniel  Ball  is  cited 
in  the  Minnesota  Rate  Cases 
(Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  S. 
352,  399),  and  the  location  in  the 
opinion  of  the  citation  indicates 
that  the  decision  was  considered 
by  Mr.  Justice  Hughes  as  not 
excluding  intrastate  commerce. 
For  a  further  discussion  of  the 
case  see  sec.  67,  i)ost.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
federal  courts  under  the  consti- 
tutional provision  quoted  in  the 
text  is  not  involved  in  fixing  a 
rate.  As  to  jurisdiction,  see  The 
Belfast.  7  Wall.,  74  U.  S.  624, 
19  L.  Ed.  266;  The  Robert  W. 
Parsons,  191  U.  S.  17,  35,  48  L. 
Ed.   73,   24  Sup.   Ct.   8.    See  as  to 


whether  commerce  is  interstate 
or  intrastate,  citing  The  Daniel 
Ball,  Diamond  Match  Co.  v.  On- 
tonagon, 188  U.  S.  82,  95,  47  L. 
Ed.  394,  23  Sup.  Ct.  266;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  State  of  New 
York  ex  rel.  v.  Knight,  192  U. 
S.  21,  27,  48  L.  Ed.  325,  24  Sup. 
Ct.  202;  and  Wilmington  Transp. 
Co.  V.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Cal.,  236 
U.  S.  151,  59  L.  Ed.  508,  35  Sup. 
Ct.  276.  An  ordinance  fixing  a 
rate  of  speed  for  boats  in  the 
Chicago  river,  was  held  not  to 
interfere  with  the  rights  of  nav- 
igation or  with  interstate  com- 
merce, Canada  Atlantic  Transit 
Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  210  Fed. 
7.  125   C.  C.   A.   587. 


(29    C 

sec.  4602.  Virginia:  "canal, 
steamboat  or  steamship  line;" 
Const.,  sec.  153.  Wasliington: 
"steamboat  companies;"  Laws 
1911,  chap.  117,  sec.  8.  West 
Virginia:  no  commission.  Wis- 
consin: "wholly  by  rail  or  partly 
by  rail  and  partly  by  water;" 
Laws  1905,  chap.  362,  sec.  2; 
Amended    Laws    1907,    chap.    582. 


ontinued.  ) 
Wyoming:  no  commission.  The 
foregoing  references  to  state 
laws  relating  to  regulation  of 
common  carriers  are  inserted  to 
show  where  specific  statements 
are  made  giving  power  to  regu- 
late water  carriers.  The  full  ex- 
tent of  the  power  to  regulate  is 
not  attemped  to  be  set  forth. 


§  56]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commeece.  265 

though  state  laws  concerning  pilotage  are  regulations  of  com- 
merce, such  laws  fall  within  that  class  of  powers  which  may  be 
exercised  by  the  states  until  Congress  shall  see  fit  to  act. 

The  first  act  of  Congress  on  the  subject  left  this  right  in  the 
states  and,  although  there  have  been  other  acts  of  Congress  re- 
lating to  pilots,  there  is  yet  power  in  the  states  to  make  regu- 
lations concerning  pilots  in  their  domestic  ports. 

A  law  of  California  requiring  certain  vessels  entering  and 
departing  from  her  ports  to  take  on  a  resident  bar  pilot  was 
held  valid  by  the  Supreme  Court  for  the  reason  that  the  law 
did  not  conflict  with  any  federal  statute  or  regulation,  al- 
though the  federal  power  to  regulate  was  stated  to  be  "un- 
questioned." "^" 

A  Louisiana  statute  prohibiting  other  than  a  duly  licensed 
pilot  from  piloting  vessels  on  the  Mississippi  river  within  the 
borders  of  the  state  was  held  to  be  a  valid  law.'"'^ 

While  states  may  establish  harbor  lines  on  navigable  waters, 
such  lines  have  no  permanent  force  as  against  the  will  of  Con- 
gress and,  therefore,  Congressional  action  supersedes  prior 
state  action.''''* 

A  law  of  the  state  of  Alabama  requiring  the  owners  of  steam- 
boats navigating  the  waters  of  the  state  to  file  with  a  state  officei- 
certain  information  relating  to  the  ownership  of  the  boat  and 
residence  of  the  owners  was  held  void,  in  so  far  as  the  law  was 
brcught  to  bear  upon  a  vessel  engaged  in  interstate  commerce 
and  licensed  and  enrolled  under  the  Act  of  Congress  for  eon- 
ducting  the  coasting  trade. "'^  In  this  case,  Mr.  Justice  Nelson 
stated  the  applicable  principle  as  follows: 

332.     Anderson   v.    Pacific   C.    S.  17.5,    53    L.    Ed.    956,    29    Sup.    Ct. 

Co.,    225    U.    S.     187,    56     L.    Ed.  552. 

1047,   32    Sup.   Cf.    526,   citing   au-  334.     Pliiladelpliia    Co.    v.    Stim- 

thorities,    stating   and    giving   the  son.  Secy,  of  War,  223  U.  S.  605, 

history    of    the    federal    laws    on  56  L.  Ed.  570,  32  Sup.  Ct.  340. 

the    subject.      See   also    Cooley    v.  335.     Sinnot    v.    Davenport,    22 

Board     of     Wardens,      12      How.,  How.,    63    U.    S.    227,    16    L.    Ed. 

53  U.  S.  299,   13  L.  Ed.   996.    The  243;      Foster     v.     Davenport,     22 

Queen,    206    Fed.    148,    124    C.    C.  How.,    63    U.    S.    244,    16    L.    Ed. 

A.   214,     reversing     same     styled  248.    For    further     statement     of 

case,   184  Fed.   537.  the      principle      controlling      the 

33c..    State    v.    Leech,    119    La.  questions    discussed    in    the    text 

522,  44  So.  285,  129  Am.  St.  Rep.  and  for     citation     of     authorities 

336;   Leech  v.  Louisana,  2T4  U.  S.  see,  'Simpson   v.    Shepard,   230   U. 


2(J6  State  Regulation  of  Carrie.rs.  [§  50 

"The  whole  commercial  marine  of  the  country  is  placed  by 
the  Constitution  under  the  regulation  of  Congress,  and  all  laws 
passed  by  that  l)od.y  in  the  regulation  of  navigation  and  trade, 
whether  foreign  or  coastwise,  are  therefore  but  the  exercise  of 
an  undisputed  poAver.  When,  therefore,  an  act  of  the  Legisla- 
tiu'e  of  a  state  prescribes  a  regulation  of  the  subject  repugnant 
to  and  inconsistent  with  the  regulation  of  Congress,  the  state 
law  must  give  way ;  and  this,  without  regard  to  the  source  of 
power  whence  the  state  Legislature  derived  its  enactment. 

"This  paramount  authority  of  the  act  of  Congress  is  not  only 
conferred  by  the  Constitution  itself,  but  is  the  logical  result  of 
the  power  over  the  subject  conferred  upon  that  body  by  the 
states.  They  surrender  this  power  to  the  General  Govern- 
ment ;  and  to  the  extent  of  the  fair  exercise  of  it  by  Congress, 
the  act  must  be  supreme. 

"The  power  of  Congress,  however,  over  the  subject  does 
not  extend  further  than  the  regulation  of  commerce  Avitt 
foreign  nations  and  among  the  several  states.  Beyond  these 
limits  the  states  have  not  surrendered  their  power  over  the 
subject,  and  may  exercise  it  independently  of  any  control 
or  interference  of  the  General  Government." 

Wharfage  charges  and  tolls  for  the  use  of  artificial  facilities 
may  be  exacted  "where  Congress  has  not  acted,"  although 
the  payment  is  required  of  those  engaged  in  interstate  or  for- 
eign commerce ;"'"'  and  states  may  by  statute  give  a  lien  upon  all 
vessels,  whether  domestic  or  foreign  and  whether  engaged  in 
interstate  or  intrastate  commerce,  for  injuries  committed  to 
persons  and  property  within  the  state,  and  the  statute  may 

S.    352,    403.    57    L.    Ed.    1511,    33  Ed.    377:    Cincinnati,    etc.,    Packet 

Sup.    Ct.    729;     and    holding    that  Co.  v.  Cattletsburg,  ins  U.  S.  559, 

tugs    used    in    lightering    vessels  26    L.    Ed.    1169;    Parkersburg    & 

engaged   in    interstate    commerce  O.   R.   T.  Co.   v.  Parkersburg,   107 

were     themselves      instrumentali-  U.   S.   691,   27   L.  Ed.   584,   2   Sup. 

ties    of    interstate    commerce,    see  Ct.    732;    Huse   v.    Glover,    119    U. 

United     States     v.     Great     Lakes  S.  543,  30  L.  Ed.  487,  7   Sup.  Ct. 

Towing    Co.,    208    Fed.    733,    217  313;      Ouachita     Packet     Co.      v. 

Fed.  657.  Aiken,    121    U.    S.    444,   30    L.    Ed. 

336.     Simpson    v.    Shepard,    230  976,    7    Sup.    Ct.    907;     Sands    v. 

U.    S.    352,.  405,    57    L.    Ed.    1511,  Manistee  River  Improvement  Co., 

33   Sup.  Ct.    729;    Keokuk    Packet  123  U.  S.  288,  295,  31  L.  Ed.  149, 

Co.  V.  Keokuk,  95  U.  S.  80,  24  L.  8  Sup.  Ct.  113. 


§  57]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  267 

provide  that  for  non-maritime  torts,  relief  may  be  had  in  the 
state  courts/" 

§  57.  Boards  of  Trade  and  Exchanges. — A  statute  of  the 
state  of  Missouri  provided  among  other  things  that  it  should 
be  "unlawful  for  any  corporation,  association,  copartnership 
or  person  to  keep,  or  cause  to  bte  kept,  in  this  state,  any  office, 
store  or  other  place  wherein  is  permitted  the  buying  or  selling 
the  shares  of  stocks  or  bonds  of  any  corporation  or  petroleum, 
cotton,  grain,  provisions  or  other  commodities,  either  on 
margins  or  otherwise,  where  the  same  is  not  at  the  time  ac- 
tually paid  for  and  delivered,  without  at  the  time  of  the  sale 
the  seller  shall  cause  to  be  made  a  complete  record  of  the 
thing  sold,  tlie  purchaser  and  the  time  of  delivery  in  a  book 
kept  for  that  purpose;  and  at  the  time  the  seller  shall  deliver 
to  the  purchaser  a  written  or  printed  memorandum  of  said 
sale,  on  which  he  shall  place,  or  cause  to  be  placed,  a  stamp  of 
the  value  of  twenty-five  cents."  It  was  urged  that  this  law 
was  invalid  because  it  atfected  sales  of  grain,  provisions  and 
other  commodities  which  were  at  the  time  of  sale  in  the 
course  of  transportation  in  interstate  commerce.  The  Su- 
preme Court  held  that  the  statute  related  to  the  place  of 
sale  and  did  not  interfere  with  interstate  commerce/''* 

§  58.  Inspection — Quarantine,  Game,  Food,  Liquor  and  Lot- 
tery Laws. — "State  inspection  laws  and  statutes  designed  to 
safeguard  the  inhabitants  of  a  state  from  fraud  and  imposi- 
tion are  valid  when  reasonable  in  their  requirements  and  not 
in  conflict  with  federal  statutes,  although  they  may  aflPect 
interstate  commerce  in  their  relation  to  articles  prepared  for 
export  or  by  including  incidentally  those  brought  into  the 
state  and  held  for  sale  in  the  original  imported  packages."  ^^' 

337.  Martin  v.  Mest,  222  U.  S.  nax,  228  Mo.  22.5,  128  S.  W.  177, 
191,  56  L.  Ed.  159,  32  Sup.  Ct.  137  Am.  St.  Rep.  613.  See  also 
42,  36  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  592;  Hatch  v.  Reardon,  204  U.  S.  152, 
Johnson  v.  Chicago  &  P.  Elevator  51  L.  Ed.  415,  27  Sup.  Ct.  188, 
Co.,  119  U.  S.  388,  400,  30  L.  Ed.  and  House  v.  Mayes,  219  U.  S. 
447,  7  Sup.  Ct.  509;  Davis  v.  Clev-  270,  55  L.  Ed.  213,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
land,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  217  234. 

U.  S.  157,   179,   54  L.  Ed.   708,   30  a39.     Simpson    v.    Shepard.    230 

Sup.  Ct.  463.  U.    S.    352,    408,    57    L.    Ed.    1511, 

338.  Brodnax  v.  Missouri,  219  33  Sup.  Ct.  729,  744;  Red  "C"  Oil 
U.  S.  285,  55  L.  Ed.  219,  31  Sup.  Co.  v.  North  Carolina,  222  U.  S. 
Ct.   238,   affirming   State  v.   Brod-  380,    56   L.    Ed.   240,    32    Sup.    Ct. 


2b"8 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  58 


"And  for  the  protection  of  its  game  and  the  preservation  of  a 
valuable  food  supply,  the  state  may  penalize  the  possession  of 
game  during  the  closed  season  whether  obtained  within  the 
state  or  brought  from  abroad."''" 

Statutes  of  this  nature,  however,  must  not  directly  affect 
interstate  commerce  and  must  not.  under  the  guise  of  an 
inspection  fee,  be  a  tax  on  such  commerce. ^*^ 

The  subject  affects  only  incidentally  the  questions  discussed 
in  this  chaptcT",  and  it  is  not  within  the  purview  of  this  book 
to  treat  of  the  subject  of  interstate  commerce  except  as  affect- 
ing carriers.  Food  and  liquors  are  commodities,  and  it  has 
been  held  that  a  lottery  ticket  is  a  commodity  in  such  a  sense 
that  its  transportation  is  commerce.  In  a  note  are  given 
decisions  which  illustrate  the  holding  of  the  courts  showing 
the  extent  of  the  police  power  of  the  states.''" 


152,  affirming  Red  "C"  Oil  Co. 
V.  Board  of  Agriculture,  172  Fed. 
695;  Patapsco  Guano  Co.  v. 
North  Carolina,  171  U.  S.  345,  43 
L.  Ed.  191,  18  Sup.  Ct.  862. 

340.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230 
U.  S.  352,  408,  57  L.  Ed.  1511, 
33  Sup.  Ct.  724,  744;  Silz  v.  Hes- 
terberg,  211  U.  S.  31,  53  L.  Ed. 
75,  29  Sup.  Ct.  10;  Geer  v.  Con- 
necticut, 161  U.  S.  519,  40  L.  Ed. 
793,  16  Sup.  Ct.  600;  Man- 
facturers'  Gas  &  Oil  Co.  v.  Indi- 
ana Natural  Gas  &  Oil  Co.,  155 
Ind.  547,  58  N.  E.  706,  53  L.  R. 
A.  135;  Adams  v.  Mississippi 
Lumber  Co.,  84  Miss.  29,  36  So. 
68;  Re  Deininger,  108  Fed.  623; 
McDonald  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co., 
134  Fed.  284;  State  v.  Mallory, 
73  Ark.  249,  83  S.  W.  955,  67  L. 
R.  A.  778;  State  v.  Harbourne, 
70  Conn.  492;  40  Atl.  179,  66 
Am.  St.  Rep.  126,  40  L.  R.  A. 
610;  Westheimer  v.  Weisman,  8 
Kan.  App.  78,  54  Pac.  332; 
People  V.  O'Neill  110  Mich.  328,  88 
W.  227,  .-^3  L.  R.  A.  697;  Selkirk 
V.  Stephens,  72  Minn.  336,  75  N. 
W.    386,    40    L.   R.    A.    760;    Ames 


V.  Kirby,  71  N.  J.  L.  446,  59  Atl. 
558;  People  v.  A  Booth  &  Co., 
42  Misc.  327,  86  N.  Y.  Supp. 
272;  People  v.  Buffalo  Fish  Co., 
164  N.  Y.  105,  58  N.  E.  34,  79 
Am.  St.  Rep.  622,  52  L.  R.  A. 
807;  People  v.  Bootman,  180  N. 
Y.   9,   72   N.   E.   505. 

341.  Note  291  supra;  Savage 
V.  Jones,  225  U.  S.  501,  56  L. 
Ed.  1182,  32  Sup.  Ct.  715;  Mc- 
Lean V.  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co., 
20.^  U.  S.  38  51  L.  Ed.  78,  27 
Sup.  Ct.  1:  New  Mexico  v.  Den- 
ver &  R.  G.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  M. 
425,    78    Pac.    74. 

342.  Quarantine  Laios:  Reid 
V.  Colorado,  187  U.  S.  138,  47  L. 
Ed.  108,  23  Sup.  Ct.  92;  Asbell 
V.  Kansas,  209  U.  S.  251,  52  L. 
Ed.  778,  28  Sup.  Ct.  485,  14 
Ana.  Cas.  1101;  United  States 
V.  Baltimore  &  0.  S.  W.  R.  Co., 
222  U.  S.  8,  56  L.  Ed.  68,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  6;  Minnesota  v.  Barber, 
136  U.  S.  3-13,  34  L.  Ed.  455,  10 
Sup.  Ct.  862;  Simpson  v.  Shep- 
ard, 230  U.  S.  352,  406,  57  L. 
Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  729;  Moi^ 
gan's  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Louisiana,   118 


>§,  59]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  269 

§  59.  Taxation,  Including  License  Taxes. — The  states  may 


U.  S.  455,  30  L.  Ed.  237,  G  Sup. 
Ct.  1114;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Haber,  169  U.  S.  613,  42 
U  Ed.  878,  18  Sup.  Ct.  488; 
Louisiana  v.  Texas,  176  U.  S.  1, 
44  L.  Ed.  347,  20  Sup.  Ct.  251; 
Rasmussen  v.  Idaho,  181  U.  S. 
198,  45  L.  Ed.  820,  21  Sup.  Ct. 
594;  Compagnie  Francaise,  etc. 
V.  Board  of  Health,  186  U.  S. 
380,  46  L.  Ed.  1209,  22  Sup.  Ct. 
811;  Midland  Valley  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  35  Okla.  672,  130  Pac.  803. 
Such  laws,  however,  can  not  be 
made  a  cover  for  discriminat- 
ions and  arbitary  en;ictments 
having  no  reasonable  relation  to 
health,  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co. 
V.  Husen,  95  U.  S.  465,  472, 
473,  24  L.  Ed.  521.  Pure  Food- 
McDermott  v.  Wisconsin,  228 
U.  S.  115,  57  L.  Ed.  754,  33 
Sup.  Ct.  431,  reversing  same 
case,  143  Wis.  18,  126  Mo.  888, 
21  Am.  Cas.  1315;  Texas  &  P. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Abilene  Cot  Oil.  Co., 
204  U.  S.  426,  51  L.  Ed.  553,  27 
Sup.  Ct.  350,  9  Am.  Cas.  1075; 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wash- 
ington, 222  U.  S.  370,  56  L.  Ed. 
237,  32  Sup.  Ct.  160;  Southern 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Reid,  222  U.  S.  424, 
56  L.  Ed.  257,  32  Sup.  Ct.  140; 
Second  Employers'  Liability  cases, 
Mondou  V.  N.  Y.  N.  H.  & 
H.  R.  Co.,  223  U.  S.  1,  56  L.  Ed. 
327,  32  Sup.  Ct.  169,  38  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  44;  Savage  v.  Jones, 
225  U.  S.  501,  56  L.  Ed.  1182,  32 
Sup.  Ct.  715;  Hipolite  Egg  Co. 
V.  United  States,  220  U.  S.  45, 
55  L.  Ed.  364,  31  Sup.  Ct.  364. 
construing  federal  statute.  Laws 
of  Congress  supreme,  Sligh  v. 
Kirkwood,  237  U.  S.  52,  59  L. 
Ed.    835,    35    Sup.    Ct.    501.    False 


statements  of  the  curative 
effects  of  a  drug  violates  Feder- 
al Pure  Food  Laws.  United 
States  V.  Six  Cases,  239  U.  S. 
510,  60  L.  Ed.  4li,  36  Sup.  Ct. 
190.  So  of  a  food.  Weeks  v. 
United  States,  245  U.  S.  618,  62 
L.  Ed.  513,  38  Sij.  Cit.  219. 
Federal  Law  Supreme,  Crescent 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilson.  233  Fed.  282. 
packages  imported  to  state  in 
interstate  or  foreign  commerce 
not  subject  to  prohibitory  laws 
of  state,  Leisy  v.  Hardin,  135  U. 
S.  100,  34  L.  Ed.  128,  10  Sup.  Ct. 
681.  See  application  of  princi- 
ple, Bowmjan  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
W.  R.  Co.,  125  U.  S.  465,  31  L. 
Ed.  700,  8  Sup.  Ct.  689;  Rhodes 
V.  Iowa,  170  U.  S.  412,  42  L.  Ed. 
1088,  18  Sup.  Ct.  664;  Vance  v. 
Vandercook  Co.,  170  U.  S.  438, 
42  L.  Ed.  1100,  18  Sup.  Ct.  674; 
Scott  V.  Donald,  165  U.  S.  58,  95 
41  L.  Ed.  632,  17  Sup.  Ct.  265; 
May  V.  New  Orleans,  178  U.  S. 
496,  44  L.  Ed.  1165,  20  Sup.  Ct. 
976;  Austin  v.  Tennessee,  179  U. 
S.  343,  45  L.  Ed.  224,  21  Sup.  Ct. 
132;  American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Iowa, 
196  U.  S.  133,  49  L.  Ed.  417,  25 
Sup.  Ct.  182;  Cook  V.  Marshall 
County,  Iowa,  196  U.  S.  261,  49 
L.  Ed.  471,  25  Sup.  Ct.  233; 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  Crenshaw, 
198  U.  S.  17,  49  L.  Ed.  925,  25 
Sup.  Ct.  552;  Heyman  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  203  U.  S.  270,  51  L. 
Ed.  178,  27  Sup.  Ct.  104;  Rearick 
V.  Pennsylvania,  203  U.  S.  507, 
51  L.  Ed.  295,  27  Sup.  Ct.  159; 
Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Kentucky, 
206  U.  S.  129,  51  L.  Ed.  987,  27 
Sup.  Ct.  606;  Adams  Exp.  Co. 
V.  Kentucky,  214  U.  S.  218,  53  L. 
Ed.    972,    29     Sup.    Ct.     633,    con- 


270 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  59 


not  burden  interstate  commerce  by  taxing  the  business  nor 


struing  Wilson  Act  of  Aug.  8, 
1890,  chap.  728,  26  Stat.  313;  Ex 
Parte  Oklahoma,  220  U.  S.  191, 
55  L.  Ed.  431^  31  Sup.  Ct.  426, 
dispensary  law.  Louisville  &  N. 
R.  Co.  V.  Cook  Brewing  Co.,  223 
U.  S.  70,  56  L.  Ed.  355,  32  Sup. 
Ct.  189  affirming  same  case,  172 
Fed.  117,  96  C.  C.  A.  322,  40  L. 
R.  A.  798,  and  holding  that  a 
railroad  will  be  enjoined  from 
refusing  beer  for  shipment  in 
interstate         commerce,  even 

though  the  shipment  is  to  a  pro- 
hibition district.  Purity  Extract 
Co.  V.  Lynch,  226  U.  S.  192,  57 
L.  Ed.  84,  33  Sup.  Ct.  44,  dis- 
cussing effect  of  Wilson  Act  and 
affirming  Purity  Extract  Co.  v. 
Lynch,  100  Miss.  650,  56  So.  316. 
De  Bary  v.  Louisiana,  227  U.  S. 
108,  57  L.  Ed.  441,  33  Sup.  Ct. 
739.  affirming  State  v.  Fredrick 
De  Bary  &  Co.,  130  La.  1090,  58 
So.  892;  McDermott  v.  Wiscon- 
sin, 228  U.  S.  115,  134,  57  L.  Ed. 
754,  33  Sup.  Ct.  431,  discussing 
the  meaning  of  'original  pack- 
age," and  reversing  McDermott 
V.  State,  143  Wis.  18,  126  N.  W. 
888;  State  v.  Intoxicating  Liqu- 
ors, 104  Me.  502,  71  Atl.  758; 
State  v.  18  Casks  of  beer,  24 
Okla.  786,  104  Pac.  1093;  Ameri- 
can Exp.  Co.  V.  Miller,  104  Miss. 
247,  61  So.  306,  45  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  120;  Crescent  Brewing  Co. 
V.  Oregon  S.  L.  R.  Co.,  24  Idaho 
106,  132  Pac.  975;  Kirkpatrick 
V.  State,  138  Ga.  794,  76  S.  E. 
53;  State  v.  Miller,  66  W.  Va. 
436,  66  S.  E.  522.  By  Act  of  Con- 
gress passed  over  the  Presi- 
dent's veto  by  the  Senate  Feb- 
ruary 28,  1913,  and  by  the  House 
March  1,  1913,  known  as  the 
Webb-Kenyon     Act.     it    was    en- 


acted,— "That  The  shipment  or 
transportation,  in  any  manner 
or  by  any  means  whatsover,  of 
any  spirituous,  vinous,  malted, 
fermented,  or  other  intoxicating 
liquor  of  any  kind,  from  one 
state,  territory,  or  district  of  the 
United  States,  or  place  noncon- 
tiguous to  but  subject  to  the  ju- 
risdiction thereof,  into  any  other 
state,  territory,  or  district  of  the 
United  States,  or  place  noncon- 
tiguous to  but  subject  to  the  ju- 
risdiction thereof,  which  said 
spirituous,  vinous,  malted,  fer- 
mented, or  other  intoxicating 
liquors  is  intended,  by  any  per- 
son interested  therein,  to  be  re- 
ceived, possessed,  sold,  or  in  any 
manner  used,  either  in  the  orig- 
inal package  or  otherwise,  in 
violation  of  any  law  of  such 
state,  territory,  or  district  of  the 
United  States,  or  place  noncon- 
tiguous to  but  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  thereof,  is  hereby 
prohibited."  Appendix  N.  post. 
For  discussion  or  this  Act  see 
Atkinson  v.  Southern  Exp.  Co., 
94  S.  C.  444,  78  S.  E.  516,  48  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  349;  Atkinson  v. 
Southern  Exp.  Co.,  94  S.  C.  457, 
78  S.  E.  520;  Adams  Exp.  Co.  v. 
Commonwealth,  154  Ky.  462,  157 
S.  W.  908,  48  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
342;  State  v.  Grier,  88  Atl.  579; 
United  States  v.  Oregon  &  W. 
R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  210  Fed.  378. 
War  time  prohibition  valid.  Hamil- 
ton V.  Kentucky  Distilleries  and 
Warehouse  co.,  251  U.  S.  — ,  64 
L.  Ed.  — :  40  Sup  Ct.  — .  Trans- 
portation by  automobile  violates 
Reed  Amendment.  United  States 
V.  Simpson  252  U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed. 
— ,  40   Sup.  Ct.  — . 


§  59] 


Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce. 


271 


by  taxing  the  receipts  of  such  commerce.'"  But  the  fact 
that  a  corporation  is  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  does  not 
exempt  its  property  located  in  a  state  from  taxation  by  the 
state."''     "It  is  the  commerce  itself  which  must  not  be  bur- 


Lotteries:  Carriage  of  Lottery 
tickets  by  a  common  carrier  in 
interstate  commerce  may  be 
prohibited  by  Congress,  Lottery 
case,  Cliampion  v.  A-oies,  188 
U.  S.  321,  47  L.  Ed.  492,  23 
Sup.  Ct.  321.  See  also,  Francis 
V.  United  States,  188  U.  S.  375, 
47  L.  Ed.  510,  23  Sup.  Ct.  334; 
Northern  Securities  Co.  v. 
United  States,  193  U.  S.  197,  48 
L.  Ed.  679,  24  Sup.  Ct.  436; 
United  States  v.  Northern  Se- 
Galley    59.      26367.  Templeton 

curities  Co.,  120  Fed.  721; 
United  States  v.  Whelpley,  125 
Fed.  617;  State  v.  Lowry  (Ind.), 
166  Ind.  372,  77  N.  E.  728,  4  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  532;  People  v.  A, 
Booth  &  Co..  42  Misc.  331,  86 
N.  Y.  Supp.  272;  Re  Gregory, 
219  U.  S.  210,  55  L.  Ed.  184,  31 
Sup.  Ct.  143.  For  a  discussion 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
principles  of  the  text  and  citing 
authorities,  see  Sligh  v.  Kirk- 
wood,  237  U.  S.  52,  59  L.  Ed.  835, 
35  Sup.  Ct.  501.  Blue  Kktj  Law 
held  invalid.  Alabama  &  N.  O. 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Doyle,  210  Fed. 
173;  Compton  v.  Allen,  216  Fed. 
537;  citing  cases.  State  Blue  Sky 
Laws  valid  prior  to  Congress- 
ional action.  Merrick  v.  Halsey 
&  Co.  242  U.  S.  568,  61  L.  Ed. 
498,  37  Sup.  Ct.  227;  Hall  v. 
Gelger-Jones  Co.,  242  U.  S.  539,  61 
L.  Ed.  480,  37  Sup.  Ct.  217;  Cald- 
well V.  Siouz  Falls  Stock  Yards 
Co.,  242  U.  S.  559,  61  L.  Ed.  493, 
37  Sup.  Ct.  224.  Inspection 
Laws.  Oyster  inspection  law 
held    invalid    as    an    interference 


with  interstate  commerce.  Foote 
V.  Stanley,  232  U.  S.  494,  58  L. 
Ed.  698,  34  Sup.  Ct.  377;  pedd- 
ler's license  law  invalid,  Stewart 
V.  Michigan,  232  U.  S.  665,  58  L. 
Ed.  786,  34  Sup.  Ct.  47B.  An  ad- 
ditional tax  on  sales  where  pro- 
fit sharing  coupons  are  given 
is  valid.  Rast  v.  Van  Deman  & 
Lewis  Company,  240  U.  S.  342, 
60  L.  Ed.  679,  36  Sup.  Ct.  370. 
Migratory  Bird  Law.  State  stat- 
ute not  in  conflict  with  Federal 
statutes.  Carey'  v.  South  Dakota, 
250  U.  S.  — ,  63  L.  Ed.  — ,  39 
Sup.  Ct.  — .  Federal  statute  in- 
valid, United  States  v.  McCul- 
lagh,    221    Fed.    288. 

343..  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Texas,  210  U.  S.  217,  52 
L.  Ed.  1031,  28  Sup.  Ct.  638; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Kan- 
sas, 216  U.  S.  1,  54  L.  Ed.  355, 
30  Sup.  Ct.  190;  Pullman  Co.  v. 
Kansas,  216  U.  S.  56,  54  L.  Ed. 
378,  30  Sup.  Ct.  282;  Minnesota 
Rate  Cases,  230  U.  S.  352,  400, 
57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  729, 
and   previous   cases   therein   cited 

344.  United  States  Express 
Co.  V.  Minnesota,  223  U.  S.  335, 
56  L.  Ed.  459,  32  Sup.  Ct.  211; 
Kansas  City  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stiles,  242  U.  S.  Ill,  61  L.  Ed. 
176,  37  Sup.  Ct.  58;  Internation- 
al Paper  Company  v.  Massa- 
chussets,  246  U.  S.  13.5,  62  L. 
Ed.  624,  38  Sup.  Ct.  292;  Cheney 
Bros.  Co.  V.  Massachusetts,  246 
U.  S.  147,  62  L.  Ed.  632,  38  Sup. 
Ct.  295;  Locomobile  Co.  v.  Mas- 
sachusetts, 246  U.  S.  146,  62  L. 
Ed.    631,   38    Sup.    Ct.    298. 


:i/_; 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers.  [§  CO 


dened  by  state  exactions  which  interfere  with  the  exclusive 
federal  authority  over  it.  A  resort  to  the  receipts  of  property 
or  capital  employed  in  part  at  least  in  interstate  commerce, 
when  such  receipts  or  capital  are  not  taxed  as  such  but  are 
taken  as  a  mere  measure  of  a  tax  of  lawful  authority  within 
the  state,  has  been  sustained."  ^'^ 

States  may  not  regulate  interstate  commerce,  nor  may  they 
prohibit  such  commerce.  They  can,  suljjject  to  this  limitation, 
prohibit  a  foreign  corporation  from  doing  business  in  the 
state,  although  a  state  "may  not  fiay  to  a  foreign  corporation, 
you  may  do  business  within  our  borders  if  you  permit  your 
property  to  be  taken  without  due  process  of  law,  or  you  may 
transact  business  in  intrastate  commerce  subject  to  the  regula- 
tory power  of  the  state.  To  allow  a  state  to  exercise  such 
authority  would  permit  it  to  deprive  of  fundamental  rights 
those  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  Constitution  in  every 
part  of  the  Union." 

These  general  principles  are  stated  and  eases  cited  by  Mr. 
Justice  Day  in  Baltic  Mining  Co.  v.  Massachusetts,  note  343, 
supra. 

Charging  a  license  fee  to  automobiles  using  the  roads  of 
a  state  is  analogous  to  levying  a  tax,  and  in  the  absence  of 
Congres-sional  action  it  is  legal  to  charge  such  fee  even  as  to 
automobiles  moving  in  interstate  commerce.""' 

§  60.  Procedure  to  Test  the  Validity  of  State  Regulations, 

— Neither  the   act   of  a   state  legislature   nor   the   order   of  a 

345.     Baltic      Mining      Co.        v.  Stone-Tracy    Co..    220    U.    S.    107, 

Massachusetts,    231    U.    S.    68,    83,  162-5,   55   L.    Ed.   389,   31    Sup   Ct. 

58    L.    Ed.    127,    34    Sup.    Ct.    15,  3.42;    United    States    Exp.    Co.    v. 

affirming     Baltic    Mining    Co.     v.  Minnesota,    233    U.    S.    335,    56    L. 

Commonwealth,     207     Mass.     381,  Ed.  459,  32  Sup.  Ct.  211.    See  also 

93    N.    E.    831,   Am.    Cas.    1913    C.  Ohio   R.    &   W.    R.    Co.    v.    Dittey, 

805;     S.    S.    White    Dental    Mnfg.  232   U.    S.   576,    58  L.   Ed.   737,   34 

Co.   V.   Commonwealth,   212   Mass.  Sup.     Ct.      372,     affirming     same 

25,      98      N.      E.      1056,    28    Am.  styled  case,  203  Fed.  537.  Armour 

&    E.    Ann.    Cas.    805;     Maine    v.  &  Company  v.  Virginia,  246  U.  S. 

Grand   Trunk  Ry.   Co.,   142   U.   S.  1.  62  L.  Ed.  547,  38  Sup.  Ct.  267. 

217,    35    L.    Ed.    994,    12    Sup.    Ct.  346.     See    Sec.    58,    supra,    and 

121;      Provident      Institution      v.  notes,  and  Hendrick  v.  Maryland, 

Massachusetts,     6     Wall.,     73      U.  235   U.   S.   610,   59  L.   Ed.   385,   35 

S.    632,    18    L.    Ed.    904;    Flint   v.  Sup.     Ct.     140    and     cases     cited; 


§  60]  Engaged,  in  Interstate  Commerce.  273 

state  administrative  body  ean  be  final  and  conclusive  as  to 
what  are  equal  and  reasonable  charges,  rules  and  regulations. 
The  carrier  is  entitled  to  have  a  judicial  hearing  as  to  the 
reasonableness  of  such  rates,  rules  and  regulations.""  Making 
rates  and  prescribing  regulations  for  the  government  of  car- 
riers for  the  future  is,  however,  a  legislative  act/"  and  courts 
may  not  set  aside  such  rates  or  regulations  unless  they  violate 
the   constitutional  rights  of  the  carrier."*" 

When  it  is  sought  to  avoid  a  rate  or  other  requirement  made 
by  a  state  or  under  its  authority,  in  the  absence  of  a  pre- 
scribed uiethod  of  procedure,  the  carrier  affected  may  resort 
to  a  court  of  equity  and  ask  for  appropriate  relief.  The 
court  resorted  to  may  be  a  state  court,  or  when  diverse  citi- 
zenship exists  or  a  Federal  question  is  involved,  the  United 
States  District  Court.  On  this  subject,  Mr.  Justice  Field 
said:'''" 

"Nor  can  it  be  said  in  such  a  case  that  relief  is  obtainable 
only  in  the  courts  of  the  state.  For  it  may  be  laid  down  as 
a  general  proposition  that,  wheuever  a  citizen  of  a  state  can 
go  into  the  courts  of  a  state  to  defend  his  property  against 
the  illegal  acts  of  its  officers,  a  citizen  of  another  state  may 
invoke  the  jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  to  maintain  a 
like  defense.  A  state  cannot  tie  up  a  citizen  of  another  state, 
having  propertj^  rights  within  its  territory  invaded  by  un- 
authorized acts  of  its  own  officers,  to  suits  for  redress  in  its 
own  courts.  Given  a  case  where  a  suit  can  be  maintained  in 
the  courts  of  the  state  to  protect  property  rights,  a  citizen 
of  another  state  may  invoke  the  jurisdiction  of  the  federal 
courts." 

If  resort  be  had  to  a  District  Court  of  the  United  States. 
and  application  for  an  interlocutory  injunction  is  presented, 
the  hearing  must  be  had  before  three  Judges  "of  whom  at 

Kane    v.    New    Jersey,    242    U.    S.  349.    Sec.  47,  supra:  Trenton  & 

160,  61  L.  Ed.  222,  37  Sup.  Ct.  30.  M.  C.  Traction  Co.  v.  New  Jersey 

347.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Public  Utility  Comr's.,  229  Fed. 
Co.  V.  Minnesota,  134  U.  S.  418,  140;  Ann  Arbor  R.  Co.  v.  Fel- 
33    L.    Ed.    970,    10    Sup.    Ct.    462.  lows,   236    Fed.   387. 

348.  Prentis  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  350.  Reagan  v.  Farmers  L.  & 
R.  Co.,  211  U.  S.  210,  53  L.  Ed.  T.  Co.,  154  U.  S.  362,  391,  38 
150,   29    Sup.    Ct    67.  L.    Ed.    1014,    14    Sup.    Ct.    1047: 


274 


State  Regulation  of  Carriers. 


[§  GC) 


least  one  shcill  be  a  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  or  a  Cir- 
cuit Judge,"  and  a  direct  appeal  may  be  taken  to  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  from  an  order  granting  or 
denying  after  notice  and  hearing  an  interlocutory  injuuc- 
tion>=^^ 

A  state  otificer  Avhose  duty  it  is  to  enforce  the  statute  or 
administrative  regulation  claimed  to  be  invalid,  is  a  proper 
party  to  a  proceeding  for  injunction,^^^ 

Some  states  provide  for  a  review  of  the  action  of  their 
Commissions,  and  when  there  is  such  provision  a  suit  for 
injunction  should  not  be  commenced  until  the  rate  or  regula- 
tion has  been  fixed  by  the  body  having  the  last  word/" 

Suit  may  be  filed  by  the  states  for  penalties  or  mandamus 
may  be  brought  to  compel  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the 
state  regulating  body.""  To  such  suits  defense  may  be  made 
and,  where  a  right  claimed  under  the  Constitution  or  laws 
of  the  United  States  is  denied,  "and  the  decision  is  against 
the  title,  right,  privilege  or  immunity  especially  set  up  or 
claimed,"  ultimate  appeal  may  be  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States/" 


Piatt  V.  Lecocq,  158  Fed.  723,  85 
C.  C.  A.  621,  where  Judge  San- 
born says:  "  Rights  created  and 
remedies  provided  by  the  ^stat- 
utes  of  a  state  to  be  pursued  in 
the  state  courts  jnay  be  enforced 
and  administered  in  tlie  national 
courts,  either  at  law  or  in  equity 
as  the  nature  of  the  rights  and 
remedies  may  require.  "A  party 
by  going  into  a  national  court 
does  not  lose  any  right  or  ap- 
propriate remedy  of  which  he 
might  have  availed  himself  in 
the  state  courts  of  the  same  lo- 
cality." Davis  V.  Gray,  16  Wall 
83  U.  S.  203,  21  L.  Ed.  447; 
Darragh  v.  H.  Wetter  Mnfg. 
Co.,  23  C.  C.  A.  609,  617,  78  Fed. 
7,  14;  National  Surety  Co.  v. 
State  Bank,  56  C.  C.  A.  657,  6G7, 


120  Fed.  593,  603,  61  L.  R.  A. 
394;  Barber  Asphalt  Co.  v.  Mor- 
ris, 66  C.  C.  A.  55,  59,  132  Fed. 
945,    949,    67    L.    R.    A.   761." 

351.  Judical  Code,  sec.  266, 
amended  by  Act.  Mar.  4,  1913, 
Chap.  160,  37  Stat.  L.  1013; 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  R. 
Com.  of  Alabama,  208  Fed.  35, 
post  Sec.  465. 

352.  Ex  parte  Young,  209  U.  S. 
123,  52  L.  Ed.  714.  28  Sup.  Ct. 
441;  Cent,  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Lendon,   157   Fed.   961. 

353.  Prentis  v.  Atlantic  C.  L. 
R.  Co.,  211  U.  S.  210,  53  L.  Ed. 
150,  29  Sup.  Ct.  67. 

354.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  At- 
lanta Stove  Works,  128  Ga.  207, 
57   S.   E.   429. 

355.  Judicial  Code,  sec.  237. 


CHAPTER  II. 

VALIDITY  AND  SCOPE  OF  THE  ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE. 

§  61.  Common  Law  Obligations  of  Common  Carriers. 

62.  Power  of  Congress  over  Interstate  Commerce. 

63.  Constitutionality  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 
63a.  Same  Subject.     Transportation  Act  1920. 

64.  Reasons  for  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

65.  Carriers  Included  in  the  Act. 

66.  Carriers'  Duties  under  the  Act. 

67.  What  Transportation  Included  in  the  Act. 

68.  Transportation   Included   in    the   Act,    continued. 

69.  Same  Subject. 

70.  Powers  and  Procedure  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

71.  Same  Subject. 

72.  Switch  Connections. 

73.  Damages  and  Penalties  for  Misquoting  a  Rate. 

74.  Penalties. 

75.  Investigations  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

76.  Additional   Power  Given  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 

77.  Commission  May  Suspend  an  Advance  in  Rates. 

78.  Report  of  Carriers. 

79.  Court  Procedure  with  Reference  to  the  Orders  of  the  Commission. 

§  61.  Common  Law  Obligations  of  Common  Carriers. — The 
duty  of  a  common  carrier  to  transport  at  reasonable  rates 
existed  at  eonunon  law.'  Tliis  was  and  is  true  because  the 
business  of  carriage  for  the  public  is  one  of  a  quasi  public 
nature  and  the  charges  therefor  are  subject  to  regulation  by 
the  public.  In  the  Abilene  case,"  Mr.  Justice  White,  delivering 
the  opinion  of  the  court  said: 

1.     Tift    v.    Southern    Ry.    Co.,  jurisprudence  does  not  leave  him 

123  Fed.  789.     The  Circuit  Court  remediless,    and    that    where    an 

expressed    the    idea    in    the    fol-  action    at    law    is    inadequate    a 

lowing    apt    language:      "And    so  remedy  in  equity  must  and  does 

we  are  of  opinion  that  the  right  exist,     McLean     Lumber     Co.     v. 

of    a    shipper    to    have    his    prop-  United  States,  237  Fed.  460,  466." 

erty  carried  at  a  reasonable  rate  2.    The   Abilene   Case,   Texas   & 

in  the  transaction  of  his  business  Pacific    Railway    Co.    v.    jVbilene 

is  a  right  of  property,  that  to  en-  Cotton   Oil  Co.,  204  U.   S.   426,   51 

force    such    right    our    system    of  L.    Ed.    553.    27    Sup.    Ct.    350.    9 

(275) 


276  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [>§,  61 

"AVithout  going  into  detail  it  may  not  be  doubted  that  at 
common  law,  where  a  carrier  refused  to  receive  goods  of- 
fered for  carriage  except  upon  the  payment  of  an  unreason- 
able sum,  the  shipper  had  a  right  of  action  in  damages.  It 
is  also  beyond  controversy  that  when  a  carrier  accepted 
goods  without  payment  of  the  cost  of  carriage  or  an  agree- 
ment as  to  the  price  to  be  paid  and  made  an  unreasonable 
exaction  as  a  condition  of  the  delivery  of  the  goods,  an  action 
could  ])e  maintained  to  recover  the  excess  over  a  reasonable 
charge.  And  it  may  further  be  conceded  that  it  is  now  set- 
tled that  even  where,  on  the  receipt  of  goods  by  a  carrier, 
an  exorbitant  charge  is  stated  and  the  same  is  coercively 
exacted  either  in  advance  or  at  the  completion  of  the  service, 
an  action  may  be  maintained  to  recover  the  overcharge.  2 
Kent.  Comm.  599,  and  note  A ;  2  Smith  Lead.  Cas.,  pt.  1,  8th 
Ed.,  Hare  &  Wallace  Notes,  p.  457." 

The  principle  of  the  right  of  organized  society  to  regulate 
the  rates  and  practices  of  carriers  was  recognized  at  least 
as  early  as  the  date  of  the  laws  of  Hammurabi,  King  of  ancient 
Babylon,^  and  the  same  principle  appears  in  the  common  law. 
The  application  of  the  principle  is  traced  in  the  opinion  of 
Chief  Justice  Waite  in  Munn  v.  Illinois/  wherein  the  reason 
therefor  is  stated  to  be  that  where  "one  devotes  his  property 
to  a  use  in  which  the  public  has  an  interest,  he,  in  effect, 
grants  to  the  public  an  interest  in  that  use." 

It  has  been  hold  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
that  rates  charged  in  contracts  of  fire  insurance  may  be  re- 
gulated by  state  laws,  the  basis  for  the  decision  bleing  that 
when  a  business  by  its  circumstances  and  nature  rises  from  a 
private  to  a  public  concern,  such  business  becomes  subject  to 
governmental  regulation.^ 

Ann.    Cas.    107.5.      See   also    Penn.  summary  of  str.te  legislation  reg- 

R.    Co.    V.    Puritan    Coal    Co.,    237  ulating     public     utility     corpora- 

U.  S.  121,  59  L.  Ed.  867,  35  Sup.  tions,    see    Interstate    Com    Com. 

Ct.   484.  V.   C.  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  167 

3.  Stephens  v.  Central  of  Ga.  U.  S.  479,  495,  496,  42  L.  Ed.  243, 
Ry.  Co.,  138  Ga.  625,  628,  75  S.  17  Sup.  Ct.  896,  and  Simpson  v. 
E.  104,  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  541,  Shepard,  230  Ll.  S.  352,  412-417 
1913  E.  Ann.  Cas.  609.  inc.,   57   L.   Ed.    J 511,   33   Sup.   Ct. 

4.  Munn    v.    Illinois,    94    U.    S.  729. 

4    Otto    113.    24    L.    Ed.    77.      For  5.    German  Alliance  Ins.  Co.  v. 


§  CiQj]  To  Reculate  Commerce.  277 

Tlnjiist  cliseriniinatinn  was  also  illegal  at  common  law.  The 
Supreme  Court  has  aiiproved  a  charge  substantially  to  the 
effect  that  not  every  discrimination  in  rates  is  unjust,  and 
that  in  order  to  constitute  an  unjust  discrimination,  there 
must  be  a  differeufe  in  rates  under  substantially  similar 
conditions  as  to  service.  All  rates  must  be  reasonable ;  and, 
under  like  conditions,  all  patrons  must  be  served  on  equal 
terms.  While  there  is  no  body  of  federal  common  law  sep- 
arate and  distinct  from  the  common  law  existing  in  the 
several  states,  the  principles  of  the  common  law  are  operative 
upon  all  interstate  commercial  transactions,  except  so  far 
as  they. are  modified  by  congressional  enactment.' 

§  62.  Power  of  Congress  over  Interstate  Commerce. — Para- 
graph 3,  Section  8,  Article  1,  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  contains  the  grant  of  power  to  Congress  over  inter- 
state commerce  and  gives  Congress  the  power  "to  regulate 
commerce  with  foreign  nations,  among  the  several  states,  and 
with  the  Indian  tribes." 

Thp  limitation  of  the  scope  of  this  book  and  a  general 
statement  of  the  extent  of  the  regulatory  power  of  the  federal 
government  have  been  stated  in  Chapter  I,  supra.  There  it 
was  shown  that  the  power  of  Congress  over  interstate  com- 
merce was  plenary  and  indivisible. 

That  the  power  to  regulate  interstate  commerce  is  complete 
in  Congress  has  never  been  doubted.  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Mar- 
shall stated  this  power  in  language  which  has  frequently  been 
cited  with  approval.     He  said:' 

"We  are  now  arrived  at  the  inquiry.  What  is  this  poAver? 
It  is  the  power  to  regulate ;  that  is,  to  prescribe  the  rule  by 
which  commerce  is  to  be  governed.  This  power,  like  all 
others  vested  in  Congress,  is  complete  in  itself,  may  be  exer- 
cised to  its  utmost  extent,  and  acknowledges  no  limitations 
other  than  are  prescribed  in  the  constitution.  ...  If.  as 
has  always  been  understood,  the  sovereignty  of  Congress, 
though  limited  to  specified  objects,  is  plenary  as  to  those  ob- 

Lewis,    233    U.   S.    389,    58    L.    Ed.  7.    Gibbons  v.  Ogden.  9  Wheat, 

1011,   34   Sup.  Ct.   612.    .  22  U.  S.  1,  6  L.  Ed.  23,  70.     See, 

6.     Western    Union    Tel.    Co.    v,  also,  Howard  v.   Illinois  Cent.  R. 

Call    Pub.    Co.,    181    U.    S.    92,    45  Co..    207    IT.    S.    463,    492,    493,    52 

L.   Ed.   765,   21   Sup.   Ct.   561.  L.   Ed.   297,    307,    28   Sup.   Ct.    141. 


278  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  62 

jects,  the  power  over  commerce  with  foreign  nations  and 
among  the  several  states  is  vested  in  Congress  as  absolutely 
as  it  would  be  in  a  single  government,  having  in  its  constitu- 
tion the  same  restrictions  on  the  exercise  of  the  power  as  are 
found  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States." 

This  broad  statement  of  the  power  of  Congress  has  been  re- 
peatedly aflfirmed  and  the  principle  applied.  Congress,  in  the 
A'it  to  Regulate  Commerce,  and  the  acts  amendatory  thereof 
and  supplementary  thereto,  has  not,  as  was  shown  in  Chapter 
I  hereof,  as  yet  exercised  its  full  constitutional  power.  In 
the  laws  regulating  the  liability  of  employers  in  interstate 
transportation  Congress  has  fully  occupied  the  field,  and  the 
decisions  with  reference  to  the  scope  of  these  laws  are  not 
ahvays  applicable  to  the  statutes  regulating  interstate  trans- 
portation generally.* 

The  proviso  to  Section  1  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
exempts  from  the  provisions  of  that  act  intrastate  transporta- 
tion.® This  exemption,  however,  does  not  leave  the  states 
free  so  to  regulate  intrastate  transportation  as  to  affect  inter- 
state transportation.  This  question  was  presented  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  which  held  that  certain 
Texas  intrastate  rates  prescribed  under  authority  of  the  stat- 
utes of  Texas  and  maintained  by  carriers  serving  both  Texas 
and  Louisiana,  were  violative  of  Section  3  of  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce,  in  that  such  rates  constituted  undue  and 
unreasonable  prejudice  against  shippers  in  Louisiana  and  gave 
an  unreasonable  preference  to  shippers  in  Texas.  The  Com- 
mission ordered  the  carriers  to  desist  from  this  discrimina- 
tion.** This  order  was  sustained  by  the  Commerce  Court,  and 
an  appeal  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court."^*  Both  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Commission  and  in  that  of  the  Commerce  Court, 
mention  was  made  of  the  fact  that  the  carriers  had  not 
resisted  in  the  courts  the  rates  prescribed  by  the  Texas  Rail- 
road Commission.  This  fact  seems  not  to  have  been  regarded 
as  material  by  the  Supreme  Court,  which  Court  upheld  the 

8.  Sec.  332  posf,  as  to  Employ-  11.  Tex.  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S., 
ers'    Liability    Laws.                                205    Fed..  380,    Op.    Com.    Ct.    No. 

9.  Sec.    336,    post.  68,   p.   655;     Houston  E.  &  W.   T. 

10.  Railroad  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  205  Fed.  391.  Op. 
L.   S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.   C.  31.      Com.  Ct.  No.  67,  p.  653. 


§  6'2]  To  Regulate  Commerce.  279 

order  of  the  Commission  on  the  broad  ground  that  any  unjust 
discrimination  however  caused  was  prohibited  bjy  Congress, 
and  that  no  state  could  lawfully  require  the  maintenance  of 
transportation  rates  within  the  state  which  unjustly  discrim- 
inated against  interstate  shippers.  The  Court  in  a  convinc- 
ing opinion  held  that  where  injurious  discrimination  resulted 
from  state  made  intrastate  rates,  Congress  is  not  bound  to 
reduce  interstate  rates  below  what  it  may  deem  to  be  a  proper 
standard,  fair  to  the  carrier  and  to  the  public;  but  that  Con- 
gress, and  by  Congress  is  included  tribunals  authorized  to 
act  in  prescribing  rates,  is  entitled  to  maintain  its  own  stan- 
dard of  interstate  rates. '^ 

Oklahoma,  Arkansas  and  Missouri,  maintaining  intrastate 
passenger  rates  of  two  cents  a  mile,  brought  complaint  be- 
fore the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  alleging  that  the 
interstate  passenger  rates  of  three  cents  a  mile  into  and 
through  these  states  were  unreasonable  and  discriminatory. 
The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  having  found  that  the 
evidence  failed  to  show  that  the  interstate  rates  were  unrea- 
sonable, dismissed  the  complaint.  In  the  course  of  the  opin- 
ion it  Avas  said:'' 

"That  rates  established  by  state  laws  or  state  authorities, 
prescribing  the  charge  for  intrastate  transportation  of  per- 
sons and  property,  are  facts  that  we  consider,  and  that  we 
respect  the  authority  establishing  such  rates  constitute  no 
valid  reason  relieving  us  from  performing  the  duties  devolv- 
ing upon  this  Commission  under  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  United  States.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
reserves  to  Congress  the  power  to  regulate  interstate  com- 
merce, and  Congress,  under  this  grant  of  authority,  has  im- 
posed upon  this  Commission  certain  duties.  If  any  rate  for 
transportation  M^holly  within  a  state  may  be  made  the  meas- 
ure of  the  rates  when  that  transportation  moves  from  one 
state  through  or  into  another,  the  interstate  rate  so  resulting 
would  not  be  regulation  of  interstate  commerce  by  the  au- 

12.  Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  ct  al, 
V.  U.  S.,  234  U.  S.  342,  58  L.  Ed.  31  I.  C.  C.  522,  540,  541.  See 
1341,   34   Sup.  Ct.   833.  also    Rates    on    Beer    and    Other 

13.  Corp.  Com.  of  Okla.   ct  al.  Malt  Products,  31  I.  C.  C.  544. 


280  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  63 

thority  prescribed  by  the  Constitution,  but  by  the  state.  If 
the  function  of  this  Commission  be  to  compute  the  sum  of 
intrastcite  rates  and  prescribe  the  result  as  a  measure  of  the 
interstate  rates,  actual  and  direct  regulation  of  interstate 
commerce  by  the  states  would  be  the  result.  That  in  the 
regulation  of  interstate  commerce  by  the  general  government 
and  of  intrastate  commerce  by  the  state  governments  there 
result  inconveniences  and  anomalies,  such  as  is  contended  to 
exist  here,  might  be  conceded ;  but  such  facts,  if  they  exist, 
neither  deprive  us  of  the  power  nor  relieve  us  from  the  duty 
of  performing  the  obligations  imposed  upon  us  by  laws  of 
Congress  authorized  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

"Were  we  at  liberty  and  inclined  to  abdicate  the  authority 
and  abandon  the  duty  imposed  upon  us  by  accepting  the 
sum  of  state  rates  as  a  measure  of  interstate  rates,  the  diffi- 
culty would  not  be  removed." 

Transportation  Act  1920  in  substance  adds  nothing  to  the 
power  of  the  Commission  over  intrastate  rates.  The  statute 
in  this  respect  does  no  more  than  to  prescribe  certain  rules  of 
procedure  and  to  recognize  rules  of  law  theretofore  applied 
by  the  Commission. 

§  63.  Constitutionality  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

— The  constitutional  grant  of  power  to  regulate  commerce 
with  foreign  countries  and  between  the  states  is  plenary. 
The  absence  of  this  power  was,  as  is  well  know^n,  one  of  the 
principal  reasons  for  dissatisfaction  with  the  confederacy  ex- 
isting prior  to  the  adoption  of  our  constitution.  Just  what 
powers  could  be  constitutionally  delegated  or  given  to  the 
commission  was  the  question  to  be  determined  by  the  framers 
of  the  acts  to  regulate  commerce.  It  has  been  held  that  to 
prescribe  rates  for  the  future  is  a  legislative  power,  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  a  rate  is  reasonable  is  a  judicial  ques- 
tion.'* The  legislature  of  a  state  may  directly  prescribe  maxi- 
mum rates,  or  such  power  may  be  delegated  to  a  commission." 

14.    Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  R.   Co.  15.     Munn    v.    Illinois,    94   U.    S. 

V.    Minnesota,    1.34    U.    S.    418,    33  4  Otto   113,   24  L.  Ed.   77;     Stone 

L.  Ed.   970,   10   Sup.   Ct.   462,  702.  v.    Farmers   L.    &   T.    Co.,    116    U. 

Prentis     v.     Atlantic     C.    L.   Co.,  S.  307,  29  L.  Ed.  636,   6   Sup.  Ct. 

211    U.   S.   210,    53   L.   Ed.    150,   29  334,    1191;     Georgia    R.    &    B.    Co. 
Sup.    Ct.    67. 


<^  63]  To  Regul.\te  Commerce.  281 

Prior  to  the  amendment  known  as  the  Hepburn  Act  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission  was  a  mere  administrative 
body,  with  no  power  to  fix  rates.  It  could  make  findings 
and  declare  a  particular  rate  unreasonable,  these  findings 
were  prima  facie  true  and  were  entitled  to  the  "strength 
due  to  the  judgment  of  a  tribunal  appointed  by  law  and  in- 
formed by  experience.""  The  original  act  was  held  to  be 
valid  by  the  Supreme  Court.''  The  court  in  the  course  of 
the  opinion  said : 

"Interpreting  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  as  applicable, 
and  as  intended  to  apply,  only  to  matters  involved  in  the 
regulation  of  commerce,  and  which  Congress  may  rightfully 
subject  to  investigation  by  a  commission  established  for  the 
purpose  of  enforcing  that  act,  we  are  unable  to  say  that  its 
provisions  are  not  appropriate  and  plainly  adapted  to  the 
protection  of  interstate  commerce  from  burdens  that  are  or 
may  be,  directly  or  indirectly  imposed  upon  it  by  means  of 
unjust  and  unreasonable  discriminations,  charges,  and  prefer- 
ences. Congress  is  not  limited  in  its  employment  of  means 
to  those  that  are  absolutely  essential  to  the  accomplishment 
of  objects  within  the  scope  of  the  powers  granted  to  it.  It 
is  a  settled  principle  "of  constitutional  la"w  that  'the  govern- 
ment which  has  a  right  to  do  an  act,  and  has  imposed  on  it 
the  duty  of  performing  that  act,  must,  according  to  the  dic- 
tates of  reason,  be  allowed  to  select  the  means;  and  those 
who  contend  that  it  may  not  select  any  appropriate  means, 
that  one  particular  mode  of  effecting  the  object  is  excepted, 
take  upon  themselves  the  burden  of  establishing  that  ex- 
ception.' McCullough  V.  Maryland,  17  U.  S.  4  Wheat.  316 
(4  L.  Ed.  579,  602).  The  test  of  the  power  of  Congress  is 
not  the  judgment  of  the  courts  that  particular  means  are  not 
the  best  that  could  have  been  employed  to  effect  the  end 
contemplated  by  the  legislative  department.  The  judiciary 
can  only  inquire  whether  the  means  devised  in  the  execution 

V.  Smith.  70  Ga.  694,  128  U.  S.  441,  454,  51  L.  Td.  1128,  1134,  27 
174,  S2  L.  Ed.  377.  9  Sup.  Ct.  47.       Sup.    Ct.    700. 

16.    Illinois  Cent.  R.   Co.  v.   In-  17.     Interstate    Com.    Com.,     v. 

terslate    Com.    Com.,    206     U.    S.       Brimson,  154  IT.  S.  447,  38  L.  Ed. 

1047,   14   Sup.   Ct.   1125. 


282  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  63 

of  a  power  granted  are  forbidden  by  the  constitntion.  It  can- 
not go  beyond  that  inquiry  without  entrenching  upon  the 
domain  of  another  department  of  government.  That  it  may 
not  do  with  safety  to  our  institutions.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
United  States  ("Sinking  Fund  Cases")  99  U.  S.  (9  Otto.) 
/OO,  718,  25  L.  Ed.  496,  501." 

In  United  States  v.  DelaAvare  &  Hudson  Co.,"  it  was  con- 
tended that  the  so-called  commodity  clause  of  section  one  of 
the  present  act  was  unconstitutional,  one  of  the  grounds  for 
such  contention  being  that  the  penalties  prescribed  by  the 
amended  act  brought  it  within  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  Ex  parte  Young,  209  U.  S.  123.  52  L.  Ed.  714,  28 
Sup.  Ct.  441.  The  clause  as  constraed  by  the  Supreme  Court 
was  held  valid.  On  the  question  of  the  ett'ect  of  the  penalties, 
at  page  417  of  the  opinion,  the  court  said: 

"With  reference  to  the  contention  that  the  commodities 
clause  is  void  because  of  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
penalties  which  it  imposes  for  violations  of  its  provisions, 
within  the  ruling  in  Ex  parte  Young,  209  U.  S.  128,  we  think 
it  also  suffices  to  say  that  even  if  the  delay  which  the  clause 
provided  should  elapse  between  its  enactment  and  the  going 
into  effect  of  the  saine  does  not  absolutely  exclude  the  clause 
from  the  ruling  in  Ex  parte  Young,  a  question  Avhich  we  do 
not  feel  called  upon  to  decide,  nevertheless  the  proposition 
is  without  merit,  because  (a)  no  penalties  are  sought  to  be 
recovered  in  these  cases,  and  (b)  the  question  of  the  constitu- 
tionality of  the  clause  relating  to  penalties  is  wholly  separate 
from  the  remainder  of  the  clause,  and.  therefore,  may  be  left 
to  he  determined,  should  an  effort  to  enforce  such  penalties  be 
made. ' ' 

Subsequently  the  right  to  enforce  this  clause  as  construed 
Avas  upheld  by  the  Supreme  Court."    The  constitutionality  of 

18.  United  States  v.  Delaware  Sup.  Ct.  65;  United  States  v. 
&  Hudson  Co.,  213  U.  S.  366,  53  Delaware  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  238 
L.  Ed.  836,  29   Sup.  Ct.  527.  U.  S.  516,  59  L.  Ed.  1438,  35  Sup. 

19.  United  States  v.  Lehigh  V.  Ct.  873.  For  a  further  history  of 
R.  Co.,  220  U.  3.  257,  55  L.  Ed.  lititgation  under  this  clause,  see 
458,  31  Sup.  Ct.  387;  Delaware  United  States  v.  Lehigh  Valley 
L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  United  States,  R.   Co.    (221  Fed.  399). 

231   U.   S.   363.   r>S   L.   Ed.   269.   34 


<^  G3]  To  Regulate  Commerce.  283 

the  act  generally  was  interestingly  and  accurately  stated  by 
Judge  Severens  at  circuit  in  an  opinion  wherein  he  shows 
the  necessity  for  Congress  to  adopt  some  such  scheme  as 
the  Act  1o  Regulate  Commerce,  and  in  which  opinion  he 
says :'° 

"It  would  have  been  impossible  for  Congress  to  have  for- 
seen  the  multitude  of  questions  depending  upon  the  special 
facts  presented  sometimes  in  one  complication  and  sometimes 
in  another,  and  declare  a  single  rule  applicable  to  each." 

The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  Section  20  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  as  amended  by  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906"' 
is  valid  and  not  unconstitutional  as  a  delegation  of  legislative 
power,  and  that  the  requirement  that  carriers  doing  both 
interstate  and  intrastate  business  should  render  to  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  accounts  of  all  their  business, 
was  not  beyond  the  power  of  Congress."  The  provision  sub- 
jecting coi^porations  to  criminal  prosecution  is  valid."'' 

In  Honolulu  R.  T.  Co.  v.  Hawaii""  the  Supreme  Court  said : 

"The  business  conducted  by  the  transit  company  is  not 
purely  private.     It  is  of  that  class  so  affected  by  a  public  in- 

20.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  21.  Post.  See.  432. 
Interstate  Com.  Com.,  184  Fed.  22.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v. 
118,  122.  For  opinion  of  the  In-  Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  224  U.  S. 
terstate  Commerce  Commission  194,  56  L.  Ed.  729,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
in  this  case  see  New  Orleans  436,  reversing  the  Commerce 
Board  of  Trade  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  Court  in  Goodrich  Transit  Co.  v. 
17  I.  C.  C.  231.  The  Commerce  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  Nos.  21,  22, 
Court  set  aside  the  order  of  the  23,  24  opinions  of  Commerce  Court 
Commission,  Avlthout  however  Oo,  190  Fed.  943.  See  also  Kan- 
disagreeing  w'th  the  circuit  sas  City  Sou.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United 
judges  as  to  the  validity  of  the  States,  231  U.  S.  423,  58  L.  Ed. 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  Lou-  296,  34  Sup.  Ct.  125,  affirming 
ishville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate  same  styled  case  Opinions  Com- 
Com.  Com.,  195  Fed.  541,  Opin-  merce  Court  No.  56,  p.  641,  204 
ions     Commerce     Court     Nos.     4,  Fed.  641. 

325    and    £75.      For    opinion!    re-  23.     New    York    C.    R.    Co.,    v. 

versing     the     Commerce     Court:  United  States,  212  U.  S.  481.  492, 

Interstate    Com.    Com.    v.    Louis-  53    L.    Ed.    613,    29    Sup.    Ct.    304, 

ville   &  N.   R.   Co.,    227   U.    S.    88,  cited   in   United    States   v.  Adams 

57    L.    Ed.    431,    33    Sup.    Ct.    185.  Exp.    Co.,    229    U.    S.    381,    390,    57 

See   also    United    States   v.    Great  L.  Ed.  1237,  U  Sup.  Ct.  878. 

N.  R.  Co.,  157   Fed.  288,   291  24.      Honolulu     R      T.     Co.     v. 


284  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  63 A 

terest  tliat  it  is  subject,  within  constitutional  limits,  to  the 
goveniinental  power  of  regulation.  This  power  of  regulation 
may  be  exercised  to  control,  among  other  things,  the  time 
of  the  running  of  cars.  It  is  a  power  legislative  in  its  char- 
acter and  may  be  exercised  directly  by  the  legislature  itself. 
But  the  legislature  may  delegate  to  an  administrative  body 
the  execution  in  detail  of  the  legislative  power  of  regulation. 
Reagan  v.  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  154  U.  S.  362,  393,  394. 
38  L.  Ed.  1014,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1047;  Interstate  Commerce  Com. 
v,  Cincinnati.  New  Orleans  &  Texas  Pacific  Railway  Company, 
167  r.  S.  479,  494.  42  L.  Ed.  243,  17  Sup.  Ct.  896." 

What  effect  the  penalties  prescribed  in  the  act  may  have  on 
its  constitutionality  in  view  of  the  Young  case  supra,  is  a 
question  that  the  act  itself  answers.  The  danger  of  incurring 
ruinous  penalties  pointed  out  in  the  Young  case  does  not  exist 
in  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  In  this  act  the  rates  pre- 
scribed by  the  commission  become  effective  only  after  thirty 
days'  notice,  during  which  time  the  order  fixing  the  rates 
may  "be  suspended  or  set  aside  by  a  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction," if  the  rate  prescribed  b)e  unlawful.  The  venue  of 
suits  "to  enjoin,  set  aside,  annul,  or  suspend  any  order  or  re- 
quirement of  the  commission"  is  fixed;  and  suits  "may  be 
brought  at  any  tim.e  after  such  order  is  promulgated.^^  It 
would  seem  that  the  carriers  have  full  opportunity  to  test  an 
order  before  feeling  compelled  by  the  possibility  of  penalties 
to  obey  it. 

The  validity  of  the  amended  fourth  section  of  the  act  was 
sustained  in  a  forcible  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court. ^* 

§  63A.  Same  Subject— Transportation  Act  1920.— The  1920 
statute  materialh^  enlarges  the  scope  of  the  Commission's 
power.     It   confers  the  right  to  prescribe  minimum  as  well 

Hawaii,  211  U.   S.  282,   53   L.  Ed.  ing  A.   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.  Co.  v.  U. 

186,  29   Sup.  Ct.   55.  S.,    191    Fed.    856,    Op.    Com.    Ct. 

25.  Sees.  15,  16,  of  Act  to  Regu-  Nos.  50,  51,  p.  229,  and  sustain- 
late  Commerce.  See  post.  396  ing  orders  of  the  Commission  in 
and    411.  Railroad  Com.  of  Nev.  v.  So.  Pac. 

26.  United  States  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329;  Spokane 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  234  U.  S.  476.  58  L.  City  of  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
Ed.  1408,  34  Sup.  Ct.  986,  revers-  C.  400. 


§  G3A]  To  Regulate  Commerce.  285 

as  maximum  rates;  but  such  right  is  necessary  fully  to  en- 
force the  provision  against  unjust  discrimination,  and  there 
is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  constitutionality  of  the  provision. 

Elaborate  provision  is  made  for  the  adjustment  of  labor 
controversies.  Many  of  these  provisions  are  more  or  less 
lacking  in  force  to  compel  obedience  thereto.  They  do  pre- 
scribe duties  which  probably  are  enforcible  in  courts  of  equity. 
That  wages  may  be  regulated  was  decided  by  the  Supreme 
Court  in  sustaining  the  Adamson  LaAv."  The.  constitutionality 
of  tlie  labor  provision  it  is  believed  may  be  accepted. 

The  Commission  is  given  jurisdiction  over  car  service;  is 
given  the  right  under  certain  circumstances,  to  prescribe  the 
lines  or  mutes  over  Avhieh  traffic  shall  move  and  it  may  re- 
(}uire  the  joint  use  of  terminals.  These  powers  are  analogous 
to  the  jurisdiction  heretofore  existing  under  which  cars  could 
be  required  to  be  furnished,  under  Avhich  routing  has  bicen 
controlled  and  under  which  through  routes  have  been  pre- 
scribed and  physical  connections  required.  The  fundamental 
basis  for  these  new  enactments  is  similar  to  that  supporting 
those  powers  which  the  Commission  has  long  exercised,  and 
such  enactments  are  probably  valid. 

In  the  provision  permitting  the  consolidation  of  existing 
and  competing  railroads  Congress  has  sought  to  permit  State 
corporations  to  do  what  the  laws  of  some  of  the  States  creat- 
ing the  corporations  prohibit.  As  to  the  few  railroads 
chartered  under  Federal  laws.  Congress  is  nn  doubt  competent 
to  permit  or  require  a  consolidation.  The  competency  of 
Congress  "To  authorize  such  consolidations  in  defiance  of 
state  legislation."  has  been  expressly  denied  in  a  dictum  of 
the  Supreme  Court.  In  Northern  Securities  Case,"'  this  dic- 
tum is  explained,  and  in  discussing  the  explanation  the  Su- 
preme Court  said-:  "So  far  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  is  concerned,  a  state  may,  indeed,  create  a  corporation, 
define  its  powers,  prescribe  the  amount  of  its  stock  and  the 
mode  in  which  it  may  be  transferred.  It  may  even  authorize 
one  of  its  corporations  to  engage  in  commerce  of  every  kind. 

27.    Wilson   v.    New,    243   U.    S.  28.      Sec.     11,     ante,     and     note 

332,    61    L.    Ed.    755,    37    Sup.    Ct.       thereto. 
298. 


286  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  63 A 

— domestio.  interstate  and  international."  The  state  creates 
the  instrumentality  but  Avhen  the  instrumentality  enters  the 
field  of  interstate  commerce,  the  powers  of  congress  may  be 
exercised.  The  Supreme  Court  further  discussing  the  question 
said:  "Whilst  every  instrumentality  of  domestic  commerce 
is  subject  to  state  control,  every  instrumentality  of  interstate 
commerce  may  be  reached  and  controlled  by  national  author- 
ity, so  far  as  to  compel  it  to  respect  the  rules  for  such  com- 
merce lawfully  established  by  Congress."  The  plenary  power 
of  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  commerce  can  only  b^e  ef- 
fective by  applying  such  power  to  the  instrumentalities  of 
such  commerce,  and  notwithstanding  the  dictum  quoted,  this 
provision  it  is  believed  is  within  that  power. 

The  issuance  of  stocks  and  bonds  is  discussed  in  Section 
51  ante  and  it  is  thought  this  provision  giving  power  to  tne 
commission  to  supervise  such  actions  are  valid.  The  right  to 
operate  a  railroad  with  the  power  of  eminent  domain  is  a 
franchise  which  the  sovereign  power  may  withhold  or  grant 
on  terms.  Therefore,  as  to  roads  that  have  devoted  their 
instrumentalities  to  the  service  of  interstate  commerce,  the 
provisions  regulating  new  construction  and  the  discontinu- 
ance of  existing  facilities  are  within  the  constitutional  grant 
to  the  Federal  legislature. 

The  right  to  regulate  rates  includes  the  right  to  fix  the 
measure  of  returns  on  capital.  So  the  Congress,  or  when 
authorized  the  Commission,  may  legally  say  that  such  returns 
shall  be  5 ;  or  6  per  centum.  What  particular  per  centum  shall 
be  prescribed  is  a  legislative  question,  and  if  not  made  so 
high  as  to  deprive  a  shipper  of  his  constitutional  property 
right  to  a  service  at  a  reasonable  price,  or  so  low  as  to 
amount  to  a  taking  of  the  property  of  the  carriers,  courts  will 
not  interfere.  Where  the  Act,  as  here,  requires  that  all 
rates  shall  be  reasonable  and  shall  yield  a  "fair  return;" 
that  some  carriers,  receiving  only  these  reasonable  rates,  may 
make  more  than  the  prescribed  percentum,  does  not  authorize 
Congress  to  make  any  disposition  of  the  excess.  If  the  rate 
is  reasonable,  the  proceeds  belong  to  the  carrier  who  per- 
formed the  service.  If  the  rate  is  unreasonable,  the  excess 
over  a  reasonable  rate  belongs  to  the  shipper.  It  is,  there- 
fore, believed  that  the  provisions  of  Section  422  of  the  Trans- 


§  64]  To  Regulate  Commerce,  287 

portation  Act,  Section  15a  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
are  unconstitutional,  in  violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment 
insofar  as  they  authorize  the  Commission  to  receive  and 
dispose  of  any  of  the  railway  operating  income  of  the  car- 
riers. 

The  statutory  provisions  relating  to  intrastate  rates,  when 
there  is  unjust  discrimination  aside  from  some  procedural 
direction,  but  enumerates  principles  which  the  courts  have 
said  already  existed;'*  and  the  slight  change  in  the  long  and 
short  haul  provision  of  section  4  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Act  does  not  affect  the  validity  thereof. 

§  64.  Reasons  for  the  Act  to  Reg-ulate  Commerce. — Prior 
to  the  act  of  Fel)ruary  4,  1887,^"  carriers  Avere  free  to  make 
such  rates  on  interstate  transportation  as  they  saw  fit,  subject 
only  to  the  power  of  the  courts  under  the  common  law,  at 
the  suit  of  individuals  to  prevent  irreparable  damage  or  give 
redress  for  unreasonable  or  unjustly  discriminatory  rates. ^* 

In  Tex.  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,'^ 
the  Supreme  Court,  speaking  of  this  act,  said : 

''It  may  be  well  to  advert  to  the  causes  which  induced  its 
enactment.  They  chiefly  grew  out  of  the  use  of  railroads 
as  the  principal  modern  instrumentality  of  commerce.  While 
ehippers  of  merchandise  are  under  no  legal  necessity  to  use 
railroads,  practically  they  are.  The  demand  for  speedy  and 
prompt  movement  virtually  forbids  the  employment  of  slow 
and  old-fashioned  methods  of  transportation,  at  least  in  the 
case  of  the  more  valuable  articles  of  traffic.  At  the  same 
time,  the  immense  outlay  of  money  required  to  build  and 
maintain  railroads,  and  the  necessity  of  resorting,  in  securing 
the  rights  of  way,  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  in  effect 
prevent    individual   merchants  and   shippers   from  themselves 

29.  Sees.  44  and  62,  ante.  Call    Pub.    Co.,    181    U.    S.    92.    45 

30.  Chapter    9,    i^ost.  L.    Ed.     765,     21     Sup.     Ct.    561; 

31.  Texas  &  P  R.  Co.  v.  Abi-  United  States  v.  Michigan  Cent, 
lene  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  204  U.  S.  426,  R.  Co.,  122  Fed.  544. 

51  L.  Ed.  553,  27  Sup.  Ct.  350,  9  32.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
Ann.  Cas.  1075;  Tift  v.  Southern  state  Com.  Com.,  162  U.  S.  197, 
Ry.  Co.,  123  Fed.  789,  138  Fed.  210,  211,  40  L.  Ed.  940,  944,  945. 
753;     Western    [Jnion   Tel.    Co.   v.  16    Sup.    Ct.    666,    5    I.   C.    R.    405. 


288  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  64 

providing  snch  means  of  carriage,  From  the  very  nature  of 
the  case,  therefore,  railroads  are  monopolies,  and  the  evils  that 
usually  accompany  monopolies  soon  began  to  show  them- 
selves, and  were  the  cause  of  loud  complaints  The  com- 
panies owning  the  railroads  were  charged,  and  sometimes 
truthfully,  with  making  unjust  discriminations  between  ship- 
pers and  localities,  with  making  secret  agreements  with 
some  to  the  detriment  of  other  patrons,  and  with  making 
pools  or  combinations  with  each  other,  leading  to  the  op- 
pression of  entire  communities. 

"Some  of  these  mischiefs  were  partially  remedied  by  special 
provisions  inserted  in  the  charters  of  the  companies  and  by 
general  enactments  1iy  the  several  states,  such  as  clauses 
restricting  the  rates  of  toll  and  forbidding  railroad  com- 
panies from  becoming  concerned  in  the  sale  or  production  of 
articles  carried  and  from  making  unjust  preferences.  Re- 
lief, to  some  extent,  was  likewise  found  in  the  action  of  the 
courts  in  enforcing  the  principles  of  the  common  law  appli- 
cable to  common  carriers — particularly  that  one  which  re- 
quired uniformity  of  treatment  in  like  conditions  of  service. 

"As,  however,  the  powers  of  the  states  were  restricted  to 
their  own  territories,  and  did  not  enable  them  to  efficiently 
control  the  management  of  great  corporations  whose  roads 
extend  through  the  entire  country,  there  was  a  general  de- 
mand that  Congress,  in  the  exercise  of  its  plenary  power 
over  the  subject  of  foreign  and  interstate  commerce,  should 
deal  with  the  evils  complained  of  h^/  a  general  enactment, 
and  the  statute  in  question  was  the  result." 

Amendatory  and  supplemental  acts  have  enlarged  the  powers 
of  the  Commission,  but  these  additions  to  the  Commission's 
powers  under  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  have  had  in  view 
the  purpose  to  prevent  discrimination  and  to  require  cer- 
tainty and  stability  in  the  rates  charged.  The  amendment 
authorizing  the  supervision  and  standardization  of  the  ac- 
counts of  carriers'"  had  for  its  purpose  to  enable  the  Com- 
mission better  to  perform  its  duties  respecting  the  regulatioii 
of  carriers."^ 

S3.    Sec.   433,   ^^osi.  United   States,    231   U.    S.    423,   5& 

34.    Kansas   City   S.   Ry.   Co.   v.       L.  Ed.  296,  34  Sup.  Ct.   125. 


§  05]  To  Regulate  Commeece,  289 

Tn  the  jMiniiesota  Rate  Cases,"  the  fact  that  the  purpose 
of  the  Act  was  not  to  include  intrastate  transportation  was 
definitely  stated. 

The  Minnesota  Rate  Cases  dealt  Avith  the  question  of  the 
constitutionality  of  rates  prescribed  by  state  authority  ap- 
plicable only  within  the  state.  A  different  question  is  pre- 
sented when  there  is  involved  the  relationship  of  interstate 
rates  with  intrastate  rates.  When  such  a.  question  is  pre- 
sented, as  was  held  in  the  Shreveport  case  supra  (Sec.  62), 
the  state  rates  must  not  unlawfully  discriminate  against  in- 
terstate shippers,  and  Avhen  they  do  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission   may  grant  relief. 

§  65.  Carriers  Included  in  the  Act. — The  original  act  ap- 
plied only  to  transportation  wholly  by  railroad,  or  partly 
by  railroad  and  partly  by  water.  Included  in  the  definition 
of  railroads  are  bridges,  ear  floats,  lighters,  and  ferries  used 
or  operated  in  connection  therewith,  the  line  in  use  by  any 
corporation  operating  a  railroad,  whether  owned  or  operated 
under  a  contract,  agreement,  or  lease,  and  all  instrumentalities 
of  shipment  or  carriage.  The  present  act  extends  the  law  to 
apply  to  the  transportation  of  oil  or  other  commodities,  ex- 
cept water  and  gas,  by  means  of  pipe  lines  or  partly  by  pipe 
lines  and  partly  by  rail  or  water,  and  includes  express  com- 
panies, telegraph,  telephone  and  cable  companies,  whether 
wire  or  wireless;  all  switches,  spurs,  tracks,  terminals  and 
terminal  facilities  of  every  kind  used  or  necessary  in  the 
transportation  of  the  persons  or  property  designated,  and 
also  all  freight  dcjiots,  yards,  and  grounds,  used  or  necessary 
in  the  transportation  or  delivery  of  any  of  said  property; 
ears  and  other  vehicles  and  all  instrumentalities  and  facilities 
of  shipment  or  carriage,  irrespective  of  ownership  or  of  any 
contract,  express  or  implied,  for  the  use  thereof,  and  all 
services   in    connection   with   the   receipt,    delivery,    elevation 

35.    Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  S.   56,  52  L.  Ed.   681,   28   Sup.  Ct. 

S.  352,  57  L.  Ed.  1511.  33  Sup.  Ct.  428;     United    States   v.    Pacific    & 

729.     For  statement  as  to  the  pur-  A.  Ry.  &  Nav.  Cc,  228  U.   S.   87, 

pose    of     the     acts     original     and  108,    57    L.    Ed.    742,    33    Sup.    Ct. 

amendatory,    see    Armour    Pack-  443. 
ing  Co.  V.   United   States,   209   U. 


290  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  65 

and  transfer  in  transit,  ventilation,  refrigeration  or  icing, 
storage  and  handling  of  property  transported. 

Tender  the  act,  foreign  carriers  engaged  in  transporting  be- 
tween points  within  and  points  without  the  United  States 
are  subject  to  the  regulations  i^rescribed ;'"'  water  carriers 
are  subject  thereto  when  the  transportation  is  partly  by  rail 
and  partly  by  w^ater,  when  both  being  under  a  common  con- 
tract, management  or  arrangement  for  a  continuous  carriage 
or  shipment."'  Tender  the  Panama  Canal  Act,^*  of  August  24. 
1912,  the  Commission  is  given  jurisdiction  over  the  transporta- 
tion of  rail  and  water  carriers  when  property  is  transported 
from  point  to  point  in  the  T"fnited  States  by  rail  and  water, 
through  the  Panama  Canal  or  otherwise.  The  extent  of  this 
jurisdiction  is  stated  in  the  act,  and  the  Commission  has 
exercised  the  jurisdiction  thus  conferred.^'  A  corporation 
organized  to  construct  and  maintain  a  bridge  across  a  river 
running  between  tw-o  states,  and  which  corporation  owns 
no  cars,  but  merely  furnishes  a  highway  over  which  common 
carriers  and  others  may  transport  goods,  was  held  not  to 
be  within  the  provisions  of  the  act." 

Carriers  by  water  betw^een  ports  of  dififerent  states  under 
joint  rates  with  railroads,  w-hich  rates  are  filed  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  are  within  the  purview  of 

36.     Re    Investigation    of    Acts  movement    between    Canada    and 

Grand    Trunk    Ry.    of    Canada,    3  the  United  States,  which  is  in  the 

I.    C.    C.    89,    2    I.    C.    R.    496.      A  United    States.      Emery   &   Co.    v. 

rate,  however,  made  by  the  Cana-  B.   Q.   M.   R.   R.,  38   I.   C.   C.   636; 

dian     Commission    applicable     in  Lake     and     Rail     Rate     Cancella- 

Canada — though      part       of      the  tions,  44  I.  C.  C.   745;     Carlowitz 

through     rate     from     the     United  &  Co.  v.  C.  P.  R.  Co.,  46  I.  C.  C. 

States    to    Canada — is   not   within  290. 

the    jurisdiction    of,  the    Commis-  37.    Sec.   335,  post. 

sion.     International   Paper   Co.   v.  38.    Sec.  375,  post. 

D.    &    H.    Co.,    33    I.    C.    C.    270.  39.    Sec.  224  and  375,  post.  Au- 

For  a  full  discussion  of  this  suh-  gusta  &  Savannah  S.  S.  Co.  v.  O. 

ject,    see    Carey    Mfg.    Co.    v.    G.  S.  S.  Co.,  26  I.  C    C.  380. 

T.   W.    Ry.    Co.,    36    I.    C.    C.    203.  40.    Kentucky    S   I.    Bridge   Co. 

Over     shipments     exclusively     in  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed. 

Canada,    the    Commission    has    no  567,   617,   2   L.   R.   A.   289,   2   I.   C. 

jurisdiction,  but   it   has   jurisdict-  R.   351. 
tion    of    that    part    of    a    through 


§  G5] 


To  Regulate  Commerce. 


291 


the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  although  such  carriers  are 
incorporated  under  the  laws  of  a  particular  state." 

In  tlie  Pipe  Line  cases''  the  Supreme  Court  sustained  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  over  pipe  line  carriers  trans- 
porting oil  in  interstate  commerce. 

A  terminal  company,  part  of  a  railroad  and  steamship 
system,  is  within  the  act,"  and  so  is  a  rate  between  points  in 
the  same  state  which  includes  delivery  on ,  boat  for  inter- 
state transportation." 

A  stock  yard  company,  owning  and  operating  a  railroad 
system  which  transports  cars  to  and  from  trunk  lines  which 
operate  cars  in  interstate  transportation,  is  within  the  act." 

That  street  raihvays  were  not  included  within  the  law  prior 
to  the  Amendatory  Act  of  June  18,  1910,*"  has  been  deter- 
mined by  the  Supreme  Court,  although  the  effect  of  that  act 
on  the  question  was  left  undecided.*' 


41.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v. 
Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  224  U.  S. 
194,  56  L.  Ed.  729.  32  Sup.  Ct. 
436,  reversing  Goodrich  Transit 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  190 
Fed.  943,  Commerce  Court  Opin- 
ions 21  to  24,  p.  95.  Within  the 
meaning  of  the  Anti-Trust  stat- 
utes, tugs  employed  in  towmg 
vessels  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce  are  themselves  instru- 
mentalities of  such  commerce, 
United  States  v.  Great  Lakes 
Towing  Co.,  208  Fed.  733.  Where 
there  is  no  common  or  joint  ar- 
rangement, water  carriers  held 
not  within  the  Act,  Mutual  Tran- 
sit Co.  V.  United  States,  178  Fed. 
G(;4,  except  as  provided  in  the 
Panama  Canal  Act,  supra. 

42.  United  States  v.  Ohio  Oil 
Co.,  234  U.  S.  548,  58  L.  Ed.  1394, 
34    Sup.   Ct.   956. 

43.  Southern  Pacific  Terminal 
Co.  v.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  219 
U.  S.  498,  55  L.  Ed.  310,  31  Sup. 
Ct.   279. 


44.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Ohio  v. 
Worthington,  187  Fed.  965.  110  C. 
C.  A.  85.     See  also,  Note  58,  post. 

45.  United  States  v.  Union 
Stock  Yards,  226  U.  S.  286,  57  L. 
Ed.  226.  33  Sup.  Ct.  83;  Union 
Stock  Yard  &  Transit  Co.  v. 
United  States,  192  Fed.  330,  Com- 
merce Court  Opinion  No.  15,  pp. 
189  and  225.  See  also  Manufac- 
turers Ry.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  304  and 
cases  cited. 

46.  Post,   Sec.  337. 

47.  Omaha  &  C.  B.  Street  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Cora.  Com.,  230 
U.  S.  324,  57  L.  Ed.  1501,  33 
Sup.  Ct.  890,  40  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  385  reversing  same  styled 
case,  191  Fed.  40,  Commerce 
Court  Opinion  No.  25,  p.  147,  and 
affirming  same  styled  case.  179 
Fed.  243,  and  setting  aside  order 
of  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion in  West  End  Improvement 
Club  V.  Omaha  &  C.  B.  Street  Ry. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  239.    See  also  Wil- 


292.  Validity  and  Scm3pe  of  The  Act.  [^  G6 

The  commission  has  frequently  acted  under  the  power 
granted  it  over  express  companies,  which  are  now  specifically 
included." 

The  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  is,  however,  not  so  broad 
as  the  Safety  Appliance  and  Employers'  Liability  Acts,  and 
Congress  has  expressly,  by  the  proviso  to  Section  1,  excluded 
intrastate  commerce.'" 

§  66.  Carriers'  Duties  under  the  Act. — It  is  the  duty  of 
every  carrier  subject  to  the  provision  of  the  law  to  provide 
and  furnish  transportation  upon  reasonable  request  therefor, 
and  to  establish  through  routes  and  .just  and  reasonable 
rates  applicable  thereto. 

All  charges  made  for  any  service  rendered  or  to  l)e  rendered 
in  the  transportation  of  passengers  or  property  and  for  the 
transmission  of  messages  by  telegaph,  telephone  or  cable, 
as  aforesaid,  or  in  connection  therewith,  shall  be  just  and 
reasonable ;  and  every  unjust  and  unreasonable  charge  for 
such  service  or  any  part  thereof  is  prohibited  and  declared  to 
be  unlawful. 

Just  and  reasonable  regulations  and  practices  affecting 
classification  of  commodities  must  be  established,  observed 
and  enforced. 

Railroads  are  prohibited  from  transporting  certain  com- 
modities in  which  they  are  interested.  Switch  connections, 
under  certain  circumstances,  must  be  made  with  other  car- 
riers and  with  shippers.  Rebates  and  other  forms  of  dis- 
crimination are  prohibited.  Undue  and  unreasonable  prefer- 
ences to  persons,  places  or  particular  kijids  of  traffic  are 
illegal ;  and.  except  in  special  cases,  no  greater  charge  shall 
be  made  for  a  shorter  than  a  longer  haul,  the  shorter  being 

sen  v.   Rock   Creek   Ry.   Co.,   7   I.  Exp.    Co.,    229    U.    S.    381,    .57    L. 

C.  C.  S.3.,  and  see  South  Covington  Ed.   12.37,  33   Sup.  Ct.   878. 

R.    Co.    V.    Covington,    235    U.    S.  49.    Pacific  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United 

537,  59  L.  Ed.  350,  35  Sup.  Ct.  15S.  States.     173     Fed.     448;       United 

48.    American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Unit-  States  v.  Union  Stock  Yards  Co., 

ed  States,  212  U.  S.  522,  53  L.  E:l.  192     Fed.     330,     339,     Commerce 

635,   29   Sup.   Ct.   31E';     Barrett  v.  Court  Opinion  No.  15,  p.  189,  225; 

New    York    City,    183    Fed.    793.  Simpson    v.    Shepard,    2S0    U.    S. 

Nor   does   it   make  any  difference  352,   57  L.   Ed.   1511,    33    Sup.   Ct. 

that    the    company    is    not    a    cor-  729;     Sec.  61,  stipra. 
poraticn,  United  States  v.  Adams 


<^  60]  To  Rkgut^te>  Commerce.  293 

included  in  the  longer.  Transportation  of  freight  must  be 
continous.  pooling  is  regarded,  and  rates  are  required  to  be 
published,  i)f)sted  and  maintained. 

Transportation  Act  1920  adopted  and  amended  the  Car 
Service  Act  prescribing  in  detail  the  duties  of  railroads  with 
reference  to  furnishing  and  distributing  cars.^"  The  1920  Act 
also  restricted  the  freedom  of  the  carriers  in  constructing  new 
or  extending  old  lines,  regulated  the  issuance  of  stocks  and 
bonds,"  and  otherwise  enlarged  regulation  and  increased  the 
power  of  the  Commission.*" 

Carriers  included  in  the  Act  must  keep  accounts  according 
to  requirements  prescribed  by  the  Commission,  and  must 
make  reports  to  the  Commission  as  required. '^^ 

The  Supreme  Court,  speaking  of  the  Act,  has  said :" 

"It  cannot  be  challenged  that  the  great  purpose  of  the  Act 
to  Regulate  Commerce,  whilst,  seeking  to  prevent  unjust  and 
unreasonable  rates,  was  to  secure  equality  of  rates  to  all, 
and  to  destroy  favoritism,  these  last  being  accomplished  by 
requiring  the  publications  of  tariffs,  and  by  prohibiting  secret 
departiu-es  from  such  tarififs,  and  forbidding  rebates,  prefer- 
ences, and  all  other  forms  of  undue  discrimination.  To  this 
extent  and  for  these  purposes  the  statute  was  remedial  and 
is,  therefore,  entitled  to  receive  that  interpretation  which 
reasonably  accomplishes  the  great  public  purpose  which  it 
was  enacted  to  subserve." 

The  Act,  while  repeating  and  adopting  the  common-law  rule 
that  rates  should  be  reasonable,  had  as  its  principal  purpose 
the  prevention  of  unjust  discrimination  and  undue  and  unrea- 
sonable preference.  The  shipper  could  protect  himself  more 
easily  from  unreasonable  rates  than  he  could  from  secret  and 

50.  Transportation  Act  1920,  United  States  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.. 
Sec.  402,  being  paragraphs  10  to  229  U.  S.  381,  57  L.  Ed.  1237,  33 
17  of  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  Sup.  Ct.  878;  Kansas  City  So. 
Sees.  344a  to  344h,  j^ost.  Ry.    v.    United    States,    231    U.    S. 

51.  id.  paragraphs  18  to  22,  423,  58  L.  Ed.  296,  34  Sup.  Ct. 
sees.  344i  to  344m,  post.  125. 

52.  See  Chapter  9,  j)ost.  54.   New  York  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co. 

53.  Post  chapter  9.  And  see,  v.  Interstate  Con;.  Com.,  200  U. 
Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Good-  S.  361,  391,  50  L.  Ed.  515,  521, 
rich   Transit   Co.,    224    U.    S.    194,       26  Sup.  Ct.  272. 

56   L.   Ed.    729,    32    Sup.    Ct.    436; 


294  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  67 

ruinous  diseriinination  against  him  and  preferences  to  his 
competitor.  Equality  of  treatment  and  the  "open  gateway 
Ijolicy"^'"^  are  sought  to  be  obtained  by  the  act. 

All  the  provisions  of  the  original,  amendatory  and  supple- 
mental acts  regulating  interstate  transportation  have  as  their 
purpose  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  charges.  To  ef- 
fectuate these  purposes  the  law  prescribes  rules  and  author- 
izes the  Commission  to  make  other  rules  and  regulations  by 
which  the  purposes  may  be  accomplished. 

§  67.  What  Transportation  Included  in  the  Act. — The 
transportation  included  in  the  act  is  that  "from  one  state  or 
territory  of  the  United  States,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  to 
any  other  state  or  territory  of  the  United  States,  or  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  or  from  one  place  in  a  territory  to  another 
place  in  the  same  territory,  or  from  any  place  in  the  United 
States  to  an  adjacent  foreign  country  *  *  *  and  car- 
ried from  such  place  to  a  port  of  trans-shipment,  or  shipped 
from  a  foreign  country  to  any  place  in  the  United  States  and 
earri.':'d  to  such  place  from  a  port  of  entry  either  in  the 
United  States  or  an  adjacent  foreign  country."  The  above 
quotation  is  taken  from  section  one  of  the  original  act,  except 
the  phrase  applying  to  transportation  between  places  in  the 
same  territory  was  added  by  the  amendment  of  June  29,  1906.^° 

By  the  Act  of  1910.  telegraph,  telephone  and  cable  com- 
panies and  the  transportation  of  oil  were  included  in  the  act.^' 
The  Panama  Canal  Act  extended  jurisdiction  to  water  carriers. 

The  proviso  of  section  one  of  the  original  act  was  retained 
in  its  original  form'*  until  the  Act  of  1910.  when  it  was 
changed  in  language  but  not  in  essential  substance.  Trans- 
portation  Act    1920   made   another   change    of   form.      In   the 

55.  Rahway  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Dela-  see  Prairie  Oil  &  Gas  Co.  v. 
ware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  United  States,  204  Fed.  798, 
C.  191,  194.  And,  see,  also  Rates  Commerce  Court  Opinion.  Act 
for  Transportation  of  Anthracite  held  valid  and  Commerce  C^l1rT 
Coal,  35  I.  C.  C.   220.   289.  reversed;     the    Pipe    Line    Cases, 

56.  Common  control,  etc.,  dls-  U.  S.  v.  Ohio  Oil  Co ,  2^.4  U.  S 
cussed,  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Unit-  548,  58  L.  Ed.  1394,  34  Sup.  Ct. 
ed    States,    179    Fed.    614.      For    a  956. 

discussion    of    the    provision    re-  57.     Post.    Sec.    335. 

lating    to    transportation    of    oil.  58.     Post.  sec.   336. 


<§!  G7]  To  Regulate  Commerce.  295 

original  provision,  the  1910  Amendment  and  in  the  1920 
Amendment  intrastate  commerce  was  excluded  from  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statnte/*  In  1920  Confess  recognized  what 
the  Commission  and  the  courts  had  already  decided,  that  in- 
trastate rates  unjustly  discriminating  against  interstate  com- 
merce could  be  regulated^ 

That  this  provision  leaves  to  the  states  the  regulation  of  in- 
trastate commerce  has  already  been  shown." 

The  Daniel  Ball"'  is  a  case  frequently  cited  and  sometimes 
given  a  construction  that  is  of  doubtful  correctness.  The 
libel  was  brought  by  the  Ignited  States  for  penalties  under 
the  act  of  July  7,  1838.  5  Stat.  L.  304,  requiring  a  license  for 
vessels  "to  transport  any  merchandise  or  passengers  upon 
the  bays,  lakes,  rivers  or  other  navigable  waters  of  the  United 
States."  Two  questions  were  presented,  one  being  that  the 
waters  upon  which  the  steamer  plied  were  not  "navigable 
waters  of  the  United  States."  This  question  being  answered 
by  the  court's  holding  that  such  waters  were  navigable  waters 
within  the  meaning  of  the  act,  it  was  further  contended  that 
the  steamer  was  engaged  wholly  in  internal  commerce.  It 
was  admitted  that  she  received  freight  originating  beyond 
the  state  destined  to  points  in  the  states  and  also  received 
freight  in  the  state  destined  to  points  beyond.  The  language 
of  Mr.  Justice  Field  must  be  construed  in  connection  with  the 
facts  of  the  case,  and  it  will  be  noticed  that  he  stresses  the 
fact  that  the  transportation  was  "on  the  navigable  waters  of 
the  United  States."  In  the  further  course  of  the  opinion  it 
was  said : 

"It  is  said  that  if  the  position  here  asserted  be  sustained, 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  the  domestic  trade  of  a  state ;  that 
Congress  may  take  the  entire  control  of  the  commerce  of 
the  country,  and  extend  its  regulations  to  the  railroads  within 
a  state  on  which  grain  or  fruit  is  transported  to  a  distant 
market. 

"We  answer  that  the  present  case  relates  to  transportation 
on  the  navigable  waters  of  the  United  States,  and  we  are  not 

59.  Sec.   336,   post.  62.    The    Daniel   Ball   v.    Unite-' 

60.  Sec.  393.b,  post.  States,  10  Wall.,  77  U.  S.  557,  19 

61.  Supra.  Sec.  43.  L.   Ed.   999. 


296  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  68 

called  upon  to  express  an  opinion  upon  the  power  of  Congress 
over  interstate  commerce  when  carried  on  bi;^  land  transporta- 
tion. And  we  answer  further,  that  we  are  unable  to  draw  any- 
clear  and  distinct  line  between  the  authority  of  Congress  to 
regulate  an  agencj^  employed  in  commerce  between  the  states, 
when  that  agency  extends  through  two  or  more  states,  and 
when  it  is  confined  in  its  action  entirely  within  the  limits  of  a 
single  state.  If  the  authority  does  not  extend  to  an  agency 
in  such  commerce  Avhen  the  agency  is  confined  wdthin  the 
limits  of  a  state,  its  entire  authority  over  interstate  com- 
merce may  be  defeated.  Several  agencies  combining,  each 
taking  up  the  commodity  transported  at  the  boundary  line 
at  one  end  of  a  state,  and  leaving  it  at  the  boundary  line  at 
the  other  end,  the  federal  jurisdiction  would  be  entirely 
ousted,  and  the  constitutional  provision  would  be  a  dead 
letter." 

In  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Texas"'  there  were  involved 
two  independent  shipments,  and  the  fact  that  the  first  was 
interstate  did  not  make  the  second,  moving  between  points 
both  of  which  were  in  Texas,  an  interstate  shipment. 

The  Commission  held  that  an  indispensable  element  of  a 
through  shipment  was  a  contract  therefor;"*  but  while  this 
statement  may  be  correct  generally,  it  disregards  the  prin- 
ciple that  substance  and  not  mere  form  controls.  In  the  Social 
Circle  case"^  an  intrastate  movement  that  was  part  of  an  inter- 
state movement  under  a  through  bill  of  lading,  w^as  held  sub- 
ject to  the  supervision  of  the  Commission. 

§  fiS.  Transportation  Included  in  Act,  Continued. — As  stated 
in  the  preceding  section,  the  general  rule  that  a  contract 
for  through  shipment  determines  w^hether  or  not  the  ship- 
ment  is    interstate    or   intrastate,    and    the    decision    in    Gulf, 

63.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  16  Sup.  Ct.  700.  See  also.  United 
Texas  204  U.  S.  403.  51  L.  Ed.  States  V.  Wood,  1)45  Fed.  405, 
.T^O    27    Sun    Ct.   3(i0,  411:      Uiv'ted    Stites    v.    Colorado 

64.  Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  157  Fed.  321. 
and  Practices    7  T    C.  C.  240.  247.  85   C    C.   A.   48;    Chicago,   B  &  Q. 

65.  Cincinnati,  N  0.  &  T.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States,  157  Fed. 
Co.    V.    Interstate   Com.   Com..    16"^  830.   85  C.   C.   A.   194. 

U.  S.   184,  192,  40  L.   Ed.  935,   938. 


§  G8]  To  Regulate  Commerce.  297 

Colorado  &  Sante  Fe  Ky.  Co.  v.  Texas  must  be  limited  by 
the  principle  that  the  subistance  and  not  tlie  mere  form  con- 
trols. Tn  the  Galveston  Terminal  Case""  it  was  held  that  where 
goods  were  intended  for  export,  the  fact  that  the  first  bill 
of  lading  was  issned  to  a  terminal  within  the  state,  the  com- 
modity there  to  be  delivered  to  a  carrier  for  a  foreign  destina- 
tion, did  not  make  the  movement  an  intrastate  one,  and  that 
such  transportation  was  snbjeet  to  regulation  by  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission.  In  this  case  emphasis  was  laid 
upon  the  fact  that  the  Terminal  Company  was  controlled  by 
the  Railroad  Company,  and  in  the  course  of  the  opinion  it 
was  said : 

"Verbal  declarations  cannot  alter  the  facts.  The  control 
and  operation  of  the  Southern  Pacific  Company  of  the  rail* 
roads  and  the  Terminal  Company  have  united  them  into  a 
system  of  which  all  are  necessary  parts,  the  Terminal  Com- 
pany as  well  as  the  railroad  companies." 

And  the  conclusion  of  the  Court  is  shown  by  this  language  : 

"The  Terminal  Com]-)any  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  system 
engaged  in  the  transportation  of  commerce,  and  to  the  ex- 
tent that  such  commerce  is  interstate  the  Commission  has 
.iurisdietion  to  supervise  and  control  it  within  statutory  limits. 
To  hold  otherwise  would  in  effect  permit  carriers  generall.y, 
through  the  organization  of  separate  corporations,  to  exempt 
all  of  their  terminals  from  our  regulating  authority." 

This  case  was  followed  and  the  Santa  Fe  case  distinguished 
in  a  subsequent  case,"^  where  it  was  held  that,  although  con- 
tinuity of  movement  might  be  conceded  as  necessary  to  make 
the  shipment,  the  court  could  look  behind  the  mere  billing 
and  determine  the  real  character  of  the  transportation.     Tn 

66. .  Southern  Pac.  Term.  Co.  v.  citing    The     Galveston     Terminal 

Interstate   Com.    Com.,    219    U.    S.  Case  and   R.  R.   Com.   of  Ohio  v. 

498.    55    L.    Ed.    .".10,    31    Sup.    Ct  Worthington,  225  U.  S.  101,  56  L. 

279.    citing   Coe    v.    Errol.    116    U.  Ed.    1004.    32    Sup.    Ct.    653.     And 

S.   517,  29   L.  Ed.   715,  6   Sup.   Ct.  see   Texas   &   P.   R.    Co.   v.   R.   R. 

475,    sustaining    the    Commiss''on  Com.  of  Louisiana,  183  Fed.  1005: 

in    Eichcnberg    v.    Southern    Pac.  'Re     Discrimination    in   Wharfage 

Co.,    14   I.   C.  C.    250.  at  Pensacola,  27  L  C.  C.  252.  For 

67.    Texas  &  N.  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Sa-  cases  like  the  Santa  Fe  Case,  see 

bine    Tram    Co.,    227    U.    S.    Ill,  United   States  v.   Wood,   145   Fed. 

57    L.    Ed.    442,    S3   Sup.    Ct.    229,  405.   411;     Oregon   R.   &  Nav.   Co. 


298  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  68 

Railroad  Cbmpanies  of  Louisiana  v.  Texas  Pac.  R.  Co.,"  the 
principles?  established  by  former  decisions  were  stated:  "The 
principle  enunciated  in  the  cases  were  that  it  is  the  essential 
of  the  character  of  the  commerce,  not  the  accident  of  local  or 
through  bills  of  lading  which  determines  federal  or  state  con- 
trol over  it.  And  it  takes  character  as  interstate  or  foreign 
commerce  when  it  is  actually  started  in  the  course  of  trans- 
portation to  another  state  or  to  a  foreign  country."  The  de- 
livery of  cars  for  interstate  shipment  is  within  the  act.*^ 

In  the  Iowa  case^"  the  shipments  of  coal  moved  to  Daven- 
port, Iowa,  in  interstate  commerce.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the 
coal  at  Davenport,  all  transportation  charges  thereto  were 
paid;  and,  without  unloading  the  cars,  the  consignee  tendered 
written  billing  for  reshipment  to  local  points  in  Iowa ;  the 
carrier  refused  to  accept  such  reshipment  in  foreign  cars, 
claiming  that  the  shipment  should  be  unloaded  and  reloaded 
into  its  own  cars .  The  commodity  when  shipped  from  the 
original  point  of  origin  in  a  state  other  than  Iowa,  was 
destined  to  Davenport,  at  which  place  the  consignee  could 
unload  and  there  sell  or  reconsign  the  coal  to  another  place. 
It  being  found  as  a  fact  that,  "The  certainty  in  regard  to 
the  shipments  of  coal  ended  at  Davenport,"  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  sustained  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Iowa  in  holding  that  this  reshipment  into  Iowa  was  an  intra- 
state movement.  The  carrier  had  contended  that  the  method 
adopted   was   a   device  to   secure  a   lower  than   the   through 

V.    Camnbell.    180    Fed.    253.    same  also   Kanotex    Refining   Co.    v.    A. 

styled    case,    173    Fed.    957,    177  T.    &    S.    F.    R.    Co.,    34    I.    C.    C. 

Fed.  318.  271;     Railroad  Com.  v.  Worthing- 

68.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Louisiana  v.  ton,  225  U.  S.  101,  56  L.  Ed.  1004, 
Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.,  229  U.  S.  336,  32  Sup.  Ct.  653;  and  the  quota- 
57   L.   Ed.   1215,   33    Sup.   Ct.   837.  tion    from    the    Daniel    Ball    Sec. 

69.  Chicago,  K.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  67  supra.  Illinois  Grain  to 
V.  Hardwick"  Farmers  ETevator  Chicago,  40  I.  0.  C.  124;  Tampa 
Co.,  226  U.  S.  426,  57  L.  Ed.  284,  Fuel  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  43  I. 
33  Sup.  Ct.  174.  C.  C.  231;     Green  v.  A.  &  V.  Ry. 

70.  Chicago  M  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  Co.,  43  I.  C.  C.  662,  673;  United 
V.  Iowa,  233  U.  S.  334,  58  L.  Ed.  States  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  230 
988,  34  Sup.  Ct.  592;  State  v.  Chi-  Fed.  940;  United  States  v.  P.  & 
cago  M.  &  St.  ?.  R.  Co.,  152  R.  Ry.  Co.,  232  Fed.  946;  Ala- 
Iowa    S17,    130    N.    W.    802.      See  bama  G.   S.   R.   Co.   v.   McFadden, 


§  G8]  To  Regui^ate  Commerce.  299 

rate ;  the  local  rate  from  Davenport  added  to  the  interstate 
rate  thereto  heing-  less  than  the  through  rate  from  the  point 
of  origin  to  the  point  of  final  destination.  This  contention 
of  the  carrier  presented  a  question  of  fact,  and  on  the  question 
of  fact  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  said:  "We  ar^ 
unable  to  say  upon  this  record  that  the  state  court  has  im- 
properly characterized  the  traffic  in  question  here."  The 
state  court  having  held  that  the  second  movement  was  an 
intrastate  movement  subject  to  regulation  by  the  state  auhori- 
ties,  its  judgment  v^as  affirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court.  The 
criticisms  that  have  been  directed  at  this  opinion  fail  to 
give  proper  consideration  to  the  finding  of  facts  involved. 
The  Supreme  Court  adopted  the  facts  as  found  by  the  state 
court,  but  took  occasion  to  say:  "It  is  undoubtedly  true  that 
the  question  whether  commerce  is  interstate  or  intrastate 
must  We  determined  by  the  essential  character  of  the  com- 
merce, and  not  by  mere  billing  or  forms  of  contract."  Whether 
assent  be  granted  or  withheld  from  the  conclusions  of  fact 
found  by  the  state  court  and  accepted  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
the  law  as  announced  by  the  latter  court  is  entirely  consist- 
ent witli  the  decisions  in  the  cases  cited  in  notes  59-61  suprck 
In  the  Shreveport  case  the  Commerce  Court  held  that  dis- 
crimination which  was  the  result  of  a  purely  intrastate  rat€ 
was  not  justified  because  the  result  of  a  State  Commission- 
made-rate,  and  that  as  to  interstate  commerce  such  discrim- 
ination could  be  prohibited  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission.'' This  case  was  affirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
the  conclusion  being  that  Sec.  3  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce was  intended  to,  and  does,  make  illegal  all  unjust  dis- 
crimination, even  though  the  discrimination  be  caused  by 
an  intrastate-  rate  prescribed  by  or  under  authority  of  a  state 
law,   and  that   Congress   is  not  required   to   remove   the   dis- 

232    Fed.    1000.      Affirmed    McFad-  S.  371,  60  L.  Ed.  1050,  36  Sup.  Ct. 

den  V.   A.   G.   S.  R.  Co.,   241   Fed.  665. 

562,  154  C.  C.  A.  338;  Landon  v.  71.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
Public  Utilities  Com.,  242  Fed.  state  Com.  Com.,  205  Fed.  380, 
658,  683  and  cases  cited;  Settle  sustaining  the  Commission  in  R. 
V.  B.  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  249  Fed.  R.  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  Louis  & 
913,  —  C.  C.  A.  — :  Atchison  T.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  31. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.   Harold,  241   TJ. 


300  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  69 

criminal  ion  l)y  lowering  an  interstate  rate  not  found  to  be 
too  his'h/" 

AMien  a  combination  rate  is  in  force  from  the  United  States 
to  a  point  in  Canada,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
has  held  that  it  has  no  jurisdiction  of  that  part  of  the  com- 
bination rate  "applicable  only  in  Canadian  territory."'^  Nor 
has  the  Commission  any  jurisdiction  of  a  shipment  moving 
through  the  United  States  from  Canada  to  Cuba.  Alaska  is 
a  territory  within  the  meaning  of  the  act/* 

§  69.  Same  Subject. — If  a  transportation  movement  begin- 
ning and  ending  in  a  state  passes  for  a  substantial  part  of 
the  distance  through  another  state,  the  state  in  which  such 
transportation  begins  and  ends  cannot  regulate  the  rate.'^^ 
The  decision  in  which  this  holding  was  made  has  been  dis- 
tinguished in  subsequent  cases  but  not  to  limit  the  principle  as 
here  stated. '*  But  where  such  shipment  moves  through  an- 
other state  when  it  could  have  moved  intrastate  at  a  loM^er 
rate,  reparation  will  be  awarded." 

Speaking  of  Water  Carriers,  the  Supreme  Court  has  said:" 

"Certain  it  is  that,  when  engaged  in  carrying  on  traffic 
under  joint  rates  with  railroads,  tiled  with  the   Commission, 

7^.    Houston  E.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Northern    P.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Solum, 

U.    S.,    2?A    U.    S.    342,    58    L.    Ed.  247  U.  S.   477,  62   L.   Ed.   1221.   38 

1341,    34    Sup.    Ct.    833.     See   also  Sup.    Ct.    550. 

Corp.    Com.    of    Okla.   v.    A.    T.    &  76.  Cincinnati,  Portsmouth,  etc. 

S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,  31   I.   C.   C.   532.  Packing  Co.  v.  Bay,  200  U.  S.  179 

73.  Fullerton  Lumber  &  50  L.  Ed.  428,  26  Sup.  Ct.  208; 
Shingle  Co.  v.  Bellingham  Bay  &  Ewing  v.  City  of  Leavenworth, 
British  Columbia  R.  Co.,  25  I.  C.  226  U.  S.  464,  468,  57  L.  Ed.  303, 
C.  370.  See  also  note  36  supra  33  Sup.  Ct.  157.  The  Hanley 
and  Quintal  &  Lynch  v.  Fla.  E.  Case  was  cited  as  authority  m 
C.  R.  Co.,  57  I.  C.  C.  289.  Simpson    v.    Shepard.    230    U.    S. 

74.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  352,  401.  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup 
United    States    ex    rel.    Humbolt      Ct.  729. 

S.  &  Co.,  224  U.  S.  474,  56  L.  Ed.  77.    Lathrop  ^Aimber  Co.  v.  Ala- 

849,    32    Sup.    Ct.    556.  bama    G.    S.    R.    Co.,    27    L    C.    C. 

75.  Hanley  v.  Kansas  C.  S.  R.      250. 

Co.,  187  U.  S.  617,  47  L.  Ed.  333,  78.     Interstate    Commerce    Com- 

23    Sup.    Ct.    214,    distinguishing  mission  v.   Goodrich   Transit  Co., 

Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsyl-  224  U.  S.  194,  208,  56  L.  Ed.  729, 

vania    145    U.    S     192.    36    L     Ed.  32    Sup.    Ct.    436.    Reversing    the 

672,  1*2  Sup.  Ct.  806,  4  I.  C.  C.  87;  Commerce      Court      in      Goodrich 


§70]  To  "Reoui.ate  Commerce.  301 

the  carriers  are  l)oiind  to  deal  upon  like  terms  with  all  ship- 
pers who  seek  to  avail  themselves  of  such  joint  rates,  and 
are  subject  to  the  general  requirements  of  the  act  preventing 
and  punishing  the  giving  of  rebates,  the  making  of  unjust 
discriminations,  the  showing  of  favoritism  and  other  prac- 
tices denounced  in  the  various  sections  of  the  act." 

And  it  was  held  that  such  carriers  were  subject  to  sections 
12,  15,  20,  and  21  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  Prior 
to  the  passage  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act,  water  carriers  not 
joining  in  a  through  route  or  common  arrangement  with  rail 
carriers  were  not  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  act.'" 
Since  the  passage  of  this  act  the  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
"when  property  may  be  or  is  transported  from  point  to  point 
in  the  United  States,  through  the  Panama  Canal  or  other- 
wise.""" 

§  70.  Powers  and  Procedure  of  the  Commission. — In  the 
first  seven  sections  of  the  act  to  regulate  interstate  railroads 
are  stated  the  rights  of  the  shipper  and  the  duties  of  the 
carrier.  Sections  six,  eight,  nine,  thirteen,  fourteen,  fifteen, 
fifteen-a.  sixteen,  sixteen-a  and  twenty  relate  to  the  remedies 
of  shippers,  and  the  administration  of  the  act  by  the  com- 
mission. Section  ten  relates  to  public  penalties,  sections 
eleven  and  twenty-four  to  the  appointment  of  the  commis- 
sioners, sections  twelve,  eighteen,  twenty-one,  and  twenty- 
two,  apply  to  the  commission's  purely  administrative  duties. 
Section  seventeen  relates  to  forms  of  procedure.  Section 
twenty-two  expressly  retains  existing  common  law  and  statu- 
tory remedies,  and  section  twenty-three  provides  for  cumula- 
tive remedies  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States.  Section  six- 
teen also  provides  a  period  of  limitation  in  which  to  bring 
eomj/Iaints  for  damages.  Section  twenty  makes  the  receiving 
carrier  liable  for  loss,  damage,  or  injury  to  property,  which 
it  has  received  for  transportation,  whether  caused  by  it  or  a 
connecting  carrier  to  whom  it  may  have  delivered  the  ship- 
ment. Section  19a,  added  by  the  Amendment  of  March  1, 
1913,  invests  the  Commission  with  power  after  investigation  to 

Transit     Company     v.     IiTterstate  80.    Panama   ('anal   Act  August 

Com.   Com.,   190   Fed.   943.  12,  1914,  Sec.  64,  supra.     See  Sec. 

79.    Re  Jurisdiction  Over  Water  ,379,  post. 
Carriers,  15  I.  C.  C.  205. 


302  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  70 

make  a  valuation  of  the  property  of  common  carriers  subject 
to  the  act.  and  prescribes  the  effect  of  such  valuations  when 
made. 

The  Transportation  Act,  1920  while  adding  somewhat  to 
existing  provisions  gave  the  Commission  in  paragraphs  18, 
et  scq.,  of  section  1,  control  over  new  construction  by  car- 
riers subject  to  the  Act ;  in  section  15a,  prescribed  a  per- 
centage return  for  carriers;  in  section  twenty-a,  regulated  the 
issuance  of  stocks  and  bonds;  in  section  twenty-five  provided 
for  the  regulation  of  common  carriers  by  water  in  foreign 
commerce  and  in  section  twenty-six  gave  the  commission  au- 
thority by  order  to  install  automatic  train-stop  or  train-control 
devices. 

Other  titles  of  the  Transportation  Act,  1920  contain  pro- 
visions relating  to  Federal  control  of  labor  and  to  inland 
water-ways. 

The  duties  prescribed  in  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  are 
not  in  substance  broader  than  such  duties  at  common  law. 
It  is  in  the  remedies  to  enforce  such  duties  that  the  act  pos- 
sesses its  real  importance.  When  a  common  carrier  has  vio- 
lated the  act  it  is  "liable  to  the  person  or  persons  injured 
thereby  for  the  full  amount  of  damages  sustained  in  con- 
sequence of  any  such  violation,"  and,  in  addition  to  this 
common  law  damage,  to  "a  reasonable  counsel  or  attorney's 
fee."  Suit  for  such  damages  the  act  says  may  be  brought 
by  "complaint  to  the  commission,"  or  by  suit  "in  any  district 
or  circuit  court  of  the  United  States  of  competent  jurisdic- 
tion." 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  speaking  of  the 
provision  of  section  nine,  just  quoted,  says"  "We  think  that 
it  inevitably  follows  from  the  context  of  the  act  that  the 
independent  right  of  an  individual  originally  to  maintain 
actions  in  courts  to  obtain  pecuniary  redress  for  violations  of 
the  act  conferred  by  the  ninth  section  must  be  confined  to 
redress  of  such  wrongs  as  can,  consistently  with  the  context 
of  the  act,  be  redressed  by  courts  without  previous  action 
by    the    commission."      This    case    was    a    suit    brought    in    a 

81.    Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Abl-       Ann.  Case  107.5.    See  also  Sec.  383. 
lene  Cotton  Oil  Co..  204  U.  S.  426.      post. 
51  L.  Ed.  553,  27  Sup.  Ct.  350,  9 


§71]  To  Regulate  Commerce.  303 

state,  court  to  recover  damages  for  an  alleged  illegal  rate 
charged,  the  rate  being  that  prescribed  in  a  legally  filed  tariff 
which  had  never  been  declared  by  the  commission  to  be  in 
violation  of  the  law.  While  this  suit  was  brought  in  a  state 
court,  and  while  express  authority  to  sue  in  the  United  States 
courts  is  granted  by  section  nine,  the  reasoning  of  the  court 
would  demand  the  same  decision  had  the  suit  been  brought 
in  a  "Court  of  the  United  States  of  competent  jurisdiction." 

§  71.  Same  Subject. — Prior  to  the  Hepburn  Act  the  com- 
mission might  determine  whether  a  particular  rate  was  just 
or  unjust,  but  could  not  prescribe  rates  to  control  in  the 
future.  The  Amendment  of  June  29,  1906  and  the  Transporta- 
tion Act  1920  gave  power  to  the  commission,  upon  the  com- 
plaint of  natural  or  corporate  persons,  including  mercantile, 
agricultural,  or  manufacturing  societies,  public  corporations 
and  state  railroad  commissions,  or  on  its  own  motion,  to  make 
investigations  with  reference  to  rates  or  practices  of  interstate 
carriers,  to  make  reports  stating  its  conclusions,  together 
with  its  decision,  order  or  requirement,  and  when  damages 
are  awarded,  such  report  should  include  the  findings  of  fact 
on  which  the  award  was  made;  power  and  authority  was 
granted  to  the  commission  and  it  was  made  its  duty  whenever, 
after  full  hearing  upon  a  complaint  made  as  provided  in  sec- 
tion thirteen  of  this  act,  or  under  an  order  for  investigation 
and  hearing  on  its  own  motion,  it  shall  be  of  the  opinion  that 
any  of  the  individual  or  joint  rates,  or  charges  whatsoever, 
demanded,  charged,  or  collected  by  any  carrier  or  carriers, 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  act,  for  the  transportation 
of  persons  or  property  as  defined  in  the  first  section  of  this 
act,  or  for  the  transmission  of  messages  by  telegraph  or  tele- 
phone, or  that  any  individual  or  joint  regulation  ov  practice 
in  respect  to  such  transportation  is  just,  fair,  and  reasonabli^ 
to  be  thereafter  followed ;  to  make  an  order  that  the  carrier 
shall  cease  and  desist  from  such  violations,  to  the  extent 
to  which  the  commission  might  have  found  the  same  to  exist, 
and  further  to  require  that  the  carrier  should  not  thereafter 
publish ,  demand,  or  collect  any  rate  or  charge  for  such  trans- 
portation in  excess  of  the  maximum  or  minimum  rate  or 
charge  so  prescribed,  and  should  confonn  to  to  the  regulation  or 


'MH  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [^  72 

practice  so  prescribed.  The  power  was  also  given  the  commis- 
sion to  rcqnire  the  establishment  of  throngh  routes  and  to  fix 
joint  rates  and  to  open  terminals  for  joint  use  on  terms  to 
be  prescribed,  to  prescribe  an  allowance  which  must  be  reason- 
able for  a  service  or  instrumentality  furnished  by  the  owner 
of  property  transported. 

All  awards  of  the  commission,  except  orders  for  the  pay- 
ment of  money,  take  effect  within  a  reasonable  time,  not  less 
than  thirty  days,  and  continue  in  force  as  prescribed  unless 
suspended,  set  aside,  or  modified  by  the  commission  or  a 
court  of  competent  jurisdiction ;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  every 
common  carrier,  its  agents  and  employees,  to  observe  and 
comply  with  such  orders  under  penalty.  The  Commission  is 
by  section  nine  of  the  Act  of  1910,  amending  section  six  of  the 
old  law,  given  power  to  reject  schedules  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, and  schedules  so  rejected  are  void,  and  the 
failure  to  comply  with  regulations  adopted  and  promulgated 
by  the  Commission,  is  a  criminal  offense. 

§  72.  Switch  Connections. — Under  section  one  of  the  Act 
of  March  4,  1887,  as  amended  by  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  the 
Supreme  Court  held  that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
had  power  to  compel  switch  connections  with  lateral  branch 
roads  only  at  the  instance  of  shippers  and  that  it  had  no  power 
to  compel  switch  connections  on  the  application  of  a  branch 
railroad.  This  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  would  not  be 
applicable  to  the  Act  of  1910,  as  the  "owner"  of  such  lateral 
branch  road  has  now  the  same  rights  as  a  shipper. 

§  73.  Damages  and  Penalties  for  Misquoting  a  Rate. — Prior 
to  the  Act  of  1910,  a  shipper,  who  had  been  damaged  by  the 
error  of  a  common  carrier  in  misquoting  a  rate,  had  no  rem- 
edy. The  Act  of  1910,  unchanged  in  1920,  amends  section  six 
of  the  prior  Act  by  providing  a  penalty  against  the  carrier  for 
giving  a  shipper  the  wrong  rate.  As  the  statute  in  section 
eight  gives  a  shipper  the  right  to  recover  damages  for  any  vio- 
lation of  the  Act,  it  is  believed  that  upon  requesting  a  quota- 
tion of  a  rate  as  the  statute  requires,  the  shipper  suffering 
damage  in  consequence  of  an  erroneously  stated  rate,  may  re- 
cover such  damages  by  suit  against  the  carrier  in  any  court  of 
competent  jurisdiction. 


<§  74]  To  Regulate  Commerce.  305 

§  74.  Penalties.— Section  ten  of  the  old  law  is  amended  by 
the  Act  of  1910;  paragraphs  one,  two  and  four  of  the  old  sec- 
tion are  unchanged.  Paragraph  three  of  the  original  section 
ten  is  amended  and  enlarged,  in  line  one,  by  adding  after 
"person"  the  words  "corporation  or  company;"  after  the 
word  "package"  in  the  old  law,  the  new  law  adds  "or  the 
substance  of  the  property;"  "officer"  is  added  to  "agent" 
m  the  new  law;  and  an  "attempt"  to  obtain  transportation 
at  less  than  the  legal  rate  is  now  illegal.  Imprisonment  is 
specifically  made  inapplicable  to  artificial  persons,  and  this 
new  language  making  illegal  other  acts  is  added:  "or  who 
shall  knowingly  and  willfully,  directly  or  indirectly,  himself 
or  by  emjiloyee,  agent,  officer  or  otherwise,  by  false  statement 
or  representation  as  to  cost,  value,  nature,  or  extent  of  injury, 
or  by  the  use  of  any  false  bill  of  lading,  receipt,  voucher,  roll, 
account,  claim,  certificate,  affidavit,  or  deposition,  knowing 
the  same  to  be  false,  fictitious,  or  fraudulent,  or  to  contain  any 
false,  fictitious,  or  fraudulent  statement  or  entry,  obtain  or 
attempt  to  obtain  any  allowance,  refund,  or  payment  for  dam- 
age or  otherwise  in  connection  with  or  growing  out  of  the 
transportation  of  or  agreement  to  transport  such  property, 
whether  with  or  without  the  consent  or  connivance  of  the  car- 
rier, whereby  the  compensation  of  such  carrier  for  such  trans- 
portation, either  before  or  after  payment,  shall  in  fact  be 
made  less  than  the  regular  rates  then  established  and  in  force 
on  the  line  of  transportation." 

§  75.  Investigfations  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion.— Section  thirteen  of  the  original  Act  is  enlarged  by  the 
Act  of  1910,  the  principle  change  being  to  extend  the  power  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to  make  investigations 
on  its  own  initiative.  The  language  of  this  amendment  would 
seem  to  be  broad  enough  to  meet  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  the  Harriman  case,"^  because  after  giving  power  to  in- 
vestigate "any  matter  or  thing  concerning  which  a  complaint 
is  authorized,"  this  is  added:  "or  concerning  which  any  ques- 
tion may  arise  under  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  Act." 

82.   Harriman  v.  Interstate  Com.       29  Sup.  Ct.  115. 
Com.,  211  U.  S.  407,  53  L.  Ed.  253. 


306  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  7G 

Tlie  Transportation  Act  1920  further  amends  Section  thir- 
teen by  prescribing  a  procedure  where  rates  imposed  by  a 
state  are  involved.  The  amendment  also  specifically  author- 
izes carriers  to  file  petitions  attacking  such  rates.  These  pro- 
visions added  in  1920  are  no  more  than  declaratory  of  what 
was  already  law,  except  in  so  far  as  they  require  a  particular 
procedure ;  and,  even  as  to  procedure,  the  requirements  are 
practically  the  same  as  the  Commission  had  theretofore  fol- 
lowed. 

§  76.  Additional  Power  Given  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission. — Section  fifteen,  added  by  the  Act  of  June  29, 
1906,  is  amended  by  the  Act  of  1910  to  enlarge  and  more  defi- 
nitely state  the  powers  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion. The  amendment  gives  the  Commission  "on  its  own 
initiative"  "in  extension  of  any  pending  complaint  or  without 
any  complaint,"  power  over  "individual  or  joint  rates,"  and 
over  "individual  or  joint  classifications."  While  the  words 
"any  regulations  or  practices  whatsoever"  affecting  rates, 
contained  in  the  Act  of  1906,  may  have  been  sufficiently  broad 
to  include  regulations  affecting  classifications  and  joint  rates, 
if  any  doubt  existed  as  to  such  Act  being  so  inclusive,  such 
doubt  is  removed  bjy  the  Act  of  1910. 

The  Transportation  Act  1920  as  stated  in  prior  sections 
further  enlarged  the  powers  of  the  Commission.  Of  these 
powers  the  most  important  and  practically  the  only  new 
powers  are ;  the  right  to  prescribe  minimum  rates,  to  open 
terminals,  the  car  service  provisions,  to  regulate  new  construc- 
tion and  decide  when  existing  facilities  might  be  abandoned, 
to  permit  pooling  and  consolidations,  to  determine  the  routing 
of  freight,  to  control  the  issuance  of  stocks  and  bonds  and 
section  fifteen-a,  which  is  known  as  the  provision  for  guaran- 
teed returns. 

Section  15a  is  of  doubtful  constitutionality.**  Paragraph 
one  contains  definitions.  Paragraph  two  names  certain  things 
which  the  Commission  must  consider  in  exercising  its  power 
to  prescribe  just  and  reasonable  rates.    The  things  named  have 

83.      Sec.   63a,   supra,   and   Sees. 
405a  to  405m,  post.  < 


§    77]  To    RE{iULATE    COMMKRCE.  307 

always  received  consideration  and  the  purpose  of  the  Commis- 
sion has  been  to  give  carriers  "a  fair  return  upon  the  aggre- 
gate value"  of  their  railway  properties.  Paragraph  three  as 
the  Congress  had  a  right  to  do,  fixes  for  two  years,  thereafter 
leaving  the  matter  to  the  Commission,  a  minimum  per  centum 
of  such  aggregate  value  which  shall  be  taken  "as  such  fair  re- 
turn." Paragraph  four  contains  provisions  guiding  in  a  de- 
termination of  "such  aggregate  value."  Paragraph  five  is  an 
explanation  and  attempted  justification  for  the  provisions  of 
paragraph  six  which  gives  the  Commission  power  to  recover 
and  receive  one-half  of  "net  railway  operating  income  in  ex- 
cess of  six  per  centum  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  and 
maintaining  a  general  railroad  contingent  fund  "  The  re- 
maining paragraphs  of  the  section  regulate  the  disposition 
of  excess  income  and  the  contingent  fund. 

§  77.  Commission  May  Suspend  an  Advance  in  Rates. — 
Heretofore  the  carriers  could  make  any  increase  in  rates  or 
any  change  in  regulations  however  unjust,  and  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  could  not  stay  the  advance  or  prohibit 
the  regulation  until  after  a  long  delay,  during  which  an  in- 
vestigation was  had.  Some  of  the  Circuit  Courts  and  Circuit 
Courts  of  Appeals  held  that  an  illegal  advance  could  be  en- 
joined, other  courts  held  the  contrary  and  the  Supreme  Court 
has  never  determined  the  question.  The  amendments  of  1910 
and  1920  provide  that  the  operation  of  such  advance  or  regula- 
tion may  be  suspended  or  deferred  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  until  after  an  investigation  by  the  Commis- 
sion. A  Senate  Committee  had  in  1906  reported  against  giving 
such  power  to  the  Commission,  and  it  must  b!e  admitted  that 
this  power  in  the  Commission  was  a  fundamental  departure  in 
the  regulation  of  common  carriers.  Theretofore  the  right  of  the 
carrier  to  initiate  rates  was  not  subject  to  the  control  of  the 
Commission,  since,  while  the  carrier  may  initiate  a  rate  or  reg- 
ulation such  right  is  subject  to  the  control  of  the  Commis- 
sion. This  law  prevents  the  delay  and  injury  which  shippers 
suffered,  who  had  theretofore  to  file  their  complaint  against 
an  illegal  advance  and  rely  on  the  tiresome,  expensive  and 
inadequate  remedy  by  reparation.  Section  fifteen,  as 
amended,  gives  the  shipper  certain  rights  with  reference  to 
through  routes  and  prohibits  carriers  and  their  agents  from 


308  Validity  and  Scope  of  The  Act.  [§  78 

giving  information  with  reference  to  shipments.  The  burden 
of  proof  to  show  the  justness  and  reasonableness  of  an  ad- 
vance is  on  the  carrier.  This  burden  was  on  the  carrier  prior 
to  the  Act  of  1910,  w^hen  a  rate  long  in  existence  was  ad- 
vanced, although  there  have  been  some  opinions  expressed  to 
the  contrary.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  in  the 
case  of  Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  313,  while  not  repudiating  the  doctrine  above,  states  it  less 
clearly  than  some  of  the  prior  decisions  of  the  Commission.  It 
is  a  fundamental  law  that  acts  of  an  individual  are  presump- 
tively not  contrary  to  his  interests,  and  as  said  by  Wallace, 
Judge,  in  Menacho  v.  Ward,  27  Fed.  529,  532:  "The  estimate 
placed  by  a  party  upon  the  value  of  his  own  services  or  prop- 
erty is  always  sufficient,  against  him,  to  establish  the  real 
value ;  but  it  has  augmented  probative  force,  and  is  almost 
conclusive  against  him,  when  he  has  adopted  it  in  a  long-con- 
tinued and  extensive  course  of  business  dealings." 

§  78.  Reports  of  Carriers. — Paragraph  two  of  section 
twenty  of  the  Act  of  1906  is  stricken  by  the  Act  of  1910,  and 
in  lieu  thereof  a  new  paragraph  is  enacted,  giving  the  Com- 
mission power  to  require  annual  reports  for  the  year  ending 
either  June  thirtieth  or  December  thirty-first  of  each  year,  in- 
stead of  June  thirtieth  only  as  was  provided  by  the  old  law, 
and  also  giving  power  to  the  Commission  in  addition  to  the 
annual  and  monthly  reports,  to  require  of  carriers  "periodical 
or  special"  reports. 

The  Transportation  Act  1920  uses  some  more  words  in  de- 
scribing what  the  Commission  may  require  as  to  the  forms  of 
accounts,  records,  and  memoranda  kept  by  the  carriers,  speci- 
fically regulates  charges  for  depreciation  and  gives  the  Com- 
mission power  to  require  annual  reports  for  the  year  ending 
ing  all  documents,  papers  and  correspondence  now  or  here- 
after existing,  and  kept  or  required  to  be  kept  by  carriers."^* 

§  79.  Court  Procedure  with  Reference  to  the  Orders  of  the 
Commission. — The  Commission  is  given  power  to  apply  to  the 
courts  to  enforce  its  orders.     Writs  of  mandamus  may  issue 

84.   Sec.  42.2,  post.    Smith  v.  Int.       135,  .3&  Sup.  Ct.  34. 
Com.  Com.,  240  U.  S.  33,  62  L.  Ed. 


§78]  To  Regulate  Commeece.  309 

from  the  district  courts  of  the  United  States  to  compel  the 
movement  and  transportation  of  freight  without  undue  dis- 
criminaion.  and  to  compel  the  furnishing  of  cars  and  other 
facilities  of  transportation.  Suits  to  enforce  orders  for  rep- 
aration, after  an  order  therefor  has  been  granted  by  the 
Commission,  may  be  brought  in  the  Federal  or  the  State 
courts.  Under  certain  circumstances,  courts  may  suspend  or 
set  aside  the  orders  of  the  Commission.  What  these  cir- 
cumstances are  will  be  discussed  hereinafter  in  Chapter  VII. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ALL   CHARGi^]S    FOR    SERVICES    RENDERED    BY    COMMON    CAR- 
RIERS IN   THE   TRANSPORTATION   OF  PERSONS  OR 
PROPERTY  OR  IN  CONNECTION  THEREWITH 
MUST  BE  JUST  AND  REASONABLE. 

§     80.     All   Charges  Must  Be  Reasonable. 
80a.  Rule  Applies  to  Accessorial   Services. 

81.  Classification. 

81a.  Class  and  Commodity  Rates. 

82.  Cost  of  Carrier's  Equipment. 

83.  Cost  of  Carrier's  Equipment.     What  Is  a  Reasonable   Return. 

84.  Same  Subject.     Difficulties  in  Determining  the  Question. 

85.  Cost  of  Service. 

86.  Cost.     When  Carrier's  Duty  to  Furnish  Service. 

87.  Cost  of  Service.     Continued. 

88.  Value  of  Service. 

89.  Same   Subject.     Use   to   Which   Commodity    Put. 
89a.  Cost  of  Assembling  Theory. 

90.  Value  of  the   Commodity,   Its  General    Utility   and   Danger   of 

Loss. 

91.  Value  of   the    Commodity.      Difference   Between    the    Rav^    and 

the  Manufactured  Product. 

92.  Competition   or   Its   Absence   Considered   in    Determining   Rea- 

sonable Rates. 

93.  Same  Subject. 

94.  Same  Subject.     Rule  Since  1910. 

95.  Same  Subject.     Conclusion. 

96.  Rates  Affected  by  Amount  of  Tonnage. 

97.  Same  Subject.     Limitations  on  Rule. 

98.  Density  of  Traffic. 

99.  Distance  and  Rate  per  Ton  Mile. 
99a.  Extra  Line  Haul. 

100.  General    Business    Conditions. 

101.  Estoppel. 

102.  Rates  Long  in  Existence  Are  Presumed  to  Be  Reasonable. 

103.  Same  Subject. 

104.  Voluntary   Reduction   of  Rates. 

105.  Same  Subject.     Act  June  18,  1910. 

106.  Grouping  Territory  and  Giving  Each  Group  Same  Rate  Legal 

under  Some  Circumstances. 

107.  Grouping   Producing  Points   and    Making  Zones   Taking  Same 

Rates. 

108.  Basing   Point   System. 

(310) 


^  80]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  311 

109.  Same  Subject.    Breaking  Rates. 

110.  Comparison    Between    Different    Lines    as    a    Means    of    Deter- 

mining Correct  Rate. 

111.  Car  Load  and  Less  than  Car  Load  Movements  as  Affecting  the 

Rate. 

112.  Establishing  Car  Load  Rates. 

113.  Same  Subject.     Rule  in  Duncan  Case  Criticised. 

114.  Same    Subject.      Proper    Differential    Between    Rates    on    Car 

Load-  and  Less  than  Car  Load   Freight. 

115.  Car  Load  Minima. 

116.  Train  Load  Rates. 

117.  Relation  of  Through  Rates  to  the  Sum  of  Local  Rates. 

118.  Proportional  Rates. 

119.  Through    Rate    Must    Not    Exceed    Aggregate    of    Intermediate 

Rates. 

120.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. 

121.  Same  Subject.     Amendments  of   1910  and   1912. 

122.  Rates   on  Commodities  Requiring  Refrigeration. 

123.  Rates  on  Returned  Shipments. 

124.  The  Public  Interest  Must  Be  Considered  in  Making  Rates. 

125.  General    Principles    Applicable    to    the    Question.      What    Is    a 

Reasonable  Rate? 

126.  Same    Subject.      Some    Statements    of    the    Commission    as    to 

Such  General  Principles. 

127.  Same  Subject.     Illustrative  Cases. 

128.  Same    Subject.      Discussion    of    Principles    in    Chicago    Live 

Stock  Exchange  Case. 

129.  Same  Subject.     Rate  Considered  in  and  of  Itself. 

130.  Same  Subject.     Commission  Not  Bound  by  Technical  Rules. 
1.3.1.     Same  Subject.     Summary. 

§  80.  All  Charges  Must  Be  Reasonable. — At  common  law 
and  under  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  all  charges  made  by 
common  carriers  for  any  service  rendered,  or  to  be  rendered, 
in  the  transportation  of  persons  or  property,  or  in  con- 
nection therewith,  are  required  to  be  just  and  reasonable,  and 
every  unjust  and  unreasonable  charge  for  such  service,  or  any 
part  thereof,  is  prohibited  and  declared  unlawful.^  This  prin- 
ciple of  law  necessarily  arises  from  the  franchises  and  practi- 
cal monopoly  incident  to  the  business  of  common  carriage. 
The  principle  is  not  new,  but  as  has  been  held  by  the  courts 

1.  Post,  Sec.  339.  Interstate  Com.  transmission  of  messages  by  tele- 

Com.    V.    Cincinnati,    N.    0.    &    T.  graph,    telephone    and    cable    are 

Ry.  Co.,  167  U.  S.  479,  42  L.  Ed.  also  subject  to  the  rule  of  reason- 

243,   17   Sup.   Sup.    Ct.    896.     The  ableness. 


312  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  80 

for  over  two  hundred  years  when  private  property  is  "affected 
with  a  pul)lie  interest,  it  ceases  to  be  juris  privati  only."  Mr. 
Chief  Justice  Waite,  speaking  of  governmental  regulation  of 
public  carriers,  said :" 

"This  brings  us  to  inquire  as  to  the  principles  upon  which 
this  power  of  regulation  rests,  in  order  that  we  may  determine 
wliat  is  within  and  what  without  its  operative  effect.  Looking, 
then,  to  the  common  law,  from  whence  came  the  right  which 
the  constitution  protects,  we  find  that  when  private  property 
is  affected  with,  a  public  interest,  it  ceases  to  be  juris  privati 
only.  This  was  said  by  Lord  Chief  Justice  Hale  more  than 
two  hundred  years  ago,  in  his  treatise  De  Portibus  Maris,  1 
Ilarg.  L.  Tr.,  78,  and  has  been  accepted  without  objection  as 
an  essential  element  in  the  law  of  property  ever  since.  Prop- 
erty does  become  clothed  wdth  a  public  interest  when  used  in  a 
manner  to  make  it  of  public  consequence,  and  affect  the  com- 
munity at  large.  AVhen,  therefore,  one  devotes  his  property  to 
a  use  in  which  the  public  has  an  interest,  he,  in  effect,  grants 
to  the  public  an  interest  in  that  use,  and  must  submit  to  be 
controlled  by  the  public  for  the  common  good,  to  the  extent  of 
the  interest  he  has  thus  created.  He  may  withdraw  his  grant 
by  discontinuing  the  use ;  but,  so  long  as  he  maintains  the  use, 
he  must  submit  to  the  control." 

What  is  a  "just  and  reasonable"  charge  is  not  always  easily 
determinable,  but  that  is  the  desideratum  sought  by  the  law. 
Whether  or  not  a  particular  rate  on  a  single  commodity  is  in 
and  of  itself  just  and  reasonable  cannot  be  demonstrated.' 
Certain  principles  and  presumptions  have  been  made  use  of  by 
the  courts  and  commission  in  determining  cases  that  came  be- 
fore them,  biit  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  rate  making  is  a 
science.  Very  early  in  its  history,  the  commission  expressed 
the  difficulty  of  determining  what  constituted  a  just  rate  as 
follows : 

2.     Munn  v.  Illinois.  94  U.  S.,  4  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  138  Ga.  625,  75  S. 

Otto   113,   24   L.   Ed.   77,    84.      Mr.  E.   1041,  42  L.  R.  A.    (N.   S.)    541, 

.Justice     Hill      of     the     Supreme  1913E,  Ann.   Gas.   609. 

Court  of  Georgia  traced  the  prin-  3.    National  Hay  Asso.  v.  Lake 

ciple  of  regulation  back  to  Ham-  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  9   I.  C.  C. 

murabi;     see   Stephens  v.   Central  264,  303,  304,  30.'>, 


§  80A]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  313 

"The  question  of  the  reasonableness  of  rates  is  always  a  per- 
plexing one.  A  great  variety  of  considerations  are  necessarily 
involved  in  each  instance.  Theory  and  conjecture  merely  are 
not  enough.  A  comparison  of  one  isolated  rate  with  another  is 
not  sufficient.  The  whole  field  must  be  considered  in  order  to 
approximate  justice,  and  at  best  the  result  cannot  be  regarded 
as  other  than  an  approximation."  * 

In  the  1910  AYestern  Rate  Advance  case"  Mr.  Commissioner 
Lane  discussed  the  principles  from  which  could  be  determined 
what  is  a  reasonable  rate  and  in  concluding  the  opinion  of  the 
Commission  in  that  case  said:  "We  are  dealing  here  with  a 
difficult  problem,  involving  multitudinous  facts  and  an  infinite 
variety  of  modifying  conditions,  which  make  the  establishment 
of  principles  and  the  framing  of  policies  a  matter  of  slow  evo- 
lution." 

Some  of  the  principles  announced  by  the  courts  and  the  com- 
mission will  be  stated  in  the  next  succeeding  sections. 

§  80A.  Rule  Applied  to  Accessorial  Services. — It  will  be 
noted  that  the  charges  "in  connection"  with  transportation 
are  included  within  the  requirement  of  reasonableness.  The 
same  reason  applies  to  charges  for  demurrage,"  refrigeration,' 
delivery,^  terminal  charges,"  as  well  as  any  other  charges  made 
for  any  service  connected  with  transportation.  The  Supreme 
Court,  however,  has  held,  reversing  the  Commission  and  the 
lower  courts,  that  carriers  are  entitled,  for  a  service  and  ex- 
pense in  stopping  goods  in  transit,  to  compensation  in  addition 
to  the  actual  expenses  incurred.'"  Many  services  in  connection 
with  the  receipt,  delivery,  elevation  and  transfer  in  transit, 

4.  Howell  V.  New  York.  L.  E.  8.  St.  Louis  Hay  &  Grain  Co.  v. 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  2  L  C.  C.  272,  2  I.  C.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  11  I.  C. 
R.  162.  C.  82,  87. 

5.  Advances  in  Rates,  Western  9.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago,  B. 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307.  &  Q.   R.   Co.,    186   U.   S.    320,   342, 

6.  Penn  Millers'  Asso.  v.  Phila-  46  L.  Ed.  1182,  22  Sup.  Ct.  824; 
delphia  &  R.  R.  Co.,  8  I.  C.  C.  Cattle  Raisers'  Asso.  v.  Chicago, 
531,  558.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co..  12  I.  C.  C.  507. 

7.  Re  Charges   for   Transporta-  10.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 
tion   and    Refrig.^ration    of   Fruit,  Hay   &  Grain   Co.,   214   U.   S.   297, 
11    I.    C.    C.    129,    Knudson-Fergu-  53  L.  Ed.  1004,  29  Sup.  Ct.  678. 
son   Fruit   Co.   v.    Mich.    Cent.    R. 

Co.,  148  Fed.  968,  79  C.  C.  A.  483. 


314  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  81 

ventilation,  refrigeration  or  icing  (including  heating),  storage 
and  handling  of  property  transported/'  are  not  separately 
charged  for  but  the  charge  is  included  in  the  general  charge 
for  the  line  haul.  The  Supreme  Court  has  "decided  that,  as 
for  a  through  rate  to  a  given  point,  the  carrier  contracted  to 
deliver  at  that  point,  the  presumption  was  that  the  through 
rate  included  adequate  compensation  for  the  services  rendered 
at  the  point  of  delivery."  '" 

In  the  Five  Per  Cent  Case,  31  I.  C.  C.  351  the  Commission 
expressed  the  view  that  every  service  should  be  charged  for; 
and  later  in  referring  to  this  view,  Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan 
spoke  of  the  soundness  of  the  principle  and  the  propriety  of  its 
application.'''  Unquestionably  all  services  should  be  charged 
for  at  a  reasonable  rate ;  but  as  stated,  the  charge  for  the  ac- 
cessorial service  is  frequently  included  in  the  charge  for  the 
principal  service.  The  objection  to  one  charge  is  that  only 
some  of  the  shippers  receive  the  accessorial  service ;  and  when 
there  is  only  one  charge,  all  the  shippers  pay  the  same  charge. 
This  is  a  preference  to  the  shipper  who  receives  the  accessorial 
services  and  a  disadvantage  to  the  shipper  who  gets  no  such 
service,  but  paj-s  the  same  rate  as  the  shipper  who  does. 

Insurance  premiums  on  property  stored  by  the  carrier  in  a 
])ublic  warehouse  pending  acceptance  by  a  consignee  are  no 
part  of  transportation  and  not  subject  to  regulation  by  the 
Commission.^* 

§  81.  Classification. — Classification  of  commodities  for  rate 
making  is  adopted  in  prescribing  rates.  Most  traffic, 
especially  the  more  valuable  articles,  moves  under  classified 
rates ;  the  heavier  articles  are  given  what  is  called  commodity 
rates.  There  are  in  the  United  States  several  ditferent  classi- 
fications. Confusion  and  sometimes  unjust  discrimination  re- 
sult from  these  difiPerent  classifications  when  the  traffic  moves 

11.  Sec.  337,  iwst.  13.    Cheese  Dealers  Asso.  Co.  v. 

12.  Covington  Stock  Yards  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C. 
Keith,  139  U.  S.  128,  35  L.  Ed.  73,       1,  3. 

11  Sup.  Ct.  461,  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  14.    Cotton  Seed  Products  Co.  v. 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co..  186  U.  S.       St.   L.   S.   F.  Ry.   Co.,   53   I.  C.   C. 
320,  336,  46  L.  Ed.  1182,  1191,   22       574. 
Sup.  Ct.  824;  Duluth  Dockage  Ab- 
sorption, 44  I.  C.  C.  300,  302. 


§  81]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  315 

through  territory  where  different  classification  rules  and  de- 
scriptions api)ly.  Efforts  have  been  made  by  representatives 
of  the  carriers  and  commissions,  national  and  state,  to  remedy 
this  condition  by  the  adoption  of  a  uniform  system  of  classi- 
fication. In  some  sections  there  are  commodities  which  do  not 
exist  in  others.  Long  existing  systems  in  reliance  upon  whish 
business  has  been  established  and  prospered,  are  facts  which 
make  difficult  a  solution  of  the  problem.  But  it  is  not,  as  said 
by  Mr.  Commissioner  Lane,  "fanciful  to  say"  that  a  solution 
may  be  arrived  at.  The  learned  Commissioner  in  the  same  con- 
nection stated  some  principles  which  must  b'e  considered.  He 
said:  "Supplement  cost  with  scientific  classification  of 
freight  *  *  *  and  we  have  something  certainly  more 
nearly  akin  to  reason  than  the  hazard  of  a  traffic  manager, 
no  matter  how  benevolently  inclined.'"^ 

It  is  the  duty  of  carriers  subject  to  the  act  to  regulate  com- 
merce "to  establish,  observe  and  enforce  reasonable  classifica- 
tion of  property  for  transportation,"  and  the  commission  may 
"enter  upon  a  hearing  concerning  the  propriety  of  sucli 
*  *  *  classification."  "May  determine  and  prescribe 
what  will  be  the  just  and  reasonable,  *  *  *  individual  or 
joint  classification."'"  Classification  like  the  other  details  in 
rate  making  is  not  an  exact  science."  In  framing  classifica- 
tions and  rates,  no  one  consideration  is  controlling.  Bulk,  value, 
liability  to  waste  or  injury  in  transit,  weight,  form  in  which 
tendered,  etc.,  must  be  taken  into  consideration."  "  All  classi- 
fications must  be  made  with  due  regard  to  these  and  kindred 
considerations.  IMarket  conditions  and  the  promotion  of  com- 
petition are  also  facts  which  are  considered.  Classification 
must  not.  of  course,  be  made  to  benefit  one,  or  a  few  shippers 
and   must   be   without   discrimination.^"     The  Interstate  Com- 

15.  Advance  in  Rates,  Western  man  &  Erbe  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Atchi- 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307.  362.  son,   T.   &   S.   F.   R.   Co.,   15   I.   C. 

16.  Sec.  a95,  j)Ost.  Re  Advances      C.   260,  262. 

on    Coal   to   Lake    Ports,    22    I.   C.  19.    McClung  &  Co.  v.  Southern 

C.  604,  623,  624.  Ry.    Co.,    22    I.    C.    C.    582,    584; 

17.  Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  Sutherland  Bros.  v.  St.  Louis  & 
V.  Ann  Arbor  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  259,  262. 
205,  206.  The     difficulties     encountered     in 

18.  Ford  Co.  v.  Michigan  Central  making  rates  between  different 
R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  507,  509,  Yaw-       classification    territories    are    dis- 


316  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [^  81 

lueree  Commission  in  the  Western  Classification  case'"  dealt  at 
length  witli  the  general  subject.  The  ojiinion  of  the  Commis- 
sion, written  by  Mr.  Commissioner  Meyer,  begins  with  the 
statement  that  classification  is  a  public  function,  and  that  com- 
mittees engaged  in  making  or  changing  classifications  should 
conduct  their  business  as  public,  giving  full  information  to 
shippers  and  Commissioners,  state  and  national,  that  there 
may  be  opportunity  for  public  hearings.  Further  principles 
were  stated:  "For  years  past  the  Western  Classification 
Committee  has  complied  to  a  certain  extent  what  are  de- 
signated classification  units.  These  units  as  complied  are  a 
combination  or  sum  of  unlike  parts,  but  may  be  expressed  with 
equal  propriety  as  a  product  composed  of  unlike  factors.  They 
are  intended  to  express  the  relation  to  one  another  of  weight, 
space,  and  value.  AVhile  a  unit  test  of  this  character  may  not 
finally  determine  the  classification  of  an  article,  it  constitutes 
a  basis  for  comparison  with  other  articles.  AVhen  all  the  modi- 
fying conditio]is  and  facts  are  known,  a  fair  classification  re- 
lation may  be  established  among  articles  through  the  aid  of 
this  classification  unit.  A  compilation  of  classification  units 
just  as  far  as  practicable  for  CA^ery  item  in  the  classification 
would  doubtless  be  of  substantial  value  in  the  present  forma- 
tive w^ork.  The  classification  is  in  an  inchoate  state.  Perhaps 
every  classification  must  remain  so.  Constant  change  appears 
to  be  inherent  in  industrial  life."  In  discussing  the  rules 
which  should  apply  in  making  a  uniform  classification,  it  was 
said:  "The  uniform  classification  must  be  worked  out  with- 
out an  attempt  to  affect  revenues.  Classification  and  rates  and 
revenues  should  be  kept  entirely  separate.  There  will  doubt- 
less be  many  coincidences  in  which  the  present  rate  applied  to 
the  new  classification  will  bring  ab'out  the  exact  transportation 
charge  which  results  from  the  old  rate  applied  to  the  old  classi- 
fication. In  other  cases  the  rate  must  be  advanced  or  reduced, 
depending  upon  the  change  in  the  classification  of  the  article 
in  order  to  protect  existing  revenues.  This  is  entirely  without 
reference  to  the  sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of  present  revenues. 

cussed     in     Interior     Iowa     Cites       R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  256. 

Case,   28   I.    C.   C.   64,   72,    and   in  20.    Western  Classification  Case, 

Mempliis    v.    Chicago   R.    I.    &    P.       25  I.  C.   C.  442. 


§  81A]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  31.7 

which  is  a  distinct  and  very  different  question.  It  would  only 
complicate  and  confuse  matters  to  attempt,  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  the  classification,  to  bring  about  a  revision  in 
rates  and  charges.  Whether  a  rate  is  too  high  or  too  low  should 
be  made  a  separate  issue  distinct  from  classification.  Never- 
theless, as  far  as  possible,  the  establishment  of  ratings  and  the 
publication  of  rates  should  follow  changes  in  the  classification 
very  closely.  A  classification  is  a  universal  tariff  from  which 
the  schedules  of  individual  carriers  should  not  depart,  except 
in  cases  demanded  by  special  conditions.  Commodity  tariffs  in 
restricted  numbers  Avill  probably  always  remain  a  necessity." 

In  the  1915  Western  Rate  Advance  Case,"  F.  H.  Millard,  a 
witness  for  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  presented 
the  result  of  studies  seeking  to  measure  the  extent  to  which  the 
value  of  the  commodity  should  constitute  a  norm  in  rate-mak- 
ing and  rate-judging.  These  studies  are  shown  in  the  appen- 
dix to  the  report  of  the  Commission  in  that  case. 

The  Consolidated  Classification  Case,  which  is  Volume  54  of 
the  Commission's  reports,  combines  and  to  some  extent  makes 
uniform,  the  several  classifications.  Perishable  Freight  In- 
vestigation 56  I.  C.  C.  449-671  is  a  further  step  towards  uni- 
formity. 

Classification  descriptions  must  necessarily  be  somewhat 
general  and  cannot  go  into  minute  details." 

In  classification  certain  rates  are  made  from  territories  de- 
scribed M'ith  a  fixed  relationship.  These  territories  are  called 
"defined  territories"  and  are  described  and  mapped  in  38  I. 
C.  C.  153,  154. 

§  81A.  Class  and  Commodity  Rates. — The  number  of  classes 
varies  in  the  three  general  classifications  and  in  such  state 
classifications  as  exist.  So  also  the  relationship  of  the  several 
classes  differs  in  the  different  classifications  and  sometimes  in 
the  same  classification.  The  Commission  in  Consolidated  Clas- 
sification Case  54  I.  C.  C.  11,  said:  "While  it  is  possible  to  re- 

21.  Western  Rate  Advance  Case  C.  15,  17.  See  for  factors  to  be 
1915,  35  I.  C.  C.  497.  considered,    National    Society    of 

22.  Casket  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  B.  &  Records  v.  A.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C. 
O.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  I.  C.  C.  327;    Acme  C.  347,  355,  and  Sec.  161,  post. 
Belting  Co.  v.  A.  &  R.  Co.,  52  I.  C. 


318  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§82 

move  many  of  the  present  inconsistencies  without  changes  in 
rate  scales,  it  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  an  absolutely 
uniform  classification  could  be  prepared  and  proposed  only  in 
connection  with  a  universal  system  of  rate  scales  having  a  uni- 
form number  of  classes.  In  our  view  a  desirable  arrangement 
would  be  to  have  in  each  scale  at  least  ten  classes  related 
somewhat  as  shoAvn  below ;  practically  all  less-than-carload 
traffic,  to  be  confined  to  the  first  four  classes,  and  a  redistribu- 
tion made  of  the  articles  in  the  carload  classes : 

Classes 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 

Percentages  .    .  .  100     85     70     60     45     35     30     25     22i/o  20 
Many  articles  that  now  move  under  commodity  rates  and 
under  exceptions  to  the  classifications  could  be  assigned  rat- 
ings in  such  a  scale  that  would  result  in  the  application  of 
rates  not  substantially  higher  or  lower  than  now  apply." 

The  greater  number  of  commodities  are  given  class  rates. 
Some  commodities  moving  in  large  volume  are  assigned  rates 
applicable  especially  to  the  named  commodity.  These  are  called 
"Commodity  Rates;"  and,  as  a  rule,  are  lower  than  the  class 
rate  on  the  same  commodity."^  As  said  by  the  Commission/* 
"There  can  be  no  question  about  the  propriety  of  commodity 
rates  where  conditions  justify  such  departures  from  the  regu- 
lar class  rates." 

§  82.  Cost  of  Carrier's  Equipment. — Bonded  indebtedness, 
operating  expenses  and  dividends  on  the  investment  of  the 
carrier  all  enter  into  the  "cost  of  service"  and  should  be 
considered,  but  the  indebtedness  and  the  stock  upon  which 
dividends  are  sought  must  represent  actual  obligations  con- 
tracted in  good  faith  and  the  expenses  must  be  actual  and 
reasonable. ^^  ]\Ir.  Commissioner  Prouty/"  discussing  this 
question,  aptly  says:  "To  make  the  capital  account  of  our 
railroads  the  measure  of  their  legitimate  earnings  would  place, 

23.  Sulphuric  Acid  from  New  Re  Alleged  Excessive  Rates  on 
Orleans,  42  I.  C.  C.  200,  202  and  Pood  Products,  4  I.  C.  C.  48,  116. 
cases  cited.  26.    Grain  Shippers'  Asso.  v.  111. 

24.  Rates  and  Rules  on  ship-  Cent.  R.  Co.,  8  I.  C.  C.  158,  182. 
ments  of  Packing  House  Products,  See  also  Re  Proposed  Advance  in 
36  I.  C.  C.  62,  69.  Freight    Rates,    9    I.    C.    C.    382, 

25.  Dow  V.  Beidelman,  125  U.  S.  where  is  found  a  full  discussion 
680,  31  L.  Ed.  841,  8  Sup.  Ct.  1028.       of  the  question. 


§  81]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  319 

as  a  rule,  the  corporation  which  has  been  honestly  managed 
from  the  outset  under  enormous  disadvantages."  What  the 
company  is  entitled  to  ask  is  a  fair  return  upon  the  value 
of  that  which  it  employs  for  the  public  convenience."  In 
considering  the  value  of  the  property  employed  in  serving 
the  public,  it  must  be  remembered  that  such  a  test  is  not 
absolute  and,  at  times,  yields  to  the  public  interest  and  the 
rule  as  to  the  value  of  service,  both  of  which  are  discussed 
hereinafter.  The  cost  and  value  of  the  railroad  properties 
are  among  the  various  facts  which  may  be  considered  in 
determining  what  in  a  particular  case  constitutes  a  reason- 
able rate. 

The  value  of  property  employed  for  the  public  convenience 
is  an  important  element  in  determining  the  reasonableness 
of  a  Avhole  schedule  of  rates.  It  can  be  of  little  value  in. 
determining  the  reasonaHleness  of  rates  on  a  particular  com- 
modity. This  is  true  because  no  method  has  ever  yet  been 
devised  by  w^hieh  the  cost  of  moving  a  particular  commodity 
can  be  determined.  AVhether  or  not  such  commodity 
is  bearing  its  proper  proportion  of  the  charges  that  must  t)c 
received  to  make  "a  fair  return"  to  the  carrier  is  a  question 
that  can  not  yet,  if  ever,  be  answered.  It  is  true  that  certain 
out-of-pocket  expenses  can  be  allocated,  but  the  proportion 
of  the  cost  of  maintenance,  general  superintendence  and 
other  general  expenses  which  should  be  charged  against  a 
particular  movement  can  not  be  determined  with  any  degree 
of  certainty.  The  rule  announced  in,  Smyth  v.  Ames  supra, 
is  as  follows : 

"We  hold,  however,  that  the  basis  of  all  calculations  as 
to  the  reasonableness  of  rates  to  be  charged  by  a  corporation 
maintaining  a  highway  under  legislative  sanction  must  be 
the  fair  value  of  the  property  being  used  by  it-  for  the  con- 
veyance of  the  public.    And,  in  order  to  ascertain  that  value, 

27.  Smyth  v.  Ames  (Nebraska  Water  Co.,  212  U.  S.  1,  53  L. 
Freight  Rate  Case),  169  U.  S.  Ed.  371,  29  Sup.  Ct.  148;  Brab- 
446,  42  L.  Ed.  S19,  18  Sup.  Ct.  ham  v.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co..  11 
418;  Covington  &  Lexington  Turn-  I.  C.  C.  464,  473;  Wilcox  v.  Con- 
pike  R.  Co.  V.  Sandford.  164  U.  solidated  Gas  Co.,  212  U.  S.  19 
S.  578,  41  L.  Ed.  560,  17  Sup.  53  L.  Ed.  382,  29  Sup.  Ct.  192, 
Ct.    198;     Knoxville   v.   Knoxville  15  Ann.  Cas.  1034. 


320  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  82 

the  original  cost  of  construction,  the  amount  expended  in 
permanent  improvements,  the  amount  and  market  value  of 
its  bonds  and  stock,  the  present  as  compared  with  the  orig- 
inal cost  of  construction,  the  probable  earning  capacity  of  the 
property  under  particular  rates  prescribed  by  statute,  and 
the  sum  required  to  meet  operating  expenses,  are  all  matters 
for  consideration,  and  are  to  be  given  such  weight  as  may 
be  just  and  right  in  each  case.  We  do  not  say  that  there 
may  not  be  other  matters  to  be  regarded  in  estimating  the 
value  of  the  property.  What  the  company  is  entitled  to 
ask  is  a  fair  return  upon  the  value  of  that  which  it  employs 
for  the  public  convenience.  On  the  other  hand,  what  the 
pu])lie  is  entitled  to  demand  is  that  no  more  be  exacted  from 
it  for  the  use  of  a  public  highway  than  the  services  rendered 
by  it  are  reasonably  worth" 

Tt  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  this  oft  quoted  rule  formu- 
lated by  the  Supreme  Court  was  announced  in  a  suit  to  enjoin 
an  act  "To  Regulate  Railroads,  to  Classify  Freights,  to  Fix 
Reasonable  Maximum  Rates  to  be  Charged  for  the  Transporta- 
tion of  Freights  upon  Each  of  the  Railroads  in  the  State  of 
Nebraska,  and  to  Provide  Penalties  for  the  Violation  of  this 
Act."  While  the  rule  is  a  correct  rule  of  law,  as  limited  by 
the  last  sentence  of  the  foregoing  quotation,  when  considered 
in  reference  to  a  general  schedule  of  rates,  it  cannot  be 
practically  applied  to  a  particular  rate.  Even  with  reference 
to  a  general  schedule  of  rates  it  should  b!e  construed  in  con- 
nection with  the  decision  of  the  case  of  Covington  &  Lexington 
Turnpike  R.  Co.  v.  Sanford,""  where  the  same  distinguished 
Judge,  Mr.  Justice  ITarlan,  who  wrote  the  opinion  in  Smyth  v. 
Ames,  said : 

"It  is  proper  to  say  that  if  the  answer  had  not  alleged,  in 
substance,  tliat  the  tolls  prescribed  by  the  Act  of  1890  were 
wholly  inadequate  for  keeping  the  road  in  proper  repair  and 
for  earning  dividends,  we  could  not  say  that  the  act  was  un- 
constitutional merely  because  the  company  (as  was  alleged  and 
as  the  demurrer  admitted)  could  not  earn  more  than  4  per 
cent  on  its  capital  stock.  Tt  cannot  be  said  that  a  corporation 
operating  a  public  highway  is  entitled,  as  of  right,  and  with- 

28.   Supra,  note  27. 


§  82]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  321. 

out  reference  to  the  interests  of  the  public,  to  realize  a 
given  per  cent  upon  its  capital  stock.  When  the  question 
arises  whether  the  legislature  has  exceeded  its  constitutional 
power  in  prescribing  rates  to  be  charged  by  a  corporation 
controlling  a  public  highway,  stockholders  are  not  the  only 
persons  whose  rights  or  interests  are  to  be  considered.  The 
rights  of  the  public  are  not  to  be  ignored.  It  is  alleged  here 
that  the  rates  prescribed  are  unreasonable  and  unjust  to  the 
company  and  its  stockholders.  But  that  involves  an  inquiry 
as  to  what  is  reasonable  and  just  for  the  public.  If  the  es- 
tablishing of  new  lines  of  transportation  should  cause  a  dimi- 
nution in  the  number  of  those  who  need  to  use  a  turn- 
pike road,  and  consequently,  a  diminution  in  the  tolls 
collected,  that  is  not  in  itself,  a  sufficient  reason  why 
the  corporation,  operating  the  road,  should  be  allowed 
to  maintain  rates  that  would  be  unjust  to  those  who 
must  or  do  use  its  property.  The  public  cannot  properly  be 
subjected  to  unreasonable  rates  in  order  simply  that  stock- 
holders may  earn  dividends.  The  legislature  has  the  authority 
in  every  case,  where  its  power  has  not  been  restrained  by 
conti'act,  to  proceed  upon  the  ground  that  the  public  may 
not  rightfully  be  i-equired  to  submit  to  unreasonable  exactions 
for  the  use  of  a  public  highway  established  and  maintained 
under  legislative  authority.  If  a  corporation  cannot  main- 
tain such  a  highway  and  earn  dividends  for  stockholders,  it 
is  a  misfortune  for  it  and  them  which  the  constitution  does 
not  require  to  be  remedied  by  imposing  unjust  burdens  upon 
the  public." 

Value  given  to  property  by  reason  of  its  excessive  earning 
liower  should  not  be  considered,  although  the  reasonable  value 
of  a  franchise  is  an  element  in  arriving  at  the  total  value 
of  property. 

The  amendment  giving  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission jurisdiction  to  make  a  valuation  of  the  carrier's  prop- 
erty"" will,  when  the  work  thereunder  is  com])leted,  furnish  a 
valuation  which  can  be  used  in  rate-making  and  rate-judging 
In  the  meantime  the  ''cost  of  road  and  equipment"  furnishes 

29.    Section  420,  post. 


322  Chabges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  eto.  [§  83 

a  "usable"  basis  which  the  Commission  applies. "^  In  rate- 
judging  and  rate-making  by  an  administrative  body  perform- 
ing the  legislative  function  of  determining  what  shall  be  the 
rate  for  the  future,  a  different  question  is  presented  from 
that  which  arises  when  a  court  has  for  determination  the 
(luestion  of  the  confiscatory  character  of  a  rate  prescribed  by 
a  r^)/a.s?'-legislative  tribunal.  The  Commission  may  and  should 
consider  all  questions  affecting  the  movement  of  the  par- 
ticular traffic,  such  as  competition,  classification,  the  public 
interests,  and  all  of  the  elements  which  enter  into  the  general 
question  of  reasonableness.  In  considering  the  questions  so 
presented,  Commissioners  have  to  survey  a  wider  field  and 
have  greater  latitude  than  the  courts,  which  are  limited  to 
the  question,  does  the  rate  involved  constitute  m  substance 
the  taking  of  property  without  due  compensation.  This  ques- 
tion is  discussed,  sec.  46  supra. 

The  principles  stated  are  not  changed  by  Transportation 
Act  1920,  Section  15a;  but  that  section  gives  additional  de- 
tails in  stating  the  principles. 

§  83.  Cost  of  Carrier's  Equipment — What  Is  a  Reasonable 
Return. — On  the  question  of  what  is  a  reasonable  return,  the 
Supreme  Court  has  said  :"^ 

"There  is  no  particular  rate  of  compensation  which  must 
in  all  cases  and  in  all  parts  of  the  country  be  regarded  as 
sufBcient  for  capital  invested  in  business  enterprises.  Such 
compensation  may  depend  greatly  upon  circumstances  and 
locality ;  among  other  things,  the  amount  of  risk  in  the  busi- 
ness is  a  most  important  factor,  as  well  as  the  locality  where 
the  business  is  conducted  and  the  rate  expected  and  usually 
realized  there  upon  investments  of  a  somewhat  similar  nature 
with  vegaT'd  to  the  risk  attending  them.  There  may  b^  other 
matters  which  in  some  cases  might  also  be  properly  taken  into 
account  in  determining  the  rate  which  an  investor  might 
properly  expect  or  hope  to  receive  and  which  he  would  be 
entitled  to  without  legislative  interference.  The  less  risk, 
the  less  right  tf)  any  unusual  returns  upon  the  investment." 

30.    Advances  in  Rates,  Eastern  325;    Western  Rate  Advance  Case 

Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  Western  Case,  1915,  35  T.  C.  C.  497. 

20    I.   C.   C.    307;     Five   Per   Cent  31.     SM?;?-a  Note  27,  this  chapter, 

Case,  31   I.  C.  C   SSI,  32  I.  C.  C  Consolidated  Gas  Co.  case. 


§  83]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  323 

In  this  ease  the  whole  schedule  of  rates  was  involved  and 
six  per  cent  Avas  held  to  be  reasonable,  the  court  saying: 
"Taking  all  facts  into  consideration,  we  concur  with  the  court 
below  on  this  question,  and  think  complainant  is  entitled  to 
six  per  cent  on  the  fair  value  of  its  property  devoted  to  the 
public  use." 

In  the  Knoxville  Water  Case,"'  the  Supreme  Court  announced 
a  rule  as  to  depreciation  as  follows : 

"Before  coming  to  the  question  of  profit  at  all  the  company 
is  entitled  to  earn  a  sufficient  sum  annually  to  provide  not  only 
for  current  repairs  but  for  making  good  the  depreciation  and 
replacing  the  parts  of  the  property  when  they  come  to  the 
end  of  their  life.  The  company  is  not  bound  to  see  its  prop- 
erty gradually  waste,  wtihout  making  provision  out  of  earn- 
ings for  its  replacement.  It  is  entitled  to  see  that  from  earn- 
ings the  value  of  the  property  invested  is  kept  unimpaired, 
so  that  at  the  end  of  any  given  term  of  years  the  original 
investment  remaius  as  it  was  at  the  beginning.  It  is  not 
only  the  right  of  the  company  to  make  such  a  provision, 
but  it  is  its  duty  to  its  bond  and  stockholders,  and,  in  the 
case  of  a  public  service  corporation  at  least,  its  plain  duty 
to  the  public.  If  a  different  course  were  pursued  the  only 
method  of  providing  for  replacement  of  property  which  has 
ceased  to  be  useful  would  be  the  investment  of  new  capital 
and  the  issue  of  new  bonds  or  stocks." 

The  rule  has  no  application  to  the  rates  charged  by  express 
companies     Mr.  Commissioner  Prouty  said  :^^ 

"In  passing  upon  an  entire  schedule  of  railway  rates  (and 
when  in  this  proceeding  we  pass  upon  the  base  rate  of  these 
defendants  we  really  consider  their  entire  schedule)  the 
controlling  factor  is  the  value  of  the  property  which  is  de- 
voted to  the  public  service.  The  cost  of  originally  produc- 
ing or  of  reproducing  that  property  is  an  important  considera- 
tion, as  is  also  the  capitalization  of  the  company  and  the 
value  of  its  securities.  In  revising  the  rates  of  these  express 
companies  those  considerations  can  have  bjut  little  weight, 
since  there  is  no  real  relation  between  the  value  of  the  prop- 

32.   Supm.  Note  27,  this  chapter.  33.     Kindel    v.    Adams    Express 

Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  475,  485. 


324  Chargp:s  for  Transportation  of  Persons^  etc.  [§  84 

erty  and  the  service  performed,  nor  in  the  case  of  these 
companies,  between  their  capital  stock  and  just  earnings." 

Increased  cost  of  labor  and  equipment  makes  the  cost  of 
service  higher,  but  this  is  generally  offset  by  increased  ef- 
ficiency. This  (juestion  is  interestingly  discussed  and  valuable 
tables  given  in  the  case  of  Re  Class  and  Commodity  Rates  from 
St.  Louis  to  Texas  Common  Points,  11  1.  C.  C.  238,  et  seq.,  and 
in  Sec.  47  supra,  other  cases  are  cited  and  discussed. 

The  Transportation  Act,  1920,  Section  15a,  paragraphs  3 
to  6  prescribe  for  "carriers  as  a  whole  or  as  a  whole"  in 
each  *  *  *  rate"  group  a  standard  of  Syo  per  centum  as 
a  minimum  which  shall  constitute  until  March  1,  1922  a  fair 
return  on  the  "aggregate  property  value."  The  Commission 
may  after  ]\larch   1,   1922  change  this  percentage. 

§  84.  Same  Subject.  Difficulties  in  Determining  the  Ques- 
tion.— ^It  is  easy  to  state  the  fundamental  ]-ule  announced  in 
Smyth  \.  Ames,  supra,  that  the  fair  value  of  the  property 
used  for  the  public  convenience  shall  be  taken  as  a  basis  for 
determining  the  reasonableness  of  a  schedule  of  rates,  but 
the  difficulty  arises  in  determining  Avhat  is  a  "fair  value" — 
AA^lio  is  to  fix  this  value?  What  fact  must  of  necessity  be 
considered  in  arriving  at  this  determination? 

Primarily  the  rate-making  body  must  determine  what  the 
fair  value  is.  and  such  determination  has  a  force  which  the 
courts  must  regard.  In  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,"*  the 
Supreme  Court  said:  "The  rate-making  power  is  a  legislative 
power,  and  necessarily  implies  a  range  of  legislative  dis- 
cretion. We  do  not  sit  as  a  board  of  revision  to  substitute 
our  judgment  for  that  of  the  Legislature,  or  of  the  com- 
mission, lawfully  constituted  by  it,  as  to  matters  within  the 
province  of  either."  While  this  is  true,  neither  a  legislature 
nor  a  commission  can  confiscate  the  property  of  a  public  utility 
company,  and  the  courts  must  therefore  determine,  when 
properly  applied  to,  w^hether  or  not  a  particular  rate  or 
schedule  of  rates  violates  the  constitutional  rights  of  the 
carrier  or  other  person  or  corporation  engaged  in  a  public 

34.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  Land  &  Town  Co.  v.  Jasper,  189  U. 
S.  352,  433,  434,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  S.  439,  446,  47  L,.  Ed.  892,  23  Sup. 
Sup.    Ct.    729,    citing    San    Diego      Ct.  571. 


§  84]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  32& 

service,  Avhose  rates  have  been  prescribed  by  the  legislature, 
or  under  its  authority.  Congress  has  empowered  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  to  make  a  physical  valuation  of 
railroads,  but  to  do  this  will  require  years  and  even  w^hen  it  is 
done  the  question  will  not  be  entirely  settled.  In  the  Minne- 
sota Rate  cases,  supra  much  testimony  was  taken  as  to 
value,  relative  cost,  expenses,  etc.,  but  the  Supreme  Court 
rejected  the  proof  as  not  adequate — the  Court  did  however 
announce  certain  general  and  fundamental  principles.  It 
was  there  held  that  (1)  the  basis  of  the  calculation  is  the 
fair  value  of  the  property,  used  for  the  convenience  of  the 
public;  (2)  that  such  value  was  not  to  be  determined  by  ar- 
bitrary rules,  but  cost  of  construction  of  improvements,  the 
market  value  of  stock  and  bonds,  the  present  as  compared 
wnth  the  original  cost  of  construction  the  probable  earning 
capacity  under  the  rates  prescribed  must  be  considered.  And 
after  quoting  from  Smyth  v.  Ames  the  Court  concluded  "AVe 
do  not  say  there  may  not  be  other  matters  to  ble  regarded  in 
determining  the  value  of  the  property."  And  when  a  carrier 
is  engaged  in  both  interstate  and  intrastate  transportation, 
and  a  rate  is  prescribed  for  intrastate  movements  the  court 
announced  a  third  principle  as  follows:  The  question  "must 
be  determined  by  considering  separately  the  value  of  the 
property  employed  in  the  intrastate  business,  and  the  compen- 
sation allowed  in  the  business  under  the  rule  prescribed." 

In  the  Indiana  case''"  further  emphasis  was  given  to  the  fact 
that  prescribing  rates  was  a  legislative  function,  and  when 
rates  are  so  prescribed  by  a  lawfully  authorized  tribunal  the 
carriers  seeking  to  set  them  aside  must  make  definite  and 
satisfactory  proof. 

In  the  1910  AVestern  Rate  Advance  case  it  was  contended 
upon  the  part  of  one  of  the  carriers  that  "it  is  immaterial  how 
the  property  was  acquir'ed,  what  it  originally  cost,  whether 
the  present  value  may  be  claimed  to  be  in  part  the  result 
of  earnings  put  back  into  the  property  in  betterments  or  is 
due  to  growth  of  traf^c  and  development  of  the  country  serv- 

S.5.  Wood  V.  Vandalia  R.  Co.,  231 
U.  S.  1,  58  L.  Ed.  97,  34  Sup.  Ct.  7. 


o26  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  85 

ed."™  This  contention  was  denied  by  the  Commission,  Mr. 
Commissioner  Lane  saying : 

"Notwithstanding  these  decisions,  it  remains  for  the  Su- 
preme Court  yet  to  decide  that  a  public  agency,  such  as  a  rail- 
j'oad  created  by  public  authority,  vested  with  governmental 
jiuthority.  may  continuously  increase  its  rates  in  proportion 
to  its  value,  either  (1)  because  of  betterments  it  has  made 
(tut  of  income,  or  (2)  because  of  the  growth  of  the  property 
in  \alue  due  to  the  increase  in  the  value  of  the  land  which 
the  company  owns." 

This  answer  is  fully  supported  by  the  subsequent  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  Cases  and  other 
like  state  rate  cases  decided  about  the  same  time/'  This 
principle  must  not,  however,  be  given  too  broad  an  applica- 
tion. Construed  in  the  light  of  the  decisions  cited  it  does  not 
deny  a  carrier  returns  on  investments  merely  because  such 
investments  may  have  been  made  from  earnings  or  may  have 
resulted  from  an  increase  in  the  value  of  the  original  invest- 
ment, l)ut  the  principle  would  prevent  charging  unreasonable 
rates  even  though  such  rates  were  necessary  to  earn  a  fair 
return  on  the  investment. 

§  85.  Cost  of  Service. — The  value  of  the  equipment  of  a 
common  carrier,  is  an  element  in  determining  what  it  costs 
to  transport  any  particular  commodity,  and  what  such  cost 
is,  that  is  the  "cost  of  service,"  is  a  fact  that  is  properly  con- 
sidered in  determining  what  is  a  reasonable  and  just  rate  to 

36.  Advances  in  Rates,  Western  Town  Co.  v.  National  City,  74  Fed. 
Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  339.  In  79;  Matthews  v.  Board  of  Corn- 
support  of  tliis  claim  these  cases  missioncrs,  106  Fed.  9. 
were  cited:  Ames  v.  Union  Pac.  37.  Simpson  v.  Shepard — Minne- 
Ry.  Co.,  64  Fed.  165;  Reagan  v.  sota  Rates  Cases— 230  U.  S.  352, 
Farmers  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  154  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct.  729; 
U.  S.  3G2,  38  L.  Ed.  1014.  14  Sup.  Knott  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Ct.  1047;  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.— Missouri  Rate  Cases— 230 
Co.  V.  Love,  177  Fed.  493;  Ken-  U.  S.  474,  57  L.  Ed.  1571,  33  Sup. 
nebec  Water  Co.  v.  Waterville,  Ct.  975;  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co. 
97  Me.  185,  54  Atl.  6;  National  v.  Conley— West  Virginia  Rate 
Water  Works  Co.  v.  Kansas  City,  Cases— 23.0  U.  S.  513,  57  L.  Ed. 
62  Fed.  853;  Metropolitan  Trust  1597,  33  Sup.  Ct.  985;  Southern 
Co.  V.  Houston  &.  T.  C.  R.  Co.,  Pac.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  230  U.  S. 
90  Fed.  683;     San  Diego  Land  &  537,   57   L.   Ed.    1610,   33    Sup.   Ct. 


*^  85]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  327 

he  charged."*  This  item  will  he  seen  referred  to  by  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  frequently  in  its  opinions  deter- 
mining whether  or  not  the  rates  under  discussion  are  or  are 
not  reasonable.  The  Supreme  Court,  speaking  of  the  com- 
mission, said:  "The  tribunal  may  and  should  consider  the 
legitimate  interests  as  well  of  the  carrying  companies  as 
of  the  traders  and  shippers."""  In  considering  a  proposed 
advance  in  freight  rates,"  Mr.  Commissioner  Prouty  first 
considers  the  question  '"is  the  rate  reasonable,  estimated 
by  the  cost  and  value  of  the  service?"  In  another  case,"^ 
i\rr.  Commissioner  Clements  said:  "The  test  of  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate  is  not  the  amount  of  the  profit  in  the  business 
of  the  shipper  or  manufacturer,  but  whether  the  rate  yields 
a  reasonable  compensation  for  the  services  rendered."  Cost 
of  service,  however,  cannot  b'e  made  an  absolute  guide  in 
fixing  rates.  District  Judge  Bethea"  well  says:  "The  cost  of 
service  to  a  carrier  would  be  an  ideal  theory,  but  it  is  not  prac- 
ticable. Such  cost  can  be  reached  approximately,  but  not 
accurately  enough  to  make  this  factor  controlling.  It  is 
worthy  of  consideration,  however."  Judge  Clements  ex- 
pressed the  rule  of  the  commission  as  follows  :*^ 

1027;    Oregon    R.    &    Nav.    Co.    v.  Com.    v.    Chicago   G.    W.    Ry.    Co., 

Campbell — Oregon     Rate     Cases —  111    Fed.    1C03,    1015.      Separation 

230  U.  S.  525,  537,  57  L.  Ed.  1604,  of    Operating    Expenses.    30    I.    C. 

33  Sup.  Ct.  1026;  Allen  v.  St.  C.  676,  678;  Coal  Rates  from  Vir- 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co. — Arkan-  ginia,  30  I.  C.  C.  635,  646;  and 
sas    Rate    Cases — 230    U.    S.    553,  cases  cited. 

57  L.  Ed.  1625,  33  Sup.  Ct.  1030;  ?9.    Tex.  &  Pac    Ry.  Co.  v.   Int. 

Wood  V.  Vandalla  R.  Co. — Indiana  Com.   Com.     162    U.   S.    197,    40   L. 

Rate  Case— 231  U.  S.  1,  58  L.  Ed.  Ed.   940,   16   Sup.   Ct.   6G6.   5   I.   C. 

97,  34  Sup.  Ct.  7;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  405. 

R.  Co.  V.  Garrett — Kentucky  Rate  40.    Re     Proposed     Advance     in 

Case— 231  U.  S.  298,  58  L.  Ed.  229,  Freight  Rates,  9  I.  C.  C.  382. 

34  Sup.  Ct.  48.  See  also  Sec.  46  41.  Central  Yellow  ^ine  Asso.  v. 
Supra  and  notes  45,  54  and  55  this  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  505. 
chapter.  42.    Int.   Com.   Com.  v.   Chicago 

38.    Re  Alleged  Excessive  Rates  Great   W.    R.   Co.,    141    Fed.    1003, 

on  Food   Products,   4   I.   C.   C.   48,  1015.    and    cases    cited.      Affirmed, 

3  I.  C.  R.  93;   Schumacher  Milling  same  style  case.  209  U.  S.  108,  52 

Co.    V.    Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.  L.  Ed.  705,  28  Sup.  Ct.  493. 

Co.,  6  I.  C.  C.  61,  4  I.  C.  R.  3.73;  43.    Cannon   v.   Mobile   &   O.   R. 

Re  Proposed  Advances  in  Freight  Co.,  11  I.  C.  C.  537,  542. 
Rates,   9    I.   C.   C.   382;    Int.   Com. 


328  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  ["§85 

"AYhile  in  the  relative  adjustment  of  rates  as  between  places 
on  its  line  a  carrier  cannot  rightfully  ignore  the  relative 
cost  to  it  of  the  respective  services  rendered  by  it,  and  since 
it  ordinarily  costs  more  to  haul  feight  a  longer  distance  than 
a  shorter  one,  the  carrier  cannot  rightfully  ignore  substan- 
tial differences  in  distance  where  all  other  circumstances  and 
conditions  are  equal,  or  substantially  similar.  There  are 
other  matters  of  equal  importance  to  that  of  cost  of  the  serv- 
ice and  often  more  controlling  which  must  also  be  considered. 
Among  these  is  competition  both  of  carriers  and  of  markets. 
The  greater  the  inequality  or  dissimilarity  in  other  potent 
circumstances  or  conditions  the  less  controlling  becomes  the 
matter  of  relative  cost." 

Tn  determining  the  cost  of  service  Mr.  Commissioner  Clem- 
ents said:  "Expenditures  for  additions  to  construction  and 
equipment  should  bV'  reimbursed  by  all  the  traffic  they  ac- 
commodate during  the  period  of  their  duration,  and  improve- 
ments that  will  last  many  years  should  not  be  charged  against 
the  revenue  of  a  single  year."^*  The  principle,  however, 
must  be  applied  in  connection  with  the  holding  in  the  Knox- 
ville  Water  Co.  case/^  that  earnings  should  be  sui^cient  to  pay 
a  reasonable  return  on  the  property  employed  in  the  public 
service  and  provide  against  depreciation.  "Cost  of  service," 
could  not,  in  any  event  require  an  unreasonable  rate,  and, 
under  some  .  circumstances,  a  carrier  may  be  compelled  to 
perform  a  particular  service  to  the  public  at  an  actual  loss. 

The  Transportation  Act  of  1920  prescribes  as  something 
to  be  accomplished  a  definite  return  for  the  use  of  capital. 
Here  the  Congress  has  said  that  all  the  cost  of  service  shall 
be  paid  by  all  the  shippers,  and  that  included  in  this  cost 
there  must  be  a  definite  return  to  the  investor.  Elsewhere 
in  the  1920  Act  are  repeated  provisions  of  the  original  Act 
requiring  that  all  charges  must  be  reasonable.  The  Con- 
gress has  now  made  one  factor,  "fair  return"  on  capital  in- 
vested,   an    essential   part    of    a    reasonable   rate,    practically 

44.    Central   Yellow   Pine  Assn.  45.      Knoxville      v.      Knoxville 

V.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  505;       Water  Co.,  212  U.  S.  1,  53  L.  Ed. 
111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,      371,  20  Sup.  Ct.  148. 
206  U.  S.  441,  461,  51  L.  Ed.  1128, 
1136,  27  Sup.  Ct.  700. 


<^  86']  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  329 

guaranteeing  that  the  sum  of  all  rates  shall  yield  a  fair 
return  on  the  sum  of  all  investments  or  all  investments  in 
each  rate  group.  There  is  yet  undetermined  what  portion  of  this 
"fair  return"  must  come  from  each  particular  service.  The 
problem  of  what  constitutes  a  reasonable  rate  on  one  or  a 
few    coinmoditios    is    not    simplified    by    this    1920    legislation.** 

§  86.  Cost — When  Carrier's  Duty  to  Furnish  Service. — In 

Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  North  Carolina  Corporation  Com- 
mission*' the  Supreme  Court  had  under  consideration  an  order 
of  the  North  Carolina  Commission  requiring  the  carrier  to 
make  a  particular  connection  with  certain  passenger  trains. 
To  do  this  the  carrier  had  to  put  on  an  extra  train  at  a  loss. 
The  Suprem.e  Court  sustained  the  order  of  the  North  Carolina 
Commission,  saying: 

"'But  this  case  does  not  involve  the  enforcement  by  a  state 
of  a  general  scheme  of  maximum  rates,  but  only  whether  an 
exercise  of  state  authority  to  compel  a  carrier  to  perform  a 
particular  and  specified  duty  is  so  inherently  unjust  and  un- 
reasonable as  to  amount  to  the  deprivation  of  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law  or  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws.  In  a  case  involving  the  validity  of  an  order  en- 
forcing a  scheme  of  maximum  rates,  of  course  the  finding  that 
the  enforcement  of  such  scheme  will  not  produce  an  adequate 
return  for  the  operation  of  the  railroad,  in  and  of  itself, 
demonstrates  the  unreasonableness  of  the  order.  Such,  how- 
ever, is  not  the  case  when  the  question  is  as  to  the  validity 
of  an  order  to  do  a  particular  act,  the  doing  of  which  does 
not  involve  the  question  of  the  profitableness  of  the  operation 
of  the  railroad  as  an  entirety.  The  difference  between  the 
tAvo  cases  is  illustrated  in  St,  Louis  &  S.  F.  E.  Co.  v.  Gill, 
156  TT.  S.  649,  39  L.  Ed.  567,  15  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  484,  and  Minn- 
eapolis &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  V.  Minnesota,  186  U.  S.  257,  46  L.  Ed. 
1151,  22  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  900.  But  even  if  the  rule  applicable  to 
an  entire  rate  scheme  were  to  be  here  applied,  as  the  findings 
made  below  as  to  the  net  earnings  constrain  us  to  conclude 

46.    Sec.     48,     ante;      Iron     Ore  47.     Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co. 

Rates,   41'   I.   C.   C.   181,    193;    The  v.  North  Carolina  Corp.  Com..  206 

Alaska   Investigation    44    I.    C.    C.  U.  S.  1,  24,  25,  51  L.  Ed.  933,  944, 

680,  693.  27  Sup.  Ct.  585.  11  Ann.  Cas.  398. 


330  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  87 

that  adef|uat'^  remuneration  would  result  from  the  general 
operation  o''  che  rates  in  force,  even  allowing  for  any  loss 
oecasioned  by  the  running  of  the  extra  train  in  question,  it 
follows  that  the  order  would  not  be  unreasonable,  even  if 
tested  by  the  doctrine  announced  in  Smyth  v.  Ames  and  kin- 
dred cases." 

§  87.  Cost  of  Service,  Continued. — Tliat  cost  of  service 
should  be  considered  in  determining  the  reasonableness  of  a 
rrite  or  a  schedule  of  rates  is  but  a  corollary  of  th'e  proposition 
that  each  is  intitled  to  his  own,  but  this  principle,  like  all 
abstract  principles,  must  be  regarded  as  merely  a  fact  to  be 
considered,  and  not  an  inflexibjle  rule  to  be  followed.  The 
principle  must  be  considered  in  connection  with  all  the  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  the  transportation,  the  rate  for  which 
is  sought  to  be  determined.  Regardless  of  cost  of  service, 
some  traffic  can  and  shoidd  bear  a  higher  rate  than  other 
traffic ;  it  is  impossible  to  determine  with  accuracy  the  cost 
of  moving  a  particular  kind  of  traffic  as  under  present  systems 
of  accounting,  cost  of  each  dift'erent  service  cannot  be  al- 
located. But.  as  was  said  by  Mr.  Commissioner  Lane,^*  "once 
we  have  learned  the  comparative  cost  for  various  services, 
it  is  not  fanciful  to  say  that  a  schedule  of  rates  may  be  made 
which  will  approach  justice  as  between  services.  Supple- 
ment cost  with  scientific  classification  of  freight,  giving  their 
due  to  all  the  various  factors,  such  as  value,  bulk,  and  hazard 
— especially  to  value — adding  return  for  use  of  plant,  and  we 
have  something  certainly  more  nearly  akin  to  reason  than 
the  hazard  of  a  traffic  manager,  no  matter  how  benevolently 
inclined.  Such  a  theory  gives  force  to  every  factor  which  the 
Supreme  Court  has  said  should  be  considered  in  the  fixing  of 
rates  for  public  utilities.  The  investor  would  have  his  return, 
and  the  value  of  the  property  would  be  eared  for  as  a  part 
of  the  rate,  though  this  return  would  of  course  vary  with  the 
rates  as  at  present,  one  service  making  a  larger  return  to 
capital  than  another." 

Bnt,  until  the  facts  suggested  by  the  Commissioner  are 
available,  "the  cost  of  the  service"  is  one  of  the  factors  to  be 

48.    Advance  in  Rates,  Western      Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  362. 


§  87]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  331 

considered  in  determining  the  reasonableness  of  rates.  But, 
neither  the  cost  of  the  service,  nor  any  of  the  other  factors,  of 
which  there  are  manj-,  should  be  taken  alone  as  conclusive,"** 
and  this  rule  is  not  abrogated  biy  the  Transjjortation  Act  1920. 

Business  conditions,  the  necessity  for  a  rate  lower  than 
the  one  under  which  the  traffic  moves,  its  Ioav  value  in  com- 
parison with  its  weight,  and  other  considerations,  make  it 
proper  that  some  traffic  shall  bear  less  than  its  proportion  of 
the  cost  of  service.  Sometimes,  were  a  particular  traffic 
charged  with  its  jii-oportion  of  the  cost  of  service,  it  would 
not  move  at  all.  The  public  welfare  demands  that  such 
trat^c  shall  move ;  the  carrier  loses  nothing  in  conceding  a 
low  rate  to  such  traffic  if  the  rate  exceeds,  however  little, 
the  out-of-pocket  cost.  The  carrier's  equipment  must  be 
maintained,  and  the  general  expenses  must  go  on,  even  though 
the  traffic  does  not  move.  These  considerations  underlie  the 
statement  of  the  Commerce  Court  :^"  "That  relative  freight 
rates  have  not  been  based  upon  the  fair,  proportionate  cost 
or  value  of  the  service  alone  or  in  combination,  is  demon- 
strated by  the  entire  history  of  freight  classification.  The 
carrier  cannot  complain  of  a  violation  of  its  constitutional 
rights  if.  not  to  favor  some  person  or  class,  but  for  the  general 
welfare,  it  is  compelled  to  make  a  rate  for  some  particular 
service  which,  though  in  excess  of  the  out-of-pocket  expense, 
would  nevertheless  be  confiscatory,  if  it  were  applied  to  all 
its  freight;  that  is,  the  carrier  has  no  "constitutional  right  to 
a  rate  for  each  distinct  kind  of  service  which  will  equal  its 
proportionate  share  of  the  entire  operating  expense." 

The  language  quoted  from  the  opinion  of  the  Commerce 
Court  is  susceptible  of  misconstruction,  and  it  is  not  without 
significance  that  no  similar  statement  appears  in  the  affirming 
opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court.     Limiting  the  language  of  the 

49.  Mr.  Commissioner  Clark  in  by  the  Supreme  Court  Atchison,  T. 
Coke  Producers  Association  of  the  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States, 
Cornellsville  Region  v.  Baltimore  231  U.  S.  736.  The  statement  or 
&  O.  R.  Co..  27  I.  C.  C.  125,  140.  the    Commerce    Court    quoted    in 

50.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  the  text  was  fortified  by  citing: 
V.  United  States,  203.  Fed.  56,  59;  Minneapolis  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  INIin- 
Commerce  Court  Opinion  No.  61,  nesota,  186  U.  S.  257.  46  L.  Ed. 
537.   Lemon   Rate   Case;     affirmed  1151,    22    Sup.    Ct    900;    St.    L.    & 


332  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [^  87 

Commerce  Court  as  it  was  probably  intended  to  be  limited, 
to  the  meaning  that  an  equal  percentage  over  actual  cost 
need  not  l)e  fixed  for  the  transportation  of  all  commodities, 
the  statement  is  a  correct  rule  of  law.  That  the  rule  must 
be  limited  as  stated  above,  follows  from  the  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  annulling  rates  on  coal  prescribed  under  the 
laws  of  North  Dakota/'  Those  state  rates  paying  no  more 
than  the  actual  cost  to  the  carrier,  were  prescribed  for  the 
avowed  purpose  of  enforcing  a  "puMie  policy."  The  state 
presented  the  argument  ''that  the  rate  was  imposed  to  aid  in 
the  development  of  a  local  industry."  Answering  this  con- 
tention, Mr.  Justice  Hughes,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  said : 

"While  local  interests  serve  as  a  motive  for  enforcing  rea-* 
son  able  rates,  it  would  be  a  very  different  matter  to  say  that 
Ihe  state  may  compel  the  carrier  to  maintain  a  rate  upon  a 
particular  commodity  that  is  less  than  reasonable,  or — as 
might  equally  well  be  asserted — to  carry  gratuitously,  in  order 
to  build  up  a  local  enterprise.  That  Avould  be  to  go  outside  the 
carrier's  undertaking,  and  outside  the  field  of  reasonable 
supervision  of  the  conduct  of  its  business,  and  would  be 
efjiiivalent  tn  an  appropriation  of  the  property  to  public  uses 
upon  terms  to  which  the  carrier  had  in  no  way  agreed."  The 
learned  Justice,  that  there  should  be  no  misunderstanding 
of  the  rule,  expressly  referred  to  the  principle  that  classifica- 
tion of  commodities  with  different  ratings  thereon  was  per- 
missible. He  said:  "The  legislature  undoubtedly  has  a  wide 
range  of  discretion  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  prescribe 
reasonable  charges,  and  it  is  not  bound  to  fix  uniform  rates  for 
all  commodities,  to  secure  the  same  percentage  of  profit  on 
every  sort  of  business.  There  are  many  factors  to  be  con- 
sidered— differences  in   the   articles   transported,  the   care  re- 

S.    F.    R.    Co.    V.    Gill,    1.56    U.    S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Com.  of  La..  192 

649     39    L.    Ed.    567.    15    Snp.    Ct  Fed.  2S0.  112  C.  C.  A.  528. 
484:      Atlantic    C.    L.    R.    Co.    v.  51.   Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  North 

North    Carolina    Corp.    Com.,    206  Dakota.   236  U.   S.   585.  59  "L.  Ed. 

U.    S.    1,    51   L.   Ed.    933,    27    Sup.  735,  35  Sup  Ct.  429.    See  also  Nor- 

Ct     585.    11     Ann.    Cas.    398.      To  folk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Conley,  236  U. 

the    Seme    effect    see    Texas    &    P.  S.  605,  59  L.  Ed.  745,  3.5  Sup.  Ct. 

437. 


§  88] 


Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable. 


OOO 


quired,  the  risk  assumed,  the  value  of  the  service,  and  it  is 
obviously  important  that  there  should  be  reasonable  adjust- 
ments and  classifications."  Nothing  in  this  decision  conflicts 
with  the  decision  in  the  North  Carolina  case,  note  47  supra, 
this  chapter.  There  the  carrier  was  compelled  to  perform  an 
absolute  duty  although  in  doing  so  for  a  reasonable  charge 
there  was  a  loss.  In  the  North  Dakota  case  the  court  held  that 
less  than  a  reasonable  rate  could  not  be  required  of  the  carrier. 
§  88.  Value  of  Service. — The  shipper  cannot  ordinarily  pay 
more  than  the  service  is  worth,  consequently,  from  necessity 
as  well  as  from  a  consideration  of  what  is  just,  the  value  of 
the  service  must  constitute  the  maximum  charge.  Rates 
should  be  proportioned  to  the  value  of  the  service  to  the 
shipper."  The  value  of  the  commodity  enters  into  the  value 
of  the  service,  and  consequently  must  also  be  considered  in 
determining  what  constitutes  a  reasonable  rate.^^  That  the  in- 
terests of  the  public  are  important  in  determining  the  rea- 


52.  Delaware  State  Grange  v. 
New  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4  I.  C.  C. 
588,  3  I.  C.  R.  554,  561;  Loud  v. 
South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C. 
529,  4  L  C.  R.  205,  citing  cases. 
Loftus  V.  Pullman  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C.  135,  140,  difference  in  value  of 
service  between  upper  and  lower 
Pullman  berths.  See  also  Re  Sus- 
pension of  Western  Classification 
No.  51,  25  I.  C.  C.  442,  at  pp.  472, 
474,  discussing  principles  of  classi- 
fication. 

53.  The  principle  that  the  value 
of  a  particular  commodity  must 
be  considered  in  determining  what 
is  a  reasonable  rate  thereon,  is 
one  which  has  been  applied 
throughout  the  history  of  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission. 
Evans  v.  O.  R.  N.  Co.,  1  I.  C. 
C.  325;  Howell  v.  N.  Y.  L.  E.  & 
W.  R.  Co..  2  I.  C.  C.  272,  285, 
1  I.  C.  R.  162;  Thurber  v.  N.  Y. 
C.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  3  I.  C.  C.  473, 
503.,  2  I.  C.  R.  742;  Re  Excessive 
Rates  on  Food  Products,  4  I.  C.  C. 


48;  Buchanan  v.  N.  P.  R.  Co.,  5 
I.  C.  C.  7;  Colorado  F.  &  I.  Co. 
V.  S.  P.  Co.,  6  I.  C.  C.  488,  489; 
Grain  Shippers  Asso.  v.  L.  S.  & 
M.  S.  R.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  264,  286; 
Georgia  Peach  Growers  Asso.  v. 
A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  255, 
277;  Tift  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  10  I.  C. 
C.  548;  National  Machinery  Co.  v. 
P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  11  I.  C.  C. 
581,  584;  Society  American  Flor- 
ists V.  U.  S.  Express  Co.,  12  I.  C. 
C.  120,  125;  Re  Released  Rates,  13 
I.  C.  C.  550;  Union  ?ac.  Tea  Co. 
V.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  545, 
547;  Darling  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co., 
15  I.  C.  C.  78,  81;  Union  Made 
Garment  Mfr's  Asso.  v.  C.  &  N. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  405,  407; 
Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v. 
A.  A.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  197,  205; 
Forest  City  Freight  Bureau  v.  A. 
A.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  205,  206; 
Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Returned 
Shipments,  19  I.  C.  C.  409;  Ford 
Co.  V.  M.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.    507,   509;     Advances   in   Rates, 


334:  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§88 

soiiableness  of  charges  by  public  service  corporations,  lias 
been  announced  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  an  established 
principle  in  rate  making.  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  says  :^*  "The 
public  can  not  properly  be  subjected  to  unreasonable  rates 
in  order  simply  that  stockholders  may  earn  dividends."  This 
view  is  further  sui)ported  bjy  the  case  of  Smyth  v.  Ames/^ 
where  it  was  said:  "It  can  not  be  admitted  that  a  railroad 
corporation  maintaining  a  highway  under  the  authority  of  the 
state  may  fix  its  rates  with  a  view  solely  to  its  own  interests, 
and  ignore  the  rights  of  the  public.  The  rights  of  the  public 
would  be  ignored  if  rates  for  the  transportation  of  persons 
or  property  on  a  railroad  are  exacted  without  reference  to  the 
fair  value  of  the  property  used  for  the  public  or  the  fair  value 
of  the  services  rendered."  In  San  Diego  Land  &  Town  Co. 
V.  National  City/"  the  Supreme  Court  reviewed  and  approved 


Western  Case  1910,  20  I.  C.  C. 
307,  355,  where  Mr.  Lane  said:  "To 
be  sure  we  can  never  depart  from 
the  ad  valorem  principle  in  rate 
making;"  Investigation  of  Ad- 
vances in  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I. 
C.  C.  22,  aO,  35;  Investigation 
&  Suspension  Docket,  26  to  26c 
(Coal  Rates),  22  I.  C.  C.  604, 
623;  Minneapolis  Traffic  Asso.  v. 
C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C. 
C.  432,  437;  Bancroft-Whitney 
Co.  V.  C.  N.  0.  &  T.  p.  Ry.  Co., 
24  I.  C.  C.  557,  558;  Bernheim 
v.  0.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.,  25  I.  C.  C. 
156,  158;  Union  Tannery  Co.  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  159,  163, 
where  Mr.  Commissioner  Clements 
clearliy  and  forcibly*  states  the 
principle;  Dixie  Dairy  Men's  Asso. 
V.  Y.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C. 
618,  621;  Scrap  Iron  Rates,  28  I. 
C.  C.  525;  Pardee  Works  v.  C.  R. 
R.  Co.,  29  I.  C.  C.  500,  where  value 
was  under  the  facts  therein,  lim- 
ited to  the  hazard;  but  this  opin- 
ion is  not  in  accord  with  the 
general  views  of  the  Commission 


as  elsewhere  expressed;  Reversed 
39  I.  C.  C.  162;  Rates  on 
Flax  seed  29  I.  C.  C.  633,  636; 
Molasses  Rates  to  Knoxville  30  I. 
C.  C.  313,  314;  Railroad  Com.  of 
Montana  v.  B.  A.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
31  I.  C.  C.  641,  652;  Five  Per 
Cent.  Case,  31  I  C.  C.  351,  419; 
Nebraska  State  Ry.  Com.  v.  C.  V. 
R.  Co.,  32  I.  C.  C.  41,  44;  Anson 
Gilkey  &  Hurd  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
33  I.  C.  C.  332,  339,  341;  Des 
Moines  Commodity  Rates,  34  I. 
C.  C.  281,  288;  Western  Rate  Ad- 
vance Case  1915,  35  I.  C.  C.  497, 
606;  and  see  Int.  Com.  Com.  v. 
Chicago  Great  W.  R.  Co.,  141  Fed. 
1003,  1015  and  cases  cited;  North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  North  Dakota, 
236  U.  S.  585,  59  L.  Ed.  735,  35 
Sup.  Ct.  429. 

54.  Covington  &  L.  Turnpike 
Road  Co.  V.  Sandford,  164  U.  S. 
578,  596,  41  L.  Ed.  560,  566,  17 
Sup.   Ct.    198. 

55.  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S. 
466,  42  L.  Ed.  819,  18  Sup.  Ct.  418. 

56.  San  Diego  Land  &  Town  Co. 


§  88]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  335 

the  ease  and  reiterated  the  principle  of  the  importance  of 
considering  "fair  value     *     *     *     of  the  services  rendered." 

The  "value  of  the  service"  may  mark  the  boundary  beyond 
whicli  rates  may  not  ordinarily  go,  but  the  rule  cannot  be 
at  all  times  applied.  The  commission  has  held  that  a  differ- 
ence in  the  value  of  two  car  loads  of  peaches  v^ould  not  justify 
a  higher  rate  on  the  more  valuable  car."  This  is  true  be- 
cause it  is  impracticable  to  know  the  exact  value  of  the 
service  in  any  case,  and,  as  will  be  frequently  seen  throughout 
this  chapter,  rate  making  is  not  subject  to  unalterable  the- 
oretical rules.  Judge  Bethea^^  says  of  the  rule:  "This  is 
considered  an  ideal  method,  when  not  interfered  with  by  com- 
petition or  other  factors.  *  *  *  This  method  is  considered 
practical  and  is  based  on  an  idea  similar  to  taxation."  Kirk- 
man,  in  The  Science  of  Railways,  vol.  8,  pp.  42,  43,  writing 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  trained  railway  man,  says : 

"A  prime  factor  in  determining  the  rates  carriers  charge, 
is  the  value  of  the  service  to  the  shipper.  This  is  the  basis 
of  remuneration  for  labor  in  every  field  of  industry.  Any 
other  Avould  bje  oppressive,  if  not  prohibitory.  Its  operation 
involves  the  exercise  of  discrimination.  But  discrimination 
is  the  instinct  of  trade,  its  intelligent,  directing  and  governing 
force.  The  ignorant,  the  vicious,  and  the  superficial  speak  of  it, 
when  exercised  by  railroads,  as  something  oppressive,  some- 
thing to  be  discountenanced.  This  is  because  they  do  not  con- 
sider the  analogies  of  trade,  or  its  merits.  The  charges  of  car- 
riers cannot  be  disproportionate  to  the  thing  handled.  If  more  is 
charged  than  I  can  reasonably  pay,  it  prohibits  me  from  doing, 
business  ;  but  if  T  am  charged  what  I  can  afford,  I  am  not  treat- 
ed unjustly,  so  long  as  the  general  profits  of  the  seller  are  not 
unreasonable.  It  is  not  an  act  of  injustice  to  me  that  a  car- 
rier charges  a  higher  rate  for  my  blooded  horse  than  for  my 
neighbor's  mule,  although  they  both  occupy  the  same  space. 
I  cannot  afford  to  pay  the  same  rate  for  the  brick  used  in  the 

V.  National  City,  174  U.  S.  739,  43  58.   Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago  G. 

L.  Ed.  1154,  19  Sup.  Ct.  804.  W.    R.    Co.,    141    Fed.    1003,    1015, 

57.  Georgia  Peachgrowers'  Asso.  Noyes,  Am.  R.  R.  Rates,  p.  53. 
V.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baltimore  & 
C.  255.  0.   R.   Co.,   43  Fed.   37,   53,   3   I.   C. 

R.  192. 


836  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  ["§  89 

consti'uction  of  my  house  that  I  can  for  the  carpets  that  cover 
its  floors.  Rates  are  based  on  discriminations  of  this  kind, 
at  once  practicable,  necessary,  and  wise." 

This  statement  is  correct  as  stating  a  general  rule,  but  the 
rule  is  subject  to  many  modifications.  His  illustration  of  the 
blooded  horse  and  the  miile  is  not  a  safe  application  of  the 
rule.  That  a  horse  may  be  worth  ten  or  twenty  times  as  much  as  a 
mule  makes  the  transportation  service  for  moving  the  horse 
more  valuable  than  for  moving  the  mule;  but  when  the  horse  is 
worth  only  a  little  more  than  the  mule,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  grade  the  relative  rates.  Difference  in  value  on  the  same 
kind  of  commodity  can  rarely  be  practically  applied  in  rate 
making.  Value  of  service  is  more  a  limitation  on  rates  than 
a  reason  for  increasing  rates. 

Neither  a  high  nor  low  value  is  controlling,  but  value  should 
always  be  considered ;  not  only  because  of  the  hazard,  pres- 
ently to  be  discussed,  but  because  the  Avorth  of  a  service  in- 
creases somewhat  with  the  value  of  the  commodity  tran- 
sported. While  the  Transportation  Act  1920,  Sec.  15a.  gives 
emphasis  to  the  cost  of  the  service,  it  is  yet  true:  "Cost  of 
transportation  may  be  said  to  determine  the  minimum  rate 
that  may  be  charged  as.  on  the  other  hand,  the  value  of  the 
service  to  the  shipper  markes  the  maximum  of  a  reasonable 
rate  or  charge.^" 

§  89.  Same  Subject — Use  to  Which  Commodity  Put. — Mere 
diflierence  in  value  or  use  of  a  different  species  of  the  same 
general  class  of  commodities,  furnishes  no  reason  for  diverg- 
ent rates.     The  Commission  has  said :"" 

"It  may  be  fairly  said  in  conclusion  that  the  carriers  in 
this  case  show  no  sufficient  justification  whatsoever  for  dis- 
criminating between  the  three  kinds  of  fire-clay  brick  in- 
volved   in   this    proceeding.      The   brick       themselves    are    so 

.59.     Bituminous  Co.  in  C.  F.  A,  60.    Stowe-Fuller  Co.  v.  Pennsyl- 

Territory,  46  I.  C.  C.  66,  112  and  vania   Co.,    12    I.    C.    C.    215,    220; 

cases  cited.    See  also  Nashville  Tie  Metropolitan  Paving  Brick  Co.  v. 

Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  Ann    Arbor    R.    Co.,    17    i.    C.    C. 

377,    381    and    cases    cited.      East  197. 
Bound  Trains  Continental  Canned 
Goods,  50  I.  C.  C.  62,  66. 


§  89]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  33 < 

nearly  alike  in  color  that,  being  the  same  size  and  of  the 
same  weight,  they  are  practically  indistinguishable  the  one 
from  the  other.  To  make  different  rates  on  each  of  these 
brick  is  virtually  to  permit  the  shipper  to  declare  which  of 
the  three  rates  he  chooses  to  impose  upon  the  freight.  The 
receiving  agent  of  the  railroad,  unless  an  expert  in  fire-clay 
brick,  could  not  tell  which  of  the  three  rates  to  impose  upon 
any  one  of  the  three  varieties,  except  by  inquiring  what  use 
was  to  be  made  of  these  brick.  Aside  from  the  difficulty  in 
learning  what  use  the  brick  were  to  be  put  to  upon  reaching 
their  destination,  we  cannot  regard  a  classification  as  scienti- 
fic, or  a  difference  in  rates  as  well  based,  which  is  altogether 
founded  upon  a  distinction  that  has  no  transportation  signi- 
ficance. 

"Moreover,  such  a  differentiation,  if  permitted  and  extended 
throughout  the  various  classes  of  freight  handled  by  railroads, 
would  lead  to  an  almost  endless  multiplication  of  rates,  which 
could  find  no  excuse  save  in  the  use  which  might  be  made  of 
the  article  transported.  One  class  of  lumber  of  the  same 
measurement  and  of  the  same  value  and  of  the 
same  general  appearance  and  of  the  same  weight 
as  another  might  be  given  a  distinct  and  separate  rate.  And 
so  with  building  stone  and  cement  and  steel  in  certain  forms, 
and  many  other  commodities  which  will  readily  suggest 
themselves.  Classification  must  be  based  upon  a  real  distinc- 
tion from  a  transportation  standpoint ;  and  we  can  find  no 
such  distinction  between  these  three  classes  of  brick,  which  are 
made  of  the  same  material  and  come  out  of  the  same  kiln, 
as  justifies  a  difference  in  rates.  To  hold  otherwise  would  be 
to  promote  false  billing  on  the  part  of  the  shippers,  and  to 
require  the  carriers,  if  they  would  avoid  the  penalty  of  the 
law,  to  make  a  practically  impossib/le  examination  into  the 
use  to  which  each  shipment  of  these  brick  was  put." 

The  subject  is  extensively  discussed  in  Ee  Restricted  Rates,'" 
and  the  conclusion  stated  "that  the  carrier  has  no  right  to 

61.     Re  Restricted   Rates,   20   I.  R.   Co.,   21    I.   C.   C.   522,    527;    Re 

C.  C.  426.     See  also  Carter  White  Rates    on    R.    R.    Fuel    &    Other 

Lead    Co.    v.    Norfolk    &    W.    Ry.  Coal,   36   I.    C.   C.   1.     Association 

Co.,   21   I.   C.   C.   41;     Ohio   Allied  of    Union    Made    Garments    Mfrs. 

Milk    Product    Shippers    v.    Erie  of   America   v.    Chicago    &  N.    W. 


o,')8  Charges  for  Transportation  op  Persons,  etc.  [§  89 

attempt  to  dictate  the  uses  to  which  commodities  transported 
by  it  shall  be  put  in  order  to  enjoy  a  transportation  rate:" 
Tn  the  course  of  the  opinion  Conference  Ruling  34  was  quoted 
as  follows : 

' '  A  tariff  providing  for  reduced  rates  on  coal  used  for  steam 
purposes,  or  that  the  carrier  will  refund  part  of  the  regular 
tariff  charges  on  presentation  of  evidence  that  the  coal  was  so 
used,  is  improper  and  unlawful — that  is  to  say,  that  the 
carrier  has  no  right  to  attempt  to  dictate  the  uses  to  which 
commodities  transported  by  it  shall  be  put  in  order  to  en- 
joy a  transportation  rate." 

§89.  Cost  of  Assemblying  Theory. — Carriers  have  attempted 
to  equalize  by  a  system  of  rates  the  opportunities  of  groups 
of  shippers,  especially  is  this  true  as  to  manufacturers.  Simi- 
larly carriers  have  attempted  to  overcome  geographical  dis- 
advantages by  an  equalizing  system  of  rates.  Economic  or 
geographical  equalization  is  not  the  province  of  a  carrier, 
nor  is  such  equalization  a  factor  which  determines  in  con- 
sidering the  reasonableness  of  a  particular  rate  or  a  system 
of  rates.'^ 

§  90.  Value  of  the  Commodity,  Its  General  Utility  and 
Dang-er  of  Loss. — The  commission  in  the  Tift  and  Central 
Yellow  Pine  cases,"''  as  reasons  for  its  conclusion  that  the 
rates  there  under  investigation  were  illegal  and  unreasonable, 
said,  "Lumber  is  an  inexpensive  freight.  *  *  *  j^  is  not 
what  is  known  as  perishable  traffic,  *  *  *  and  in  case 
of  accident,  the  damage  is  insignificant.  *  *  *  Lumber  is 
moreover  an  article  of  general  utility."  Each  of  these  cases 
received  the  approval  of  the  Supreme  Court."*  The  element  of 
value  of  the  commodity  transported  forms  a  proper  considera- 

R.    Co..    16    I.    C.    C.    405;     Whit-  v.    111.    Cent.    R.    Co.,    10    I.    C.    C. 

comb    V.    Chicago    &    N.    W.    Ry.  505. 

Co.,   15   I.   C.   C.   27;     Northbound  64.    So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tift,  148  Fed. 

Rates   on   Hardwood,    32    I.    C.    C.  1021,    206    U.    S.    428,    51    L.    Ed. 

521.  1124,   27   Sup.   Ct.   709;     111.   Cent. 

62.  Iron  Ore  Rate  Cases,  41  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  206  U. 
I.  C.  C.   181,  188,  189.  S.  441,  51  L.  Ed.  1128,  27  Sup.  Ct. 

63.  Tift  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  10  I.  C.       700. 
C.  548;    Central  Yellow  Pine  Asso. 


§  90]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  339 

tion  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  establishment  of  a  rate. 
The  liability  of  a  carrier  as  an  insurer  of  freight  against  all 
loss,  except  such  as  is  occasioned  by  the  act  of  God  or  the 
public  enemy  is  elementary,  and  the  greater  the  value  the 
greater  the  risk."''  In  the  Food  Products  case,'^  it  was  stated : 
"While  rates  should  not  be  so  low  as  to  impose  a  burden  on 
other  traffic,  they  should  have  reasonable  relation  to  the  cost 
of  production,  and  the  value  of  the  transportation  service  to 
the  producer  and  shipper.  In  the  carriage  of  the  great 
staples  which  supply  an  enormous  business,  and  which  in 
market  value  and  actual  cost  of  transportation,  are  among 
the  cheapest  articles  of  commerce,  rates  yielding  moderate 
profit  are  both  justifiable  and  necessary." 

"It  is  axiomatic  that  rates  depend  largely  upon  value,"" 
and  "value  has  long  been  one  of  the  established  measures  of 
a  rate,""*  but  vaUie  and  not  use  is  one  of  the  determining 
factors  in  classification.'"'  That  value  should  be  considered 
in  rate-making  has  been  recognized  by  the  Supreme  Court.'" 

The  correctness  of  the  rule,  that  value  should  be  considered 
in  making  rates,  and  the  difficulty  of  applying  the  rule,  is 
forcefully    stated    by    the    commission    in    the    Overall   case^^ 

65.  Notes  43  and  53  supra,  this  Ry.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  594,  596;  Nat'l 
chapter.  Howell  v.  New  York,  L.       Society  of  Record   v.   A.   &  R.   R. 

E.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  2  I.  C.  C.  272,  1  I.       Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  347,  3.55. 

C.  R.  162,  172.  See  aliso  Imt.  69.  Re  Suspension  of  Western 
Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago  Great  W.  Classification  No.  51',  25  I.  C.  C. 
Ry.  Co.,  141  Fed.  1003,  1015,  and  442,  499.  See  also  Union  Tan- 
citations,  ning  Co.  v.   Southern  Ry.  Co.,  26 

66.  Re  Alleged  Excessive  Rates  I.   C.   C.   159,   163. 

on  Food  Products.  4  I.  C.  C.  116,  70.    Kansas   City    Southern   Ry. 

3  I.  C.  R.  93,  104.    See  also  Mayor.  Co.  v.  Carl,  227  U.  S.  639,  650,  653, 

etc.,  of  Wichita  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  57  L.  Ed.  683,  33  Sup.  Ct.  391,  cit- 

S.    F.    Ry.,    9    I.    C.    C.    534,    548;  ing  Re  Released  Rates,  13  I.  C.  C. 

Farmers',  etc..  Club  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  550;    Southern  Oil  Co.  v.  Southern 

F.  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  351,  360.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  79;   Miller  v. 

67.  Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Re-  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  129; 
turned  Shipments,  19  T.  C.  C.  409,  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  North 
418.  Dakota  236  U.  S.  585,  50  L.  Ed.  735, 

68.  Fels  &  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  35  Sup.  Ct.  429. 

R.   Co.,   25   I.   C.  C.   154,   158,  and  71.    Association  of  Union  Made 

note  53,  supra,  this  chapter.  Tex-  Grarment  Mnjfrs.  of  Ajnerica  v. 
olite  Chemical  Co.  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.      Chicago   &   N.   W.   Ry.   Co.,   16    I. 


S-tO  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  91 

where,  although  recognizing  that  equitably  these  cheap  cotton 
garments  were  entitled  to  a  classification  different  from  the 
more  valuable  woolen  clothing,  relief  was  denied. 

When  increased  value  of  a  commodity  increases  the  hazard, 
the  cost  of  service  from  loss  and  damage  may  be  increased 
and  that  fact  might  justify  an  increased  rate/^  Iron  should 
not  bear  a  rate  equal  to  the  average  of  all  rates."  Coaf 
and  salt"''  are  articles  of  low  grade  traffic  and  entitled  to 
relatively  low  rates. 

§  91 .  Value  of  the  Commodity — Difference  between  the  Raw 
and  the  Manufactured  Product. — The  more  valuable  the  com- 
modity sliii)ped  the  greater  the  loss  to  the  carrier  should  the 
commodity  be  damaged  or  destroyed  while  in  course  of  trans- 
portation. This  and  the  rule  just  discussed  relating  to  the 
value  of  the  commodity  justifies  the  general  rule  that  the 
manufactured  product  should  take  a  higher  rate  than  the 
raw  product  from  which  the  finished  product  is  made. 

This  general  rule,  the  Commission  has  held,  is  founded  in 
reason  "because  ordinarily  there  is  a  substantial  difference 
between  the  value  of  the  one  and  of  the  other,  and  frequently 
there  is  a  greater  degree  of  risk  incident  to  the  transportation 
and  care  of  the  manufactured  product  than  of  the  raw  ma- 
terial."" 

While  this  general  principle  has  been  frequently  applied," 
the  rule  has  its  exceptions.  Between  the  rates  on  live  stock 
and  the  rates  on  the  products  of  live  stock  there  is  no  uniform 

C.  C.  405.    See  also  Caldwell  Co.  v.  Ry.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C.  299,  4  I.  C.  R. 

Chicago,    I.    &    L.    Ry.    Co.,    20    I.  33. 

C.  C.  412.  76.    East   St.   Louis   Cotton   Oil 

72.  Kindel  v.  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  475,  485.  20  L  C.  C.  37. 

73.  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  v.  77.  Bulte  Milling  Co.  v.  Chicago 
So.  Pac.   Co.,  6   I.  C.   C.   488,   515.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351,  364; 

74.  Denison  Light  &  Power  Co.  Massee  &  Felton  Lumber  Co.  v. 
V.  Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  10  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  110; 
I.  C.  C.  337;  Sligo  Iron  Stove  Co.  Association  of  Union  Made  Gar- 
V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  17  ment  Mnfrs.  of  America  v.  Chi- 
I.  C.  C.  139;  Sligo  Iron  Stove  Co.  cage  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C. 
V.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  C.  405;  American  Milling  Co.  v. 
527.  Pierre    Marquette   R.    Co.,    Unrep. 

75.  Anthony  Salt  Co.  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Op.  328. 


§  92]  Must  be  Just  and  Eeasonable.  341 

relation.  In  some  territory  the  manufactured  product  takes 
the  higher  rate,  in  other  sections  live  stock  and  packing  house 
products  take  the  same  rates/*  So  with  grain  and  grain 
products/" 

§  92.  Competition  or  Its  Absence  Considered  in  Determin- 
ing Reasonableness  of  Rate. — In  the  Central  Yellow  Pine  and 
the  Tift  cases,""  the  commission  had  under  consideration  a 
rate  fixed  by  the  concerted  and  concurrent  action  of  the 
carriers  and  there  said : 

"AVe  deem  it  unnecessary  to  express  an  opinion  as  tw 
whether  this  concert  of  action  in  fixing  the  advanced  rate 
amounts  to  an  unlawful  agreement  under  the  so-called  "Anti- 
Trust  Act" — the  enforcement  of  that  act  being  a  matter  prop- 
erly cognizable  by  the  courts.  It  is  clearly,  however,  within 
the  scope  of  our  authority  and  duty  to  consider  this  joint 
or  concerted  action  of  the  defendants  in  the  aspect  of  its 
bearing  upon  the  reasonableness  and  validity  of  the  ad- 
vanced rate,  the  result  of  that  action.  When  rates  are  es- 
tablished by  concert  of  action  and  previous  understanding  be- 
tween the  carriers,  it  is  manifest,  whether  or  not  there  be  a 
binding  agreement  to  maintain  such  rates,  that  the  element  of 
competition  is  eliminated.  Concert  of  action  is  wholly  incon- 
sistent with  competition  and,  during  the  time  the  rates  fixed 
by  concert  of  action  are  maintained,  the  effect,  so  far  as 
competition  is  concerned,  is  the  same  as  if  there  was  a  binding 
agreement  to  maintain  such  rates. 

78.  Chicago  Board  of  Trade  v.  Farmers.  Merchants  &  Shippers 
C.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  4  I.  C.  C.  158;  Club  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  12 
Squire  &  Co.  v.  M.  C.  R.  Co.,  4  I.  C.  C.  351;  Howard  Mills  Co. 
I.  C.  C.  611;  Chicago  Live  Stock  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  258; 
Exchange  v.  C.  G.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  Investigation  of  Advances  in 
10  I.  C.  C.  429;  Int.  Com.  Com.  Rates  on  Grain,  21  I.  C.  C.  22, 
V.  C.  G.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  141  Fed.  32;  Kansas-California  Flour 
1003;  Investigation  of  Alleged  Rates,  29  I.  C.  C.  459,  32  I.  C. 
Unreasonable  Rates  on  Meat,  20  C.  602;  Wheat  Rates  from  Okla- 
I.  C.  C.  160;  Sinclair  v.  C.  M.  &  homa,  30  I.  C.  C.  93:  Western 
St.  P.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  490,  Advance  Rate  Case  1915,  35  I. 
506;    Western  Rate  Advance  Case,  C.  C.  497. 

1915,  35  I.  C.  C.  497.  80.   Central  Yellow  Pine  Asso.  v. 

79.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Wichita  v.  A.  I.  C.  C.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  505;  Tift 
T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  534;       v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  548. 


342  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  ^2 

*' Competition  is  favored  by  law.  The  object  of  the  pooling 
section  (§  5)  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  is  to  prevent 
'any  contract,  agreement,  or  combination'  between  otherwise 
competing  carriers  by  which  competition  between  them  may 
be  done  away  with.  In  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Ga.  Railway  Co.  v. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  it  is  said,  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Law.  it  is  conceded,  Avas  intended  to  encourage 
normal  competition.  It  forbids  pooling  for  the  very  purpose  of 
allowing  competition  to  have  effect.  (99  Fed.  Rep.  61.)  The 
Supreme  Court  holds  that  the  suppression  of  competition  is 
violative  of  the  so-called  "Anti-Trust  Act"  in  that,  such  sup- 
pression restrains  trade  and  commerce  by  "keeping  rates  and 
charges  higher  than  they  might  otherwise  be  under  the  laws 
of  competition."  (Joint  Traffic  Association  Case,  171  U.  S. 
505,  569,  571,  577,  43  L.  Ed.  259,  287,  288,  290,  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
25 ;  1  Fed.  Anti-Trust  Dec.  869 ;  U.  S.  v.  Trans-Missouri  Freight 
Association,  166  U.  S.  341,  41  L.  Ed.  1027,  17  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  540. 

The  ground  upon  which  competition  is  favored  is  that  it 
conduces  to  the  reasonableness  of  rates  or  to  the  protection 
of  the  public  from  unreasonably  high  or  excessive  rates. 
In  I'^nited  States  v.  Freight  Association,  supra,  the  Supreme 
Court  says,  "competition  will,  itself  bring  charges  down  to 
what  may  be  reasonable.  (166  U.  S.  339,  41  L.  Ed.  1027,  17 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  540).  The  act  to  regulate  commerce  (§  1),  in 
prohibiting  unreasonableness  of  rates,  in  effect  forbids  what- 
ever conduces  to  such  unreasonableness.  In  any  event,  it 
is  incumbent  upon  the  commission,  when  the  reasonableness  of 
rates  is  in  issue  before  it,  to  consider  how  those  rates  were 
brought  about — whether  they  are  the  product  of  untrammeled 
competition  or  the  result  of  a  concert  of  action  or  combination 
between  the  carriers  establishing  and  maintaining  them.  The 
advanced  rates  complained  of  cannot  be  claimed  to  be  the 
outcome  of  competition  because  the  natural,  direct  and  im- 
mediate effect  of  competition  is  to  lower  (United  States  v. 
Joint-Traffic  Asso.,  171  U.  S.  505,  577,  43  L.  Ed.  259,  290,  19 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  25),  rather  than  advance,  rates.  The  advanced 
rates  must  be  presumed  to  be  higher  than  rates  which  unre- 
strained competition  would  produce."" 

81.    Tift  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  138  Fed.     Com..    206    U.    S.    441,    .51    L.    Ed. 
753;   111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.     1128,  27  Sup.  Ct.  700. 


§  93]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  343 

Mr.  Commissioner  Prouty,  in  Re  Class  and  Commodity  Rates 
from  St.  Louis  to  Texas  Common  Points,  11  C.  C.  238,  269, 
270,  discusses  this  question  as  follows : 

"The  theory  of  this  country  in  respect  to  interstate  rates 
in  the  past  has  apparently  been  that  competition  between 
various  railroads  would,  if  it  could  be  secured,  produce  rea- 
sonable freight  rates  in  the  same  way  that  competition  tends 
to  produce  a  reasonable  price  of  commodities  in  general.  This 
was  the  idea  expressed  in  the  enactment  of  the  5th  section 
of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  in  1887  which  prohibits  pool- 
ing. It  was  also  the  ])urpose  of  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Act  of 
1890  wliich  foi'bids  all  agreements  in  restraint  of  interstate 
commerce,  and  as  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  all  agreements  b)?tween  carriers  as  to  the  rate 
of  freight  applied  to  interstate  shipments.  The  idea  has 
received  the  sanction  of  judicial  interpretation  and  the  ap- 
proval of  judicial  dicta.  It  i.s  impossible  to  read  the  utter- 
ances of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Trans -Missouri  case  and 
the  Joint  Traffic  Association  case  without  the  conviction  that 
a  majority  of  that  tribunal  Avere  of  the  opinion  not  only  that 
competition  could  be  relied  upon  to  regulate  freight  rates 
but  that  it  was  the  safest  and  best  means  to  that  end." 

§  93.  Same  Subject. — The  principle  applied  by  the  Com- 
mission has  received  the  approval  of  the  courts.  The  Su- 
preme Court  has  said;  "The  interstate  commerce  law  was 
intended  to  promote  trade.""'  And  in  Tut.  Com.  Com.  v. 
Chicago  G.  W.  R.  Co. :'' 

"It  must  be  remembered  that  railroads  are  the  private 
property  of  their  owners;  that  while,  from  the  public  char- 
acter of  the  work  in  which  they  are  engaged,  the  public 
has  the  power  to  prescril)e  rules  for  securing  faithful  and 
efficient  service  and  equality  between  shippers  and  communi- 
ties, yet,  in  no  proper  sense,  is  the  nublic  a  general  manager. 
As  said  in  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Alabama  Mid- 
land R.  Co.,  168  U.  S.  144,  172,  42  L.  Ed.  414,  425,  18  Sup. 

82.     Louisville    &   N.    R.    Co.    v.  83.    Int.   Com.   Com.   v.  Chicago 

Behlmer,  175  U.  S.  648,  44  L.  Ed.       G.  W.  R.  Co.,  209  U.  S.  108,  119, 
309,  20   Slip.  Ct.   209.  120,    52    L.    Ed.    705,    712,    71S,    28 

Sup.   Ct.   493. 


344  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  93 

Ct.  Rep.  45,  51,  quoting  from  the  opinion  in  Cireuit  Court  of 
Appeals  samo  style  case,  5  Inters.  Com.  Rep.  697,  21  C.  C.  A. 
59,  41  U.  S.  App.  466,  74  Fed.  723 : 

"  'Subject  to  the  two  leading  prohibitions  that  their  charges 
shall  not  be  unjust  or  unreasonable,  and  that  they  shall  not 
unjustly  discriminate  so  as  to  give  undue  preference  or  dis- 
advantage to  persons  or  traiRc  similarly  circumstanced,  the 
act  to  regulate  commerce  leaves  common  carriers  as  they  were 
at  the  common  law, — free  to  make  special  rates  looking  to 
the  increase  of  their  bbsiness,  to  classify  their  trai^c,  to  ad- 
just and  apportion  their  rates  so  as  to  meet  the  necessities  of 
commerce  and  of  their  own  situation  and  relation  to  it,  and 
generally  to  manage  their  important  interests  upon  the  same 
principles  which  are  regarded  as  sound  and  adopted  in  other 
trades  and  pursuits.' 

''It  follows  that  railroad  companies  may  contract  with 
shippers  for  a  single  transportation  or  fcr  successive  trans- 
portations, subject  though  it  may  be  to  a  change  of  rates  in 
the  manner  provided  in  the  interstate  commerce  act  (Armour 
Packing  Co.  v.  United  States,  209  U.  S.  56,  52  L.  Ed.  681,  28 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  528),  and  also  that,  in  fixing  their  own  rates, 
they  may  take  into  account  competition  with  other  carriers, 
provided  only  that  the  competition  is  genuine,  and  not  a  pre- 
tense (Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R. 
Co..  145  IT.  S.  26;^,  36  L.  Ed.  699,  4  Inters.  Com.  Rep.  92,  12 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  844;  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  162  IT.  S.  197,  40  L.  Ed.  940.  5  Inters.  Com.  Rep. 
405,  16  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  666;  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v. 
Alabama  IMidland  R.  Co.  supra;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Behlmer,  175  V.  S.  648,  44  L.  Ed.  309,  20  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  209; 
East  Tenn.,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
181  V.  S.  1,  45  L.  Ed.  719,  21  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  516;  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  v.  Loui.sville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  190  U.  S.  273, 
47  L.  Ed.  1047,  23  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  687). 

"It  nuist  also  be  remembered  that  there  is  no  presumption 
of  wrong  arising  from  a  change  of  rate  by  a  carrier.  The 
presumption  of  honest  intent  and  right  conduct  attends  the 
action  of  carriers  as  well  as  it  does  the  action  of  other  cor- 
porations or  individuals  in  their  transactions  in  life.  Un-"^ 
doubt edly,  when  rates  are  changed,  the   carrier  making  the 


§  93]  Must  be  Just  and  Eeasonable.  345 

change  must,  Avlien  properly  called  upon,  be  able  to  give  a 
good  reason  therefor;  but  the  mere  fact  that  a  rate  has  been 
raised  carries  with  it  no  presumption  that  it  was  not  right- 
fully done.  Those  presumptions  of  good  faith  and  integrity 
which  have  been  recognized  for  ages  as  attending  human  ac- 
tion have  not  been  overthrown  by  any  legislation  in  respect 
to  common  carriers." 

It  is  evident  ''that  there  is  no  presumption  of  wrong"  when 
a  carrier  "takes  into  account  competition  with  other  car- 
riers" and  without  an  illegal  combination  between  it  and 
othej-  carriers  makes  an  advance  in  its  rates,  for  as  said  by 
the  court  in  the  course  of  the  same  opinion,  "Competition 
eliminates  from  the  case  an  intent  to  do  an  unlawful  act." 
But  when  an  advance  is  made  as  a  result  of  a  combination 
that  is  illegal,  there  can  be  no  presumption  that  the  act  of 
making  the  advance  was  in  good  faith  and  th?  carrier  should 
not  only  show  "a  good  reason  therefor,"  but  the  rate  so  ad- 
vanced is  presumptively  illegal,  and  the  carrier  should  be  re- 
quired clearly  to  show  that  it  is  not  unreasonable.  Judge 
Speer,  with  tbat  ability  and  clearness  that  usually  mark  his 
opinions,  in  the  case  of  Tift  v.  So.  Ey.  Co.,  supra,  states  the 
rule  correctly  and  at  length." 

Tt  is  true  that  the  commission  has  no  authority  to  enforce 
the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Law  and  cannot  penalize  carriers 
who  may  violate  it.  but  the  commission  can  and  should,  when 
considering  the  difficult  question  of  what  is  a  reasonable  rate, 
lock  to  the  causes  that  produced  the  rate  and  the  method 
adopted  in  putting  it  into  effect.  Congress  has  been  repeat- 
edly importuned  to  permit  interstate  carriers  to  combine, 
and  has  so  far  refused  to  amend  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Law, 
in  that  respect.  That  the  law  applies  to  carriers,  and  that  any 
contract  or  combination  in  restraint  of  trade  between  the 
states  violates  the  act  has  been  definitely  settled  in  the  Trans- 
]\Iissouri  Freight  and  Joint  Traffic  Association  Cases  cited 
supra  section  92.  Tt  is  probably  true  that  freight  associations 
are  necessary  to  the  proper  conduct  of  the  great  business  of 

84.    Tift  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  1.38  Fed.       206  U.  S.  428,  51  L.  Ed.  1124,  27 
753,   761,   762,   763.     Affirmed,    So.       Sup.  Ct.  709. 
Ry.    Co.    V.    Tift,    148    Fed.    1021, 


346  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  O-t 

carriers,  and  that  there  should  be  some  modification  of  the 
law  with  reference  to  such  associations.  Such  modifications,  if 
made,  should  protect  the  interests  of  the  public  as  well  as 
that  of  the  carriers,  and  rates  made  by  such  associations 
should  in  some  manner  be  investigated  and  found  reason- 
able before  becoming  efifective.  Of  course,  if  a  rate  is  rea- 
sonable, although  made  as  the  result  of  concert  of  action,  it 
cannot,  for  that  reason  alone,  be  condemned  by  the  com- 
mission.*" 

The  Transportation  Act  1920  changes  the  principle  of  com- 
petition, but  the  foregoing  discussion  of  the  reasons  why 
monopoly  was,  prior  to  that  Act,  regarded  as  harmful,  is  an 
ap])ropriate  statement  in  deciding  what  facts  should  be  con- 
sidered in  judging  whether  or  not  particular  rates  are  reason- 
able. The  1920  Amendment  permits  pooling  under  certain 
conditions,  opens  terminals  to  joint  uses  and  makes  the  anti- 
trust laws  inapplicable  to  railroads  and  invites  consolidation 
of  competitive  lines.^' 

§  94.  Same  Subject — Rule  Since  1910. — The  Amendment  of 
1910,  as  changed  in  1920,  provides:  "At  any  hearing  involving 
a  rate  fare  or  charge  increased  after  January  1,  1910,  or  of  a 
rate  fare  or  charge  sought  to  be  increased  after  the  passage 
of  this  Act,  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  that  the  increased 
rate,  fare  or  charge,  or  proposed  increased  rate,  fare  or  charge 
is  just  and  reasonable  shall  be  upon  the  carrier."*'  The  Tift 
case  was  decided  before  this  provision  was  adopted,  and  at  the 
time  when  the  burden  of  proof  was  on  him  who  attacked  a 
particular  rate.  The  rule  applied  where  rates  were  advanced 
as  the  result  of  concerted  action  was  a  rule  of  evidence,  the 
principal  effect  of  which  was  to  shift  the  burden  of  proof. 
Such  rule  in  so  far  as  that  effect  is  concerned  has  now  no  ap- 

85.    China  &  Japan  Trading  Co.  a  rate  establislied  in  consequence 

V.    Ga.    R.    Co.,    12    I.    C.    C.    236,  of    an    agreement     between      car- 

241,    and    cases   there    cited.      En-  riers.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Texas  v.  At- 

terprise   Mfg.    Co.    v.    Ga.   R.    Co.,  chison,   T.   &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  20   1. 

2    I.    C.    C.    451.    456;      Board    of  C.  C.  463,  466. 

Bristol    Tenn.    v.    Virginia    &    S.  86.     See    Sec.    63a,    supra,    and 

W.  Ry.  Co.,  15   I.   C.  C.   453.  The  chapter  9,  post. 
Commission    has    not    always    in-  87.    See  Sees.  399  and  505,  post. 

dulged    any    presumption    against 


§  95]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasoxable.  347 

plication,  as  the  statute  has  itself  placed  the  burden  on  the 
carrier  increasing  the  rate.  Since  1910  the  Commission  gives 
less  weight  to  the  fact  of  concerted  action,  both  because  of  the 
effect  of  the  statute  and  because  as  a  practical  matter  carriers 
can  advance  few  rates  except  by  unanimous  consent.  The 
Transportation  Act  1920  removes  all  necessity  to  consider  con- 
certed action. 

§  95.  Same  Subject — Conclusion. — The  carriers  are  permit- 
ted to  meet  competition,  provided  that  in  doing  so,  they  do  not 
transport  at  a  loss.  Market  competition  frequently  may  re- 
quire a  carrier  to  transport  goods  a  long  distance  at  a  com- 
paratively low  rate.  So  long  as  any  profit  is  made  by  such 
transportation,  it  benefits  not  only  the  carrier  but  all  ship- 
pers that  such  transportation  should  be  accepted.  But  it 
would  be  unjust  to  the  carrier  to  make  this  kind  of  traffic 
a  basis  for  all  rates.  Kirkman,  speaking  of  this  kind  of  com- 
petition, says  :*' 

"Competition  is  a  potent  factor  in  determining  rates,  and  is 
general  in  the  case  of  railroads.  Thus  the  facility  and  cheap- 
ness with  M'hich  wheat  may  be  moved  from  India  to  Liverpool 
affect  the  rate  on  wheat  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  They 
also  affect  the  rates  on  substitutes  therefor,  such  as  rye, 
barley,  and  so  on.  In  so  far  as  this  is  so,  it  is  apparent  that 
competition  is  only  partially  dependent  upon  the  presence  of 
neighboring  lines  or  other  local  influences.  Local  competition, 
while  valuable,  is  not  enough  to  enforce  equitable  conditions. 
It  must  be  supplemented  by  the  competitive  markets  of  the 
world,  including  the  diversified  carriage  of  mankind  Hfy  land 
and  water.  Kichness  of  soil,  facilities  of  production,  the 
price  of  labor  and  rates  of  local  carriers  from  points  of  pro- 
duction to  places  of  general  consumption  influence  the  charges 
of  other  carriers  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  It  is  no  ex- 
aggeration to  say  that  sources  of  competition  among,  carriers 
are  as  numerous  as  the  divergent  interests  of  trade.  Because 
of  this  they  are  self-regulative.  Their  errors  of  judgment  and 
sins  of  omission  and  commission  are  self -corrective." 

88.     Science    of    Railways,    vol.       8,  pp.  and  9. 


348  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  95 

This  quotation  would  not  be  accurate  if  applied  to  competi- 
tion generally ;  it  does  correctly  describe  market  competi- 
tion. Water  competition,  where  it  exists,  atfects  rates  in  a 
similar  way  to  that  of  market  competition.  The  carriers 
have  suppressed  water  competition  in  some  cases  and  use  it 
in  others  to  defend  some  particular  practice.  This  competi- 
tion is  discussed  by  IMr.  Commissioner  Prouty  as  follows.** 

"Without  doubt  water  competition  is  made  to  do  most 
heroic  service  in  many  portions  of  the  United  States  in  justi- 
fying anomalies  in  the  freight  rate,  but  we  are  constrained 
to  believe  that  this  competition  between  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Oceans  is  not  a  thing  of  the  imagination,  but  rather 
of  intense  reality  with  which  these  rail  carriers  must  deal. 

"When  the  rail  lines  first  reached  the  Pacific  Coast  all 
merchandise  was  brought  in  by  water;  at  the  end  of  several 
years  the  greater  portion  of  it  still  came  by  that  means. 
While  both  the  tonnage  and  the  proportion  have  been  largely 
reduced  since,  there  has  been  no  time  when  the  ocean  was 
not  an  important  factor  in  determining  the  rate  from  New 
York  to  San  Francisco.  Nothing  gives  stronger  evidence  of 
the  present  vitality  of  that  competition  than  the  fact  that  men 
familiar  with  the  situation  have  been  to  an  enormous  expense 
in  providing  tonnage  for  this  service  which  is  more  than  three 
times  the  amount  carried  in  recent  years.  From  the  day  the 
transcontinental  railroad  touched  the  Pacific  Ocean  its  strug- 
gle has  been  to  divert  b'usiness  from  sail  to  rail  and  with 
steamships  already  in  service  and  the  canal  in  immediate 
prospect  it  is  certain  that  this  struggle  has  not  ended. 

"In  1869,  when  the  Central  Pacific  and  Union  Pacific  began 
business,  goods  used  in  California  were  mainly  manufactured 

89.  Business  Men's  League  of  Commerce  of  Newport  News  v. 
St.  Louis  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
Ry.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  318,  359,  360.  345.  But  a  competing  water  route 
Low  rate  induced  by  water  com-  will  not  justify  unreasonable 
petition,  Re  Advances  in  Rates  rates,  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
for  the  Transportation  of  Flax-  state  Com.  Com.,  219  U.  S.  433, 
seed,  23  I.  C.  C.  272,  275.  Water  55  L.  Ed.  283,  31  Sup.  Ct.  288. 
competition  creating  dissimilar  See  amendment  as  to  water  corn- 
conditions,  Georgetown  Ry.  &  petition  suppressed  by  rail  car- 
Light  Co.  V.  Norfolk  &  W.  R.  riers,  Sec.  351,  i)ost. 
Co.,   2  I.   C.   C.   144;    Chamber   of 


§  96]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  340 

upon  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  In  order  to  secure  the  transporta- 
tion of  these  goods  the  rail  lines  found  it  necessary  to  make 
a  rate,  not  as  Ioav  in  cents  per  hundred  pounds,  but  of  as 
great  value,  all  things  considered,  as  the  water  rate.  Most 
rates  between  New  York  and  San  Francisco  have  ever  since 
been  and  still  are  established  on  this  basis.  It  is  idle  to  say 
that  when  wrought  iron  pipe,  for  instance,  can  be  transported 
from  coast  to  coast  by  water  for  35  cents  per  hundred  pounds, 
rail  carriers  can  maintain  a  carload  rate  much  above  the  75 
cents  now  in  force." 

There  was  competition  in  service  prior  to  1920,  al- 
though no  real  competition  in  rates.  How  far  competition  in 
service  will  be  reduced  by  the  Transportation  Act  1920  re- 
mains to  be  seen.*" 

§  96.  Rates  Affected  by  Amount  of  Tonnage. — The  commis- 
sion has  said:  "The  business  of  the  defendants  (the  carriers), 
not  only  in  lumber,  but  in  traffic  in  general,  has  grown  and  is 
growing  largely,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  deprive 
their  franchises,  or  right  to  exist,  from  the  public,  the  lumb'er 
shippers  as  part  of  the  public  might  plausibly,  to  say  the  least, 
claim  that  they  have  a  right  to  participate  in  the  prosperity  of 
the  defendants  by  having  their  rates  reduced  rather  than 
advanced.  The  general  rule  is.  the  greater  the  tonnage  of  an 
article  transported,  the  lower  should  be  the  rate.  No  rule  is 
more  firmly  grounded  in  reason  or  more  universally  recog- 
nized ]iy  cari'iers.  It  is  because  of  the  greater  density  of  traf- 
fic north  of  the  Ohio  River  in  Central  Freight  Association  ter- 
ritory and  in  the  eastern  territory  that  rates  in  general  are 
made  materially  lower  in  those  territories  than  in  the  south- 
ern territory ."'  This  principle  was  restated  by  Mr.  Com- 
missioner Clements,  in  Farrar  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  11  I.  C.  C.  632, 
637. 

In  a  later  case  Mr.  Commissioner  Prouty,  said:'" 

90.  Tift  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  138  92.  Re  Class  and  Commodity 
Fed.  753;  Science  of  Railways,  Rates  from  St.  Louis  to  Texas 
Vol.  8,  pp.  10,  11;  Class  and  Com-  Common  Points,  11  I.  C.  C.  238, 
modity  Rules,  38  I.  C.  C.  411,  431.  273,   274.     For  other  cases  apply- 

91.  Tift  V.  Southern  Railway  ing  the  principle,  see  Re  Ad- 
Co.,   10  I.  C.  C.  548,  583.  vances    in    Rates,    Eastern    Case, 

20  I.  C.  C.  243,  275;    National  Hay 


350  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  % 

"It  is  well  understood  that  freight  rates  should  decline  as 
a  country  develops  and  as  business  therefore  mcreases     *     *     * 

"It  was  urged  that  the  improvements  '.-equired  for  these 
economies,  the  reduction  of  grades,  the  laying  of  heavier  rail, 
the  purchase  of  modern  equipment,  had  necessitated  vast 
outlays  of  money  and  that  this  was  a  valid  reason  for  the 
advance  in  rates.  Undovibtedly  the  making  of  these  improve- 
ments has  required  the  expenditure  of  large  sums ;  in  many 
cases  it  has  amounted  to  a  virtual  reconstruction  of  the 
railroad  and  to  a  practical  change  of  its  equipment.  This  ad- 
ded expenditure  must  be  considered  in  determining  the  rea- 
sonableness of  those  rates,  but  does  not  justify  an  advance 
in  rates.  What  has  been  the  purpose  of  these  improvements? 
Certainly  to  decrease  the  cost  of  operation,  to  handle  freight 
and  passengers  at  less  expense  than  they  could  be  handled  in 
the  former  way.  It  is  a  strange  logic  which  imposes  upon  the 
public  a  higher  rate  while  insuring  to  the  carrier  a  lower  cost 
of  operation.  The  actual  making  of  these  improvements  may 
have  added  not  only  to  the  expense  of  operation  but  may 
have  detracted  from  the  efficiency  of  operation.  The  prosecu- 
tion of  the  necessary  work  has  interfered  with  the  movement 
of  traffic  and  thereby  added  to  the  cost  of  this  movement. 
But  all  this  is  temporary  and  comparatively  insignificant  and 
should  not  be  made  an  excuse  for  a  permanent  advance  in 
rates. 

"It  is  urged  that  the  increased  volume  of  traffic  has  neces- 
sitated these  outlays ;  that  otherwise  the  business  could  not  be 
handled.  And  that  is  probably  true:  but  increase  of  traffic, 
while  it  may  produce  temporary  embarassment,  should  re- 
duce, not  advance,  rates." 

The  rule  stated  in  the  Tift  case  supra  is  too  broad.  While 
increased  density  of  all  traffic  affects  rates  and  justifies  lower 
rates,  increased  density  of  a  particular  traffic  may  not  neces- 
sarily have  that  eflPect.  If  there  is  a  large  volume  of  a  par- 
ticular traffic  with  a  light  density  of  all  traffic,  higher  rates 
may  be  necessary  than  when  there  is  a  lesser  volume  of  the 
particular  traffic  with  a  greater  volume  of  all  traffic.  It  is 
however,  unquestionably  true  that  a  large  volume  of  a  par- 
ticular traffic  is  a  fact  which  ought  to  be  considered  in  deter- 
mining what  should  be  the  rate  thereon. 


§  97]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  351 

§  07    Same  Subject. — Further  Limitations    of    the    Rule. — 

The  rule  may  not  be  api)lied  too  far.  A  traffic  official  of  one 
of  the  defendants  in  the  Morgan  Grain  case'"'  testified  that  the 
amount  of  traffic  offered  in  1907  was  so  large  as  to  pass  the 
''economic  maximum,"  and,  therefore,  the  carriers  not  hav- 
ing sufficient  equipment,  the  cost  of  handling  the  traffic  was 
relatively  higher  than  if  less  traffic  had  been  offered.  This 
may  be  true,  and  when  true,  while  furnishing  no  reason  why 
the  carrier  should  increase  rates  based  upon  its  inability  to 
meet  economically  its  obligations  to  the  shippers,  it  would 
not  be  just  to  require  the  application  of  the  rule  that  the 
greater  the  tratfic  the  less  relatively  should  be  the  rate.  Al- 
though if  the  condition  of  more  traffic  than  could  be  eco- 
nomically handled  should  be  a  permanent  one,  it  would  be 
the  duty  of  the  carrier  to  provide  adequate  facilities  therefor. 
The  effect  of  "this  added  expenditure"  is  discussed  in  the 
quotation  supra  from  the  opinion  of  j\Ir.  Commissioner  Prouty. 

§  98.  Density  of  Traffic. — Within  reasonable  limits,  the 
,greater  the  volume  of  all  traffic  the  lower  should  be  the  rates. 
This  is  obvious  and  is  the  practice  of  railroads  generally 
In  the  densely  populated  sections  of  the  country  rates  are 
on  a  lower  level  than  in  the  sparsely  settled  sections. 

The  statement  of  the  Commission,  speaking  through  Mr. 
Commissioner  Prouty,  in  Ee  Class  and  Commodity  Rates, 
supra,  applies  here.  Rates  should  decrease  as  density  of 
traffic  increases,"*  and  the  fact  that  a  region  is  "comparatively 
thinly  populated""''  map  justify  higher  rates."' 

and    Grain    Association    v.    Michi-  94.     Re   Advances    in    Rates,   — 

gan  C.  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  34,  47;  Eastern  Case  — ,  20  I.  C.   C.  243, 

Hydraulic     Press     Brick     Co.     v.  275. 

Mobile   &    O.   R.    Co.,    19    I.    C.    C.  9.5.    Cherokee  Lumber  Co.  v.  At- 

530,  531;  Virginia  Carolina  Chem.  lantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  438. 

Co.   V.   St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.   Ry.  96.    Stiritz  v.  New  Orleans  M.  & 

Co.,    18   I.   C.    C.    1;     Ozark   Fruit  C.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.   578;     Mem- 

&  Grain   Assn.   v.   St.   L.   &   S.   F.  phis    Freight    Bureau    v.    Illinois 

R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  134,  139;    Bur-  Cent.  R.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  507,  511; 

gess      Transcontinental       Freight  Railroad  Com.  of  Ark.  v.  M.  &  N. 

Bureau,  13  I.  C.  C.  668,  675.  A.   R.   Co.,   30   I.  C.  C.   488;     Rail- 

93.   Morgan  Grain  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  way  Com.  of  Montana  v.  B.  A.  & 

R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  460.  P.   Ry.   Co.,    31    I.   C.   C.    641,   648, 


352  Chaeges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  99 

§  99.  Distance  and  Revenue  per  Ton  Mi^e. — Judge  Cooley, 
then  eliairiiian  of  the  commission,  in  a  head  note  stated  this 
rule:'"  "As  a  rule  in  the  transportation  of  freight  by  rail- 
roads, while  the  aggregate  charge  is  continually  increasing 
the  further  the  freight  is  carried,  the  rate  per  ton  mile  is 
constantly  growing  less  all  the  time,  making  the  aggregate 
charge  less  in  proportion  every  hundred  miles  after  the  first, 
arising  out  of  the  character  and  nature  of  the  service  per- 
formed and  the  cost  of  the  service ;  and  thus  staple  com- 
modities and  merchandise  are  enabled  to  bear  the  charges 
of  this  mode  of  transportation  from  and  to  the  most  distant 
portions  of  the  country."  Judge  Cooley  also  pointed  out  that 
this  rule  is  not  only  not  abrogated  but  is  sanctioned  by  the 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  The  general  principle  has  been 
applied  by  the  commission  in  other  cases.*^  The  rule  is. 
hoAvever,  subject  to  exceptions,"^  and  when  comparing  rates, 
"the  rate  per  ton  mile  is  not  always  the  measure  of  a  reason- 
able rate,  and,  rightly  applied,  w^ould  make  distance  alone 
the  gauge  for  transportation  charges,  but  it  is  always  valuable 
as  atfording  a  basis  of  comparison  for  relative  rate  b^urdens."" 
Mr.  Commissioner  Prouty  says,  "The  rate  per  ton  mile,  while 
often  instructive,  is  not  by  any  means  a  fair  index  of  a  rea- 
sonable rate.""^  While  the  rate  per  ton  mile  usually  de- 
creases as  distance  increases,  the  rate  per  ton  mile  on  one 
road  is  not  necessarily  a  safe  guide  in  fixing  a  rate  on  another 
road  operatiiig  under  different  conditions. 

649;    Commercial  Club  of  Mitchell,  I.    C.    C.    22,    23;     National    Hay 

S.  Dak.  V.  A.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  46  I.  Assn.    v.    Michigan    C.   R.    Co.,    19 

C.  C.  17.  I.  C.  C.  34,  47;     Muscogee  Traffic 

97.  Farrar  v.  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Bureau  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 
Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  480,  1  I.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  169,  173. 

R.  764.  99.      Manufacturers'     and     Job- 

98.  Business  Men's  Asso.  v.  Chi-  bers'  Union  v.  Minneapolis  &  St. 
Cage,  St.  P.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  2  L.  Ry.  Co.,  4  I.  C.  C.  79,  3  I.  C.  R. 
I.   C.  C.   52,   2   I.   C.   R.   41;     Busi-  115. 

ness    Men's    Asso.    v.    Chicago    &  100.    Farrar  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  11  I. 

N.   W.   Ry.    Co.,   2    I.    C.    C.    73,    2  C.  C.  640.  649. 

I.   C.   R.   48,   52;    Gustin  v.   Atchi-  101.    Re  Proposed   Advances   in 

son,   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,    8   I.   C.  Freight  Rates,  9  I.  C.  C.  383,  396; 

C.   277,   288.     Re  Investigation   of  Butte    Milling    Co.    v.    Chicago    & 

Advances    in    Rates   on    Grain,    21  A.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  351,  362. 


§  99]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  353 

The  rule  that  as  the  distance  increases  the  rate  per  mile 
should  decrease,  as  has  been  so  frequently  said  of  all  formula^j 
of  rate-making,  must  be  applied  with  due  regard  to  all  the 
circumstances  and  conditions  surrounding  the  making  of  the 
rate  or  rates  under  discussion.  The  principle  is  but  a  rule  of 
evidence,  a  fact  which  may  justify  a  particular  deduction, 
and  not  an  inflexible  rule  of  law.  The  question  of  expense  in- 
curred in  earning  the  particular  revenue  must  not  be  lost 
sight  of,'°"  and  the  formula  is  but  one  of  many  considerations 
in  rate  adjustments/"'' 

Car  mile  and  train  mile  earnings  are  frequently  used  in 
comparing  rates  and,  as  with  the  ton  mile  comparisons,  may 
constitute  probative  evidence.'"* 

What  is  sometimes  called  the  rate  per  ton  mile,  more  prop- 
erly the  revenue  per  ton  mile  which  the  rate  for  the  distance 
yields,  reflects  the  rate  and  the  length  of  the  haul  only,  and  is 
obtained  by  dividing  the  rate  per  ton  for  the  total  haul  by  the 
length  of  the  haul.  Students  of  the  principles  applied  to 
rate-judging  have  extended  the  comparisons  by  using  revenues 
per  gross  ton  mile  both  with  and  without  a  consideration  of 
the  empty  haul  incident  to  a  particular  traffic.  The  revenue 
per  net  ton  mile  gives  no  consideration  to  the  ratio  of 
revenue  paying  load  to  the  total  load  hauled,  while  the  reve- 
nue per  gross  ton  mile  reflects  both  the  weight  of  the  com- 
modity hauled  and  the  weight  of  the  car  in  which  it  is  hauled. 
Some  commodities,  such  as  oil,  coal,  live  stock  and  meat  pro- 
ducts, are  transported  in  special  equipment  which  from  neces- 
sity is  hauled  nearly  as  great  distances  empty  as  loaded.    Com- 

102.  Nebraska  State  R.  Com.  v.  104.  Wisconsin  Steel  Co.  v. 
Cliicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  Pittsburg  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.,  27  I.  C. 
C.  C.  121,  125.  126.  In  Kansas  v.  C.  152,  162;  Lake  Cargo  Coal  Rate 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  Case,  22  I.  C.  C.  604,  620;  con- 
C.  673,  owing  to  lighter  density  strued.  Rock  Springs  Distilling 
of  traffic  rates  for  the  longer  Co.  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  27  I.  C. 
distances  in  West  Kansas  were  C.  54,  57;  Milburn  Wagon  Co.  v. 
approved  which  yield  a  revenue  Toledo,  St.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  27  I. 
per  net  ton  mile  higher  than  for  C.  C.  63,  66;  Re  Export  Rates  of 
the   shorter   distances.  Flax    Seed    Products,    27    I.    C.    C. 

103.  Ashgrove  Cement  Co.  v.  246,  248;  Little  Rock  Chamber  of 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  23  Commerce  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
I.  C.  C.  519,  524.  S.  R.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  341,  343. 


354  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  ['§>  99A 

parisons  wliieli  include  these  additional  considerations  are 
obviously  nu)re  valuable  than  comparisons  of  revenue  per 
net  ton  mile  and  revenue  per  car  mile.  In  the  Western  Rate 
Advance  case  of  1915,  those  more  comprehensive  comparisons 
were  presented  and  relied  on  as  tending  to  show  the  propriety 
of  selecting  for  rate  advances  the  commodities  affected  by  the 
tariffs  there  under  suspension  and  investigation/"^  There 
are  eases  where  the  car  mile  comparison  is  the  better/""  and 
light  density  of  traffic  at  the  end  must  be  considered."" 

§  99A.  Extra  Line  Hauls. — Prior  to  the  date  of  the  passage 
of  the  Transportation  Act  1920  the  Commission  practically 
without  exception,  save  when  the  haul  exceeded  five  hundred 
miles,  applied  the  principle  that  for  a  two  or  more  line  haul 
the  charges  might  be  greater  by  the  cost  of  switching  than 
for  a  one  line  haul  for  a  similar  distance.^"*  The  principle 
merely  raises  a  presumption  of  fact  and  is  not  a  rule  of 
law.^""  "Single  line"  comprehends  all  lines  under  the  same 
controlling  interests."" 

The  presumptive  force  of  the  principle  lost  all  or  substantially 
all  of  its  support  when  Congress  by  the  1920  Act  practically 
terminates  whatever  competition  had  theretofore  existed 
among  the  railroads."' 


105.  Western  Rate  Advance 
Case,  1915,  35  I.  C.  C.  497. 

106.  Rice  from  Texas  &  Louisi- 
ana, 40  I.  C.  C.  285,  289;  Chamber 
of  Commerce  of  Johnson  City  v. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  46  I.  C.  C.  527,  531; 
Western  Cement  Rates  48  I.  C.  C. 
201. 

107.  Commercial  Club  of  Mit- 
chell, S.  Dak.,  V.  A.  &  W.  Ry.  Co., 
46  I.  C.  C.  1,  7. 

108.  Sheridan  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce Case,  26  I.  C.  C.  638,  649 
and  cases  cited;  Hayden  Bros. 
Coal  Corp.  v.  D.  &  S.  L.  R.  R.  Co., 
?.9  I.  C.  C.  94,  106;  Northwestern 
Cooperage  &'  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  St. 
P.  &  St.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  43  I.  C.  C.  629, 
632. 

109.  Stonega  Coke  &  Coal  Co.  v. 
L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  1.  C.  C.  523, 


551;  The  Mississippi  River  Case, 
28  I.  C.  C.  47,  59. 

110..  Capital  City  Oil  Co.  v.  Y. 
&  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  141, 
146;  Wellington  Mines  Co.  v.  C. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  203,  205; 
Royster  Guano  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R. 
Co.,  50  I.  C.  C.  '!4,  43. 

111.  Car  Service  Provision  para- 
graphs 10  to  17,  Sec.  1  of  Act,  sec- 
tions 344 A  to  344H,  post;  joint  use 
of  terminal  facilities,  paragraph  4 
of  section  3  of  Act,  Section  347a, 
post;  consolidation  of  carriers, 
paragraph  4,  section  5  of  Act, 
section  352b,  post;  anti-trust  laws 
made  inapplicable,  paragraph  8, 
section  5  of  Act,  section  352g,  post; 
routing  further  regulated,  para- 
graphs 9  and  10,  section  15  of 
Act,   sections   401   and   402,   post, 


V  100]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  355 

§  100.  General  Business  Conditions. — How  far  rates  may 
be  affected  by  the  business  situation  of  the  country  and  the 
shippers  has  been  the  subject  of  consideration  in  several  cases. 
It  will  be  admitted  that  the  fact,  when  such  fact  exists,  that 
a  shipper  has  a  ready  market  for  his  goods  at  a  good  price, 
affects  the  value  of  the  service  to  the  shipper  and  may  be 
considered  in  determining  what,  in  a  particular  case,  is  a 
reasonable  rate.  It  is  also  true  that  prosperous  times  may  and 
generally  do  increase  the  price  of  both  labor  and  equipment 
necessary  for  the  carrier  to  operate,  thus  affecting  "the  cost 
of  service,"  and  consequently  furnishing  a  fact  that  is  an 
element  among  the  many  considerations  entering  into  a  deter- 
mination of  Avhat  is  the  proper  rate  to  be  charged  for  trans- 
portation. But  the  mere  fact  of  general  prosperity,  or  of 
general  depression,  will  not  justify  a  carrier  in  absorbing  the 
one  or  shifting  the  other  to  the  shipper.  "Transportation  by 
rail  is  a  service  of  a  quasi  public  nature,  not  to  be  sold  to  the 
highest  bidder,  nor  subject  to  the  law  of  supply  and  de- 
mand.""^ "The  claim"  that  the  carriers  may  absorb  all  or 
part  of  the  prosperity  of  the  shipper,  says  Mr.  Commissioner 
Clements  "is  based  upon  the  erroneous  assumption,  so  prev- 
alent among  traffic  managers,  that  a  rate  may  be  made  as 
high  as  'the  traffic  will  bear.'"^'"  AYhen  rates  have  been 
reduced  because  it  was  necessary  to  meet  conditions  caused  by 
depressed  financial  conditions,  such  rates  may  be  advanced 
in  prosperous  times  to  the  point  where  they  are  reasonable. 
]\Ir.  Commissioner  Prouty,  in  the  able  discussion  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  rate  making  already  quoted  from,  says  :"* 

"No  reduction  in  these  rates  has  been  made  in  the  past  for 
the  purpose  of  stimulating  the  movement  of  this  traffic.  The 
amount  of  these  advances  is  so  slight  as  compared  with  the 

providing  a  "fair  return''  on  "ag  113.    Tift  v.   So.   Ry.   Co.,   10   I. 

gregate  value"  paragraphs  2,  3,  5,  C.  C.  548,  582;  Central  Yellow  Pine 

6,  section  l'5a  of  Act,  sections  405b  Asso.    v.    111.    Cent.    R.    Co.,    10    I. 

to  405f,  j)ost.  C.  C.  505. 

112.    Re   proposed   Advances   in  114.    Re   Class   and   Commodity 

Freight  Rates,  9  I.  C.  C.  382,  405.  Rates    from    St.    Louis    to    Texas 

See   also  Freight   Bureau   of   Cin-  Common   Points,    11    I.   C.   C.   238, 

cinnati  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  272,  273. 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  6  I.  C.  C.  195,  4  L  C. 
R.   592,   617. 


1156  Charges  fob  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  100 

selling  price  of  the  article  traiisi)orted  that  they  produce 
no  effect  whatever  upon  the  volume  of  the  traffic.  Now  with 
respect  to  a  rate  of  this  kind  we  do  not  think  an  increase  in  the 
price  of  the  article  transported  justifies  of  itself  an  increase  in 
the  freight  rate.  These  rates  were  not  reduced  when  the 
prices  fell:  why  should  they  be  advanced  when  prices  rise? 
An  incident  which  occurred  in  this  very  case  strongly  empha- 
sizes the  absurdity  of  the  claim. 

"Cotton  is  an  important  item  of  traffic  upon  the  Interna- 
tional &  Great  Northern  Railroad,  one  of  these  respondents. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  ravages  of  the  boll  weevil  have 
seriously  affected  the  cotton  crop  in  certain  parts  of  Texas. 
The  attorney  for  the  International  &  Great  Northern,  himself, 
a  former  railroad  commissioner  of  Texas  and  a  thoughtful 
student  of  this  subject,  gave  as  a  reason  for  the  advances 
in  question  in  wiiich  his  line  participates  that  owing  to  the  boll 
weevil  the  cotton  crop  upon  a  large  part  of  his  road  was  a 
failure,  and  that  this  reduced  the  amount  of  cotton  for  trans- 
portation ;  that  in  consequence  of  the  failure  of  this  important 
crop  the  whole  country  was  impoverished  and  was  able  to 
purchase  less,  which  also  contributed  to  reduce  the  income 
of  his  railroad.  For  these  reasons  it  had  become  necessary 
to  advance  rates  in  order  to  obtain  sufficient  revenue  with 
wiiich  to  operate  the  road  and  pay  a  fair  return  upon  the 
investment.  Here,  therefore,  we  have  in  the  same  case  and 
by  parties  of  the  same  general  system  a  claim  upon  the  one 
hand  that  these  advances  are  justified  by  general  conditions 
of  prosperity  and  upon  the  other  hand  that  they  are  justified 
by  general  conditions  of  adversity. 

"Railroads  should  share  in  the  general  prosperity.  The}^ 
should  do  this  partly  by  being  able  to  advance  those  rates 
which  have  declined  under  commercial  conditions.  They  should 
do  it  still  more  by  the  increased  traffic  which  they  obtain. 
In  times  of  prosperity  when  money  is  plentiful  and  business 
good  people  ride  more,  buy  more,  new  industries  are  being 
established  and  old  industries  are  active,  traffic  increases  and 
out  of  such  increased  traffic  the  railway  obtains,  by  automatic 
action  so  to  speak,  Avithout  any  advance  in  its  rate  a  large 
share  in  the  general  prosperity." 


<§  1,00]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  357 

The  opinions  of  Commissioners  Clements  and  Proiity,  supra, 
are  in  accord.  The  carrier  may  not  absorb  the  prosperity  of 
the  shipper,  but  when  prosperity  exists  the  carriers  may  restore 
rates  "that  have  declined  under  commercial  conditions."  It' 
the  prosperity  of  the  country  adds  to  the  density  of  the 
traffic,  it  mic;ht,  in  some  cases,  furnish  a  reason  for  reductions 
in  rates. 

In  thp  1910  Western  Rate  Advance  case,  p.  315,'"  the 
broad  view  which  the  Commission  may  take  was  discussed. 
It  was  there  said:  "It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Com- 
mission is  not  a  court  of  law,  its  function  is  to  apply  the 
mandatory  and  restrictive  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate 
Commerce  to  stated  conditions  of  fact.  We  must  regard 
the  problems  presented  to  use  from  as  many  standpoints  as  there 
are  public  interests  involved.  *  *  *  The  reasonableness 
of  a  rate  is  to  be  determined  by  no  mere  mathematical  cal- 
culation. ' ' 

And  in  the  further  course  of  the  opinion  in  that  case,  p.  317 : 
"Tt  is  doubtless  true  that  in  its  control  over  the  charges  which 
our  railroad  may  make  this  Commission  exercises  a  power  so 
extensive  as  to  justify  the  broadest  consideration  of  the  eco- 
nomic and  financial  effects  of  its  orders." 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  business  conditions  should  be 
considered  in  making  and  judging  rates,  it  is  not  permissible 
to  fix  rates  loAver  than  are  just  and  reasonable,  because  of 
the  inability  of  a  particular  commodity  to  blear  such  rates. 
Mr.  Commissioner  Daniels,  citing  prior  decisions  of  the  Com- 
mission in  deciding  the  claim  for  lesser  rates  based  upon  the 
statement  that  the  prices  received  were  less  than  the  actual 
cost  of  production,  said:""  "Tt  should  be  observed,  however, 
that  the  reasonableness  or  unreasonableness  of  freight  rates 
cannot  be  gauged  solely  by  the  ability  or  inability  of  ship- 
pers under  depressed  prices  to  market  their  products  at  the 

115.  Advance  in  Rates,  —  Wes-  59  L.  Ed.  735,  35  Sup.  Ct.  429; 
tern  Case  — ,  20  I.  C.  C.  307,  315,  see  also  Lumber  Rates  from 
317.  Helena,  Ark.,  41  I.  C.  C.  565,  577; 

116.  Railroad  Com.  of  Montana  Southeastern  Lumber,  42  I.  C.  C. 
V.    B.    A.   &    ?.    Ry.    Co.,   31    I.    C.  548,  558;     McLean  Lumber  Co.  v. 
C.  641,  644;    and  see  N.  P.  R.  Co.  United  States,  237  Fed.  460,  470. 
V.   North   Dakofa,    2.3.6    U.    S.    585, 


358  Charoes  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  101 

existing  rates  with  a  reasonable  margin  of  profit.  Such  a 
doctrine  would  lead  ta  the  conclusion  that  the  differential 
burdensi  of  production  arising  -from  naturtd  disadvantages, 
distance  from  market,  and  other  economical  difficulties  of  all  com- 
munities and  industries  should  be  neutralized  and  absorbed  by 
the  carriers  which  serve  them." 

§  101.  Estoppel. — Where  carriers,  in  the  exercise  of  their 
right  to  det(^rmine  the  policy  under  which  their  rates  are  to  be 
made,  establish  a  rate  for  the  purpose  of  developing  a  par- 
ticular industry,  called  by  the  carriers,  "Missionary  Rates," 
they  are  not  estopped  from  advancing  such  rates  when  the 
resultant  rates  are  not  unreasonable,  and  the  fact  that  such 
rates  were  so  established  is  not  alone  sufficient  evidence  to 
justify  a  finding  that  the  advanced  rates  are  unreasonable 
and  violative,  of  section  one  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act. 
In  Western  Oregon  Lumber  Manufacturers'  Association  v. 
Soiithern  Pacific  Co.,^"  the  Commission  held  that  when  the 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  established  a  rate  for  the  purpose  of 
developing  the  lumber  industry  of  a  particular  section,  which 
rate  it  maintained  with  brief  intervals  for  six  years,  an  ad- 
vance thereon,  when  "on  the  strength  of  this  rate  that  in- 
dustry had  attained  considerable  proportions,"  was  unrea- 
sonable. The  question  of  the  validity  of  this  order  having 
come  before  the  Supreme  Court,  that  court  in  speaking  of 
the  contention  of  the  carriers  said:  "That  is  to  say  the  con- 
tention is  that  the  order  entered  by  the  Commission  shows  on 
its  face  that  the  body  assumed  not  only  that  it  had  power  to 
prevent  the  charging  of  unjust  and  unreasonable  rates,  but 
also  to  regulate  and  control  the  general  policij  (italics  sup- 
plied) of  the  owners  of  railroads  as  to  fixing  rates,  and  con- 
sequently that  there  was  authority  to  substitute  for  a  just  and 
reasonable  rate  one  which  in  and  of  itself  in  a  legal  sense 
might  be  inijust  and  unreasonable,  if  the  Commission  was 
satisfied  tliat  it  was  a  wise  policy  to  do  so,  or  because  a  rail- 
road had  so  conducted  itself  as  to  be  estopped  in  the  future 

117.     Western    Oregon    Lumber      bound   Rates  on  Hardwood,   32   I. 
Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,       C.  C.  521,  .524. 
14   I.   C.    C.    61.     See   also   North- 


§  1,01]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  359 

from  being  entitled  to  receive  a  just  and  reasonable  compensa- 
tion for  the  service  rendered."  '^ 

While  the  attorneys  representing  the  Commission  before 
the  Supreme  Court  disclaimed  for  the  Commission  any  suck 
construction  of  the  order,  the  order  was  construed  by  the 
court  to  mean  what  Avas  contended  in  the  foregoing  quotation. 

In  speaking  of  the  power  necessary  to  enter  the  order  as  it 
was  construed,  the  court  said:  This  "extraordinary  power 
which  the  railroads  thus  say  was  exerted  in  rendering  the 
order  complained  of,  a  power  which  if  obtained,  would  open 
a  vast  field  for  the  exercise  of  discretion,  to  the  destruction 
of  rights  of  private  property  in  railroads  and  would  in  effect 
assert  public  ownership  without  any  of  the  responsibilities 
whioli  ownership  would  imply." 

The  court  having  given  the  Commission's  order  a  construc- 
tion as  indicated  by  the  contention  made,  held  the  order  void. 

The  Commerce  Court,  citing  the  Supreme  Court  case,  supra, 
and  in  speaking  of  orders  of  the  Commission,  said:  "Its 
orders  must  be  based  on  transportation  considerations,  and 
while  it  may  give  weight  to  all  factors  bearing  either  on  the 
cost  or  value  of  the  transportation  service,  it  must  disregard 
as  well  the  demand  of  the  shipper  for  protection  from  legiti- 
mate competition,  domestic  or  foreign,  for  unlimited  markets, 
or  for  the  enforcement  of  equitable  estoppels  arising  from  a 
justifiable  expectation  that  past  rates  will  be  maintained.""" 
That  because  a  carrier  has  maintained  a  low  rate  upon  which 
business  has  been  built  up,  the  carrier  may  not  advance  its 
charges  to  a  reasonable  rate,  is  unquestionably  true.  This  is 
true  because  all  parties  know  that  rates  are  subject  to  legis- 
lative control  and  estoppel  cannot  apply,  and  Congress  has 
not  as  yet  given  the  Commission  power  to  initiate  rates  but 
has  left  the  general  policy  of  rate  uiaking  to  the  carriers,  sub- 
ject only  to  the  specific  provisions  of  the  statutes  regulating 
interstate  commerce.     Nor  does  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 

118.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  In-  Co.  v.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  190 
terstate  Com.  Com.,  219  U.  S.  433,  Fed'.  591  (Lemon  Case),  Opinion 
444,  55  L.  Ed.  283,  31  Sup.  Ct.  Commerce  Court  No.  7,  p.  83; 
288.  same   case,    203    Fed.    56.    Opinion 

119.  Atchison,   T.   &    S.   F.   Ry.  Commerce    Court   No.    61,    p.    537. 


oGO  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  102 

Court  necessarily  mean  that  there  is  no  evidentiary  value  in 
the  proof  that  a  rate  was  established  to  encourage  an  industry 
whose  prosperity  is  dependent  upon  a  continuation  of  the 
rate/""  There  is  nothing  in  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  which  prevents  the  Commission  from  giving  considera- 
tion to  the  presumption  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  carriers 
selling  transportation  have  long  fixed  a  particular  value 
thereon.     This  presumption  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 

It  is  also  true  that  carriers  "may  not  make  contracts  which 
abrogate  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,"  and  such  contracts 
cannot  prevent  the  Commission  from  determining  the  rate 
involved  therein  and  prescribing  when  necessary  a  different 
rate  or  practice.'"' 

§  102.  Rates  Long  in  Existence  Are  Presumed  to  Be  Reason- 
able.— AVhen  conditions  have  not  materially  changed,  it  is 
consistent  Avith  the  motives  which  usually  actuate  mankind 
to  presume  that  a  rate  long  in  existence  is  reasonable  and 
that  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  him  who  seeks  to  obtain  or 
justify  another  and  higher  rate.  As  early  as  1889  the  Com- 
mission, speaking  of  a  rate  sought  to  be  changed  by  a  carrier, 
said:  "It  has.  without  the  pressure  of  competition  other  than 
on  equal  terms,  long  continued  this  rate  and  as  long  been 
making  evidence  that  this  nineteen-cent  rate  is  not  unreason- 
ably low."'"^  The  principle  was  again  announced  in  the 
Food  Products  case'""  and  in  Proctor  v.  Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R. 
Co.^^^     i\Ir.  Commissioner  Prouty,  in  Holmes  v.  Southern  Ry.. 

120.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Co.  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.,  39  I.  C.  C. 
Finn,  235  U.  S.  601,  59  L.  Ed.  379,  118,  122;  Stonega  Coke  &  Coal 
35  Sup.  Ct.  146;  Duluth,  Minne-  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C. 
sota  Log  Rates,  29  I.  C.  C.  420,  52.?.,  549;  Cape  Girardeau  Com- 
421.  mercial    Club    v.    111.    C.    R.    Co., 

121.  Ottumwa    Bridge    Co.    v.       51   I.   C.  C.  105. 

Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  122.     Logan    et     al.,     Com.     of 

C.   C.    121.      See   also   Commercial  Northwestern  Grain  Assn.  v.  Chi- 

Coal    Co.    V.    Baltimore    &    O.    R.  cago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  2  I.  C.  C.  604, 

Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  11;   Menefee  Lum-  2  I.  C.  R.  431,  434. 

ber    Co.    v.    Texas    &    P.    Ry.    Co..  123.      Re      Alleged      Excessive 

15  I.  C.  C.  49;    Penn  Tobacco  Co.  Freight  Rates  on  Food  Products,  4 

V.    Old    Dominion    Steamship    Co.,  I.  C.  C.  48,  3  I.  C.  R.  93. 

IS  I.  C.  C.  197;   Baltimore  Butch-  124.    Proctor  v.  Cincinnati,  H.  & 

ers  Abattoir  &  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  D.   R.   Co.,    4    I.   C.   C.   87,   3   I.   C. 

Philadelphia,   B.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  20  R.  131. 

I.   C.   C.   124,   128.     Daffney  Brick 


§  1.02]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  361 

Co./"'^  announced  the  rule  in  this  language:  "The  continu- 
ance of  a  given  rate  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  that  rate,  but  when  a  railway  company  advances 
a  rate  which  has  been  for  some  time  in  force,  the  fact  of  its 
continuance  is  in  the  nature  of  an  admission  against  that  com- 
pany, which  tends  to  show  the  unreasonableness  of  the  ad- 
vance ;  and  the  force  of  this  admission  becomes  great  in  view 
of  the  general  decline  in  the  average  of  railway  rates  and  the 
lessened  cost  of  service."  The  general  rule  is  recognized,  but 
found  not  applicable  to  the  facts  in  Proctor  v.  Cincinnati,  H. 
&  D.  R.  Co.'^"  In  the  Central  Yellow  Pine  Asso.  Case'"  the 
Commission  said:  "When  carriers  advance  a  rate  which  has 
been  for  some  time  in  force,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  them 
to  show  sufficient  grounds  for  such  advance."  In  the  Tift 
case'""  this  language  was  used:  "The  maintenance  of  materi- 
ally lower  rates  for  such  long  periods  of  time  brings  this 
case  within  the  rule  that  'when  an  advance  is  made  in  rates 
which  have  long  been  maintained  and  the  evidence  shows  that 
the  traffic  affected  is  large,  important  and  constantly  increas- 
ing, the  advance  will  be  held  unjust  unless  it  is  satisfactorily 
explained.'  "  Each  of  these  cases  was  tried  in  the  circirit 
court  and  reached  the  Supreme  Court  where  both  were  af- 
firined.'""  Li  the  Yellow  Pine  case  the  Supreme  Court  said : 
"The  question  submitted  to  the  commission  *  *  *  was 
one  Avhich  turned  on  matters  of  fact.  In  that  ciuestion.  of 
course,  there  were  elements  of  law,  but  we  cannot  see  that 
any  one  of  these  or  any  circumstances  probative  of  the  con- 
clusion was  overlooked  or  disregarded."     It  was  stated  by 

125.  Holmes    v.    Southern    Ry.  127.    Central  l;ellow  Pine  Asso. 
Co.,  8  I.  C.  C.  561,  568.                           v.    111.    Cent.    R.    Co.,   10    I.    C.    C. 

126.  Proctor   v.    Cincinnati,    H.       505. 

&  D.  R.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  440.     For  128.    Tift   v.   So.   Ry.   Co.,   10   I. 

further   history   of   this   case,    see  C.  C.  548. 

Interstate    Com.    Com.    v.    Cincin-  129.   Tift  v.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  138  Fed. 

nati,    H.    &    D.    R.    Co.,    146    Fed.  753;   So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tift,  148  Fed. 

559;     Cinncinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  Co.  1021,  206  U.  S.  428,  51  L.  Ed.  1124. 

V.    Interstate    Com.    Com.,    206    U.  27  Sup.  Ct.  709;     111.  Cent.  R.  Co. 

S.  142,  51  L.  Ed.  995,  27  Sup.  Ct.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  206  U.  S.  441, 

648,   enforcing  order  of  the  Com-  51  L.  Ed.  1128,  27  Sup.  Ct.  700. 
mission. 


362  CpiARCiEs  FOE  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  103 

tlic  Siiprnnc  Coin-t  that  the  Tift  ease,  supra,  depended  "upon 
llip  same  legal  considerations,"  as  the  Yellow  Pine  case. 

The  ease  of  INIemphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co., 
17  T.  C.  C.  313,  while  not  repudiating  the  doctrine  above, 
states  it  less  clearly  than  some  of  the  prior  decisions  of  the 
Commission.  It  is  a  fundamental  law  that  acts  of  an  in- 
divdual  are  presumptively  not  contrary  to  his  interests,  and  as 
said  by  Judge  Wallace,  in  Menacho  v.  Ward,  27  Fed.  529,  532, 
23  Blatch.  502:  "The  estimate  placed  by  a  party  upon  the 
value  of  his  own  services  or  property  is  always  sufficient, 
against  him,  to  establish  the  real  value;  but  it  has  augmented 
probative  force,  and  is  almost  conclusive  against  him,  when 
he  has  adopted  it  in  a  long-continued  and  extensive  course  of 
business  dealings." 

Mr.  Justice  Brandeis""  stated  the  proposition  clearly  as 
follows:  "Low  rates  voluntarily  established  by  the  carrier, 
may  be  accepted  by  the  Commission  as  evidence  that  other 
rates,  actually  or  proposed,  for  comparable  service,  are  un- 
reasonably high.  Board  of  Trade  v.  Central  of  Ga.  R.  R.  Co. 
28  Inters.  Com.  Rep.  1.54,  164;  Sheridan  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce V.  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  26  Inters.  Com.  Rep.  638. 
647.  Compare  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States,  238  U. 
S.  1,  11,  ft  seq.  59  L.  Ed.  1177,  1180,  .35  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  696. 
The  voluntarily  making  of  unremuneratively  low  rates  in 
important  tratific  may  also  tend  to  induce  the  Commission  to 
resist  appeals  of  carriers  for  general  rate  increases  on  the 
ground  of  financial  necessities." 

§  103  Same  Subject. — The  Supreme  Court,  in  the  case  of 
Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,"''^  without  referring 
to  the  Tift  or  Yellow  Pine  case,  said:  "It  must  also  be  re- 
membered that  there  is  no  presumption  of  wrong  arising 
from  a  change  of  rate  by  a  carrier.  *  *  *  Undoubtedly 
when  rates  are  changed  the  carrier  making  the  change  must, 
when  properly  called  upon,  be  able  to  give  a  good  reason 
therefor,  but  the  mere  fact  that  a  rate  has  been  raised  carries 

130.  Skinner  &  Eddy  Corp.  v.  Chicago  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  209  U.  S. 
United  States,  —  U.  S.  —  63  L.  108,  119,  .52  L.  Ed.  705,  712,  713, 
Ed.  — ,  39  Sup.  Ct.  — .  28    Sup    Ct.    493,    affirming    same 

131.  Interstate    Com.    Com.  v.  styled  case,  141  Fed.  1003. 


§  1.03]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  363 

Avith  it  no  presumption  that  it  was  not  rightfully  done." 
These  decisions  of  tlie  Supreme  Court  are  harmonious.  The 
fact  that  a  "good  reason"  must  be  given  ])y  the  carrier  is 
equivalent  to  saying  that,  "tlie  advance  will  be  held  unjust  unless 
it  is  'satisfactorily  explained,'  that  is,  unless  a  'good  reason' 
therefor  is  given."  Mr.  Commissioner  Clements'"'  discusses 
these  cases,  and,  after  quoting  from  the  decision  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  in  the  Great  AVestern  case,  says,  "This  is  a  mere 
affirmance  of  what  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  itself  recog- 
nizes as  a  right  of  the  carriers,  viz.,  the  right  to  initiate  rates. 
And  it  must  be  apparent  that  were  a  'presumption  of  wrong' 
to  attach  to  any  change  in  rates  which  the  carriers  are 
authorized  to  establish,  this  must  result  in  a  denial  of  the  free 
exercise  of  the  right  guaranteed  by  the  Act.  But  it  would 
be  going  far  to  say  that  the  language  above  quoted  is  authority 
for  the  inference  that  the  Supreme  Court  does  not  still 
recognize  the  principle  that  a  rate  which  has  been  in  force  for 
a  long  period  of  years  and  with  respect  to  which  commercial 
conditions  have  been  adjusted,  which  rate  has  presumably 
afforded  a  reasonable  return  to  the  carrier,  may  not  be  ma- 
terially advanced  without  imposing  upon  the  carriers  the 
burden  of  justifying  the  increase." 

The  prineiide  that  the  long  maintenance  of  rates  is  evidence 
that  such  rates  are  reasonably  high,  was  applied  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  in  a  case  where  rates  were  fixed  by  the  Railroad 
Commission  of  the  state  of  Kentucky.  ]\Ir.  Justice  Pitney, 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  said:"'*  "Since  it  ap- 
peared that  the  company,  long  prior  to  March  25,  1910.  had 
voluntarily  established  the  comparatively  low  rates  upon  a 
substantial  part  of  their  traffic,  had  maintained  them  for 
many  years  after  the  reason  assigned  for  originally  introduc- 
ing them  had  ceased  to  exist,  and  then  withdrawn  them,  not 
upon  the  ground  that  they  were  inadequate,  but  because  they 
gave  rise  to  discrimination,  and  in  so  doing  had  introduced 

132.      Pacific       Coast       Lumber  13a.    Louisville  &  N.   R.   Co.  v. 

Mnfrs.  Asso.  v.  N.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  14  Finn,    235    U.    S.    601.    59    L.    Ed. 

I.  C.  C.  23,  38.  See  also  Re  Class  379,    35    Sup.    Ct.    146,    147;     Int. 

and    Commodity    Rates    from    St.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville  &   N.   R. 

Louis    to    Texas    Common    Points,  Co.,   227    U.    S.    88,    99,    57    L.    Ed. 

11  L  C.  C.  238.  431,    436,   33    Suo.   Ct.   185. 


3G4  Charges  FOB  Tkansportation  OF  Persons,  etc.  [§  104 

rates  vei\y  much  greater,  it  seems  to  lis  that  the  conduct  of  the 
carrier,  in  the  absence  of  some  explanation  more  conclusive 
than  any  that  Avas  made,  was  sufficient  basis  for  a  reasonable 
inference  that  the  special  rates  in  force  prior  to  March  25  upon 
the  distillery  supplies  were  reasonable  and  adequate  com- 
pensation for  that  and  other  similar  traffic,  and  that  the 
rates  thereafter  charged  were  unreasonably  high  to  the  extent 
of  being  extortionate." 

§  104.  Voluntary  Reduction  of  Rates. — AVhere  a  carrier 
voluntarily  reduces  its  rates,  that  fact  under  the  principle 
applicable  to  presumptions  would  be  evidence  that  from  and 
after  the  date  of  the  reduction  the  resultant  rate  was  reason- 
ably high.  Such  a  presumption,  however,  should  not  be  in- 
dulged to  the  extent  of  holding  that  the  act  of  the  carrier 
is  proof  sufficient  that  the  rate  in  force  prior  to  the  reduction 
was  unreasonably  high.  To  hold  such  a  presumption  to  be 
conclusive  would  mahe  it  dangerous  for  carriers  ever  volun- 
tarily to  reduce  rates.  On  this  subject  the  Commission  has 
said:  "The  subsequently  estalilished  lower  rate  is  now  a  just  and 
reasonable  rate  over  the  defendant  lines ;  but  the  Commission 
is  nuAvilling  to  subscribe  to  the  theory  that  the  voluntary 
reduction  of  a  rate  by  a  carrier  conclusively  shows  that  the 
former  rate  was  unreasonable  and  that  reparation  should  be 
granted  on  all  shipments  moving  thereunder  within  the  period 
of  the  statute  of  limitations.""' 

§  105.  Same  Subject— Act  June  18,  1910.— By  Act  of  June 
18,  1910,'''  it  was  provided:  ''AVhenever  there  shall  be  tiled 
with  the  Commission  any  schedule  stating  a  new  individual  or 
joint  rate,  fare  or  charge,  or  any  new  individual  or  joint  classi- 
fication, or  any  new  individual  or  joint  regulation  or  practice 
afTecting  any  rate,  fare  or  charge,"  the  Commission  may,  as 
provided  in  the  amendment  ''enter  upon  a  hearing  concerning 

134.    Ottumwa  Bridge  Co.  v.  C,  bacco  Co.  v.  Old  Dominion  Steam- 

M.    &    St.    P.    R.    Co.,    14    I.    C.   C.  ship  Co.,   18   I.   C.   C.    197;     Balti- 

121,  125;    Commercial  Coal  Co.  v.  more  Butchers  Abattoir   v.   P.    B. 

B.    &   O.    R.    Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    11;  &  W.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  124. 

Menefee   Lumber   Co.    v.    T.    &    P.  135.    Post.  Sees.  898,  and  399. 
Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  11;    Penu  To- 


§    105]  AfuST    HK  .Il'ST   A  NT)   REASONABLE.  365 

the  propriety  of  such  rate,  fare,  charge,  classification,  regula- 
tion or  practice,"  and  "after  full  hearing.  *  *  *  the 
Commission  may  make  such  order  in  reference  to  such  rate, 
fare,  charge,  classification,  regulation,  or  practice"  as  it  might 
make  in  an  ordinary  proceeding  complaining  of  an  existing 
rate.  It  is  further  provided  that,  "At  any  hearing  involving 
a  rate  increased  after  January  1,  1910,  or  of  a  rate  sought  to 
be  increased  after  the  passage  of  this  Act.  the  burden  of  proof 
to  show  tliat  tlie  increased  rate  or  proposed  increased  rate  is 
just  and  reasonable  shall  be  upon  the  common  carrier." 

The  Transportation  Act  1920  substitutes  "lawfulness"  for 
"propriety"  in  the  quotation  above  from  the  Act  of  1910;  and 
after  the  word  rate  italicized  above  adds  "fare  or  charge  or  pro- 
posed increased  rate,  fare  or  charge."  This  Act  changes  the 
language,  but  adds  nothing  to  the  meaning  of  the  former  Act 
as  enforced  by  the  Commission.^'"'  "Rate,  fare  or  charge"  are 
used  although  the  clear  meaning  of  the  whole  section  is  that 
when  any  change  is  made  in  any  classification,  regulation  or 
practice  affecting  and  increasing  a  rate,  the  burden  of  justify- 
ing the  change  is  upon  the  carrier.  A  change  that  did  not  in- 
crease the  rate  would  not,  as  to  the  burden  of  proof,  be  affected 
by  the  amendment. 

This  statutory  rule  as  to  burden  of  proof  does  not  lessen  the 
force  of  the  rules  of  evidence  stated  in  the  preceding  two 
sections.  The  Commission,  in  speaking  of  a  rate  in  force  for 
a  quarter  of  a  century  and  which  had  been  materially  ad- 
vanced in  the  last  seven  years,  held  that  the  reason  justifying 
a  further  advance  "must  be  even  more  cogent,"  and  that  the  his- 
tory of  the  rates,  "was  evidence  which  bears  strongly  upon 
the  propriety  of  the  *  *  *  increase.""'  In  a  still  more  re- 
cent case  the  rule  was  stated  with  its  j^roper  limitations  as  fol- 
lows:  "Undoubtedly  a  presumption  of  reasonableness  arises 
from  the  long  existence  of  a  rate;  but  if  this  presumption 
were  conclusive,  necessary  and  proper  changes  in  rates  W'Ould 
be  prohil)ited."^^* 

136.  Section  399,  post.  138.    Robinson  Land  &  Lumber 

137.  United  States  Leather  Co.  Co.  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.,  26  I. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  C.  C.  427,  429.  For  Illustrative 
323,  327.  application    of    the    principle    see. 


:>(-G  Charoes  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  lOG 

The  Coiimieree  Court,"'  citing  the  Great  Western  case,''" 
gave  that  case  a  somewhat  wider  meaning  than  was  meant  by 
the  opinion  therein.  Tn  reversing  the  Commerce  Court,  the  Su- 
preme Court  cited  the  Great  Western  case,  but  said:  "Under 
the  circumstances  the  maintenance  of  these  low  rates,  after  the 
water  competition  disappeared,  tends  to  support  the  theory 
that  ))y  an  increase  of  business  or  other  cause  they  had  become 
reasonable  and  compensatory."  So.  the  presumption  may  or 
may  not  arise  and  all  the  facts  must  be  considered.  The 
syllabus  of  the  opinion  is  as  follows:  "The  value  of  evidence 
in  rate  proceedings  varies,  and  the  weight  to  be  given  to  it  is 
peculiarly  for  the  body  experienced  in  regard  to  rates  and 
familiar  with  the  indicias  of  rate-making." 

"When  rail  rates  are  advanced  with  the  disappearance  of 
water  competition,  no  inference  adverse  to  the  railroads  can  be 
drawn,  but  when  the  old  rates  had  been  maintained  for  several 
3'ears  after  such  disappearance  there  is  a  presumption  if  the 
rates  are  raised  that  the  advance  is  made  for  other  pur- 
poses." "'    The  italics  do  not  appear  in  the  syllabus. 

The  railroad  situation  is  radically  different  since  Federal 
control,  the  1920  Amendment  proposes  at  least  two  new  and 
untried  experiments,  the  elimination  of  comjietition  and  a 
partial  guaranty  of  fair  returns;  and  issues  hereafter  pre- 
sented must  be  "determined,  at  least  to  a  great  extent,  in  the 
light  of  present  conditions."  "" 

§  106.  Groriping  Territory  and  Giving-  Each  Group  Same 
Rate  Legal  under  Some  Circumstances. — It  has  been  and  is 
yet  a  practice  with  carriers  to  group  contiguous  territory  and 

Ocheltree  Grain   Co.   v.    St.   Louis  a   preliminary   application   for   in- 

&    S.   F.   R.    Co.,    13    I.    C.    C.    46;  junction. 

Millar  v.   New    ^ork   C.   &   H.    R.  140.     Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago 

R.  Co.    19    I.  C.  C.    78;      Audley,  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  209  U.  S.  108,  119, 

Hill   &   Co.   V.    Southern   Ry.    Co.,  52   L.    Ed.   705,   712,   713,   28    Sup. 

20  I.  C.  C.  225;    Commercial  Club  Ct.  493. 

of    Omaha   v.    Southern    Pac.    Co.,  141.     Int.    Com.   Com.   v.   Louis- 

20  I.  C.  C.  631.  vine  &  N.  R.  Co.,  227  U.  S.  88,  57 

139.    Louisville  &  N.  R.   Co.   v.  L.  Ed.  431,  33   Sup.  Ct.  185.     See 

Interstate    Com.    Com.,    195    Fed.  also  note  120  this  chapter. 

541,  557,  Opinion  Commerce  Court  142.     Green  v.  A.  &  V.  Ry.  Co., 

No.'  4,  pp.  325,  375,  and  see  same  43  I.  C.  C.  662,  074. 
styled  case,  184  Fed.  118,  denying 


§  106]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable..  367 

give  the  same  rate  to  all  points  within  a  particular  group. 
This  practice  is  called  "blanketing."  The  Commission  in  1888, 
speaking  of  this  practice,  said  :''"' 

"This  is  a  practice  which  prevails  very  largely  in  the  mak- 
ing of  rates  and  results  in  giving  to  some  towns  rates  which 
are  relatively  lower  than  are  charged  to  others.  It  is  probably 
a  convenient  practice  to  the  railroad  companies  or  it  would  not 
be  so  often  adopted ;  and  it  may  sometimes  tend  to  equalize 
railroad  advantages  as  between  towns  without  wronging  any 
one.  The  system  is  not  necessarily  illegal,  it  only  becomes 
illegal  when  it  can  be  shown  that  illegal  results  flow  from  it." 

The  practice  is  not  approved  by  the  Commission,  how^ever, 
when  "the  difference  in  the  transportation  expense  from  the 
various  parts  of  such  district  is  considerabile  and  substan- 
tial."'^* 

Texas  is  arranged  in  groups  for  rate-making  purposes,  and 
when  the  parties  to  the  case  are  satisfied  with  the  system,  the 
Commission  will  not  disturb  it.'" 

But  in  referring  to  the  holding  in  the  P^armers,  Merchants  & 
Shippers  Club  case,  supra,  the  Commission  said:  "In  so  hold- 
ing we  said  that  the  reasonableness  of  these  rates  must  be  de- 
tei'mined  not  by  considering  the  rate  from  the  point  of  origin 
to  a  particular  station  in  the  group,  but  rather  as  applicable  to 
the  entire  group.  It  is  evident  that  ever}^  system  of  group 
rates  must  occasion  more  or  less  discrimination.  The  rate  to 
the  nearer  edge  of  the  group  as  compared  with  that  to  the 
more  distant  edge  is  of  necessity  discriminatory .^"' 

143.  LaCrosse  Manufacturers'  &  6  I.  C.  C.  ISl,  4  I.  C.  R.  474,  480; 
Jobbers'  Union  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  Merchants'  Union  of  Spokane 
St.  P.  R.  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  629,  631,  Falls  v.  N.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C. 
2  I.  C.  R.  9,  10.  See  also  Busi-  478,  4  I.  C.  R.  1?3;  Rea  v.  Mobile 
ness  Men's  Asso.  of  Minnesota  v.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  7  I.  C.  C.  43. 
Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  145.  Farmers,  Merchants  &  Ship- 
2  I.  C.  C.  12,  52,  2  I.  C.  R.  41,  pers  Club  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S. 
46;  Lippman  &  Co.  v.  111.  Cent.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  351,  365. 
R.  Co.,  2  I.  C.  C.  584,  2  I.  C.  R.  Although  when  such  grouping  re- 
414;  Howell  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  suits  in  unjust  discrimination  it 
&  W.  R.  Co.,  2  I.  C.  C.  272,  2  will  be  changed.  Kaufman  Com- 
I.  C.  R.  162;  Imperial  Coal  ■  Co.  mercial  Club  v.  T.  &  N.  0.  R.  Co., 
V.   Pittsburg  &  L.   E.  R.   Co.,   2   I.  31  I.  C.  C.  161. 

C.  C.  618,  2  I.  C.  R.  436.  146.    Mitchell  v    Atchison,  T.  & 

144.  Newland  \.  N.  Pac.  R.  Co.,       S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  1^  I.  C.  C.  324.  325. 


308  Charges  foe  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  107 

Tn  concluding  tlie  opinion  of  the  Commission,  Mr.  Commis- 
sioner Prouty  said:  "It  is  impossil)le  to  pass  abi-uptly  from  the 
group  system." 

There  are  many  cases  in  the  reports  of  the  Commission  rec- 
ognizing the  group  system  of  rates,  some  of  which  will  be  dis- 
cussed in  the  chapter  on  Equality  in  Rates.  In  this  section  the 
reasonableness  of  rates  is  under  discussion  and  the  group  sys- 
tem is  opposed  to   the  distance  basis. 

Considering  distance  and  the  group  system,  the  Commission 
said:  "Distance  is,  of  course  a  factor  to  be  considered  in  deter- 
miniiig  the  reasonableness  of  rates, and  when  rates  are  construct- 
ed upon  this  basis,  and  other  things  are  equal  it  may  become  a 
very  important  factor.  When,  however,  as  in  this  ease,  rates  are 
constructed  and  maintained  upon  the  group  system  and  the 
sul)ject  matter  is  a  heavy  commodity  like  coal,  and  the  differ- 
ences in  distance  are  relatively  inconsiderable,  such  differ- 
ences do  not  of  themselves  compel  differences  in  rates."  ^" 

As  a  general  rule  in  establishing  the  boundary  lines  of 
groups,  some  measure  or  principle,  such  as  radial  or  operat- 
ing is  possible,  it  should  be  tolerated.  In  giving  such  reasons, 
tures  of  the  country,  and  the  location  of  trausportation  lines 
should  be  followed."* 

§  107.  Grouping-  Producing  Points,  and  Making  Zones  Tak- 
ing Same  Rates.- — The  principles  discussed  in  the  foregoing 
section  have  been  applied  by  the  Commission  to  cases  where 
a  inore  or  less  contiguoiLS  territory  is  given  the  same  rate  to  the 
markets.  In  speaking  of  such  system  already  in  existence  the 
Commission  said : 

"When  the  Ignited  States  Government  transports  a  package 
10  miles  for  one  citizen  for  10  cents,  while  it  charges  his  neigh- 
bor the  same  amount  for  transportng  a  like  parcel  3,000  miles. 
a  clear  discrimination  is  made,  but  it  is  a  discrimination  of  that 
character  which  by  universal  consent  is  in  the  public  interest. 

For   a    discussion    and    history    of  147.     Victor   Manufacturing  Co. 

the    Teaxs    common    point    terri-  v.    Southern   Ry.   Co.,   27  I.   C.   O. 

tory   and    a  comparison  with   the  661,  CG3. 

transcontinental  group,  see  Texas  148.   Humphrey  Brick  &  Tile  Co. 

Common   Point  Case,   26   I.   C.   C.  v.   P.    R.  R.   Co.,   50   I.   G.   C.    457, 

528,   529.  462. 


<^  1.07]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  3G9 

So,  here,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  these  postage-stamp 
rates  as  applied  to  the  distribution  of  the  rjroduets  of  the  Paci- 
fic coast  states  are  not  upon  the  whole  for  the  general  public 
good.  Under  this  system  the  producers  upon  the  Pacific  coast 
are  given  the  widest  possible  market  for  their  products;  the 
carriers  obtain  a  certain  amount  of  long-distance  business  at 
remunerative  rates,  Avhich  they  would  not  otherwise  have ;  the 
freight  rale  does  not  so  far  enter  into  the  cost  of  these  articles 
to  the  consumer  that  any  noticeable  burden  is  imposed  upon 
any  section  of  the  country.  If  this  Commission  were  required 
to  estal)lish  a  reasonable  schedule  of  rates  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  citrous  fruits  from  southern  California  to  eastern  desti- 
nations, we  should  not  feel  at  liberty  to  put  in  this  blanket; 
but  to  establish  graded  rates  at  this  time  upon  lemons  would  be 
to  break  up  this  rate  system  which  is  highl.v  satisfactory  to  all 
parties  concerned,  and  while  the  action  of  the  court  may  in  the 
end  compel  us  to  do  this,  we  feel  that  we  can  for  the  present, 
properly  leave  this  situation  as  it  is."  "* 

The  rates  resulting  from  this  system  of  rate-making  must,  of 
course,  be  reasonable  and  not  unjustly  or  unduly  discrimina- 
tory.'^" The  system  has  its  irregularities  at  best,  but  there  are 
reasons  why,  at  least  until  a  more  scientific  basis  of  rate-mak- 
ing is  possible,  it  should  be  tolerated.  In  giving  such  reasons, 
the  Commission  has  said  : 

"In  transportation  of  low-grade  commodities  that  move  in 
bulk  and  in  large  quantities  it  is  a  long  established  custom  to 
group  or  blanket  a  numUer  of  stations  or  a  large  expanse  of 
territory.  Such  rate  adjustments  necessarily  to  some  extent 
disregard  distances.  If  strictly  distance  rates  were  applied  to 
grain  moving  from  points  of  origin  it  is  apparent  that  at  a  cer- 
tain distance  from  a  market  that  is  prepared  to  purchase  the 
surplus  the  rate  would  be  prohibitive."  '^' 

149.  Arlingto-i  Heights  Fruit  197;  Clyde  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsyl- 
Exchange  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  22       vania  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  135. 

I.  C.  C.  149,  156;   order  sustained  151.     Kansas    City   Transp.    Bu- 

by  Commerce  Court,  Atchison,  T.  reau  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 

&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  United  States,  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  195,  204.  For  typi- 

203    Fed.    56.     Opinion   Commerce  cal    grouping,    see    Ferguson    Saw 

Court  No.  61,  p.  r-37.  Mill  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 

150.  Sun  Company  v.  Indianapo-  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  396,  398;  Re 
lis   Sou.   R.   Co.,    22    I.   C.    C.    194,  Transportation     of     Wool,     Hides 


370  Charges  FOR  Transportation  OF  Persons,  etc.  [§  108 

Tn  prescribing  rates,  the  Commission  has  adopted  a  system 
of  zones  ''as  an  appropriate  solntion"  of  a  particular  rat6 
situation.'""  Tlie  courts  recognize  that  the  Commission  has  the 
jurisdiction  to  determine  the  effect  of  the  custom  of  the  car- 
riers in  making  groups  and  zones/"'  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  in  prescribing  parcel  post  rates,  the  postage  stamp  system 
was  abandoned  to  an  extent  and  zone  rates  applied. 

§  108.  Basing  Point  System. — What  this  system  is  and  the 
attitude  of  the  Commission  thereon  cannot  be  better  stated  than 
by  using  the  language  of  the  Commission  itself.  Ln.  Bioard  of 
Trade  of  Hampton  v.  Nashville,  Chattanooga  &  St.  L.  R.  Co,.'" 
it  was  said  by  Mr.  Commissioner  Clements : 

''As  stated  in  our  finding  of  fact,  through  rates  made  in  this 
way — that  is.  composed  of  rates  to  "basing  points"  and  local 
rates  back — are  in  pursuance  of  what  is  known  as  the  "basing 
point"  system  of  rate-making,  which  according  to  the  evidence 
of  the  witness  (Cutler),  prevails  "throughout  the  southern  ter- 
ritory. This  system  has  been  heretofore  several  times  dis- 
cussed and  disapproved  by  the  Commission.  Re  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co.,  1  T.  C.  C.  Rep.  84,  85,  1  Inters.  Com.  Rep.  287 ;  Martin 
V.  Chicago.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  2  I.  C.  C.  Rep.  25,  46,  47,  2  Inters. 
Com.  Rep.  32 ;  Re  Tariffs  and  Classifications  of  A.  &.  W.  P.  R. 
Co.,  3  I.  C.  C.  Rep.  19,  24,  25,  46-49,  2  Inters.  Com.  Rep.  461. 

"Under  this  system,  where  the  haul  is  through  the  basing 
point  to  a  point  beyond,  the  rate  to  the  latter  is  the  through 
rate  to  the  basing  point  plus  the  local  rate  from  the  biasing 
point  on  and  where,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  haul  is  to  an 
intermediate  point,  the  rate  to  the  intermediate  point  is  the 
rate  for  the  haul  through  such  intermediate  point  to  the  bas- 
ing point  plus  the  local  rate  back  over  the  same  line.  In  the  former 

and    Pelts,    23    I.    C.    C.    151,    164  154.    Board  of  Trade  of  Hamp- 

(coal)  ;    Transportation  Bureau  of  ton   v.   Nashville,   C.   &    St.    L.   R, 

Wichita  v.   St.   Louis,   I.   M.   &   S.  Co.,  8   I.  C.  C.   503,  520,   521,   522. 

Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  679,  680.  See  also  Board  of  Trade  of  Daw- 

152.  Pacific  Creamery  Co.  v.  son  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  8  I. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  29  C.  C.  142.  Competition  at  one 
I.  C.  C.  405,  408,  and  cases  cited.  place  may  justify  a  different  rate 

153.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago,  to  another,  Roberts  Cotton  Oil  Co. 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  88,  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C. 
54  L.   Ed.  946,  30  Sup.  Ct.  651.  248. 


§  1.08]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  371 

ease,  the  haul  is  not  treated  as  a  eontinuous  haul  through  the 
basing  point  to  the  point  beyond,  but  as  tAvo  distinct  hauls; 
one  a  through  haul  to  the  basing  point,  and  the  other  a  local 
haul  from  the  basing  point  to  the  point  beyond;  and  in  the 
latter  ease,  not  as  a  through  haul  to  the  interaiediate  point, 
but  as  a  haul  through  the  intermediate  point  to  the  basing 
point  beyond  plus  a  local  haul  back.  Local  hauls,  as  is  well 
known,  are  much  more  expensive  to  the  carrier  per  mile  than 
long  through  hauls,  or  any  proportion  of  such  through  hauls. 
Therefore  local  rates  are  properly  made  much  higher  for  the 
same  distance  than  through  rates,  and  hence  the  charge  of  a 
local  rate  for  a  part  of  a  through  haul,  when  the  extra  expense 
of  a  local  haul  has  not  been  incurred,  is  prima,  facie,  excessive, 
Augusta  Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Wrightsville  &  T.  R.  Co.,  74  Fed., 
Rep.  522. 

"It  is  a  significant  fact,  that  the  result  of  this  system  of  rate- 
making  is  to  enable  the  basin g-point  merchants  to  compete 
with  the  local  merchants  of  surrounding  localities  at  their  own 
doors  on  equal  terms,  while  the  latter  are  debarred  from  such 
competition  with  the  former,  and  as  to  territory  intermediate 
between  the  basing  points  and  surrounding  localities  merchants 
at  the  basing  points  are  given  such  an  advantage  in  rates 
as  to  enable  them  to  undersell  merchants  at  surrounding  lo- 
calities, and  drive  them  out  of  the  "jobbing  business"  in  sucli 
intermediate  territory  as  the  testimony  shows  has  been  the  re- 
sult in  the  present  case.  The  direct  tendency  and  almost  in- 
variable outcome  of  the  system  is  that  basing  points  are  built 
up  and  flourish  at  the  expense  of  surrounding  localities.  The 
building  up  of  one  locality  at  the  expense  of  another,  by  rates 
favoring  the  former  and  discriminating  against  the  latter,  was 
undoubtedly  one  of  the  principal  evils  which  the  Act  to  Re- 
gulate Commerce  was  designed  to  remedy,  and  it  would  seem 
that  due  allowance  might  and  should  be  made  for  the  effect  of 
competition  without  defeating  the  object  of  the  law." 

The  system  of  making  the  rate  to  the  point  beyond  the  full 
local  from  the  basing  point  was  abandoned  by  the  carriers  and 
a  system  of  differentials  or  arbitraries  over  the  basing  point 
established.  Even  this,  when  resulting  in  discrimination,  is 
illegal  aaid  the  principle  was  announced  by  the  Commission 
that  "rates  to  the  basing  points  should  bear  some  reasonable 


372  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  109 

relation  to  the  total  distances  involved."  '"'  In  adjusting  rates 
under  the  amended  fourth  section  of  the  Act,  the  basing  point 
system  was  practically  destroyed  by  the  Commission."' 

§  109.  Same  Subject — Breaking  Rates. — It  has  been  the 
system  adopted  by  the  carriers  in  different  sections  of  the 
country  to  make  rates  to  a  river  crossing  and  thence  to  the 
point  of  destination,  the  through  rate  being  a  combination  of 
the  two.  In  some  places  this  system,  called  the  rate  breaking 
system,  is  applied  at  inland  points  although  "such  an  adjust- 
ment is  unusual,  l.ecause  it  is  at  points  and  on  the  banks  of 
rivers,  where  a  transfer  is  necessary,  that  rates  ordinarily 
break."  And  "to  have  rates  break  at  a  particular  point  is  not 
an  inherent  right." ''''  While  the  system  of  breaking  rates  at 
l)articu]ar  points  may  not  be  the  best,  the  Commission  cannot 
at  once  overcome  such  a  system  but  can,  when  necessary  to 
prevent  discrimination,  control  this  method  of  rate-making. 
Speaking  of  the  system  in  a  case  where  the  complainants  in- 
sisted, "that  the  system  of  basing  rates  to  the  Missouri  River 
cities  and  points  beyond  upon  the  Mississippi  River  crossings 
is  improper,"  Mr.  Commissioner  Clark,  for  the  Commission, 
said:  "We  are  not  impressed  with  the  view  that  the  system  of 
making  rates  on  certain  basing  lines  should  be  abolished.  No 
system  of  rate-making  has  been  suggested  as  a  substitute  for 
it,  except  one  based  upon  the  postage  stamp  theory,  or  one 
based  strictly  upon  mileage.  Either  of  these  v/ould  create  re- 
volution   in    transportation    affairs    and   chaos    in    commercial 

1.55.  Board  of  Trade  of  Carroll-  v.  Atlanta  &  W.  P.  R.  Co.,  28 
ton  V.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  178;  Mayor  and  Coun- 
I.  C.  C.  154.  See  also  Mayor  and  cil  of  Tifton,  Ga.  v.  Louisville  & 
Council  of  Boston,  Ga.  v.  Atlan-  N.  R.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  160;  Co- 
tic  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  24  I.  C.  C.  50;  lumbia  Grocery  Co.  v.  Louisville 
City  of  Montezuma  v.  Central  of  &  N.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  502. 
Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  280;  156.  Fourth  Section  Violations 
Town  of  Pelham,  Ga.  v.  Atlantic  in  the  Southeast,  30  L  C.  C.  153. 
C.  L.  R.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  433;  157.  Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan, 
Mayor  and  Council  of  Douglas,  in  Commercial  Club  of  Duluth  v. 
Ga.  V.  Atlantic,  B.  &  A.  R.  Co..  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  27  I.  C. 
28  I.  C.  C.  445;  Mayor  and  Coun-  C.  639,  650,  657.  See  also  Sioux 
cil  of  Vienna,  Ga.  v.  Georgia,  S.  City  Tierminhl  Elevlator  Co.  v. 
&  F.  Ry.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  173;  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  27 
LaGrange   Chamber   of  Commerce  I.  C.  C.  457,  463. 


§  1,09]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  373 

affairs,  that  have  been  builded  upon  the  system  of  rate-making 
now  in  effect.  It  must  not,  however,  be  assumed  that  a  basing 
line  for  rates  may  bis  established  and  be  made  an  impassable 
barrier  for  through  rates,  or  that  cities  or  markets  located  -at 
or  upon  such  basing  line  have  any  inviolable  possession  of  or 
hold  upon,  the  right  to  distribute  traffic  in  or  from  the  terri- 
tory lying  beyond.  Development  of  natural  resources,  increase 
in  population,  growth  of  manufacturing  and  producing  fa- 
cilities, and  increased  traffic  on  railroads  create  changed  condi- 
tions which  may  warrant  changes  in  rates  and  in  rate  adjust- 
nients  in  order  to  afford  just  and  reasonable  opportunity  for 
interchange  of  traffic  between  points  of  production  and  points 
of  large  consumption."  ^""^  The  order  of  the  Commission  in  the 
case  in  which  the  above  announcement  was  made  coming  be- 
fore the  Supreme  Court,  this  declaration  was  quoted  by  the 
court  and,  repljniig  to  the  contention  that  the  Commission  had 
adopted  illegal  junnciples  in  arriving  at  its  conclusions  effec- 
tive in  the  order,  the  court  said:  "As  we  have  said,  the  Com- 
misson  is  the  tribunal  that  is  intrusted  with  the  execution  of 
the  interstate  commerce  law,  and  has  been  given  very  compre- 
hensive powers  in  the  investigation  and  determination  of  the 
proportion  which  rates  charged  shall  bear  to  the  services  ren- 
dered, and  this  power  exists,  whether  the  system  of  rates  be 
old  or  new.  If  old,  interests  will  have  probably  become  at- 
tached to  them  and,  it  may  be,  will  be  disturbed  or  disordered 
if  they  be  changed.  Such  circumstance  is.  of  course,  proper  to 
be  considered  and  constitutes  an  element  in  the  problem  of 
regulation,  but  it  does  not  take  jurisdiction  away  to  entertain 
and  attempt  to  resolve  the  problem.  And  it  may  be  that  there 
cannot  be  an  accommodation  of  all  interests  in  one  proceed- 
ing." ''"'  The  opinion  of  the  Court  refers  to  the  force  "due  to  tha 
judgments  of  a  tribunal  appointed  by  law  and  informed  by  ex- 
perience. 

158.  Burnham,  Hanna,  Hunger  court  in  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  171  Fed. 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299,  303,  680,  and  sustaining  the  Commis- 
312,  313.  eion  in  Burnham,  Hanna,  Munger 

159.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago,  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 
R.   I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  218  U.   S.  88,  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299. 

107,    108,    110,    54    L.    Ed.    946,    30  160.     Illinois   C.    R.    Co.   v.    Int. 

Sup.  Ct.  651,  reversing  the  lower      Com.  Com.,  206  U.  S.  441,  454,  51 


374  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [^  110 

Breaking  rates  at  rivers  grew  out  of  the  fact  that  many- 
roads  ran  only  to  the  river  and  other  roads  took  the  commodity 
tlience,  there  being  no  physical  connection  between  the  roads. 
Another  reason  was  that  in  some  instances  one  of  the  hauls  was 
by  water  and  the  water  carrier  had  no  physical  connection 
with  the  rail  carrier  which  performed  the  other  part  of  the 
through  haul.  The  can-iers  as  a  matter  of  preference  or  to  en- 
able one  cit}^  to  enjoy  advantages  similar  to  a  more  favorably 
located  city,  extended  the  principle.'"  There  is  now  no  justi- 
fication for  refusing  through  rates  merely  because  the  haul 
crosses  the  jMississippi,  Ohio  or  some  other  river.  The  principle 
of  charging  as  a  through  rate  the  aggregate  of  tvro  local  rates  is 
illogical  and  conflicts  with  the  evident  legislative  purpose  to 
make  all  the  roads  one  aggregate  system. 

§  no.  Comparisons  between  Different  Lines  as  a  Means  of 
Determining  Correct  Rates. — It  is  competent  to  compare  rates, 
distances  and  general  conditions  on  one  road  with  those  on  an- 
other when  considering  the  adjustment  of  rates,  but  in  connec- 
tion therewith  all  other  factors  which  enter  into  the  question 
of  what  constitutes  a  reasonable  rate  must  be  considered."^ 
Rates  should  be  relatively  as  well  as  absolutely  reasonable,  and 
a  locality  not  widely  dissimilar  from  another  is  pnma  facie  en- 
titled to  the  same  rate.""'  AYhen  the  cricumstances  and  condi- 
tions are  substantially  dissimilar,  comparison  of  rates  are 
valueless.''"  Comparisons  of  "transportation  rates  in  force  on 
lines  of  rival  companies  or  on  dififerent  branches  or  lines  of  the 
same  company  have  a  bearing  upon  and  are  entitled  to  con- 
L.Ed.  1128,  27  Sup.  Ct.  700,  citing  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C.  156,  .3  I.  C.  R. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Behl-  794;  Re  Tariffs  of  Transconti- 
mer,  175  U.  S.  648,  44  L.  Ed.  nental  Lines,  2  I.  C.  C.  324,  2  I. 
309,   18   Sup.  Ct.    502;     East   Ten-       C.   R.  203. 

nessee,  Va.  &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int.  163.     Manufacturers'    and    Job- 

Com.    Com.,    181    U.    S.    1,    27,    45       bers'  Union  v.   Minneapolis  &  St. 
L.  Ed.  719,  21  Sup.  Ct.  516.  L.  R.  Co.,  4  I.  C.  C.  79,  .3.  I.  C.  R. 

161.  Nashville       Lumbermens       115. 

Club  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  164.   Business  Men's  Asso.  v.  Clii- 

59,  60,  61;    Live  Stock  from  Nash-  cago   &  N.   W.   R.  Co.,   2   I.   C.  C. 

ville,  48  I.  C.  C.  277,  281.  73,  2  L  C.  R.  48;   Evans  v.  Union 

162.  Cannon  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  6  I.  C.  C.  520;  Mar- 
Co.,  11  I.  C.  C.  527,  543;  Lincoln  ten  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  9 
Creamery    Co.    v.    Union    Pac.    R.  I.  C  C.  581,  597,  12  I.  C.  C.  223 


§  1.10]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  375 

sideration  in  connection  with  the  question  of  reasonable 
charges  for  transj^ortation  services  rendered  under  like  condi- 
tions."'"''    And  as  said  by  Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan:'"" 

"But  while  the  revenue  per  ton  per  mile  over  other  routes  on 
other  lines  and  to  other  destinations  is  often  suggestive  in  arriv- 
ing at  a  proper  estimate  of  the  reasonableness  of  a  rate  over  a 
route  complained  of,  it  is  by  no  means  conclusive.  Varying  condi- 
tions existing  on  ditferent  lines  must  of. necessity  justify  dif- 
ferences in  rates  for  hauls  of  the  same  distance.  The  real  ques- 
tion in  any  such  complaint  is  the  reasonableness  of  the  partic- 
ular rate  on  the  particular  line  between  the  points  in  question. 
In  testing  such  a  rate  the  rates  on  the  same  or  adjacent  lines  in 
the  immediate  territory  Avhere  the  same  conditions  exist  are  of 
much  greater  significance  and  afford  a  much  more  accurate 
basis  for  our  action." 

A  mere  comparison  of  the  rates  attacked  with  rates  in  other 
parts  of  the  country  is  not  sufficient  evidence  upon  which  the 
commission  may  condemn  a  rate. 

Nor  does  the  mere  fact  that  a  lower  rate  is  in  force  by  a  com- 
peting line  "of  itself  establish  the  unreasonableness"  of  the 
rate  by  the  line  under  investigation.^"' 

As  stated  by  the  Commission:  "There  is  no  evidence  that  the 
rate  charged  was  unreasonable,  except  that  there  was  a  lower 
rate  to  a  nearby  point  via  another  line.  This  of  itself  has  never 
been  held  sufficient  to  establish  that  the  rate  over  a  particular 
line  is  unreasonable."  '"**  While  this  is  true,  there  is  some  pro- 
bative value  in  evidence  showing  that  between  the  same  points 
there  is  another  line  over  which  a  lower  rate  exists,  and  this 
evidence  when  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  rate  complained 

165.  Morrell  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  &  Co.  v.  Buffalo  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  18 
Co.,   6  I.  C.  C.  121,  4  I.  C.  R.  469.       I.  C.  C.  380. 

See     discussion     of     question     in  167.   Delray  Salt  Co.  v.  Michigan 

Freight   Bureau    of   Cincinnati    v.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  18  T.  C.  C.  24.5. 
Cincinnati  N.  0.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  168.   Snyder-Maldne-Donahue  Co. 

6  I.  C.  C.  195,  4  I.  C.  R.  592,  610,  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.   R.  Co.,   18  I. 

611.  C.  C.   498,   499.     Also  see  Pankey 

166.  Dallas  Freight  Bureau  v.  &  Holmes  v.  Central  New  Eng- 
Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  land  Ry.  Co.,  18  T.  C.  C.  578. 

C.  233,  cited  and  followed,  Clark 


376  Charges  foe  Transportation  of  Persons^  etc.  [§  111 

of  yields  a  comparatively  high  rate  per  ton  mile  may  justify  a 
finding  that  such  rate  is  unreasonable/'" 

Comparing  one  rate  M'ith  another  is  but  a  method  of  arriving 
at  the  fair  value  of  a  particular  service.  The  underlying  prin- 
ciple applied  in  making  such  comparisons  is  the  same  as  is  used 
Avhen  the  market  value  of  property  is  sought  to  be  determined 
by  comparisons  with  the  value  of  other  property  similarly  sit- 
uated, and  which  value  is  indicated  by  prices  that  have  been 
paid  therefor  in  the  open  market.  The  method  of  judging  rates 
by  comparison  is  one  that  has  been  applied  since  tribunals  have 
considered  the  question  of  what  are  reasonable  charges."" 

§  in.  Car  Load  and  Less  than  Car  Load  Movements  as 
Affecting  the  Rate. — It  has  been  hereinbefore  shown  that  cost 
and  value  of  service  both  enter  into  the  cpiestion  of  what  con- 
stitutes a  reasonable  rate.  "The  hazard  involved,"  ''^  must  al- 
so be  considered  in  determining  that  question.  It  is  indisput- 
able that  it  costs  more  per  hundred  pounds  to  haul  freight  in 
less  than  car  loads  than  it  costs  to  haul  the  same  freight  in  car 
load  quantities.  Among  other  reasons,  this  is  true  because  the 
shipper  loads  and  the  receiver  or  consignee  unloads  car  load 
shipments,  while  the  carrier  loads  and  unloads  articles  shipped 
in  less  than  car  loads.  Usually  a  car  load  shipment  is  sealed 
b}"  the  consignor  and  unsealed  by  the  consignee,  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  the  seals,  showing  that  it  has  been  tampered  with,  or 
that  the  car  is  in  any  way  defective,  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  a  concealed  loss  chargeable  to  the  carrier.  The  clerical  ex- 
pense of  l)illing  and  the  expense  of  delivering  is  much  less  in 
car  load  than  in  less  than  carload  shipments,  and  the  loss  and 
damage  on  less  than  car  load  shipments  is  greater  than  on  car 
load  movements.  The  principle  is  recognized  by  the  Commis- 
sion.    In  the  Thurber  case''"  the  Commission   said;  "It  is  a 

169.  Parfrey  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  171.  Kindel  v.  Adams  Express 
St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  104.               Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  475,  485. 

170.  Bacon's  Abridgment,  p.  172.  Thurber  v.  New  York  C.  & 
243,  title  Carriers.  1  Com.  Dig.  C.  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  I.  C.  C.  473,  2 
citing  1  Sid.  36;  Hutchinson  on  I.  C.  R.  742,  752.  See  also  Har- 
Carriers  (2d  Ed.)  Sec.  447,  4  El-  vard  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  4  I.  C. 
licit  on  Railroads  Sees.  1560  et  C.  212,  3  I  C.  R.  257;  Schultz- 
seq.  Hansen  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co., 


§  1,12]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  377 

sound  rule  for  carriers  to  adapt  their  classificatioiis  to  the  laws 
of  trade.  If  any  article  moves  in  sufficient  volume,  and  the  de- 
mands of  commerce  will  be  better  served,  it  is  reasonable  to 
give  it  a  car  load  classification  and  rate.  The  car  load  is  prob- 
ably the  only  practicable  unit  of  quantity." 

While,  as  stated  by  the  Commission  in  the  Thurber  case. 
nupra,  shippers  usually  load  and  unload  car  load  freight,  such 
is  not  the  universal  custom.  Speaking  of  the  practice,  the 
Commission  has  said:  "While  there  is  every  reason  for  hold- 
ing that  the  sliipper  should  load  and  unload  freight  handled  as 
a  strictly  car  load  proposition,  there  seem  to  be  many  reasons 
why  with  respect  to  commodities  handled  by  the  package,  the 
carrier  should  load  and  unload  even  though  the  rate  applied 
may  be  the  car  load;  and  such  we  think  has  been  the  usual 
practice  in  the  past.  Our  conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  no  gen- 
eral and  invariable  rule  can  be  laid  down  applying  to  all  busi- 
ness which  takes  a  car  load  rate."  "^ 

§  112.  Establishing  Car  Load  Rates. — While  the  principle 
of  a  difference  betw.een  carload  and  less  than  carload  ship- 
ments is  recognized  by  the  C(unmission,  and  while  to  prevent 
discrimination,  it  could  prescribe  such  a  diflferential,  that  trib- 
unal is  disinclined  to  exercise  such  power.  Mr.  Commis- 
sioner Clements,  voicing  the  opinion  of  the  Commission,  said  :^'* 

"The  commission  has  held  that  differentiation  by  the  car- 
riers of  carloads  from  less  than  car  loads  in  the  ajiplication  of 
rates  may  be  warranted  under  certain  conditions.  Here,  how- 
ever, we  are  asked  to  enter  an  affirmative  order  establishing  a 
differential.  AA^hat  would  be  the  etfect  upon  all  the  business 
interests  involved  in  this  traffic  should  the  commission  take 
such  action?  No  doubt  its  etfect  upon  the  jobbers  at  south- 
eastern points  would  be  beneficial ;  traffic  would  move  into  the 
southeast  in  such  manner  as  to  give  the  longest  possible  haul  in 
car  loads  to  the  local  dealers,  who.  securing  these  long  haul  car 

18    I.    C.    C.    2.34,    237;    when    the  173.   Wholesale  Fruit  &  Produce 

carrier    does    unload    or    load     it       Assn.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
must   be   without    discrimination,       Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  410,  419. 
Empire  Fuel  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  174.    Duncan  v.  Nashville,  C.  & 

R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  219.  224.  St.    L.    Ry.    Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    590, 

593,  594,  595. 


378  Charges  foe  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [^  113 

load  I'ates,  would  be  the  IxMieficiaries.  Other  classes  who  would 
be  aflfectod  by  the  change  would  be  the  small  dealers  and  con- 
sumers, and  it  appears  that  the  necessary  operation  of  such  a 
change  would  be  to  cut  off  these  classes  from  purchasing  in 
small  quantities  at  Nashville  and  Ohio  River  points  and  com- 
pel them  to  deal  with  jobbers  in  their  immediate  vicinity,  who 
would  purchase  in  large  enough  quantities  to  secure  the  bene- 
fits of  the  lower  rates  on  the  long  car  load  haul  from  the  Ohio 
River  to  Nashville.  The  entire  record  points  to  the  fact  that 
a  differential  on  this  traffic  would  have  the  effect  of  enhancing 
the  price  of  those  products  to  the  consumer.     *     *     * 

"A  railroad  cannot  be  compelled,  as  prayed  in  this  case,  or 
even  permitted  to  adopt  a  system  of  rate  making  which  enables 
a  large  dealer  to  drive  a  smaller  dealer  out  of  the  market.  We 
must  have  some  other  motive  upon  which  to  act  in  a  matter  of 
this  kind  than  that  the  trade  of  a  particular  community  is  a 
vested  right  belonging  to  any  particular  class  in  that  com- 
munity. AVe  are  not  permitted  so  to  narrow  our  view  of  all  the 
interests  involved  as  to  look  only  to  the  interests  of  a  particular 
class  in  the  community,  and  this  for  the  sole  purpose  of  vest- 
ing in  that  class  what  they  claim  to  be  their  inherent  rights, 
more  especially  when  the  enjoyment  thereof  is  to  be  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  community  at  large." 

The  Commission  has,  where  any  quantity  rates  were  in  force, 
distinguished  the  Duncan  caiie,supra,  and  required  that  car 
load  rates  be  established."^ 

§  113.  Same  Subject^ — Rule  in  Duncan  Case  Criticized. — 
With  great  deference  to  the  learned  lawyer  and  experienced 
commissioner  who  wrote  the  opinion  in  the  Duncan  case,  it  is 
submitted  that  he  failed  to  give  due  effect  to  the  rule  of  cost  of 
service.  It  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  a  higher  rate  on 
less  than  car  loads  increases  the  price  to  the  consumer,  and  if 
it  did.  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  one  man  should  re 
ceive  for  his  money  a  greater  service  than  another  receives  for 
the  same  amount  of  money.  Carriers  must  ordinarily  receive 
from  the  total  of  all  commodities  transported  by  them  enough 

175.  Mutual  Rice  Trade  &  De  224.  See  also  Taylor  Dry  Goods 
Tolopment  Assn.  v.  International  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  L,. 
Se   G.   N.   R.   Co..   23    I.   C.    C.    219,       205. 


§  1,13]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  379 

to  pay  all  operating  expenses  and  a  fair  return  on  the  invest- 
ment. If  fifty  per  cent  of  these  commodities  are  transported  in 
less  that  car  load  lots,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  more  than  sixty 
per  cent  of  the  cost  of  all  transportation  is  caused  by  this 
moiety  and  less  than  forty  per  cent  by  the  half  transported  in 
car  lots.  Bnt  while  the  car  load  shipper  costs  the  carrier  but 
forty  per  cent  of  the  transportation  charge,  he  pays  fifty  per 
cent  thereof.  If  the  car  load  shipper  paid  only  the  forty  per 
cent  the  maximum  which  he  should,  pay  and  the  less  than  car 
load  shipper  should  pay  his  sixty  per  cent  and  more,  the  total 
transportation  charges  paid  by  the  consumer  would  be  the 
same  that  he  pays  when  there  is  no  ditferential  and  there 
would  be  no  discrimination.  The  jobber  is  sometimes  regarded 
as  a  mere  parasite,  but  this  view  of  his  function  is  incorrect. 
He  fills  an  important  position  in  commerce.  "Without  him,  or 
some  other  equally  effective  agency,  the  producer  and  the  con- 
sumer could  not  be  got  together.  The  Kansas  wheat  farmer 
could  never  market  his  wheat  directly  by  dealing  with  the 
Georgia  consumer.  There  nuist  be  one  or  more  intermediaries 
who  collect  the  product  and  distribute  it  to  the  consumer.  He 
who  collects  the  grain  at  the  primary  markets  of  Kansas  City, 
St.  Louis,  Omaha,  Chicago,  and  perhaps  other  cities,  the  jobber 
at  Nashville,  Atlanta  and  other  cities  and  the  retail  dealer  who 
sells  direct  to  the  consumer,  each  performs  a  necessary  service 
in  enabling  the  producer  to  sell  and  the  consumer  to  buy. 
AVhen  a  producer  controls  all.  or  a  large  part,  of  a  commodity, 
he  may  himself  perform  all  these  intermediary  services,  but 
such  services  must  be  performed  by  some  agency.  The  agen- 
cies performing  this  necessary  service  will  be  compelled  by  the 
laws  of  trade  not  to  charge  more  than  is  reasonable  for  the  ser- 
vice. It  is  not  a  question  of  a  large  dealer  driving  out  the 
small  dealer,  but  a  question  of  those  intermediaries  paying  for 
only  what  service  they  obtain  from  the  carriers.  The  total 
transportation  charges  which  the  consumer  pays  are  not  in- 
creased, but  decreased  and  these  charges  are  equitablj^  dis- 
tributed. The  justice  of  a  car  load  and  less  than  car  load  dif- 
ferential is  shown  by  the  general  application  by  the  carriers 
themselves  of  such  diflferential. 


380  Charges  foh  Transportation  of  Persons^  etc.  [§  114 

Tu  the  Western  Classification  ease,''"  the  rule  for  determin- 
inf^j  when  a  carload  rating  should  be  established  was  stated  as 
follows:  "A  carload  rating  should  be  established  for  a  com- 
modity Avhen  that  commodity  can  be  offered  for  shipment  in 
carload  quantities,  unless  public  interests  or  other  valid  consid- 
erations require  the  contrary."  Tn  a  subsequent  case  this 
rule  was  quoted,  the  Duncan  and  other  cases  cited,  and  it  was 
said:  "The  Commission  has  always  recognized  the  propriety 
of  carload  ratings.  It  has  in  many  cases  established  carload 
and  less  than  carload  rates  upon  the  same  commodity,  but 
whether  a  carload  rating  should  be  accorded  in  a  particular 
instance,  depends  not  only  upon  whether  that  commodity  is 
offered  for  shipment  in  carload  quantities,  but  also  upon  other 
considerations."'"'  What  the  Commission  meant  is,  that  when 
commercial  usage  makes  a  carload  of  a  particular  commodity 
a  greater  quantity  than  is  ordinarily  used  by  the  average 
shipper,  the  advantages  to  be  obtained  by  the  low^er  cost  of 
movements  in  carloads  must  yield  to  the  customs  of  trade. 
Somewhat  more  liberal  was  the  rule  applied  in  permitting  the 
carriers  to  increase  the  minimum  carload  for  grain  products.^" 
The  round  bale  cotton  case''"  was  based  upon  a  special  situa- 
tion, and  in  declining  to  fix  a  carload  rating  which  w^ould 
have  a])plied  only  to  cotton  compressed  to  a  stated  density, 
it  can  not  be  said  that  the  Commission  has  determined  that 
in  no  oClsp  will  it  require  the  establishment  of  carload  ratings. 

§  114.  Same  Siibject^Proper  Differential  Between  Rates 
on  Carload  and  Less  Than  Carload  Freight. — On  this 
subject  the  Commission  has  stated  the  rule  as  follows:  "The 
differential,  like  the  rate  itself,  should  be  fixed  with  a  view  to 
the  just  interests  of  all  parties  concerned.  *  *  *  In  fixing 
upon  a  rate  or  a  rate  adjustment  a  carrier  may  always  prop- 
erly consider  the  cost  of  service,  and  that  factor  should  have 
great    influence    with    the    commission    in    passing    upon    the 

176.  Re  Suspension  of  Western  178.  Western  Rate  Advance  Case 
Classification  No.   51,   25    I.   C.   C.       1915,  35  I.  C.  C.  497. 

442,  446.  179.     American       Round       Bale 

177.  Taylor  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  M.  Press  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
P.   Ry.   Co.,   28   I.   C.   C.    205,    207,       32  I.  C.  C.  458. 

208,  209. 


§  1.15]  Must  be  Just  and  Keasonable.  381 

reasonableness  of  the  carrier's  action.  If  it  actually  costs  these 
carriers  less  to  handle  this  transcontinental  freight  in  car- 
loads than  in  less  than  carloads  we  ought  not  in  the  absence 
of  a  controlling  reason  to  the  contrary,  to  deny  the  carrier 
the  right  to  make  a  difference  in  its  tariff  corresponding  to 
the  difference  of  expense.  The  defendant  carriers  have  some- 
what elaborately  estimated  the  relative  expense  of  carrying 
this  freight  in  carloads  and  less  than  carloads.  The  nature 
of  that  testimony  fully  appears  in  the  statement  of  facts,  and 
need  not  be  repeated.  We  have  found  that  it  costs  trans- 
continental carriers  approximately  50  per  cent  more  to  handle 
transcontinental  traffic  in  less  than  car  loads  than  in  carloads. 
The  less  than  carload  rate  in  many  of  the  instances  called  to 
our  attention  by  the  complainant  exceeds  the  carload  rate 
by  somewhat  more  than  50  per  cent,  but  on  the  whole  we  are 
inclined  to  think  that,  on  the  average,  the  difference  between 
carloads  and  less  than  carloads  established  by  the  tariff  of 
June  25,  1898,  does  not  generally,  if  at  all  exceed  the  actual 
difference  of  cost  in  the  service  rendered."" 

The  question  discussed  in  sections  111  to  114  are  here  dis- 
cussed as  they  affect  the  reasonableness  of  rates.  The  issue 
of  unlawful  discrimination  is  discussed  in  seotion  156,  post, 
where  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Commission  has  changed  its 
attitude  from  that  adopted  in  the  Duncan  case,  supra. 

§  115.  Carload  Minima. — It  is  usual  for  the  carriers  to  pro- 
vide that  a  specified  weight  of  a  commodity  shall  be  required 
to  constitute  a  carload  in  order  to  obtain  a  rate  different  from 
tlie  rate  on  the  same  commodity  moving  in  less  than  carloads. 
This  minimum  must  be  reasonable  and  must  not  exceed  the 
capacity  of  the  car.  AVhere  no  minimum  was  established  the 
Commission  said : 

"The  absence  of  a  legally  established  minimum  car  load 
weight  suggests  the  inquiry  as  to  the  quantity  upon  which  a 
shipper  might  claim  the  benefit  of  the  car  load  rate  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  less-than-carload  rate.  And  for  the  purpose  of 
laying  down  a  general  rule  we  hold  that  when  a  car  is  de- 
manded and  loaded  by  the  shipper  and  is  tendered  and  other- 

180.  Business  Men's  League  of  Ry.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  318,  358,  359. 
St.  Louis  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.      See  Sec.  156,  post. 


382  Charges  FOE  Transportation  OF  Persons,  etc.  [§  116 

wise  handled  as  a  carload,  and  no  minimum  carload  weight  is 
legally  [jrovidcd.  the  carload  rate,  if  it  makes  less  than  the 
1.  c.  1.  rate,  must  be  applied  on  the  actual  weight.  It  lies  in 
the  poAver  of  a  carrier  to  protect  its  revenue  by  fixing,  in 
the  manner  provided  by  law,  minimum  weights  to  be  ap- 
plicable under  its  published  carload  rates.  If  it  fails  to  take 
this  precaution  we  think  it  imposes  no  hardship  upon  it  to 
give  a  shipper  the  benefit  of  the  carload  rate  on  the  actual 
weight  of  the  shipment  tendered  as  a  carload,  whether  it  ba 
more  or  less  than  an  ordinary  carload  quantity.""^ 

If  the  rate  is  for  a  carload,  the  greater  the  load  the  less  the 
rate  on  each  one  hundred  pounds,  and  the  less  the  load  the 
greater  the  rate  a  hundred.  So  "the  minimum  carload  Aveight 
is  a  factor  in  determining  the  carload  rate.'"*" 

§  116.  Train  Load  Rates.^ — The  carload  is  a  reasonable  and 
practicable  unit  of  quantity  that  may  properly  be  adopted  in 
determining  rates.  Perhaps  logically  the  train  load  might  also 
be  considered,  but  in  the  actual  movement  of  commodities  the 
train  load  rarely  occurs,  and  to  adopt  as  a  unit  of  quantity  the 
train  load  would  benefit  very  few  shippers  and  would  dis- 
criminate against  a  large  number.  Practicable  units  must  be 
observed.  So  it  has  been  said  that  loAver  rates  by  the  hundred 
pounds  for  train  loads  than  for  carloads  should  not  be 
established."*  Applying  the  same  principle,  a  rate  on  one 
hundred  or  one  hundred  thousand  cars  should  not  be  less  by 
the  car  than  on  one  car.'*' 

181.  1915  Western  Advance  Rate  Advance  Case  1915,  35  1.  C. 
Rate  Case  35  I.  C.  C.  497,  Chicago      C.  497. 

Wool  Co.  V.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  184.     Planters   Compress   Co.    v. 

40  I.  C.  C.  101;   Southeastern  Cot-  Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

ton   Goods,    43   I.   C.   C.    530,   536;  11   I.   C.   C.   382;    Paine   Bros.   Co. 

Consolidated     Classification    Case.  v.    Lehigh    V.   R.    Co.,    7    I.    C.    C. 

54  I.  C.  C.  8.  218;    Richards    \.    Atlantic    Coast 

182.  Sunderland  Bros.  Co.  v.  Line  R.  Co..  23  I.  C.  C.  23-9,  240. 
Missouri,  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  185.  Carr  v.  Northern  Pacific  R. 
C.  C.  425,  426.  Co.,   9   I.   C.   C.   1,   14;    Woodward 

183.  Georgia  Fruit  Exchange  v.  Bennett  Co.  v.  S.  P.  L.  A.  &  S.  F. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  623,  T.  Co.,  29  I.  C.  C.  664,  665,  and 
630;  Kansas  City  Hay  Dealers  cases  cited;  wholesale  theory  dis- 
Assn.  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  approved.  Diamond  Lumber  Co.  v. 
14    I.    C.    C.    597,    603;     Western  M.   &  St.   P.   Ry.   Co.,   43   I.  C.   C. 


§  1,17]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  383 

§  117.  Relation  of  Throiig-h  Rates  to  the  Sum  of  the  Local 

Rates. — 111  December,  1906,  the  Commission  adopted  and  is- 
sued to  all  railroads  the  following  ruling: 

''Reduction  of  Joint  Rate  to  Equal  Sum  of  Locals  (effective 
December  21,  1906).  Where  a  joint  rate  is  in  effect  by  a  given 
route,  which  is  higher  between  any  points  than  the  sura  of  the 
locals  between  the  same  points,  by  the  same  or  any  other  route, 
and  such  joint  rate  has  been  in  effect  thirty  days  or  longer, 
such  higher  joint  rate  may,  until  further  notice  from  the  com- 
mission, be  changed  by  reducing  the  same  to  the  sum  of  such 
locals,  but  not  otherwise,  upon  posting  one  day  in  advance  a 
tariff  of  such  reduced  rate  and  mailing  a  copy  thereof  to  the 
commission. 

]\Iany  informal  complaints  are  received  in  connection  with 
regularly  established  through  rates  which  are  in  excess  of  the 
sura  of  the  locals  between  the  same  points.  The  Coraraission  has 
no  authority  to  change  or  fix  a  rate  except  after  full  hearing 
upon  forraal  complaint.  It  is  believed  to  be  proper  for  the 
Commission  to  say  that,  if  called  upon  to  formally  pass  upon  a 
case  of  this,  nature,  it  would  be  its  policy  to  consider  the 
through  rate,  which  is  higher  than  the  sura  of  the  locals  be- 
tween the  same  points  as  prima  facie  unreasonable,  and  that 
the  burden  of  proof  would  be  upon  the  carrier  to  defend  such 
higher  through  rate." 

The  foregoing  administrative  order  of  the  commission  fur- 
nishes a  general  rule  which  has  been  frequently  enforced.^"" 

65,  66;  private  Wire  Contracts,  Wells-Higman  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids 
50  I.  C.  C.  731.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  487;  Web- 
186.  Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain  ster  Grocery  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
Co.  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  13  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  493;  and 
I.  C.  C.  148,  159;  Burnham,  Hanna,  ordinarily  the  through  rate  should 
Munger  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Chicago,  be  somewhat  less  than  the  com- 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299;  bination  of  locals,  Jubitz  v.  South- 
Kindel  v.  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  ern  Pac.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  44,  4o; 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  555;  Randolph  Washington  Milling  Co.  v.  Norfolk 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  546,  549; 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  601;  Milburn  Appalachia  Lumber  Co.  v.  Louis- 
Wagon  Co.  V.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  ville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  25  I.  C.  C.  193, 
Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  144:  Windsor  194;  Commercial  Club  of  Mitchell 
Turned  Goods  Co.  v.  Chesapeake  S.  Dak.  v.  A.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  46 
&   O.    Ry.    Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.    162;  I.  C.  C.  1,  7:  Herrick  Refrigerator 


384  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  118 

There  have  been  and  may  be  reasons  which  make  the  rule  in- 
applicable.'" 

Carriers  may  not  avoid  the  application  of  the  general  prin- 
ciple by  making  different  minima  on  local  and  through  ship- 
ments/^^ The  amended  fourth  section  making  it  unlawful  "to 
charge  any  greater  compensation  on  a  through  rate  than  the 
aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates  subject  to  the  provisions" 
of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  makes  statutory  the  prior 
rule  frequently  applied  by  the  Commission. 

' '  Penalty  Rates, ' '  that  is,  inbound  rates  part  of  a  through  haul 
higher  if  the  outbound  movement  is  over  a  line  different  from 
the  one  enjoying  the  inbound  haul,  are  unlawful.'"* 

§  lis  Proportional  Rates. — A  proportional  rate  is  but  a  part 
of  a  rate  charged  for  the  haul  over  a  portion  of  the  through 
route  In  recognition  of  the  fact  that  there  has  been  paid  or 
will  be  paid  another  or  subsequent  transportation  charge, 
tlie  proportional  rate  is  usually  lower  than  the  local  rate  for 
the  same  haul.  That  such  proportion  may  be  less  than  the 
local  over  the  intermediate  line  is  but  an  application  of  the 
principle  that  usually  a  through  rate  is  less  than  the  sum  of 
the  locals,  it  is,  therefore,  obvious  that  there  is  nothing 
illegal  of  itself  in  a  proportional  rate,  although  such  rate 
like  all  other  rates  must  not  be  unreasonable  and  must  not 
result  in  unjust  discrhnination  or  undue  preference. 

The  Commission  in  defining  and  stating  the  principles  ap- 
plicable to  proportional  rates,  said  : 

"A  proportional  rate  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  a  separ- 
ately established  rate,  as  that  phrase  is  used  in  section  6  of 
the  amended  act,  applicable  to  through  transportation.  And 
it  has  not  Ireen  understood  either  by  the  Commission,  or  by 

&  Cold  Storage  Co.  v.  C.  G.  W.  R.  188.   Lull  Carriage  Co.  v.  K.  &  S. 

Co.,  46  I.  C.  C.  421.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  15,   16. 

187.    Coffeyville  Vitrified   Brick  189.     Mobile    Chamber   of    Com- 

&   Tile   Co.   V.    St.   Louis   &    S.    F.  merce    v.    M.   &    0.    R.    Co.,    32    I. 

Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  498,  499;  White  C.  C.  272;   The  Tap  Line  Case,  23 

Bros.  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  I.  C.   C.   549,   650;    Red   River   Oil 

Co.,  17  L  C.  C.  288;   Winona  Car-  Co.  v.  T.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 

riage  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  438,  447. 
C.   334;    Southeastern   Lumber,   42 
I.  C.  C.  548,  558. 


§  1,18]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  385 

others  so  far  as  we  are  informed,  that  a  separately  estab- 
lished rate  can  be  other  than  an  open  rate  available  to  all. 
The  separately  established  or  proportional  rate  is  simply  one 
way  of  making  up  the  through  charges  between  two  points ; 
bnt  while  we  have  made  no  criticism  and,  as  at  present 
advised,  see  no  grounds  for  any  criticism  of  proportional  rates 
applicable  only  to  through  movements  from  a  defined  ter- 
ritory or  group  of  points,  we  have  never  recognized  as  valid 
and,  as  at  present  advised,  see  no  grounds  upon  which  we 
could  recognize  as  valid  a  proportional  rate  limited  to  ship- 
ments that  come  into  the  proportional  rate  point  over  the  lines 
of  a  particular  carrier.  Proportional  rates  limited  to  through 
movements  from  defined  territory,  or  from  a  group  of  points, 
seem  to  form  a  proper  basis  for  making  up  through  charges 
for  transportation  from  those  points  and  that  territory.  But 
a  proportional  rate,  the  use  of  which  is  limited  to  shipments 
over  a  particular  line,  would  appear  to  be  a  rate  that  dis- 
criminates against  shippers  over  another  line."^"" 

When  the  proportionals  are  unreasonable  the  Commission 
may  order,  and  has  ordered,  a  reduction  therein. 

Proportional  rates  should  as  a  rule  be  less  than  correspond- 
ing local  rates,^"'  and  such  rates  have  a  value  when  they 
promote  and  preserve  wholesome  competition  between  pro- 
ducing centers.'""  The  shipper  is  not  interested  in  the  divis- 
ions of  rates  between  the  carriers  unless  the  resultant  through 
rate  is, unreasonable,  and  proportionals  do  not  measure  local 


190.    Bascom  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  191.    Greater   Des   Moines   Com- 

&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,   17   I.  C.   C.  354,  mitee  v.   Chicago,  R.   I.  &   P.  Ry. 

356,    357.    See    also    Kansas    City  Co.,   17   I.   C.  C.   54,   57;    Ottumwa 

Transportation  Bureau  v.  Atchison  Commercial  Assn.  v.  Chicago,  B.  & 

T.  &  F.  Ry.   Co  ,   16  I.   C.   C.   195,  Q.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  413,  414. 

201;    Board    of   Trade    of    Kansas  192.    R.    R.   Com.    of   Kansas  v. 

City  V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  Atchison,   T.   &  S.   F.   Ry.  Co.,   22 

32    I.   C.   C.   297,   307;    Commodity  I.  C.  C.  407,  415. 

Rates  to  Pacific  Coast  Terminals.  193.     Indianapolis    Freight    Bu- 

32  I.  C.  C.  611,  632;   Hocking  Val-  reau  v.  Cleveland,  C.  C.  St.  L.  Ry. 

ley  R.   Co.   v.    Lackawana   Coal   &  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  504,  512;    Interior 

Lumber  Co.,  224  Fed.  930;  Stevens  Iowa   Cities  Case,  28   I.   C.  C.   64, 

Grocery  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  So.  73;    Serry  v.   Sou.   Pac.   Co.,   18  I. 

Ry.  Co.,  42  I.  C.  C.  396,  398;   Iowa  C.  C.  554,  556;    Scott  Mayer  Com- 

V.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.,  46  I.  C.  C.  595,  mission  Co.  v.  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P. 

599.  Ry.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  529,  532. 


386  Charges  for  Transportation  or  Persons,  etc.  [^  119' 

"Proportional  Eates"  as  defined  in  the  Panama  Canal  Act, 
retained  in  Transportation  Act  1920,  are  rates  "which  differ 
from  the  corresponding  local  rates  to  and  from  the  port  and 
which  ai)ply  only  on  traffic  which  has  been  brought  to  the  port 
or  is  carried  from  the  port  by  a  common  carrier.""* 
Tender  this  statute  the  Commiesion  established  port 
proportional  rates  less  than  the  local  rates,  and  it 
would  seem  in  view  of  former  practices  of  the  Commission 
that  it  was  the  intention  of  Congress  to  require  that  rela- 
tionship."' 

§  1]9.  Through  Rates  Must  Not  Exceed  Aggregate  of  In- 
termediate Rates. — This  Amendment  to  the  foiirth  section  of 
the  original  Act  provides:  "It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any 
common  carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  *  *  * 
to  charge  any  greater  compensation  as  a  through  rate  than 
the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act." 

It  is  further  provided  "that  upon  application,"  authority 
may  be  given  "to  charge  less  for  longer  than  for  shorter 
distances,"  and  the  "Commission  may  from  time  to  time 
prescril)e  the  extent  to  which  such  designated  common  car- 
riers may  be  relieved  from  the  operation  of  this  section.""* 

Does  the  authority  to  grant  relief  apply  to  the  whole  sec- 
tion or  only  to  the  long  and  short  haul  clause  thereof?  With- 
out the  Amendment  the  Commission  had  applied  as  a  general 
rule  the  principle  that  joint  through  rates  should  not  exceed 
the  sum  of  the  locals,  and'"  if  the  statute  does  not  make 
universal  this  rule  it  means  nothing.'"^     It  w^ould  seem  that 

194.  Sec.  378,  j^ost.  here   the   House    and    Senate   pro- 

195.  Baltimore  &  S.  S.  Co.  v.  A.  visions,  that  comparison  may  be 
C.  L.  R.  Co.,  49  I.  C.  C.  176.  had     between      the     Section      as 

196.  post,  Sec.  335.  passed   and   the   provision    in   the 

197.  Sec.  117,  supra;  Mayfield  Senate  and  House  bills.  Senate 
&  Grady  Co.  Commercial  Club  v.  Bill:  "That  section  four  of  the 
B.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  48  I.  C.  C.  45,  Act  entitled  'An  Act  to  regulate 
5.5.  56.  commerce,'     approved       February 

198.  The  importance  of  this  pro-  fourth,  eighteen  hundred  and 
vision  and  the  questions  that  will  eighty-seven,  be  amended  by 
have  to  be  determined  thereun-  striking  out  the  words  'under  s«b- 
der,  make  it  of  interest  to  insert  stantially    similiar   circumstances 


§  119] 


Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable. 


387 


Congresrrt  had  in  mind,  when  the  Senate  and  House  bills  were 
combined   and    both    changed,    that   relief    could   be    granted 


and  conditions,'  where  the  same 
appear  in  said  section  four,  and 
further  amend  said  section  four  of 
said  Act  by  striking  out  all  of 
said  section  four,  beginning  with 
the  words  'Provided,  however,' 
and  further  amend  said  section 
four  so  that  when  amended  it 
will  read  as  follows:  'Sec.  4. 
That  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any 
common  carrier  subject  to  the 
provision  of  this  Act  to  charge 
or  receive  any  greater  compensa- 
tion in  the  aggregate  for  the 
transportation  of  passengers  or 
of  like  kind  of  property,  for  a 
shorter  than  for  a  longer  distance 
over  the  same  line  or  route  in 
the  same  direction,  the  shorter 
being  included  within  the  longer 
distance,  or  to  charge  any  greater 
compensation  as  a  through  route 
than  the  aggregate  of  the  local 
rates;  but  this  shall  not  be  con- 
strued as  authorizing  any  com- 
mon carrier  within  the  terms  of 
this  Act  to  charge  or  receive  as 
great  compensation  for  a  shorter 
as  for  a  longer  distance: 

"  'Provided,  however,  That  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion may,  from  its  knowledge,  or 
from  information,  or  upon  appli- 
cation, ascertain  that  the  circum- 
stances and  conditions  of  the 
longer  haul  are  dissimilar  to  the 
circumstances  and  conditions  of 
the  shorter  haul,  whether  they 
result  from  competition  by  water 
or  rail;  then  it  may  authorize 
a  common  carrier  to  charge  less 
for  the  longer  than  for  the 
shorter  distance  for  the  trans- 
portation of  passengers  or  prop- 
erty;   but   in   no   event   shall   the 


authority  be  granted  unless  the 
commission  is  satisfied  that  all 
the  rates  involved  are  just  and 
reasonable  and  not  unjustly  dis- 
criminatory nor  unduly  preferen- 
tial or  prejudical. 

"  'That  no  rates  or  charges 
lawfully  existing  at  the  time  of 
the  passage  of  this  amendatory 
Act  shall  be  required  to  be 
changed  by  reason  of  the  provi- 
sions of  this  section  prior  to  the 
expiration  of  six  months  after  the 
passage  of  this  Act,  nor  in  any 
case  where  application  shall  have 
been  filed  before  the  commission, 
in  accordance  wifh  the  provisions 
of  this  section,  until  a  determina- 
tion of  such  application  by  the 
commission; 

"  'Provided  that  such  determi- 
nation is  made  within  one  year 
after  the  passage  of  this  Act, 
Provided,  further,  That  if  more 
than  one  year,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission is  needed  to  consider  the 
questions  and  make  such  deter- 
mination of  them,  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  may  ex- 
tend the  time  beyond  one  year; 
Provided,  further.  That  when  ap- 
plication is  made  to  the  said  com- 
mission by  a  carrier  to  fix  a  low- 
er rate  for  longer  than  for  shorter 
distances  on  account  of  water 
competition,  said  application  shall 
not  be  granted  if  the  commission, 
after  investigation,  shall  find  that 
the  lower  rate  asked  for  will  de- 
stroy  water   competition.'  " 

House  Bill:  "Sec.  8.  That  sec- 
tion four  of  said  Act  to  regulate 
commerce  be  amended  so  as  to 
read  as  follows: 


388  Charges  foe  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  1L9 

only  from  the  long  and  short  haul   clause,  which  clause  as 
theretofore  construed  meant  practically  nothing,  and  that  the 


"  'Sec.  4.  That  it  shall  b*^  unlaw- 
ful for  any  common  carrier  sub- 
ject to  the  provision  of  this  Act 
to  charge  or  receive  any  greater 
compensation  in  the  aggregate 
for  the  transportation  of  passen- 
gers, or  of  like  kind  of  property, 
for  a  shorter  than  for  a  longer 
distance  over  the  same  line  or 
route  in  the  same  direction,  the 
shorter  being  included  within  the 
longer  distance,  or  to  charge  any 
greater  compensation  as  a  through 
route  than  the  aggregrate  of  the 
local  rates;  but  this  shall  not  be 
construed  as  authorizing  any 
common  carrier  within  the  terms 
of  this  Act  to  charge  or  receive 
as  great  compensation  for  a 
shorter  as  for  a  longer  distance; 

"  'Provided,  however,  that 
upon  application  to  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  such  com- 
mon carrier  may  in  special  cases, 
after  investigation,  be  authorized 
by  the  commission  to  charge  less 
for  longer  than  for  shorter  dis- 
tances for  the  transportation  of 
passengers  or  property;  and  the 
commission  may  from  time  to 
time  prescribe  the  extent  to 
which  such  designated  common 
carrier  may  be  relieved  from  the 
operation  of  this  section;  Pro- 
vided, further.  That  no  rates  or 
charges  lawfully  existing  at  the 
time  of  the  passage  of  this 
amendatory  Act  shall  be  required 
to  be  changed  by  reason  of  the 
provisions  of  this  section  prior  to 
the  expiration  of  six  months  after 
the  passage  of  this  Act,  nor  in 
any  case  where  application  shall 
have  been  filed  before  the  com- 
mission,   in   accordance   with    the 


provision  of  this  section,  until  a 
determination  of  such  application 
by  the  commission.'  " 

The  Committee  of  the  House, 
in  reporting  the  original  bill,  said: 
"Section  Gb  proposes  an  amend- 
ment to  section  4  of  the  inter- 
state commerce  act  in  relation  to 
charges  for  long  and  short  hauls. 
The  existing  law  provides  that 
the  carrier  shall  not  charge 
greater  compensation  'under  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances 
and  conditions'  for  a  snorter  than 
for  a  longer  distance  over  the 
same  line  in  the  same  direction, 
but  authorizes  the  commission  in 
special  cases  to  relieve  the  car- 
rier from  the  operation  of  this 
provision.  The  courts  have  so 
construed  the  meaning  of  the 
words  'under  substantially  similar 
circumstances  and  conditions'  as 
to  practically  deprive  section  4  of 
the  existing  law  of  real  vitality. 
In  the  substitute  recommended 
by  your  commitee,  section  4  of 
the  existing  law  is  amended  so 
as  to  leave  out  the  words  'under 
substantially  similar  circum- 
stances and  conditions'  and  to  pro- 
hibit a  carrier  from  receiving 
greater  compensation  for  a  shorter 
than  for  a  longer  distance  over 
the  same  line  in  the  same  direct- 
ion, the  shorter  being  included 
within  the  longer  distance,  or  to 
receive  a  greater  compensation  as 
a  through  route  than  the  aggregate 
of  the  local  rates,  but  authorizing 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission to  relieve  a  carrier  upon 
application  from  the  operation  of 
this  section;  and  in  order  not  to 
unduly  disturb  existing  conditions 


§  1.19]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  389 

words  authorizing  relief  "from  tlie  operation  of  this  sec- 
tion" meant  that  "section"  was  limited  by  the  words  "be  au- 
thorized *  *  *  to  charge  less  for  longer  than  for  shorter 
distances."'"''  The  Transportation  Act  1920  s;upports  this 
view  because  in  specifying  the  principles  under  which  relief 
may  be  granted,  only  principles  applicable  to  the  long-and- 
sliort  haul  clause  are  named.  However  this  may  be,  the 
Commission  has  applied  the  principle  that,  through  rates  must 
not  exceed  the  sum  of  the  locals  although  implying  that  there 
might  be  conditions  justifying  a  departure  from  the  general 
rule."""  Local  rates  that  are  not  "subject  to  the  provisions 
of"  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  are  not  necessarily  a 
pro])er  measure  of  the  through  rate.  The  Commission  does, 
and  properly  should,  give  consideration  to  rates  fixed  by 
State  Commissions  but,  were  it  bound  by  such  rates  the  ex- 
clusive power  of  Congress  over  interstate  commerce  would 
be  made  subordinate  to  the  action  of  the  states. ""^  In  dis- 
cussing this  question  the  Commission  has  said: 

"While  state  rates  are  valuable  for  comparative  purposes 
in  fixing  a  reasonable  charge  for  a  transportation  service,  the 
assumption  of  complainant  that  the  action  of  the  defendant  in 
this  case  in  maintaining  higher  transportation  rates  on  inter- 
state than  intrastate  trafific  amounts  to  unlawful  discrimina- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  carrier  is  not  sound,  for  upon  the  record 

in  an  abrupt  manner  the  amend-  Halsbury's  Laws  of  England,  vol. 

ment    further    provides    that    no  4,  p.  81. 

rates  or  charges  lawfully  existing  200.  Arabol  INlfg.  Co.  v.  South 
at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Brooklyn  Ry.  Co.,  25  I.  C.  C.  429, 
proposed  act  shall  be  required  to  430:  Commercial  Club  of  Duluth 
be  changed  by  reason  of  this  sec-  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  27  I. 
tion  prior  to  the  expiration  of  six  C.  C.  639,  660. 
months  after  passage  of  the  act,  201.  Cobb  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry. 
nor  until  any  application  made  Co.,  20  L  C.  C.  100,  102;  Pulp  & 
with  the  commission  shall  have  Paper  Mfrs.  Traffic  Assn.  v.  Chi- 
been  determined."  cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  27 
199.  The  English  Railway  and  I.  C.  C.  83,  96;  Corp.  Com.  of 
Traffic  Act  of  1888,  section  27,  Okla.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
gave  the  Commissioners  power  to  31  I.  C.  C.  532.  Rates  on  Beer 
direct  that  no  greater  charge  and  Other  Malt  Products.  31  I. 
should  be  made  for  a  shorter  than  C.  C.  544;  Rates  on  Live  Poultry 
a  longer  haul  when  the  circum-  in  Western  Trunk,  Line  Tern- 
stances  demanded   such   direction.  tory,  32  I.  C.  C.  380. 


390  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  120 

it  is  shown  that  the  condition  is  one  over  which  the  carrier 
has  no  control."  '"' 

§  120.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. — If  only  the  rates 
on  the  lines  of  each  carrier  considered  separately  were  sub- 
ject to  the  regulation  of  the  Commission,  it  would  be  very 
difficult  to  obtain  reasonable  rates  on  those  comm<)dities 
Avhich  move  over  two  or  more  lines.  For  this  reason,  carriers 
subject  to  the  Act  are  required  to  establish  through  routes 
and  joint  rates.  Joint  rates  must  be  reasonable  and  the 
principles  relating  to  rates  generally  apply  as  well  to  these 
rates.  Of  the  right  of  shippers  to  through  routes  and  joint 
rates  Mr.  Commissioner  Clements  says :"'"' 

"The  law  does  not  require  the  commission  in  all  cases  where 
no  through  routes  and  joint  rates  exist  to  establish  them,  but 
only  empowers  it  to  do  so  in  proper  cases  with  the  manifest 
intent  of  giving  effect  to  the  general  purposes  of  the  act  to 
regulate  commerce  by  securing  reasonable  facilities  to  the 
public  and  preventing  unreasonable  and  unjust  rates,  prac- 
tices, and  discriminations,  and  in  the  exercise  of  this  authority 
the  commission  is  bound  by  the  same  considerations  of  justice 
and  fairness  as  it  is  in  the  exercise  of  the  rate-making  power 
in  other  respects.  Where  neither  the  interest  of  the  public, 
nor  the  ends  of  justice  as  between  parties  directly  interested, 
will  be  promoted  by  the  establishment  of  through  routes  and 
joint  rates  and  divisions  thereof,  a  proper  case  for  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  authority  invoked  has  not  bteen  shown." 

In  discussing  an  order  for  a  through  route  made  by  the 
Commission  prior  to  the  amendments  of  1910  and  1912,  the 
Supreme  Court  construing  the  statute  said : 

"We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  Commission  had  no  power 
to  make  the  order,  if  a  reasonable  and  satisfactory  through 
route  already  existed,  and  that  the  existence  of  such  a  route 
may  be  inquired  into  by  the  courts."  ""* 

202.  Baxter  &  Co.  v.  Georgia,  S.  54  L.  Ed.  608,  30  Sup.  Ct.  417,  af- 
&  F.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  647,  648.  firming    Circuit    Court,    Northern 

203.  Loup  Creek  Colliery  Co.  v.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com. 
Virginia  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  471,  and  setting  aside  the  order  of  the 
477.  Commission    in    Re      Matter      of 

204.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Northern  Through  Passenger  Routes  via 
Pac.   Ry.   Co.,  216  U.   S.   538,    544,  Portland  Oregon,  16  I.  C.  C.  300. 


§  121]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  391 

§  121.  Same  Subject — Amendments  of  1910  and  1912. — Sec- 
tion one  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,  as  amended  by 
the  Acts  of  1906,  and  of  1920  makes  it  the  duty  of  carriers 
"to  establish  through  routes  and  just  and  reasonable  rates, 
fares  and  charges  applicable  thereto.'"" 

The  Amendment  of  August  24,  1912,  kno-\vn  as  the  Panama 
Canal  Act,  provided  that,  "When  property  may  be  or  is  trans- 
ported from  point  to  point  in  the  United  States  by  rail  or 
water  through  the  Panama  Canal  or  otherwise  *  *  *  in 
addition  to  the  jurisdiction  given  by  the  Act  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce" other  jurisdiction  is  given.""*  In  the  specified  ad- 
ditional jurisdiction  this  is  stated:  "To  establish  through 
routes  and  maximum  joint  rates  between  and  over  such  rail 
and  water  lines,  and  to  determine  all  the  terms  and  condi- 
tions under  which  such  lines  shall  be  operated  in  the  hand- 
ling of  the  traffic  embraced.""' 

The  Act  of  1910,  amended  by  Transportation  Act  1920, 
gave  the  Commission  poAver  "after  hearing"  to  "establish 
through  routes,  joint  classifications,  and  joint  rates,  fares  or 
charges"  or  "the  minima  or  maxima  or  minima  and  maxima 
to  be  charged,"  and  to  "prescribe  the  division  of  such  rates, 
fares  and  charges,"  and  to  prescribe  the  "terms  and  condi- 
tions under  which  such  through  routes  shall  be  operated;" 
and  the  provision  was  made  to  apply  "when  one  of  the  con- 
necting carriers  is  a  water  line."^"^  There  was  by  Act  1910. 
retained  in  1920  Act,  a  limitation  on  the  power  by  the  pro- 
vision that  "In  establishing  any  such  through  route  the  Com- 
mission shall  not  (except  as  provided  in  Section  3,  and  ex- 
cept where  one  of  the  carriers  is  a  water  line),  require  am' 
carrier  by  railroad,  without  its  consent,  to  embrace  in  such 
route  substantially  less  than  the  entire  length  of  its  railroad 
and  of  any  intermediate  railroad  operated  in  conjunction  and 
under  a  common  management  or  control  therewith,  which  lies 
between  the  termini  of  such  proposed  through  route,  unless 
such  inclusion  of  lines  would  make  the  through  route  un- 
reasonably long  as  compared  with  another  practicable  through 
route  which  could  otherwise  be  established,""" 

205.  Sec.  335,  j)ost.  208.    Sec.  400,  post. 

206.  Sec.   375,  post.  209.     Sec.    401,    post.       Downie 

207.  Sec.  377,  post.  Pole  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  31  I.  C. 


392  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons^  etc.  [§  121 

The  Act  of  1906,  limiting  the  Commission's  power  by  this 
language,  "provided  no  reasonable  or  satisfactory  through 
route  exists,"  was  not  reenaeted  in  section  15  of  the  Act 
of  1910.  This  change  in  the  statute  makes  inapplicable  to 
the  present  law  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  v.  Northern  Pacific  Kailway, 
supra.  The  law  as  now  written  provides  for  a  hearing  with 
or  without  a  formal  complaint  and  invests  in  the  Commission 
a  discretion  as  to  when  and  under  what  conditions  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  may  be  established;  the  limitation 
quoted  above,  of  course,  controlling  this  discretionary  power. 
Other  than  the  quoted  limitation  the  Commission  now  has 
like  power  over  through  routes  and  joint  rates  as  over  any 
other  kind  of  a  rate."'"  In  exercising  this  discretion  the  Com- 
mission may  permit  one  carrier  to  demand  "financial  security 
before  entering  into  either  joint  rate  arrangements  or  ac- 
cepting freight  under  proportional  rates."'^ 

The  Commission  has  construed  the  words  "or  otherw^ise" 
quoted  from  the  Panama  Canal  Act,  infra,  and  has  held  that 
it  could  thereunder  establish  through  routes  with  a  water 
carrier.''"  The  Commission  in  the  case  where  such  holding 
was  first  made  said : 

"If  the  above  alnendment  applies  to  the  traffic  in  question, 
the  right  of  the  Comioission  to  establish  this  through  route  is 
clear.  The  defendants  contend  that  it  does  not  apply,  for  the 
reason  that  this  amendment  relates  only  to  the  traffic  wdiich 
passes  through  the  Panama  Canal.  They  argue  that  the  words 
'or  otherwise'  modify  the  phrase  'by  rail  and  water'  and  not 
the  phrase  'through  the  Panama  Canal.'  But  the  plain  every- 
day reading  of  the  act  is  'through  the  Panama  Canal  or  other- 

C.  142;  Lumber  Rates  from  North  210.   Truckers    Transfer    Co.   v. 

Pacific    Coast,    30    I.    C.    C.    Ill;  Charleston  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I. 

Wheeler   Lumber,    Bridge    &   Sup-  C.     C.     275,     277;      Crane     Iron 

ply  Co.  V.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  Works  v.   United    States,   Opinion 

30    I.    C.    C.    343;    Cement    Rates  Commerce  Court  No.   55,   pp.   453, 

from  Mason  City.  30  I.  C.  C.  426:  464,  209  Fed.  238. 

New   York   Dock   Ry.   v.   B.   &   O.  211.    Truckers     Transfer  Co.  v. 

R.  Co.,  32  I.  C.  C.  568;    St.   L.   I.  Charleston    &    W.    C.    Ry.    Co.,    27 

M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  U.  S.  217  Fed.  I.  C.  C.  275.  279. 

80.      Ogden    Gateway    Case.    35    I.  212.  Augusta  &  Savannah  Steam- 

C.  C.  131.  boat  Co.  v.  Ocean  Steamship  Co  , 


§  122]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  393 

wise,'  and  the  defendants  has  referred  us  to  no  canon  of 
eonstrnction  nor  to  an.y  reason  for  disregarding  the  obvious 
meaning  of  those  words.  Indeed,  a  consideration  of  the 
situation  to  which  the  amendment  aY)plies  would  seem  to  con- 
clusively demonstrate  that  the  position  of  the  defendants  is 
not  correct,  since  the  words  'or  otherwise'  are  pure  surplusage 
if  read  as  the  defendants  say  they  should  be.  Traffic  through 
the  Panama  Canal  can  only  move  by  rail  and  water,  unless 
it  moves  from  port  to  port,  and  in  that  case  we  have  no 
jurisdiction.  We  hold,  therefore,  that  the  Commission  has 
jurisdiction  to  establish  the  through  routes  and  the  joint 
rates  prayed  for." 

§  122.  Rates  on  Commodities  Requiring  Refrigeration. — 
The  charge  made  by  a  carrier  for  refrigeration  must,  like  all 
of  its  other  charges,  be  reasonable.  To  determine  what  is 
reasonable  the  general  principle  applied  to  other  rates  must 
be  considered  as  well  as  the  special  circumstances  peculiar 
to  the  shipment.     On  this  subject  the  Commission  has  held :"" 

"In  determining  what  is  a  reasonable  charge  for  furnish- 
ing refrigeration  for  the  movement  of  citrus  fruits  from 
California  to  eastern  markets,  nothing  should  be  added  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  a  refrigerator  car  is  used,  since  that 
has  been  taken  into  account  in  establishing  the  rate  of  trans- 
portation, nor  for  the  service  of  inspection,  which  is  sub- 
stantially the  same  for  all  shipments ;  but  the  expense  of 
transporting  the  additional  weight  of  the  ice  and  for  repairs 
to  the  ice  bunkers  should  be  considered." 

In  the  same  case  it  was  held  that  when  the  shipper  pre- 
cooled  his  fruit,  such  fact  mnst  be  considered  in  determining 
the  rate.'" 

26  I.  C.  C.  ?.80,  384,  385;    Decatur  213.    Arlington  Heights  Freight 

Navigation  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  Exchange    v.    Southern    Pac.    Co.. 

31  I.  C.  C.   281;    Pacific  Nav.  Co.  20  I.  C.  C.  106;   same  styled  case, 

V.    S.    P.    Co.,    31    I.    C.    C.    472;  22  I.  C.  C.  149;   at  p.  156  see  dis- 

Federal   Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.   C.  cussion  of  "postage  stamp  rates." 

of  N.   J.   R.   Co.,  35   I.   C.  C.  488;  214.    The  order  of  the  Commis- 

Ocean    Rail    Rates    to    Charlotte,  sion    was   sustained    by   the    Com- 

N.  C.  38  I.  C.  C.  405,  410;    Balti-  merce  Court,  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F. 

more  &   Carolina  S.   S.   Co.   v.   A.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States,  204  Fed. 

C.  L.  R.  Co.,  49  1.  C.  C.  176.  647,  Opinion  Commerce  Court  No. 


394  Charges  FOR  Transportation  OF  Peesons, I  ETC.   [§  123' 

§  123.  Rates  on  Returned  Shipments. — What  the  privilege 
of  returning  shipments  at  less  than  usual  rates  means  and 
the  origin  and  growth  thereof  are  stated  hy  the  Commission : 

"Tht  returned-shipment  privilege  seems  to  have  originated 
for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  argicultural  interests.  Farm 
implements  and  machinery  often  prove  defective  or  break 
down  while  in  use,  and  if  full  tariff  rates  must  he  paid  for 
their  transportation  to  a  point  where  repairs  can  be  affected 
the  fanner  is  subjected  to  a  serious  handicap.  Kules  were 
therefore  adopted  permitting  the  return  of  agricultural  im- 
plements, vehicles,  and  similar  articles  at  one-half  the  regular 
rates. 

"Through  the  operation  of  competitive  forces  the  return- 
shipment  rules  became  increasingly  liberal  and  were  gradu- 
ally enlarged  to  cover  the  return  of  freight  of  every  character 
and  for  every  purpose.  *  *  *  The  record  shows  that  while 
returned  shipments  form  but  a  small  proportion  of  the  car- 
riers' entire  traffic  the  privilege  is  of  importance  to  several 
branches  of  industry." 

After  thus  describing  the  rule  and  after  discussing  the 
question  involved  therein,  the  Commission  condemmed  the 
privilege  as  having  no  legal  or  logical  basis."" 

In  the  same  opinion,  at  page  418,  it  was  shown  that  when 
the  returned  shipment  was  on  "freight  in  an  obviously  de- 
teriorated condition,"  the  axiom  "that  rates  depend  largely 
upon  value"  should  be  considered,  not  because  it  was  a  re- 
turned shipment  but  because  of  the  value.  The  difficulty  oi 
always  considering  value  in  this  connection  is  manifest  and 
was  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Commissioner  Clements  as  follows : 

"AA^e  are  not  prepared  to  lay  down  the  principle  that  old 
or  secondhand  articles  must  be  treated  differently  from  new 
or  that  vahie  is  the  controlling  element  in  making  rates.  Such 
of  these  articles  or  parts  as  are  in  fact  scrap  are  entitled  to 

41,  p.  627.  For  ocher  applications  I.  C  .C.  623;  Albree  v.  Boston 
of  the  rule  see  Ozark  Fruit  Grow-  &  M.  R.  Co.,  22  i.  C.  C.  303. 
ers  Assn.  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  215.  Re  Reduced  Rates  on  Re- 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  106;  Asparagus  turned  Shipments,  19  I.  C.  C.  409, 
Growers'  Assn.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  414,  and  discussion  and  cases  cited 
17  I.  C.  C.  423;  Georgia  Fruit  at  pp.  416,  417- 
Exchange  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  20 


<§>  124]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  395 

the  scrap  rate,  but  if  they  have  any  value  as  the  articles 
which  they  originally  purported  to  be,  we  do  not  feel  that 
we  can  require  the  cai-riers  to  transport  them  at  other  than 
the  regular  tariflp  rates  applicable  to  the  new  or  originally 
transported  article."  "'" 

§  124.  The  Public  Interest  Must  Be  Considered  in  Making 
Rates. — A  rate  made  by  a  carrier,  a  legislative  or  an  ad- 
ministrative body  must  not  disregard  the  interests  of  the 
public,  and  the  fact  that  a  particular  rate  is  necessary  to 
ena])le  the  carrier  to  pay  interest  and  dividends  will  not  justi- 
fy a  rate  which  is  unduly  burdensome  on  the  public. 

The  legislature  of  Kentucky  having  prescribed  the  maxi- 
mum rate  to  be  charged  by  turnpike  roads  in  that  state,  the 
Supreme  Court  in  determining  whether  or  not  such  act  was 
illegal,  said:'" 

"It  is  proper  to  say  that  if  the  answer  had  not  alleged, 
in  substance,  that  the  tolls  prescribed  by  the  act  of  1890 
were  wholly  inadequate  for  keeping  the  road  in  proper  re- 
pair and  for  earning  dividends,  we  could  not  say  that  the 
act  was  unconstitutional  merely  because  the  company  (as  was 
alleged  and  as  the  demurrer  admitted)  could  not  earn  more 
than  4  per  cent  on  its  capital  stock.  It  cannot  be  said  that 
a  corporation  operating  a  public  highway  is  entitled,  as  of 
right,  and  without  reference  to  the  interests  of  the  public, 
to  realize  a  given  per  cent  upon  its  capital  stock.  When  the 
question  arises  whether  the  legislature  has  exceeded  its  con- 
stitutional power  in  prescribirg  rates  to  be  charged  by  a 
corporation  controlling  a  public  highway,  stockholders  are 
not  the  only  persons  whose  rights  or  interests  are  to  be  con- 
sidered. The  rights  of  the  public  are  not  to  be  ignored.  It 
is   alleged   here   that   the   rates   prescribed   are   unreasonable 

216.  Minneapolis  Traffic  Assn.  v.  olis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Minnesota, 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  186  U.  S.  257,  268,  46  L.  Ed. 
I.  C.  C.  432,  437.  1151,    1158,      22      Sup.      Ct.      900; 

217.  Covington  &  L.  Turnpike  Loftus  v.  Pullman  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
road  Co.  v.  Sandford,  164  U.  S.  C.  135,  140;  "Having  in  mind  the 
578,  596,  597,  41  L.  Ed.  560,  566,  public  interest;"  R.  R.  Com.  of 
567,  17  Sup.  Ct.  198.  Quoted  and  Texas  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
followed,  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  463,  484;  R.  R. 
S.  466,  545,  42  L.  Ed.  819,  848,  18  Com.  of  Kansas  v.  Atchison,  T. 
Sup.   Ct.    418.     See   also   Minneap-  &  S.  F.  Ry.   Co.,  22   I.   C.  C.   407, 


396  Charges  FOR  Transportation  OF  Persons,  ETC.  [§  125 

and  unjust  to  tho  company  and  its  stockholders.  But  that 
involvos  an  inquiry  as  to  what  is  reasonable  and  just  for 
tlie  pu1)]ic.  If  the  esta])lishing  of  new  lines  of  transportation 
should  cause  a  diminution  in  the  number  of  those  who  need 
to  use  a  turnpike  road,  and,  consequently,  a  diminution  in 
the  tolls  collected,  that  is  not,  in  itself,  a  sufficient  reason 
why  the  corporation,  operating  the  road,  should  be  allowed 
to  maintain  rates  that  Avould  U^  unjust  to  those  who  must  or 
do  use  its  property.  The  public  cannot  properly  be  subjected 
to  unreasonable  rates  in  order  simply  that  stockholders  may 
earn  dividends.  The  legislature  has  the  authority  in  every 
case,  where  its  power  has  not  been  restrained  by  contract, 
to  proceed  upon  the  ground  that  the  public  may  not  right- 
fully be  required  to  submit  to  unreasonable  exactions  for 
the  use  of  a  public  highway  established  and  maintained  under 
legislative  authority.  If  a  corporaton  cannot  maintain  such 
a  highway  and  earn  dividends  for  stockholders,  it  is  a  mis- 
fortune for  it  and  them  which  the  constitution  does  not  re- 
quire to  be  remedied  by  imposing  unjust  burdens  upon  the 
public." 

A  particular  service  falling  within  the  absolute  duties  of 
the  carrier  may  be  required  of  a  public  carrier,  when  it  is 
necessary  to  the  public  convenience,  Avhere  the  whole  serv- 
ice performed  yields  a  fair  compensation,  even  though  such 
particular  service  must  be  furnished  at  a  loss  to  the  carrier."" 

§  125.  General  Principles  Applicable  to  the  Question,  What 
Is  a  Reasonable  Rate? — It  was  a  maxim  of  traffic  managers 
that  "'all  the  traffic  could  bear"  was  the  only  definite  prin- 
ciple appliea])le  to  rate  making.  Kirkman,  in  the  Science  of 
Railways,  vol.  8.  at  p.  11,  says:  ''In  the  practical  operation 
of  railroads  such  rates  are  made  as  the  traffic  will  bear."  If 
this  rule  were  dopted  there  would  be  little  difficulty  in  fixing 
rates.  But  it  is  apparent  that  such  a  rule,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  business  of  transportation  companies  is  affected  with 

410.    As  to  what  is  a  "fair  return"  Ed.  93S,  27  Sup.  Ct.  585.      See  in 

See  jyosf.  Sec.  131.  Supra,  Sec.  83.  this   connection    Sec.    100,    supra; 

218.    Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co.  National     Implement     &     Vehicle 

V.     North     Carolina     Corporation  Assn.  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.,   42  I.  C. 

Commission,    206    U.    S.    1,    51    L.  C.   461.  468. 


§  125]  Must  be  Just  axd  Reasonable.  397 

a  public  use,  would  be  uufair.  Mr.  Commissioner  Clements,  in 
Tift  V.  So.  Ry.  Co.,  10  I-    C.  C.  548,  582,  says:  "This  elaim 

*  *  *  on  the  part  of  the  carriers  is  based  upon  the 
erroneous  assumption,  so  in-ovalent  among  traffic  manae"*rs, 
that  a  rate  may  be  as  high  as  'the  traffic  will  bear.'  "  What 
"the  traffic  will  bear"  is,  by  force  of  economic  law,  the  maxi- 
mum. It  has  been  seen  that  a  particular  service  may,  under 
some  circumstances,  be  required  of  a  common  carrier  at  less 
than  cost,  but  ordinarily  cost  of  service  fixes  the  minimum 
rate.  It  is  interesting  and  instructive  to  group  what  has 
been  said  by  the  courts  and  the  Commission  with  reference  to 
this  problem.  The  Supreme  Court,  speaking  of  the  basis  of 
a  whole  schedule  of  rates,  said : 

"We  hold,  however,  that  the  basis  of  all  calculations  as 
to  the  reasonableness  of  rates  to  be  charged  by  a  corporation 
maintaining  a  highway  under  legislative  sanction  must  be 
the  fair  value  of  the  property  being  used  by  it  for  the  con- 
venience of  the  public.  And,  in  order  to  ascertain  that  value, 
the  original  cost  of  construction,  the  amount  expended  in 
permanent  improvements,  the  amount  and  market  value  of  its 
bonds  and  stock,  the  present  as  compared  with  the  original 
cost  of  construction,  the  probable  earning  capacity  of  the 
property  under  particular  rates  prescribed  by  statute,  and  the 
sum  required  to  meet  operating  expenses,  are  all  matters  for 
consideration,  and  are  to  be  given  such  weight  as  may  be 
just  and  right  in  each  case.  We  do  not  say  that  there  may 
not  bie  other  matters  to  be  regarded  in  estimating  the  value 
of  the  property.  What  the  company  is  entitled  to  ask  is  a) 
fair  return  upon  the  value  of  that  which  it  employs  for  the 
public  convenience.  On  the  other  hand,  what  the  public  is 
entitled  to  demand  is  that  no  more  be  exacted  from  it  for 
the  use  of  a  public  highway  than  the  services  rendered  by  it 
are  reasonably  worth."  "" 

In  the  same  case  the  court  said : 

"  'In  passing  upon  questions  arising  under  the  act,  the 
tribunal  appointed  to  enforce  its  provisions,  whether  the  com- 
mission or  the  courts,  is  empowered  to  fully  consider  all  the 

219.  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Ed.  940,  5  I.  C.  R.  405,  16  Sup. 
Com.   Con.,   162   U.   S.   197,   40   L.       Ct.  Rep.  666. 


398  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  12G 

circumstances  and  conditions  that  reasonably  apply  to  the 
sil  nation,  and  that,  in  the  exercise  of  its  jnrisdiction,  the 
tribunal  may  and  shonld  consider  the  legitimate  interests  as 
well  of  the  carrying  companies  as  of  the  traders  and  shippers, 
and  in  considering  whether  any  particular  locality  is  sub- 
jected to  an  undue  preference  or  disadvantage  the  W'elfare 
of  the  communities  occupying  the  localities  where  the  goods 
nre  delivered  is  to  be  considered  as  well  as  that  of  the  com- 
munities which  are  in  the  locality  of  the  place  of  shipment.'  " 

Tn  a  later  case  Covington  &  L.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Sandford, 
104  TT.  S.  578,  59G,  597.  41  L-  Ed.  560,  566,  567,  17  Sup.  Ct. 
198  section  124  supra,  it  was  held,  that  "the  rights  of  the 
public  are  not  to  be  ignored." 

The  Supreme  Court  in  the  Minnesota  Rate  cases,""  speak- 
ing of  how  to  determine  the  "fair  value"  upon  which  a  fair 
return  was  legally  required,  said:  "The  ascertainment  of  that 
value  is  not  controlled  by  artificial  rules.  It  is  not  a  matter  of 
formulas,  but  there  must  be  a  reasonable  judgment  having, 
its  basis  in  a  proper  consideration  of  all  relevant  facts." 

There  is,  however,  a  flexible  limit  of  judgment  which  be- 
longs to  the  power  to  fix  rates, "^  and,  as  to  rates  within  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Acts,  "the  Commission  is  the  tribunal 
that  is  intrusted  with  execution"  of  such  laws."" 

§  126.  Same  Subject — Some  Statements  of  the  Commission 
as  to  Such  General'',  Principles. — The  Commission  in  Delaware 
State  Grange  v.  New  York.  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  4  I.  C.  C.  588,  3 
I.  C-  R.  554.  560.  561,  in  speaking  of  the  general  principles 
to  be  considered  in  rate  making,  said : 

"The  mandate  of  the  statute  is  that  all  rates  must  be 
reasonable  and  just,  but  how  the  reasonableness  and  justice 
of  a  rate  are  to  be  determined  is  not  prescribed  by  the  statute, 
nor  lias  any  satisfactory  test  been  evolved  by  transportation 
experts.  Conflicts  about  rates  arise  from  the  conflicting  in- 
terests of  carriers  and  shippers.     As  carriers  make  their  own 

220.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  230  U.  S.  1,  26,  51  L.  Ed.  933,  27  Sup. 
U.  S.  352,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  3.3  Sup.       Ct.  585. 

Ct.  729.  222.    Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago. 

221.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  88, 
North    Carolina    Corp.    Com.,    206       108,    54    L.    Ed.    946,    30    Sup.    Ct. 

585. 


§  126]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  399 

rates,  they  have  primary  regard  for  their  own  interests,  and 
often  give  less  weight  than  they  ought  to  the  interests  of 
those  they  serve.  This  is  more  frequently  the  case  in  the 
absence  of  competition.  T'nder  stress  of  esompetition,  or 
sometimes  for  the  purpose  of  developing  business,  rates  that 
are  equitable  or  even  ver}-  low  are  likely  to  be  made.  But 
when  a  controversy  arises  between  the  public  and  a  carrier, 
the  question  of  the  reasonable  limit  of  a  rate  usually  involves 
many  considerations,  and  is  often  difficult  to  determine.  A 
rate  that  might  be  regarded  as  reasonable  and  just  by  a  pro- 
ducer and  shipper,  might,  from  a  carrier's  standpoint,  be 
deemed  extremely  unreasonable  and  unjust,  and,  so,  converse- 
ly, a  rate  that  a  carrier  might  claim  to  be  reasonable  in 
itself,  and  that  it  might  support  with  strong  reasons  based 
upon  the  cost  of  the  service,  the  quantity  of  the  business  and 
the  characteristics  of  its  line  of  road,  might  exhaust  the 
greater  part  of  the  proceeds  of  the  producer's  commodity  and 
be  destructive  to  his  interests.  It  is  only  stating  a  truism, 
therefore,  to  say  there  is  no  recognized  test  of  a  rate  mutually 
reasonable  for  a  carrier  and  for  the  producer  of  the  traffic. 

"The  reasonableness  of  a  rate  must  consequently  be  as- 
certained in  every  instance  in  wiiich  the  question  arises,  by  its 
relations  botli  to  the-  carrier  and  to  the  shipper,  and  by  com- 
parison with  rates  normally  charged  for  like  or  similar  serv- 
ice." 

In  Thompson  Lumber  Co.  v.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
657,  664,  the  Commission  says : 

"In  determining  what  is  a  reasonable  and  just  rate  many 
considerations  are  involved.  Among  these  are  the  general 
financial  and  physical  condition  of  the  road,  the  character  of 
the  commodity  iu  question,  whether  it  constitutes  a  large 
or  small  part  of  the  business  of  the  carrier,  whether  it  is 
economical  or  expensive  to  handle,  how  it  compares  with  other 
commodities  hauled,  and,  as  evidencing  the  railroad's  own 
judgment,  whether  a  different  rate  has  bleen  in  eflPect  on  this 
commodity  at  some  other  time-  " 

Cost  and  value  of  service  are  discussed  by  the  Commission  in 
Boston  Chamber  of  Commerce  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co., 
1  I.  C.  C.  436,  ]  I.  C.  R.  754,  760,  761,  as  follows: 


400  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  126l 

''Tlie  element  of  cost  of  service  which  may  at  one  period 
have  been  recognized  as  controlling  in  fixing  rates  has  long 
ceased  to  be  regarded  as  the  sole  or  most  important  factor 
for  that  purpose.  The  value  of  the  service  with  respect  to 
the  articles  carried,  the  volume  of  business,  and  the  conditions 
and  force  of  competition  are  justly  considered  to  have  con- 
trolling weight  in  determining  the  charges  for  transportation. 
But  even  with  regard  to  the  cost  of  service  the  cost  is  at 
least  somewhat  greater  to  Boston  than  to  New  York." 

Import  tariff  duties  should  not  be  counted  as  part  of  a 
transportation  charge. ■"^ 

"A  railroad  company  may  be  operated  with  a  less  return 
than  it  ought  to  enjoy  or  even  at  a  loss,  but  neither  condition 
of  affairs  would  justify  the  exaction  by  it  of  rates  that  are 
higher  than  they  reasonably  should  be  for  services  performed, 
all  things  being  considered."  ^^* 

The  problem  is  difficult,  the  facts  to  be  considered  multitudi- 
nous and  of  an  infinite  variety  of  modifying  conditions,  from 
which  the  Commission,  without  applying  any  policy  which 
runs  counter  to  the  power  granted  and  the  duty  imposed  upon 
it,  seeks  by  "slow  evolution"  to  develop  a  satisfactory  system 
of  rates."^ 

In  the  Eastern  Advance  Rate  case""'  the  Commission  said: 

"This  Commission  is  called  upon  to  deal  wnth  rates  as  they 
exist,  and  in  so  doing  we  ordinarily  consider  them,  not  from 
the  revenue  standpoint,  but  rather  from  the  commercial  and 
traffic  standpoint.  At  the  same  time  it  is  now  the  settled 
law  that  there  is  a  limit  below  which  the  revenue  of  railroads 
can  not  be  reduced  by  public  authority,  and  if  there  were 
no  such  constitutional  limitation  it  would  nevertheless  be- 
hoove every  regulating  body  to  permit  the  existence  of  such 

223.  Florida  Fruit  &  Vegetable  Ry.  Co.  v.  International  Bridge 
Assn.  V.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.,  17       Co..  8  App.  Cas.  731. 

I.  C.  C.  552,  561.  225.    Advances   in  Rates— West- 

224.  R.  R.  Comrs.  of  Iowa  v.  II-  ern  Case— 20  I.  C.  C.  307,  379. 
linois    Cent.    R.    Co.,    20    I.    C.    C.  226.   Advance  in  Rates — Eastern 
181,   186,   citing   Canada   Southern  Case— 20  I.  C.  C.  243,  248. 


§  127]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  401 

rates,  when  possible,  as  will  yield  just  earnings  to  the  rail- 
ways. The  question  of  revenue  is  therefore  fundamental  and 
ever-present  in  all  considerations  as  to  the  reasonableness  of 
railroad  rates,  although  it  may  not  be  and  seldom  is,  where 
single  rates  are  presented,  the  controlling  question-  " 

§  127.  Same  Subject. — Illustrative  Cases. — It  has  been  the 
purpose  of  this  chapter  to  give  as  comprehensively  as  possible 
the  decision  both  of  the  Commission  and  Coui'ts  which  show 
the  principles  M'hich  have  been  considered  and  applied  in 
making  rates.  The  principles  stated  herein  illustrate  the 
difficulty  of  the  problem,  but  they  furnish  data  from  which 
some  generalizations  may  be  drawn.  In  recent  volumes  of 
the  report  of  the  decisions  of  the  Commission  there  is  in 
the  index  a  title,  Measure  of  Rates.  Under  this  general  title 
may  be  found  references  to  the  Commission's  rulings  relating 
to  the  "adjustment  of  rates,"  "advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages," "basis  of  rates,"  "branch  line  through  thinly  popu- 
lated region,"  "burden  of  transportation,"  "capacity  of 
boats,"  "car  earning,"  categorical  answers,"  "channels,  depth 
of,"  "charging  ^vhat  traffic  will  bear,"  "circumstances  and 
conditions,"  "classification,"  "commercial  and  economic  con- 
ditions," "comparison  of  rates,"  "competition,"  "competi- 
tive rates,"  "cost,"  "cost  of  carriage."  "cost  of  construc- 
tion," "cost  of  handling,"  "cost  of  maintenance,"  "cost  of 
operation,"  "cost  of  production,"  "cost  of  transportation," 
"cost  of  service,"  "density  of  traffic,"  "distance,"  "division 
of  rates,"  "division  of  through  rates,"  "earnings,"  "empty 
car  movement,"  "equipment,"  "erroneous  rates,"  "factor 
in  through  rates,"  "free  movement  of  traffic,"  "harbor,  con- 
dition of,"  "length  of  haul,"  "local  rates,"  "long  as  well  as 
short  haul,"  "main  line  rates,"  "nature  of  commodity," 
"navigation,  condition  of,"  "paper  rates,"  "past  rates," 
"raw  material,"  "relative  rates,"  "return  haul,"  "risk," 
"state  rates,"  "three  line  haul,"  "ton  mile  earnings,"  "ton 
per  mile  rate,"  "tonnage,"  "train  mile  earnings,"  "transpor- 
tation conditions,"  "trunk  line  rates,"  "two  line  haul," 
"use,"  "value  of  commodity,"  "value  of  service,"  "volume 
of  traffic,"  voluntary  rates,"  "voluntary  reductions,"  "weak 
line,"  and  "wharf  and  dock  facilities." 


402  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.  [§  128 

And  in  one  ease  the  question  of  how  a  rate  on  a  locomotive 
moving  on  its  own  wheels  should  be  constructed  was  dis- 
cussed."" Many  other  facts  have  been  discussed  in  the  opin- 
ions of  the  Commission.  These  but  illustrate  the  correctness 
of  the  statement  that  "multitudinous  facts  must  be  consid- 
ered." 

The  Transportation  Act  1920,  Sec.  15a  adds  "fair  return" 
and  defines  the  term,  making  such  return  a  fact  that  must  be 
considered.  Prior  to  the  passage  of  that  Act,  the  Commission 
ahvays,  in  a  general  system  of  rates,  gave  consideration  to  a 
fair  return  on  the  investment.  The  Amendment  emphasizes 
this  factor  in  rate  making. 

§  128.  Same  Subject — Discussion  of  Principles  in  Chicago 
Live  Stock  Exchange  Case — In  speaking  of  the  factors  to 
be  considered  in  rate-making,""^  Judge  Bethea,  citing  authori- 
ties, said: 

"A  careful  examination  of  the  opinions  of  that  court  (as 
well  as  the  evidence  taken  in  these  cases)  shows  that  there 
are  a  great  many  factors  and  circumstances  to  be  considered 
in  fixing  a  rate.  Noyes,  Am.  R.  R.  Rates,  pp.  61  et  seq., 
85-109.  Among  other  things:  (1)  The  value  of  the  service 
to  the  shipper,  including  the  value  of  the  goods  and  the 
profit  he  could  make  out  of  them  by  shipment.  This  is  con- 
sidered an  ideal  method,  when  not  interfered  with  by  com- 
petition or  other  factors.  It  includes  the  theory  so  strenu- 
ously contended  for  by  petitioners,  the  commission,  and  its 
attorneys,  of  making  the  finished  product  carry  a  higher  rate 
than  the  raw  material.  This  method  is  considered  practical, 
and  is  based  on  an  idea  similar  to  taxation.  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  v.  B.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.  (C.  C.)  43  Fed.  37,  53; 
Noyes,  Am.  R.  R.  Rates,  53.  (2)  The  cost  of  service  to  the  car- 
rier would  be  an  ideal  theory,  but  it  is  not  practical.  Such 
cost  can  be  reached  approximately,  but  not  accurately  enough 
to  make  this  factor  controlling.   It  is  worthy  of  consideration, 

227.  Re  Investigation  of  Ad-  Court,  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chi- 
vance  on  Transportation  of  Lo-  cago  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  209  U.  S. 
comotives  and  Tenders,  21  I.  C.  108,  52  L.  Ed.  705,  28  Sup.  Ct. 
C.   103.  493.     In    this   case   the    order   of 

228.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago  the  Commission  in  Chicago  Live 
G.  W.  R.  Co.,  141  Fed.  1003,  Stock  Exchange  v.  Chica,go  G. 
1015,  1016.    Sustained  in  Supreme 


§  128]  Must  be  Just  and  Eeasonable.  403 

however.  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Baltimore  &  0. 
Ry.  Co.,  43  Fed.  87,  3  T.  C.  R.  192;  Ransome  v.  Eastern  Coun- 
ties Railway  Company  (1857)  I.  C.  B.  N.  S.  437,  26  L.  J.  C.  P. 
91;  Judson  on  Interstate  Commerce,  §§  148,  149;  Western 
Union  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Call  Publishing  Co.,  181  U.  S.  92,  21 
Sup.  Ct  561,  45  L.  Ed.  765 ;  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Detroit,  Grand  Haven  '&  Milwaukee  Railroad  Co.,  167  U.  S. 
633,  17  Sup.  Ct.  986,  42  L.  Ed.  306.  (3)  Weight,  bulk  and  con- 
venience of  transportation.  (4)  The  amount  of  the  product  or 
the  commodity  in  the  hands  of  a  few  persons  to  ship  or  com- 
pete for,  recognizing  the  principle  selling  cheaper  at  whole- 
sale than  at  retail.  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  B.  & 
0.  Ry.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  263,  12  Sup.  Ct.  844,  36  L.  Ed.  699.  (5) 
General  public  good,  including  good  to  the  shipper,  the  rail- 
road company  and  the  different  localities.  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  v.  B.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  263,  12  Sup. 
Ct.  844,  36  L.  Ed.  699.  (6)  Competition,  which  the  authorities, 
as  well  as  the  experts,  in  their  testimony  in  these  cases,  rec- 
ognize as  a  very  important  factor.  Pickering  Philips  v.  Lon- 
don &  Northwestern  Railway  Company,  2  Q.  B.  D.  (1882)  229 
(this  case  construes  section  2  of  the  English  act  of  1854,  which 
is  almost  like  section  3  of  our  interstate  commerce  act)  ;  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  v.  B.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.,  supra-.;  Cin- 
cinnati, New  Orleans  &  Texas  Pacific  Railway  Company  v. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  162  U.  S.  184,  16  Sup.  Ct. 
700,  40  L.  Ed.  935 ;  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Ala- 
bama Midland  Railway  Company,  168  U.  S.  144,  18  Sup.  Ct. 
45,  42  L.  Ed.  414 ;  Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad  Co.  v.  Behl- 
mer,  175  U.  S.  648,  20  Sup.  Ct.  209,  44  L.  Ed.  309 ;  East  Ten- 
nessee, Virginia  &  Georgia  Railway  Company  v.  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  181  U.  S.  1,  21  Sup.  Ct.  516,  45  L.  Ed. 
719 ;  Texas  &  Pacific  Railway  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  162  U.  S.  197,  16  Sup.  Ct.  666,  40  L.  Ed.  940; 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Louisville  &  Nashville 
Railroad  Co.,  190  U.  S.  273,  23  Sup.  Ct.  687,  47  L.  Ed.  1047 
The  Supreme  Court  has  also  held  that  it  may  be  presumed  that 
Congress,  in  adopting  the  language  of  the  English  act,  had  in 
mind  the  construction  given  to  the  words  "undue  preference" 

W.   R.   Co.,   10   I.   C.   C.   428,   was      held  invalid. 


404  Charges  FOR  Tkansportation  OF  Persons,  ETC.   [§  129 

by  the  courts  of  England.     Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V*  B.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  284,  12  Sup.  Ct.  844,  36  L.  Ed.  699. 

"None  of  the  above  factors  alone  are  considered  necessarily 
controlling  by  the  authorities.  Neither  are  they  all  control- 
ling as  a  matter  of  law.  It  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  decided 
by  the  proper  tribunal  in  each  ease  as  to  what  is  controlling." 

§  129.  Same  Subject— Rate  Considered  in  and  of  Itself.— 
With  reference  to  a  rate  "in  and  of  itself."  the  Commission 
has  said :''" 

"It  is  said  that  the  rate  from  St.  Cloud  is  reasonable  in  and 
of  itself.  A  rate  can  seldom  be  considered  "in  and  of  itself."" 
It  must  be  taken  almost  invariably  in  relation  to  and  in  con- 
nection with  other  rates.  The  freight  rates  of  this  country, 
both  upon  dififerent  commodities  and  between  different  locali- 
ties, are  largely  inter-dependent,  and  it  is  the  fact  that  they 
do  not  bear  a  proper  relation  to  one  another,  rather  than  the 
fact  that  they  are  absolutely  either  too  low  or  too  high  which 
most  often  gives  occasion  for  complaint." 

In  the  Cattle  Raisers'  Asso.  case,''"  the  Commission  discuss- 
es the  cost  to  the  carier  at  orinating  and  delivering  points, 
cost  and  maintenance  of  equipment,  expense  of  loading  and 
reloading  in  transit  incident  to  feeding,  watering  and  resting 
the  stock,  character  of  the  movement,  number  of  cars  in 
trains,  average  loading,  volume  and  desirability  of  the  traffic, 
return  of  empty  cars,  liability  to  damage,  cost  of  carriage,  in- 
creased cost  of  producing  live  stock,  decreased  selling  price, 
method  of  making  the  advanced  rates,  disappearance  of  com- 
petition, cost  of  railroad  labor  and  supplies,  improved  methods 
of  operation  and  increased  general  traffic,  mileage  revenue  per 
ton,  per  car  and  per  train,  and  other  pertinent  circumstances 
and  conditions. 

§  130.  Same  Subject — Commission  Not  Bound  by  Technical 
Rules. — In  the  investigation  of  these  question  the  Commission 
is   not   hampered   by   technical   rules.      The    Supreme    Court, 

said  -r 

229.  Tileston  Mill  Co.  v.  North-  231.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baird, 
ern  P.  R.  Co.,  8  I.  C.  C.  346,  361.  194    U.    S.   25,    44,   48   L.    Ed.    860, 

230.  Cattle  Raisers'  Assn.  v.  Mis-  869,  24   Sup.  Ct.   563. 
souri,    K.    &    T.    R.    Co.,    11    I.    C. 

C.  296. 


<§  1,30]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  405 

''The  inquiry  of  a  board  of  the  character  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  should  not  be  too  narrowly  constrained 
by  technical  rules  as  to  the  admissibility  of  proof.  Its  func- 
tion is  largely  one  of  investigation,  and  it  should  not  be  hamp- 
ered in  making  inquiry  pertaining  to  interstate  commerce  by 
these  narrow  rules  which  prevail  in  trials  at  common  law, 
where  a  strict  correspondence  is  required  between  allegation 
and  proof." 

The  Commission's  right  to  consider  the  problem  in  all  its 
phases  was  clearly  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court,  as  follows : 

"The  Commission  is  the  tribunal  that  is  intrusted  with  the 
execution  of  the  interstate  commerce  laws,  and  has  been  given 
very  comprehensive  powers  in  the  investigation  and  deter- 
mination of  the  proportion  which  the  rates  charged  shall  bear 
to  the  service  rendered,  and  this  power  exists,  whether  the  sys- 
tem of  rates  be  old  or  new.  If  old,  interests  will  have  prob- 
ably become  attached  to  them  and,  it  may  be,  will  be  disturbed 
or  disordered  if  thej-  are  changed.  Such  circumstance  is,  of 
course,  proper  to  be  considered  and  constitutes  an  element  in 
the  problem  of  regulation,  but  it  does  not  take  jurisdiction  a- 
way  to  entertain  and  attempt  to  resolve  the  problem.  And  it 
may  be  that  there  cannot  be  an  accommodation  of  all  interests 
in  one  proceeding."""' 

The  Commission  in  discussing  its  own  power  said : 

"It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  Commission  is  not  a 
court  of  law;  its  function  is  to  apply  the  mandatory  and  re- 
strictive provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  to  stated 
conditions  of  fact.  "We  must  regard  the  problems  presented 
to  us  from  as  many  standpoints  as  there  are  public  interests 
involved.  "-"=' 

232.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago  Western  Case,  —  20  I.  C.  C.  307, 
R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  88,  315;  Theory  on  which  case  tried 
108,  54  L.  Ed.  946,  30  Sup.  Ct.  followed  regardless  of  variance 
669.  See  also  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  between  allegation  and  proof.  Hec- 
Co.  V.  Florida,  203  U.  S.  256,  51  kle  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  46  I.  C.  C. 
L.  Ed.  174,  27  Sup.  Ct.  108.  See  513,  514;  New  York  Harbor  Case, 
also  Seaboard  A.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  47  I.  C.  C.  643,  647;  but  "essen- 
Florida,  203  U.  S  261,  51  L.  Ed.  tial  rules  of  evidence"  must  be 
175,  27  Sup.  Ct.  109;  and  post,  preserved,  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
Section,   189.  v.    Spiller,   246    Fed.   1,   158   C.    C. 

233.  Advances     in     Rates,     —  A.  227. 


406  Charges  for  Transportation  of  Persons,  etc.   [^  131 

§  131.  Same  Subject — Summary. — The  statement  so  fre- 
quently made  and  reiterated  tliat  the  problem  of  rate-making 
is  a  difficult  one,  means  no  more  than  that  there  is  no  definite 
scientific  rule  by  which  it  can,  with  certainty,  be  determined 
just  what  is  a  reasonable  rate. 

The  "tribunal  appointed  by  law  and  informed  by  experi- 
ence" has  evolved  and  is  evolving  principles  Avhich  will  fur- 
nish sufficient  data  to  justify  generalizations  broad  enough  to 
authorize  the  deduction  of  scientific  principles.  In  making 
these  deductions,  the  first  consideration  is  the  agency  which 
performs  the  service.  This  agency  performs  a  public  service, 
devotes  its  property  to  a  public  use  and  must,  therefore,  sub'- 
mit  to  public  regulation ;  but  the  capital  of  this  agency  is  pri- 
vate capital  entitled  to  protection  as  such.  To  these  facts  the 
law  applied  the  principle  that  those  who  furnish  such  private 
capital  so  devoted  to  a  public  use  are  entitled  to  receive  a  fair 
return  from  such  investment.  What  is  a  "fair  return"  invol- 
ves economic  considerations  such  as  the  risks  involved  in  the 
investment,  the  security  of  the  investment  because  it  is  a 
practical  monopoly,  returns  which  capital  may  secure  from 
other  investments,  as  well  as  the  public  necessity  that  capital 
shall  be  devoted  to  this  special  use.  "Fair  return"  necessarily 
involves  the  question  of  the  value  of  the  property  so  devoted 
to  the  public  use.  In  determining  this  value  there  must  be 
considered  the  investment,  that  made  originally  and  that 
added  in  permanent  improvements,  the  present  market  value 
of  the  stocks  and  bonds,  which  are  but  symbols  of  the  invest- 
ment, the  question  of  the  cost  of  the  property,  its  reproduction 
cost  and  the  methods  of  making  the  investment,,  that  is,  was 
the  investment  made  wisely  and  honestly  or  otherwise.  The 
character  of  the  territory  served  by  the  carrier  is  not  infre- 
quently a  fact  which  must  not  be  lost  sight  of.  The  extent 
and  regularity  of  the  whole  movement  is  determined  by  the 
character  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  kinds  of  business  con- 
ducted by  them.  The  physical  situation  of  the  agency  as  to 
grades,  curves,  etc.,  may  materially  afifect  the  cost  of  the  serv- 
ice and  thereby  determine  the  amount  of  the  return  which 
should  bic  received. 

The  attitude  of  the  agency  to  the  question  is  not  without 
value ;   the  way  the  problem  has  been  solved  by  the  agency  in 


§  131]  Must  be  Just  and  Reasonable.  407 

a  long  course  of  dealing  would  indicate  that  such  agency  has 
found  a  solution  not  unfair  to  itself. 

The  thing  transported  must  be  considered.  Is  it  heavy  as 
compared  with  the  space  it  occupies?  Does  it  require  any  spe- 
cial equipment?  Is  it  subject  to  loss  or  injury  in  transport- 
ing? Is  there  much  or  little  of  it?-  The  answers  to  these  ques- 
tions furnish  facts  which  must  be  considered  in  classifying 
commodities  so  as  to  fix  rates  or  charges  for  their  transporta- 
tion. 

The  places  from  and  to  which  the  commodities  move  are  fac- 
tors in  the  problem.  The  distance  a  thing  is  hauled  must  be 
considered,  as  the  greater  the  distance  the  less  ordinarily  is 
the  cost  for  each  mile  of  the  haul,  and  the  service  of  loading 
and  unloading  applies  the  same  to  a  short  as  to  a  long  haul. 

The  situation  of  the  man  who  owns  the  thing  moved. and  the 
purpose  of  the  movement  frequently  affects  the  question  of  the 
rate.  This  does  not  mean  that  rates  must  be  determined  by 
the  use  to  which  the  commodity  is  put;  it  means  that  a  pro- 
ducer of  a  commodity  which  is  also  produced  by  others  in  the 
same  general  territory,  the  market  for  all  the  producers  being 
the  same,  cannot  ship  otherwise  than  upon  rates  not  greatly 
higher  than  his  competitors.  This  principle  is  similar  to  the 
one  that  justifies  a  rate  basis  made  to  meet  market  competi- 
tion. A  thing  may  grow  or  be  mined  in  w^idely  different  lo- 
calities, and  the  sale  of  the  thing  may  be  in  the  same  market. 
Obviously  that  this  market  may  have  the  benefit  of  competi- 
tion and  that  producing  localities  may  have  the  benefit  of  a 
market,  distance  cannot  be  made  an  ah'solute  measure  for  the 
rates. 

So  the  public  interest  must  not  be  disregarded  in  determin- 
ing what  this  public  agency  shall  receive  for  performing  the 
duties  which  society  has  farmed  out  to  it.  Rates  must  not  be 
so  adjusted  as  to  deprive  the  public  of  the  service,  commodi- 
ties must  be  moved  and  they  cannot  be  moved  if  the  charge 
therefor  exceeds  the  value  to  be  derived  from  the  movement. 
One  producer  must  not  be  permitted  a  monopoly  in  serving 
the  public.  That  charges  may  not  exceed  the  value  of  the 
service  is  an  economic  law  depending  upon  neither  court  nor 
commission  for  its  enforcement. 


408  Charges  FOR  Transpoetation  OF  Persons,  ETC.   [§  131 

Carriers  may  with  propriety  and  for  the  good  of  the  general 
public  make  rates  barely  more  than  the  cost  of  the  particular 
movement,  in  order  to  develop  industries,  create  and  maintain 
competition  and  serve  those  who  because  of  their  location  dis- 
tant from  the  point  of  production  cannot  be  otherwise  served. 
JRate-raaking  tribunals  may  not  make  rates  so  low  as  to 
deprive  private  capital  of  a  substantial  return  on  the  fair 
value  of  the  property  devoted  to  the  public  use. 

While  long  existing  wrongs  do  not  become  rights  and  no  one 
can  have  a  vested  interest  in  a  wrong,  the  fact  that  in  the  slow 
evolution  toward  a  science  of  rate-making  there  have  grown 
up  rate  situations  inconsistent  with  the  principles  which  must 
exist  when  there  is  such  a  science,  does  not  justify  an  abrupt 
and  radical  alteration  of  these  situations.  Existing  conditions 
are  facts  which  must  be  recognized  in  the  application  of  all 
abstract  economic  principles,  and  while  the  principle  is  not 
destroyed  ]>y  such  recognition,  it  may  be  inapplicable  to  the 
particular  situation. 

To  determine  what  is  a  reasonable  rate,  the  law  must  be  ap- 
plied, economics  considered  and  ethics  invoked,  and  while  the 
facts  to  be  weighed  are  multitudinous  and  the  scientific  princi- 
ples few,  we  may  say  that  it  is  not  fanciful  to  anticipate  that  a 
system  of  rate-making  will  be  evolved  which  will  approach 
justice.  Shippers  and  carriers  contending  each  with  the  other, 
sometimes  selfishly,  but  not  infrequently  with  an  earnest  de- 
sire for  a  right  solution,  presenting  their  theories  to  a  dis- 
interested and  unbiased  tribunal,  "appointed  by  law  and  in- 
formed by  experience,"  may  furnish  data  which,  being  sifted, 
studied  and  classified  in  its  reports,  will  enable  that  tribunal 
to  solve  the  problem. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

EQUALITY  IN  RATES. 

132.  Scope  of  Chapter. 

133.  Common  Law  as  to  Equality  in  Rates  by  Carriers. 

134.  Same   Subject.     Damages. 

135.  Comparison  of  the  English  Railway  and   Canal  Act   with  the 

Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

136.  Discrimination  Forbidden. 

137.  Discrimination    against   Individuals. 
13.8.     Same  Subject. 

139.  Same  Subject.     Construction  by  the  Commissicn. 
139a.  Same  Subject.     Independent  Contributing  Causes. 

140.  Same  Subject.     Allowances  to  Shippers. 

141.  Trap   Car   Service. 

142.  Peddler  Cars. 
142a.  Private  Cars. 

143.  Car  Spotting. 

144.  Undue  Preferences  in  Favor  of  Persons  or  Localities. 

145.  Same    Subject.      Application    of    Section    made    by    the    Com- 

mission. 
145a.  Differentials. 

146.  Discrimination   against   Traffic. 

146a.  Same   Subject.     Competition  between  Users  of  Related  Rates. 

147.  Same    Subject.      Discrimination    Beyond    the    Control    of    the 

Carrier. 

148.  Facilities    for   Interchange   of   Traffic   and    Rates   and   Charges 

to   Connecting   Lines  Must   Be   without    Undue   or   Unreason- 
able  Preference. 

149.  Same  Subject.     Statute. 

150.  Same  Subject.     Statute  and   Proviso. 

151.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. 

152.  Discrimination  by  Charging  More  for  a  Shorter  than  a  Longer 

Haul. 

153.  Long    and    Short    Haul.      Old    Law    Construed.      Definite    Con- 

struction. 

154.  Long  and  Short  Haul  Clause  under  Act  of  1910. 
154a.  Long  and  Short  Haul  Clause  under  Act  of  1920. 

155.  Fourth  Section.  Relationship  between   Through  Rate  and   In- 

termediate Rates. 

156.  Discrimination  between   Carloads   and   Less   than   Carloads. 

157.  Bulked  Shipments. 

158.  Carloads,  Ownership  of. 

159.  Train   Loads. 

(409) 


410  Equality  in  Eates.  [§  132 

160.  Classification    of    Commodities    Should    Be    ^Yithollt    Discrimi- 

nation. 

161.  Uniform  Classification. 

162.  Power  of  the  Commission  over  Classification. 

163.  Milling  in  Transit. 

164.  Rebilling. 

165.  Rebilling— Found  Illegal. 

166.  Rebilling  Illegal  Only  When  Unjustly  Discriminatory. 

167.  Rebilling..    Conclusion. 

168.  Payment  of  Elevator  Allowances 
1^69.  Transit  Privileges — Generally. 

170.  Allowances  to  Tap  Line  Railroads. 

171.  Allowances  to  Industrial  Tracks. 

172.  Illegal    for    Carriers    to    Transport    Commodities    Produced    or 

Owned  by  Them  or  in  Which  They  Are  Interested. 

173.  Commodities  Clause  of  Act  of  1906. 

174.  Cars  Must  Be  Furnished  without  Discrimination. 

175.  Same  Subject.     Principles  Applied  by  the  Commission. 

176.  Freight  Charges  Must  Be  Collected  without   Discrimination. 

177.  Right   of   Carrier   to    Route    Shipments   Beyond    Its   Own    Ter- 

minus. 

178.  Discrimination  in  Billing. 

179.  Tariffs  of  Rates  Must  Be  Printed,   Posted  and   Maintained. 

180.  Same  Subject.     Misquoting  Rates. 

181.  Different   Rates   over   the   Same   Line    in    Opposite    Directions. 

182.  Discrimination  by  Granting  Free  Service. 

183.  Basing  Points,   Group   Rates   and   Zone  Rates. 

184.  How    Far   a  Rate  Made  by   a   State   Relieves   a   Carrier   from 

the  Duty  to  Serve  Communities  with  Legal  Equality. 

185.  Commutation.     Mileage  and  Party  Rate  Tickets. 

186.  Rebates. 

187.  Same  Subject.     Corporation  Punishable. 

188.  Summary 

§  132.  Scope  of  Chapter. — A  rate  may  be  reasonable,  and 
yet,  because  of  its  relation  to  other  rates,  unlawful  as  violative 
of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  which  re- 
quire a  just  equality  in  rates. 

Many  of  the  facts  affecting  the  reasonab^leness  of  rates  must 
be  considered  in  determining  whether  or  not  a  rate  is  unlaw- 
fully discriminatory  or  preferential.  "While  this  is  true,  there 
are  certain  principles  which  have  been  specially  applied  to  the 
question  of  equality  in  rates.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter 
to  state  these  principles  with  the  application  thereof  that  has 
been  made,  and  to  deduce  therefrom,  to  the  extent  that  may 
be,  such  rules  as  can  be  legally  and  properly  applied.    In  do- 


§  133]  E-QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  411 

ing  so,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  facts  to  be  considered 
are  mmierous  and  of  constantly  varying  force,  that  a  definite 
measure  for  the  determination  of  the  legality  of  a  rate  has  not 
been  fixed  and  that  a  flexible  judgment  must  be  applied  to 
situations  as  they  arise,  and  that  long  established  and  gen- 
erally accepted  conditions  cannot  be  abruptly  changed,  but 
that  slow  evolution  is  the  concomitant  of  rate  regulation. 

§  133.  Common  Law  as  to  Equality  in  Rates  by  Carriers. — 

The  common  law  requirement  as  to  the  reasonableness  of  rates 
we  have  seen  supra,  sec.  61,  was  undisputed.  Equality  in 
rates  was  not  so  definitely  provided  for  in  that  system  of  laws, 
and  it  has  been  doubted  whether  or  not  a  carrier  was  bound 
to  charge  equal  rates  to  all  its  customers.  Discussing  this 
question  Mr.  Justice  Brown  said  :^ 

"Prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  act  of  Febiruary  4,  1887  (24 
Stat,  at  L.  379),  to  regulate  commerce,  commonly  known  as 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  railway  traffic  in  this  country 
was  regulated  by  the  principles  of  the  common  law  applicable 
to  common  carriers,  which  demanded  little  more  than  that 
they  should  carry  for  all  persons  who  applied,  in  the  order  in 
which  the  goods  were  delivered  at  the  particular  station,  and 
that  their  charges  for  transportation  should  be  reasonable.  It 
was  even  doubted  whether  they  were  bound  to  make  the  same 
charge  to  all  persons  for  the  same  service :  (Fitchburg  R.  Co. 
V.  Gage,  12  Gray,  393 ;  Baxendale  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co., 
4  C.  B.  N.  S.  63 ;  Great  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  L.  R.  4  H.  L. 
226,  237;  Ex  parte  Benson,  18  S.  C.  38;  Johnson  v.  Pensacola 
&  P.  R.  Co.,  16  Fla.  632)  ;  though  the  weight  of  authority  in 
this  country  was  in  favor  of  an  equality  of  charge  to  all  per- 
sons for  similar  services." 

That  the  common  law  required  equality  of  service  and 
charges  under  the  same  or  similar  circumstances  more  clearly 
appears  from  a  subsequent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Call  Publishing  Co.,^  where  Mr. 
Justice  Brewer  said : 

1.    Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baltimore  2.     Western    Union    Tel.    Co.    v. 

&    0.    R.    Co.,    145    U.    S.    263,    36  Call  Publishing  Co.,  181  U.  S.  92, 

L.   Ed.   699,  703,   12   Sup.   Ct.   844.  45  L.  Ed.  765,  21  Sup.  Ct.  561. 
See  3  Fed.  Stat.  Ann.  813. 


412  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  134 

"Common  earriers,  whether  engaged  in  interstate  commerce 
or  in  that  wholly  within  the  state,  are  performing  a  public 
service.  They  are  endowed  by  the  state  with  some  of  its 
sovereign  powers,  such  as  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  and  so 
endowed  by  reason  of  the  public  service  they  render.  As  a  con- 
sequence of  this,  all  individuals  have  equal  rights  both  in  re- 
spect to  service  and  charges.  Of  course,  such  equality  of  right 
does  not  prevent  differences  in  the  modes  and  kinds  of  service 
and  diflferent  charges  based  thereon.  There  is  no  cast  iron  line 
of  uniformity  which  prevents  a  charge  from  being  above  or 
below  a  particular  sum,  or  requires  that  the  service  shall  be 
exactly  along  the  same  lines.  But  that  principle  of  equality 
does  forbid  any  difference  in  charge  which  is  not  based  upon 
difference  in  service,  and^  even  when  based  upon  difference 
of  service,  must  have  some  reasonable  relation  to  the  amount 
of  difference,  and  cannot  be  so  great  as  to  produce  an  unjust 
discrimination.  To  affirm  that  a  condition  of  things  exists  un- 
der which  common  carriers  anywhere  in  the  country,  engaged 
in  any  form  of  transportation,  are  relieved  from  the  burdens 
of  these  obligations,  is  a  proposition  which,  to  say  the  least,  is 
startling. ' ' 

Further  in  the  opinion  it  was  stated  that  "the  principles  of 
the  common  law  are  operative  upon  all  interstate  commercial 
transactions,  except  so  far  as  they  are  modified  by  congres- 
sional action,"  and,  we  may  conclude,  that  such  principles  re- 
quired "equal  rights  both  in  respect  to  service  and  charges," 
when  the  circumstances  and  conditions  were  the  same ;  and 
where  the  circumstances  and  conditions  were  different,  the 
difference  in  services  and  charges  should  bear  a  reasonable 
relation  thereto. 

§  134.  Same  Subject — Damages. — In  the  Parsons  case'  the 
question  discussed  was  not  the  ng^it  to  "equality  of  charge 
*  *  *•  for  similar  services,"  but.  that  opinion  had  reference 
to  plaintiff's  right  to  recover  damages  under  the  special  facts 
there  involved.  That  inequality  of  charges  for  similar  serv- 
ices was  wrong  Avas  not  questioned  for,  said  the  court:  "Be- 
fore any  party  can  recover  under  the  aci  he  must  show,  not 

3.    Parsons  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.      2.3.1,  17  Sup.  Ct.  887. 
R.  Co.,   167   U.    S.   447,   42   L.   Ed. 


§  134]  E-QUALiTY  IN   Rates.  413 

merely  the  wrong  of  the  carrier,  but  that  that  wrong  has  in  fact 
operated  to  his  injury.  If  he  had  shipped  to  New  York  and 
been  charged  local  rates  he  might  have  recovered  any  excess 
thereon  over  through  rates.  He  did  not  ship  to  New  York  and 
yet  seeks  to  recover  the  extra  sum  he  might  have  been  charged 
if  he  had  shipped." 

The  same  comment  applies  to  the  decision  in  the  Coal  case. 
That  case  was  based  upon  the  fact  that  the  carrier  had  given 
to  certain  shippers  what  was  decided  to  be  a  rebate  and  had 
not  given  the  same  allowances  to  the  plaintiff  suing.  In  the 
District  Court  the  plaintiff  recovered/  and  the  recovery  was 
sustained  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals.^  In  the  Supreme 
Court  the  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  was  re- 
versed and  a  new  trial  ordered,  not  because  the  plaintiff  did 
not  have  a  right  of  action,  but  because  it  had  not  shown  that  it 
had  suffered  legal  damages." 

Neither  of  these  cases  denies  that  at  common  laAV  a  shipper 
had  a  right  to  equality  of  charges  under  similar  circumstances, 
and  in  this  respect  neither  conflicts  with  the  statement  of  Mr. 
Justice  Brown  quoted  in  the  preceding  section.  That  equality 
of  service  from  a  public  service  company  or  corporation  was  a 
right  at  common  law,  seems  to  be,  so  far  as  the  Supreme  Cotirt 
of  the  United  States  has  spoken,  undisputed.  In  order  to 
recover  damages  for  an  invasion  of  this  right  proof  of  the  fact 
of  having  suffered  legal  damages  is  necessary. 

Where  as  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  a 
schedule  of  rates  may  not  be  fixed  less  than  will  yield  a  fair  re- 
tiu-n  on  the  property  employed  in  the  public  use.  every  custom- 
er of  a  public  carrier  is,  to  some  extent,  interested  in  Avhat  is 
charged  every  one  else.  It  is  true  that  an  individual  may 
not  have  a  cause  of  action  so  long  as  wliat  he  pays  is  reasonable, 
unless  the  preference  granted  others  damages  him  . 

Neither  under  our  statute  nor  under  the  common  law  is 
mere  discrimination  prohibited,  but  it  will  be  found  upon  an 

4.  International  Coal  Mining  Co.  ^  6.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  162  Fed.  national  Coal  Co.,  230  U.  S.  184, 
996.  57   L.   Ed.    1446,   33    Sup.   Ct.   893. 

5.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Inter-  See,  following  this  case  and  cit- 
national  Coal  Co.,  173  Fed.  1,  97  ing  authorities,  New  Orleans 
C.  C.  A.  383.  Board   of  Trade  v.   Illinois   C.   R. 

C,  29  I.  C.  C.  32. 


414  Equality  in  Eates.  [§  135 

exaniination  of  the  English  authorities,  that  where  the  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  were  the  same,  those  who  dealt  with 
a  common  carrier  were  entitled  to  equal  treatment. 

These  principles  are  consistent  with  what,  in  1916,  the  Com- 
mission announced  as  its  settled  doctrine/ 

§  135.  Comparison  of  the  English  Railway  and  Canal  Act 
with  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. — The  remark  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  in  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  R.  Co.," 
''that  Congress  in  adopting  the  language  of  the  English  act, 
had  in  mind  the  construction  given  to  these  words  by  the  Eng- 
lish courts"  had  reference  to  section  three  of  our  act,  although 
to  a  lesser  extent  the  same  could  bie  said  of  section  two. 

Section  two  fo  the  act  of  February  4,  1887,  post,,  §  345, 
known  as  the  unjust  discrimination  clause,  is  based  upon  §  90 
of  the  English  Raihvay  Clauses  Act  of  1845."  The  section  of 
the  English  act,  called  the  Equality  Clause,  provided  that 
"tolls  be  at  all  times  charged  equally  to  all  persons,  and  after 
the  same  rate,  whether  per  ton  per  mile  or  otherwise,  in  re- 
spect of  all  passengers,  and  of  all  goods  or  carriages  of  the 
same  description,  and  conveyed  or  propelled  by  a  like  carriage 
or  engine,  passing  only  over  the  same  portion  of  the  line  of 
railway  under  the  same  circumstances."  Section  two  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Act  used  the  words  "under  substantially 
similar  circumstances  and  conditions,"  which  phrase  is  not  so 
exclusive  as  the  words  of  the  English  act  which  requires 
equality  only  when  the  transportation  is  "over  the  same  por- 
tion of  the  line  of  railway."  The  American  act  is,  therefore, 
broader  in  its  scope  than  the  English  act,  but  each  act  recog- 
nizes that  "different  circumstances"  may  justify  different 
rates.  The  English  statute  uses  the  word  "same"  before 
"circumstances,"  ours  uses  the  word  "similar."  This  differ- 
ence and  the  broader  scope  of  the  American  act  should  be  kept 

7.  Astoria  v.  S.  P.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  &  O.  R.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  263,  36  L. 
38   I.    C.    C.    16,    24;    See    also  La  Ed.  699,  703,  12  Sup.  Ct.  844. 
Crosse  Shippers  Assn.  v.  Chicago.  9.    Browne  &  Theobald  Law  of 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C.  453,  Railways  (English),  p.  312.  Tram- 
461-463,  and  Sec.  146  a.  post.  mell.    Railroad   Commissioners   of 

8.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baltimore  Georgia   v.   Clyde   S.    S.   Co.,    5    I. 

C.  C.  S.24,  4  I.  C.  R.  120,  140. 


<§  135]  E'QUALJTY  IN  Rates.  415 

in  mind  when  considering  the  English  decisions.  Section  two 
of  the  English  Railway  and  Canal  Traffic  Act  of  1854,"  fur- 
nished the  model  of  section  three  of  our  act.'"  The  English 
and  the  American  sections  just  referred  to  are  each  designated 
as  the  "undue  preference  clause."  The  fourth  section  of  the 
American  act,  known  as  the  "long  and  short  haul  clause," 
was  unlike  any  section  of  the  English  act  prior  to  1887.  In 
1888  the  Railway  and  Canal  Traffic  Act  of  that  year  gave  the 
English  Commissioners  power  to  prohibit  a  higher  charge  for 
a  less  distance  where  the  service  is  similar.  The  provision  is 
the  third  paragraph  of  section  twenty-seven  and  reads  as  fol- 
lows :^' 

"The  court  or  the  commissioners  shall  have  the  power  to  di- 
rect that  no  higher  charge  shall  be  made  to  any  person  for  ser- 
vices in  respect  of  merchandise  carried  over  a  less  distance 
than  is  made  to  any  other  person  for  similar  services  in  re- 
spect of  the  like  description  and  quantity  of  merchandise  car- 
ried over  a  greater  distance  on  the  same  line  of  railway." 

This  comparison  may  be  concluded  by  quoting  the  language 
of  the   Commission  as   follows :" 

"In  a  case  purely  of  alleged  undue  preference  or  prejudice 
the  English  cases  have  direct  application.  Even  in  cases  un- 
der our  second  and  fourth  sections,  English  cases  brought 
under  the  undue  preference  clause  in  which  the  decision  has 
held  undue  preference  to  exist,  have  value  as  showing  how 
strictly  the  English  commission  or  court  has  applied  the 
broader  language  of  the  clause  to  a  particular  set  of  facts, 
but  when  English  decisions  under  the  undue  preference  clause 
are  cited  by  a  carrier  in  justification  of  its  action  under  the 
strict  language  of  ovir  second  and  fourth  sections,  the  cita- 
tions have  greatly  diminished  force.  These  sections  apply 
only  against  rates  in  specific  cases,  but  the  undue  preference 
clause  or  third  section  is  inclusive ;    it  applies  both  to  rates 

10.  Browne  &  Theobald,  supra,  English  Railway  and  Canal  Traf- 
p.  405.  Trammell  Case,  supra,  flc  Act  of  1888;  Browne  &  Theol 
note  5,  this  chapterr.  bald,  pp.  765  to  772. 

11.  post.  Sec.  346,  note  7,  supra,  13.  Trammell,  Railroad  Commis- 
this  chapter.  sion    of    Georgia    v.    Clyde    S.    S. 

12.  Browne  &  Theobald,  p.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C.  a24,  4  I.  C.  R.  120, 
771;    see  also  sections  25  to  27        143,  144. 


416  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  136 

and  facilities,  and  says  gonerally  to  the  carrier,  you  shall  not 
in  any  manner  unduly  i)refer  one  person  or  kind  of  traffic 
over  another,  and  leave  it  to  the  commission  or  the  court  to 
say  when  the  undue  preference  is  given.  In  the  second  and 
fourth  sections  what  is  unlawful  is  clearly  defined,  the  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions  of  the  transportation  being  similar 
in  substance.  We  think,  therefore,  that  while  English  cases 
are  valuable  as  defining  undue  preference  or  prejudice  their 
value  is  greatly  limited  in  cases  where  the  statute  itself  de- 
scribes the  offense  it  declares  unlawful." 

§  136.  Discrimination  Forbidden. — Equality  of  rights  and 
privileges  under  ''substantially  similar  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions" is  sought  to  be  guaranteed  shippers  and  "particular 
descriptions  of  tratfic"  by  sections  two,  three  and  four  of 
the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  These  sections,  which  were 
in  the  original  Act  and  have  been  enlarged  and  retained  in  the 
Amendments,  announce  the  principles  of  law  fixing  equality  of 
charges  and  service  by  common  carriers.  These  principles 
are  supported  and  enforced  by  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  which  prohibit  free  passes,  except  under 
certain  prescribed  limitations ;  prohibit  carriers  from  trans- 
porting commodities  in  which  they  are  interested;  require 
the  making  of  switch  connections;  regulate  the  pooling  of 
freights:  require  schedules  of  rates  to  be  printed,  posted 
and  maintained;  prevent  changes  in  rates  without  at  least 
thirty  days  notice  unless  where  special  permission  is  given 
to  make  changes  on  less  notice ;  provide  punishment  for 
granting,  receiving,  or  inducing  the  payment  of  rebates; 
punish  false  billing;  require  witnesses  to  testify,  and  pre- 
scribe methods  of  procedure  for  the  public  enforcement  of 
the  act  and  the  protection  of  individuals  who  may  suffer 
from  its  violation. 

Inequality  of  charges  is  an  evil  that  is  more  readily  seen 
and  keenly  felt  than  are  charges  unjustly  high.  A  difference 
in  a  freight  charge  of  a  few  cents  per  hundred  pounds  on  a 
particular  commodity  may  mark  the  line  between  a  reason- 
able and  an  unreasonable  rate  and  the  higher  charge  may 
be  unjiist  and  unreasonable.  The  injustice,  however,  is  so 
distributed  that  no  one  feels  seriously  hurt  and  no  complaint 
is  made.     A  preferential  or  discriminatory  charge  may  make 


§  137]  Equality  in   Rates.  417 

or  unmake  cities  and  individuals  and  may  hurt  some  to  the 
benefit  of  others.  Such  charges,  therefore,  are  not  only  un- 
just and  contrary  to  the  very  spirit  of  the  American  people, 
but  they  are  sufficiently  injurious  to  arouse  to  action  those 
who  are  injured.  The  consumer  usually  pays  the  unjustly 
high  rate,  but  the  shipper  or  the  community  is  injured,  some- 
times ruined,  by  the  discriminatory  rate.  Under  the  once 
prevalent  system  of  rebating,  businesses  were  built  up  or 
destroyed  by  carriers.  Even  since  rebating  has  practically 
ceased,'  cities  are  helped  or  injured  by  privileges  given  the 
one  and  withheld  from  the  other.  Barely  would  carriers  have 
complaints  of  rates  if  all  rates  and  practices  were  adjusted 
without  undue  discrimination  and  unjust  preference.  Speak- 
ing of  the  evils  existing  before  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce 
was  passed  by  Congress  and  which  evils  the  states  had  in- 
effectually attempted  to  remedy,  the  Supreme  Court  said  :^* 

"These  evils  ordinarily  took  the  shape  of  inequality  of 
charges  made,  or  of  facilities  furnished,  and  were  usually 
dictated  by  or  tolerated  for  the  promotion  of  the  interests 
of  the  officers  of  the  corporation  or  of  the  corporation  itself, 
or  for  the  benefit  of  some  favored  persons  at  the  expense  of 
others,  or  of  some  particular  locality  or  community,  or  of 
some  local  trade  or  commercial  connection,  or  for  the  de- 
struction or  crippling  of  some  rival  or  hostile  line." 

The  problem  of  giving  shippers  a  just  equality  is  not  au 
easy  one  of  solution  by  the  carriers.  It  is  easier  to  know 
what  is  just  equality  than  to  adopt  such  rates  and  practices 
as  will  accomplish  that  end.  Long  existing  injustice  is  hard 
to  dislodge.  A  j^articular  discrimination  that  has  long  con- 
tinued in  favor  of  a  community,  has  become  in  the  eyes  of 
that  community  a  vested  right.  It  is  hard  for  the  beneficiary 
of  a  wrong  to  see  that  wrongs  do  not  become  rights  by  mere 
lapse  of  time.  Carriers  frequently  welcome  the  aid  of  the 
Commission  to  help  rid  tliemselves  of  practices  that  are  un- 
justly discriminatory. 

§  137.  Discrimination  against  Individuals. — Section  two  of 
the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  jjost  section  345,  was  intended 

14.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baltimore  L.  Ed.  699,  703,  12  Sup.  Ct.  844. 
&    0.    R.    Co.,    145    U.    S.    263,    36 


418  Equality  in  Eates,  [§  137 

to  prevent  different  charges  for  different  persons  for  a  like 
and  contemporaneous  service  to  a  like  kind  of  traffic  under 
substantially  similar  circumstances  and  conditions.  Under 
the  "same  circumstances"  and  "goods  of  the  same  descrip- 
tion" used  in  the  English  law  are  not  used  with  reference 
to  the  contents  of  the  parcels  but  to  the  parcels  themselves, 
that  is.  like  or  different  for  the  purposes  of  carriage.  They 
are  also  used  with  reference  to  the  conveyance  of  goods  and 
not  to  the  persons  themselves."  This  means,  and  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  has  also  been  so  construed,  that  com- 
petition, however  great,  can  not  justify  charges  to  one  per- 
son greater  than  those  to  another.  Two  shippers,  shipping  a 
like  kind  of  traffic  at  the  same  time,  over  the  same  road  are 
entitled  to  the  same  rate.  It  makes  no  difference  that  one 
may  be  in  a  position  to  ship  over  another  line,  or  that  his 
total  shipments  may  greatly  exceed  those  of  the  other.  In 
Wight  V.  United  States^*  the  Supreme  Court,  speaking  of 
the  phrase  "under  substantially  similar  circumstances  and 
conditions, ' '  said  : 

"For  this  case,  it  is  enough  to  hold  that  that  phrase  as 
found  in  section  2,  refers  to  the  matter  of  carriage,  and  does 
not  include  competition." 

In  the  Troy  Alabama  case."  the  Supreme  Court  advanced 
the  same  ruling  as  follows : 

"To  prevent  misapprehension,  it  should  be  stated  that  the 
conclusion  to  which  we  are  led  by  these  cases,  that,  in  apply- 
ing the  provisions  of  the  3d  and  4th  sections  of  the  act, 
which  make  it  unlawful  for  common  carriers  to  make  or  give 
any  undue  or  unreasonable  preference  or  advantage  to  any 
particular  person  or  locality,  or  to  charge  or  receive  any 
greater  compensation  in  the  aggregate  for  the  transportation 

15.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sutton.  38  17.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Alabama 
L.  J.  Ex.  177,  L.  R.  4  H.  L.  226,  M.  R.  Co..  168  U.  S.  144,  42  L. 
22  L.  T.  43,  18  W.  R.  92.  Ed.  414,  18  Sup.  Ct.  45;    Pennsyl- 

16.  Wight  V.  United  States,  167  vania  R.  Co.  v.  International 
U.  S.  512.  42  L.  Ed.  258,  17  Sup.  Coal  Mining  Co.,  173  Fed.  1,  97 
Ct.  822.  See  also  Int.  Com.  Com.  C.  C.  A.  383;  reversed  on  another 
V.  Detroit  G.  H.  &  :\I.  Ry.  Co.,  point,  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
167  U.  S.  633,  42  L.  Ed.  306,  310,  ternational  Coal  Mining  Co.,  230 
17  Sup.  Ct.  986;  Re  Restricted  U.  S.  184,  57  L.  Ed.  1446,  33  Sup. 
Rates,  20  I.  C.  C.  426,  433.  Ct.  893. 


§  137]  E-QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  41i> 

of  passengers  or  of  like  kind  of  property,  under  substantially 
similar  circumstances  and  conditions,  for  a  shorter  than  a 
longer  distance  over  the  same  line,  in  the  same  direction, 
competition  which  affects  rates  is  one  of  the  matters  to  be 
considered,  is  not  applicable  to  the  2d  section  of  the  act. 

"As  we  have  shown  in  the  recent  case  of  Wight  v.  United 
States,  167  U.  S.  512  (42  L.  Ed.  258,  17  Sup.  Ct.  822),  the 
purpose  of  the  second  section  is  to  enforce  equality  btitween 
shippers  over  the  same  line,  and  to  prohibit  any  rebate  or 
other  device  by  which  two  shippers,  shipping  over  the  same 
line,  the  same  distance,  under  the  same  circumstances  of  car- 
riage, are  compelled  to  pay  different  prices  therefor,  and  we 
there  held  that  the  phrase  "under  substantially  similar  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions,"  as  used  in  the  second  section, 
refers  to  the  matter  of  carriage,  and  does  not  include  com- 
petition between  rival  routes. 

"This  view  is  not  open  to  the  criticism  that  different  mean- 
ings are  attributed  to  the  same  words  when  found  in  different 
sections  of  the  act ;  for  what  we  hold  is  that,  as  the  purposes 
of  the  several  sections  are  different,  the  phrase  under  con- 
sideration must  be  read,  in  the  second  section,  as  restricted 
to  the  case  of  shippers  over  the  same  road,  thus  leaving  no 
room  for  the  operation  of  competition,  but  that  in  the  other 
sections,  which  cover  the  entire  tract  of  interstate  and  for- 
eign commerce,  a  meaning  must  be  given  to  the  phrase  wide 
enough  to  include  all  the  facts  that  have  a  legitimate  bearing 
on  the  situation — among  which  we  find  the  fact  of  competition 
when  it  affects  rates." 

Kirkman,  in  the  Science  of  Railways,  vigorously  argues 
against  any  governmental  regulation  of  railroads,  but  he  ad- 
mits that  there  is  no  justice  in  distinguishing  between  persons. 
He  says:" 

"If  a  raili-oad  refuses  to  one  shipper  what  it  concedes  to 
another,  everything  being  alike,  article,  place,  time,  quantity, 
risk,  and  service,  that  is  not  discrimination,  but  robbery. 
Petty  instances  of  this  kind  have  occurred  in  the  history  of 
railway  management.  But  they  are  only  instances.  They  are, 
however,  the  stock  in  trade  of  railway  critics.     They  are  un- 

18.  Vol.  8,  p.  110. 


420  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  138 

worthy  of  notice.  They  form  no  appreciable  element,  and  are 
not  to  be  eomparecl  for  a  moment  to  the  benefits  that  grow  out 
of  the  ability  of  carriers  to  adapt  their  properties  to  the  vary- 
ing needs  of  those  they  serve." 

§  138.  Same  Subject. — The  equality  required  by  section  two 
of  the  Act  is  as  to  all  persons  for  performing  "a  like  and 
contemporaneous  service"  relating  to  a  "like  kind  of  traffic" 
transported  "under  substantially  similar  circumstances  and 
conditions."  The  three  quoted  provisions  are  limitations  on 
or  exceptions  to  the  general  principle  of  equality.  What  then 
is  meant  by  these  phrases?  In  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Penn.  R.  Co.'"  the  contention  was  made  that  "contemporane- 
ous" must  be  confined  to  shipments  made  practically  at  the 
same  moment  of  time,  and  that  shipments  as  much  as  a 
month  apart  were  too  remote  to  come  Avithin  the  meaning 
of  the  statute.  Obviously  such  a  construction  would  destroy 
the  practical  effect  of  the  law,  and  the  court  properly  held 
that  the  word  referred  to  rates  in  effect  and  meant  "at  the 
same  time  with  the  offending  rates."  In  affirming  this  case 
in  part,  the  Supreme  Court  recognized  and  applied  this  con- 
struction.^" 

"Like  kind  of  traffic"  permits  a  classification  of  different 
commodities  but  the  phrase  refers  to  the  traffic  itself,  and  not 
to  the  use  to  which  it  should  be  put  nor  to  its  ownership. 

In  Sec.  89  chapter  three  hereof  is  discussed  the  cases  refer- 
ring to  the  use  of  a  commodity.  Under  the  holdings  of  the 
Commission  and  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  in  the  words 
"like  kinds  of  traffic,"  like  modifies  traffic  and  not  the  use  to 
which  the  traffic  may  be  put.'\ 

How  "similar  circumstances  and  conditions"  has  been  con- 
strued is  shown  in  the  next  preceding  section.  That  different 
persons  may  own  the  commodities  shipped  constitutes  no  dif- 
ferent circumstance  or  condition.".     The  words  relate  to  the 

19.  Mitchell  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsyl-  L.  Ed.  1107,  32  Sup.  Ct.  742.  See 
vanla  R.  Co.,  181  Fed.  403,  411.  also     Business     Men's     Ass'n    v. 

20.  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Chicago,     St.   P.   M.   &   O.   R.   Co., 
Pennsylvania    R.    Co.,    2.3.0    U.    S.  2    I.   C.   C.   52,   2   I.   C.   R.   41. 
247,   57   L.   Ed.    1472,   33    Sup.    Ct.  22.    Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Delaware, 
916.  L.    &   W.   Ry.    Co..   220   U.    S.    235, 

21.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baltimore  55  L.  Ed.  448,  31  Sup.  Ct.  392, 
&    O.    R.    Co.,    225    U.    S.    326.    57  reversing  Delaware,  L.   &  W.  Ry. 


§    139]  E-QUALITY    TN     RaTES.  421 

eirciimstance  of  carriage  only/''  The  provision  require  the 
same  equality  as  to  the  incidents  of  transportation,  the  ac- 
cessorial services,  thus  it  is  illegal  to  give  a  shipper  a  prefer- 
ence by  the  devise  of  leasing  to  him  at  a  nominal  charge  land 
used  in  the  transportation  of  his  commodities."'  So  it  is  illegal 
to  concede  a  favored  shipi)er  the  privilege  of  giving  notes  in 
payment  of  freight  due.'"'  The  rule  of  eqviality  extends  to 
demurrage."  The  provisions  of  the  Elkins  Act  prohibiting 
rebates  will  be  discussed  in  a  subsequent  section." 

§  139.  Same  Subject — Construction  by  the  Commission. — 
In  Capital  City  Gas  Co.  v.  Central  V.  K.  Co.''  Mr.  Commis- 
sioner Knapp,  speaking  for  the  Commission  and  having  under 
consideration  rates,  one  of  which  was  made  for  coal  when 
delivered  to  a  connecting  carrier  for  "railroad  supply,"  and 
the  other  and  higher  of  which  was  a  combination  rate  ap- 
plicable to  coal  used  for  commercial  purposes  and  purposes 
other  than  "railroad  supply,"  said: 

"When  lyituminous  coal  is  carried  by  defendants  from 
Norwood  to  Montpelier  the  service  is  performed  under  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances  and  conditions  whether  trans- 
ported for  a  connecting  railroad  or  for  complainant  and  other 

"We  are  constrained  to  hold  that  these  facts,  which  are 
wholly  undisputed,  establish  a  discrimination  forbidden  by 
the  second  section  of  the  act.  Tn  transporting  bituminous 
coal  from  Norwood  to  IMontpelier  at  90  cents  a  ton  for  "rail- 
road supply"  the  same  service  is  performed  and  the  cir- 
cumstances aiul  conditions  of  carriage  are  the  same  in  every 
material  effect  as  in  transporting  coal  ;it  $1.85  per  ton  for 

Co.    V.    Int.    Com.    Com.    166    Fed.  Co.   v.   Int.   Com.   Com.   219   U.   S. 

499.     See    as    to   persons,    Re   Ad-  498,    55    L.    Ed.    310,    31    Sup.    Ct. 

vances   on    Manganese    Ore.    25    I.  279. 

C.    C.   663,   668;    Re   Commutation  25.    United     States     v.     Sunday 

Tickets  to  School  Children,  27   I.  Creek  Co,,   194  Fed.  252;    affirmed 

C.  C.  144.  same    styled    case,    210    Fed.    747. 

23.    Pennsylvania  R.   Co.  v.   In-  26.    Lehigh     Valley     R.     Co.     v. 

ternational   Coal   Mining   Co.,   173  United  States,  ISS  Fed.  879. 

Fed.    1,    97    C.    C.    A.    383.      See  27.   Sec.  371. 

Same  Case,  230   U.    S.   184,   57   L.  28.    Capital  City  Gas  Co.  v.  Cen- 

Ed.  1446,  33  Sup.  Ct.  893.  tral   Vermont  R.   Co.,   11   I.   C.   C. 

24.   Southern    Pacific    Terminal  104,  105,  106,  107. 


422  Equality  in  Bates.  [§  139 

complainant  and  other  consignees.  This  appears  to  be  con- 
ceded since  no  proof  was  offered  that  the  fact  is  otherwise. 
It  follows,  as  we  think,  that  the  difference  in  rates  is  a  violar 
tion  of  the  statute. 

Wight  V.  United  States,  167  U.  S.  512,  42  L.  Ed.  258,  17 
Sup.  Ct.  Kep.  822 :  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Ala- 
bama Midland  R.  Co.,  168  V.  S.  144,  166,  42  L.  Ed.  414,  423,  18 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  45. 

"In  the  former  case  it  was  held  that  the  phrase  'under  sub- 
stantially similar  circumstances  and  conditions,"  as  said  in 
the  second  section,  refers  to  the  matter  of  carriage,  and  the 
decision  therein  rendered,  as  explained  and  confirmed  in  the 
subsequent  case,  condemns  as  unlawful  the  discriminating 
charges  here  considered.  It  is  not  permissible  under  this 
section  for  two  or  more  carriers  to  establish  a  joint  through 
rate,  less  than  the  sum  of  their  locals,  which  is  available 
only  to  a  particular  shipper  or  class  of  shippers^  while  deny- 
ing such  lower  rate  to  other  shippers  of  like  traffic  between 
the  same  points  of  origin  and  destination.  In  such  case  it 
may  be  said  that  the  law  presumes  a  common  injury  to  those 
compelled  to  pay  the  higher  rate  because  of  the  concession 
to  the  interest  favored.  If  those  defendants  obtain  only  rea- 
sonable returns  from  their  entire  coal  traffic,  it  may  be  well 
claimed  that  the  rates  charged  complainant  and  other  Mont- 
pelier  consumers  are  higher  than  they  would  be  but  for 
the  much  lower  rates  allowed  on  coal  for  "railroad  supply." 

"Moreover,  if  this  view  is  correct,  the  absence  of  actual 
prejudice  to  complainant  would  not  excuse  the  defendants. 
The  most  salutary  law  may  doubtless  be  disregarded  in  some 
cases  without  injury  and  inflict  a  degree  of  hardship  in  other 
cases  by  its  enforcement.  Whatever  may  be  said  in  that  re- 
gard in  the  present  instance,  we  are  convincd,  upon  the  au- 
thority of  the  decisions  above  cited,  that  the  regulating  stat- 
ute does  not  permit  the  discrimination  shown  in  this  case 
and  our  ruling  must  so  declare." 

The  disei'imination  meant  by  the  Act  is  everything  that  may 
affect  the  shipper,  for,  says  the  Commission:  "That  one 
shipper  may  not  enjoy  at  the  hands  of  a  carrier  advantages 
that  are  denied  to  other  shippers  is  a  principle  asserted  in 


§  139A]  E'QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  423 

the  Act  throughout  its  various  provisions,"""  or,  as  sub- 
sequently stated  by  the  Commission:  "The  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  this  Act,  (the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce),  as  so  often 
stated  by  the  Supreme  Court,  is  one  of  fair  play.'"*" 

§  139A.  Same  Subject.     Independent  Contributing  Causes. 

The  shipper's  situation  and  the  relation  of  other  than  the 
rates  involved  to  similar  rates  paid  by  a  competitor  are  facts 
which  have  their  bearing-  when  considering  the  question  of 
unjust  discrimination.  The  claim  of  one  community  that  it 
is  subjected  to  an  unlawful  disadvantage  in  rates  therefrom 
to  the  advantage  of  a  competing  community  is  frequently 
sought  to  be  met  by  proof  that  the  complaining  community 
enjo3's  lower  rates  thereto  than  the  inbound  rates  of  the 
competing  community.  In  the  language  of  traffic  experts, 
the  total  of  the  "in  and  out"  rates  shows  equality.  Objviously 
that  "in"  rates  are  low  does  not  justify  unlawful  "out"  rates. 
This  situation  was  illustrated  :n  the  several  hearings  and 
opinions  which  involved  the  claim  of  Shreveport,  La.,  that  her 
rates  outbound  into  Texas  were  unlawful  when  contrasted 
with  intrastate  rates  out  bound  from  Texas  points.  In  one 
of  the  opinions  the  Commission  said  :'^  "We  are  dealing  here 
with  outbound  rates,  and  the  reasonableness  of  such  rates 
does  not  in  any  wise  depend  upon  whether  the  articles  tak- 
ing those  rates  were  produced  at  the  points  of  shipment  or 
came  to  those  points  by  wagon,  boat,  railroad,  or  otherwise." 

This  language  of  the  Commission  states  a  correct  principle, 
but  the  application  of  the  principle  must  be  limited  to  facts 

29.  Brook-Rauch  Mill  &  Eleva-  it  was  said:  "A  just  equality  of 
tor  Co.  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  opportunity  for  shipper  and  lo- 
17  I.  C.  C.  158,  1G4,  citing  Eichen-  cality  is  required  by  law."  A  use- 
berg  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  14  I.  ful  note  and  a  valuable  general 
C.  C.  250,  which  latter  case  was  discussion  of  the  subject  appears 
approved  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Law  Edition  containing 
in  Southern  Pac.  Terminal  Co.  v.  the  case  of  Manufacturers  Ry. 
Int.  Com.  Com.,  219  U.  S.  498,  Co.  v.  United  States,  246  U.  S. 
55    L.    Ed.    aiO,    31    Sup.    Ct.    279.  457,  62  L.  Ed.  831,  38  Sup.  Ct.  383. 

30.  Mobile  Chamber  of  Com-  31.  Railroad  Com.  of  La.  v. 
merce  v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.,  23  Arkansas  H.  T.  Ry.  Co.,  41  L  C. 
L  C.  C.  417,  426.  See  Kaufman  C.  83,  118,  119;  Hutcheson  Traffic 
Commercial  Club  v.  T.  N.  O.  R.  Bureau  v.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
Co.,   31   I.   C.   C.    1B7,    171,   where  43  I.  C.  C.  689,  693. 


424  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  140 

similar  to  those  involved  in  the  particular  opinion.  When  the 
inbound  and  outbound  rates  constitute  in  substance  a  through 
rate;  as  where  the  carriers  serving  both  communities  are 
wholly  or  partly  responsible  for  both  inbound  and  outbound 
rates  to  both  communities,  a  different  question  is  presented. 
In  such  cases  the  unlawfulness  of  the  discrimination  can  only 
be  determined  b^v  a  comprehensive  consideration  of  both  sets 
of  inbound  and  outbound  rates.^" 

§  140.  Same  Subject — Allovs^ances  to  Shippers. — Under  the 
amendment  of  June  29,  1906,  to  the  Act  to  Regulate  Com- 
merce, the  owner  of  property  transported  rendering  services 
in  connection  with  the  transportation  or  furnishing  an  in- 
strumentality used  therein  is  entitled  to  charge  therefor.*' 
Such  charge  mast  be  stated  in  the  published  tariffs,"  rau&t 
not  violate  any  of  the  sections  of  the  Act  requiring  reason- 
able and  non-discriminatory  rates.  Whenever  allowances  are 
made,  being  published  in  a  tariff',  are  subject  to  complaint  to 
the  Commission  and  may  be  investigated  by  the  Commission 
on  its  own  initiative,  and  that  tribunal  may  determine  what 
allowance  is  legal  and  reasonable.'''"  AA^hether  or  not  the 
amount  allowed  is  reasonable  must,  like  all  charges  relating 
to  transportation,  be  determined  by  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances in  each  particular  case  having  in  view  all  relevant 
principles  applicable  to  questions  relating  to  the  determina- 
tion of  the  reasonableness  and  validity  of  rates.  It  is  equally 
true  that  whether  or  not  a  particular  allowance  unjustly  dis- 

32.  St.  Louis  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  14  I.  C.  C.  619;  Federal  Sugar 
United  States,  245  U.  S.  136,  62  Refining  Co.  v.  Baltimore  & 
L.  Ed.  199,  38  Sup.  Ct.  49;  Pardee  O.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  200;  Balti- 
Works  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.  of  N.  more  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States, 
J.,  39  I.  C.  C.  162,  164.  200    Fed.      779,      Opinion      Com- 

33.  For  statute  see  Sec.  404,  merce  Court  No.  38,  p.  499; 
2)ost.  United   States  v.   B.   &  O.   R.   Co.. 

34.  American  Sugar  Refining  231  U.  S.  274,  58  L.  Ed.  218.  34 
Co.  V.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  Sup.  Ct.  75;  Langdon  v.  Pennsyl- 
200  Fed.  652.  While  there  have  viana  R.  Co.,  194  Fed.  486,  496. 
been  rulings  on  the  subject  of  35.  Suffern  Grain  Co.  v.  Illinois 
this  case  not  in  accord  with  the  Cent.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  178.  183; 
general  opinion  on  this  point,  the  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Updike 
decision  is  correct.  See  Re  Al-  Grain  Co.,  222  U.  S.  215,  218,  56 
lowances    for    Transfer   of    Sugar,  L.  Ed.  171,  32  Sup.  Ct.  39. 


§  141]  Equality  in   Rates.  425 

criminates  against  other  shippers  presents  a  question  deter- 
minable from  the  particular  facts  applicable  to  the  special 
case.  The  Commission  may  not,  when  the  shipper  is  within 
the  provisions  of  the  statute,  deny  to  him  a  proper  allowance. 

The  shipper  who  owns  instrumentalities  used  in  transporta- 
tion or  who  is  in  a  position  to  render  services  in  connection 
therewith,  who  receives  compensation  for  his  services  or  pay 
for  the  use  of  his  instrumentalities,  cannot  be  said  to  be  un- 
fairly favored  so  long  as  the  allowance  or  pay  is  not  unrea- 
sonable and  so  long  as  others  rendering  like  services  or  fur- 
nishing like  instrumentalities  are  treated  in  the  same  way. 

Examples  of  allowances  are,  for  compressing  cotton,^*  grain 
doors/'  elevation  of  grain, ''^  staking  cars,'"'  lighterage,"  trans- 
portation by  tap  lines  and  industrial  lines/^  The  question  will 
be  treated  more  in  detail  in  later  sections  of  this  chapteT 
where  is  discussed  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  specifio 
service  or  instrumentality  upon  which  the  claim  for  allowance 
is  based  justifies  any  allowance. 

§  141.  Trap  Car  Service. — The  Commission  has  defined  thiji 
service  as  follows:^"  "The  term  trap  or  ferry,  strictly  speak- 
ing, is  applied  to  a  ear  placed  at  an  industry  or  commercial 
house  having  a  private  siding,  and  there  loaded  by  a  shipper 
with  less-than-carload  shipments,  and  hauled  by  a  carrier  to 
its  local  freight  or  transfer  station  for  handling  and  for- 
warding of  contents;  and  also  is  applied  to  a  car  loaded  with 

36.  Merchants  Cotton  Compress  40.  United  States  v.  B.  &  0.  R. 
&  Storage  Co.  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  98;  Anderson,  Case.,  231  U.  S.  274,  58  L.  Ed. 
Clayton  &  Co.  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  218,  34  Sup.  Ct.  75.  See  also 
&  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  340.  Lighterage    and    Storage    Regula- 

37.  Balfour,  Guthrie  &  Co.  v.  tJons  at  New  York,  35  I.  C.  C.  47. 
Oregon  W.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  41.  Louisiana  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
C.  539.  United  States,  209  Fed.  244;  Tap 
•  38.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Updike  Line  Cases,  234  U.  S.  1,  58  L. 
Grain  Co.,  222  U.  S.  215,  56  L.  Ed.  1185,  34  Sup.  Ct.  741;  Indus- 
Ed.  171,  32  Sup.  Ct.  39;  Traffic  trial  Railways  Case,  29  I.  C.  C. 
Bureau  Merchants  Exchange  v.  212;  Car  Spotting  Charges,  34  I. 
Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.,    22    I.  C.  C.  609. 

G.  C.  496.  42.     Trap  or  Ferry  Car  Service 

39.     Duluth   Log  Co.   v.    Minne-       Charges,  34  I.  C.  C.  516. 
sota  &  I.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  627. 


■ir'26  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  142 

less-than-earload  shipments  which  is  hauled  to  and  placed 
npon  the  private  track  of  an  industry  or  commercial  house 
by  tlie  carrier  from  a  local  freight  or  transfer  station.  Where 
such  cars  are  loaded  to  a  prescribed  minimum,  the  practice 
of  respondent  has  been  to  make  no  charge  for  the  service.  In 
the  eastern  part  of  the  territory  involved  the  name  'ferry' 
is  given  to  a  car  used  as  above  described,  and  in  the 
Avestern  part  the  name  'trap'  is  applied.  The  origin  of  the 
names  is  not  clear.  Both  mean  the  same  thing,  and  for  con- 
venience the  v^^ord  trap  will  be  hereinafter  used." 

In  the  Five  Per  Cent  Case"  the  Commission  suggested  that 
the  carriers  investigate  special  services  being  rendered  by 
them  with  a  view  to  eliminating  those  that  were  discrimina- 
tory and  making  proper  charges  for  those  which  were  legal. 
In  Conference  Euling  97.  the  Commission  said:  "The  Com- 
mission condemns  as  unlawful  a  practice  under  which  a  car- 
rier provides  an  empty  car  at  factory  sidings  in  which  the 
shipper  may  load  less  than-carload  shipments  which  the  car- 
rier then  moves  to  its  regular  freight  station,  where  the  ship- 
ments are  assorted  and  placed  in  other  cars  to  be  forwarded 
to  their  respective  destinations.  Such  a  practice  is  lawful 
only  under  definite  and  clear  tariff  authority,  nondiscrimina- 
tory in  terms  and  in  its  application." 

Ostensibly  in  compliance  with  the  suggestion  and  the  ruling 
of  the  Commission,  but  with  a  real  desire  that  the  practice  be 
continued,  tariffs  were  filed  by  the  carriers  in  which  charges 
were  proposed  for  the  trap  car  service.  In  the  Trap  Car  Case 
supra,  these  tariffs  were  ordered  canceled.  The  advantages 
from  the  service,  both  to  the  public  and  to  the  carriers,  were 
shown,  and  it  was  held  that  the  service  when  offered  without 
undue  preference  or  unjust  discrimination,  was  not  illegal. 
It  is  hardly  open  to  successful  contradiction  that  this  service 
lessens  the  congestion  which,  without  the  service,  would  result 
to  the  carriers'  terminal  facilities. 

§  142.  Peddle'r  Cars. — In  some  parts  of  the  United  States 
the  carriers  have  for  many  years  maintained  what  has  come  to 
be  called  a  peddler  car  service.  This  service  has  been  defined 
in  32  I.  C.  C.  428  note  44,  below  as  follows : 

43.     Five  Per  Cent  Case,  31   I.       v.  P.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  583,  584. 
C.  C.  351,  408;    "VVoolson  Spice  Co. 


§  142A]  Kquality  in  Rates.  427 

"The  original  arrangement  permitted  the  sale  from  the 
ears,  as  peddlers  from  wagons,  of  fresh  meats  and  packing- 
house products,  but  the  growth  of  the  business  and  economy  of 
operation  demanded  that  sales  should  be  made  prior  to  the 
shipment  of  the  car,  and  that  each  package  should  b,e  con- 
signed to  a  particular  consignee.  The  cars  move  from  the 
packing  houses,  usually  on  certain  days  of  each  week,  and 
the  loading  depends  on  sales  made  in  advance,  generally  by 
salesmen  of  the  packers  who  canvass  the  territory  served 
by  the  peddler-car  routes.  When  a  packer  has  orders  for  a 
sufficient  tonnage  he  makes  arrangements  with  the  carrier  for 
the  shipment  and  loads  at  his  packing  plant  a  refrigerator  car 
owned  by  him  which  is  usually  equipped  with  meat  hooks 
and  other  necessary  appliances.  Each  car  contains  on  the 
average  less  than  100  consignments,  which  are  loaded  in 
station  order.  The  car  is  then  forwarded  by  fast  freight  to 
the  first  destination  to  which  there  is  a  consignment,  after 
which  it  is  handled  as  way  freight  and  the  various  consign- 
ments arc  unloaded  by  the  carriers  at  the  stations  to  which 
they  are  billed.  *  *  *  Tt  appears  that  the  service  ren- 
dered by  the  respondents  in  connection  with  the  peddler  cars 
is  generally  not  greater,  and  in  some  instances  less,  than  the 
service  which  they  render  in  connection  with  less-than-car- 
load  traffic  handled  through  their  freight  houses;  that  for 
the  peddler-car  service  the  user  pays  the  regular  less-than- 
carload  rates,  guarantees  the  carriers  a  minimum  per-car 
earning,  saves  the  carrier  the  expense  of  refrigeration,  re- 
duces loss  and  damage  claims,  and  gives  to  the  carrier  a 
volume  of  traffic  which  could  not  be  satisfactorily  transported 
in  its  own  equipment." 

Such  a  service  when  performed  Avithout  discrimination  is 
not  illegal.'* 

§  142  A.  Private  Cars. — Eailway  equipment  has  never  been 
adequate  to  meet  the  demands  of  shippers,  like  meat  packers 

44.     Investigation      of     Alleged  House   Products,    3.6    I.    C.    C.    62: 

Unreasonable  Rates  on   Meats,  23  Eastern    Live    Stock    Case,    36    I. 

I.    C.    C.    656;      Rules    Governing  C.  C.  675:   Peddler  Car  Minimum. 

Shipments  of  Freight   in  Peddler  43  I.  C.  C.  139;   Swift  &  Co.  v.  P. 

Cars,  32  I.  C.  C.  428;    Rates  and  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.,  48  I.  C.  C. 

Rules    on    Shipments    of    Packing  525. 


428  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  142 A 

and  oil  distributors,  who  need  special  kinds  of  cars  in  which 
properly  to  distribute  their  commodities.  Private  cars  were 
in  use  at  the  tim.e  of  the  adoption  in  1887  of  the  original 
Commerce  Act ;'''  and  in  one  of  the  earliest  eases  decided  by 
the  Commission  it  was  held  that  the  carriers  should  not  allow 
their  "own  deficiencies  in  the  particular  (lack  of  proper 
cars)  to  be  made  the  means  of  putting  at  an  unreasonable  dis- 
advantage those  who  make  use  in  the  same  traffic  of  the  same 
facilities"  supplied  by  the  carriers." 

The  Commission  made  an  exhaustive  investigation  of  the 
use  of  private  cars  and  the  practices  adopted  in  such  use. 
It  was  held  in  an  opinion  based  on  such  investigation  that 
there  were  benefits  to  the  public  in  the  use  of  such  cars  and 
that  while  such  use  "has  undoubtedly  bieen  of  benefit  to 
carriers,  it  has  been  of  incalculable  benefit  to  shippers  as 
well."'"  The  facts  on  which  the  Commission  acted  were 
principally  those  furnished  by  large  shippers,  owners  of 
private  cars,  and  the  carriers.  The  carriers  have  always 
shown  deference  to  these  large  shippers  and  are  not  over  zeal- 
ous in  presenting  facts  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  shippers 
who  control  an  immense  volume  of  traffic. 

Carriers  should  by  pooling  their  cars  or  by  other  means 
supply  suitable  cars  for  all  kinds  of  traffic.  The  private  car 
owner  has  an  advantage  not  open  to  all  and  "a  privilege 
which,  although  ostensibly  open  to  the  whole  public,  can  in 
the  nature  of  things,  only  be  taken  advantage  of  by  certain 
shippers,  creates  thereby  a  discrimination  which  may  or  may 
not  be  undue,  according  to  the  circumstances  in  each  case."*^ 

The  danger  to  the  general  public  from  permitting  shippers 
to  own  their  own  cars  has  caused  considerable  discussion  in 
the  Congress :  and  in  the  Transportation  Act  1920  the  defini- 

4.5.     Scofield    v.    Lake    S.    &    M.  48.     Traffic  Bureau    (St.  Louis) 

S.   R.   Co.,   2    I.   C.    C.    90.   2    I.    C.  v.   C.   B.   &  Q.  R.  Co.,   14   I.   C.   C. 

R.  67;    United  States  v.  P.  R.  Co.,  317.   The  National   Association   of 

242   U.   S.   208,   61   L.   Ed.   251,   37  Railway  Commissions  gave  views 

Sup.  Ct.  95.  similar  to  those  in  the  text.  Proc- 

46.  Rice  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  ter  &  Gamble  Co.  v.  C.  H.  &  D. 
Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  722.  Ry.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  556,  558,  559, 

47.  Matter     of     Private     Cars,  560. 
50  I.  C.  C.  652,  672,  678. 


§  143]  E-QUALiTY  IN   Rates.    '  429 

tion    of    transportation   was    enlarged    to    include    provisions 
relating  to  car  service  and  ear  distribution.'" 

5  143.  Car  Spotting-. — Similar  in  principle  to  the  trap  car 
service  is  wiiat  has  l)ecn  called  car  spotting  which  is  defined:^'' 
''  'Spotting'  service  is  the  service  beyond  a  reasonably  con- 
venient point  of  interchange  lietween  road  haul  or  connecting 
carriers  and  industrial  plant  tracks,  and  includes:  (a)  One 
placement  of  a  loaded  car  which  the  road  haul  or  connecting 
carrier  has  transported,  or  (b)  The  taking  out  of  a  loaded 
car  from  a  particular  location  in  the  plant  for  transportation 
by  road  haul  or  connecting  carrier,  (c)  The  handling  of  the 
empty  car  in  the  reverse  direction." 

While  the  shipper  where  sliipments  are  delivered  at  his 
plant  or  warehouse  saves  drayage,  the  carrier  who  makes 
the  delivery  is  not  using  its  terminals  and  the  advantage  is 
mutual.  It  is  therefore  a  service  which  is  not  illegal  per  se 
and  only  becomes  illegal  when  granted  to  one  and  refused  to 
another  under  circumstances  which  cause  that  discrimination 
prohibited  by  law.^^ 

§  ]44.  Undue  Preferences  in  Favor  of  Persons  or  Loca»lities. 
— Section  three  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  we  have 
seen  is  substantially  the  same  as  section  two  of  English  Rail- 
way and  Canal  Traffic  Act  of  1854.^".  This  section  is  broader 
than  section  two  of  the  English  Act  and  prohibits  undue  or 
unreasonable  preference.  The  words  "undue"  and  "unrea- 
sonable" in  the  section  show  that  in  the  legislative  mind 
there  could  be  a  preference  that  was  not  unreasonable  and 
that  was  legal.  This  has  been  the  construction  both  of  the 
English  and  the  American  statutes.  The  Supreme  Court  dis- 
cusses English  eases  in  the  Party  Rate  Case,'''  and  also  con- 

49.  Section  344A,  post.  Case,    234    U.    S.    294,    58    L.    Ed. 

50.  Car  Spotting  Cliarges,  34  I.  1319,  34  Sup.  Ct.  814;  Atchison, 
C.  C.  609,  614;  Alan  Wood  Iron  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  232 
&  Steel  Co.  V.  P.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  U.  S.  199,  58  L.  Ed.  568;  34  Sup. 
C.  540.  Ct.    291;     Iowa   &   S.   W.    Ry.    Co. 

51.  General  Elec.  v.  N.  Y.  C.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  32  I.  C. 
&  H.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  237;    Los  C.   172. 

Angeles    Case,    18    I.    C,    C.    310;  52.     Sec.   135.  infra. 

Order      sustained      by      Supreme  53.     Int.    Com.    Com.    v.    Balt!- 

Court,     Los     Angeles     Switching      more  &  0.  R.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  263.  36 


430  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  144 

striies  both  sections  two  and  three.  The  Supreme  Court  in 
the  case  referred  to  refuse  to  enforce  an  order  of  the  Com- 
mission and  held  that  a  party  of  ten  or  more  could  be  legally 
carried  on  one  ticket  at  a  less  rate  for  each  individual  than 
was  charged  for  one  person.  In  the  course  of  the  opinion  Mr. 
Justice  Brown  said : 

"In  order  to  constitute  an  unjust  discrimination  under 
section  2,  the  carrier  must  charge  or  receive  directly  from 
one  person  a  greater  or  less  compensation  than  from  another, 
or  must  accomplish  the  same  thing  indirectly  by  means  of  a 
special  rate,  rebate  or  other  device ;  but,  in  either  case,  it 
must  be  for  a  'like  and  contemporaneous  service  in  the  trans- 
portation of  a  like  kind  of  traffic,  under  substantially  similar 
circumstances  and  conditions.'  To  bring  the  present  case 
within  the  words  of  this  section,  we  must  assume  that  the 
transportation  of  ten  persons  on  a  single  ticket  is  substantially 
identical  with  the  transportation  of  one,  and,  in  view  of  the 
universally  accepted  fact  that  a  man  may  but,  contract,  or 
manufacture  on  a  large  scale  cheaper  proportionately  than 
upon  a  small  scale,  this  is  impossible.  ' 

"In  this  connection  we  quote  wnth  approval  from  the  opin- 
ion of  Judge  Jackson  in  the  court  below:  'To  come  within  the 
inhibition  of  said  sections  (2  and  3),  the  differences  must  be 
made  under  like  conditions;  that  is,  there  must  be  contem- 
poraneous service  in  the  transportation  of  like  kinds  of  traffic 
under  substantially  the  same  circumstances  and  conditions. 
In  respect  to  passenger  traffic,  the  positions  of  the  respective 
persons,  or  classes,  between  wdiom  differences  in  charges  are 
made,  must  be  compared  with  each  other,  and  there  must  be 
found  to  exist  substantial  identity  of  situation  and  of  serv- 
ice, accompanied  by  irregularity  and  partiality  resulting  in 
undue  advantage  to  one,  or  undue  advantage  to  the  other,  in 
order  to  constitute  unjust  discrimination.' 

"The  English  Traffic  Act  of  1854  contains  a  clause  similar 
to  section  3  of  the  Interstate  Comraierce  Act,  that  *no  such 
company  shall  make  or  give  any  undue  or  unreasonable  prefer- 
ence or  advantage  to  or  in  favor  of  any  particular  person  or 
company ;  or  any  particular  description  of  traffic,  in  any  re- 
spect whatsoever,  nor  shall  any  such  company  subject  any 
y)articular  person  or,  company,  or  any  particular  description 


§  144]  Equality  in   Rates.  431 

of  traffic,  to  any  undue  or  unreasonable  prejudice,  or  disad- 
vantage in  any  respect  whatsoever.' 

"In  Hozier  v.  Caledonian  R.  Co.,  17  Sess.  Cas.  303,  1  Nev. 
&  McN.  R.  Cas.  27,  complaint  was  made  by  one  who  had  fre- 
quent occasion  to  travel,  that  passengers  from  an  intermediate 
station  between  Glasgow  and  Edinburgh  were  charged  much 
greater  rates  to  those  places  than  were  charged  to  other 
througli  passengers  between  these  termini;  but  the  Scotch 
Court  of  Session  held  that  the  petitioner  had  not  shown  any 
title  or  interest  to  maintain  the  proceeding;  his  only  coni- 
l^laint  being  that  he  did  not  choose  that  parties  traveling  from 
Edinburgh  to  Glascow  should  enjoy  the  benefit  of  a  cheaper 
rate  of  travel  than  he  himself  could  enjoy.  'It  provides.' 
said  the  court,  'for  giving  undue  preference  to  parties  pari 
passu  in  the  matter,  but  you  must  bring  them  into  competition 
in  order  to  give  them  an  interest  to  complain.' 

"This  is  in  substance  holding  that  the  allowance  of  a  re- 
duced through  rate  worked  no  injustice  to  passengers  living 
on  the  line  of  the  road,  who  were  obliged  to  pay  at  a  greater 
rate.  So,  in  Jones  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co.,  3  C.  B,  N.  S. 
718,  the  court  refused  an  injunction  to  compel  a  railway 
company  to  issue  season  tickets  between  Colchester  and  Lon- 
don, upon  the  same  terms  as  they  issued  them  between  Har- 
wick  and  London,  upon  the  mere  suggestion  that  the  granting 
of  the  latter,  the  distance  being  considerably  greater,  at  a 
much  lower  rate  than  the  former,  was  an  .undue  and  uiu'eason- 
able  preference  of  the  inhabitants  of  Harwick  over  those  of 
Colchester.  Upon  the  other  hand,  in  Ransome  v.  Eastern 
Counties  R.  Co.,  1  C.  B.  N.  S.  437,  where  it  was  manifest  that 
a  railway  company  charged  Ipswich  merchants  who  sent  from 
thence  coal  which  had  come  thither  by  sea,  a  higher  rate  for 
the  carriage  of  their  coal  than  they  charged  Peterboro  mer- 
chants, who  had  made  arrangements  with  them  to  carry  large 
quantities  over  their  lines,  and  thus  the  sums  charged  the 
Peterboro  merchants  were  fixed  so  as  to  enable  them  to  com- 
pete with  the  Ipswich  merchant,  the  court  granted  an  injunc- 
tion upon  the  ground  of  an  undue  preference  to  the  Peterboro 
merchants,  the  object  of  the  discrimination  being  to  benefit 
the  one  dealer  at  the  expense  of  the  other,  by  depriving  the 
latter  of  the  natural  advantages  of  his  position.     In  Oxlade 


432  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  144 

V.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  1  C.  B.  N.  S.  454,  26  L.  J.  C.  P.  129, 
1  N.  &  IMac.  72,  a  railway  company  was  lield  .instified  in 
carrying  goods  for  one  person  for  a  less  rate  than  that  at 
which  they  carried  the  same  description  of  goods  for  another, 
if  there  bie  circumstances  which  render  the  cost  of  carrying  the 
goods  for  the  former  less  than  the  cost  of  carrying  them  for 
the  latter,  but  that  a  desire  to  introduce  northern,  coke  into  a 
certain  district  was  not  a  legitimate  ground  for  making  spec- 
ial agreements  with  diiferent  merchants  for  the  carriage  of 
coal  and  coke  at  a  rate  lower  than  the  ordinary  charge,  there 
being  nothing  to  show  that  the  pecuniary  interests  of  the  com- 
pany were  affected ;    and  that  this  was  an  undue  preference. 

"In  short,  the  substance  of  all  these  decisions  is  that  rail- 
way companies  are  only  bound  to  give  the  same  terms  to  all 
persons  alike  under  the  same  conditions  and  circumstances, 
and  that  any  fact  which  produces  an  inequality  of  condition 
and  a  change  of  circumstances  justifies  an  inequality  of 
charge.  These  traffic  acts  do  not  appear  to  be  as  comprehen- 
sive as  our  own,  and  may  justify  contracts  which  with  us 
would  be  obnoxious  to  the  long  and  short  haul  clause  of  the 
act,  or  would  be  open  to  the  charge  of  unjust  discrimination. 
But  so  far  as  relates  to  the  question  of  'undue  preference,' 
is  must  be  presumed  that  Congress,  in  adopting  the  language 
of  the  English  act,  had  in  mind  the  construction  given  to 
these  words  by  the  English  courts,  and  intended  to  incorpor- 
ate them  into  the  statute.  McDonald  v.  Harvey,  110  U.  S. 
619  (28  L.  Ed.  269,  4  Sup.  Ct.  142)." 

In  the  same  case  Circuit  Judge  Jackson,  afterwards  Mr. 
Justice  Jackson,  said:'*  "In  passing  upon  the  question  of 
undue  or  unreasonable  preference  or  disadvantage,  it  is  not 
only  legitimate,  but  proper,  to  take  into  consideration,  be- 
sides the  mere  differences  in  charges,  various  elements,  such 
as  the  convenience  of  the  public,  the  fair  interest  of  the 
carrier,  the  relative  quantities  or  volume  of  the  traffic  in- 
volved,   the   relative    cost    of   the    services    and   profit    to    the 

L.   Ed.   699.   705,   12   Sup.   Ct.   844,  was    applied    in    Gallaway    Coal 

4  I.  C.  R.  92.  Co.,   V.  A.   G.   S.   R.   Co.,   40   I.   C. 

54.    Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Baltimore  C.  311,  320;    Nashville  Switching, 

&    0.    R.    Co.,    4.3.   Fed.    37,    53,    54,  40  I.  C.  C.  474,  482. 
3    I.    C.    R.    192;    This    principle 


§  145]  Kquality  in   Rates.  433 

company  and  the  situation  and  circumstances  of  the  respec- 
tive customers  with  reference  to  each  other,  as  competitive 
or  otherAvise." 

§  145.  Same  Subject — Application  of  Section  Made  by  the 
Commission. — There  have  been  a  great  many  cases  in  which 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  has  applied  section  3 
of  the  Commerce  Act.  A  clear  and  fair  reading  of  the  law, 
says  the  Commission,  "is  one  which  credits  Congress  with 
the  intention  of  stopping  all  undue  discrimination  by  inter- 
state carriers.  It  may  be  said  without  exaggeration  that  it 
is  the  paramount  duty  of  interstate  carriers  under  this  Act 
to  avoid  discrimination. ' '  " 

The  law  is  not  satisfied  because  a  rate  may  not  be  unrea- 
sonably high,  for,  as  said  by  the  Commission: 

"A  community  is  entitled  to  something  more  than  a  reason- 
able rate ;  it  is  entitled  to  a  nondiscriminatory  rate.  The 
carrier  may  not  say,  'We  will  give  to  this  community  a  rea- 
sonable rate'  and  meet  the  full  requirements  of  the  law;  it 
must  view  its  rates  as  a  whole  and  see  to  it  that  they  affect 
no  advantage  or  preference  to  one  community  over  another 
which  does  not  arise  necessarily  out  of  the  transportation 
advantages  which  the  one  has  over  the  other.  "^'' 

The  prohibitions  of  the  section  apply  to  all  the  carrier's 
duties  and  obligations,  to  facilities  and  to  through  routes,  for, 
as  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  quoted  by  the  Commission, 
the  carrier  "is  bound  to  deal  fairly  with  the  public,  to  ex- 
tend them  reasonable  facilities  for  the  transportation  of  their 
persons  and  property,  and  to  put  all  its  patrons  upon  an 
absolute  equality."" 

Nor    does    the    fact,    that    removing    unjust    discrimination 

55.  R.  R.  Com.  of  La.  v.  St.  366,  quoted  with  approval  in  To- 
Louls  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  peka  Traffic  Assn.  v.  Alabama  & 
31,  41  (Shreveport  Case);  order  V.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  428,  436. 
sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court,  57.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Good- 
Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  V.  ridge,  149  U.  3.  680,  37  L.  Ed. 
United  States,  234  U.  S.  342,  58  896,  13  Sup.  Ct.  970, 'quoted  in 
L.  Ed.  1341,  34  Sup.  Ct.  833.  Re    Wichita    Falls    System    Joint 

56.  R.  R.  Com.  of  Nevada  v.  Coal  Rates,  26  I.  C.  C.  215,  223. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329, 


434  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  145 

may  reduce  revenues,  constitute  an  answer  to  the  claim  for 
"fair  play."'^ 

"Nor  is  it  the  view  of  the  Commission  that  a  carrier  cannot 
be  held  to  discriminate  against  a  community  or  territory 
which  it  does  not  reach  by  its  own  rails.  If  it  participates 
in  a  joint  rate  from  the  territory  affected  and  is  in  such 
position  that  it  may  either  join  in  such  rates  or  decline  to 
do  so,  it  is  then  liable  for  the  discrimination  w^hich  may 
result  from  its  action  in  joining  with  the  other  carriers  in 
the  discriminatory  rate  or  regulation."" 

The  Commission  formerly  had  no  power  to  compel  car- 
riers to  increase  rates,  so  when  there  was  discrimination  in 
rates  between  two  communities,  unless  the  carrier  removed 
such  discrimination  the  high  rate  must  have  been  reduced.*" 
Under  Transportation  Act  1920  the  Commission  is  empowered 
to  prescribe  minimum  rates.  Whether  or  not  a  preference  or 
advantage  is  undue  or  unreasonable  within  the  meaning  of 
the  section  is  "primarily  for  the  investigation  and  determina- 
tion of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and  not  for 
the  Courts.  The  dominating  purpose  of  the  Statute  was  to 
secure  conformity  to  the  prescribed  standards  through  the 
examination  and  appreciation  of  the  complex  facts  of  trans- 
portation by  the  body  created  for  that  purpose."*^ 

58.  Cardiff  Coal  Co.  v.  Chicago,  Products,  23  I.  C.  C.  652,  655; 
M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  Scott  Paper  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 
460,  467.  R.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  601,  603. 

59.  Partridge  &  Sons  v.  Pennsyl-  61.  Simpson  v.  Shepard,  23.0  U. 
vania  R.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  484,  486,  S.  352,  57  L.  Ed.  1511,  33  Sup.  Ct. 
487  citing:  Indiana  Steel  &  Wire  729,  citing  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Co.  V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Abilene  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  204  U. 
Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  155;  Southern  S.  426,  51  L.  Ed.  553,  27  Sup.  Ct. 
Furniture  Mnfrs.  Assn.  v.  South-  350,  9  Ann.  Cas.  1075;  Baltimore 
em  Ry.  Co.,  25  I.  C.  C.  379;  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States,  215 
Rates  from  the  Walsenberg  Coal  U.  S.  481.  54  L.  Ed.  292,  30  Sup. 
Field,  26  I.  C.  C.  85.  See  also  Ct.  164;  Robinson  v.  Baltimore  & 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Ash-  O.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  506,  56  L. 
burn,  Ga.,  v.  Georgia,  S.  &  F.  R.  Ed.  288,  32  Sup.  Ct.  114;  United 
Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  140,  and  a  sum-  States  v.  Pac.  &  A.  R.  N.  Co., 
mary  of  Commission  cases  cited  228  U.  S.  87,  57  L.  Ed.  742,  33 
pp.  148,  149,  150.  Sup.    Ct.    443.    Disadvantages    un- 

60.  Rates  Transportation  of  connected  with  transportation 
Fresh    Meats    &    Packin.g    House       should  not  be  equalized  by  rates. 


§  145A]  E-QUALiTv  IN  Rates.  435 

§  145A.  Differentials. — A  rate  differential  is  a  fixed  dif- 
ference in  rates,  so  that  as  one  rate  is  changed  the  other  is 
similarly  changed,  thus  maintaining  the  original  difference. 
There  are  many  rates  dift'erentially  related.  Where  the  dif- 
ference is  just,  existing  differentials  are  always  sustained 
by  the  Commission.  Differentials  that  are  unr'easonable  are 
changed  to  make  them  reasonable. °'  Where  independent  car- 
riers served  a  common  market  dift'erential  adjustments,  re- 
moving unlawful  discrimination,  could  not  be  prescribed  by 
the  Commission  prior  to  the  Amendment  of  1920,"  but  now 
the  Commission  may  initiate  both  minimum  and  maximum 
rates. 

§  146.  Discrimination  against  Traffic. — ^The  section  prohib- 
its "any  undue  or  unreasonable  preference  or  advantage  to 
*     *     *     any  particular  description  of  traffic." 

In  discussing  classification,  section  81  supra,  it  has  been 
shown  that  different  comnijOdities  have  been  classified  or 
given  a  special  commodity  rating.  The  necessity  and  pro- 
priety of  this  is  there  shown.  When,  however,  a  particular 
"description  of  traffic"  is  classified,  it  must  be  without  undue 
or  unreasonable  preference. 

In  determining  the  reasonableness  of  rates,  comparisons  may 
be  made  between  commodities  of  like  weight,  bulk,  value, 
etc.,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  those  commodities  come  in 
competition  the  one  with  the  other. 

§  146A.  Same  Subject — Competition  Between  Users  of  Re- 
lated Rates. — In  determining  whether  or  not  particular  de- 
scriptions of  traffic  are  so  related  by  the  carrier  as  to  violate 
the  provisions  quoted  herein,  it  is  material  to  determine  whe- 
ther or  not  the  different  commodities  in  any  waj^  compete. 
This  principle  has  been  applied  by  the  Commission.  As  early 
as  1892  the  Commission  said:"*  "In  the  absence  of  some  com^ 
peting  relation  between  different  articles  of  traffic,  there  would 

Anson,   Gilkey   &   Hurd   Co.   v.    S.  C.  224,  236. 

P.    Co.,    33    I.    C.    C.    332;    Milling  63.    Gallaway   Coal   Co.  v.   A.   O. 

Logs  In  Transit,  40  I.  C.   C.  597,  S.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  311,  315,  and 

600.  cases  cited. 

62.    Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v.  64.    Rice  v.  C.  W.  &  B.  R.  Co., 

St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  3  I.  C.  R.  841,  849,  5  I.  C.  C.  193. 


436  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  146 A 

seem  to  be  no  opportunity,  by  means  solely  of  the  rates  im- 
l)0se(l  npon  them  respectively,  for  that  unjust  discrimination 
■which  the  law  forbids.  Disadvantage  to  the  shipper  of  one 
product  can  hardly  be  predicated  upon  the  charges  for  trans- 
porting another  product,  differing  essentially  in  character 
from  the  former  and  widely  dissimilar  in  the  demands  which 
it  supplies.  In  such  cases  the  rates  themselves  are  insufficient 
to  convict  the  carrier  of  discrimination.  The  amount  actually 
charged  on  one  commodity  may,  however,  be  of  great  import- 
ance in  determining  whether  the  charge  on  another  com- 
modity is  reasonable  or  otherwise,  especially  when  both  have 
numerous  points  of  resemblance  in  respect  to  the  cost  and 
hazard  of  transportation." 

The  United  States  Circuit  Court,  the  English  Court  and  the 
Supreme  Court  as  shown  in  the  Party  Rate  Case,  Section  144, 
supra,  all  recognized  that  without  competition  unlawful  dis- 
crimination could  not  exist. 

Illustrative  of  other  applications  of  the  principle  are :  Wall 
plaster  and  cement  were  sought  to  be  compared,  and  it  was 
said:  "It  is  admitted  that  a  charge  of  undue  discrimination 
may  not  be  predicated  on  the  lower  cement  rates,  because 
the  commodities  are  not  competitive."*'^  In  denying  relief 
where  competition  between  localities  was  alleged,  the  Com- 
mission said:  "It  does  not  appear  that  there  is  such  a  com- 
petitive relation  between  Baton  Rouge  and  New  Orleans  in 
respect  of  the  commodity  in  question  that  different  rates  to 
these  points  are  prima  facie  unlawful. '  '*' 

Between  the  rates  on  wheat  and  coarse  grain,  which  are 
"competitive  in  no  practical  sense,""'  and  between  rates  on 
poles  and  lumber,"*  there  can  be  no  undue  or  unlawful  prefer- 
ence because  of  lack  of  competition. 

65.  Acme  Cement  Plaster  Co.  v.  Bureau  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  Co.,  43  I.  C  C.  224,  226;  Laundry- 
I.  C.  C.  30,  36.  men's   Nat'l.  Assn.   v.   Adams   Ex- 

66.  Southern  P.itnlithic  Co.  v.  press  Co.,  45  I.  C.  C.  361.  362  (laun- 
Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  300.  dry  &  bread);   Kansas  City  &  M. 

67.  Board  of  Trade  of  Chicago  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co., 
V.  Chicago  &  A.  11.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  46  I.  C.  C.  464,  465.  The  general 
530,  535.  question     was     interestingly     dis- 

68.  California  Pole  &  Piling  Co.  cussed  by  Henry  Hull,  Case  & 
V.   Southern  Pac.   Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  Comment,  April  1918. 

670;    See  also  Texarkana  Freight 


§  147]  E'QUALriTY  IN   Rates.  43? 

§  147.  Same  Subject — Discrimination  beyond  the  Control 
of  the  Carrier. — On  this  subjec-t  the  Supreine  Court  has  said  -."^ 

"The  prohibition  of  the  3d  section,  when  that  section  is 
considered  in  its  proper  relation,  is  directed  against  unjust 
discrimination  or  undue  preference  arising  from  the  volun- 
tary and  wrongful  act  of  the  carriers  complained  of  as  hav- 
ing given  undue  preference,  and  does  not  relate  to  acts  the 
result  of  conditions  wholly  beyond  the  control  of  such  car- 
riers."'" 

Many  past  discriminations  have  been  defended  on  the 
gro^*nd  that  the  particular  carrier  complained  against  could 
not  remedy  the  situation;  the  claim  being  made  that  the 
conditions  had  grown  up  and  existed  without  the  aid  and  con- 
trary to  the  wishes  of  the  carrier. 

Such  a  claim  cannot,  however,  be  successfully  maintained 
to  prevent  the  establishment  of  joint  rates,  through  combina- 
tion rates  having  been  voluntarily  established.'^  Controlling 
competition  may  justify  a  rate  situation  which  would  be 
otherwise  unlawful.'"  The  "test  of  the  discrin-onation  is 
the  ability  of  one  of  the  carriers  *  *  *  to  put  an  end 
to  the  discrimination  by  its  own  act."" 

Length  of  time  tliat  an  unreasonable  preference  has  existed 
will  not  justify  it.  Judge  Taft,  in  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Ga.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  note  70  siipra,  said : 

"We  are  X)ressed  with  the  argument  that  to  reduce  the 
rates  to  Chattanooga  will  upset  the  whole  southern  schedule 
of  rates,  and  create  the  greatest  confusion;  that  for  a  decade 
Chattanooga  has  been  grouped  with  to^vTis  to  the  south  and 
west  of  her,  shown  in  the  diagram ;  and  that  her  rates  have 

69.  East  Tenn.  Va.  &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.       L.   Ed.   199,  38   Sup.  Ct.   49. 

V.    Int.    Com.    Com.,    181    U.    S.    1,  72.    Eastern  Shore,  etc.  Produce 

18,  45  L.  Ed.  719,  725,  21  Sup.  Ct.  Exchange  v.  N.  Y    P.  &  N.  R.  Co., 

516.  40    I.    C.    C.    328,    334    and    cases 

70.  East  Tenn.,  Va.   &  Ga.  Ry.  cited. 

Co.    V.    Int.    Com.    Com.,    99    Fed.  73.    Ashland   Fire   Brick   Co.  v. 

52,    63,   39   C.   C.   A.   413,   425.   See  S.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  115;  Traffic 

also    Board    of   Trade   of   Chicago  Bureau,  Toledo  v.  C.  H.  &  D.  Ry. 

V.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  4  I.  C.  C.  Co.,    4a   I.    C.    C.    446,    456;    Com- 

158.   3  I.  C.  R.  233.  mercial  Club  of  Mitchell  v.   A.   & 

71.  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  48  I.  C.  C.  40,  43. 
United    States,   245    U.    S.   136,    62 


438  Equality  in  Eates.  [§  148 

been  the  key  to  the  southern  situation.  The  length  of  time 
which  an  abuse  has  continued  does  not  justify  it.  It  was 
because  time  had  not  corrected  abuses  of  discrimination  that 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  was  passed." 

From  these  authorities  it  is  seen  that  in  determining  whether 
or  not  undue  preference  exists  all  the  surrounding  facts  and 
circumstances  must  be  considered,  including  competition  and 
the  interests  of  the  public  and  the  carriers.  The  commerce 
of  this  vast  country  could  not  be  transacted  unless  carriers 
were  allowed  to  meet  market  and  other  competition  by  taking 
all  traffic  that  increases  receipts  more  than  expenditures. 
Nor  are  shipper  seemingly  discriminated  against  by  this  lower 
competive  traffic,  really  subjected  to  unjust  and  unreasonable 
discrimination  or  preference.  If  this  cheaper  rate  traffic  pays 
any  profit,  it,  to  that  extent,  increases  the  revenues  of  the 
carrier  and  enables  it  better  to  perform  its  public  duties.  As 
said  by  AV.  B.  Dabney  (The  Public  Regulations  of  Railways, 
]11,  113)  :  ''Discrimination  which  produces  no  injury  cannot 
be  considered  unjust ;  if  it  can  be  shown  that  discrimination 
may  in  certain  cases  be  actually  beneficial  to  the  community 
apparently  discriminated  against,  it  should,  instead  of  being 
denounced,  be  encouraged.  It  is  not  the  commerce  of  one 
nation  or  continent  alone,  that  determines  the  conditions  of 
transportation  within  its  limits,  but  that  of  the  civilized 
world."  Carriers,  however,  cannot  use  these  arguments  to 
do  more  than  meet  the  situations  presented  by  the  circum- 
stances and  conditions,  and  any  discrimination  in  excess  of 
that  required  by  the  different  conditions  is  unjust  and  unrea- 
sonable.^* 

§  148.  Facilities  for  Inter chang-e  of  Traffic  and  Rates  and 
Charges  to  Connecting'  Lines  Must  be  Without  Undue  or  Un- 
reasonable Preference. — Prior  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
a  carrier  was  not  compelled  to  form  a  business  connection  with 
another  carrier  and  was  not  compelled  to  "afford  all  reason- 
able, proper,  and  equal  facilities  for  the  interchange  of  traffic" 
with  connecting  carriers.  In  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Denver  &  N.  0.  R.  Co.,"  a  bill  was  brought  by  the  Denver 

74.     As  to  competetion  see  Ante      made  by  a  state,  Sec.  44  ante. 
Section  146a,  post,  Sec.  201.  Rates  75.    Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 


§  148]  E'QUAi^iTY  IN  Rates.  439 

company  to  compel  the  Atchison  company  to  unite  with  it 
in  forming  a  through  line  of  railroad  transportation  with  all 
the  privileges  as  to  exchange  of  business  that  were  customary 
with  connecting  carriers  and  that  were  then  conceded  to  a 
competitive  line  of  complainant.  It  apears  from  the  evidence^ 
that  it  was  the  custom  of  connecting  lines  to  make  arrange- 
ments with  reference  to  the  interchange  of  business  and  the 
formation  of  through  lines.     Of  the  facts,  the  court  said : 

"A  large  amount  of  testimony  is  found  in  the  record,  as 
to  the  custom  of  connecting  roads  in  respect  to  the  inter- 
change of  business  and  the  formation  of  through  lines.  From 
this  it  appears  that,  while  through  business  is  very  generally 
done  on  through  lines  formed  by  an  arrangement  between  con- 
necting roads,  no  road  can  make  itself  a  part  of  such  a  line,  so 
as  to  participate  in  its  special  advantages,  without  the  consent 
of  the  others.  Oftentimes  new  roads,  opening  up  new  points, 
are  admitted  at  once  on  notice,  without  a  special  agreement  to 
that  effect  or  in  reference  to  details;  still,  if  objection  is 
made,  the  new  road  must  be  content  with  the  right  to  do  busi- 
ness over  the  line  in  such  a  way  as  the  law  allows  to  others 
that  have  no  special  contract  interest  in  the  line  itself.  The 
manner  in  which  its  business  must  be  done  bj^  the  line  will 
depend  not  alone  on  the  connection  of  its  track  with  that  of 
the  line,  but  upon  the  duty  which  the  line  as  a  carrier  owes  to 
it  as  a  customer.  No' usage  has  been  established  which  re- 
quires one  of  the  component  companies  of  a  connecting 
through  line  to  grant  to  a  competitor  of  any  of  the  other  com- 
panies the  same  privileges  that  are  accorded  to  its  associates, 
simply  because  the  tracks  of  the  competiting  company  unite 
with  its  own  and  admit  of  a  free  and  convenient  interchange 
of  business.  The  line  is  made  up  by  the  contracting  companies 
to  do  business  as  carriers  for  the  public;  and  companies,  whose 
roads  do  not  form  part  of  the  line,  have  no  other  rights  in  con- 
nection with  it  than  such  as  belong  to  the  public  at  large,  un- 
less special  provision  is  made  therefor  by  the  legislature  or 
the  contractii^g  companies." 

The  decree  entered  by  the  trial  court  had  fixed  in  detail, 
rules  and  regulations  for  the  working  of  the  Atchison,  Topeka 
and  Santa  Fe  and  Denver  and  New  Orleans  roads,  in  connec- 
tion  with   each   other  as   a   connecting  through  line   and,   in 


440  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  148 

effect,  required  the  Atchison,  Topeka  and  Santa  Fe  Company 
to  place  the  Denver  and  New  Orleans  Company  on  an  equal 
footing  as  to  the  interchange  of  business  with  the  most 
favored  of  the  competitors  of  that  company,  both  as  to  prices 
,  and  facilities,  except  in  respect  to  the  issue  of  through  bills 
of  lading,  through  checks  for  baggage,  through  tickets  and, 
perhaps,  the  compulsory  interchange  of  cars. 

The  Supreme  Court  goes  somewhat  at  length  into  the  his- 
tory of  state  legislation  with  reference  to  connections  between 
carriers  and  holds  that  "such  matters  are  and  always  have 
been  proper  subjects  for  legislative  consideration"  and  that 
remedies  for  failure  to  make  connections  or  to  make  connec- 
tions without  discrimination  "can  only  be  obtained  from  the 
legislative  branch  of  the  government."  The  court  then  dis- 
cussed the  "undue  preference  cluase"  of  the  English  Railway 
and  Canal  Traffic  Act  of  1854  and  said : 

"Were  there  such  a  statute  in  Colorado,  this  case  would 
come  before  us  in  a  different  aspect.  As  it  is,  we  know  of  no 
power  in  the  judiciary  to  do  what  the  Parliament  of  Great 
Britian  has  done  and  what  the  proper  legislative  authority 
ought  perhaps  to  do,  for  the  relief  of  the  parties  to  this  con- 
troversy. 

"All  the  American  cases  to  which  our  attention  has  been 
called  by  counsel  relate  either  to  what  amounts  to  undue  dis- 
crimination between  the  customers  of  a  railroad,  or  to  the 
power  of  a  court  of  chancery  to  interfere,  if  there  be  such  a 
discrimination.  None  of  them  hold  that,  in  the  absence  of 
statutory  direction  or  a  specific  contract,  a  company  having 
the  power  to  locate  its  own  stopping  places  can  be  required  by 
court  of  equity  to  stop  at  another  railroad  junction  and  inter- 
change business,  or  that  it  must  under  all  circumstances  give 
one  connecting  road  the  same  facilities  and  the  same  rates  that 
it  does  to  another  with  which  it  has  entered  into  a  special  con- 
tract relations  for  a  continuous  tlirough  line  and  arrange 
facilities  accordingly.  These  cases  are  all  illustrative  in  their 
analogies,  but  their  facts  are  different  from  those  we  have  now 
to  consider." 

The  decree  of  the  circuit  court  Avas  reversed,  with  instruc- 
tions to  dismiss  the  bill  without  prejudice.  This  case  was  de- 
cided in  1883,  and  clearly  points  out  the  evils  sought  to  be 


§  148]  Equality  in  Rates.  441 

remedied  by  this  section  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  In 
Wisconsin,  M.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobson/'  the  Supreme  Court 
had  before  it  a  case  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota  to 
review  the  judgment  of  that  court  affirming  the  judgment  of 
the  district  court,  directing  the  plaintiff  in  error  and  the  Will- 
mar  &  Sioux  Falls  Railway  Company  to  make  track  connec- 
tions with  eaeli  otlier  at  Hanley  Falls,  in  the  state  of  Minne- 
sota, where  their  respective  tracts  intersected. 

The  judgment  of  the  state  court  declared  as  follows : 

"That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  defendants,  the  Wisconsin, 
Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad  Company  and  the  Willmar  & 
Sioux  Falls  Railway  Company,  and  they  should  be  and  are 
required  to  forthwith  provide  at  the  place  of  intersection  of 
their  said  roads  at  said  Hanley  Falls,  ample  facilities  by  track 
connections  for  transferring  any  and  all  cars  used  in  the  re- 
gular business  of  their  respective  lines  of  road  from  the  line 
of  tracks  of  one  of  said  companies  to  those  of  the  other,  and 
to  forthwith  provide,  at  said  place  of  intersection,  equal  and 
reasonable  facilities  for  the  interchange  of  cars  and  traffic 
between  their  respective  lines,  and  for  the  receiving,  for- 
warding, and  delivering  property  and  cars  to  and  from  their 
respective  lines." 

The  court  discussed  somewhat  at  length  the  legal  principle 
that  railroads  are  public  highways,  upon  which  fact  rests  the 
right  and  duty  of  the  government  to  regulate,  in  a  reasonable 
and  proper  manner,  the  conduct  of  their  business,  and  the  sub- 
stance of  its  opinion  affirming  that  of  the  state  Supreme  court 
is  contained  in  two  paragraphs  of  the  opinion,  as  f oIIoavs  : 

"We  think  this  case  is  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  power  of 
regulation  in  favor  of  the  interests  and  for  the  accommodation 
of  the  public,  and  that  it  does  not,  regard  being  had  to  the 
facts,  unduly,  unfairly,  or  improperly  affect  the  pecuniary 
rights  or  interests  of  the  plaintiff  in  error." 

"In  this  case  the  provision  is  a  manifestly  reasonable  one, 
tending  directly  to  the  accommodation  of  the  public,  and  in  a 
manner  not  substantially  or  unreasonably  detrimental  to  the 
ultimate  interests  of  the  corporation  itself." 

V.    Denver    &    N.    0.    R.    Co.,    110  76.    Wisconsin  M.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 

U.  S.  667,  28  L.  Ed.  291,  4  Sup.  Jacobson.  179  U.  S.  287,  45  L.  Ed. 
Ct.    185.  194,  21  Sup.  Ct.  115. 


442  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  149 

§  149.  Same  Subject — Statute. — The  second  paragraph  of 
section  three  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce,"  as  orignally 
enacted,  required  common  carriers  subject  to  the  act  to  aflford 
reasonable,  proper  and  equal  facilities  for  the  interchange  of 
traffic  and  prohibited  discrimination  in  the  rates  and  charges 
of  connecting  lines,  but  did  not  require  them  to  give  the  use 
of  tlieir  tracks  or  terminal  facilities  to  another  carrier  en- 
gaged in  like  business.  This  provision  of  the  law  did  not 
apply  where  the  circumstances  and  conditions  were  dissimi- 
lar." As  to  its  tracks  and  terminal  facilities,  a  common  car- 
rier was  under  the  former  law  left  free  to  allow  their  use  by 
one  or  more  connecting  lines  to  the  exclusion  of  others;^*  but 
as  will  be  seen  in  a  subsequent  section,  this  right  of  selection 
has  been  limited  by  subsequent  enactments  and  decisions. 

This  section  did  not  compel  a  carrier  to  establish  through 
routes  and  joint  rates,  and  any  carrier  could  select  from  two 
or  more  connecting  carriers  those  whom  it  would  employ  as  its 
agents  to  send  freight  beyond  its  own  line.^"  This  power  to 
require  the  establishment  of  through  routes  and  joint  rates 
has  been  given  to  the  Commission  by  sections  one  and  fifteen 
of  the  Act  as  amended  by  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906.  The 
owner  of  a  private  wharf,  however,  cannot  be  compelled  ex- 
cept by  condemnation  and  upon  compensation  being  made  for 
the  taking  of  the  property,  to  allow  its  use  by  others." 

Since  the  Amendment  of  1906  it  has  been  the  duty  of  each 
carrier  subject  to  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  to  '*hold  it- 

77.  Sec.   347.  post.  R.   Co.,    110  U.   S.   667,   28   L.   Ed. 

78.  Kentucky  &  I.  Bridge  Co.  v.  291,  4  Sup.  Ct.  185;  Gulf,  C.  & 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  37  Fed.  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miami  S.  S. 
567,  624,  2  L.  R.  A.  289,  2  L  C.  Co.,  86  Fed.  407.  30  C.  C.  A.  142. 
R.  351;  New  York  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  80.  Kentucky  &  I.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
V.  New  York  &  N.  E.  Ry.  Co.,  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co..  37  Fed. 
50  Fed.  867.  567,  630;    Prescott  &  A.  C.  R.  Co. 

79.  Little  Rock  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co., 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,   59  73  Fed.  438. 

Fed.    400.    Affirmed.    63    Fed.    775,  81.     Louisville   &    N.    R.    Co.   v. 

11    C.    C.    A.    417,    26    L.    R.    A.  West     Coast     Naval     Stores     Co., 

192.      Oregon    S.    L.    &    U.   N.   Co.  198  U.  S.  483,  49  L.  Ed.   1135,   25 

V.   Northern  Pac.   R.   Co.,   51   Fed.  Sup.    Ct.    745;    Weems    Steamboat 

465.      Affirmed.      61    Fed.    158,    9  Co.    v.    People's    Co.,    214    U.    S. 

C.    C.   A.   409;    Atchison,   T.    &   S.  345,   53   L.   Ed.   1024,   29    Sup.   Ct. 

F.    Ry.    Co.    V.    Denver    &    N.    O.  661. 


§  150]  E-QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  443 

self  impartial  as  between  shippers  and  give  to  each  one  equal 
terminal  facilities  and  service.'"'  It  is  not  illegal  for  a  car- 
rier to  give  an  exclusive  privilege  to  a  public  auctioneer  to 
conduct  auctions.*" 

§  150.  Same  Subject — Statute  and  Proviso. — Section  three 
of  the  Act  to  Eegulate  Commerce,  prior  to  Transportation  Act 
1920  provided: 

"But  this  shall  not  l)e  construed  as  requiring  any  such  com- 
mon carrier  to  give  the  use  of  its  tracks  or  terminal  facilities 
to  another  carrier  engaged  in  like  business." 

In  discussing  this  proviso,  the  Commission  held,  that  where 
carriers  allowed  the  "use  of  their  tracks,  or  terminal  facilities, 
the  proviso  of  section  3  can  have  no  application;"  and  in  the 
further  course  of  the  opinion  in  the  same  case  it  was  said: 

"Terminals  are  either  open  or  they  are  not;  and  if  a  carrier 
holds  itself  out  as  ready  to  permit  the  use  of  its  tracks  at  a 
certain  charge,  the  fact  that  such  charge  may  be  prohibitive 
does  not  mean  that  the  terminals  are  not  open.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  would  seem  to  be  a  potent  argument  for  the  reduc- 
tion of  charges  for  the  use  of  tracks  or  terminal  facilities  al- 
ready extended." 

And,  said  the  Commission,  concluding  the  argument : 

"It  follows,  that  having  elected  to  perform  this  service,  the 
charge  therefor  mast  be  reasonable."** 

This  section  to  this  point  and  the  two  next  preceding  sec- 
tions discuss  the  law  prior  to  the  Amendment  of  1920.  By  that 
amendment,  paragraph  2  of  section  3  of  the  original  Act  was 

82.  Enterprise  Fuel  Co.  v.  Penn-  followed  in  St.  Louis  S.  &  P.  R. 
sylvania  R.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  219.  Co.  v.  Peoria  &  P.  U.  R.  Co.,  26 
224;  Baltimore  Butchers  Abat-  I.  C.  C.  226,  236,  237;  Penn.  Co.  v. 
toir  &  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  Phila-  United  States,  236  U.  S.  351,  59 
delphia,  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  L.  Ed.  616,  35  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  370: 
C.  C.  124,  128;  Buffalo  Union  affirming  same  styled  case,  214 
P'urnace  Co.  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  Fed.  445;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  620.  v.    United    States    238    U.     S.    1, 

83.  Southwestern  Produce  Dis-  59  L.  Ed.  1177,  35  Sup.  Ct.  696. 
tributers  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  20  I.  "Grazing  but  not  hitting,"  so  says 
C.   C.   458.  Mr.   Justice  Holmes,  the  question 

84.  Merchants  &  Mnfrs.  Assn.  in  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.United 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  States,  242  U.  S.  GO,  61  L.  Ed.  153, 
C.    474,    476.      The    principle    was  37    Sup.   Ct.   61. 


4-14  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  151 

changed  for  the  first  time.  The  Amendment  authorizes  the 
Commission  to  do  what  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Nashville 
Switching  Case,  242  U.  S.  60,  held  that  it  could  not  do  under 
the  law  then  in  force.  The  cases  cited  in  those  sections,  not 
excepting  the  Nashville  Switching  Case,  show  a  strong  proba- 
bility that  the  Supreme  Court  will  sustain  the  validity  of  the 
1920  Amendment   requiring  the   joint  use   of  terminals.*" 

§  151.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. — The  statutory 
dutj'  of  the  carriers  to  establish  and  maintain  through  routes 
and  joint  rates,  together  with  the  statutory  power  of  the  Com- 
mission in  respect  thereto,  will  be  discussed  in  another  connec- 
tion.*" The  question  of  discrimination  is  the  subject  of  this 
section. 

Mr.  Commissioner  Lane,  in  an  opinion  of  the  Commission 
dealing  with  the  question,  asked:  "What  is  the  duty  of  the 
carriers  with  respect  to  the  operation  of  through  routes?" 
And  he  also  asks:  "What  power  has  been  vested  in  the  Com- 
mission to  enforce  the  requirements  of  the  law?"  Answering 
the  first  question  he  said : 

"There  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  duty  of  the  carriers  un- 
der the  present  act.  The  commerce  of  the  country  is  regarded 
as  national,  not  local,  and  the  railroads  are  required  to  serve 
the  routes  which  they  have  established,  or  which  they  have 
been  required  to  establish."  The  statute  is  then  quoted,  and 
analyzed  and  in  further  answer  to  the  first  question,  the  opin- 
ion proceeds:  "Reading  these  provisions  together,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  as  to  the  intent  of  Congress-  Our  railroads  are 
called  upon  to  unite  themselves  that  they  will  constitute  one 
national  system :  they  must  establish  through  routes,  keep  these 
routes  open  and  in  operation,  furnish  the  necessary  facilities 
for  transportation,  make  reasonable  and  proper  rules  of  prac- 
tice as  between  themselves  and  the  shippers,  and  as  between 
each  other.  The  full  burden  of  this  great  obligation  is  in  the 
first  instance  cast  upon  the  carriers  themselves." 

As  to  the  second  question,  it  was  there  said : 

"The  law's  requirements  as  to  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to 

85.    For     amendment     see     Sec.       245   U.   S.   136,   6.?   L.   Ed.   199,   38 
347,     i)ost.      Compare     St.     Louis       Sup.  Ct.  49. 
S.    W.    R.    Co.    V.    United    States  86.   post,  sec.  195. 


§  152] 


E-QUALiTY  IN   Rates. 


445 


the  shipper  to  furnish  equipment  and  maintain  its  through 
routes  carries  with  it  necessarily  the  power  on  the  part  of  the 
Commission  to  enforce  rules  which  will  permit  the  free  inter- 
change of  traffic  as  between  carriers.  The  carriers  must  keep 
their  through  routes  open,  and  if  they  fail  to  do  this  because 
of  the  diversion  or  appropriation  of  cars  this  Commission  has 
it  within  its  power  to  prescribe  the  conditions  upon  which 
such  through  routes  shall  be  operated."" 

The  duty  exists  to  maintain  through  routes  without  undue 
discrimination  and,  should  the  carriers  fail  in  the  performance 
of  that  duty,  the  Commission  has  power  to  enforce  it." 

In  pursuance  of  this  power,  aided  by  the  additional  power 
granted  in  the  Panama  Canal  Act,*"  the  Commission  has  held 
that  it  could  enforce  through  routes  with  a  water  carrier."" 

§  152.  Discrimination  by  Charging-  More  for  a  Shorter 
Than  a  Longer  Haul — Old  Law. — Section  four  of  the  Act  to 


87.  Missouri  &  Illinois  Coal  Co. 
V.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C. 
39,  44,  45,  46,  49. 
■  88.  Re  Coal  Rates  on  Stony 
Fork  Branch,  2fi  I.  C.  C.  168;  St. 
Louis,  S.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Peoria 
&  P.   U.   Ry.  Co..   26   I.  C.  C.   226. 

89.  Post.  Sec.  377. 

90.  Augusta  &  Savannah  Steam- 
boat Co.  V.  Ocean  Steamship  Co., 
26  I.  C.  C.  380;  Decatur  Nav.  Co. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  31  I.  C.  C. 
281  and  cases  cited;  Port  Huron 
&  D.  S.  S.  Co.  V.  P.  R.  Co.,  35 
I.  C.  C.  475.  In  discussing  this 
question  the  author  hereof  in  a 
report  to  the  Commission  adopted 
by  it  in  Baltimore  &  C.  S.  S.  Co. 
V.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  I.  C.  C. 
176,  180  said:  "Regardless  of  what 
the  defendants  have  done  in 
making  rates  into  the  southeast, 
they  are  under  a  duty  to  make 
reasonable  proportional  rates  to 
and  from  ports  reached  by  them, 
and  their  defense  in  this  case  is 
based  upon  conditions  which  Con- 
gress  intended   to   change  by   the 


provision  for  proportional  rates. 
Under  defendants'  system  of  rates 
there  is  a  minimum  of  water  haul 
and  a  maximum  of  rail  haul.  The 
full  utilization  of  the  water  high- 
ways will  tend  to  lessen  car  short- 
ages and  will  make  cheaper  the 
transportation  cost  of  many  com- 
modities of  prime  necessity.  The 
rail  carriers  are  entitled  to  a 
reasonable  compensation  for  their 
haul  between  ports  and  interior 
points,  but  no  more.  Nor  can 
the  rail  carriers  by  a  refusal  to 
publish  proportional  rates,  or  to 
join  in  through  routes  and  joint 
rates,  deprive  interior  points  of 
the  benefit  of  water  transportation 
to  and  from  the  ports  nearest  to 
such  points.  That  there  are  other 
reasonable  water-and-rail  routes 
furnishes  no  sufficient  justification 
for  a  refusal  to  establish  proport- 
ional rates  which  shall  make  a- 
vailable  a  route  that  will  increase 
the  water  haul  and  lessen  the 
rail  haul,  and  thus  decrease  the 
cost  of  the  total  haul." 


446  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  152 

Eegvilate  Commerce  as  originally  enacted,  known  as  the  long- 
and-short-haiil  clause,  prohibited  carriers  from  charging  or 
receiving  a  greater  compensation  from  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers or  '"like  kind  of  property  under  substantially  similar 
circumstances  and  conditions"  for  a  shorter  than  for  a  longer 
distance  over  the  same  line,  in  the  same  direction,  the  shorter 
being  included  in  the  longer.  The  proviso  of  the  section  au- 
thorized the  Commission,  in  special  cases,  after  investigation, 
to  permit  a  less  charge  for  a  longer  than  a  shorter  haul.  The 
meaning  of  this  proviso  was  first  discussed  by  Judge  Cooley, 
then  chairman  of  the  Commission,  In  re  Petition  of  Louisville 
and  Nashville  Railroad  Co.  and  Southern  Ry.  '&  S.  S.  Co.,  1 
I.  C.  C.  31,  57,  1  I.  C.  R.  278.  The  carriers,  not  knowing  just 
what  would  be  the  construction  of  the  section,  thought  it  wise 
to  appeal  to  the  discretion  granted  by  the  Commission  in  the 
proviso.  The  proceedings  before  the  Commission  in  the  case 
cited,  snpra,  are  given  at  length  in  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Reports,  vol.  I.  beginning  at  page  76. 

The  first  case  under  this  section  to  reach  the  Supreme  Court 
is  "what  is  known  as  the  Social  Circle  case."^  In  that  case  the 
first  contention  was  that  as  the  charge  to  Social  Circle  was 
made  up,  of  the  joint  rate  to  Atlanta,  the  long  haul,  plus  the 
local  rate  over  an  intrastate  road  from  Atlanta  to  Social 
Circle,  the  w^hole  of  the  local  rate  going  to  the  state  road,  the 
shipment  was  not  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate 
Commerce.  This  contention  was  held  unsound,  the  court  say- 
ing: "that  when  goods  are  shipped  under  a  through  bill  of 
lading,  from  a  point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in  another,  and 
when  such  goods  are  received  in  transit  by  a  state  common 
carrier,  under  a  conventional  division  of  the  charges,  such  car- 
rier must  be  deemed  to  have  subjected  its  road  to  an  arrange- 
ment for  a  continuous  carriage  or  shipment  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce."  Having  held  that  the 
Georgia  road  was  subject  to  the  provision  of  the  section,  the 
court  proceeded  to  define  the  power  of  the  Commission,  and  to 
state  the  effect  of  its  decision  that  the  section  had  been  vio- 
lated.   The  court  said : 

91.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Cincinnati,  184,  40  L.  Ed.  93.^,  16  Sup.  Ct.  700. 
N.  0.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  162  U.  S. 


§  153]  E/QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  447 

"Subject,  then,  as  we  hold  the  Georgia  Railroad  Company 
is,  under  the  facts  found,  to  the  provisions  of  the  act  to  regu- 
late commerce,  in  respect  to  its  interstate  freight,  it  follows, 
as  we  think,  that  it  was  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commis- 
sion to  consider  whether  the  said  company,  in  charging  a 
higher  rate  for  a  shorter  than  a  longer  distance  over  the  same 
line,  in  the  same  direction,  the  shorter  being  included  within 
the  longer  distance,  was  or  was  not  transporting  property  in 
transit  between  states,  under  'substantially  similar  circum- 
stances and  conditions.' 

''We  do  not  say  that,  under  no  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions, would  it  be  lawful,  when  engaged  in  the  transportation 
of  foreign  freight,  for  a  carrier  to  charge  more  for  a  shorter 
than  a  longer  distance  on  its  own  line ;  but  it  is  for  the  tri- 
bunal appointed  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  the  statute, 
whether  the  Commission  or  the  court,  to  consider  whether  the 
existing  circumstances  and  conditions  were  or  Avere  not  sub- 
stantially similar." 

§  153.  Long-  and  Short  Haul — Old  Law  Continued — Definite 
Construction. — In  the  Troy  Alabama  case,""  the  Supreme 
Court  held  that  competition  between  rival  routes  which  affects 
rates  must  be  considered  in  determining  whether  or  not  the 
circumstances  and  conditions  were  substantially  similar  under 
section  four  of  the  act,  although  such  competition  was  not  a 
pertinent  fact  in  considering  discrimination  under  section 
two.    It  was  there  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Shiras : 

"We  are  unable  to  suppose  that  Congi-ess  intended,  by  the 
4th  section  and  the  proviso  thereto,  to  forbid  the  common  car- 
riers, in  cases  where  circumstances  and  conditions  are  sub- 
stantially dissimilar,  from  making  different  rates  until  and 
unless  the  Commission  shall  authorize  them  so  to  do,  much  less 
do  we  think  that  it  was  the  intention  of  Congress  that  the  de- 
cision of  the  Commission,  if  applied  to,  could  not  be  reviewed 
by  the  courts.  The  provisions  of  section  16  of  the  act,  which 
authorizes  the  court  to  'proceed  to  hear  and  determine  the 
matter  speedily  as  a  court  of  equity,  and  without  the  formal 
pleadings    and   proceedings    applicable    to    ordinary    suits    in 

92.    Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Alabama      414,  18  Sup.  Ct.  45. 
M.  R.  Co.,  168  U.  S.  144,  42  L.  Ed. 


448  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  153 

equity  but  in  such  manner  as  to  do  justice  in  the  premises,  and 
to  this  end.  such  court  shall  have  power,  if  it  think  fit,  to  di- 
rect and  prosecute  in  such  mode  and  by  such  persons  as  it 
may  appoint,  all  such  inquiries  as  the  court  may  think  needful 
to  euable  it  to  form  a  just  judgment  in  the  matter  of  such 
petition,'  extend  as  well  to  an  inquiry  or  proceeding  under  the 
4th  section  as  to  those  arising  under  the  other  sections  of  the 
act." 

After  reviewing  the  evidence,  the  order  of  the  Commission 
was  set  aside.  This  decision  put  it  in  the  power  of  rail  car- 
riers i^ractically  to  destroy  the  force  of  section  four.  If  com- 
petition of  rival  lines  will  relieve  from  the  section,  it  is  always 
possible  for  the  line  that  reaches  the  longer  distance  point, 
and  not  the  shorter,  to  make  such  competition  as  will  release 
from  the  obligation  of  the  statute  the  carrier  that  serves  both 
points.  This  result  was  clearly  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Justice 
Harlan  in  his  dissenting  opinion,  in  language  as  follows : 

"I  dissent  from  the  opinion  and  judgment  in  this  case. 
Taken  in  connection  wnth  other  decisions  defining  the  powers 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  the  present  decision, 
it  seems  to  me,  goes  far  to  make  that  Commission  a  useless 
body  for  all  practical  purposes,  and  to  defeat  many  of  the  im- 
portant objects  designed  to  be  accomplished  by  the  various 
enactments  of  Congress  relating  to  Interstate  Commerce.  The 
Commission  was  established  to  protect  the  public  against  the 
improper  practices  of  transportation  companies  engaged  in 
commerce  among  the  several  states.  It  has  been  left,  it  is  true, 
with  power  to  make  reports,  and  to  issue  protests.  But  it  has 
been  shorn,  by  judicial  interpretation,  of  authority  to  do  any 
thing  of  an  effective  character.  It  is  denied  many  of  the 
powers  which,  in  my  judgment,  were  intended  to  be  conferred 
upon  it.  Besides,  the  acts  of  Congress  are  now  so  construed 
as  to  place  connnnnities  on  the  lines  of  interstate  commerce 
at  the  mercy  of  competing  railroad  companies  engaged  in  such 
commerce.  The  judgment  in  this  case,  if  I  do  not  misappre- 
hend its  scope  and  effect,  proceeds  upon  the  ground  that  rail- 
road companies,  when  competitors  for  interstate  business  at 
certain  points,  may,  in  order  to  secure  traffic  for  and  at  those 
points,  establish  rates  that  will  enable  them  to  accomplish  that 
result,   although   such   rates   may   discriminate   asrainst   inter- 


§  153]  Equality  in  Rates.  449 

mediate  points.  Under  such  an  interpretation  of  the  statutes 
in  question,  they  may  well  be  regarded  as  recognizing  the  au- 
thority of  competing  railroad  companies  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce — when  their  interests  will  be  subserved  thereby — to 
build  up  favored  centers  of  population  at  the  expense  of  the 
business  of  the  country  at  large.  I  cannot  believe  that  Con- 
gress intended  any  such  result,  nor  do  I  think  that  its  enact- 
ments, properly  interpreted,  would  lead  to  such  a  result." 

It  would  seem  that  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice 
Harlan,  supra,  more  nearly  applied  the  legislative  intent  than 
that  arrived  at  by  the  majority  of  the  court.  But  it  should  be 
remembered  that,  as  has  been  said  by  the  Supreme  Court,  the 
act  to  regulate  commerce  was  experimental,  and  its  purpose 
was  not  to  prevent,  l)ut  promote,  competition.  Competition  of 
markets  is  a  force  that  carriers  cannot  disregard,  it  affects  all 
transportation  to  a  greater  or  less  extent.  As  said  by  Arthur 
T.  Iladley,  Railroad  Transportation,  p.  65:  "The  wheat  of 
Dakota,  the  wheat  of  Russia,  and  the  wheat  of  India  come  into 
direct  competition.  The  supply  at  Odessa  is  an  element  in  de- 
termining the  price  at  Chicago.  *  *  *  Cabbages  from 
Germany  contend  with  cabbages  from  Missouri  in  the  markets 
of  New  York."  Nor  does  this  lower  rate  to  the  competitive 
point  injure  the  non-competitive  point,  so  long  as  there  is  any 
profit  in  the  competitive  rate.  This  point  is  clearly  pointed 
out  in  the  LaGrange  case'"'  The  higher  rate  for  the  local  haul 
is  sometimes  necessary  in  order  that  a  community  may  have 
railroad  transportation.  To  quote  again  from  Hadley's  Rail- 
road Transportation,  at  p.  115  : 

"Suppose  it  is  a  question  whether  a  road  can  be  bluilt 
through  a  country  district,  lying  between  two  large  cities, 
which  have  the  benefit  of  water  communication,  while  the 
intervening  district  has  not.  The  rate  between  these  points 
must  be  made  low  to  meet  water  competition ;  so  low  that  if 
it  were  applied  to  the  whole  business  of  the  road  it  would 
make  it  quite  unprofitable.  On  the  other  hand,  the  local  busi- 
ness at  intermediate  points  is  so  small  that  this  alone  cannot 
support  the  road,  no  matter  how  low  or  how  high  the  rates  are 
made.     So  that,  in  order  to  live  at  all,  the  road  must  secure 

93.   Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville      &  N.  R.  Co.,  190  U.  S.  273,  47  L. 


450  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  154 

two  different  things — the  high  rates  for  its  local  traffic,  and 
the  large  traffic  of  the  through  points  which  can  only  be 
attracted  by  low  rates.  If  the  community  is  to  have  the  road, 
it  must  permit  the  discrimination." 

The  burden  of  proof  to  show  dissimilarity  in  circumstances 
is  on  the  carrier."*  "Line"  used  in  the  statute  means  a  physi- 
cal line,  not  a  mere  business  arrangement."^ 

§  154.  Long  and  Short  Haul  Clause  under  Act  1910. — Con- 
gress in  1910  for  the  first  time  since  the  passage  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce,  amended  the  so-called  Long  and  Short 
Haul  Clause  of  the  Act  (Sec.  4).  The  Amendment  struck  out 
the  words  of  the  former  law  "under  substantially  similar  cir- 
cumstances and  conditions,"  but  gave  the  Commission  power, 
upon  application  and  after  investigation,  to  grant  relief  from 
the  operation  of  the  section  as  amended."^ 

Construing  the  Amended  Act  the  Commission  held  it  consti- 
tutional ;  held  that  its  provisions  granted  the  Commission 
power  to  determine  how  far  relief  should  be  extended,  power 
to  determine  whether  or  not  a  wrong  resulted  from  a  particu- 
lar application  of  rates  and  power  to  correct  that  wrong  if 
found  to  exist.  The  history  of  the  old  and  the  new  law  was  given 
and  the  conclusion  reached  that,  while  in  determining  what 

Ed.  1047,  23  Sup.  Ct.  687.  U.  S.  633,  42  L.  Ed.  306,  17   Sup. 

94.  Spartanburg  Board  of  Trade  Ct.  986;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  2  I.  v.  Behlmer,  175  U.  S.  648,  44  L. 
C.  C.  304,  2  I.  C.  R.  193.  Ed.    309,    20    Sup.    Ct.    209;    East 

95.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Ga.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int. 
&  L.  R.  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  158,  1  Com.  Com.,  181  U.  S.  1,  45  L. 
I.  C.  R.  500,  571;  Daniels  v.  Ed.  719,  21  Sup.  Ct.  516.  Se© 
Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  6  I.  also  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Clyde 
C.  C.  458,  476.  For  other  cases  S.  S.  Co.,  181  U.  S.  29,  45  L.  Ed. 
discussing  the  subject  see:  Rail-  729,  21  Sup.  Ct.  512;  Brewer  v. 
road  Com.  of  Georgia,  Trammel!  Central  of  Ga.  R.  Co.,  84  Fed. 
et  al.  V.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  258;  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Western 
C.   324,   4   I.   C.  R.   120,   150;    Tex.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  88  Fed.  186. 

&  P.   Ry.   Co.   V.   Int.   Com.   Com.,  96.    Sec.  348,  post.  Also  old  and 

162  U.   S.   197,   40   L.  Ed.   940,   16  new  law  contrasted,  Atchison,  T. 

Sup.     Ct.     666;     Parsons    v.     Chi-  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United   States, 

cago  &  N.  W.      Ry.  Co.,     167     U.  191    Fed.    856,    857.    and    Railroad 

S.    447,    42    L.    Ed.    231,    17    Sup.  Com.  of  Nev.  v.   So.  Pac   Co.,   21 

Ct.    887;    Int.    Com.    Com.    v.    De-  I.  C.  C  329,  332,  333. 
troit,    G.    H.    &    M.    Ry.    Co.,    167 


§  154A]  Equality  in  Rates..  451 

relief  should  be  granted  under  the  power  conferred  by  the 
proviso,  the  Commission  could  not  act  arbitrarily,  bjut  must 
apply  the  principles  controlling  in  administering  other  por- 
tions of  the  Act.  Applying  this  conclusion  to  transcontinental 
transportation,  the  Commission  divided  the  United  States  into 
zones  and  fixed  a  rate  percentage  between  the  different 
zones."  Suit  being  filed  in  the  Commerce  Court,  that  court 
enjoined  the  order  of  the  Commissions."^  An  appeal  being 
taken  to  the  Supreme  Court,  that  court  reversed  the  Com- 
merce Court  and  sustained  the  validity  of  the  statute,  thus 
leaving  in  force  the  orders  of  the  Commission.*" 

The  right  primarily  to  determine  for  themselves  the  exist- 
ence of  circumstances  as  a  basis  of  charging  higher  rates  for 
shorter  than  for  longer  distances,  was  taken  from  the  carriers 
and  vested  in  the  Commission  by  the  amendment  of  1910. 
This  fact  was  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court,  following  which 
statement  it  was  said  :^°°  "This  results  from  the  fact  that  by 
the  amendment  in  question  the  original  power  to  determine 
the  existence  of  the  conditions  justifying  the  greater  charge 
for  a  shorter  than  was  exacted  for  a  longer  distance,  was 
taken  from  the  carriers  and  primarily  vested  in  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission,  and  for  the  purpose  of  making  the 
prohibition  efficacious  it  was  enacted  that  after  a  time  fixed 
no  existing  rate  of  the  character  provided  for  should  continue 
in  force  unless  the  application  to  sanction  it  had  been  made 
and  granted." 

§  154 A.  Long  and  Short  Haul  Clause  Under  Act  1920. — For 
years  there  have  been  advocates  of  a  provision  which  would 

97.  Railroad    Com.    of    Nevada  C.    329    and    400,    supra,    Opinions 
V.   Southern  Pac.   Co.,   21  I.  C.  C.  Commerce   Court    Nos.    50,    51,    p. 
329;   City  of  Spoltane  v.  Northern  229 — ("Intermountain  Case"). 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  400.  100.    United  States  v.  L.  &  N.  R. 

98.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  Co.,  235  U.  S.  314,  59  L.  Ed.  245, 
V.  United  States,  191  Fed.  856.  35  Sup.  Ct.  113,  citing  Intermount- 

99.  United  States  v.  Atchison,  T.  ain  Case,  note,  supra-  Louisville 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  234  U.  S.  476,  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States  245 
58  L.  Ed.  1408,  34  Sup.  Ct.  986,  U.  S.  463,  62  L.  Ed.  400,  38  Sup. 
reversing  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Ct.  141;  United  States  v.  Mer- 
Co.  V.  United  States,  191  Fed.  chants  &  M.  Traffic  Assn.,  242  U. 
856,  supra,  and  sustaining  order  S.  178,  61  L.  Ed  233,  37  Sup.  Ct. 
of    the    Commission    in    21    I.    C.  24. 


452  Equality  in  Rates.  [^  155 

unqualifiedly  prohibit  a  greater  charge  for  a  shorter  haul  over 
the  same  line  in  the  same  direction.  The  amendment  of  1920 
is  a  compromise  between  such  advocates  and  those  v\^ho  were 
satisfied  with  the  amendment  of  1910.  The  quotation  conclud- 
ing section  154  above  is  ample  authority  to  sustain  the  valid- 
ity of  the  1920  amendment.  Such  amendment  grants  no  fur- 
ther power  to  the  Commission,  but  restricts  the  power  which 
it  had  under  the  former  law. 


101 


§  155.  Fourth  Section— Relation  between  Through  Rates 
and  Intermediate  Rates. — That  through  rates  should  not  ex- 
ceed the  sum  of  the  local  rates  and  that  prima  facie  the 
through  rates  should  be  less  than  the  aggregate  of  the  locals, 
were  general  principles  announced  and  applied  by  the  Com- 
mission prior  to  the  Act  of  1910.  The  amendment  contained 
in  that  Act  made  it  illegal  for  a  carrier  "to  charge  any  greater 
compensation  as  a  through  route  than  the  aggregate  of  the 
intermediate  rates  subject  to  the  provisions  of"  the  Act."^ 

The  Commission  has  assumed  to  grant  relief  from  this  clause 
of  the  Fourth  section  as  it  has  and  was  certainly  authorized  to 
do  as  to  the  provision  relating  to  long  and  short  hauls.  The 
purpose  of  the  Amendment  was  to  fix  one  method  of  measur- 
ing rates  and  to  prevent  unjust  discrimination.  Obviously 
two  or  more  hauls  over  intermediate  lines  should  cost  more 
than  one  haul  over  the  same  lines ;  therefore,  to  charge  more 
for  what  costs  less  is  unjust  discrimination.  The  subject 
has  been  discussed  supra,  section  119,  120  and  121. 

§  156.  Discrimination  between  Carloads  and  Less  than  Car- 
loads.— A  differential  between  carload  and  less  than  carload 
shipments  is  not  prohibited  by  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce, 
and  the  Commission  has  said  :"*  "It  is  a  sound  rule  for  car- 
riers to  adapt  their  classifications  to  the  laws  of  trade.  If  an 
article  moves  in  sufficient  volume,  and  the  demands  of  com- 
merce will  be  better  served,  it  is  reasonable  to  give  it  a  car  load 
classification  and  rate.  The  car  load  is  probably  the  only 
practicable  unit  of  quantity."  Whether  or  not  there  should 
be  a  differential  and,  if  any,  w^hat,  between  carload  and  less 

101.  Sec.  349.  post.  H.   R.   R.   Co.,   3   I.   C.   C.   R.   473, 

102.  Sec.  200,  post.  2  I.  C.  R.  742. 

103.  Thurber  v.  New  York  C.  & 


§  157]  EQUALITY  IN  Rates.  453 

than  carload  depends  npon  tlie  facts  and  circumstances  of 
each  particular  case.  One  of  the  most  important  facts  to  be 
considered  is  the  difference,  if  any,  in  the  cost  of  service. 

Noyes,  in  his  excellent  work  on  American  Railroad  Rates'"* 
says:  "Shipments  in  car  load  lots  furnish  a  large  paying 
freight  relative  to  dead  weight,  and  smaller  proportionate  ex- 
pense for  loading  and  unloading,  billing  and  collecting,  than 
small  shipments."  The  differential,  like  a  rate,  should  bie 
reasonable  and  should  be  fixed  with  a  view  to  the  just  inter- 
ests of  all  concerned  and  the  adjustment  of  this  difference 
rests  primarily  with  the  carriers'""  This  principle  has  been 
very  generally  recognized  by  carriers. 

The  number  of  commodities  taking  car  load  classifications 
has  materially  increased. 

This  progessive  recognition  of  the  law  that  it  is  discrimina- 
tion to  charge  for  a  less  expensive  movement  the  same  as  for  a 
more  expensive  one,  would  seem  to  justify  the  hope  that  this 
form  of  discrimination  may  eventually  be  abolished.  While 
the  Commission  has  always  shown  reluctance  to  require  the 
establishment  of  carload  ratings,  it  has  to  prevent  discrimina- 
tion ordered  carriers  to  make  such  a  rating.'""  The  question 
is  discussed  in  sections  112,  113,  and  116  supra,  and  there  is  a 
full  review  of  the  authorities  in  the  Taylor  Dry  Goods  case.'" 

§  157.  Bulked  Shipments.— It  has  been  held'"'  in  England 
that  a  railway  company  cannot  legally  charge  a  greater  sum 

104.  Noyes,  American  Railroad  Ry.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  101;  South- 
Rates,  73.  eastern  Cotton  Goods  43  I.   C.  C. 

105.  Business  Men's  League  of  530,  536,  and  Consolidated  Claa- 
St.  Louis  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  sification  Case,  54  I.  C.  C.  8,  the 
Ry.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  318,  358,  359,  Commission  continues  its  "pro- 
368;  California  Com.  Asso.  v.  gressive  recognition''  of  the  text 
Wells  Fargo  Ex.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  of  this  section  written  in  1909. 
422;  Scofield  v.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  In  Wyeth  Hdw.  &  l\Ifg.  Co.  v.  A. 
R.  Co.,  2  I.  C.  C.  90,  2  I.  C.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  697, 
R.  67.  700,  the  Commission  came  near  to 

106.  Spokane   v.   N.   P.   R.   Co.,  a  retrograte  movement. 

19  I.  C.  C.  162.  108.    Crouch  v.  G.  N.  R.  Co.,  11 

107.  Taylor  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Ex.  742,  25  L.  J.  Ex.  137,  Baxen. 
M.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  205.  In  dale  v.  L.  &  S.  W.  Ry.,  4  H.  & 
the  1915  Western  Advance  Rate  C.  130,  35  L.  J.  Ex.  108,  L.  R. 
Case,    30    I.    C.    C.    497,    495;    Chi-  1  Ex.  137,  12  Jur.   (N.  S.)   274,  14 

cago  Wool  Co.  V.   C.  M.  &  St.   P.        L.  T.  26,  14  W.  R.  458. 


454  "Equality  in  Rates.  ['^  158 

for  the  ear'-'age  of  a  package  containing  several  parcels 
belonging  to  different  persons  than  for  a  package  containing 
several  parcels  all  belonging  to  one  person.  The  English 
rule  was  held  by  the  majority  of  the  Commission,  Mr.  Com- 
missioner Lane  writing  the  opinion,  to  be  the  law  in  the 
United  States.^""  From  this  rule  Commissioners  Knapp  and 
Harlan  dissented.  The  question  coming  before  the  circuit 
court,  Circuit  Judges  Lacombe,  Ward  and  Noyes  adopted 
the  dissenting  opinion  of  Mr.  Commissioner  Knapp/^"  It 
is  difficult  to  see  what  interest  a  carrier  has  in  the  question 
of  whether  or  not  the  several  packages  constituting  a  car- 
load of  freight  belong  to  one  or  more  persons.  "When  only 
one  bill  of  lading  is  issued  and  only  one  person  is  dealt  with, 
why  should  a  carrier  ask  as  to  the  title  to  the  several  par- 
cels? Does  not  the  rule  announced  by  the  court  supra 
open  an  opportunity  for  illegal  devices?  Suppose  a  shipper 
claims  he  owns  all  the  packages  and  they  are  billed  to  one 
consignee,  it  would  in  some  cas,es,  be  impossible  to  prove  that 
the  shipper's  statement  was  not  true.  In  a  case  wherie  a 
shipper  concealed  the  true  ownership  he  would  get  a  carload 
rating,  while  the  more  honest  shipp,er  would  pay  the  higher 
rate.  Discrimination  refers  to  the  matter  of  carriage  and 
character  of  the  commodity,  not  to  the  question  of  title.  If 
the  shipmeJits  move  the  sam,e  way,  with  the  same  expense  to 
the  carrier,  and  are  of  like  kind  of  traffic,  it  should  make  no 
difference  whether  the  shipper  is  the  real  owner  or  only  trustee 
for  the  real  owners. 

§  158.  Carloads — Ownership  of. — The  next  preceding  sec- 
tion taken  from  the  first  edition  of  this  book  was  written 
prior  to  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Bulked 
Shipment  case.'''"  In  that  case,  decided  April  3,  1911,  the 
rule  announced  in  the  text  was  stated  to  be  the  law.  In  the 
course  of  the  opinion  it  was  said : 

109.  California  Com.  Asso.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  166  Fed.  499. 
"Wells  Fargo  Ex.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  111.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Delaware, 
422;  Export  Shipping  Co.  v.  Wa-  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  235, 
bash  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  437,  and  252,  253,  55  L.  Ed.  448,  31  Sup. 
cases  cited  in  the  prevailing  and  Ct.  392.  citing  as  construing  the 
dissenting  opinions.  English    Equality    Clause,    Great 

110.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.       Western  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  1869— 


<^  159]  E-QUALITY  IN  Rates.  455 

"The  contention  that  a  carrier  when  goods  are  tendered  to 
him  for  transportation  can  make  the  mere  ownership  of  the 
goods  the  test  of  the  duty  to  carry,  or,  what  is  equivalent, 
may  discriminate  in  fixing  the  charge  for  carriage,  not  upon 
any  difference  inhering  in  the  goods  or  in  the  cost  of  the 
service  rendered  in  transporting  them,  but  upon  the  mere 
circumstance  that  the  shipper  is  or  is  not  the  real  owner  of 
the  goods  is  so  in  conflict  with  the  obvious  and  elementary 
duty  resting  upon  a  carrier,  and  so  destructive  of  the  rights 
of  shippers  as  to  demonstrate  the  unsoundness  of  the  proposi- 
tion by  its  mere  statement." 

In  giving  the  reason  for  the  conclusion  reached,  the  court 
said : 

"Moreover,  the  unsoundness  of  the  contention  is  demon- 
strated by  authority.  It  is  not  open  to  question  that  the 
provisions  of  Section  2  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  were 
substantially  taken  from  Section  90  of  the  English  Railway 
Clauses  Consolidated  Act  of  1845,  known  as  the  Equality 
Clause." 

The  principle  being  thus  established,  is  universally  followed. 

It  has  been  held  that  in  such  shipments  the  forwarding 
agent  is  so  far  the  agent  of  the  shipper  as  to  bind  him  by 
a  contract  for  released  rates."" 

§  159.  Train  Loads. — The  usual  course  of  business  must  be 
considered  in  determining  questions  of  discrimination,  and 
while  there  may  be  some  basis  in  logic  for  the  claim  that  a 
lower  rate  a  car  should  be  made  on  train  loads  than  on  ear- 
loads,  in  fact  train  loads  are  rarely  used  and  such  a  unit  of 
quantity  would  not  be  equitable  or  justified.  This  principle 
is  well  expressed  by  the  Commission  as  follows : 

"Whatever  difference  there  may  be  in  the  cost  to  the 
carrier  between  traffic  in  train  loads  and  traffic  in  carloads, 
it  appears  from  the  general  course  of  legislation  with  respect 
to  commerce  between  the  states,  from  the  debates  and  reports 

L.  R.   4,  H.   L.   226,   38   L.   J.   Ex.  Manchester,   etc.,  R.   Co.   1885—11 

177,    22    L.    T.    43,    18    W.    R.    92;  App.  Cas.  97. 

Evershed    v.     London    &    N.    W.  112.    Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Ry.  Co.,  1878^33  App.  Cas.  1029,  O'Conner,    232    U.    S.    508,    58    L. 

and  Denaby  Main  Colliery  Co.  v.  Ed.  703,  34  Sup.  Ct.  380. 


456  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  160 

of  the  various  committees  in  Congress  when  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Interstate  Commerce  was  under  consideration,  from  the 
better  considered  court  opinions,  and  from  the  reports  and 
opinions  of  this  Commission,  that  to  give  greater  consideration 
to  train-load  traffic  than  to  carload  traffic  would  create  prefer- 
ence in  favor  of  large  shippers  and  be  to  the  prejudice  of 
small  shippers  and  the  public.""^ 

§  1C)0.  Classification  of  Commodities  Should  Be  Without 
Discrimination. — Classification  of  commodities,  like  any  other 
act  of  the  carrier  affecting  the  rate  to  be  charged,  must  be 
reasonable  and  such  classification  must  be  based  on  a  real 
distinction.'"  Unless  the  distinction  is  real,  it  would  violate 
section  two  of  the  interstate  commerce  act  and  discriminate 
beween  "like  kinds  of  traffic."  A  uniform  classification  would 
be  much  better  than  the  differences  now  existing  in  that 
respect  and  the  Commission  "has  sought  as  far  as  practic- 
able to  secure  the  establishment  throughout  the  country  of 
a  uniform  classification  of  freight/'"^  We  have  seen,  sec- 
tion 90  ante,  that  low  class  traffic  of  prime  utility  and 
moving  in  large  quantities  demands  a  low  rate .  The 
principles  of  classification  are  so  important  and  are  sc 
clearly  stated  by  Prof.  Henry  C.  Adams,  former  Statistician 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,"^  that  it  is  valuable 
to  reproduce  them  here : 

"Principles  underlying  freight  classifications. — It  was  dis- 
covered early  that  the  charges  for  transportation  of  different 
articles  of  freight  could  not  be  apportioned  among  such 
articles  with  regard  alone  to  the  cost  of  carriage.  This  basis 
of  determining  the  charges,  it  was  found,  would  confine  to 
narrow  limits  the  movement  of  different  articles,  whose  bulk 
or   weight    was   large    in    comparison    to    their    value,    while 

113.     Anaconda    Copper    Mining  114.    Stowe-Fuller  Co.   v.   Penn- 

Co.    V.    Chicago    &   E.    R.    Co.,    19  sylvania   Co.,    12   I.   C.    C.  R.   215, 

I.  C.  C.  592,  596;     Carstens  Pack-  220. 

ing   Co.   V.    Oregon    S.   L.    R.    Co.,  115.    Duluth  Shingle  Co.  v.  Du- 

17  I.  C.  C.  324,  328.     See  also  Sec.  I'Uh,  etc.,   R.   Co.,   10   I.   C.   C.   R. 

116,  supra:  Burlington  C.  R.  &  N.  489,  504. 

Ry.  Co.  V.  Northwestern  Fuel  Co.,  116.   Railways  in  United  States, 

31   Fed.   652;    Paine  Bros.  v.   Le-  part  2,  pp  14,  lo. 
high  Valley  R.  Co.,  7  I.  C.  C.  218. 


§  160]  Equality  in   Rates.  457 

heavier  articles  with  less  bulk  would  l)e  made  to  pay  dispro- 
portionately low  rates. 

"Under  the  system  of  apportioning  the  charges  strictly  to 
the  cost,  some  kinds  of  commerce  which  have  been  very  use- 
ful to  the  country  and  have  a  tendency  to  bring  different 
sections  into  more  intimate  business  and  social  relations  could 
never  have  amounted  to  anj^  considerable  magnitude,  and  in 
some  cases  could  not  have  existed  at  all,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  the  value  at  the  place  of  delivery  would  not  equal  the 
purchase  price  with  the  transportation  added.  The  tratSc 
would  thus  be  precluded,  because  the  charge  for  carriage 
would  be  greater  than  it  could  bear.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  rates  for  the  carriage  of  articles  which,  with  small  bulk 
or  weight,  concentrated  great  value  would,  on  that  system 
of  making  them,  be  absurdly  low  when  compared  to  the  value 
of  the  articles,  and  perhaps  not  less  so  when  the  comparison 
was  with  the  value  of  the  service  in  transporting  them. 

"Accordingly,  it  was  found  not  to  be  unjust  to  distribute 
tlie  entire  cost  of  service  among  all  articles  carried  on  a  basis 
that  gave  greater  consideration  to  the  relative  value  of  the 
service  than  to  the  cost.  Such  a  method  would  be  most  bene- 
ficial to  the  country ;  it  would  enlarge  commerce  and  extend 
communication,  and  would  be  better  for  the  railroads  be- 
cause of  the  increased  traffic  which  would  be  brought  to  them. 

"The  value  of  the  article  carried  under  this  system  would 
be  the  most  important  element  in  determining  what  freight 
charge  it  should  bear.  Other  considerations,  however,  equally 
important  must  not  be  overlooked  when  the  freight  classifica- 
tion is  to  be  made.  The  classifications  as  now  constructed  have 
for  tlieir  foundation  the  following  elements : 

"The  competitive  element  or  the  rates  made  necessary  by 
competition. 

"The  volume  of  the  business — that  is,  the  tonnage  move- 
ment. 

"The  direction  in  which  the  freight  moves,  that  is,  whether 
it  moves  in  the  direction  in  which  most  of  the  freight  is 
transported  or  in  the  reverse  direction  in  which  empty  cars  are 
running. 

"The  value  of  the  article. 

"The  bulk  and  weight. 


458  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  161 

"The  degree  of  risk  attending  transportation. 

"The  facilities  required  for  particular  or  special  shipments. 

"The  conditions  attending  transportation,  such  as  furnish- 
ing special  equipment,  as  in  the  case  of  private  dressed-beef 
cars  or  cars  specially  adapted  for  freight  of  a  perishable 
nature,  or  cars  of  large  size  for  freight  of  extraordinary  bulk. 

"Another  condition  which  has  also  received  consideration 
is  the  analogy  M^^ich  the  new  articles  to  be  classified  bear 
to  other  articles  found  in  the  classification. 

"The  conditions  under  which  railroad  companies  can  af- 
ford to  transport  traffic  have  a  large  influence  in  determining 
the  classification. 

"These  are  the  general  rules  under  which  classifications 
are  constructed,  and  while  to  a  large  extent  controlling,  the 
classifications  are,  notwithstanding,  in  a  great  measure  a 
series  of  compromises,  the  participants  in  which  are  not  alone 
the  railroads,  but  also  the  shippers  and  representatives  of 
business  interests  throughout  the  country,  the  latter  being 
aflt'orded  ample  opportunity  to  join  with  the  railroads  in  the 
discussion  as  to  the  proper  classification  of  articles  of  ship- 
ment affecting  their  interests. 

""While  the  pressure  for  reductions  is  very  strong  from 
certain  localities,  concessions  are  not  now  so  readily  granted, 
as  the  territory  covered  ^yy  the  freight  classifications  is  so 
large  that  great  care  in  the  assignment  of  articles  to  particular 
classes  must  be  taken  in  order  to  avoid  working  an  injury  to 
any  particular  section.  The  commercial  and  transportation 
interests  are  regarded  as  identical,  and  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  territory  and  all  interests  affected  must  be  considered. 
It  is,  however,  occasionally  observed  that  particular  localities 
are,  to  some  extent,  preferentially  served  by  the  action  of 
carriers  who  resist  proposed  changes  in  the  classification  for 
the  reason  that,  in  their  opinion,  they  will  operate  to  the 
prejudice  of  certain  patrons.  Thus  exceptions  to  the  classi- 
fication are  created  by  a  road  continuing  to  carry  some  ar- 
ticles at  one  class,  while,  in  the  opinion  of  a  majority  of  the 
roads  using  the  classification,  the  articles  could  well  stand  a 
higher  rating." 

§  161.  Uniform  Classification. — Efforts  to  obtain  uniformity 
in  the  classification  of  coinmodities  have  been  made  since  the 


§  161]  E-QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  459 

date  of  the  original  Act  to  Eegulate  Commerce,  and  probably 
even  before  that  date.  Beginning  at  page  453  of  volume  25 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  Reports  is  given  a 
history  of  these  efforts  since  1887.  In  the  same  case  in  which 
that  history  is  given  the  Commission  stated  some  principles 
which  should  be  applied  to  all  attempts  to  reach  uniformity. 
Says  the  Commission:  "The  making  of  a  freight  classifica- 
tion is  a  great  public  function,"  and  further:  "No  great  re- 
form like  classification  reform,  which  touches  every  interest 
in  the  country,  can  ever  hope  to  be  carried  into  effect  without 
causing  disturbances,  annoyance,  and  opposition,  and  some 
injustice.  It  is  therefore  especially  important  that  before  a 
classification  committee  publishes  new  rules,  descriptions., 
packing  requirements,  and  ratings,  full  public  hearings  shall 
have  previously  been  given  after  sufficient  notice.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  hear  everyhody.  In  making  a  classification  that 
would  mean  endless  repetition  and  interminahle  controversy 
without  ever  reaching  a  conclusion.  Rather  is  it  important 
to  hear  everything.  In  other  words  a  body  of  experts  in 
classification  should  hear  and  know  everything  and  then  form 
their  conclusions."  ^^'^ 

We  now  have  three  general  classifications : 

First.  The  official  classification,  which,  speaking  generally, 
applies  north  of  the  Ohio  and  Potomac  Rivers  and  East  of 
Chicago  and  Mississippi  River. 

Second.  Southern  classification,  applying  generally  to  the 
territory  south  of  the  Ohio  and  Potomac  Rivers  and  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River. 

Third.  The  western  classification,  applying  to  that  territory 
not  included  in  the  other  two  classifications. 

Besides  the  three  general  classifications  referred  to  there 
are  classifications  published  by  the  railroad  commissions  of  the 
States  of  Illinois.  Iowa,  Georgia,  North  Carolina  and  Florida, 
applying  locally  on  shipments  moving  between  points  in 
those  states.  Between  points  in  the  State  of  Texas  the  west- 
ern  classification    governs    in    connection    with   an    exception 

117.    Re  Western  Classification,      I.   C.    C.    554.      See   also    Sections 
25  I.  C.  C.  442,  450,  451,  et  scq.;      81,  81  A  ante,  and  160,  supra. 
Western    Trunk    Line    Rules,    34 


460  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  162 

shoet  published  by  the  railroad  commission  of  that  state. 
There  is  also  a  classification  known  as  the  New  England 
Freight  Classification,  which  governs  the  class  rates  between 
points  on  the  eastern,  western  and  northern  divisions  of  the 
Boston  and  Maine  Railroad. 

Progress  has  been  made  towards  uniformity  of  classifica- 
tion by  the  decisions  in  the  Consolidated  Classification  case"* 
and  the  Perishable  Freight  Investigation.*^"  This  uniformity 
should  be  reached  separately  from  any  question  of  the  meas- 
ure of  rates.  When  the  carriers  seek  so  to  change  this  classi- 
fication as  to  raise  rates,  the  fact  that  uniformity  may  also 
be  accomplished  will  not  justifv  an  otherwise  unjustified 
rate."" 

§  162.  Power  of  Commission  over  Classification. — The  Com- 
mission has  the  power  to  prohibit  a  classification  that  works  a 
discrimination.  This  power  was  exercised  by  the  Commission 
and  a  forcible  and  illustrative  opinion  written  by  Mr.  Com- 
missioner Knapp  in  Procter  &  Gamble  v.  Cincinnati,  H.  & 
D.  Ry.  Co.'"^  This  order  of  the  Commission  was  enforced.""^ 
The  Supreme  Court,  Mr.  Justice  "White  delivering  the  opin- 
ion, concluded  the  discussion  of  the  question  by  saying : 

"AVhatever  might  be  the  rule  by  which  to  determine  whether 
an  order  of  the  Commission  was  too  general  where  the  case 
with  which  the  order  dealt  involved  simply  a  discrimination 
as  against  an  individual,  or  a  discrimination  or  preference 
in  favor  of  or  against  an  individual  or  specific  commodity  or 
commodities  or  localities,  or  as  applied  to  territory  subject 
to  different  classifications,  we  think  it  is  clear  that  the 
order  made  in  this  case  was  within  the  competency  of  the 
Commission,  in  view  of  the  nature  and  character  of  the  wrong 
found  to   have  been  committed  and  the   redress  which  that 

118.  Consolidated  Clasificatlon  higher  than  class  rates,  although 
Case,  all  of  Vol.  .54  I.  C.  C.  this    is    unusual.    Sulphuric    Acid 

119.  Perishable  Freight  Investl-  from  New  Orleans,  42  I.  C.  C.  200, 
gation,  56  I.  C.  C.  449.  202     and     cases     cited;     Warren, 

120.  National  Society  of  Record  Webster  &  Co.,  v.  P.  &  Ry.  Co., 
Assn.  V.   A.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  38  I.  C.  C.  499. 

C.   347,    356.     Associated   Railway  121.    Procter  &  Gamlile  v.  Cin- 

Classification  Exceptions  41  I.  C.  cinnati,  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.,  9  1.  C. 
C    561.     Commodity  rates  may  be      C.  440. 

122.   Cincinnati  H.  &  D.  Ry.  Co. 


§  1G8]  E-QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  461 

wrong  necessitated.  Finding,  as  the  Commission  did,  that 
the  classification,  by  percentage  of  common  soap  in  less  than 
carload  lots  operating  througout  offical  classification  ter- 
ritory, brought  about  a  general  disturbance  of  the  relations 
previously  existing  in  that  territory,  and  created  discrimina- 
tions and  preferences  among  manufacturers  and  shippers  of 
the  commodity  and  between  localities  in  such  territory,  we 
think  the  Commission  was  clearly  within  the  authority  con- 
ferred by  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  in  directing  the 
carriers  to  cease  and  desist  from  further  enforcing  the  classifi- 
cation operating  such  results." 

The  subject  is  one  which  involves  so  many  facts  that  only 
the  general  principles  come  within  the  purview  of  this  book. 
In  a  report  of  nearly  two  hundred  pages  the  Commission  has 
discussed  the  subject,  cited  illustrative  decisions,  given  the 
history  of  eflforts  for  uniform  classification,  and  annoimced 
applicable  principles.'" 

§  163.  Milling:  in  Transit. — The  Interstate  Commerce  Act  in 
force  prior  to  the  amendment  of  June  29,  1906,  was  construed 
as  giving  the  Commission  no  power  to  compel  carriers  to  grant 
the  privilege  known  as  milling  in  transit.^'*  This  privilege 
is  described  and  its  legality  discussed  by  Mr.  Commissioner 
Prouty  as  follows :'" 

"Generally  in  its  application  the  raw  material  pays  the 
local  rate  into  the  point  of  manufacture ;  when  afterwards 
the  manufactured  product  goes  forward  it  is  transported  upon 
a  rate  which  would  be  applicable  to  that  product  had  it 
originated  in  its  manufactured  state  at  the  point  where  the 
raw  material  was  received  for  transportation,  whatever  has 
been  paid  into  the  mill  being  accounted  for  in  this  final 
adjustment.  Under  this  or  some  equivalent  arrangement  at 
the  present  time  grain  of  all  kinds  is  milled  and  otherwise 
treated  in  transit;  flour  is  blended,  cotton  is  compressed, 
lumber  is  dressed  and  perhaps  otherwise  manufactured ;  live 
stock  is  stopped  ofi'  to  test  the  market. 

V.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  206  U.  S.  142,       Interior   Iowa   Cities   Case,    28    I. 
51    L.    Ed.    995,    27    Sup.    Ct.    648.       C.   C.    64. 

123.    Re  Western  Classification,  124.    Diamond  Mills  Co.  v.  Bos- 

2r,    I.    C.    C.    442,    609.      See    also       ton  &  M.  R.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  311. 

125.    Central  Yellow  Pine  Assn. 


462  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  163 

"It  may  be  argued  with  much  force  that  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce  does  not  sanction  arrangements  of  this  kind 
and  the  Commission  early  in  its  history  intimated  that  such 
might  finally  be  its  conclusion.  Crews  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R. 
Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  Rep.  401,  1  Inters.  Com.  Rep.  703.  Such  prac- 
tices were,  however,  in  use  to  a  considerable  extent  at  the 
time  of  the  passage  of  the  act  and  since  then  they  have  be- 
come universal.  To  abrogate  these  privileges  would  be  to 
confiscate  thousands  and  probably  millions  of  dollars  in  value 
by  rendering  worthless  industrial  plants  which  have  been 
constructed  upon  the  faith  of  their  continuation.  Nor  is  it 
a  forced  construction  of  the  statute  to  hold  that  w^hen  the 
product  finally  goes  forward  to  the  point  of  consumption  it 
but  completes  the  journey  upon  which  is  entered  when  the 
raw  material  was  taken  up.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
application  of  this  principle  has  cheapened  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation and  probably  of  manufacture.  The  commission 
finally  held,  In  re  Unlawful  Rates  in  the  Transportation  of 
Cotton,  8  I.  C.  C.  Rep.  121,  that  cotton  might  be  compressed  in 
transit. ' ' 

The  Commission  has  said  :^"'' 

"The  stopping  of  a  commodity  in  transit  for  the  purpose  of 
treatment  or  reconsignment  is  in  the  nature  of  a  special  priv- 
ilege which  the  carrier  may  concede,,  but  which  the  shipper 
cannot,  in  the  present  state  of  the  law,  demand  as  a  matter  of 
lawful  right.  Carriers  may  not,  however,  discriminate  be- 
tween markets  nor  between  individuals  in  the  granting  of  such 
privileges." 

In  the  Diamond  Mills  case,  supra,  the  Commis.sion  said:  "A 
complete  system  of  interstate  railway  regulation  would  prob- 
able give  the  regulating  body  authority  to  determine  when 
privileges  of  this  kind  should  be  accorded,  and  upon  what 
terms,  for  they  all  enter  into  and  are  really  part  of  the  rate." 

The  Hepburn  amendment  has  given  to  the  Commission  the 
right  and  power  to  regulate  these  matters.  Section  one  of 
the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  as  it  now  exists"^  provides: 

V.  Vicksburg   S.   &  P.   R.   Co.,   10      v.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co..  11  I.  C.  C. 
I    C.  C.  19,  213.  214.  R.  90,  101. 

126.    St.  Louis  Hay  &  Grain  Co.  127.   post,  sec.  335. 


§  164:]  E-QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  463 

"The  term  'transportation'  shall  include  *  *  *  all  in- 
struments and  facilities  of  shipment  or  carriage  *  *  * 
and  all  services  in  connection  with  the  receipt,  delivery,  eleva- 
tion, and  transfer  in  transit  *  *  *  storage  and  handling 
of  property  transported,"  and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  every 
carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  act  to  provide  and 
furnish  such  transportation  upon  reasonable  request  therefor, 
and  to  establish  through  routes  and  just  and  reasonable  rates 
applicable  thereto.  Under  this  amended  law  the  Commission 
has  required  milling  in  transit  to  be  extended  so  as  to  pre- 
vent discrimination/"* 

In  the  1915  Western  Rate  Advance  case,'"*  it  appeared 
that  the  grain  rates  then  sought  to  be  advanced  were  suf- 
ficiently high,  that  the  flour  rates  which  were  the  proportional 
or  remainder  of  the  through  rates  were  too  low.  The  car- 
riers having  offered  their  proof  on  the  theory  that  the  mill- 
ing in  transit  privilege  should  continue,  it  was  pointed  out 
by  the  Commission  that  the  owner  of  the  grain  who  paid  the 
high  local  rate  to  the  mill  or  the  market  should  not  have 
his  rates  increased,  because  the  remainder  of  the  through 
rate  was  too  low. 

§  ]64.  Rebilling. — Eebilling  is  a  privilege  granted  to  cer- 
tain markets  and  consists  of  the  right  to  ship  a  commodity 
from  the  point  where  it  is  produced  to  a  distributing  market 
where  the  shipper  may  unload,  sort  and  clean  the  commodity, 
thereafter  shipping  the  same  amount  of  the  same  kind  of 
commodity  to  his  customers,  not  at  the  local  rate  from  the 
distributing  point  to  the  final  destination  but  at  the  remainder 
of  the  through  rate.  Commissioner  Prouty  illustrated  the 
practice  at  Kansas  City  as  follows :"" 

"During  the  period  covered  by  this  investigation,  which 
was  from  April  1st  to  July  7th,  1896,  and  for  a  considerable 

128.  Southern  Illinois  Miller's  and  Practices  in  the  Transport- 
Assn.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  ation  of  Grain,  7  I.  C.  C.  240. 
C.  672,  678.  241,    242,    247.    See    also    Re    Sub- 

129.  Western  Rate  Advance  Case  stitution  of  Tonnage  at  Transit 
1{>15,  35  I.  C.  C.  497;  Nashville  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280.  For  a  fur- 
Flower  Transit  Rules,  41  I.  C.  C.  ther  definition  see  Cairo  Board  of 
483,  490.  Trade  v.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

130.  Re  Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  46  I.  C.  C.  343,  348. 


4G4  Equality  in  Rates.  [^  164 

period  prior  thereto,  the  rate  on  corn  from  Kansas  City  to 
Chicago  was  20  cents  per  100  pounds.  Hutchinson,  Kansas,  is 
a  station  upon  the  Santa  Fe  Railway,  which  runs  from  there 
through  Kansas  City  to  Chicago,  111.  The  through  rate  from 
Hutchinson  to  Chicago  was  25  cents,  and  the  local  rate  from 
Plutchinson  to  Kansas  City  IS^/o  cents.  A  shipper  from 
Plutchinson  would  forward  a  car  load  of  corn  to  Kansas  City 
and  pay  the  local  rate  of  13 Vo  cents.  If  afterwards  he  con- 
cluded to  send  this  car  load  on  to  Chicago  he  might  ship  it 
by  the  Santa  Fe  Road,  or  by  any  other  road  between  the  two 
points,  at  the  balance  of  the  through  rate  from  Hutchinson. 
The  Chicago  &  Alton  Railroad,  for  instance,  would  transport 
this  car  load  of  corn  from  Kansas  City  to  Chicago,  not  for 
20  cents  per  100  pounds,  but  for  11  Mi  cents .  If  the  grain  was 
sold  at  Kansas  City,  the  purchaser  succeeded  to  the  right  of 
sending  it  forward  at  the  reduced  rate. 

"When  the  shij^per  shipped  this  car  load  of  corn  to  Kansas 
City  he  had,  as  an  ordinary  thing,  no  idea  or  purpose  as  to 
its  ultimate  destination.  It  might  be  eaten  in  Kansas  City; 
it  might  be  sent  to  the  Chicago  market,  or  it  might  go  to 
the  Gulf ;  there  was  nothing  upon  any  of  the  papers  connected 
with  its  transportation  to  indicate  wliat  its  destination  beyond 
Kansas  City  was,  or  that  it  was  destined  to  any  point  beyond, 
but  if  he  did  subsequently  elect  to  ship  it  beyond  Kansas 
City,  the  rate  to  any  point  he  might  select  was  the  difference 
between  the  through  rate  from  Hutchinson  to  the  point  of 
destination  and  the  local  rate  which  he  had  already  paid 
from  Hutchinson,  and  this  rate  was  always  different  from 
the  rate  between  Kansas  City  and  the  point  of  destination. 

"The  result,  of  course,  was  that  nearly  all  grain  was  ship- 
ped into  Kansas  City  upon  a  local  bill  of  lading  in  the  first 
instance  and  was  afterward  sent  forward,  if  it  finally  went 
forward,  upon  a  new  bill  of  lading  at  the  balance  of  the 
through  rate.  The  difference  between  the  through  rate  from 
the  point  of  origin  to  the  point  of  destination  and  the  local 
rate  from  the  point  of  origin  to  Kansas  City  was  not  the  same 
in  all  eases,  nor,  indeed,  in  most  cases,  and  consequently  the 
balance  of  the  through  rate  continually  varied." 

In  the  same  case  the  practice  was  declared  illegal  and  this 
rule  was  stated: 


•^  165]  E-QUALiTY  IN  Rates.  465 

"An  indispensable  element  in  every  through  shipment 
would  seem  to  be  a  contract  for  such  through  service ;  an 
agreement  between  the  parties  at  the  inception  of  the  car- 
riage that  the  freight  shall  be  transported  to  the  point  of 
destination  at  the  through  rate." 

Tts  disapproval  of  the  practice  wa  sindicated  by  the  com- 
mission in  the  cases  of  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Wichita  v.  Atchison, 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ky.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  534,  and  Cannon  Falls  Elevator 
Co.  V.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  650. 

§  165.  Rebilling: — Found  Illegal. — In  the  Duncan  case"'  the 
Commission,  speaking  through  Mr.  Commissioner  Clements, 
describes  the  practice  and  states  the  conclusion  of  the  Com- 
mission as  follows : 

"It  is  contended  by  defendants  that  rebilling  or  reship- 
ping  is  on  the  same  basis  as  milling  in  transit  and  similar 
privileges.  There  is  no  case  before  us  in  this  case  against 
milling  in  transit,  but  it  appears  from  the  record  that  the 
privilege  of  milling  in  transit  is  accorded  uniformly  through- 
out the  southeastern  territory  and  is  in  no  sense  applied  to 
Nashville  or  any  other  particular  point  alone. 

"We  are  not  convinced  that  the  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions under  which  the  reshipping  privilege  is  accorded  at 
Nashville  are  so  dissimilar  from  those  obtained  at  the  other 
points  involved  in  this  traffic  as  to  justify  giving  it  our 
sanction  on  that  ground.  However,  there  are  other  aspects 
independent  of  this  which  lead  us  to  regard  this  privilege 
with  disfavor. 

"Illustrating  the  second  feature  of  the  complaint  as  to  the 
alleged  illegality  of  this  privilege,  the  following  example  is 
given :  A  Nashville  dealer  buys  2  cars  of  grain,  1  at  Memphis 
and  1  at  Louisville.  He  pays,  up  to  Nashville  on  a  Memphis 
car,  11  cents  per  100  pounds  and  on  the  Louisville  car  10 
cents.  Should  this  Memphis  ear  burn,  after  being  put  in 
the  warehouse,  or  be  sold  at  Nashville,  he  would  have  two 
expense  bills  and  one  car  of  grain.  Should  he  sell  a  car  at 
Atlanta,  the  Nashville  merchant  would  naturally  use  the 
Memphis  bill  which  shows  a  payment  of  11  cents,  paying  the 

131.    Duncan  v.  N.   C.  &  St.  L.       Ry.  Co.,  16  I.  C.  C.  590. 


466  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  165 

balance  of  the  tlirough  rate  from  Mempliis  to  Atlanta  of  9 
cents.  He  has',  therefore,  shipped  the  Louisville  ear  to  At- 
lanta for  a  total  of  19  cents,  when  the  through  rate  from 
Louisville  to  Atlanta  is  24  cents  and  the  combination  of 
locals  27  cents.  It  is  further  alleged  that  as  considerable 
grain  is  consumed  in  Nashville  there  is  always  a  surplus  of 
expense  bills  which  may  be  manipulated  in  order  to  secure 
a  cheaper  rate  than  that  provided  in  the  tariffs.  In  answer 
to  this  defendants  say  that  the  operation  of  the  reshipping 
l^rivilege.  as  described  in  this  example,  is  limited  by  the  fact 
that  the  Memphis  car  of  grain  is  worth  more  to  the  dealer 
at  Nashville  than  the  St.  Louis  car,  by  reason  of  the  difference 
in  the  freight  rate,  and,  therefore,  Memphis  grain  is  not  sold 
at  Nashville  proper,  but  is  all  reshipped  to  the  southeast. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  tariffs  of  the  carriers  contain  a  rule 
which  prohibits  trading  in  expense  bills,  and  it  is  hardly 
probable  that  such  a  rule  would  appear  if  the  manipulation  of 
expense  bills  is  impossible,  as  contended  by  defendants. 

"While  this  manipulation  of  expense  bills  may  not  be  prac- 
ticed to  the  extent  apprehended  by  complainants,  we  may 
remark  that  prohibitions  of  law  are  not  invariably  directed 
against  illegal  acts  because  they  may  be  numerous;  a  statute 
may  be  considered  equally  necessary  by  the  legislature  to 
prevent  sporadic  or  isolated  acts  in  contravention  of  public 
policy.  A  practice  or  privilege  which  permits  the  movement 
of  a  single  shipment  at  less  than  the  rate  lawfully  applicable 
to  such  movement  is  one  which  the  commission  has,  under  the 
law,  no  alternative  but  to  condemn. 

"In  considering  a  practice  at  Kansas  City  similar  to  the 
one  under  consideration  (Alleged  Unlawful  Rates  and  Prac- 
tices, 7  I.  C.  C.  240),  it  was  found  that  the  practice  of  hand- 
ling grain  in  connection  with  this  privilege  was  manifestly 
open  to  many  abuses.  On  several  occasions  the  Commission 
has  considered  practices  of  a  more  or  less  similar  nature 
and  has  uniformly  regarded  them  with  disfavor.  In  the  case 
above  referred  to  the  finding  was  based  upon  the  fact  that 
the  movement  upon  which  the  through  rate  was  applied  was  in 
no  essential  sense  a  through  movement,  and  we  find  the  same 
to  be  true  with  respect  to  rebilling  or  reshipping  at  Nashville. 
The  grain  upon  its  arrival  at  Nashville  loses  its  identity,  and 


§  1G6]  Equality  in  Rates.  467 

in  every  respect  may  be  regarded  as  a  local  shipment.  There 
is  hardly  a  single  incident  of  a  through  shipment  involved  in 
the  transaction— the  bill  of  lading  is  local,  the  rate  is  local, 
and  there  is  nothing  upon  paper  connected  with  the  transac- 
tion indicating  that  the  grain  is  to  be  carried  beyond  Nash- 
ville. If  it  is  the  intention  to  carry  it  beyond,  there  is  no 
present  idea  as  to  the  point  of  destination. 

"We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  reshipping  or  rebiilling 
privilege  and  the  application  of  rates  thereunder  obtaining 
at  Nashville  is  an  illegal  device  by  means  of  which  grain, 
grain  products,  and  hay  may  be  transported  at  less  than  the 
tariff  rate  applicable  thereto ;  and  further,  that  it  gives  to 
Nashville  undue  and  illegal  preference  and  advantage  and 
subjects  other  points  in  the  southeast  to  unjust  and  unreason- 
able prejudice  and  disadvantage. 

§  166.  Rebilling— Illegal  Only  When  Unjustly  Discrimina- 
tory— Subsequently  to  its  first  opinion  in  the  Duncan  case, 
supra,  the  Commission  in  an  investigation  "did  not  *  *  * 
condemn  rebilling  or  reshippmg  as  such,"  and  in  a  second 
opinion  there  was  entered  a  finding  and  holding  that  the  priv- 
ilege there  under  discussion  "constituted  an  unreasonable 
preference  or  advantage  and  undue  and  unreasonable  pre- 
judice and  disadvantage  in  violation  of  section  3  of  the  act 
to  regulate  commerce."^''" 

The  Supreme  Court,  reversing  the  Commerce  Court,  sus- 
tained the  Commission's  order  in  the  second  case,  placing  its 
conclusion  more  on  section  4  than  on  section  3  of  the  Act, 
although  section  3  was  the  section  relied  on  by  the  shippers 
and  in  the  opinion  of  the  Commission."^  Upon  further  hear- 
ing  the    Commission   reiterated    its    order."*      The    Supreme 

132.  Duncan  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  For  same  case  on  application  for 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  186.  preliminary  injunction,  see  Nash- 

133.  United  States  v.  L.  &  N.  ville  Grain  Exchange  v.  United 
R.  Co.,  235  U.  S.  314,  59  L.  Ed.  States,  191  Fed.  37,  Opinion 
245,  35  Sup.  Ct.  113.  Commerce    Court   No.    46,   p.    165. 

134.  Duncan  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  On  appeal  to  Supreme  Court,  see 
Ry.  Co.,  35  I.  C.  C.  477.  For  the  United  States  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co., 
further  history  of  the  case,  see  235  U.  S.  ai4,  59  L.  Ed.  245,  35 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  United  Sup.  Ct.  113.  Nashville  Grain  Exch. 
States,  197  Fed.  58,  Opiniojii  v.  U.  S.  234  Fed.  C99. 
Commerce   Court   No.   47,   p.   173. 


468    •  Equality  in  Rates.  [^  167 

Court  has  indicated  that  such  practice  is  discriminatory,  and 
that  when  shipments  are  made  at  the  remainder  of  the  through 
rate,  carriers  are  estopped  to  say  that  such  remainder  is  not 
a  fair  rate  on  all  traffic.  That  court,  speaking  through  Mr. 
Justice  Brewer,  said  :^^^ 

"Under  the  guise  of  a  rebilling  rate,  the  Vicksburg  mer- 
chant who  dealt 'with  this  western  road  was  given  a  rate  of 
31^  per  cent  on  any  grain  that  he  might  see  fit  to  ship  to 
Meridian.  While  it  may  be  true  that  a  local  railway's  share 
of  an  interstate  rate  may  not  be  a  legitimate  basis  upon  which 
a  state  railroad  commission  can  establish  and  enforce  a 
purely  local  rate,  yet,  whenever,  under  the  guise  or  pretense  of 
a  rebilling  rate,  some  merchants  are  given  a  low  local  rate,  the 
Commission  is  justified  in  making  that  rate  the  rate  for  all. 
It  is  not  bound  to  inquire  whether  it  furnishes  adequate  re- 
turn to  the  railway  company,  for  the  state  may  insist  upon 
equality,  to  be  enforced  under  the  same  conditions  against 
all  who  perform  a  public  or  quasi  public  service," 

§  167.  Rebilling'.  Conclusion. — That  rebilling  offers  oppor- 
tunity for  manipulation  of  expense  bills  cannot  be  doubted, 
although  that  fact  is  insufficient  to  show  that  the  practice 
is  illegal.  The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  sustaining  the 
second  order  in  the  Duncan  case  supra,  compares  a  reship- 
ping  or  rebilling  rate  with  a  local  rate,  and  holds  in  effect 
that  when  such  rates  are  so  compared,  the  lower  reshipping 
rate  for  the  longer  haul  may  result  in  a  violation  of  the  fourth 
section,  where  the  local  rate  for  the  shorter  haul  is  higher. 
That  such  might  be  the  result  is  true.  If  there  are  no  reasons 
why  there  should  be  a  reshipping  rate  lower  than  a  local 
rate,  the  reshipping  rate  by  whatever  name  called  may  be  in 
substance  but  a  local  rate.  Properly  considered,  the  opinion 
of  the  Supreme  Court  applies  the  well  known  principle  that 
substance  and  not  form  should  be  the  determining  factor. 
Rebilling  rates  are  not  illegal  per  se,  and  such  rates  become 
unlawful  only  when  they  produce  a  discrimination  prohibited 
by  section  8  or  when  they  are  in  substance  local  rates  and 

135.  Alabama  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  496,  51  L.  Ed.  298,  27  Sup. 
Railroad  Com.  of  Mississippi,  203       Ct.  163. 


§  168  Equality    in    Rates.  469 

violate   section   4.     The   final   opinion   of   the   Commission  in 
the  Duncan  case  accords  with  this  conclusion. 

§  168.  Payment  of  Elevator  Allowances. — Formerly  carriers 
bringing  grain  from  producing  territory  paid  elevators,  even 
warehouses  and  .stores,  allowances  for  elevating,  sacking, 
grading  and  weighing  grain.  Such  payments  were  first  held 
to  be  lawful  and  later  unlawful.  The  Supreme  Court  found 
them  lawful  when  reasonable  and  free  from  discrimination."" 
The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  exclude  the  Com- 
mission from  exercising  its  administrative  functions  nor  from 
deciding  that  such  allowances  might  be  withdrawn  by  the 
carriers.  After  these  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  in 
a  case  sustaining  the  right  of  the  carriers  to  withdraw  such 
elevator  allowances  as  are  not  necessary  incidents  to  the 
transportation,  the  Commission  gave  a  history  of  the  decisions, 
and  reached  the  conclusion  that  where  elevation  is  a  necessary 
part  of  the  transportation,  the  carriers  cannot  escape  the  obli- 
gation to  perform  or  pay  for  the  service,  otherwise  the  serv- 
ice or  payment  therefor,  may  be  withdrawn."^ 

Discrimination  when  it  exists  violates  both  sections  two  and 
three  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

There  is  a  provision  of  section  15  of  the  Act  to  Regulate 
Commerce  under  which  the  owner  of  property  transported 
who  renders  any  service  connected  with  the  transportation 
or  who  furnishes  any  instrumentalities  used  therein,  may  be 
compensated  therefor  by  the  carriers.  Applying  this  section, 
the  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  carriers  may  and  must  pay 
the  owners  of  grain  transported  for  elevating  such  grain.  Of 
course  the  provisions  of  sections  1,  2  and  3  apply  and  the 
payments  must  be  reasonable  and  free  from  undue  or  un- 
reasonable preference  or  advantage. 

136.    Re  Allowance  to  Elevators  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Updike  Grain 

by  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  215,  56  L.  Ed.  171, 

315;  Traffic  Bureau  Merchants  Ex-  32    Sup.    Ct.    39,    affirming    sam& 

change    of    St.    Louis    v.    Chicago,  styled   case,   178   Fed.   223,    101  C. 

B.  &   Q.   R.   Co.,    14    I.   C.    C.   317,  C.  A.  583. 

331;  See  Sec.  404,  post;  Int.  Com.  137.   Grain  Elevation  Allowances 

Com.    V.    Diffenbaugh,    222    U.    S.  at   Kansas  City,  34   I.   C.  C.   442. 

42,  56  L.  Ed.  83,  32   Sup.  Ct.  22,  Note  also  Omaha  Elevator  Co.  v. 

modiflying  decree  in  Peavey  &  Co.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  249  Fed.   827, 

V.  Union  Pac  R.  Co.,  176  Fed.  409;  162  C.  C.  A.  61, 


470  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  169 

§  169.  Transit  Privileges — Generally. — Ordinarily  the 
through  rate  from  point  of  origin  to  point  of  destination  is 
less  than  the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates,  the  result 
of  this  generally  applied  rule  is  that  jobbers  and  manufacturers 
at  cities  intermediate  between  the  points  of  production  and 
of  consumption  cannot  compete  with  those  located  at  the 
cities  at  or  near  to  the  points  of  consumption.  That  such  com- 
petition may  be  made  possible,  transit  rates  have  been  ac- 
corded under  which  the  commodity  may  be  stopped  at  the 
intermediate  point  for  cleaning,  milling,  sorting,  manufactur- 
ing or  otherwise  treating.  After  such  stoppage  the  same 
commodity,  or  the  same  kind  of  comm,odity,  or  the  product 
of  the  commodity,  may  be  transported  to  the  farther  destina- 
tion at  a  rate  less  than  the  local  rate.  This  difference  be- 
tween the  remainder  of  the  through  rate  or  the  transit  rate 
being  accorded  because  the  commodity  had  paid  a  charge  up 
to  the  intermediate  point.  The  justification  for  this  practice 
is  commercial,  and  not  based  on  cost  of  service,  blecause  it 
costs  no  more  to  move  a  commodity  originating  at  a  particular 
place  than  it  costs  to  transport  the  same  commodity  which 
has  received  a  prior  transportation  service.  In  speaking  of 
the  practice  the  Commission  said  :^'''*  ' '  Transit  in  many  cases 
is  beneficial  in  its  application.  When  it  can  be  applied  with- 
out discrimination  it  results  in  the  diffusion  of  business,  in 
giving  to  rival  communities  the  relative  advantages  to  which 
they  are  entitled,  and  which  can  be  accorded  them  in  no  other 
way,  and,  generally  speaking,  in  the  application  of  lower 
transportation  charges.  The  commercial  operations  of  this 
country  have  in  many  instances  grown  upon  the  exercise  of 
transit  privileges  and  could  have  been  developed  in  no  other 
way.  This  Commission  has  never  held  that  transit  was  to  be 
condemned  in  so  far  as  it  was  beneficial  and  could  properly 
be  applied." 

There  are  possibilities  of  misusing  the  transit  rates,  these 
the  Commission  has  sought  to  guard  against.  Rules  have  been 
announced  and  principles  stated  for  the  government  of  car- 
riers in  respect  to  transit.     On  this  subject  the  Commission 

138.    Transportation     of     Wool,      171. 
Hides  and  Pelts,  23   I.  C  C  151, 


§  170]  Equality  in  Rates.  471 

has  said:''*  "The  business  man  who  employs  the  transit  priv- 
ilege looks  upon  it  as  a  useful  and  in  many  cases  as  an  ex- 
ceedingly profitable  practice.  Indeed,  we  recognize  that  in 
most  instances  transit  is  now  a  commercial  necessity,  because 
of  its  almost  universal  application  and  on  account  of  the 
development  which  certain  lines  of  business  have  taken  en- 
tailing heavy  investments.  There  is  only  one  way  to  mini- 
mize violations  of  the  law  at  transit  points  and  that  is  by 
the  adoption  of  unambjiguous  rules  and  the  proper  policing 
thereof  to  reduce  the  opportunity  for  such  violations." 

After  shipments  have  moved  to  the  point  where  later  transit 
is  permitted ,  the  transit  allowance  cannot,  in  the  absence  of 
unlawful  discrimination,  be  made  retroactive.**** 

Reshipping  rates,  transit  rates  and  proportional  rates,  all 
rest  upon  the  same  principle  and  are  not  illegal  merely 
because  local  rates  may  be  higher.  When  these  special  rates 
are  accorded  to  one  market  they  cannot  lawfully  be  withheld 
from  another. 

Import  and  export  rates  are  made  on  proportionals,  and  "a 
carrier  may  lawfully  make  an  import  rate  from  a  port  in  the 
United  States  to  an  interior  destination  less  than  its  domestic 
rate  from  the  same  port  to  the  same  destination,"  but  differ- 
ent rates  cannot  be  made  on  the  proportional  in  the  United 
States  based  upon  the  foreign  port  from  which  the  traffic 
starts."- 

§  170.  Allowances  to  Tap  Line  Railroads. — What  are  called 
tap   lines   were   described    by   the    Commission   as   follows :"" 

139.  Transit  Case,  24  I.  C.  C.  42  I.  C.  C.  736;  Burritts  v.  C.  P. 
340,  349.  See  also  Fabrication-in-  Ry.  Co.,  45  I.  C.  C.  195;  Fargo 
Transit  Charges,  29  I.  C.  C.  Iron  &  Metal  Co.  v.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co., 
70;  Re  Substitution  of  Tonnage  46  I.  C.  C.  399;  National  Live 
at  Transit  Points,  18  I.  C.  C.  280;  Stock  Exch.  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co., 
Transit   Case  25   I.  C.   C.   130,  26  47  L  C.  C.  380,  400,  401,  402. 

I.    C.    C.    204;     National    Casket  141.    Texas  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int. 

Co.   V.    Sou.    Ry.   Co.,    31   I.    C.    C.  Com.   Com.,   162   U.   S.   197,   40   L. 

678.  Ed.    940,    16    Sup.    Ct.    666;    New 

140.  Meeds  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  Orleans  Board  of  Trade  v.  111- 
C.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  337;  Swift  inois  C.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  465; 
&  Co.  V.  M.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  Import  and  Domestic  Rates— Clay. 
C.  701;   Interstate  Packing  Co.  v.  39  I.  C.  C.  132. 

C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.   Co.,  42   I.   C.   C.  142.    Central  Yellow  Pine  Assn. 

389;    Freeman   v.    Sou.   Ry..    Co., 


472  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  170 

"While  these  logging  roads  are  almost  or  quite  without  ex- 
ception mill  propositions  at  the  outset,  built  exclusively  for 
the  purpose  of  transporting  logs  to  the  mill,  they  soon  reach 
a  point  where  they  engage  in  other  business  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent.  As  the  length  of  the  road  increases,  as  the 
lumber  is  taken  off  and  other  operations  obtain  a  foothold 
along  the  line,  various  commodities  besides  lumber  are  trans- 
ported, and  this  business  gradually  develops  until  in  several 
cases  what  was  at  first  a  logging  road  pure  and  simple  has 
become  a  common  carrier  of  miscellaneous  freight  and  pas- 
sengers. Almost  all  these  lines,  even  where  they  are  run  as 
private  enterprises,  do  more  or  less  outside  transportation, 
and  it  would  be  difficult  to  draw  any  line  of  demarkation  be- 
tween the  logging  road  as  such  and  the  logging  road  which 
has  become  a  general  carrier  of  freight." 

In  many  instances  carriers  paid  divisions  of  the  through 
rates  to  these  tap  lines,  which  allowances  or  divisions  were 
usually  for  the  benefit  of  the  lumber  manufacturing  plant 
generally  the  OM^ner  of  the  tap  line.  This  practice  was  de- 
scribed by  the  Supreme  Court  as  follows:'"  "The  railroads 
west  of  the  Mississippi  make  a  certain  allowance  to  the  mills 
which  have  'logging  roads' — that  is,  roads  by  which  logs  are 
hauled  from  the  timber  to  the  mills.  This  is  called  'tap-line 
alloAvance  or  division."  *  *  *  The  mills  east  of  the  river 
have  logging  roads  also,  but  appellants  make  no  allowance 
to  them.  *  *  *  There  does  not  appear  to  be  any  reason 
for  such  allowance  Avest  of  the  IMississippi  which  does  not  ap- 
ply east  of  that  river,  and  it  amounts  to  a  rebate  or  reduction 
from  the  regularly  published  rate,  and  gives  an  advantage  to 
the  mills  west  of  the  IMississippi  over  those  east,  although 
the  published  rates  from  both  are  the  same." 

The  Commission  entered  into  a  general  investigation  as  to 
the  character  of  tap  lines  and  the  legality  of  allowances 
thereto,  after  which  it  was  determined  that  most  of  such  al- 
lowances were  unlawful,  amounting  in  effect,  when  paid  to  a 
tap  line  owned  by  the  manufacturing  plant,  to  a  departure 
from  the  lawful  rate.^" 

V.  V.  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co..  10  I.  C.  C.  206  U.  S.  441,  444,  51  L.  Ed.  1128, 
193,  199.  27  Sup.  Ct.  700. 

143.   Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C,  144.   Tap  Line  Cases,  23.  I.  C.  C. 


<^  171]  Equality  in  Eates.  473 

The  Supreme  Court,  referring  to  the  fact  that  the  trans- 
portation of  lumber  was  excepted  from  the  commodities 
clause""  of  the  Comineree  Act,  reversed  the  Commission  and 
held  that  if  the  tap  line,  although  owned  by  the  manufactur- 
ing plant  was  a  common  carrier  the  payment  of  a  division 
thereto  was  not  illegal.  The  Court  also  held  that  not  the 
extent  to  which  a  railroad  is  used,  but  the  right  of  the  public 
to  demand  service  of  it,  determined  its  character  as  a  com- 
mon carrier/"  The  holding  of  the  Supreme  Court  does  not 
deprive  the  Commission  of  the  power  to  regulate  tap  lines 
participating  in  interstate  commerce.  As  to  rates,  rules  and 
practices,  the  Commission  has  power  over  these  short  lines  to 
the  same  extent  as  over  other  common  carriers  subject  to  ita 
jurisdiction.*" 

§  171.  Allowances  to  Industrial  Tracks. — Except  for  the 
proviso  of  the  Commodities  clause  which  excepts  from  its 
provisions  thereof  "timber  and  the  manufactured  products 
thereof,"  the  principles  applicable  to  allowances  to  industrial 
railroads  are  similar  to  those  applicable  to  divisions  to  tap 
line  roads.  In  the  first  Industrial  Kailways  case*"  the  Com- 
mission said:  "The  allowances  are  made  to  the  industries  or 
to  their  subsidiary  railways  in  the  form  of  (a)  divisions  out  of 
the  rate,  (b)  per  diem  reclaims,  (c)  remission  of  demurrage 
and  (d)  furnace  allowances."  It  was  held  that  these  vari- 
ous allowances  depleted  the  revenues  of  the  carriers  and  were 
generally  unlawful.  Following  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  the  tap  line  cases,  the  Commission  modified  its  hold- 
ing, saying:'**    "Since  the  Supreme  Court  decided  the  tap  line 

277,  549.     Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  55   I.   C.  C.   113;    111.  C.  R.   Co.  v. 

of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  ."^O  I.  C.  C.  450.  Brooks-Scanlon  Co.,  241  Fed.  445, 

145.  Sec.  343,  post.  154  C.  C.  A.  227. 

146.  Tap  Line  Cases,  234  U.  S.  148.  Industrial  Railways  Case, 
1,  58  L.  Ed.  1185,  34  Sup.  Ct.  741.  29  I.  C.  C.  212. 

147.  Tap  Line  Case,  31  I.  C.  C.  149.  Industrial  Railways  Case, 
490;  Joint  Rates  with  Birming-  32  I.  C.  C.  129,  131;  and  see 
ham  Southern  R.  Co.,  32  I.  C.  C.  Manufacturer's  Railway  Case,  32 
110;  Davis  Bros.  Lumber  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C.  100;  General  Electric  Co. 
C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  46  I.  C.  C.  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  14 
501;  "Wasteful  Service  by  Tap  I.  C.  C.  237;  Solvay  Process  Co. 
Lines,  53  I.  C.  C.  656;  New  Orleans  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
N.   &  N.  Ry.  Co.  V.   I.   C.   R.   Co,  246. 


474  Equality  in  Rates.  [^  171 

cases,  we  have  given  effect  to  the  court's  decision  by  fixing 
the  maximum  divisions  of  rates  or  switching  allowances  which 
the  tap  line  roads  may  receive  from  the  trunk  line  carriers. 
Since  that  time  we  have  also  decided  In  re  Joint  Rates  with 
the  Birmingham  Southern  R.  R.  Co.,  32  I.  C.  C.  110,  and  the 
Manufacturers  Railway  Case,  32  I.  C.  C.  100,  giving  effect 
in  each  instance,  under  the  facts  there  found,  to  the  prin- 
cii)les  announced  by  the  Supreme  Court.  The  General  Elec- 
tric Compan.y  case,supra,  the  Solvay  Process  Company  case, 
supra,  and  the  Crane  Iron  "Works  case,  17  I.  C.  C.  514,  were 
decided  upon  the  facts,  circumstances,  and  conditions  ap- 
pearing in  connection  with  each.  Those  cases,  however,  dif- 
fered from  the  tap  line  cases  and  from  the  instant  case  in 
that  in  each  of  the  former  cases  the  industrial  railway,  or  the 
industrial  corporation  which  in  fact  owned  it,  sought  to  have 
us  require  the  trunk  line  roads  to  accord  the  industrial  roads 
allowances  or  divisions  which  the  trunk  line  roads  were  un- 
willing to  accord  and  which  they  contended  would  be  unlaw- 
ful." 

The  Supreme  Court  referred  to  the  distinction  drawn  by  the 
Commission  between  "allowances"  and  "absorptions"  as  "ab- 
struse," and  when  applied  to  tap  lines  and  industrial  roads 
these  words  and  "divisions"  mean  essentially  the  same 
thing.""  By  whatever  name  called  they  may  not  be  pro- 
hibited by  the  Commission,  they  must  be  reasonable  and  free 
from  unlawful  discrimination  and  they  could  probiably,  when 
not  included  in  the  rates  charged,  be  withdrawn  by  the  car- 
riers. Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan  for  years  advocated  plans 
under  which  many  of  the  accessorial  services  performed  or 
paid  for  by  the  carriers,  would  have  been  discontinued;  or, 
if  continued,  paid  for  in  addition  to  the  regular  rates.  That, 
under  the  law,  the  carriers  could  adopt  such  plans  is  free 
from  doubt.  Whether  the  change  should  be  made  is  an 
economic  question.  The  Commission  may  not  compel  the 
adoption  of  the  plans,  but  it  can  prevent  unlawful  discrimina- 
tion and  improper  payments."^ 

150.  Manufacturers  R.  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C.  578;  St.  Louis  Terminal 
United  States,  246  U.  S.  457,  482;  Case,  34  I.  C.  C.  453;  Second  In- 
62  L.  Ed.  831,  844,  38  Sup.  Ct.  383.      dustrial  Railways  Case,  a4  I.  C.  C. 

151.  Car-Ferry   Allowances,    32       596,   and  cases   there  cited;   Five 


^  172]  Equality  in  Rates.  475 

§  172.  Illegal  for  Carriers  to  Transport  Commodities  Pro- 
duced or  Owned  by  Them  or  in  Which  They  Are  Interested. — 

The  ownership  or  control  by  carriers  of  a  particular  commodity 
(gives  such  carriers  an  opportunity  to  transport  such  com- 
modity and  sell  it  at  less  than  can  its  competitors  who  have 
no  means  of  transportation  and  must  pay  the  carrier  to  trans- 
port their  commodity  of  like  kind.  The  carrier  can  do  this 
because  it  can  forego  some  of  the  rate  its  competitor  must  pay 
and,  therefore,  undersell  such  competitor.  This  evil  was 
prevalent  and  the  Commission  had  sought  to  remedy  it  so  far 
as  it  could  with  the  limited  power  it  had  in  this  respect  before 
the  passage  of  the  Hepburn  amendment.  Prior  to  the  passage 
of  the  amendment  containing  this  clause  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  brought  its  bill  seeking  to  enjoin  a  contract 
described  in  the  allegation  as  follows  :^^" 

"In  the  spring  of  1903  the  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  made  a 
verbal  agreement  with  the  New  Haven  to  sell  to  that  road 
60,000  tons  of  coal,  to  be  carried  from  the  Kanawha  district 
to  Newport  News,  and  thence  by  water  to  Connecticut,  for 
delivery  to  the  buyer  at  $2.75  per  ton,  and  that  a  considerable 
portion  had  already  been  delivered  and  the  remainder  was  in 
process  of  delivery.  It  was  averred  that  the  price  of  the  coal 
at  the  mines  where  the  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  bought  it,  and  the 
cost  of  transportation  from  Newport  News  to  Connecticut, 
would  aggregate  $2,47  per  ton,  thus  leaving  to  the  Chesa- 
peake &  Ohio  only  about  28  cents  a  ton  for  carrying  the  coal 
from  the  Kanawha  district  to  Newport  News,  whilst  the  pub- 
lished tariif  for  like  carriage  from  the  same  district  was  $1.45 
per  ton." 

Upon  this  allegation,  the  court  formulated  the  question  in- 
volved as  follows : 

"The  question,  therefore,  to  b)e  decided  is  this:  Has  a  car- 
rier engaged  in  interstate  commerce  the  power  to  contract 
and  sell  and  transport  in  completion  of  the  contract  the  com- 
modity sold,  when  the  price  stipulated  in  the  contract  does 

Per  Cent  Case  31  I.  C.  C.  351,  408,  Tube  Co.  v.  Lake  Ter.  R.  Co.,  56 

409;  Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  I.  C.  C.  272  and  cases  there  cited. 
P.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C.  40;  West-         152.  New  York,  N.  Y.  &  H.  R.  Co. 

port  Stone  Co.,  Second  Industrial  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  200  U.  S.  3C1, 

Case,    38    I.    C.    C.    316.    National  50  L.  Ed.  515,  26  Sup.  Ct.  272. 


476  Equality  in  Rates.  [^  173 

not  pay  tlie  cost  of  the  purchase,  the  cost  of  delivery,  and  the 
published  freight  rates?" 

The  evils  of  carriers  engaging  in  the  purchase  and  sale  of 
commodities  transported  by  them  were  forcibly  pointed  out  in 
the  course  of  the  opinion. 

Cases  "were  cited,  and  the  conclusion  was  to  direct  the  court 
below  to  issue  a  decree  "perpetually  enjoining  the  Chesa- 
peake &  Ohio  from  taking  less  than  the  rates  fixed  by  its 
published  tariff  of  freight  rates,  by  means  of  dealing  in  the 
purchase  and  sale  of  coal." 

§  173.  Commodities  Clause  of  Act  1906. — It  is  obvious  that 
the  evils  pointed  out  so  forcibly  by  the  Supreme  Court  apply 
equally  where  the  carrier  puts  the  ownership  of  the  com- 
modity in  a  corporation  in  which  the  carrier  owns  all  the 
stock,  and  that  the  difference  is  only  in  degree  and  not  in  kind 
where  the  carrier  has  only  a  part  of  the  stock  in  the  corpora- 
tion  owning  the  commodity.  Congress,  by  virtue  of  its 
plenary  power  to  regulate  interstate  commerce,  sought  to 
prevent  these  evils,  and  the  prohibition  was  made  to  apply 
where  the  carrier  had  an  interest,  direct  or  indirect,  in  the 
commodity  transported.  This  clause  the  circuit  court  held 
unconstitutional,  but  the  Supreme  Court,  upon  appeal,  held  the 
provision  valid'"^^  as  construed.  This  construction  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

"We  then  construe  the  statute  as  prohibiting  a  railroad 
company  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  from  transporting 
in  such  commerce  articles  or  commodities  under  the  following 
circumstances  and  conditions:  (a)  When  the  article  or  com- 
modity has  been  manufactured,  mined  or  produced  by  a  car- 
rier or  under  its  authority,  and  at  the  time  of  transportation 
the  carrier  has  not  in  good  faith  before  the  act  of  transporta- 
tion dissociated  itself  from  such  article  or  commodity;  (b) 
When  the  carrier  OAvns  the  article  or  commodity  to  be  trans- 
ported in  whole  or  in  part;  (c)  When  the  carrier  at  the  time 
of  transportation  has  an  interest,  direct  or  indirect,  in  a  legal 
therefore,   articles  or  commodities  manufactured,  mined,  pro- 

153.    United  States  v.  Delaware      opinion    of   lower    court,    see    164 
&  H.   Co.,   213   U.   S.   366,   415,   53      Fed.  215. 
L.  Ed.  836,  29   Sup.  Ct.  527.    For 


§  174]  Equality  in  Eates.  477 

or  equitable  sense  in  the  article  or  commodity,  not  including, 
duced  or  owned,  etc.,  by  a  bona  fide  corporation  in  which  the 
railroad  company  is  a  stockholder." 

"In  my  judgment  the  act,  reasonably  and  properly  con- 
strued, according  to  its  language,  includes  within  its  prohibi- 
tions a  railroad  company  transporting  coal,  if,  at  the  time, 
it  is  the  owner,  legally  or  equitably,  of  stock — certainly,  if  it 
owns  a  majority  or  all  the  stock — in  the  company  which 
mined,  manufactured  or  produced,  and  then  owns,  the  coal 
which  is  being  transported  by  such  railroad  company.  Any 
other  view  of  the  act  will  enable  the  transporting  railroad 
company,  by  one  device  or  another,  to  defeat  altogether  the 
purposes  which  Congress  had  in  view,  which  was  to  divorce, 
in  a  real,  substantial  sense,  production  and  transportation, 
and  thereby  to  prevent  the  transporting  company  from  doing 
injustice  to  other  owners  of  coal.", 

In  construing  the  clause  when  brought  before  it  the  second 
time  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  when  the  carrier  so  exer- 
cised its  power  as  a  stockholder  in  a  corporation  owning  the 
commodity  as  to  deprive  such  corporation  of  actual  indepen- 
dent existence,  the  commodities  so  owned  were  within  the  pro- 
hibition of  the  law."* 

AVhen  a  carrier  organized  a  coal  company  to  which  its  coal 
properties  were  leased  and,  although  the  stock  of  the  com- 
pany so  organized  was  not  owned  by  the  carrier,  such  com- 
pany was  in  substance  controlled  by  the  carrier,  it  was  held 
that  the  commodities  clause  was  violated.^''^ 

§  174.  Cars  Must  Be  Furnished  Without  Discrimination. — 

Transportation  includes  in  its  meaning  "cars,"  and  section 
one  of  the  Act  provides:  "Cars  shall  be  furnished  irrespec- 
tive of  ownership  or  any  contract,  express  or  implied,  for  the 
use  thereof."  '"  It,  therefore,  is  the  duty  of  the  carriers  subject 
to  the  Act  to  furnish  cars  without  any  unlawful  preference. 
In  the  Pitcairn  Coal  case,'^'   the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals 

154.  United  States  v.  Lehigh  873.  For  further  history  of  the 
Valley  R.  Co.,  220  U.  S.  257,  55  litigation  relating  to  this  clause, 
L.  Ed.  458,  31  Sup.  Ct.  387.  see    U.    S.    v.    L.    V.    R.    Co.,    225 

155.  post.  Sec.  343,  U.  S.  v.  Dela-  Fed.   399. 

ware,   L.  &  W.   R.   Co.,   238  U.   S.  156.    Post,  Sec.  337. 

516,   59   L.  Ed.   1438,   35   Sup.   Ct.  157.    United   States  ex  rel.  Pit- 


478  Equality  in  Kates.  [§  174 

prescribed  rules  for  coal  car  distribution.  The  Supreme  Court, 
however,  held  that  the  courts  had  no  jurisdiction  prior  to 
action  b}^  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  and  the  lower 
court  was  reversed.    The  Supreme  Court  said: 

''The  distribution  to  shippers  of  coal  cars  including  those 
owned  by  the  shippers  and  those  used  by  the  carrier  for  its 
own  fuel  is  a  matter  involving  preference  and  discrimination 
and  within  the  competency  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, and  the  courts  cannot  interfere  with  regulations  in 
regard  to  such  discriminations  until  after  action  thereon  by 
the  commission."  ^^^ 

In  the  ]\Iorrisdale  Coal  Co.  case,  cited  note  supra,  it  was  con- 
tended that  "all  cars  in  the  district  should  be  distributed 
according  to  the  capacity  of  the  mine,  without  deducting  pri- 
vate cars,  foreign  fuel  cars,  or  the  carrier's  own  fuel  cars." 
AnsAvering  this  contention,  the  Supreme  Court  said:  "Whe- 
ther this  should  be  done  as  a  general  rule,  or  under  the  pe- 
culiar conditions  prevailing  on  defendant's  road  at  that  time, 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  an  administrative  question,  and  to  be 
decided  by  the  Commission  as  preliminary  to  the  right  to 
maintain  this  suit." 

While  the  question  of  the  reasonableness  of  a  rule  for  the 
distribution  of  cars  is  an  administrative  one  over  which,  when 
interstate  commerce  is  involved,  the  Commission  alone  has 
primary  jurisdiction,  the  courts,  state  or  federal,  have  juris- 
diction to  determine  whether  or  not  a  plaintiff  has  been 
damaged  by  the  failure  of  a  carrier  to  furnish  cars  "upon 
the  basis  of  the  carrier's  own  rule  of  distribution.""^  In 
other  words,  what  is  a  reasonable  rule  is  for  determination 
by  the  Commission ;  whether  or  not  an  established  rule  has 
been  violated  with  resulting  damage  is  a  judicial  question 
within  the  purview  of  the  courts. 

cairn  Coal  Co.  v.  Baltimore  &  0.  Co.    v.    Pennsylvania   R.    Co.,    230 

R.  Co.,  165  Fed.  113.  U.  S.  304,  57  L.  Ed.  1474,  33  Sup. 

158.    Baltimore  &  O.  R.   Co.  v.  Ct.  938. 
United   States,   215  U.   S.   481,   54  159.  Penn.    R.    Co.    v.    Puritan 

L.  Ed.  292,  30  Sup.  Ct.  164.     The  Coal  Co.,  237  U.  S.  121,  59  L.  Ed. 

same    ruling    was    made    in    Int.  867,    35    Sup.    Ct.    484;     affirming 

Com.    Com.   v.   Illinois   C.   R.    Co.,  same  styled  case,  237  Pa.  420,  85 

215   U.   S.   452,   54  L.   Ed.   280,   30  Atl.  426,  Ann.  Cas.  1914B,  37. 
Sup.     Ct.     155;     Morrisdale    Coal 


<^  174]  Equality  in  Eates.  479 

A  state  statute  requiring  a  railroad  corporation  to  furnish 
cars  within  a  reasonable  time  after  they  are  required,  recog- 
nized that  "a  reasonable  time  in  any  case  would  depend  upon 
all  the  circumstances  and  conditions  existing,  including  the 
requirements  of  the  interstate  commerce  carried  on  by  the 
corporation,"  was  held  valid  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  a  suit 
originally  brought  in  a  state  court,  in  which  court  plaintitf 
made  no  attack  whatever  upon  the  carrier's  rules  for  car  dis- 
tribution."" 

The  Commission  in  a  decision  rendered  prior  to  the  court's 
decision  in  the  Mullberry  Coal  case  (note  supra),  said:"^  "It 
is  the  duty  of  carriers  to  furnish  cars  suitable  to  transport  in 
safety  traffic  which  they  hold  themselves  out  to  carry." 

The  claim  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  made  in  that  case  is 
probably  too  broad  a  claim,  although  there  is  little  doubt  that 
the  Commission  has  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  courts 
in  cases  where  there  is  a  refusal  upon  reasonable  request  to 
furnish  cars  for  interstate  transportation.  "Cars  must  be 
furnished"  is  the  language  of  the  statute,  and  for  any  viola- 
tion of  the  statute  the  shipper  may  recover  damages.  If  the 
claim  presents  an  administrative  question,  the  Commission 
alone  has  jurisdiction.  If  no  administrative  question  is  pre- 
sented,   the    "person    or    persons    claiming    to    be    damaged 

*  *     *     may    either    make    complaint    to    the    Commission 

*  *  *  or  may  bring  suit  *  *  *  in  any  district  or  cir- 
cuit court  of  the  United  States,"  or  under  the  reservation  of 
section  22,  in  any  state  court  of  competent  jurisdiction."^ 

The  Commissiion  may  not,  however,  reqtiir>e  carriers  to 
furnish  a  tank  car,  as  the  words  "cars,"  "transportation" 
and  "practices"  alone  nor  all  together  used  in  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Act  do  not  confer  such  power."^  The  "car  ser- 
vice" provision  of  the  Act  of  May  29,  1917,  as  reenancted  and 

160.  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Mul-  Florida  Citrus  Exchange  v.  A.  C. 
berry  Hill  Coal  Co.,  238  U.  S.  L.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  325,  326; 
275,  59  L.  Ed.  1306,  35  Sup.  Ct.  Farmers  Elevator  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
760;  affirming  same  styled  case  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  47  I.  C.  C.  475; 
257  111.  80,  100  N.  E.  151.  Menasha  Paper  Co,  v.  C.  &  N.  W. 

161.  Vulcan  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  Ry.  Co.,  241  U.  S.  55,  60  L.  Ed. 
V.  I.  C.  C.  Co.,  33  I.  C.  C.  52,  64.  885,   S6   Sup.  Ct.  501. 

162.  Sees.  8,  9  and  22  of  the  163.  United  States  v.  P.  R.  Co., 
Act.  Sees.  382,  S83  and  443,  post. 


480  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  175 

amended  l3(.y  the  Transportation  Act  1920  provides  how  cars 
shall  be  distributed  and  used,  but  does  not  attempt  to  compel 
carriers  to  furnish  special  types  of  cars.'" 

§  175.  Same  Subject — Principles  Applied  by  the  Commis- 
sion.— It-  being  within  the  administrative  functions  of  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  to  determine  whether  or  not 
a  particular  distribution  violates  the  law.  the  same  question  is 
presented  as  in  other  cases  of  discrimination.  In  deter- 
mining the  question  as  to  coal  cars  the  Commission  has  ac- 
cepted and  applied  certain  general  rules.  Obviously  one  coal 
mine  may  need  and  be  entitled  to  more  cars  than  another. 
This  fact  makes  necessary  the  rating  of  mines.  This  rating 
can  be  made  by  determining  the  physical  and  commercial 
capacity  of  the  mine.  Clearly  to  consider  only  physical  capa- 
city would  be  unjust,  as  that  capacity  might  not  be  even 
approximately  reached.  How  this  physical  capacity  has  been 
determined  was  described  by  the  Commission  as  follows : 

"The  physical  capacity  is  determined  by  the  thickness  of 
the  coal  seam,  the  number  of  rooms  or  working  places,  the 
capacity  of  the  underground  tram  tracks,  and  the  facilities 
for  getting  the  coal  out  of  the  mine  into  the  tipple,  and  from 
the  tipple  into  the  cars.  A  fixed  per  diem  value  is  assigned 
to  a  man's  labor,  taking  into  consideration  the  character  of 
the  seam  upon  wdiich  the  work  is  to  be  done ;  and  the  number 
of  places  in  which  a  man  can  work  is  taken  into  account  regard- 
less of  the  number  who  were  actually  employed. 

The  methed  of  determining  the  commercial  capacity  was 
described  by  the  Commission  as  follows : 

"The  commercial  capacity,  or  the  requirements  of  a  mine 
for  cars  as  tested  by  its  actual  shipments,  is  arrived  at  by 
taking  the  volume  of  the  shipments  made  by  a  mine  during  a 
period  of  free-car  supply,  usually  of  four  months  and  gener- 
ally from  April  1  to  Augustl,  in  each  of  the  two  proceding 
years.  The  three  figures  expressed  in  coal  tons,  namely,  the 
physical  capacity,  the  commercial  capacity  for  the  first  year, 

242   U.   S.   208,   61   L.   Ed.   251,   37  165.    Rail   &  River   Coal   Co.   v. 

Sup.  Ct.  95,  227  Fed.  911.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

164.     Sec.  344A  to  F,  post.  86,  93,  94. 


'^  175]  Equality  in  Rates.  481 

and  the  commercial  capacity  for  the  second  year,  are  added  to- 
gether and  the  sum  is  divided  by  three.""" 

In  the  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  case,  supra,  speaking  of 
the  methods  of  rating  by  thus  determining  the  physical  and* 
commercial  capacity  of  the  mines,  the  Commission  said : 

"After  a  careful  consideration  of  the  system  as  applied  to 
interstate  shipments,  we  are  inclined  to  think  *  *  *  that 
a  methed  of  rating  coal  mines  based  upon  a  combination  of 
their  physical  and  commercial  capacities  more  closely  approxi- 
mates their  actual  car  requirements  than  a  system  based  upon 
physical  capacity  only." 

The  Commission  in  the  Hillsdale  case,  supra,  in  summing 
up  the  principles  adopted  in  previous  cases,  said : 

"The  general  status  of  the  question  before  the  Commission 
may  be  readily  ascertained  by  an  examination  of  our  decisions 
in  one  or  two  formal  proceedings  since  the  passage  of  the  so- 
called  Hepburn  Act.  In  Railroad  Commission  of  Ohio  v.  H. 
V.  Ry.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  Rep.  398,  we  held  that  while  a  carrier 
during  periods  of  car  shortage  might  not  assign  privately 
owned  cars  to  operators  other  than  their  own  owners,  and 
might  not  assign  foreign  railway  fuel  cars  to  any  mines  except 
those  to  which  they  had  been  manifested  by  the  foreign  lines, 
it  must  nevertheless  count  all  such  cars  against  the  distribu- 
tive share  of  the  respective  mines  to  which  the  private  cars 
belonged  or  to  which  the  foreign  railway  fuel  cars  had  been 
consigned ;  and  in  case  the  private  cars  or  foreign  railway 
fuel  cars  so  delivered  to  a  mine  were  not  sutficient  to  fill  out 
its  distributive  share  of  available  coal  cars,  it  should  have  in 
addition  only  so  many  of  the  system  cars  of  the  carrier  as 
might  be  necessary,  when  added  to  the  private  or  foreign 
railway  fuel  cars  so  received  by  it,  .to  make  up  its  full  ratable 
proportion  to  the  total  available  coal  cars  of  all  classes.  "We 
also  held  that  all  foreign  railway  fuel  cars  consigned  to  a 
particular  operator,  and  all  private  cars  owned  by  a  particular 
operator,  must  be  delivered  to  that  operator,  even  though 
their  number  might  exceed  the  ratable  proportion  of  the  parti- 
cular mine  in  the  distribution  of  available  cars." 

166.    Hillside  Coal   &  Coke  Co.      C.  356,  359,  360. 
V.   Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,  19   I.   C. 


482 


Equality  in  Bates. 


[§  175 


These  general  principles  were  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
to  be  sucli  as  the  Commission  might  legally  apply."'  but  that 
court  in  the  Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  case,  supra,  summed  up  the 
Commission's  cases  by  saying: 

"It  was,  however,  recognized  that  there  could  be  no  hard 
and  fast  rule,  and  that  circumstances  might  arise  which 
would  otherwise  warrant  a  departure  so  as  to  enable  the  car- 
rier to  meet  emergencies  arising  from  a  strike  on  its  road,  or 
embargoes  by  connecting  lines." 

The  duty  to  furnish  cars,  a  facility  of  transportation,  with- 
out undue  discrimination  or  unjust  preference,  applies,  of 
course,  to  all  kinds  of  traffic  moved  by  the  carriers."* 


1G7.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Illinois  C. 
R.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  452,  54  L.  Ed. 
280,  30  Sup.  Ct.  155;  Int.  Com. 
Com.  V.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  215 
U.  S.  479,  54  L.  Ed.  291,  30  Sup. 
Ct.  163.  For  cases  of  the  Commiss- 
ion discussing  the  general  ques- 
tion see:  Richmond  Elevator  Co. 
V.  Pere  Marquette  R.  Co.,  10 
I.  C.  C.  629,  636,  637;  Gallo- 
gly  V.  Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R. 
Co.,  11  I.  C.  C.  1;  Parks  v.  Cin- 
cinnati &  M.  V.  R.  Co.,  10  I.  C. 
C.  47;  Thompson  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  640; 
Hawkins  v.  Wheeling  &  L.  E.  R. 
Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  212;  Glade  Coal 
Co.  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co., 
10  I.  C.  C.  226,  and  cases  there 
cited  and  discussed;  Powhatan 
Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Norfolk  & 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  .69; 
Traer  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  13 
I.  C.  C.  451;  Jacoby  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  392; 
Bulah  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  52;  Re  Coal 
Rates  Stony  Fork  Branch,  26  I. 
C.  C.  168.  For  other  than  Com- 
mission cases  see:  Logan  Coal 
Co.  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  154 
Fed.   497;    United   States   ex   rel. 


Coffman  v.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.  (C  C),  109  Fed.  831;  United 
States  ex  rel.  Kingwood  Coal  Co. 
V.  West  Virginia  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
(C.  C.)  125  Fed.  252;  West  Vir- 
ginia &  N.  R.  Co.  V.  United  States 
ex  rel.  Kingwood  Coal  Co.,  134 
Fed.  198,  67  C.  C.  A.  220;  United 
States  ex  rel.  Greenbrier  Coal  & 
Coke  Co.  V.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  143  Fed.  266,  74  C.  C.  A.  404; 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Cincinnati,  N.  O. 
&  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Ohio  St.  130, 
23  N.  E.  928;  United  States  ex 
rel.  Pitcairn  Coal  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  R.  Co.,  154  Fed.  108; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Mulberry 
Hill  Coal  Co.,  238  U.  S.  275,  59 
L.  Ed.  1306,  35  Sup.  Ct.  760; 
Vulcan  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  I.  C. 
R.  Co.,  33  I.  C.  C,  52  and  cases 
cited.  Pennsylvania  Parafine 
Works  V.  P.  R.  Co.,  34  I.  C.  C, 
179.  The  Supreme  Court  failed 
to  sustain  the  Commission  in  the 
two  last  cited  cases.  See  note 
163,  supra. 

168.  Re  Advance  Rates  on  Po- 
tatoes, 25  I.  C.  C.  159,  169;  Gal- 
veston Commercial  Assn.  v.  At- 
chison, T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  25  I. 
C.  C.  216,  228. 


§  176]  Equality  in  Rates.  483 

§  176.  Freight  Charges  Must  be  Collected  Without  Dis- 
crimination. — One,  if  not  the  principal,  purpose  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  being  to  prevent  every  form  of  discrimi- 
nation, favoritism  and  inequality,""  and  it  being  the  purpose 
of  Congress  ''that  all  shippers  should  be  treated  alike,"  and 
the  intention  of  the  Act  being  "to  prohibit  any  and  all 
means  that  might  be  resorted  to  obtain  or  receive  concessions 
and  rebates  from  the  fixed  rates  duly  posted  and  pub- 
lished," ^'°  it  would  seem  to  be  clear  that  a  carrier  should  not 
extend  to  one  shipper  a  credit  and  refuse  another  shipper  in 
like  situation  the  same  extension.  It  would  seem  to  be  equally 
clear  that  whatever  privilege  was  extended  must  be  stated  in 
the  published  tariffs  :"^ 

177.  Right  of  Carrier  to  Route  Shipments  beyond  Its  Own 
Terminus.— In  the  absence  of  a  contract  specifying  the  rout- 
ing, the  carrier  may  route  freight  passing  beyond  its  own 
lines  over  any  other  reasonably  convenient  line.  If  there  is  a 
contract  on  the  subject,  or  if  the  shipper  gives  instructions, 
the  carrier  must  of  course,  comply  therewith.  In  the  absence 
of  instructions,  the  carrier  should  route  by  the  most  direct 
and  cheapest  route. ^"  There  was  nothing  in  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce  before  the  Amendment  of  June  29,  1906,  that 
would  make  illegal  a  contract  by  which  an  initial  carrier  re- 
served to  itself,  as  a  condition  of  guaranteeing  the  through 
rates,  the  right  of  routing  the  shipment  beyond  its  own  line 
as  it  miglit  determine."''  The  Hepburn  Amendment,  not  pro- 
hibiting such  right  nor  specifically  granting  the  power  to  the 

169.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ry.  Co.,  168  Fed.  161,  94  C.  C.  A. 
Mottley,  219  U.  S.  467,  55  L.  Ed.  217,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  982,  16 
297,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265.  Ann.    Cas.    613;    United    States    v. 

170.  Armour  Packing  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  209  Fed.  283. 
United  States,  209  U.  S.  56,  52  Transportation  Act  1920,  post 
L.  Ed.  681,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428;  Mos-  Section  346 A  requires  Carriers  to 
hassuck  Valley  Railroad  Case,  37  collect  freight  charges  before  de- 
I.  C.     C.     566;      Northampton     &  livering  the  freight. 

Bath  Railroad  Case,  41  L  C.  C.  68,  172.    Dewey  Bros.  Co.  v.   Balti- 

72;    Hocking    Valley    Ry.    Co.    v.  more  &  O.  R.  Co.,  11  I.  C.  C.  481; 

United   States,   210   Fed.   735.  Hennepin   Paper  Co.  v.   Northern 

171.  So  held       in     the     United  Pac.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  535. 
States  V.  Hocking  Valley  R.  Co.,  173.    Southern   Pac.   Co.   v.   Int. 
194   Fed.   234.   See  Gamble-Robin-  Com.   Com.,   200  U.  S.   536,   50  L. 
son  Com.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ed.  585,  26  Sup.  Ct.  330. 


484  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  178 

Commission  to  j^rohibit  same,  the  carrier  may  yet  excercise  the 
right,  provided,  of  course,  no  undue  or  unjust  discrimination 
results  to  shippers  thereby.  The  Commission  now  has  the 
power  to  establish  through  routes  and  joint  rates. 

The  1920  Amendment  gives  the  Commission  power  over 
routing,''*  and  provides  for  the  recovery  of  damages  for  divert- 
ing shipments  contrary  to  routing  instructions.^'^ 

§  178.  Discrimination  in  Billing. — An  unjust  discrimination 
may  be  committed  by  billing  one  commodity  under  a  classi- 
fication to  which  it  does  not  belong,  by  giving  it  a  false  weight 
or  value,  and  by  letting  one  commodity  go  at  the  net  weight 
and  denying  that  privilege  to  a  like  kind  of  traffic.  This  species 
of  discrimination  and  other  like  devices  and  means  are  pro- 
hibited by  section  10  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  (see 
post,  §  384.)  The  prohibition  of  the  statute  applies  to  the 
shipper  as  well  as  the  carrier.  The  net  weight  practice  was 
in  effect  a  rebate,''"  as  is  the  other  practices  mentioned,  all 
of  which  are  but  devices  violating  the  Act,  and  subjecting  those 
who  are  guilty  to  punishment.  The  offense  is  committed  when 
the  goods  are  billed-  ^"  A  shipper  who,  by  misrepresentation, 
obtains  a  lower  classification  and  rate  than  he  is  entitled  to, 
is  liable  to  the  carrier  for  the  difference  between  the  rate  paid, 
and  the  rate  he  should  have  paid  under  a  proper  billing.^'* 
One  who  in  good  faith  by  mistake  incorrectly  describes  the 
goods  is  not  subject  to  the  penal  provision  of  the  Act."* 

§  179.  Tariffs  of  Rates  Must  Be  Printed,  Posted  and  Main- 
tained.— Xo  carrier  can  engage  in  interstate  transportation 
of  goods  "unless  the  rates,  fares,  and  charges  upon  which  the 
same  are  transported  bV  said  carrier  have  been  filed  and 
published."  The  act  requires  not  only  the  filing  and  publishing 
of  such  "rates,   fares  and   charges,"  but  demands   that  the 

174.  Sec.  344g,  post.  178,     Missouri,    K   &    T.    R.    Co. 

175.  Sec.  401,  jiost.  v.  Trinity  Lumber  Co.,  1  Tex.  Civ. 
vGalley  155.  26367.         Templeton.  App.  553,  21  S.  W.  290. 

176.  Procter  &  Gamble  v.  Cin-  179.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
cinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  Co.  v.  Goetz,  51  III.  App.  151; 
C.    440,   484.  Davis  v.   Pere   IMarquette   R.    Co., 

177.  Davis    v.    United     States,       10  I.  C.  C.  105. 
104  Fed.  136,  43  C.  C.  A.  448. 


§  179]  Equality  in  Rates.  485 

published  tarififis  must  be  charged  and  collected.  (See  post, 
§§  358,  364).  No  change  in  the  tariff  can  be  made  without 
reasonable  notice.  No  provisions  of  the  Act  are  more  effec- 
tive to  prevent  discrimination  and  promote  equality  than 
are  these.  The  courts  and  the  Commission  have  sustained 
and  enforced  these  provisions.  It  has  sometimes  been  con- 
tended that  they  are  unjust  when  applied  to  import  or  ex- 
port traffic.  It  is  true  that  such  provisions  Avould  be  in- 
applicable to  purely  water  traffic.  It  is  little  or  no  more  ex- 
pensive for  a  ship  to  carry  her  full,  than  it  is  to  carry  her 
mininuim  cargo.  For  this  reason,  as  a  ship's  sailing  day  ap- 
proaches and  her  cargo  has  not  beeii  obtained,  she  does  and 
should  be  allowed  to  reduce  her  rates,  thereby  obtaining 
her  full  load.  This  principle,  however,  does  not  apply  to  that 
part  of  a  through  export  or  import  movement  that  is  had 
over  rail  carriers.  Ships,  as  well  as  individuals,  are  entitled 
to  know  what  the  land  movement  will  cost  and  have  this 
cost  based  upon  equality  of  charge.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
law  that  makes  the  rail  carrier  transport  its  dimestic  freight 
at  the  same  rate  as  its  proportion  of  an  import  or  export 
movement.^*"  On  this  subject  the  Commission,  in  its  twenty- 
second  annual  report,  pp.  14  and  15,  says : 

"Effective  April  15,  1908,  and  in  exact  harmony  with  the 
decision  of  the  Commission  in  the  case  of  Cosmopolitan  Ship- 
ping Company  v.  Hamburg-American  Packet  Company  et  al., 
13  I.  C  C.  Rep.,  266,  a  regulation  was  promulgated  by  the 
Commission  requiring  that  tariffs  applying  on  traffic  exported 
to  or  imported  from  foreign  countries  not  adjacent  to  the 
United  States  must  show  the  rates,  fares,  and  charges  of  the 
inland  carriers  subject  to  the  act  for  such  transportation  to 
the  port  and  from  the  port  in  the  United  States,  and  that  such 
rates,  fares,  and  charges  be  so  stated  as  to  be  available  for 
all  persons  who  desire  to  use  them.  It  was  provided  that  as 
a  matter  of  convenience  to  the  public  such  tariffs  might  show 
through  rates  to  or  from  foreign  points,  but  that  if  so  pre- 
pared they  should  also  show  the  inland  rate  or  fare  of  the 
carrier  subject  to  the  act. 

180.    Tex.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int.       Ed.  940,  16  Sup.  Ct.  666. 
Com.   Com.,   162   U.  S.   197,   40   L. 


486  Equality  in  Rates.  [^  179 

"Representations  were  made  to  the  Commission  that  trans- 
continental rail  carriers  reaching  our  Pacific  coast  ports  were, 
on  account  of  the  long  rail  haul,  at  a  disadvantage  in  com- 
petition with  other  carriers  serving  Atlantic  ports  and  trans- 
porting Asiatic  traffic  via  the  Suez  Canal  route.  They  there- 
fore requested  modification  of  the  requirements  as  to  notice 
of  changesin  rates,  and  were  given  permission  to  make  changes 
in  their  rates,  applicable  to  such  import  and  export  traffic  to 
or  from  our  Pacific  coast  ports  upon  notice  of  three  days  of 
reduction  in  rates  and  of  ten  days  as  to  advance  in  rates. 
Subsequently,  by  supplemental  order,  the  same  permission  was 
extended  to  carriers  subject  to  the  act  reaching  Pacific  coast 
ports  in  British  Columbia. 

"The  rail  carriers  in  the  United  States  ordinarily  known 
as  the  transcontinental  lines  withdrew,  effective  November  1, 
1908,  all  their  through  import  and  exportrates  via  the  Pacifie 
ports  and  applied  to  the  inland  carriage  of  export  and  im- 
port traffic  through  those  ports  the  domestic  rates  applicable 
on  traffic  to  and  from  the  ports  proper.  The  Canadian  Pacific 
Railway,  in  connection  with  a  large  number  of  carriers  in 
the  T'''nited  States  with  lines  east  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
published  and  filed  proportional  class  and  commodity  inland 
rates  applicable  to  Vancouver,  British  Columbia,  on  traffic 
destined  to  oriental  ports,  the  Philippines,  Australia,  and 
New  Zealand,  which  proportional  rates  are  much  lower  than 
the  domestic  rates  applying  on  traffic  destined  to  Vancouver 
proper.  These  tariffs,  as  permitted  by  the  Commission's  rule 
foreign  ports  in  connection  with  certain  named  steamship 
lines. 

"The  rule  of  the  Commission  was  freely  commented  upon 
and  for  the  information  of  shippers,  show  through  rates  to 
in  the  newspapers,  bhit  almost  without  exception  from  an  en- 
tirely erroneous  standpoint  and  a  total  misunderstanding  or 
misconception  as  to  what  the  rule  required.  No  opinion  was 
expressed  by  the  Commission  that  the  inland  portion  of  ex- 
port and  import  rates  might  not  reasonably  and  properly  be 
less  than  the  domestic  rates  to  the  ports.  The  order  simply 
required  the  carriers  to  conform  to  the  plain  requirements  of 
the  law  and  to  publish,  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law,  what- 
ever rates  thev  saw  fit  to  establish  on  this  traffic." 


§  180]  Equality  m  Rates.  487 

§  180.  Same  Subject. — Misquoting-  Rates. — If  a  carrier  makes 
a  mistake  and  quotes  the  wrong  rate,  the  shipper  must  never- 
theless pay  the  correct  tarifif  rate,  even  though  he  suffer  severe 
loss  thereby,  and  for  this  loss  he  has  no  remedy.^"  In  Poor 
V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  418,  421,  422,  Mr.  Com- 
missioner Harlan  gives  the  reason  for  this  decision  as  follows : 

"And  of  necessity  no  other  conclusion  was  possible  if  the 
integrity  of  this  regulative  legislation  is  to  be  preserved.  If 
a  mistake  in  naming  a  rate  between  two  given  points  is  to 
be  accepted  as  requiring  the  application  of  that  rate  by  the 
carrier,  the  great  principle  of  equality  in  rates,  to  secure 
which  was  the  very  purpose  and  object  of  the  enactment  of 
these  several  statutes,  might  as  well  be  abandoned.  If  the 
act  of  a  railroad  clerk,  whether  through  mistake  or  otherwise. 
in  quoting  a  less  than  the  lawful  rate  or  in  inserting  a  lower 
rate  in  a  bill  of  lading  is  to  be  held  to  require  or  to  justify 
and  excuse  the  substitution  of  that  rate,  on  a  particular  ship- 
ment, for  the  lawfully  published  rate,  the  effectiveness  of 
such  legislation  is  at  an  end  and  its  whole  purpose  destroyed. 
For  past  experience  shows  that  billing  clerks  and  other 
agents  of  carriers  might  easily  become  experts  in  the  making 
of  errors  and  mistakes  in  the  quotation  of  rates  to  favored 
shippers,  while  other  shippers,  less  fortunate  in  their  rela- 
tions with  carriers  and  whose  traffic  is  less  important,  would 
be  compelled  to  pay  the  higher  published  rates. 

"Stability  and  equality  of  rates  are  more  important  to 
commercial  interests  than  reduced  rates.  It  was  instability 
and  inequality  that  were  the  special  evils  to  be  remedied;  it 
was  the  possibility  that  one  shipper,  in  one  way  or  another, 
whether  by  mistake  or  otherwise,  could,  and  actually  did,  get 
a  lower  rate  than  another  shipper  that  led  to  the  more  string- 

181.     Tex.    &    Pac.    Ry.    Co.    v.  R.   Co.   v.   Dumas,  43   S.  W.   609; 

Mugg,    202    U.    S.    242,    50   L.    Ed.  Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.    v. 

1011,  26  Sup.  Ct.  628;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  Plubbell,    54    Kans.    232,    38    Pac. 

F.    R.    Co.    V.    Hefley,    158    U.    S.  266,   5   I.   C.  R.   241;    Pond-Decker 

98,    39    L.    Ed.    910,    15    Sup.    Ct.  Lumber    Co.    v.    Spencer,    86    Fed. 

802;    Poor   Grain   Co.   v.    Chicago.  846,    30    C.    C.    A.    430;    Mobile    & 

B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  418,  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Dismukes,  94  Ala. 
421,  422;  Suffern,  Hunt  &  Co.  v.  131,  10  So.  289,  4  I.  C.  R.  200; 
Indiana,   D.    &   W.    Ry.    Co.,    7    I.  Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.  v. 

C.  C.  255,  278;   Houston  &  T.  O.  Holmes,  18  Okla.   92,   90  Pac.   22, 


488  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  180 

ent  letiislation.  That  evil  the  present  amended  statute  meets 
in  substantially  the  language  of  previous  legislation." 

While  Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan  was  undoubtedly  correct 
in  his  conclusion  as  the  law  then  stood,  the  ruling  was  one 
that  frequently  worked  serious  injury  to  shippers.  On  this 
subject  the  Commission,  in  its  twenty-second  annual  report, 
pp.  16,  17,  aptly  says : 

"The  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  requires  carriers  to  collect 
their  published  rates,  under  severe  penalty,  and  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  has  held  that  this  must  be  done 
even  though  the  carrier  has  quoted  to  the  shipper  a  different 
rate,  in  good  faith,  upon  wdiich  the  shipper  has  acted. 

"The  practical  hardship  of  this  rule  is  illustrated  by  the 
last  ease  in  which  it  w^as  applied  by  that  court.  Texas  and 
Pacific  Eailway  Company  v.  Mugg,  202  IT.  S.  242,  50  L.  Ed. 
ion,  26  Sup.  Ct.  628.  Here  the  plaintiff  applied  for  a  rate 
on  coal  from  a  point  in  Arkansas  to  a  point  in  Texas  and  was 
quoted  a  rate  of  $1.25  upon  one  kind  and  $1.50  upon  another. 
Upon  the  strength  of  this  quotation  he  made  sale  of  three 
carloads  for  a  delivered  price  at  the  Texas  point.  In  fact, 
the  published  rate  was  $2.75  upon  one  kind  and  $2.85  upon 
the  other,  and  the  shipper  was  obliged  to  pay  upon  the  arrival 
of  the  coal  in  Texas  $140.18  more  than  would  have  been  due 
under  the  rates  quoted.  This  converted  the  transaction  from 
a  profit  to  a  loss,  and  his  suit  was  to  recover  damages  thus 
occasioned.  The  court,  as  has  been  said,  held  that  no  recovery 
could  be  had." 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  shippers  ordinarily  do  not  know 
and  it  would  sometimes  take  an  expert  to  find  out  what  a 
particular  rate  is,  and,  therefore,  reliance  must  be  had  on 
the  information  furnished  by  the  agents  of  the  carriers. 
The  Commission  points  out  the  evil  but  suggests  no  remedy. 
It  would  probably  be  an  effective  remedy  to  allow  the  Com- 
mission to  award  reparation  in  such  eases  as  it  might  find 
were  based  upon  an  honest  mistake  of  the  carrier.  The  Com- 
mission would  be  able  to  prevent  the  evils  that  Mr.  Commis- 
sioner Harlan  points  out;  and,  if  necessary  to  prevent  discrim- 
ination, the  rate  mistakenly  given  might  be  open  to  all  who 
ship  contemporaneously  with  the  shipper  who  relied  on  the 
misquoted  rate. 


§  181]  Equality  in  Rates.  489 

The  Act  of  1910  prescribing  a  penalty  for  misquoting  a  rate 
under  certain  prescribed  conditions  makes  it  illegal  to  mis- 
state a  rate.  This  provision  taken  in  connection  with  Sec- 
tion 8  of  the  Act,  presents  a  situation  different  from  that 
existing  prior  to  this  Amendment  and  now  when  the  amended 
provision  is  violated  it  is  believed  that  a  shipper  may  re- 
cover his  damages/"" 

§  ]81.  Different  Rates  over  the  Same  Line  in  Opposite  Di- 
rections.— In  the  case  of  Duncan  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co./""  the  Commission  said: 

"The  complainant  was  not  discriminated  against  in  being 
allowed  on  his  shipments  west,  to  Los  Angeles,  the  lowest 
available  rate,  and  there  was  no  discrimination  against  him 
on  his  shipments  east  to  Douisville,  as  he  was  charged  the 
general  rate  exacted  of  all  shippers.  His  complaint  in  refer- 
ence to  the  disparity  between  the  rates  charged  him  on  his 
east  and  west  bound  shipments,  respectively,  is  not  properly 
one  of  unjust  discrimination  under  the  third  section  of  the 
act  to  regulate  commerce,  but  rather  calls  in  question  tihe 
reasonableness  of  the  higher  rate.  The  claim  is  in  substance, 
that  the  rate  of  $350  eastward  is  unreasonable  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  rate  over  the  same  line  and  between  the  same 
points  westward  is  only  $263.  This  fact  alone  is  relied  upon 
to  support  tlie  charge.  The  two  rates  have  no  necessary  con- 
nection or  relation,  and  the  fact  that  a  rate  over  a  road  or 
line  in  one  direction  is  materially  higher  than  the  rate  on 
the  same  class  of  traffic  over  the  same  road  or  line  and  be- 
tween the  same  points  in  the  opposite  direction  does  not, 
as  in  the  case  of  hauls  over  the  same  line  in  the  same  direc- 
tion, establish  prima  facie  the  unreasonableness  of  the  higher 
rate.  This  Avould  appear  to  be  especially  true  where  the 
hauls  are  of  as  great  length  as  those  now  under  consideration. 
It  is  moreover  in  evidence,  as  remarked  above,  that  the  "west- 
bound movement  of  the  traffic  termed  "emigrants'  movables" 
is  double  the  east-bound  movement,'  and  the  goods  shipped 
west  a.s  'emigrants'  movables'  are  'materially  lower  in  value' 

182.     Sees.    368,    and    382,    posi,  183.    Duncan   v.   Atchison,  T.   & 

and    St.    Louis    S.   W.    Ry.    Co.    v.       S.   F.  R.   Co.,   6   I.   C.   C   85,   4   L 
Lewellen  Bros.,  192  Fed.  540.  C.  R.  385. 


490  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  181 

than  those  shipped  east.  It  may  be  conceded  that  the  much 
greater  volume  of  the  traffic  moved  west  than  east  is  to  some 
extent  attri])utable  to  the  lower  rate  west,  but  the  tide  of 
emigration  is  naturally  from  a  comparatively  old  and  thickly 
populated  country  like  the  east  to  a  new  and  sparsely  settled 
country  like  the  west.  No  evidence  as  to  the  unreasonable- 
ness of  this  rate  in  itself  has  been  offered." 

This  ruling  has  been  repeated  several  times  by  the  Com- 
mission. In  the  Duncan  case,  supra,  the  facts  of  the  case 
showed  a  much  heavier  movement  of  the  goods  transported 
under  the  shipment  there  in  controversy  towards  the  west 
than  towa'rds  the  east.  This  fact  is  one  of  the  causes  that 
affects  rates  and  may  always  be  considered.  The  amount  of 
traffic  of  a  particular  kind  that  moves  in  a  particular  direction 
may  properly  constitute  a  different  circumstance  and  con- 
dition. The  conclusion  of  the  Commission  was  correct,  but 
what  was  there  stated  should  not  be  accepted  as  a  general 
rule.  If  the  movement  both  ways  is  practically  equal  and 
there  are  no  other  differentiating  circumstances,  the  fact 
that  a  rate  over  a  road  or  line  in  one  direction  is  materially 
higher  than  the  rate  on  the  same  class  of  traffic  over  the 
same  road  or  line  and  between  the  same  points  in  the  op- 
posite direction  does,  as  in  the  case  of  hauls  over  the  same 
line  in  the  same  direction,  establish  prima  facie  the  unreason- 
ablenes.?  of  the  higher  rate. 

The  facts  in  the  MacLoon  case'"  while  stated  by  the  Com- 
mission to  be  practically  the  same  as  in  the  Duncan  case,  do 
not  so  clearly  support  the  holding  as  did  the  facts  in  the 
last  named  case.  There  was  no  evidence  as  to  the  relative 
amount  of  traffic  each  way  and  the  accommodations  seemed  to 
have  been  practically  the  same.  The  charge  was  greater  going 
west  than  going  east.  This  case  would  indicate  a  disposition 
on  the  part  of  the  Commission  to  make  it  a  general  rule  that 
there  is  no  relation  between  traffic  in  opposite  directions  over 
the  same  route-     In  later  cases""  the  MacLoon  case  is  cited 

184.  MacLoon  v.  Boston  &  M.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  619;  Cadillac 
R.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  642,   645.  Lumber   Ex.   v.   V.   A.   R.   R.   Co., 

185.  Hewins  v.  New  York.  N.  4,1  I.  C.  C.  636;  Little  Rock 
H.  &  H.  R.  Co ,  10  I.  C.  C.  221,  Freight  Bureau  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry. 
224;    Hull  Vehicle   Co.  v.   S.   Ry.  Co.,  51  I.  C.  C.  23 


^  182]      ■  Equality  in  Rates.  491 

and  followed.  It  will  be  conceded  that  circumstances  may 
exist  justifying  a  difference  in  rates  over  the  same  line  in 
opposite  directions;  but,  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  such  cir- 
cumstances, such  difference  is  evidence  of  unjust  discrimina- 
tion, and  requires  exiilanation/*" 

§  182.  Discrimination  by  Granting  Free  Service. — Free  tic- 
kets, fares,  passes,  or  free  transportation  for  passengers  are 
prohibited,  with  certain  exceptions,  bj^  paragraph  four  of  sec- 
tion one  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  as  amended  by 
the  Act  of  April  13,  1908'".  The  provisions  requiring  the 
tariff  rates  to  be  charged  and  collected  would  prevent  the 
free  transportation  of  property,  except  such  as  may  be  had 
under  section  22  of  the  Act. 

The  purpose  and  history  of  these  provisions  of  the  law  are 
given  by  the  Commission  in  an  investigation  of  the  subject 
of  granting  passes  in  Colorado  and  Montana.  In  the  report  of 
this  investigation  it  was  held  that  to  grant  an  interstate  ship- 
per an  intrastate  pass  violates  the  Act  and  prosecutions  were 
recommended.  It  was  also  shown  that  a  free  pass  dissipates 
revenues  and  when  carriers  seek  rate  advances  this  fact  is 
proper  to  be  considered."^ 

In  the  Mottley  Case"*  the  Supreme  Court  had  for  deter- 
mination the  validity  of  a  contract  for  transportation  made 
by  Mottley  in  consideration  of  the  settlement  of  his  claim 
for  damages.  The  contract,  although  made  prior  to  the  stat- 
ute prohibiting  free  passes,  was  held  void,  the  court  saying: 

"The  passenger  has  no  right  to  buy  tickets  with  service, 
advertising,  releases  or  property,  nor  can  the  railroad  com- 
pany buy  services,  advertising,  releases  or  property  with  trans- 
portation.    The  statute  manifestly  means  that  the  purchase 

186.     Int    Com.    Com.    v.    Louis-  187.    Sec.  342,  2yost. 

ville   &  N.   R.   Co.,   118   Fed.   613,  188.     Re    Issuance    and    Use    of 

623.    Weil  v.   Penn.   R.  Co.,   11   I.  Passes,  26  I.  C.  C.  491;    Re  Issue 

C.    C.    627,    629,    630;    Phillips    v.  and    Use    of    Passes    —    Montana 

Grand  Trunk  W.  R.  Co.,  11  I.  C.  Situation  —  29  I.  C.  C.  411. 

C.    659,    664,    665;     Pacific    Coast  189.    Louisville   &  N.   R.   Co.   v. 

Gypsum  Co.  v.  O.  W.  R.  Co.,  30  I.  Mottley,    219    U.    S.    467,    477,    55 

C.  C.  135.  Heider  Mfg.  Co.  v.  C.  &  L.    Ed.    297,    31    Sup.    Ct.    265,    34 

G.  W.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  556,  558;  L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.)    671;    Tripp   v. 

Merchants   Freight   Bureau   v.   M.  M.   C.   R.   Co.,   238   Fed.    449,   455, 

P.  R.  Co.,  50  I.  C.  C.  247,  248.  151  C  C.  A.  385. 


492      ^  Equality  in  Rates.  [^  183 

of  a  transportation  ticket  by  a  passenger  and  its  sale  by  the 
company  shall  be  consummated  only  by  the  former  paying 
cash  and  by  the  latter  receiving  cash  of  the  amount  specified 
in  the  published  tariffs." 

While  such  a  contract  cannot  be  specifically  enforced,  if 
valid  when  made,  the  holder,  after  the  law  has  prevented  its 
enforcement,  may  recover  damages  for  its  breach.'*"  Although 
the  decisions  are  not  uniform  and  the  Supreme  Court  has  not 
yet  decided  the  question,  it  would  seem  that  in  a  suit  by  a 
carrier  for  freight  charges  the  shipper  could  by  plea  in  re- 
coupment recover  damages  for  loss  or  injury  to  the  property 
shipped."'. 

§  183.  Basing  Points,  Group  Rates  and  Zone  Rates. — In 
discussing  the  reasonableness  of  rates  the  questions  of  basing 
the  rate  of  one  locality  on  that  of  another,  grouping  ter- 
ritory and  giving  the  whole  group  the  same  rate,  and  mak- 
ing rates  to  or  from  particular  zones  were  diseussed.^*^  The 
description  of  these  systems  of  rate  making  there  given  need 
not  l>:e  here  repeated  .It  has  there  seen  that  discrimination 
could  result  from  such  practices,  and  it  is  obvious  that  either 
of  the  systems  may  be  so  applied  as  unduly  to  discriminate 
for  or  against  a  particular  locality.  But  it  was  shown  that 
the  systems  were  not  necessarily  illegal,  the  illegality,  if 
existing,  arising  from  the  application  of  the  system. 

Generally  speaking,  competition  may  force  a  lower  rate 
at  one  point  than  at  another.  What  competition  must  be 
considered  and  the  force  that  must  be  given  thereto  present 
questions  having  the  difficulties  which  accompany  the  deter- 
mination of  all  questions  relating  to  making  or  judging 
rates.  Definite  water  competition  is  a  fact  which  carriers 
may  consider,  and  water  competition  at  one  point  which  forces 
a  low  rate  thereat  may  be  met  by  a  carrier  without  being 
compelled  to  accord  the  same  low  rate  to  another  point  where 

190.  New  York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Cimeo,  241  Fed.  727,  730  —  con- 
Co.  V.  Gray,  239  U.  S.  583,  60  L.  tra,  .Johnson-Brown  Co.  v.  V.  V. 
Ed.  4.51,  36  Sup.  Ct.  176;  Irvin  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  239  Fed.  590 
V.    Postal    Tel.    &    Cable    Co.,    173  and   cases  cited   592. 

Pac.  487.  192.    108,  supra, 

191.  AVells     Fargo     &     Co.     v. 


§  184]  Equality  in  Rates.  493 

no  such  competition  exists.'".  But,  "every  city  is  entitled  to 
the  advantage  of  its  location  and  may  not  lawfully  be  sub- 
jected to  high  freight  charges  merely  because  carriers,  for 
reasons  of  convenience  or  otherwise,  include  it  with  a  num- 
ber of  other  points  in  surrounding  territory  which  latter 
points  are  not  similarly  situated. ' ' '"  Carriers  cannot  of 
their  own  initiative,  nor  can  they  be  compelled,  "to  equalize 
natural  advantages."  '^^ 

In  speaking  of  group  rates,  the  Commission  said: 

"When  general  rate  adjustments  in  and  between  large 
territories,  which  contemplate  subsltantial  justice  between 
all  shippers  generally,  result  in  individual  instances  of  dis- 
proportionate inequality,  they  fail  in  their  purpose  to  that 
extent,  and  their  strict  observance  in  such  cases  upon  no 
other  ground  than  the  arbitrary  theory  of  their  existence, 
should  yield  to  the  extent  necessary  to  prevent  gross  in- 
justice, just  as  many  other  general  rules  are  necessarily  sub- 
ject to  exceptions.""" 

The  report  of  the  Commission  in  the  Carrollton  Board  of 
Trade  ease,  "'  discusses  the  general  subject  and  holds  that 
distance  is  a  fact  requiring  consideration. 

This  system  following  action  under  the  1910  Amendment 
has  practically  ended  in  the  southeast.'"* 

§  1S4.  How  Far  a  Rate  Made  by  a  State  Relieves  a  Carrier 
from  the  Duty  to  Serve  Commodities  with  Legal  Equality. — 

That  discrimination  which  the  statute  prohibits,  may  result 

193.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Ala-  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  22  I. 
bama  M.   Ry.   Co..    168   U.   S.   144,       C.   C.   84,    88. 

42    L.    Ed.    414,    18    Sup.    Ct.    45;  196.    Alpha     Portland     Cement 

Int.    Com.    Com.    v.    Louisville    &  Co.    v.    Baltimore    &    O.    R.    Co., 

N.  R.  Co.,  190  U.  S.  273,  47  L.  Ed.  22    I.    C.    C.    446,    449;    Kaufman 

1047,  23   Sup.  Ct.    687;    Int.   Com.  Commercial  Club  v.  T.  &  N.  O.  R. 

Com.    V.    Western    &    A.    Ry.    Co.,  Co.,    31    I.    C.    C.    167;    Coffeyville 

181    U.    S.    29,    45   L.    Ed.    729,    21  Commercial    Club    v.    A.    T.    &    S. 

Sup.    Ct.    512;    Columbia   Grocery  F.    R.    Co.,    33    I.    C.    C.    122,    34 

Co.  V.  Louisville  &  N.   R.  Co.,   18  I,   C.  C.  231. 
I.  C.   C.   502.  197.    Board  of  Trade  of  CarroH- 

194.  Corporation  Com.  of  North  ton  v.  Central  of  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  28 
Carolina    v.    Norfolk    &    W.    Ry.  I.  C.  C.   154. 

Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  303,  307.  198.    Green  v.  A.  &  V.  Ry.  Co., 

195.  Elk    Cement    &   Lime    Co.       43   I.   C.   C.   662,  677. 


494  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  185 

from  the  fact  that  state  made  rates  applying  within  a  pra- 
ticular  state  are  lower  than  interstate  rates  applicable  to 
interstate  shipments  which  are  made  to  compete  with  like 
shipments  moving  under  intrastate  rates.  If  Congress  has 
no  power  to  prohibit  discrimination  when  one  class  of  the 
discriminatory  rates  is  made  by  a  state,  there  could  be  the 
most  injurious  discrimination  from  which  no  remedy  would 
exist.  This  and  similar  arguments  influenced  the  Commission 
in  the  Shreveport  case  to  direct  the  carriers  there  defendant 
to  remove  an  unlawful  discrimination  resulting  from  rates 
prescribed  by  the  Railroad  Commission  of  Texas.  Such  an 
order  the  courts  held  was  valid."" 

The  doctrine  of  the  Shreveport  case  has  become  the  ac- 
cepted rule  and  the  Transportation  Act  1920 "'"'  has  recognized 
the  doctrine  and  prescribed  rules  of  procedure  for  its  enforce- 
ment. 

§  185.  Commutation,  Mileage  and  Party  Rate  Ticket. — Sec- 
tion 22  of  the  Act  provides:  "Nothing  in  this  act  shall  pre- 
vent *  *  *  the  issuance  of  mileage,  excursion  or  commu- 
tation tickets."  The  right,  however,  to  issue  these  special 
contracts  for  passenger  travel  is  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
other  sections  of  the  Act  requiring  that  all  in  similar  situation 
shall  be  accorded  like  treatment.  Commutation  tickets  must 
not  be  accorded  to  some  and  denied  to  other  similarly  sit- 
uated.^"^ 

A  dictum  of  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  supports  the  conclusion 
that  commutation  tickets  might  be  limited  in  their  use  to 
school  children,  while  the  opinion  of  the  Commission  seems  to 
favor  the  opposite  view.""'      While  the  question  is  not  free 

199.  Houston,  E.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.      Sec.  393b,  post  — . 

V.   United   States-Shreveport   case,  201.     Commutation    Tickets    to 

234  U.  S.  342,  58  L.  Ed.  1341,  34  School  Children,  17  I.  C.  C.  144; 

Sup.    Ct.    833,    affirming   Texas    &  Re  Restricted  Rates,  20   I.   C.   C. 

P.    R.    Co.    V.    United    States,    205  426;    Commutation  Rate  Case,   21 

Fed.    380,    and    the    order    of   the  I.  C.  C.  428;   Bitzer  v.  W.  V.  Ry. 

Commission  in  Railroad  Com.   of  Co.,  24   I.  C.  C.  225. 

La.   V.    St.   L.    S.   W.    Ry.    Co.,    23  202.    Interstate  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mas- 

I.    C.    C.    31.      See    also    Sec.    44,  sachusetts,  207  U.  S.  79,  52  L.  Ed. 

supra.  111.    28     Sup.     Ct.    26;     affirming 

200.  Transportation   Act   1920;  Commonwealth   v.   Interstate   Ry. 


<§  1S6]  Equality   in   Rates.  495 

from  doubt,  the  public  purpose  served,  and  the  absence  of 
damage  to  any  one  tends  to  justify  a  classification  of  school 
children  for  the  purpose  of  conceding  to  them  special  com- 
mutation fares. 

The  Commission  has  said  "commutation  tickets  will  benefit 
a  large  number  of  persons,  without  operating  to  the  undue 
prejudice  of  others.'""''  It  is  not  an  unjust  discrimination  to 
give  lower  rates  for  each  individual  when  several  travel  on 
one  ticket  than  is  accorded  each  individual  traveling  alone.""* 

§  186.  Rebates. — A  rebate  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act 
to  Regulate  Commerce  means  the  acceptance  by  a  common 
carrier  of  a  rate  less  than  that  provided  for  in  its  tariffs 
of  charges.  The  most  frequent  method  of  rebating  was  for 
the  carrier  to  exact  the  full  tariff  charge  and  afterwards 
"rebate"  or  pay  to  the  shipper  a  portion  thereof.  This  re- 
bate was  sometimes  affected  under  the  guise  of  a  claim  for 
damages  by  the  shipper.  In  whatever  form,  whether  openly 
or  by  the  most  ingenious  and  complicated  device,  all  rebates 
are  illegal  and  punishable  under  the  Elkins  law.  The  desire 
to  obtain  equality  to  shippers  and  to  prevent  favoritism  was 
probably  the  strongest  reason  for  the  enactment  of  the  Act 
to  Regulate  Commerce.  By  the  unjust  and  preferential  pay- 
ment of  rebates  the  incomes  of  carriers  were  dissipated  and 
the  unfortunate  shipper  who  received  no  rebates  had  his 
business  destroyed,  while  his  more  favored  competitor  thrived. 
The  views  of  the  Supreme  Court,  through  Mr-  Justice  White, 
in  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  200  U.  S.  361,  391,  52  L.  Ed.  515,  521,  26  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  272,  277,'°'  are  apposite  here : 

"It  can  not  be  challenged  that  the  great  purpose  of  the 
act  to  regulate  commerce,  whilst  seeking  to  prevent  unjust 
and  unreasonable  rates,  was  to  secure  equality  of  rates  to 
all  and  to  destroy  favoritism,  these  last  being  accomplished 

Co.,  187  Mass.  4^6,  73  N.  E.  530;  R.   Co.,   145  U.   S.   263,  36   L.   Ed. 

Commutation    Tickets    to    Scliool  699,  12  Sup  Ct.  844,  4  I.  C.  R.  92. 

Children,  17  I.  C.  C.  144.  205.    New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R. 

203.  St.  Louis,  Mo.  Illinois  Pas-  Co.  v.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  200 
senger  Fares,  41  I.  C.  C.  584,  600,  U.  S.  361,  391,  50  L.  Ed.  515,  521, 
601.  26  Sup.  Ct.  272,  277. 

204.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  B.  &  O. 


496  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  186 

by  requiring  the  publication  of  tariffs  and  by  prohibiting 
secret  departures  from  such  tariffs,  and  forbidding  rebates, 
preferences,  and  all  other  forms  of  undue  discrimination. 
To  this  extent  and  for  these  purposes,  the  statute  was 
remedial,  and  is,  therefore,  entitled  to  receive  that  interpre- 
tation -which  reasonably  accomplishes  the  great  public  pur- 
pose which  it  was  enacted  to  subserve  *  *  *  The  all-em- 
bracing prohiV)ition  against  either  directly  or  indirectly  charg- 
ing less  than  the  published  rates  shows  that  the  purpose  of 
the  statute  Avas  to  make  the  prohibition  applicable  to  every 
method  of  dealing  by  a  carrier  by  which  the  forbidden  result 
could  be  brought  about.  If  the  public  purpose  which  the 
statute  was  intended  to  accomplish  be  borne  in  mind,  its 
meaning  becomes,  if  possible,   clearer." 

Mr.  Justice  Day,  after  quoting  the  above  remarks  in  the 
Armour  Packing  Co.  ease,"""  said : 

"The  Elkins  act  proceeded  upon  broad  lines  and  was  evid- 
ently intended  to  effectuate  the  purpose  of  Congress  to  re- 
quire that  all  shippers  should  be  treated  alike,  and  that  the 
only  rate  charged  to  any  shipper  for  the  same  service,  under 
the  same  conditions,  should  be  the  one  established,  published, 
and  posted  as  required  by  law.  It  is  not  so  much  the  particu- 
lar form  by  which  or  the  motive  for  which  this  purpose  was 
accomplished,  but  the  intention  was  to  prohibit  any  and  all 
means  that  might  be  resorted  to  to  obtain  or  receive  conces- 
sions and  rebates  from  the  iixed  rates,  duty  posted  and  pub- 
lished." 

Emphasis  was  given  to  these  principles  by  the  Supreme 
Court  in  holding  that  land  cannot  be  purchased  and  paid  for 
by  conceding  to  the  grantor  a  rebate  although  the  amount  of 
the  rebate  is  less  than  the  value  of  the  land.  Said  Mr. 
Justice  Lamar  in  the  opinion  of  the  court:  "The  commerce 
act  prohibits  the  payment  of  rebates,  and  its  command  can 
not  be  evaded  by  calling  them  differentials  or  concessions, 
nor  by  taking  the  money  from  the  railroad  itself  or  from 
a  company  that  is  proved  to  be  the  same  as  the  railroad."'" 

206.     Armour    Pack,ing    Co.    v.  207.    Fouche  River  Lumber  Co. 

United    States,    209    U.    S.    56.    52       v.   Bryant  Lumber  Co.,  230  U.   S. 
L.  Ed.  681,  28  Sup.  Ct.  428.  816,   57   L.   Ed.    1498,   33   Sup.    Ct. 


<§  187]  Equality  in  Rates.  497 

The  law  applies  to  demurrage  charges^"*  and  each  distinct 
shipment,  transportation  or  transaction  constitutes  a  separate 
oflPense.""" 

The  venue  of  suits  in  prosecutions  for  granting  rebates  is 
in  any  federal  district  through  which  moves  the  transporta- 
tion on  which  the  rebate  is  paid."" 

When  no  joint  tariff  is  filed,  the  sum  of  the  local  rates  is 
the  valid  through  rate,  and  a  carrier  who  issues  a  through  bill 
of  lading  and  collects  less  than  such  rate  is  guilty  of  rebat- 
ing."' 

§  187.  Same  Subject  Corporation  Punishable. — In  New  York 
C.  &  n.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  United  States,'''  it  was  contended  that 
the  law  could  not  impute  to  a  corpforation  the  commission 
of  a  crime  and  that  the  conviction  of  a  corporate  common 
carrier  for  rebating  was  illegal.  This  question  is  discussed 
at  length,  authorities  cited  and  this  conclusion  arrived  at: 

"We  see  no  valid  objection  in  law,  and  every  reason  in 
public  policy,  why  the  corporation  which  profits  by  the  trans- 
action, and  can  only  act  through  its  agents  and  officers,  shall 
be  punishable  by  fine  because  of  the  know^ledge  and  intent  of 
its  agents  to  whom  it  has  intrusted  authority  to  act  in  the 
subject-matter  of  making  and  fixing  rates  of  transportation, 
and  whose  knowledge  and  purposes  may  well  be  attributed 
to  the  corporation  for  which  the  agent  acts.  While  the 
law  should  have  regard  to  the  rights  of  all,  and  to  those  of 

887,  citing  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  United    States    v.    Lehigh    Valley 

V.    Mottley,   219    U.    S.    467,    55   L.  R.  Co.,  184  Fed.  546. 

Ed.  397,  31  Sup.  Ct.  265,  34  L.  R.  209.     United    States    v.    Standard 

A.    (N.  S.)    671;    United  States  v.  Oil   Co.,  192  Fed.  438;    New  York 

Lehigh   Valley   R.    Co.,    220    U.    S.  C.    &    H.    R.    R.    Co.    v.    United 

257,    55    L.    Ed.    458,    31    Sup.    Ct.  States,   212   U.    S.   481,   53   L.   Ed. 

387;  United  States  v.  Union  Stock  613,   29   Sup.   Ct.  304. 

Yards    Co.,    226    U.    S.    286,    57   L.  210.     See   note   185,   supra,    this 

Ed.   226,   33    Sup.   Ct.   83,    and    re-  chapter. 

versing    Fouche    Lumber    Co.    v.  211.    Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 

Bryant  Lumber  Co.,   97  Ark.   623,  United   States,    157   Fed.    830.     Af- 

135  S.  W.  790.  fi'-med    209    U.    S.    90,    52    L.    Ed. 

208.     Lehigh    Valley    R.    Co.    v.  098,  28  Sup.  Ct.  439. 

United    States,    188    Fed.    879,    at-  212.    New  York   C.  &  H.   R.   R. 

firming  United  States  v.  Philadel-  Co.    v.    United    States,    212    U.    S. 

phia  &  R.  Co.,  184  Fed.   543,  and  481,  53  L.  Ed.  613,  29  Sup.  Ct.  304. 


498  Equality  in  Rates.  [§  188 

corporations  no  less  than  to  those  of  individuals,  it  can  not 
shut  its  ej'es  to  the  fact  that  the  great  majority  of  business 
transactions  in  modern  times  are  conducted  through  these 
bodies,  and  particularly  that  interstate  commerce  is  almost 
entirely  in  their  hands,  and  to  give  them  immunity  from  all 
punishment  because  of  the  old  and  exploded  doctrine  that  a 
corporation  cannot  commit  a  crime  would  virtually  take  away 
the  only  means  of  effectually  controlling  the  subject-matter 
and  correcting  the  abuses  aimed  at. 

"There  can  be  no  question  of  the  power  of  Congress  to 
regulate  interstate  commerce,  to  prevent  favoritism  and  to 
secure  equal  rights  to  all  engaged  in  interstate  trade.  It 
would  be  a  distinct  step  backward  to  hold  that  Congress  can 
not  control  those  who  are  conducting  this  interstate  commerce 
by  holding  them  responsible  for  the  intent  and  purposes  of 
the  agents  to  whom  they  have  delegated  the  power  to  act 
in  the  premises." 

This  section  and  the  one  preceding  it  are  limited  to  the 
question  of  discrimination  as  the  result  of  rebates.  The  pro- 
cedure for  determining  and  punishing  rebating  will  be  more 
fully  discussed  in  a  subsequent  chapter."" 

§  188.  Summary. — Obviouslj^  many  of  the  facts  which  must 
be  considered  in  determining  whether  a  particular  rate  is 
reasonable  or  unreasonable  must  also  be  considered  in  deter- 
mining whether  or  not  a  particular  rate  is  unjustly  discrimin- 
atory or  unduly  preferential.  Some,  therefore,  of  the  prin- 
ciples discussed  in  section  131,  supra,  are  applicable  here. 

A  common  carrier  performs  a  public  function;  the  Gov- 
ernment permits  the  carrier  to  do  what  the  Government  itself 
could  do.  The  charges  exacted  by  the  carrier  are  analogous 
to  taxation.  The  Government  taxes,  that  it  may  perform  its 
governmental  duties.  The  Government,  it  is  true,  exacts  no 
profit  for  the  service  rendered,  the  common  carrier  using, 
private  capital  is  permitted  to  receive,  in  addition  to  the 
actual  cost  of  the  service  it  performs,  a  fair  return  on  the 
capital  necessarily  used  to  enable  it  to  perform  such  service. 
The  Government  itself  would,  were  it  to  undertake  to  perform 
the   service    directly,   have   to    obtain   capital   to   supply   the 

213.    Sec.  371,  post. 


§  188]  Equality  in  Rates.  499 

necessary  facilities.  The  Government  could  furnish  the  serv- 
ice free  to  all,  obtaining  the  cost  thereof  from  general  taxa- 
tion, or  it  could  as  with  the  mails  make  all  who  use  the 
service  pay  therefor. 

This  analogy  between  taxation  and  charges  by  common  car- 
riers is  sufficient  to  require  that  the  rule  of  uniformity  ap- 
plicable to  taxation  should  be  observed  in  fixing  the  charges 
which  the  common  carrier  may  exact. 

But  uniformity  does  not  mean  that  every  charge  must  be 
the  same.  It  means  no  more  than  that  under  the  same  or  simi- 
lar circumstances  the  charge  exacted  shall  be  guaged  alike. 

There  are  different  kinds  of  taxes,  but  there  must  be  uni- 
formity in  the  tax  on  the  same  or  a  similar  subject-matter. 

To  get  just  uniformity,  either  in  taxation  or  in  charges  by 
public  service  corporations,  there  must  be  classification ;  classi- 
fication as  to  the  service  rendered  considering  the  cost  and 
extent  thereof,  and  classification  as  to  the  value  the  service 
is  to  him  for  whom  it  is  performed. 

It  has  been  the  aim  of  the  author  of  this  chapter  to  present 
the  principles  which  have  been  applied  in  making  this  classi- 
fication of  commodities  and  distinction  in  rates.  That  these 
principles  must  yield  sometimes  is  true.  That  the  known 
facts  are  not  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  justify  definite 
generalizations  and  a  fixed  standard  to  be  applied  to  the  prob- 
lem, must  be  admitted.  But  the  general  rules  which  have  been 
empirically  deduced  justify  the  statement  of  the  Commission 
that  "it  is  not  fanciful  to  say  that  a  schedule  of  rates  may  be 
made  which  will  approach  justice  as  between  services." 


CHAPTER    V. 

ENFORCEMENT   BY   THE   COMMISSION   OF   THE   ACT   TO    REGU- 
LATE COMMERCE. 

§  189.  General    Statement    of    the   Functions    of    the    Interstate    Com- 
merce Commission. 

190.  Appointment  and  General  Duties  of  the  Commission. 

191.  Switch  Connections.     Duty  of  Carriers. 

192.  Switch  Connections.     Powers  of  the  Commission. 

193.  Industrial   Switches  and  Railways. 

194.  Switch  Connections  with  Carriers  by  Water. 

195.  Through  Routes. 

196.  Division  of  Joint  Rates. 

197.  Allowances  to  Shippers  for  Services  and  Facilities. 

198.  Distribution  of  Cars. 

198a.  Furnishing  Cars,  Car   Service. 

199.  Long  and   Short  Haul  Provisions,  History   of. 

200.  Relationship  of  Intermediate  and   Through   Rates. 

201.  Water  Competition. 

202.  Power  of  the  Commission  under  the  Fourth  Section. 

203.  Ownership  of  Water  Carriers  by  Railroads. 

204.  The    Commission's    Duties    with    Reference    to    Schedules    of 

Rates. 
204a.  Bills  of  Lading. 

205.  Damages. 

206.  Damages — Power  of  the  Commission  to  Make  Award  of. 

207.  Awards  of  Damages  for  Charging  an  Unjust  and  Unreasonable 

Rate. 

208.  Awards  of  Damages   for  Unlawful   Discrimination. 

209.  Damages  under  the  Fourth  Section. 

210.  Damages  for  Misrouting. 

211.  Damages — General   Statement. 

212.  Damages  for  Misquoting  a  Rate. 

213.  Damages,  to  Whom  Paid. 

214.  Damages,  by  Whom  Paid. 

215.  Damages — Protest  Unnecessary. 

216.  Damages — Interest  and   Attorney's  Fees. 

217.  Award  of  Damages  an  Inadequate  Remedy. 

218.  Damages,  Limitation  on  Complaint  for. 

219.  General  Investigation  by  tbe  Commission. 

220.  Same  Subject.    Amendments  of  1910  and  1920. 

221.  Commission   May  Ask   the  Aid   of  the  Courts   to   Enforce  the 

Law. 

222.  Commission  Has  Power  to  Prescribe  Rates  for  the  Failure. 

(50O) 


§  189]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  501 

223.  Suspension  of  Rates,  Regulations  and  Practices. 

224.  Through  Routes  and  JoJnt  Rates. 

225.  Allowance  for  Services  or  Instrumentalities. 

226.  Powers  Enumerated,  Not  Exclude  Others. 

227.  Effect  of  Commission's  Orders. 

228.  Commission's  Control  Over  Its  Orders. 

229.  Commission  May  Employ  Attorneys. 

230.  Records  of  Commission. 

231.  Valuation  of  Railroad   Property. 

232.  Valuation,    How    Made. 

233.  Finality  and  Effect  of  Valuation. 

234.  Office  of  Commission. 

235.  Annual  Reports  from  Carriers. 

236.  Examiners. 

23.7.  Reports  by  the  Commission. 

238.  Lake  Erie  and  Ohio  River  Ship  Canal. 

239.  Paftel  Post. 

240.  Government  Aided  Railroads  and  Telegraph  Companies. 

241.  Common  Law  Remedies. 

§  189.  General  Statement  of  the  Functions  of  the  Commis- 
sion.— In  discussing  the  scope  and  validity  of  the  Act  to 
Regulate  Commerce  infra  chapter  two,  it  was  seen  that  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  was  an  administrative  body, 
v^ith  no  judicial  power,  that  it  is  an  agency  of  the  legislative 
department  of  the  Federal  Government  to  which  has  been 
delegated  the  legislative  power  of  prescribing  rates  for  the 
future.  In  the  performance  of  its  administrative  duties,  it  exer- 
cises certain  functions  in  the  exercise  of  which  it  adopts  forms 
and  procedure  similar  to  those  in  use  by  courts  when  enforc- 
ing the  judicial  powers  of  the  government.  "VVliile  in  a  loose 
way  it  is  frequently  said  that  the  Commission  exercises  quasi 
judicial  powers,  it  cannot  be  said  that  any  of  the  judicial 
powers  conferred  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
are,  or  can  be,  exercised  by  the  Commission.  Its  duties  under 
existing  law  naturally  divide  themselves  into  two  distinct 
branches.  The  first  of  these  are  purely  administrative  in  their 
nature.  The  second  is  the  exercise  of  its  delegated  legislative 
power  and  consists  of  prescribing  rules,  regulations  and  rates 
for  the  future.  Under  the  first  head,  upon  complaint,  the 
Commission,  after  hearing,  may  decide  that  the  past  practice 
of  a  carrier  has  not  been  in  accord  with  the  law.  and  it  may 
determine  that  by  such  practices  the  complainant  has  bteen 


502  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  189 

damaged  in  an  amount  which  the  Commission  fixes.  Its  find- 
ings awarding  reparation  may  or  may  not,  at  the  option  of 
the  carrier,  be  obeyed.  If  the  order  therefor  is  obeyed,  it  is 
not  that  the  carrier  can  be  compelled  to  do  so  by  any  order 
of  the  Commission,  but  because  the  carrier  recognizes  the 
justice  thereof  or  fears  that  the  courts  may  do  so.  If  obedi- 
ence is  refused,  the  Commission,  or  the  parties  in  whose  favor 
the  order  is  granted,  may  ask  the  judicial  department  of 
the  government  to  lend  its  aid  to  make  effective  the  findings 
of  the  Commission.  When  the  matter  is  brought  to  the  at 
tention  of  the  proper  court  in  such  a  way  as  to  invoke  its 
action,  a  hearing  is  had  de  novo,  the  findings  of  the  Com- 
mission being,  by  a  rule  of  evidence  prescribed  by  the  legis- 
lative department,  prima  facie  true.  Exercising  its  full  and 
unlimited  judicial  power,  the  court  may  give  weight  to  the 
findings  of  the  Commission  like  it  might  to  any  other  admin- 
istrative body ;  but  the  power  to  enforce  the  order  is  wholly  in 
the  courts. 

The  Commission  prescribes  forms  of  accounting  which  the 
carriers  must  obey,  prescribes  the  forms  of  tariffs  and  methods 
of  publishing  same,  and  makes  conference  rulings  applicable 
to  the  general  enforcement  of  the  Act. 

By  the  Amendment  of  March  1,  1913,  the  Commission  is 
directed  to  investigate,  ascertain  and  report  the  value  of  all 
the  property  owned  or  used  by  every  common  carrier  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  commerce  acts. 

The  Transportation  Act  1920  materially  increases  the  pow- 
ers of  the  Commission,  modifies  the  language  of  the  former 
act  as  to  existing  poAvers,  gives  a  right  to  initiate  rates  and 
adds  the  duty  to  prescribe  minimum  rates,  makes  more  defi- 
nite the  duty  of  the  Commission  in  respect  to  giving  railroads 
a  "fair  return"  on  investment,  increases  its  duties  as  to  the 
service  and  distribution  of  cars,  changes  from  the  principle 
of  competition  required  by  former  laws,  and  adopts  the 
principle  of  cooperation,  and  adds  the  right  to  supervise  the 
issuance  of  securities  and  the  increase  or  decrease  of  exist- 
ing facilities.^ 

1.  For  an  historical  sketch  of  1920  see  articles  by  the  writer 
former  statutes  and  an  analy-  hereof  Columbia  Law  Review, 
Bis    of   the     Transportation     Act      March   1919,  p.  47,  ct  scq;  Rail- 


§  190]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  503 

§  190.  Appointment  and  General  Duties  of  the  Commission. 

• — The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  is  composed  of  eleven 
members,  whose  terms  of  officer  are  seven  years  each,  and  each 
of  whom  receives  an  annual  salary  of  twelve  thousand  dollars. 
They  are  appointed  by  the  President  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate.  Not  more  than  six  of  the  com- 
missioners may  be  of  the  same  political  party,  and  they  may 
be  removed  by  the  President  for  inefficiency,  neglect  of  duty, 
or  malfeasance  in  office.  They  shall  not  engage  in  any  other 
business,  vocation,  or  employment.  The  principle  office  of 
the  Commission  shall  be  in  Washington,  where  its  general  ses- 
sions shall  be  held ;  but  whenever  the  convenience  of  the 
public  or  of  the  parties  may  be  promoted,  or  delay  or  ex- 
pense prevented  thereby,  the  Commission  may  hold  special 
sessions  in  any  part  of  the  United  States.  It  may,  by  one  or 
more  of  the  commissioners,  prosecute  any  inquiry  necessary 
to  its  duties,  in  any  part  of  the  United  States,  into  any 
matter  or  question  of  fact  pertaining  to  the  business  of  any 
common  carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  act.  It  shall 
inquire  into  the  management  of  the  business  of  all  common 
carriers  sub.ject  to  the  act,  and  is  authorized  and  required  to 
enforce  such  act.  It  has  power  to  require,  by  subpoena,  the 
attendance  of  witnesses  and  the  production  of  books  and 
it  may  order  testimony  taken  by  depositions.  Every  order 
of  the  Commission  shall  be  forthwith  served  by  mailing  to  any 
one  of  the  principal  officers  or  agents  of  the  carrier  at  his  usual 
place  of  business  a  copy  thereof;  and  the  registry  mail  receipt 
shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  receipt  of  such  order  by  the 
carrier.  It  may  suspend  or  modify  its  orders  and  grant  re- 
hearings.  It  has  power  to  require  reports  from  ca^Vriei's 
subject  to  'the  act  and  to  prescribe  forms  for  accounting  by 
carriers.    It  must  itself  make  annual  reports  to  Congress. 

§  191.  Switch  Connections — Duty  of  Carrier. — It  is  the  duty 
of  any  common  carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Act,  upon  application  of  any  lateral, 
branch  line  of  railroad,  or  of  any  shipper  tendering  inter- 
state traffic  for  transportation,  to  construct,  maintain,  and  op- 
erate upon  reasonable  terms  a  switch  connection  with  any  such 
lateral,  branch  line  of  railroad,  or  private  side  track  which  may 


504  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [<§>  192 

be  constructed  to  connect  with  its  railroad,  where  such  connec- 
tion is  reasonably  practicable  and  can  be  put  in  with  safety  and 
will  furnish  sufficient  business  to  justify  the  construction  and 
maintenance  of  the  same,  and  to  furnish  cars  for  the  move- 
ment of  such  traffic  to  the  best  of  its  ability  without  discrim- 
ination in  favor  of  or  against  any  such  shipper." 

Under  section  one  of  the  Act  of  March  4,  1887,  as  amended 
by  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  had  power  to  compel  switch 
connections  with  lateral  branch  roads  only  at  the  instance 
of  shippers  and  that  it  had  no  power  to  compel  switch  con- 
nections on  the  application  of  a  branch  railroad.^ 

The  amendment  of  June  18,  1910,  however,  gives  the  right  to 
''any  lateral,  branch  line  of  railroad,"  as  well  as  to  any  ship- 
per. 

In  construing  the  words  "lateral  branch  line,"  the  Supreme 
Court  gave  as  examples  of  such  lines,  "those  that  are  depend- 
ent upon  and  incident  to  the  main  line — feeders,  such  as  may 
be  built  from  mines  or  forests  to  bring  coal,  ore  or  lumber  to 
the  main  line  for  shipment,"  and  the  court  held  that  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  a  particular  line  comes  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statutory  language  must  be  determined  by 
what  the  line  is,  and  not  by  what  it  may  become.* 

§  192.  Switch  Connections — Povrer  of  the  Commission. — 
Should  a  carrier  fail  to  perform  the  duty  to  make  switch 
connections,  on  application  therefor  in  writing  by  any  ship- 
per or  owner  of  such  lateral,  blranch  line  of  railroad,  such 
shipper  or  owner  of  such  lateral,  branch  line  of  railroad, 
may  make  complaint,  and  the  Commission  shall  hear  and  in- 
vestigate the  same  and  shall  determine  as  to  the  safety  and 
practicability  thereof  and  the  justification  and  the' reasonable 
compensation   therefor,    and   the    Commission   may    make    an 

road   Herald   April   1920,   p.  ,  4.     United    States    v.    Baltimore 

et  seq.  &   O.  R.   Co.,  226  U.   S.  14,   57  L. 

2.  Paragraphs  4  and  9  of  Sec-  Ed.  104,  33  Sup.  Ct.  5,  affirming 
tion  1  of  Interstate  Commerce  Act  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  United 
sections  338,  344,  post.  States,    195    Fed.     962,      Opinion 

3.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Commerce  Court  No.  60,  p.  431. 
Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  216  For  order  of  the  Commission 
U.  S.  531,  54  L.  Ed.  605,  30  Sup.  see,  Cincinnati  &  Columbus  Trac- 

Ct.  415,  tion    Co.    V.    Baltimore    &    O.    R. 


<§  192]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  505 

order  directing  the  common  carrier  to  comply  with  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  in  accordance  with  such  order.^ 

This  provision  is  supplemented  by  the  Transportation  Act 
1920  which  authorizes  the  Commission,  when  in  the  public 
interest  and  practicable,  to  require  that  existing  terminal 
facilities,  including  main  line  track  or  tracks  for  a  reasonable 
distance,  to  be  opened  to  a  joint  use  under  such  terms  and 
for  such  compensation  as  may  be  agreed  on  or  fixed.* 

Wlien  there  is  an  application  for  a  switch  connection  made 
as  provided  by  statute  and  the  evidence  shows  an  existing 
siding  from  which  interstate  freight  is  tendered,  that  there 
is  sufficient  business  to  justify  the  construction  and  mainten- 
ance of  the  switch  and  the  connection  is  reasonably  prac- 
ticable and  safe,  the  Commission  will  order  a  connection.^ 

There  must,  however,  be  an  existing  side  track  or  lateral 
branch  line  of  railroad  with  which  the  connection  can  be 
made,*  and  the  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  to  enforce  a 
contract  for  such  connection.* 

The  prohibition  against  requiring  a  carrier  to  give  the 
use  of  its  tracks,  terminals  and  facilities  to  a  competing  car- 
rier, does  not  prevent  the  Commission  in  a  proper  case  from 
requiring  a  carrier  to  receive  cars  from  a  connection  for  trans- 
portation over  its  tracks  and  terminals.  Such  a  requirement 
when  the  haul  is  "a  substantial  part  of  a  continuous  trans- 
portation routing"  and  necessary  to  such  movement,  is  a 
proper  regulation  of  the  bKisiness  of  the  carrier  and  not  an 
appropriation    of  terminal   facilities   for   the   use   and   benefit 

Co.,    20    I.    C.    C.    486.      Following  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  240,  243,  244;  Louis- 

the  Supreme  Court  see,  St.  Louis,  ville  Board   of  Trade  v.  L.   &  N. 

S.  &  P.  R.  Co.  V.  Peoria  &  P.  U.  R.   Co.,   40   I.  C.   C.   679,   688   and 

Ry.  Co.,   26   I.   C.   C.   226;    Morris  cases    cited;    Giiyton    &    Harring- 

Iron    Co.    V.    Baltimore    &    0.    R.  ton  l\Iule   Co.  v.  L.  &  N.   R.   Co., 

Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  240.  50  I.  C.  C.  546. 

5.  Par.  9  of  section  1  as  num-  7.  Ridgewood  Coal  Co.  v.  Lehigh 
bered  by  Transportation  Act  Valley  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  183, 
1920.  185. 

6.  Transportation  Act  1920,  8.  Winters  Metallic  Paint  Co. 
section  405,  paragraph  4  of  sec-  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.. 
tion  3  of  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  16  I.  C.  C.  687. 

section    347a,    j)ost.     See    for    old  9.    Ralston     Townsite     Co.     v. 

law  Morris  Iron  Co.  v.  B.  &  O.  R. 


506  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  193 

of  another  road.^"  For  the  transportation  over  its  tracks  the 
carrier  performing  the  service  is  entitled  to  a  reasonable  coni- 
jiensation/^ 

The  provision  of  Transportation  Act  1920  under  which  a 
joint  use  of  terminals  may  be  required  supersedes  the  former 
law  prohibiting  the  requirement  that  a  carrier  should  be  com- 
pelled to  give  the  use  of  its  terminals.  Under  the  amendment 
the  use  of  terminals  are  not  given;  but  may,  in  analogy  to 
tlie  right  of  eminent  domain,  be  opened  to  a  joint  use  upon 
fair  compensation. 

§  ]93.  Industrial  Switches  and  Railways. — The  jurisdiction 
of  the  Commission  to  require  switch  connections  includes  the 
power  and  imposes  the  duty  to  regulate  such  connections. 
Many  industries  own  private  switch  tracks  connecting  with 
a  carrier ;  some  of  the  tracks  privately  owned  have  developed 
so  far  as  to  become  incorporated  as  railways.  That  connec- 
tions may  in  proper  cases  be  required  to  be  made  by  the 
carriers  with  these  industrial  tracks  or  industrial  railways  has 
been  shown  in  the  preceding  section.  When  such  connections 
are  made,  cars  are  delivered  from  the  line  of  the  carrier  to 
the  industrial  track  or  railway,  and  sometimes  the  line  car- 
rier delivers  incoming  cars  over  and  takes  outgoing  cars  from 
the  plant  tracks.  Obviously  such  delivery  and  receipt  of 
cars  is  valuable  to  the  industry  and  costs  the  carrier  some- 
thing. Carriers  have  made  allowances  from  their  rates  to  such 
industries  or  to  their  subsidiary  railways  in  the  form  of  rate 
divisions,  per  diem  reclaims,  remission  of  car  demurrage, 
furnace  allowances,  and  have  performed  services  without  ad- 
ditional charges  over  the  line  rate  by  placing  cars  at  points  on 
the  tracks  or  railways  of  the  industry. 

Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  Penn.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  236  U.  S.  351, 

S54.  59    L.   Ed.    616,   35    Sup.    Ct.    370; 

10.    Grand     Trunk     R.     Co.     v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Com. 

Michigan    Railroad    Com.,    231    U.  of  La.,  236  U.   S.,   157,   59   L.   Ed. 

S.  457,  58  L.  Ed.  310,  34  Sup.  Ct.  517,  35   Sup.  Ct.  275. 
152;  Michigan  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Michl-  11.  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Hay 

gan  Railroad  Com.,  236  U.  S.  615,  &   Grain    Co.,    214    U.    S.    297,    53 

59   L.   Ed.    750.    35    Sup.    Ct.    422;  L.   Ed.   1004,   29   Sup.   Ct.   678. 


§  194]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  507 

These  allowances  and  remissions  were  discussed  by  the  Com- 
mission in  the  First  Industrial  Kailways  case/^  and  held  to 
be  illegal, 

"Spotting  cars"  in  so  far  as  the  phrase  has  a  definite 
meaning,  is  the  service  performed  by  a  line  carrier  of  placing 
or  receiving  cars  for  a  plant  beyond  the  point  of  interchange 
between  the  rails  of  the  carrier  and  the  tracks  of  the  in- 
dustry, and,  as  such  practice  is  so  defined,  it  was  held  illegal 
unless  a  reasonable  charge  was  made  for  the  service/^ 

In  prior  sections  it  has  been  shown  that  allowances  some- 
times called  absorptions,  at  other  times  called  divisions,  are 
not  unlawful/* 

§  194.  Switch  Connections  with  Carriers  by  Water. — The 
Panama  Canal  Act  gives  jurisdiction  to  the  Commission  over 
interstate  transportation  "by  rail  and  water  through  the 
Panama  Canal  or  otherwise,"  and  "of  the  carriers,  both  by 
rail  and  by  water,  which  may  or  do  engage  in  the  same,"  and 
gives  the  Commission  power  to  establish  physical  connections 
between  the  lines  of  the  rail  carrier  and  the  dock  of  the  water 
carrier  at  which  interchange  of  passengers  or  property  is  to 
be  made  when  such  "connection  is  reasonably  practicable" 

12.  Industrial  Railways  Case,  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  310.  Com- 
29  I.  C.  C.  212.  merce   Court   reversed,    Interstate 

13.  Industrial  Railway  Case,  Com.  Com.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S. 
29  I.  C.  C.  212,  234.  Spotting  F.  Ry.  Co.,  234  U.  S.  294,  58  L. 
was  defined  in  a  tariff  suspended  Ed.  1319,  34  Sup.  Ct.  814;  Sees, 
by  the  Commission  as  "service  170,  171,  supra.  Tap  Line  Cases, 
beyond  a  reasonable  convenient  234  U.  S.  1,  58  L.  Ed.  1185,  34 
point  of  exchange."  In  a  brief  it  Sup.  Ct.  741;  Manufacturers' 
was  defined  as  "placing  a  car  at  Railway  Co.  v.  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S. 
a  particular  spot."  See  also  Ry.  Co.,  32  I.  C.  C.  578;  Indus- 
Alan  Wood  Iron  &  Steel  Co.  v.  trial  Railways  Case,  32  I.  C.  C. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  129;  Car  Ferry  Allowance  at  Che- 
540;  National  Tube  Co.  v.  Lake  boygan,  32  I.  C.  C.  578;  Trap  or 
Tex.  R.  Co.,  56  I.  C.  C.  272.  Ferry  Car  Service  Charges,  34  I. 

14.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  C.  C.  516;  Second  Industrial  Rail- 
V.  Interstate  Com  .Com.,  188  ways  Case.  34  I.  C.  C.  596;  Car 
Fed.  229  and  929,  Opinion  Com-  Spotting  Charges,  34  I.  C.  C.  609; 
merce  Court  No.  2,  p.  3,  enjoin-  Manufacturer's  R.  Co.  v.  United 
ing  the  order  of  the  Commission  States,  246  U.  S.  457,  62  L.  Ed. 
in  Associated  Jobbers  of  Los  831,  38  Sup.  Ct.  383.  Section  170 
Angeles   v.   Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.  and  171,  supra. 


508  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  195 

and  "can  be  made  with  safety  to  the  public,  and  the  aniiount  of 
business  to  be  handled  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  outlay."  ^^ 

It  was  argued  before  the  Commission  that  the  words  "or 
otherwise"  modified  the  phrase  "by  rail  and  water"  and  not 
the  phrase  "through  the  Panama  Canal."  This  construction 
was  not  adiopted  and  it  was  held  that  by  reason  of  the  words 
"or  otherwise,"  the  Commission  had  jurisdiction  to  establish 
through  routes  and  joint  rates  between  rail  carriers  and  water 
carriers,  those  operating  tlirough  the  Canal  and  those  operat- 
ing on  other  waters.  Not  to  adopt  the  construction  ^given  the 
statute  by  the  Commission  would  leave  the  words  "or  other- 
wise" mere  surplusage,  to  do  which  would  violate  the  funda- 
mental canons  of  statutory  construction." 

The  change  made  by  Transportation  Act  1920  in  this  pro- 
vision makes  more  specific  than  the  old  law,  the  dock  at  which 
interchange  may  be  required.  Paragraph  4  of  section  15  as 
amended  provided,  as  the  Commission  had  already  held  in  the 
Baltimore  and  Carolina  Steamship  Case,  note  16,  supra,  that 
the  short  haul  limitation  of  section  15  did  not  apply  when  one 
of  the  connecting  "carriers  is  a  water  line." 

§  195.  Through  Routes. — It  is  made  the  duty  of  the  carriers 
subject  to  the  Act  "to  establish  through  routes."" 

The  Commission  may,  after  hearing  on  a  complaint,  estab- 
lish through  routes  and  joint  rates  as  the  maximum  to  be 
charged  and  prescribe  the  division  of  such  rates  and  the 
terms  and  conditions  under  which  such  through  routes  shall 
be  operated,  when  that  may  be  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any 
provision  of  the  Act,  and  the  carriers  complained  to  have  re- 
fused or  neglected  voluntarily  to  establish  such  through 
routes  and  joint  rates.  This  jurisdiction  exists  when  one  of 
the  carriers  is  a  water  line. 

15.  Act  March  24,  1912,  Sec.  Bowling  Green  Bus.  Men's  Pro- 
377,   post.  tective   Asso.,   v.   L.   &  N.  R.   Co., 

16.  Augusta  &  SavanAali  31  I.  C.  C.  1;  Pacific  Nav.  Co.,  v. 
Steamboat  Co.  v.  Ocean  Steam-  S.  P.  Co.,  31  I.  C.  C.  472;  Port 
ship  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  380,  385;  Fed-  Huron  &  Duluth  S.  S.  Co.  v.  P. 
eral  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  35  I.  C.  C.  475;  Baltimore 
R.  Co.,  of  New  Jersey,  35  I.  C.  C.  &  Carolina  S.  S.  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L. 
488;     Decatur    Navigation    Co.    v.  R.  Co.,  49  I.  C.  C.  176,  179. 

L.  &  N.   R.   Co..  31  I.   C.   C.   281;  17.    Sec.  1  of  Act,  Sec.  338,  post. 


§  195]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  509 

The  Panama  Canal  Act,  as  shown  in  the  preceding  section, 
extended  the  power  of  the  Commission  over  transportation  by 
water  and  also  gave  the  Commission  power  to  establish 
through  routes  and  maximum  joint  rates  between  and  over 
such  rail  and  water  lines,  and  to  determine  all  the  terms  and 
conditions  under  which  such  lines  shall  be  operated  in  the 
handling  of  the  trafific  embraced/" 

The  Amendment  of  June  18,  1910,  omitted  from  the  statute 
the  words,  ''provided  no  reasonable  or  satisfactory  through 
route  exists."  Under  the  old  law,  the  non-existence  of  a  rea- 
sonable or  satisfactory  through  route  was  jurisdictional,  and 
M^here  there  was  such  through  route  the  Commission  had  no 
power  to  order  another.^" 

Under  the  old  law  it  was  said : 

''It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule,  admitting  of  no 
qualification,  that  a  manufacturer  or  merchant  who  has  traffic 
to  move  and  is  ready  to  pay  a  reasonable  rate  for  the  service, 
has  a  right  to  have  it  moved  and  to  have  reasonable  rates 
estal^lished  for  the  movement  regardless  of  the  fact  that 
the  revenues  of  the  carrier  may  be  reduced  by  reason  of  its 
competition  with  other  shippers  in  the  same  market;  and  he 
has  the  right  also  to  have  the  benefit  of  through  routes  and 
reasonable  joint  rates  to  such  distant  markets  if  no  reasonable 
or  satisfactory  through  route  already  exists."" 

A  limitation  as  to  the  character  of  the  through  route  was 
prescribed  by  the  Amendment  of  1910  by  the  provision  that 

18.  A,ct  of  August  24,  1912,  222;  Southern  California  Sugar 
Sees.  376,  377,  jwst :  Augusta  &  Co.  v.  San  Pedro,  L.  A.  &  R. 
Savannah  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Ocean  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  6;  Cedar  Hill 
Steamship  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  380;  Coal  &  coke  Co.  v.  Colorado  & 
Truckers  Transfer  Co.  v.  Charles-  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  479; 
ton  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  Spring  Hill  Coal  Co.  v.  Erie  R. 
275.   See  also  note   16,  supra.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  508;   Pacific  Coast 

19.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Lumber  Mnfg.  Assn.  v.  Northern 
Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  216  U.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  51,  53. 
Ct.  417;  Enterprise  Transporta-  20.  Cardiff  Coal  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
tion  Co.  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C. 
S.  538,  54  L.  Ed.  608,  30  Sup.  460.  As  sustaining  the  text  see 
12  I.  C.  C.  326;  Enterprise  P.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States,  236 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Pennsyl-  U.  S.  351,  59  L.  Ed.  616,  35  Sup. 
vania    R.    Co.,    16    I.    C.    C.    219,  Ct.    370. 


510  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  195 

no  compan.y  without  its  consent  should  be  required  to  embrace 
in  such  route  substantially  less  than  the  entire  length  of  its 
railroad  and  of  any  intermediate  railroads  operated  in  con- 
junction and  under  a  common  management  or  control  there- 
with.""' 

By  the  Transportation  Act  1920  this  limitation  does  not 
apply  when  one  of  the  carriers  is  a  water  carrier/^ 

While  the  limitation  is  stated  positively,  a  carrier  could  not 
use  it  to  discriminate  in  violation  of  other  provisions  of  the 
Act/^  nor  is  it  a  protection  to  the  carrier  in  charging  an  un- 
reasonable rate  between  two  given  points.  It  means  that  a 
carrier  "shall  not  be  deprived  of  a  haul  which  it  is  capable  of 
providing  by  a  reasonably  direct  route."*  Other  than  this 
limitation  under  the  law  as  it  now  exists,  the  Commission  has 
discretionary  power. "^ 

The  Commission  refused  to  establish  a  through  route  with 
tugs  and  barges  operated  by  the  owner  of  practically  the 
whole  freight  which  would  use  the  route  if  one  were  estab- 
lished f^  but  the  mere  fact  that  only  one  shipper  may  at  the 
outset  use  the  connection,  does  not  prevent  the  connection 
from  having  a  public  purpose.^^ 

The  Commission  having  no  .jurisdiction  of  railroads  and 
steamship  lines  located,  owned  and  operated  entirely  in  an 
adjacent  foreign  country,  cannot  establish  through  routes 
therewith."^ 

21.  Sec.  401,  post,  for  full  text  238,  Commerce  Court  Opinion 
of  provision.  No.  55,  p.  453,  461,  not  appealed. 

22.  Transportation  Act  1920,  For  report  of  the  Commission  in 
Sec.  418;  Int.  Com.  Act,  Sec.  15,  the  same  case  see:  Crane  Iron 
par.  4.  Works  v.  Central   R.   Co.  of  New 

23.  Proposition  urged  but  not  Jersey,  17  I.  C.  C.  514;  and  Crane 
decided,  Hughes  Creek  Coal  Co.  R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  &  R.  Ry. 
V.   Kanawha  &  M.   Ry.   Co.,   29   I.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  248. 

C.  C.  671,  679.  26.    Gulf  Coast   Navigation  Co. 

24.  Meridan  Fertz.  Factory  v.  v.  Kansas  City  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.       I.  C.  C.  544. 

351,  352.  27.     Union  Lime  Co.  v.  C.  &  N. 

25.  Truckers    Transfer    Co.    v.  W.  Ry.  Co.,   233  U.   S.   211,   58  L. 
Charleston   &    W.    C.    Ry.    Co.,    27  Ed.  924,  34  Sup.  Ct.  522;   Federal 
I.    C.    C.    275,    277,    quoting    the  Sugar    Refining    Co.    v.    C.    of    N. 
Commerce    Court    in    Crane    Iron  J.  Ry.  Co.,  35  I.  C.  C.  488. 
Works  V.  United  States,  209  Fed.  28.    Humbolt   Steamship   Co.   v. 


§  196]       Of  the  Act  to  Eegulate  Commerce.  511 

Agreements  between  connecting  railway  and  steamship  car- 
riers to  establish  through  routes  and  joint  rates  and  to  refuse 
such  an  arrangement  with  other  connecting  carriers,  resulting 
in  high  and  discriminatory  charges,  with  the  intent  and  result 
of  eliminating  competition,  violates  the  anti-trust  laws  of  the 
United  States.  AATiether  or  not  the  giving  or  refusing  joint 
traffic  arrangements  is  in  violation  of  the  commerce  acts,  is  a 
question  which  the  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to  determine  in 
advance  of  action  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission.^' 

The  broad  purpose  of  this  provision  is  well  stated  by  the 
Commission  as  follows : 

''The  railroads  of  the  country  are  called  upon  to  so  unite 
themselves  that  they  will  constitute  one  national  system; 
they  must  establish  through  routes,  keep  these  routes  open 
and  in  operation,  furnish  the  necessary  facilities  for  transpor- 
tation, make  reasonable  and  proper  rules  of  practice  as  be- 
tween themselves  and  the  shippers,  and  as  between  each 
other."'" 

A  carrier  publishing  a  joint  through  rate  is  responsible 
therefor.'^  Electric  railways  are  entitled  to  through  routes 
and  joint  rates. ^^ 

§  196.  Division  of  Joint  Rate. — When  joint  rates  are  estab- 
lished by  order  of  the  Commission,  or  otherwise,  and  carriers 
fail  to  agree  among  themselves  upon  the  apportionment  or  di- 
vision thereof,  the  Commission  may,  after  hearing,  prescribe 
the  just  and  reasonable  proportion  of  such  joint  rate  to  be  re- 
ceived by  each  carrier  party  thereto.'^    Speaking  of  this  power 

White    Pass    &   Yukon    Route,    25  32.    Louisville   Board   of  Trade 

I.  C.  C.  136.  V.  Indianapolis,  C.  &  S.  T.  Co.,  27 

29.  United  States  v.  Pacific  &  I.  C.  C.  499,  and  cases  cited. 
Arctic  Ry.  Nav.  Co.,  228  U.  S.  That  a  through  route  could  not 
87,  57  L.  Ed.  742,  33  Sup.  Ct.  443.  be     made     with      the     Columbus 

30.  Missouri  &  Illinois  Coal  Co.  Traction  Co.  was  placed  on  the 
V.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  ground  that  such  company  was 
C.  39,  45.  not  a  lateral  branch  road.  United 

31.  Black  Horse  Tob.  Co.  v.  II-  United  States  v.  Baltimore  &  O. 
linois  Cent  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  R.  Co.,  226  U.  S.  14,  57  L.  Ed.,  104, 
588;      Texico     Transfer     Co.      v.  33  Sup.  Ct.  5. 

Louisville   &   N.   R.   Co.,   20   I.   C.  33.    Sees.  397,  and  400,  post. 

C.  17. 


512  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  197 

Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Com- 
mission, said  i''* 

''The  phrase  'the  jnst  and  reasonable  proportion  of  such 
joint  j-ate  to  be  received  by  each  carrier'  necessarily  implies 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  commission  in  fixing  divisions  to 
take  into  consideration  all  the  circumstances,  conditions,  and 
proper  adjustment  of  the  situation  as  between  the  two  roads, 
and  precludes  the  idea  that  joint  rates  must  be  divided  be- 
tween the  participating  carriers  on  a  mileage  or  any  other 
fixed  basis." 

In  note  34,  suprn,  the  opinion  was  expressed  in  the  second 
edition  of  this  book  that  the  Commission  was  competent  to 
prescribe  divisions  of  rates  even  though  the  rates  had  not 
been  established  by  it.  At  first  the  Commission  did  not  take 
this  view,  but  subsequently  it  adopted  the  correct  view.*^ 
The  Transportation  Act  1920  ^''  specifically  gives  the  Commis- 
sion the  power  which  it  had  already  come  to  hold  that  it 
possessed. 

§  197.  Allowance  to  Shippers  for  Services  and  Facilities. — 

The  statute  reads:" 

"If  the  owner  of  property  transported  under  this  Act  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  renders  any  service  connected  Avifh  such 
transportation,  or  furnishes  any  instrumentality  used  therein, 
the  charge  and  allowance  therefor  shall  be  no  more  than  is 

34.    star  Grain  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  35.     Morganton      &      Kingwood 

Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co.,   14  Divisions,   40   I.    C.    C.    509,    49    I. 

I.  C.  C.  364,  370.     Without  giving  C.   C.   540.    For  cases   illustrating 

force    to    the    vi^ords     "or     other-  the    exercise    of    the    power    see 

wise"     in    the    statute    the    Com-  Western    P.    R.    Co.    v.    S.    P.    Co. 

mission   expressed   a   doubt   as   to  55    I.    C.    C.    71;    Chestnut    Ridge 

its    power    to    prescribe    divisions  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States  247  Fed. 

of    rates     not     fixed     by     it.     Re  791. 

Wharfage    Charges    at    Galveston,  36.     Transportation     Act     1920, 

23  I.  C.  C.  535,  546.     Giving  force  Sec.  418;   Int.  Commerce  Act  Sec. 

to   all   the   words    of   the   statute  15,  par.  6. 

there    seems    to    be    no    room    to  37.     Sec.  15  being  added  thereto 

doubt     the     jurisdiction     of     the  by  Act  June  29,   1906,  post,   Sec. 

Commission    in    all    cases    where  404. 
there  is  a  failure  of  the  carriers 
to  agree.  37  I.  C.  C.  231. 


§  11)7]       Of  the  Act  to  Recui^ate  Commerce.  513 

just  and  reasonable,  and  the  Commission  may,  after  hearing 
on  a  complaint  or  on  its  own  initiative,  determine  what  is  a 
reasonable  charge  as  the  maximum  to  be  paid  by  the  carrier 
or  carriers  for  the  services  so  rendered  or  for  the  use  of  the 
instrumentality  so  furnished,  and  to  fix  the  same  by  appropri- 
ate order." 

This  statute  has  received  consideration  in  many  cases.  It  is 
not  open  to  question  that  when  a  shipper  renders  services  con- 
nected with  the  transportation  of  his  goods  or  furnishes  any 
instrumentality  used  therein,  a  charge  and  allowance  therefor 
is  recognized  by  the  law.  This  charge  and  allowance  must  be 
just  and  reasonable,  that  is,  it  must  not  be  too  high  nor  dis- 
criminate against  another  shipper  rendering  a  like  service  or 
furnishing  a  like  instrumentality."* 

The  Commission  has  held  that  this  charge  and  allowance 
must  be  limited  to  the  cost  of  the  service.'"' 

The  Commission  in  the  Sugar  Lighterage  case'"  did  not  deny 
the  vadidity  or  application  of  the  statute,  but  held  the  the  fact 
that  one  sugar  refinery  owned  and  operated  a  dock  and  ter- 
minals for  the  railroad  did  not  justify  an  allowance  thereto 
when  such  allowance  was  denied  another  refinery  owning  no 

cS.    Central   Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Co.   v.   Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,    3    I. 

Louisville    &   N.    R.    Co.,    67    Fed.  C.    C.    577:    In    re    Transportation 

339;    Railroad   Cora,   of   Kentucky  of  Fruit,  10  I.  C.  C.  360;    Peavey 

v.    Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.,    10    I  Co.   v.   Union   Pac.   R.   Co.    (C.C.) 

S.  568,  48  L.  Ed.  565,  24   Sup.  Ct.  176    Fed.    409,   affirmed   222    U.    S. 

Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.,    192    U.  42,  56  L.   Ed.  83,  32   Sup.  Ct.  22; 

C.    C.    173;    Cattle    Raisers    Assn.  Interstate    Com.    Com.    v.    Diffen- 

V.    Chicago,    B.    &    Q.    R.    Co.,    11  baugh,  222  U.  S.  42,  56  L.  Ed.  8S, 

Ed.    73,    11    Sup.    Ct.    461;    Butch-  32     Sup.    Ct.    22;     Fouche    River 

ers,     etc.,     Stock     Yards     Co.     v.  Lumber   Co.     v.    Bryant     Lumber 

35,  14  C.  C.  A.  290;   United  States  Co.,  230  U.  S.  816,  57  L.  Ed.  1498, 

V.    Keith,    139    U.    S.    128.    35    L.  33    Sup.    Ct.    887;     Mitchell    Coal 

R.    A.    213,    affirmed,    192    U.    S.  &    Coke    Co.    v.    Pennsylvania    R. 

I.  C.  C.  277;   Central  Stock  Yards  Co.,  230  U.  S.  247,  57  L.  Td.  1472, 

Co.  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  118  33  Sup.  Ct.  916. 
Fed.    113,    55    C.    C.    A.    63,    63    L.  39.    Re  Allowances  to  Elevators, 

568,    48    L.    Ed.    565,    24    Sup.    Ct.  12  I.  C.  C.  85;   Federal  Sugar  Re- 

339;    Covington    Stock    Yards    Co.  fining   Co.   v.    Baltimore    &    0.   R. 

V.   Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.    (C.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  40,  47. 
C),    40    Fed.    101;      Consolidated  40.    Federal  Sugar  Refining  Co. 

Fordg.   Co.  V.   Southern  Pac.  Co.,  v.    Baltimore   &   O.   R.   Co.,   20    I. 

9    I.    C.    C.    182;    Excursion    Car  C.  C.  200. 


514  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  197 

such  terminals  but  tendering  sugar  brought  by  boat  to  the  same 
pier  as  that  to  which  the  first  company  brought  its  sugar.  The 
issue  of  law  in  this  case  was  therefore  whether  or  not  undue 
discrimination  existed.  This  issue  of  law  was  determined  by 
the  Commerce  Court  differently  from  the  Commission.  The 
Commerce  Court  said :" 

"AVe  find  Arbuckle  Bros,  owning  the  Jay  Street  terminal, 
used  as  a  public  terminal  of  petitioners  within  the  light'Crage 
limits.  We  find  the  Federal  Sugar  Refining  Company,  with  its 
refinery  at  Yonkers,  10  miles  north  of  the  lighterage  limits, 
owning  and  operating  no  public  terminal  for  petitioners,  and 
tendering  petitioners  no  freight  at  any  of  their  public  ter- 
minals. So  that  we  cannot  see  how  any  violation  of  either 
section  2  or  section  3  can  be  predicated  of  the  facts  stated  in 
the  record."  The  Supreme  Court  held  there  was  no  undue 
discrimination  and  affirmed  the  decision  of  the  Commerce 
Court.'' 

The  Supreme  Court  held  allowances  to  grain  elevators 
proper,'"  but  that  such  allowances  should  be  free  from  dis- 
crimination.*^ 

The  so-called  tap  line  allowances  or  divisions  to  short  roads 
owned  or  controlled  by  a  shipper  must  be  without  discrimina- 
tion, otherwise,  said  the  Supreme  Court,  "it  amounts  to  a  re- 
bate."" 

"What  this  allowance  means  Avas  considered  and  discussed 
by  the  Commission  in  the  tap  line  case.'"  The  Supreme  Court 
reversed  the  order  of  the  Commission  and  held  that  tap  line 
allowances  were  legal. '^ 

Industrial  railways  present  similar  questions.  These  have 
been  discussed  sections  171  &  193  supra. 

41.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  dike,  222  U.  S.  215,  56  L.  Ed.  171, 
United      States,     200     Fed.     779,       32  Sup.  Ct.  39. 

Opinion      Commerce      Court     No.  45.    Illinois  Cent.  R.   Co.  v.  In- 

38,  p.  499.  terstate     Com.    Com.,    206     U.    S. 

42.  United  States  v.  Baltimore  441,  444,  51  L.  Ed.  1128,  27  Sup. 
&_  O.    R.    Co.,    231    U.    S.    274,    58  Ct.  700. 

L.  Ed.  218,  34  Sup.  Ct.  75.  46.    Tap  Line  Case,  23   I.  C.  C. 

43.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Dif-  277  and  549  and  see  section  170, 
fenbaugh,  222  U.  S.  42,  56  L.  Ed.       supra. 

83,  32  Sup.  Ct.  22.  47.    United   States  v.  Louisiana 

44.  Union  Pac  Ry.  Co.  v.  Up-      &  P.  R.  Co.  —  Tap  Line  Cases,  234 


§  198]       Of  the  Act  to  Eegulate  Commerce.  515 

The  meaning  of  the  word  "transportation"  in  this  connec- 
tion was  defined  by  District  Judge  Rellstab  in  an  opinion 
which  as  to  this  question  seems  to  be  comprehensive,  clear  and 
accurate.  Under  his  definition,  draying  sugar  from  a  refinery 
to  a  railroad  was  not  transportation  nor  service  in  connection 
therewith  within  the  legislative  meaning,  but  was  a  drayage 
service  falling  normally  upon  the  shipper."  The  decision  of 
Judge  Rellstab  was  reversed,  but  the  opinion  on  appeal  is  not 
inconsistent  with  the  definition  of  the  court  below,  but  is  ex- 
plainable on  the  theory  that  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  held 
that  a  payment  made  to  all  in  like  condition  was  not  a  rebate, 
whether  an  allowance  within  the  meaning  of  section  15  or 
not/" 

§  lf'8  Distribution  of  Cars.— Transportation  includes  cars 
and  other  vehicles  and  all  instrumentalities  and  facilities  of 
shipment  or  carriage,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  every  carrier  sub- 
ject to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  to  pro- 
vide and  furnish  transportation.  The  Commission  is  given 
jurisdiction  to  enforce  this  duty.  AVhere  carriers  fail  to  fur- 
nish cars  without  discrimination  this  jurisdiction  may  be  in- 
volved that  the  governmental  power  of  regulation  may  be  used 
in  compelling  a  just  and  equal  distribution  of  cars  and  the 
prevention  of  an  unjust  and  discriminating  one. 

In  determining  whether  a  particular  car  distribution  is  just 
and  equal  or  unjust  and  discriminatory,  the  Commission  may 
consider  the  producing  capacity  of  the  shippers  and  all  cars 
used  in  the  transportation  Avhether  private  cars  or  cars  used 
by  the  carrier  for  its  own  fuel,  and  the  courts  have  no  juris- 
diction over  the  question  until  after  action  thereon  by  the 
Commission.^" 

U.   S.   1,   58   L.   Ed.   1185,   34   Sup.  Angeles   v.    Atchison,    T.    &    S.    F. 

Ct.  741,  34  I.  C.  C.  116.  Ry.    Co.,    18    I.    C.    C.    310.      Com- 

48.   American  Sugar  Refining  Co.  merce   Court   reversed,   Interstate 

V.    Delaware,    L.    &   W.    Ry.    Co.,  Com.   Com.   v.   Atchison,   T.   &   S. 

200    Fed.    652.      See    also,    Atchl-  F.   Ry.   Co.,  234   U.   S.   294,   58   L. 

son,     T.     &     S.     F.     Ry.     Co.     v.  Ed.  1319,  34  Sup.  Ct.  814. 

Interstate    Com.     Com.,    1S8     Fed.  49.  American  Sugar  Refining  Co. 

229      and      929,      Opinion      Com-  v.    Delaware,    L.    &    W.    Ry.    Co., 

merce   Court   No.   2,   p.    3,   enjoin-  207  Fed.  733,  125  C.  C.  A.  251. 

ing  the  order  of  the  Commission  50.    Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  II- 

in    Associated     Jobbers     of     Los  linois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  452, 


516  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.        [§  198A 

Where,  however,  the  question  involved  is  not  the  adminis- 
trative question  of  what  is  a  reasonable  rule,  but  the  judicial 
question  of  whether  or  not  the  rule  in  force  has  been  complied 
with,  the  courts  have  jurisdiction  without  prior  action  by  the 
Commission/' 

§  198A.  Furnishing  Cars — Car  Service. — The  duty  to  fur- 
nish cars  and  the  limitations  in  respect  thereto  on  the  power 
of  the  Commission  was  discussed  in  sections  24  to  26,  supra. 
The  Transportation  Act  1920  gives  the  Commission  powers 
properly  withihn  its  functions  over  car  service/"  The  method 
of  exercising  these  powers  is  similar  to  the  procedure  adopted 
in  enforcing  the  other  powers  of  the  Commission/^ 

§  199.  Long  and  Short  Haiil  Provisions,  History  of. — Sec- 
tion four  of  the  original  Act  lO  Regulate  Commerce''*  prohib- 
ited "under  substantially  similar  circumstances  and  condi- 
tions" a  greater  charge  for  a  shorter  than  for  a  longer  dis- 
tance over  the  same  line  in  the  same  direction,  the  shorter  be- 
ing included  wathin  the  longer  distance.  The  proviso  to  this 
section  gave  power  to  the  Commission  to  relieve  carriers  from 
the  requirements  thereof. 

Judge  Cooley  in  construing  this  section  and  provision  an- 
nounced principles  which  may  be  quoted,  as  such  principles 
finally  became  the  settled  construction  of  the  law.    He  said  /^ 

54    L.    Ed.    280,   30    Sup.    Ct.    155;  ing  Co.,  2?.8  U.   S.  456,  59  L.   Ed. 

Interstate   Com.   Com.   v.    Chicago  1406,  35  Sup.  Ct.  896. 

&    A.    R.    Co.,    215    U.    S.    479,    54  52.    Transportation     Act     1920, 

L.  Ed.  291,  30  Sup.  Ct.   163;    Bal-  Sec.     402;     Interstate     Commerce 

timore    &    O.    R.    Co.    v.    United  Act,    Sec.    1,   paragrapli    10   to    17, 

States     ex     rel.     Pitcairn      Coal  Sees.  344a  to  344h,  post. 

Co.,  215  U.  S.  481,  54  L.  Ed.  292,  53.     See   Car    Supply    Investiga- 

30    Sup.    Ct.    164;       Vulcan    Coal  tion,  42  I.  C.  C.  657,  and  comments 

Mining    Co.    v.    I.    C.    R.    Co.,    33  of  Mr.  Commissioner  McChord  47 

I.  C.  C.  52.  I.  C.  C.  760,  et  seq. 

51.   Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn.  54.   Act.  Feby.  4,  1887,  Chap.  104, 

R.   Co.,  230  U.    S.   304,   57   L.   Ed.  24  Stat.  L.  379  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 

1474,    33    Sup.    Ct.    938;    Penn.   R.  1916  Sections  8563  et  seq.  3  Fed. 

Co.   V.   Puritan   Coal   Co.,   237   U.  Stat.   Ann.   809,   et  seq.    See   post 

S    121,  59  L.  Ed.  867,  35  Sup.  Ct.  Sections  348  to  351. 

484;    111.    C.    R.    Co.    v.    Mulberry  55.    Re  Petition  Louisville  &  N. 

Hill   Coal   Co.,    238   U.    S.   275,    59  R.  Co.,  and  Southern  Pacific  Rail- 

L.  Ed.  1306,  35  Sup.  Ct.  760;  Penn.  way  and  Steamship  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C. 

R.   Co.  V.   Clark  Bros.   Coal  Min-  31,  57,  1  I.  C.  R.  278. 


§  199]       Op  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  517 

"That  which  the  act  does  not  declare  unlawful  must  remain 
lawful  if  it  was  so  before ;  and  that  which  it  fails  to  forbid 
the  carrier  is  left  at  liberty  to  do  without  permissio)i  of  any 
one.  The  charging  or  receiving  the  greater  compensation  for 
the  shorter  than  the  longer  haul  is  seen  to  be  forbidden  only 
when  both  are  under  substantially  similar  circumstances  and 
conditions ;  and,  therefore,  if  in  any  case  the  carrier,  without 
first  obtaining  an  order  of  relief,  shall  depart  from  the  general 
rule,  its  doing  so  will  not  alone  convict  it  of  illegality,  since 
if  the  circumstances  and  conditions  of  the  two  hauls  are  dis- 
similar the  statute  is  not  violated. 

"Should  an  interested  party  dispute  that  the  action  of  the 
carrier  was  warranted,  an  issue  would  be  presented  for  ad- 
judication, and  the  risks  of  that  adjudication  the  carrier 
would  necessarily  assume.  The  later  clause  in  the  same  sec- 
tion, which  empowers  the  Commission  to  make  orders  for  re- 
lief in  its  discretion,  does  not  in  doing  so  restrict  it  to  a  find- 
ing of  circumstances  and  conditions  strictly  dissimilar,  but 
seems  intended  to  give  a  discretionary  authority  for  cases  that 
could  not  well  be  indicated  in  advance  by  general  designation, 
while  the  cases  which  upon  their  facts  should  be  acted  upon 
as  clearly  exceptional  would  be  left  for  adjudication  when  the 
action  of  the  carrier  was  challenged.  The  statute  becomes 
on  this  construction  practical,  and  this  section  may  be  en- 
forced without  serious  embarrassment." 

In  a  later  case  the  Commission  refused  to  follow  the  opinion 
of  Judge  Cooley,"  but  subsequently  the  Supreme  Court 
adopted  the  Cooley  rule,"  with  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  vigorously 

56.  Railroad  Com.  of  Georgia,  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  167  U.  S.  447,  42 
Trammell  et  al.  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  L.  Ed.  231,  17  Sup.  Ct.  887:  Int. 
Co.,  5  I.  C.  C.  324,  4  I.  C.  R.  Com.  Com.  v.  Detroit,  G.  H.  & 
120,  150.  M.   Ry.   Co.,   167  U.   S.   633,   42  L. 

57.  The  history  of  the  judicial  Ed.  306,  17  Sup.  Ct.  986;  Louis- 
construction  appears  from  the  ville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Behlmer,  175 
following  cases:  Int.  Com.  Com.  U.  S.  648,  44  L.  Ed.  309,  20  Sup. 
V.  Alabama  M.  R.  Co.,  168  U.  Ct.  209;  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  Ga. 
S.  144,  42  L.  Ed.  414,  18  Sup.  Ct.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  181 
45;  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Cincinnati,  U.  S.  1,  45  L.  Ed.  719,  21  Sup. 
N.  O.  &  T.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  162  U.  Ct.  516.  See  also  Int.  Com.  Com. 
S.  184,  40  L.  Ed.  935,  16  Sut>.  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.,  181  U.  S.  29, 
Ct.    700;    Parsons    v.    Chicago    &  45   L.   Ed.   729,   21   Sup.   Ct.   512; 


518  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  200 

dissenting.  It  was  held  that  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  dis- 
similarity of  circumstances  was  on  the  carrier,  and  that 
"line"  used  in  the  statute  meant  a  physical  line  and  not  a 
mere  business  arrangement. 

§  200.  Relationship  of  Intermediate  and  Through  Rates.— 
The  amended  fourth  section  also  makes  it  unlawful  "to  charge 
any  greater  compensation  as  a  through  route  than  the  aggre- 
gate of  intermediate  rates  subject  to  the  provisions"  of  the 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 

This  rule  but  makes  statutory  what  was  a  general  principle 
applied  by  the  Commission. 

§  201.  Water  Competition. — The  second  paragraph  of  sec- 
tion four  of  the  amended  Act  provides : 

"Whenever  a  carrier  by  railroad  shall  in  competition  with 
a  water  route  or  routes  reduce  the  rates  on  the  carriage  of  any 
species  of  freight  to  or  from  competitive  points,  it  shall  not  be 
permitted  to  increase  such  rates  unless  after  hearing  by  the 
Commission  it  shall  he  found  that  such  proposed  increase 
rests  upon  changed  conditions  other  than  the  elimination  of 
water  competitioii." 

§  202.  Power  of  the  Commission  under  the  Fourth  Section. 
— The  fourth  section  prohibits  three  things,  (a)  a  greater 
charge  for  a  shorter  than  a  longer  haul  under  the  circum- 
stances named,  (b)  a  greater  charge  for  a  through  route  than 
the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates  subject  to  the  Act,  (c) 
an  increase  of  rates  which  had  been  lowered  in  competition 
with  water  routes. 

These  provisions  leave  carriers  no  discretion.  They  must 
be  obeyed  unless  the  Commission  orders  otherwise.  The  ex- 
ceptions to  this  absolute  provision  must  be  such  as  the  Com- 
mission may  prescribe.  This  is  the  fundamental  diflference 
between  the  old  section  as  construed  and  the  present  law. 

Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  &  D.  R.  Co.,  2  I.  C.   C.   304,  2   I. 

R.   Co.,  190   U.   S.   273,   47   L.   Ed.  C.    R.    193:    Boston    &    A.    R.    Co. 

1047,  23   Sup.  Ct.   687;    Brewer  v.  v.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C. 

Central    of    Ga.    R.    Co.,    84    Fed.  158,  1   I.  C.  R.   500,   571;    Daniels 

258;    Int   Com.    Com.   v.   Western  v.   Chicago   R.   I.   &  P.   R.   Co.,    6 

&  A.  R.  Co.,  88  Fed.  186;  Spartans-  I.  C.  C.  458,  476.  See  sections  152 

burg  Board  of  Trade  v.  Richmond  to  155,  supra  and  348  to  351,  post. 


§  202]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  519 

The  power  is  given  the  Commission  upon  application,  after 
investigation,  to  authorize  the  carrier  "to  charge  less  for 
longer  than  for  shorter  distances,"  and  to  "prescribe  the  ex- 
tent to  which  such  designated  common  carrier  may  be  re- 
lieved from  the  operation  of  the  section." 

The  provision  giving  the  right  to  prescribe  the  extent  of  re- 
lief which  may  be  granted,  might  with  reason  be  construed 
as  being  limited  by  the  language  giving  authority  to  "charge 
less  for  longer  than  for  shorter  distances;"  although  the  prac- 
tice of  the  Commission  has  been  to  relieve  from  the  provision 
relating  to  through  routes  and  aggregate  intermediate  rates 
as  well  as  limiting  the  relation  of  charges  in  the  long  and 
short  haul  clause. 

Eates  lawfully  in  existence  when  the  amended  law  was 
passed  were  not  required  to  l)e  changed  prior  to  the  expira- 
tion of  six  months  after  such  time,  nor  then,  when  application 
for  relief  was  filed,  "until  a  determination  of  such  application 
by  the  Commission." 

The  Commission  also  has  power  to  permit  an  increase  of 
rates  loAvered  hi  meet  water  competition  "upon  changed  condi- 
tions other  than  the  elimination  of  water  competition." 

In  determining  its  power  under  this  statute  the  Commission 
held  the  law  constitutional,  that  the  provision  for  exceptions 
to  the  general  clause  did  not  give  the  Comnussiori  arbitrary 
or  absolute  power,  that  the  burden  was  on  the  carrier  to  show 
facts  authorizing  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  and  that 
the  object  of  the  law  was  to  make  "a  rule  of  well  nigh  univer- 
sal application,"  deviation  from  which  could  only  be  au- 
thorized "to  meet  transportation  circumstances  which  are  be- 
yond the  carrier's  control,"  and  then  only  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  meet  such  conditions.^**  The  orders  of  the  Com- 
mission in  the  cases  in  which  these  principles  were  announced 
were  set  aside  by  the  Commerce  Court. ^°  Upon  appeal  the 
Supreme  Court  reversed  the  Commerce  Court  and  sustained 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission."" 

58.  Railroad  Com.  of  Nevada  v.  v.  United  States,  191  Fed.  856, 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  329,  Opinion  Commerce  Court  Nos. 
341;    Spokane,   City   of,   v.   North-       50,  51,  p.  229. 

ern  Pac.  R.  Co.,   21   I.   C.   C.   400.  60.  United  States  v.  Atchison,  T. 

59.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.       &    S.    F.    Ry.    Co.,    Intermountain 


520  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  203 

The  further  limitations  on  the  right  of  the  Commission  to 
grant  relief  from  the  long-and-short  haul  provision  of  section 
4  contained  in  Transportation  Act  1920  are  discussed  in  sec- 
tions 152  to  155,  supra. 

§  203.  Ownership  of  Water  Carriers  by  Railroads. — The 
Panama  Canal  Act  makes  it  unlawful  after  July  1,  1914,  for 
"any  railroad  company  or  other  common  carrier  subject  to 
the  act  to  regulate  commerce  to  own,  lease,  operate,  control, 
or  have  any  interest  whatsoever  (by  stock  ownership  or  other- 
wise, either  directly,  indirectly,  through  any  holding  com- 
pan3%  or  by  stockholders  or  directors  in  common,  or  in  any 
other  manner)  in  any  common  carrier  by  water  operated 
through  the  Panama  Canal  or  elsewhere  with  which  said  rail- 
road or  other  carrier  aforesaid  does  or  may  compete  for  traffic 
or  any  vessel  carrying  freight  or  passengers  upon  said  water 
route  or  elsewhere  with  which  said  railroad  or  other  carrier 
aforesaid  does  or  may  compete  for  traffic ;  and  in  case  of  the 
violation  of  this  provision  each  day  in  which  such  violation 
continues  shall  be  deemed  a  separate  offense." 

Jurisdiction  was  given  the  Commission  after  hearing  "to 
determine  questions  of  fact  as  to  the  competition  or  possibility 
of  competition."  This  determination  was  authorized  to  be 
made  on  the  application  of  the  carrier,  or  shipper,  or  on  the 
initiative  of  the  Commission  itself,  and  in  all  cases  the  Com- 
mission's order  is  final."^ 

If  an  "existing  specified  service  by  water  other  than 
through  the  Panama  Canal  is  being  operated  in  the  interest  of 
the  public  and  is  pf  advantage  to  the  convenience  and  com- 
merce of  the  people,"  and  if  "such  extension  will  neither  ex- 
elude,  prevent,  nor  reduce  competition  on  the  route  by  water," 
the  Commission  may  extend  the  time  beyond  July  1,  1914, 
under  the  conditions  prescribed  in  the  statute.'^ 

The  principles  upon  which  the  Commission  has  acted  in  de- 
termining   applications    under    this    statute    were    stated    in 

Cases,    234    U.    S.    47(5,    58    L.    Ed.  61.    Act  August  24,  1912;    Sees. 

1408,    34    Sup.    Ct.    986;    Sec.    154,      353,  354,  post. 

ante.  62.    Act   August    24,   1912;    Sec. 

355,  i)ost. 


§  204]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  521, 

Application  of  Soutlierii  Pacific  Co.  in  re  Operation  of  Steam- 
ship Company/^ 

§  204.  The  Commission's  Duty  with  Reference  to  Schedule 
of  Rates. — It  is  the  duty  of  all  common  carriers  subject  to  the 
Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  to  file  with  the  Commission,  print 
and  keep  open  to  public  inspection  schedules  showing  all  the 
rates,  fares,  and  charges  for  transportation  both  on  their  own 
line  and  over  other  lines,  pipe  lines  and  water  connections 
with  whicli  they  have  established  a  through  route  and  joint 
rates.  Changes  in  these  schedules  cannot  be  made  without 
thirty  days'  notice;  but  the  Commission  may,  in  its  discretion 
and  for  good  cause  shown,  allow  changes  upon  less  than  the 
notice  herein  provided,  or  modify  the  requirements  of  this 
section  in  respect  to  publishing,  posting,  and  filing  tariffs, 
either  in  particular  instances  or  by  a  general  order  applicable 
to  special  or  peculiar  circumstances  or  conditions.  The  Com- 
mission may  determine  and  prescribe  the  form  in  which  the 
schedules  required  by  this  section  to  be  kept  open  to  public 
inspection  shall  be  prepared  and  arranged,  and  may  change 
the  form  from  time  to  time  as  shall  be  found  expedient. 

Under  the  power  given  with  respect  to  the  schedules  of  rates 
to  be  charged  by  common  carriers  it  issues  administrative 
orders  from  time  to  time. 

Carriers  are  prohibited  from  engaging  or  participating  in 
interstate  transportation  "unless  the  rates,  fares,  and  charges 
*  *  *  have  been  filed  and  published"  as  provided  by  the 
statute. 

The  Commission  has  power  to  reject  tariffs  under  certain 
conditions,"*  and  those  so  rejected  are  void. 

Tariffs  provisions  relating  to  interchangeable  mileage 
tickets  must  likewise  be  published.*"^ 

Discrimination  was  one  of  the  evils  most  complained  of 
prior  to  the   original  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce   and  since, 

63.   Sec.  355,  and  see  Application  64.    Sec.  6  of  Act;   Sees.  364  and 

S.   P.   Co.  re  Operation  S.  S.  Co.,  366,  2>ost;  Brown  &  Sons  Lumber 

32    I.   C.    C.    692.    S.    P.    Co.    Own-  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  37  I.  C.  C. 

ership   of   Oil    Steamers,   34   I.    C.  507,  509. 

C.  377;    Steamer  Lines  on  Ches.H-  65.     Sec.    22    of    Act;    Sec.    444, 

peake  Bay,   35   I.   C.   C.   692.   aiid  post. 
see   post    section    353    and    auJ  o 
tations. 


522  Enforcemen  •  by  the  Commission.         [§  204 

and  that  Act  and  the  supj  lemental  and  amendatory  Acts  have 
been  framed  to  aflford  an  effective  means  for  reducing  the 
wrongs  resulting  from  unjust  discrimination  and  undue  pre- 
ference. One  of  the  means  of  effectuating  this  purpose,  is 
that  of  placing  upon  all  carriers  the  positive  duty  of  establish- 
ing, filing  and  publishing  schedules  of  reasonable  rates  with  a 
uniform  application  and  of  a  definite  meaning,  and  of  main- 
taining and  collecting  such  rates  so  long  as  they  remain  un- 
altered in  the  manner  provided  by  law."" 

Where  the  tariff  shows  no  joint  through  rate,  carriers  par- 
ties to  a  through  bill  of  lading  must  collect  the  sum  of  the 
local  rates  shown  by  the  local  tariffs." 

Where  an  agent  of  a  carrier  gives  a  shipper  a  rate  less  than 
that  prescribed  in  the  legally  filed  tariff,  the  shipper  must 
nevertheless  pay  the  full  tariff  rate,"*  and  a  rate  in  a  bill  of 
lading  less  than  the  tariff  rate  will  not  relieve  a  shipper  from 
paying  the  tariff  rate  the  shipment  being  interstate,  although 
the  statute  of  the  state  in  which  the  bill  of  lading  was  issued 
made  it  illegal  to  collect  a  higher  rate  than  was  on  the  Mil  of 
lading  specified.""  That  a  schedule  of  rates  has  been  duly  filed 
will  not  prevent  the  Commission  from  declaring  such  rates 
unreasonable  and  awarding  reparation  for  the  amount  charged 
and  collected  in  excess  of  what  was  a  reasonable  rate.^" 

66.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Abi-  U.  S.  573,  56  L.  Ed.  556,  32  Sup. 
lene  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  204  U.  S.  Ct.  316;  New  York  C.  &  H.  R. 
426,  51  L.  Ed.  553,  27  Sup.  Ct.  R.  Co.  v.  United  States,  212  U. 
350;  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  S.  500,  53  L.  Ed.  624,  29  Sup. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  Ct.  309;  but  the  Act  of  1910  pro- 
162  U.  S.  184,  40  L.  Ed.  935,  16  vides  a  penalty  for  misquoting  a 
Sup.  Ct.  700,  5  I.  C.  R.  391,  167  rate.  Sec.  180,  ante.  Sees.  205,  212, 
U.  S.  479,  42  L.  Ed.  243,  17  Sup.  and  368,  post. 

Ct.  896.  69.     Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

67.  United  States  v.  New  York  Hefley,  158  U.  S.  98,  39  L.  Ed. 
C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  212  U.  S.  509,  910,  15  Sup.  Ct.  802;  Spratlin  v. 
53  L.  Ed.  629,  29  Sup.  Ct.  313.  St.   L.   &   S.  W.   Ry.   Co.,   76   Ark. 

68.  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  82,  88  S.  W.  836;  St.  L.  &  S.  W. 
Mugg,  202  U.  S.  242,  50  L.  Ed.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Carden,  34  S.  W.  (Tex) 
1011,  26  Sup.  Ct.   628:    Illinois  C.       145. 

R,  Co.  V.  Henderson  Elevator  Co.,  Galley   181   26367.    Templeton, 

226   U.   S.   441,   57  L.  Ed.   290,   33  70.   Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v. 

Sup.    Ct.    176;    Kansas    City    Sou.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 

Ry.    Co.   V.    Albers   Com.    Co.,   223  R.  199,  204. 


§  204A]      Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  523 

Transportation  Act  1920''  requires  common  carriers  "by 
water  in  foreign  commerce  whose  vessels  are  registered  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States"  to  file  certain  schedules  and 
authorizes  the  Commission  to  make  "rules  and  regulations 
with  respect  thereto." 

§  204.  A.  Bills  of  Ladings. — In  a  comprehensive  and  able 
opinion  i\Ir.  Commissioner  Wooley  in  announcing  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Commission,  after  quoting  parts  of  Sections  12, 
and  35  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  said:"  "Thus  th*» 
Commission  has  power  and  authority  under  the  Act  to  deter- 
mine the  reasonableness  of  rules,  regulations,  and  practices 
of  the  carriers,  and  to  require  them  to  cease  and  desist  from 
the  enforcement  of  rules  and  regulations,  and  the  continuance 
of  practices  found  to  be  unreasonable  or  unjustly  discrimina- 
tory, or  unduly  prejudicial.  And  herein  lies  the  Commission's 
power  to  lay  hands  upon  the  'issuance,  form  and  substance' 
of  bills  of  lading.  The  act  specifically  requires  carriers  subject 
thereto  to  issue  bills  of  lading.  The  Commission  has  undoubted 
authority  to  enforce  this  requirement  in  a  proper  proceeding.  It 
can  require  carriers  to  file  with  it  the  rules  and  regulations 
which  they  write  into  their  bills  of  lading.  It  can,  by  due  process, 
require  that  uniform  rules  and  regulations  be  adopted  by  car- 
riers subject  to  its  jurisdiction.  It  can  determine  whether 
such  are,  in  and  of  themselves,  or  as  interpreted  in  the  prac- 
tices of  the  carriers,  reasonable  and  nondiscriminatory,  and, 
if  otherwise,  condemn  them  and  prescribe  reasonable  rules 
and  regulations,  in  which  event  the  carriers  must  obey." 

It  is  believed  that  this  conclusion  is  sound,  although  a  Dis- 
trict Court  of  the  United  States  has  held  otherwise."  The 
issue  is  now  before  the  Supreme  Court.^* 

The  statute  penalizing  the  forgery  of  interstate  and  foreign 
bills  of  lading,  confers  no  jurisdiction  on  the  Commission  ,but 
the  decision  holding  that  such  statute  is  constitutional  sup- 

71.  Transportation  Act,  Sec.  73.  Alaska  S.  S.  Co.  v.  United 
441;    Int.  Com.  Act,  Sec.  25,  para-       States,  259  Fed.  713. 

graphs   1    to    5;    Sections   446a  to  74.    United     States     v.     Alaska 

446e,  post.  Steamship  Co.,  251  U.  S.  ,  64 

72.  Bills  of  Lading,  52  I.  C.  C.       U.  S. ,  40  Sup.  Ct. . 

671,  686. 


524  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  205 

ports  the  contention  that  Congress  could,  as  it  did  in  sections 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act  referred  to  above,  commit  au- 
thority to  the  Commission  to  regulate  the  form  of  such  con- 
tracts." 

The  Commission  in  the  Bills  of  Lading  Case  held  that  un- 
der the  Cummins  Amendment,  which  in  this  respect  is  un- 
changed by  the  Transportation  Act  1920,  the  shipper's  meas- 
ure of  recovery  for  loss  or  damage  to  his  freight  is  based  on 
the  value  of  the  property  at  the  point  where  the  contract  re- 
quires its  delivery.  That  such  is  the  law  has  been  held  by  a 
District  and  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  of  the  United  States'"  and 
the  Supreme  Court  by  r,efusing  an  application  for  writ  of 
certiorari  approved  the  decision  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals, 

§  205.  Damagfes, — In  addition  to  the  public  penalties  pre- 
scribed by  the  Act,  a  carrier  is  liable  to  any  person  or  persons 
injured  by  its  violation  of  the  Act  for  the  full  amount  of  dam- 
ages sustained  in  consequence  of  such  violation,  together  with 
a  reasonable  counsel  or  attorney's  fee,  to  be  fixed  by  the  court 
in  every  case  of  recovery.  The  only  damages  recoverable  un- 
der this  Act  by  application  to  the  Commission  are  damages, 
for  a  violation  of  the  provisions  thereof,  consequently  the 
Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  to  award  damages  for  breach 
of  contract  by  a  carrier.  The  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  aw^ard  damages  against  a  shipper,  nor  can  a  carrier  set  off 
a  claim  for  undercharges  or  other  damages  against  the  claim 
of  a  shipper  for  reparation." 

75.  United  States  v.  Ferger,  250  can  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
U.  S.  199,  207,  63  L.  Ed.  609,  612,  Co.,  6  I.  C.  C.  85,  4  I.  C.  R.  385; 
39  Sup.  Ct.  445,  447.  Carstens    Packing    Co.    v.    Oregon 

76.  Note  72  supra,  and  McCaull-  R.  &  N.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  125;  Blume 
Dinsmore  Company  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  Co.  v.  Wells-Fargo  &  Co.,  15  I. 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  252  Fed.  664;  C.  C.  53;  damage  caused  by  delay; 
Chicago  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shiel  &  Co.  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co., 
McCaull-Dinsmore  Co.,  260  Fed.  12  I.  C.  C.  210,  breach  of  contract; 
835^  —  C.  C.  A.  — ;  affirmed  251  LaSalle  &  B.  Co.  v.  Chicago  & 
U.  S.  — ,  64  L.  Ed.  — ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  610; 
— .  General  Electric  Co.  v.  New  York 

77.  Lanning-Harris  C.  &  G.  Co.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  237, 
V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  15  breach  of  contract:  Colorado  Fuel 
I.  C.  C.  37,  38;  Falls  &  Co.  Co.  v.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  39  T. 
V.  Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  P.  Ry.  C.  C.  491,  493;  Southwestern  Port- 
Co.,    15    I.    C.    C.    269,    27S;    Dun-  land   Cement  Co.  v.   T.   &  P.  Ry. 


§  206]       Op  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  525 

The  language  of  the  statute  is  broad  and  makes  the  carrier 
liable  for  damages  sustained  in  any  case  where  such  carrier 
does  or  causes  to  be  done  any  act,  matter,  or  thing,  prohibited 
or  declared  unlawful  by  the  statute.  Such  liability  exists 
when  there  is  a  failure  to  do  any  act,  matter,  or  thing,  required 
by  the  law/* 

The  foregoing  right  stated  in  section  8  of  the  Act  in  so  far 
as  it  permits  a  recovery  of  damages  for  an  unlawful  charge 
was  not  created  by  the  section,  although  some  uncertainty  as 
to  the  full  extent  of  the  right  was  removed  by  the  statute.  In 
England  it  had  been  held  that  a  shipper  paying  a  reasonable 
rate  could  not  recover  damages  because  of  a  discriminatory 
rate  favoring  another,'"  but  in  this  country  the  weight  of  au- 
thority was  the  other  way.  The  statute  removed  any  doubt 
which  might  have  existed  on  the  subject.*"  The  amount  of 
recovery  is  stated  in  the  statue  to  be  the  ''full  amount  of  dam- 
ages sustained,"  which  is  not  different  from  the  common  law 
measure  of  damages  in  cases  where  damages  are  recoverable. 
''The  right  to  recover,"  as  said  hj  the  Supreme  Court,  "is 
limited  to  the  pecuniary  loss  suffered  and  proved.*^ 

§  206.  Damages — Power  of  the  Commission  to  Make  Award 

of. — Any  person  or  persons  claiming  to  be  damaged  by  any 
common  carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce  may  make  complaint  to  the  Commission,*^  by 
petition  which  shall  briefly  state  the  facts.  After  service  and 
hearing  of  which*""  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Commission  to 

Co.,    41    I.    C.    C.    39,    40;    Pacific  Exch.   N.    S.    177,    22    L.   T.   N.    S. 

Creamery    Co.    v.    Sou.    Pac.    Co.,  43,  18  Week.  Ref.  92. 

42  I.  C.  C.  93,  100;    Trexler  Lum-  80.    Parsons  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W 

ber  Co.  v.   Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  42   I.  C.  R.   Co.,   167  U.   S.   447,   42   L.   Ed 

C.   719;    Galloway   Co.  v.   G.   B.   &  231,  17  Sup.  Ct.  887;  Pennsylvania 

W.   R.   Co.,   48   I.   C.   C.   455,   456:  R.  Co.  v.  International  Coal  Min 

Wilson  V.  P.  R.  Co.,  50  I.  C.  C.  571,  ing  Co.,  230  U.  S.  184,  57  L.  Ed 

who    liable    for    under    charges;  1446,  33  Sup.  Ct.  893. 

Pittwood   V.   N.   P.   Ry.   Co.,   51   I.  81.  Cases  noted  supra  and,  Knud 

C.  C.  535.  sen-Ferguson   Fruit  Co.   v.   Michi 

78.  Sec.  8  of  the  Act;  Sec.  382,  gan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  149  Fed.  973 
post.  79  C.  C.  A.  483;    St.  Louis,  S.  W 

79.  Great  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Sut«  R.  Co.  v.  Lewellen,  192  Fed.  540 
ton  L.   R.,   4   H.   L.   238,   38  L.   J.  82.   Sec.  9  of  Act;  Sec.  383,  post 

83.   Sec.  13  of  Act;  Sec.  392,  post 


526  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  206 

make  a  report  in  writing  in  respect  thereto,  which*  shall  state 
the  conclusions  of  the  Commission  together  with  its  decision, 
order  or  requirement  in  the  premises,  and  such  report  shall, 
when  there  is  an  award  of  damages,  include  the  findings  of 
fact  on  which  the  award  is  made/* 

When  the  Commission  shall  determine  that  any  party  com- 
plainant is  entitled  to  an  award  of  damages,  it  shall  make  an 
order  directing  the  carrier  to  pay  the  complainant  the  sum  to 
which  he  is  entitled  on  or  before  a  day  named.  These  findings 
of  fact  and  the  order  based  thereon  are  prima  facie  evidence 
of  the  facts  therein  stated/' 

Prior  to  the  Amendment  of  March  2,  1889,  the  Commission 
held  that  a  claim  for  damages  "presents  a  case  at  common  law 
in  which  the  defendants  are  entitled  to  a  jury  trial,"  and 
under  the  then  law  awards  for  damages  were  not  made/' 
Since  the  Amendment  to  section  16,  awards  may  be  made." 

Of  these  provisions  for  award  of  damages,  it  has  been  said: 

*'As  to  the  provisions  covering  reparation  cases,  Congress 
is  no  longer  dealing  with  those  matters  which  concern  the 
practical  management  and  conduct  of  the  business  of  carriers 
and  the  regulation  thereof  in  futuro,  in  the  interests  of  the 
public  generally,  but  is  conferring  a  private  right  of  action 
upon  those  who  have  suffered  actual  damage,  by  reason  of 
such  carriers'  violation  of  some  requirement  of  the  Act.  The 
conferring  of  such  right  of  action,  though  incident  to  its 
power  to  regulate  commerce,  is  not  a  regulation  thereof.  It 
makes  redress  of  a  private  injury,  actually  suffered,  possible. 
It  concerns  the  past  and  not  the  future  conduct  of  the  carrier, 
and,  though  this  right  of  action  for  damages  is  qualified  by 
making  it  dependent  in  certain  cases  upon  the  precedent  a- 
ward  of  reparation  by  the  Commission,  such  award  is  not  of 
the  nature  of  the  administrative  functions  conferred  on  that 

84.  Sec.  14  of  Act;  Sec.  394,  posf.  125  C.  C.  A.  235;   Note  77  below. 

85.  Sec.  16  of  Act;  Sec.  407,  post  87.   Rawson  v.  Newport  N.  &  M. 

86.  Heck  v.  East  Tennessee,  Va.  V.  R.  Co.,  3  I.  C.  C.  266,  2  I.  C. 
&  Ga.  Ry.  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  495,  1  R.  626;  MacLoon  v.  Chicago  & 
I.  C.  R.  775;  Riddle  v.  New  York,  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  5  I.  C.  C.  84,  3 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  594,  I.  C.  R.  711,  and  practice  of  the 
1  I.  C.  R.  787;    Lehigh  Valley  R.  Commission  since. 

Co.    V.    Clark,    207    Fed.    717,    720, 


§  207]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commebce.  527 

body.'^  Ill  reversing  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  the  Su- 
jjreme  Court  without  discussing  the  principles  quoted  found 
that  the  report  of  the  Commission  conlormed  to  the  statute, 
Misrouting  violates  the  law^s  and  damage  suffered  may  be  a- 
warded  by  the  Commission.''" 

§  207.  Awards  of  Daina,ges  for  Charging  an  Unjust  and  Un- 
reasonable Rate. — The  statute  provides  that  charges  subject 
to  the  Act  must  be  "just  and  reasonable."""  When  this  law 
is  violated  the  Commission  may  make  an  "award  of  dam- 
ages." The  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  before  such 
an  award  can  be  made  there  must  be  a  finding  that  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable  and  the  Commission  must  prescribe 
"a  reasonable  maximum  rate  to  be  observed  by  all,"  and  "an 
order  of  reparation  without  such  establishment  of  a  reasonable 
maximum  rate  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  Commission  and 
void. ' ' "  This  decision  was  reversed  by  the  Supreme  Court 
in  an  opinion  written  by  Mr.  Justice  Lamar  who  said  -."^ 

"But  however  desirablle  it  may  have  been  to  deal  with  the 
entire  matter  at  one  time,  the  joinder  of  the  two  subjects  was 
not  jurisdictional.  There  was  no  such  necessary  connection 
between  the  two  as  to  make  the  order  of  reparation  void  be- 
cause of  the  absence  of  a  concurrent  provision  establishing  a 
a  rate  for  the  future. ' ' 

When  a  rate  is  advanced  and  the  increased  rate  is  con- 
demned the  shipper,  having  the  legal  right  to  have  transpor- 
tation at  a  reasonable  rate,  is  clearly  entitled  to  an  award  of 
damages  by  way  of  reparation  measured  by  the  amount  paid 

88.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  423;  Newman  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Clark,  207  Fed.  717,  723,  125  C.  Mississippi  C.  R.  Co.,  26  I.  C. 
C.  A.  235,  District  Court  affrmed  C.  97;  Sec.  15  of  Act;  Sec.  402, 
except  as  to  a  portion  of  the  at-  j)ost. 

torney's    fees,    and    Circuit    Court  90.    Sec.  1  of  Act;  Sec.  339,  post. 

of  Appeals   reversed,  Mills  v.  Le-  91.    Denver   &   R.    G.   R.   Co.   v. 

high    V.    R.    Co.,    238    U.    S.    473,  Baer  Bros.  Mer.  Co.,  187  Fed.  485, 

59  L.  Ed.  1414,  35  Sup.  Ct.  888.  109    C.    C.    (A.    337;     Commercial 

89.  McCaull-Dinsmore  Co.  v.  Chi-  Club  of  Omaha  v.  A.  &  S.  Ry. 
cago   G.  W.   Ry.    Co.,    14   I.    C.    C.  Co..  27  I.  C.  C.  S02,  314. 

527;  Gus  Momsen  &  Co.  v.  Gila  92.  Baer  Bros.  Mer.  Co.  v.  Den- 
Valley,  G.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  ver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.,  233  U.  S. 
C.  C.  614;  Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  479,  58  L.  Ed.  1055,  34  Sup.  Ct. 
Pennsylvania   R.   Co.,   26    I.   C.   C.  641. 


528  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  207 

in  excess  of  the  rate  found  to  be  unreasonable."''  AVTiere,  how- 
ever, complaint  is  made  of  a  rate  already  in  existence  and  such 
rate  is  declared  unreasonable  at  the  date  of  the  order  of  the 
Commission,  a  different  question  is  presented.  At  what  exact 
time  did  the  rate  become  reasonable?  Discussing  this  question 
in  the  Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  case,'*  the  Commission  said : 
"The  Commission  is  not  justified  in  awarding  damages  in  any 
case  except  on  a  basis  as  certain  and  definite  in  law  and  in 
fact  as  is  essential  to  the  support  of  a  final  judgment  or  decree 
requiring  the  ]jayment  of  a  definite  sum  of  money.  *  *  * 
The  test  of  reasonableness  can  be  applied  only  by  reference  to 
and  upon  consideration  of  all  pertinent  facts,  circumstances, 
and  conditions  affecting  the  rate  in  effect  at  any  particular 
time.  *  *  *  A  rate  reasonable  in  view  of  the  circum- 
stan(res  and  conditions  when  it  is  established  may  in  course  of 
time  become  unreasonable  by  virtue  of  changed  circumstances 
and  conditions.  It  is  manifestly  impractical  for  the  carriers 
or  the  Commission  in  such  a  case  to  determine  at  what  exact 
time  in  the  gradual  process  of  charges  the  rate  becomes  unrea- 
sonable." 

In  the  Burnham-Hanna-Munger  case,'^  no  reparation  was 
awarded  for  shipments  moving  prior  to  the  date  of  the  order, 
but  awards  were  made  for  shipments  moving  after  that  date 
and  during  the  time  the  order  was  enjoined.  After  two  years 
from  the  date  of  the  order  therein  advances  were  made  some 
of  which  were  held  to  increase  rates  to  a  point  where  they 
were  unreasonable.     In  determining  the  question  arising  in  an 

93.    Tift  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  10  Interstate    Com.    Com.,    193    Fed. 

I.    C.    C.    548;    Tift    v.    Southern  678.   Op.  Com.  Ct.  No.   18  p.  311; 

Ry.   Co.,    138   Fed.    753;    Southern  Chicago,   B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Fein- 

Ry.    Co.    V.    Tift,    148    Fed.    1021;  tuch,   191   Fed.   482,   112   C.   C.   A. 

Southern  Ry.   Co.   v.   Tift,   206  U.  126. 

S.    428,    51    L.    Ed.    1124,    27    Sup.  94.    Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v. 

Ct.    709;    Nicola,    Stone    &    Myers  Atchison,    T.    &    S.    F.    Ry.    Co., 

Co.  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.   Co.,  14  20  I.  C.  C.  43,  49,  50,  51. 

I.    C.    C.      199;      Central      Yellow  95.   Burnham-Hanna-Munger  Dry 

Pine    Assn.    v.    Illinois    Cent    R.  Goods  Co.  v.   Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 

Co.,  10  I.  C.  C.  505;   Illinois  Cent.  Ry.    Co.,    14    I.    C.    C.    299,    order 

R.    Co.    V.    Interstate    Com.    Com.,  enjoined    in    Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P. 

206  U.  S.  441,  51  L.  Ed.  1128,  27  Ry.   Co.  v.   Interstate   Com.  Com.. 

Sup.  Ct.  700;    Russe  &  Surges  v.  171  Fed.  680,  and  the  Commission 


§  207]       Op  thk  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  529 

investigation  of  these  increases  the  Commission  said:  "We 
are  now  ijrescribing  what  may  well  be  considered  a  new  rate 
adjustment,"  and  under  such  conditions  reparation  was  de- 
nied."' 

The  Commission  having  found  a  rate  unreasonable  from  the 
date  of  that  order,  reparation  should  be  allowed,  the  Commis- 
sion saying:  "In  every  case  like  this  the  Commission  must 
fix  the  point  of  time  at  which  the  rate  becomes  unreasonable, 
must  determine  when  shippers  were  entitled,  and  when  car- 
riers ought  to  have  established  the  rate  found  reasonable. 
Manifestly  each  ease  must  depend  upon  its  own  facts,  and  the 
complainant  must  assume  the  burden  of  showing  that  the  rates 
paid  have  been  unreasonable."" 

When  a  shipper  owning  a  commodity  employs  a  common 
carrier  to  transport  it,  it  is  his  right  to  have  such  transporta- 
tion at  a  reasonable  charge.  If  the  carrier  exacts  more  than 
a  reasonable  charge,  the  shipper's  rights  have  been  invaded 
to  the  extent  that  the  charge  exacted  exceeds  a  reasonable 
one.  The  shipper  is  entitled  to  have  his  injury  wiped  out  by 
a  return  to  him  of  the  amount  paid  in  excess  of  what  he  was 
lawfully  bound  to  pay.  This  is  the  measure  of  his  minimum 
recovery.  Under  some  circumstances  this  amount  may  be 
augmented  to  recoup  the  shipper  for  the  loss  of  his  business 
maliciously  caused  by  the  common  carrier  . 

This  rule  has  not  been  consistently  followed  by  the  Commis- 
sion. In  some  cases  reparation  has  been  denied,  as  in  the 
Anadarko  Cotton  Oil  Case,  supra,  because  there  was  a  general 
readjustment  of  rates.  In  order  cases  rates  have  been  held 
unreasonable,  but  although  the  facts  remained  unchanged  for 
two  years  prior  to  the  order,  reparation  was  denied  or  dated 
from  some  date  other  than  that  prescribed  in  the  statute  of 
limitations.  The  later  decisions  of  the  courts  have  refused 
so  to  limit  a  shipper's  rights  and  sustained  the  rule  as  given 
above.*' 

sustained  in  Interstate  Com.  Com.  97.    Re  Wool,  Hides  and  Pelts, 

V.    Chicago,    R.    I.    &   P.    Ry.    Co.,  25    I.    C.    C.    675,    678;     National 

218    U.    S.    88.    54    L.    Ed.    946,    SO  Wool    Growers    Assn.    v.    Oregon 

Sup.  Ct.  651.  S.  L.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  151. 

96.    Re   Advances   in    Rates   be-  98.    The  principle  is  settled  by 

tween    Mississippi    and    Missouri  the   courts:    Southern  Pac.   Co.  v. 

Rivers,  21  I.  C.  C.  546.  Darnell-Taenzer   Lumber   Co.,   245 


530 


Enforcement  by  the  Commission. 


[§  208 


And  reparation  may  be  ordered  for  an  unreasonable  charge 
although  no  tariff  is  provided  therefor/" 

Damages  may  be  awarded  "where  a  carrier  collects  a 
greater  sum  on  an  intermediate  shipment  than  is  fixed  by  its 
published  tariffs/"" 

"Damages"  and  "Reparation"  have  been  used  interchange- 
ably in  the  reports  of  the  Commission,  although  in  the  later 
volumes  the  word  damages  is  generally  adopted. 

§  208.  Awards  of  Damages  for  Unjlawful  Discrimination. — 

Sections  two""   and  three^""   of  the   Act   prohibit  unjust  dis- 


U.  S.  531,  62  L.  Ed.  451,  38  Sup. 
Ct.  186.  (For  the  history  of  this 
case  see  13  I.  C.  C.  668,  190  Fed. 
659,  221  Fed.  890,  137  C.  C.  A.  460, 
229  Fed.  1022,  143  C.  C.  A.  6G3); 
N.  Y.  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Ballou 
&  Wright,  242  Fed.  862,  155  C.  C. 
A.  450,  P.  U.  R.  :918A,  149.  See  as 
illustrating  the  lack  of  a  definite 
adherence  to  the  rule  stated  in  the 
text:  Rules  unreasonable  but  re- 
paration denied;  Hires  Condensed 
Milk  Co.  V.  P.  R.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C. 
441  and  cases  cited  448;  Scott  v. 
Cape  Charles  R.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C. 
467;  Brick  from  New  Hampshire, 
42  I.  C.  C.  231;  Arlington  Heights 
Fruit  Exchange  \.  Sou.  Pac.  Co., 
39  I.  C.  C.  88,  45  I.  C.  C.  248.  250; 
Coca-Cola  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  45  I.  C.  C.  461.  Reparation  de- 
nied because  general  system  of 
rates  involved:  Western  Gro.  Co. 
V.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  53 
and  cases  cited  p.  55;  Alleged  Un- 
reasonable Rates  on  Live  Stock, 
41  I.  C.  C.  514  and  cases  cited; 
Cudahy  Packing  Co.  v.  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  42  I.  C.  C.  579;  Dela- 
ware, etc.  Coal  Co.  v.  D.  L.  &  W.  R. 
Co.,  46  I.  C.  C.  506  and  cases  cited. 
Reparation  granted:  Federal  Glass 
Co.  V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co., 
38   I.   C.   C.   331;    Fruit   Despatch 


Co.  V.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  48  I.  C.  C. 
634;  Cotton  Mfrs.  Assn.  v.  C.  C. 
&  0.  Ry.  Co.,  53  I.  C.  C.  741. 
General  statement  of  claim  suf- 
ficient: Morgan's  L.  &  T.  R.  &  S. 
S.  Co.  V.  Joseph  Iron  Co.,  243 
Fed.  149;  Commercial  Club  of 
Omaha  v.  A.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  41  I. 
C.  C.  480,  cases  cited  482;  But 
some  certainty  is  required,  A.  T. 
&  S.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Spiller,  246  Fed. 
1,  158  C.  C.  A.  227,  249  Fed.  677; 
Montgomery  v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co., 
228  Fed.  616.  Injury  to  business: 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Ohio 
Valley  Tie  Co.,  242  U.  S.  288,  61 
L.  Ed.  305,  37  Sup.  Ct.  120.  No 
defense  that  shipper  adds  freight 
to  selling  price:  Nitro  Powder  Co. 
V.  W.  S.  R.  Co.,  44  I.  C.  C.  596, 
597;  Ballou  &  Wright  Case,  supra, 
this  note. 

99.  Laning-Harris  Coal  &  Grain 
Co.  V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.. 
15  I.  C.  C.  37;  Wheeler  Lumber, 
Bridge  &  Supply  Co.  v.  Astoria 
&  C.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  10. 

100.  Memphis  Freight  Bureau  v. 
Kansas  C.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
C.  90;  Hampton  Mnfg.  Co.  v.  Old 
Dominion  Steamship  Co.,  27  I.  C. 
C.  666,  668. 

101.  post,  Sec.  345. 

102.  post.  Sec.  346. 


§  208]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 


531 


crimination  and  imdue  or  unreasonable  preference.  When 
these  sections  are  violated  the  transgressing  carrier  is  liable 
to  the  ''person  or  persons  injured  thereby  for  the  full  amount 
of  damages  sustained  in  consequence  of  any  such  violation."  ^°' 

The  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  to  make  on  award  of 
damages  in  discrimination  cases  was  at  one  time  denied  in 
an  opinion  by  a  bare  majority  of  the  commissioners/"*  but  the 
courts  having  decided  otherwise,  the  Commission  now  exer- 
cises jurisdiction  over  claims  for  such  awards.^""  That  such 
jurisdiction  exists  cannot  now  be  doubted."*' 

In  the  Coal  Car  Supply  cases  shippers  Avere  damaged  by 
being  prevented  from  selling  coal  as  a  result  of  discrimination 
against  them  in  furnishing  cars.  This  discrimination  was 
found  illegal  and  the  carriers  ordered  to  desist  therefrom."' 
Subsequently,  and  after  the  courts  had  held  that  the  Com- 
mission   had    jurisdiction    so    to    do,    the    Commission   he^rd 


103.  Sec.  8  of  Act;  Sec.  382,  j^ost 

104.  Joynes  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  361. 

105.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C. 
186. 

106.  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Com- 
missioner Lane  in  Joynes  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C. 
361,  et  seq.;  Morrisdale  Coal  Co. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  176  Fed. 
748;  Morrisdale  Coal  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  183  Fed.  929,  106 
C.  C.  A.  269.  affirmed,  same  styled 
Case,  230  U.  S.  304,  57  L.  Ed.  1474, 
33  Sup.  Ct.  938;  Baltimore  &  0. 
R.  Co.  V.  United  States  (Pitcairn 
Case),  215  U.  S.  481,  54  L.  Ed. 
292,  30  Sup.  Ct.  164;  Robinson  v. 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S. 
506,  56  L.  Ed.  288.  32  Sup.  Ct. 
114,  affirming  same  styled  case,  64 
W.  Va.  406,  63  S.  E.  323.  Mr. 
Justice  Pitney  in  his  dissenting 
opinion  in  Pennsylvania  R.  Co. 
V.  International  Coal  Mining  Co., 


230  U.  S.  184,  57  L.  Ed.  1446,  33 
Sup.  Ct.  893,  914,  915,  appends  a 
list  of  cases  where  the  Commis- 
sion had  granted  reparation  for 
unlawful  charges  "because  dis- 
criminatory, irrespective  of 
whether  they  were  otherwise 
extortionate,"  because  "in  excess 
of  rate  afterward  voluntarily  es- 
tablished by  the  carrier"  because 
of  error  in  routing,"  because 
"rates  held  unreasonable  per  se," 
"unreasonable  because  higher 
than  obtainable  by  another  route," 
and  "because  of  exceeding  the 
sum  of  the  locals,"  see  pages  242 
and  243  of  opinion. 

107.  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C 
356;  Jacoby  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  392;  Bulah  Coal 
Co.  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  20  I. 
C.  C.  52,  order  sustained,  Penn« 
sylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate  Com. 
Com.,  193  Fed.  81;  Opinion  Com. 
Ct.  No.  31,  p.  275. 


532  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  208 

evidence,  determined  the  amount  of  damages  suffered  and  en- 
tered an  award  therefor  in  favor  of  the  shippers/"^ 

The  jurisdiction  is  settled,  but  the  difficult  question  is  one 
of  proof.  What  must  be  showm  to  establish  the  fact  of  the 
damage?  In  the  International  Coal  Mining  case,^""  damage 
was  claimed  because  the  defendant  carrier  had  rebated  part 
of  the  published  rate  to  a  competitor  of  the  plaintiff.  The 
discrimination  resulting  from  a  less  charge  than  that  pre- 
scribed in  a  legally  filed  tariff,  no  prior  action  by  the  Com- 
mission was  necessary  to  give  the  courts  jurisdiction.  In 
the  Supreme  Court,  the  shipper  contended  that  it  was  unneces- 
sary to  allege  or  prove  that  it  had  suffered  an  injury,  for 
the  reason  that,  as  a  matter  of  law,  it  was  entitled  to  recover 
as  damages  the  same  rate  per  ton  on  all  its  shipments  as 
had  been  paid  by  any  other  person,  on  his  tonnage  shipped 
at  the  same  time  over  the  same  route.  There  was  "neither 
allegation  nor  proof  that  it  (plaintiff)  suffered  any  injury." 
What  plaintiff  there  claimed  was  its  right  to  receive  the  same 
rebate  which  had  been  paid  its  competitor.  The  pleadings, 
the  evidence  and  this  contention  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  in 
considering  the  opinion  of  a  majority  of  the  court  in  denying 
such  contention.  Delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Mr. 
Justice  Lamar  said : 

"Making  an  illegal  undercharge  to  one  shipper  did  not 
license  the  carrier  to  make  a  similar  undercharge  to  other 
shippers.  *  *  *  The  measure  of  damages  was  the  pecuni- 
ary loss  inflicted  on  the  plaintiff  as  the  result  of  the  rebate 
paid.  These  damages  might  be  the  same  as  the  rebate  or 
less  than  the  rebate,  or  many  times  greater  than  the  rebate; 
but  unless  they  were  proved  they  could  not  be  recovered." 

The  ease  was  remanded  for  a  new  trial,  and  all  that  the 
opinion  holds  is  that  a  plaintiff's  rights  are  not  measured 
by  the  benefits  another  shipper  receives,   but   are   measured 

108.    Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  109.    Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  In- 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  ternational  Coal  Mining  Co.,  230  U. 
186.  See  also,  Hillsdale  Coal  &  S.  184,  57  L.  Ed.  1446,  33  Sup.  Ct. 
Coke  Co.  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  893,  reversing  Pennsylvania  R. 
229  Pa.  61,  78  Atl.  28.  Co.  v.   International   Coal  Mining 

Co.,  173   Fed.   1,   97  C.  C.   A.   383. 


§  208]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  533 

by  the  actual  damages  he  suffers,  proof  of  which  damages 
must  be  made  as  in  other  suits  therefor. 

The  Commission  held  that  rates  on  tobacco  for  export 
were  discriminatory  in  violation  of  the  Act,  and  entered  an 
order  requiring  the  carriers  to  desist  from  such  discrimina- 
tion, but  made  no  finding  tliat  the  rate  was  unreasonable  in 
violation  of  section  one."^  On  a  supplemental  hearing,  com- 
plainants sought  to  recover  an  award  of  damages.  On  such 
hearing  it  appeared  that  the  complainants  shipped  to  foreign 
ports  other  than  those  to  which  the  shippers  in  whose  favor 
the  discrimination  existed  shipped,  and  no  evidence  of  dam- 
ages was  offered.  It  was  contended  that  an  award  should 
be  made  of  the  difference  between  the  rate  paid  by  com- 
plainants and  that  paid  by  other  shippers  shipping  to  points 
to  which  complainants  made  no  shipments.  The  Commission 
denied  reparation,  but  its  opinion  should  be  construed  as 
limited  by  the  facts  of  the  case."^  In  a  later  case  involving 
the  same  principle,  the  Commission  stated  the  rule  as  follows : 

"Reparation  may  properly  be  awarded  when  a  discrimina- 
tory freight  rate  has  been  exacted,  but  it  does  not  necessarily 
follow  tliat  because  a  rate  is  found  to  be  unjustly  discrimina- 
tory and  unduly  prejudicial,  that  the  complaining  parties 
are  the  ones  who  have  been  damaged  through  its  exaction."  "^ 

That  it  may  be  difficult  to  prove  damages  is  no  reason  for 
denying  the  right  thereto  if  the  damages  are  reasonably 
certain   and   can   be  proved   with   reasonable   exactitude."' 

In  awarding  general  damages,  the  courts  meet  with  the 
same  difficulty  and  the  rules  for  fixing  other  kinds  of  damages 
should  apply  when  a  shipper  is  damaged  by  a  rate  illegally 
discriminatory  against  him.     The  Meeker  case"*   is   decisive 

110.  New  Orleans  Board  of  113.  Weinman  v.  De  Palma,  232 
Trade  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  29  U.  S.  571,  58  L.  Ed.  733,  34  Sup. 
I.  C.  C.  465.  Ct.  370. 

111.  New  Orleans  Board  of  114.  Meeker  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R. 
Trade  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  29  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  129,  23  I.  C.  C. 
I.  C.  C.  32.  480,   211    Fed.    785,    128    C.    C.    A. 

112.  Curry  &  Whyte  Co.  v.  Du-  311,  236  U.  S.  412,  434,  59  L.  Td. 
luth  &  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  I.  C.  C.  644,  659,  35  Sup.  Ct.  328,  337. 
1,  14.  See  also  Becker  v.  Pere  See  also  Mills  v.  Lehigh  V. 
Marquette  R.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  645,  R.  Co.,  238  U.  S.  473,  59  L.  Ed. 
657.  1414,    35    Sup.    Ct.    888;    So.    Pac. 


534  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  208 

only  of  the  question  of  the  prima  facie  effect  of  an  order  oC 
the  Commission.  In  that  case  the  Commission  had  awarded 
damages  both  for  a  violation  of  section  one  and  of  section 
three  of  the  act.  The  carrier  being  sned  presented  no  testi- 
mony but  relied  on  the  claim  that  the  report  of  the  Commission 
showed  that  the  amount  of  the  award  corresponded  in  one 
instance  to  the  amount  of  the  rebate  and  in  the  other  to 
the  amount  of  the  overcharge,  and  that  therefore  the  Com- 
mission had  applied  an  erroneous  and  inadmissible  measure 
of  damages.  To  this  contention  the  Supreme  Court  replied: 
"The  Commission  was  authorized  and  required  by  section  8 
of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  to  award  the  full  amount  • 
of  damages  sustained,  and  that,  of  course,  was  to  be  deter- 
mined from  the  evidence.  If  it  showed  that  the  damage  cor- 
responded to  the  rebate  in  one  instance  and  to  the  overcharge 
in  the  other,  the  claimant  was  entitled  to  an  award  upon 
that  basis.  The  case  of  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  International 
Coal  Min.  Co.,  230  U.  S.  184,  57  L.  Ed.  1446,  33  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
893,  is  cited  as  holding  otherwise,  but  it  does  not  do  so. 
There  a  shipper,  without  proving  that  he  sustained  any  dam- 
age, sought  to  recover  from  a  carrier  for  giving  a  rebate  to 
another  shipper,  and  this  court,  referring  to  section  8,  said 
(p.  203)  :  "The  measure  of  damages  was  the  pecuniary  loss 
inflicted  on  the  plaintiff  as  the  result  of  the  rebate  paid. 
Those  damages  might  be  the  same  as  the  rebate,  or  less  than 
the  rebate,  or  many  times  greater  than  the  rebate ;  but  unless 
they  were  proved,  they  could  not  be  recovered.  Whatever 
they  were  they  could  be  recovered.'  There  is  nothing  in 
either  report  of  the  Commission  which  is  in  conflict  with 
what  was  said  in  that  case.  On  the  contrary,  the  plain  im- 
port of  the  findings  is  that  the  amount  awarded  represents  the 
claimant's  actual  pecuniary  loss;  and,  in  view  of  the  recital 
that  the  findings  were  based  upon  the  evidence  adduced,  it 
must  be  presumed,  there  being  no  showing  to  the  contrary, 
that  they  were  justified  by  it." 

Co.    V.    Goldfielfl    Consol.    Milling  Fed.    659.      As    misconstruing   the 

&    Transportation    Co.,    220    Fed.  International  Coal  case  supra,  see 

14;    Darnell-Taenzer    Lumber    Co.  Lehigh    V.    R.    Co.    v.    Clark,    207 

V.    So.    Pac.    Co.,    221    Fed.    890,  Fed.    717,    125    C.    C.    A.    235,    re- 

137    C.    C.   A.    460,    reversing   190  versed    in   Mills   Case   supra;  Le- 


§  208]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  535 

In  the  case  of  Mills  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  note  supra, 
the  Commission  found  that  the  complainant  was  entitled  to  a 
stated  amount  "as  reparation.""^  It  was  contended  that 
such  a  finding  was  not  equivalent  to  a  finding  that  he  was 
damaged.  Of  this  contention  the  Court  said:  "What  the 
Commission  decided  was  that  the  shippers  were  entitled  to 
reparation ;  that  is,  to  be  made  whole, — to  be  compensated 
for  a  loss  because  of  an  illegal  and  unreasonable  exaction ; 
and  the  amount  which  they  stated  as  the  sum  to  be  paid  "as 
reparation'  on  the  specified  shipments  was  the  amount  which 
they  found  necessary  to  accomplish  the  reparation, — to  af- 
ford the  compensation.  The  statute  was  not  concerned  with 
mere  forms  of  expression,  and  in  view  of  the  decision  that 
a  finding  of  the  ultimate  fact  of  the  amount  of  damage  is 
enough  to  give  the  order  of  the  Commission  effect  as  prima 
facie  evidence,  we  think  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in 
its  ruling.  The  statutory  provision  merely  established  a  rule 
of  evidence.  It  leaves  every  opportunity  to  the  defendant  to 
contest  the  claim.  But  when  the  Commission  has  found  that 
there  was  damage  to  a  specified  extent,  prima  facie  the  dam- 
age is  shown ;  and,  according  to  the  fair  import  of  its  decision, 
the  Commission  did  find  the  amount  of  damage  in  this  case." 

A  shipper's  damages  as  the  ajuthorities  now  stand  are 
not  ordinarily  measured  by  the  difference  between  the  rate 
paid  by  him  and  a  lower  and  unlawfully  preferential  rate 
paid  by  his  competitor.  In  such  cases  the  shipper  must  be 
able  to  show  just  wherein  and  to  what  extent  he  has  been 
damaged.  There  are  many  cases  in  the  reports  of  the  Com- 
mission in  which  reparation  has  been  disallowed  under  the 
authority  of  the  International  Coal  case,  snpra,  solely  be- 
cause the  complainant  failed  to  offer  the  necessary  proof, 
and  that  in  eases  where  the  proof  existed.  It  may  be  said 
that  the  business  charged  an  unlawful  rate  in  violation  of  sections 
2  or  3  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  may  be  seriously  in- 
jured without  any  shipment  having  moved  under  such  unlaw- 
ful rate.     To  prove  this  and  other  injuries,   and   to   measure 

high  V.  R.  Co.  V.  American  Hay  115.    Naylor  &  Co.  v.  Lehigh  V. 

Co.,    219    Fed.    539,    135    C.    C.    A.       R.  Co.,   15  I.  C.  C.  9,  18   I.  C.  C. 

307.  624. 


536  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  209 

the  amount  necessary  to  repair  the  injury,  the  same  principles 
that  the  courts  are  constantly  applying  to  suits  for  injuries  to 
business,  nmst  be  brought  into  action."" 

§  209.  Damages  under  the  Fourth  Section. — Under  section 
foiu-  of  the  Act,  as  has  been  shown,"'  relief  may  be  granted 
from  the  long  and  short  haul  provision,  and  the  Commission 
lias  granted  relief  from  the  provision  requiring  that  the  rate 
for  the  through  routes  shall  not  exceed  the  aggregate  of  the 
intermediate  rates. 

Ihider  these  circumstances,  where  the  carrier  has  followed 
the  statute  and  applied  for  relief,  the  existing  rate  for  the 
shorter  haul  is  the  legal  rate  until  adjudged  otherwise  by  the 
Commission  after  hearing.  Until  such  adjudication  the  car- 
rier has  not  "done  any  act,  matter  or  thing  *  *  *  pro- 
hibited or  declared  to  be  unlawful,"  nor  has  there  been  an 
omission  to  "do  any  act,  matter  or  thing"  required  to  be 
done.  Discussing  the  question  and  of  the  applications  filed  for 
relief  under  the  section,  the  Commission  said  : 

"Tender  this  provision  over  11,000  applications  were  tiled 
before  the  date  fixed,  and  these  two  applications  were  among 
that  number.     Noav,  we  think  that  it  plainly  appears,   from 

116.    Graustein  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  That  it  is  possible  to  make  proof 

Co.,  45  I.  C.  C.  393.  Recent  cases  sufficient   to   obtain   an   order    for 

discussing  the  general   principles  damages   for  charging  a  discrim- 

are:     Manufacturers  &  Merchants  inatory  rate  appears  from  the  fol- 

Asso.  V.  A.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  I.  C.  lowing  cases:   Pittsburg  Steel  Co. 

C.  350,  351;  California  Corrugated  v.  P.  &  L.  E.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C. 

Culvert  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  C.   312;    McGowan-Foshee  Lumber 

38  I.  C.  C.  568;  Greenbaum  v.  Co.  v.  F.  A.  &  G.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  I. 
Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C.  715;  C.  C.  581;  Valley  Smokeless  Coal 
Brooks  Coal  Co.  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  I.  C.  C. 
Co.,  39  I.  C.  C.  426;  Wilkes  &  654;  Buffalo  Union  Furnace  Co.  v. 
Company   v.   A.    G.    S.    R.   R.    Co.,  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  44  I.  C.  C. 

39  I.  C.  C.  447;  Union  Lumber  267;  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Minds,  250 
Co.  V.  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  41  U.  S.  368,  63  L.  Ed.  665,  39  Sup. 
I.  C.  C.  411;  Omaha  Alfalfa  Mill-  Ct. -531;  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Stineman 
ing  Co.  V.  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  43  I.  C.  Coal  Min.  Co.,  242  U.  S.  298,  61 
C.  264;  and  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  L.  Ed.  316,  37  Sup.  Ct.  118;  Penn. 
Coal  Co.  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  46  L  C.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacoby  &  Co.,  242  U.  S. 
506,  where  the  Commission  did  89,  61  L.  Ed.  163,  37  Sup.  Ct.  49. 
what  was  designated  as  "sub-  117.  Ante  Sees.  154,  155;  j)ost. 
stantial"   and   "essential"   justice.  Section  349. 


§  210]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  537 

the  action  of  Congress  in  providing  that  no  carrier  should  be 
proceeded  against  for  a  violation  of  the  fourth  section  until 
its  application  had  been  acted  upon,  that  "it  was  the  intent  of 
Congress  to  say  that  matters  should  be  left  in  statu  quo  until 
that  time.  It  would  be  inconsistent,  to  grant  reparation  for 
a  disregard  of  the  rule  of  the  fourth  section  during  that  period 
within  wliich  the  law-making  authority  had  expressly  san- 
ctioned existence  of  such  disregard. 

"AVithout  undertaking,  therefore,  to  lay  down  any  rule  as 
to  tlie  granting  of  reparation  for  violations  of  the  fourth 
section,  we  hold  that  no  damages  can  be  given  up  to  the  time 
when  the  Commission  passes  upon  these  fourth  section  ap- 
plications, unless,  possibly,  a  case  is  made  out  under  the  third 
section,  which  might  carry  with  it  an  award  of  damages,  or 
unless  under  the  first  section  the  rate  to  the  intermediate  point 
has  been  found  unreasonable.""* 

The  Commission  has  with  practical  unanimity  and  in  hun- 
dreds of  eases  awarded  reparation  Avhere  through  rates  have 
exceeded  the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate  clause  of  the 
fourth  section.'** 

§  210.  Damages  for  Misrouting. — The  law  prior  to  1920 
stating  the  shippers'  rights  provided:  "subject  to  such  rea- 
sonable exceptions  and  regulations  as  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  shall  from  time  to  time  prescribe,  shall  have  the 
right  to  designate  in  writing  by  which  of  such  through  routes 
such  property  shall  be  transported  to  destination,  and  it  shall 
thereupon  be  the  duty  of  the  initial  carrier  to  route  said  prop- 
erty and  issue  a  through  bill  of  lading  therefor  as  so  directed, 
and  to  transport  said  property  over  its  own  line  or  lines  and 

118.  Appalachian  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  C.  524,  529;  Lust's  Digest,  Vol. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  25  I.  C.  C.  1,  p.  864,  et  seg.,  for  several  hund- 
1S3,  197,  followed  in  Jonesville  red  cases.  If  the  long-and-short 
Clothing  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  haul  provision  were  absolute,  re- 
Ry.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  628,   630.  paration    should    be    awarded    for 

119.  Section  154,  suj)ra.  Lindsay  its  violation.  Sou.  Pac.  Co.  v.  Cali- 
Bros.  v.  B.  &  0.  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  16  fornia  Adjustment  Co.,  237  Fed. 
I.  C.  C.  6,  8;  Windsor  Turned  954,  150  C.  C.  A.  604,  248  U.  S. 
Goods  Co.  v.  C.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  18  595,  63  L.  Ed.  226,  39  Sup.  Ct. 
I.  C.  C.  162,  164;   Alabama  Pack-  182. 

ing  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.   R.   Co.,   47   I. 


538  Enfoecement  by  the  CoMMissioisr.         [^  210 

deliver  the  same  to  a  connecting  line  or  lines  according  to 
such  through  route,  and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  each  of  said 
connecting  carriers  to  receive  said  property  and  transport  it 
over  the  said  line  or  lines  and  deliver  the  same  to  the 
next  succeeding  carrier,  or  consignee  according  to  the  rout- 
ing instructions  in  said  bill  of  lading :  Provided,  however, 
that  the  shipper  shall  in  all  instances  have  the  right  to  deter- 
mine, where  competing  lines  of  railroad  constitute  portions  of 
a  through  line  or  route,  over  which  of  said  competing  lines 
so  constituting  a  portion  of  said  through  line  or  route  his 
freight  shall  be  transported,"'"" 

Under  the  authority  granted  by  the  statute,  the  Commission 
passed  certain  conference  rulings  in  which  it  is  stated  that 
it  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  claims  for  damages  arising 
from  the  misrouting  of  freight.''^  Carriers  could  not  dis- 
regard instructions  of  shippers  as  to  intermediate  routing, 
except  when  the  tariff  of  the  initial  line  reserved  the  right 
to  the  carrier  to  dictate  intermediate  routing.  When  such 
reservation  was  made  in  the  tariff:  (1)  where  all-rail  rates 
and  rail-and-water  rates  are  available  the  agent  of  the  car- 
rier must  have  had  the  shipper  designate  which  of  the  two 
he  wished  to  use;  and  (2)  the  agent  could  not  route  ship- 
ment via  a  route  which  will  be  more  expensive  to  the  shipper 
than  the  one  desired  by  him,  or  which  did  not  furnish  sub- 
stantially as  good  and  expeditious  service. 

In  the  absence  of  specific  routing  which  the  carrier  is  will- 
ing to  observe,  the  routing  was  via  the  cheapest  reasonable 
route  of  the  class  designated  by  the  shipper.  The  initial 
carrier  had  the  duty  to  protect  the  routing.^" 

When  a  bill  of  lading  was  presented  by  a  shipper  showing 
both  routing  and  rate,  and  the  rate  was  not  available  by  the 
prescribed  routing,  a  routing  applicable  to  the  rate  had  to 
be  adopted.^"' 

When  a  carrier  routed  by  a  higher  interstate  rate  and  there 
was  available  a  lower  reasonable  intrastate  rate,  damages  for 

120.  Sec.  15  ofAct;  Sec.  402,  122.  Conf.  Rulings  214,  91,  93, 
post.                                                                140,   190,   192,   198,   205,  214d.   286, 

121.  Conf.  Ruling  286.  316. 

123.    Com.     Ruling    286f. 


•^i  211]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  539 

the  difference  between  the  lower  and  higher  rate  may  be 
allowed,  unless  the  route  over  the  interstate  line  was  pre- 
scribed by  the  shipper.'"^ 

The  routing  instructions  were  not  absolutely  binding  and 
the  obligation  of  the  carrier  was  to  deal  justly  with  the  ship- 
per.''' While  the  Transportation  Act  1920"'  gives  the  Com- 
mission power  to  make  orders  affecting  the  routing  of  freight, 
unless  and  until  such  orders  are  made  carriers  are  obligated 
to  observe  instructions  and  rules  relating  to  routing  as  here- 
tofore. 

§  211.  Damages — General  Statement. — Carriers  may  volun- 
tarily make  rates  lower  than  they  could  be  compelled  to  make 
them,  but  the  Commission  will  not  award  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  a  rate  lower  than  that  which  it  would  prescribe,  even 
though  the  shipper  and  carrier  may  agree  thereto.'^' 

Where  complainant  operates  an  industrial  road  which  is  a 
plant  facility,  originating  shipments  and  receiving  an  allow- 
ance from  the  carrier  therefor  or  participating  in  the  joint 
rate  under  which  shipments  moved,  reparation  has  been  denied 
by  the  Commission."*  If,  however,  the  industrial  railroad 
was  legally  entitled  to  an  allowance,  and  some  may  be,  and,"* 
if  the  allowance  did  not  exceed  a  reasonable  compensation, 
it  would  seem  that  where  the  rate,  other  than  the  portion  al- 
lowed the  industrial  railroad,  is  unreasonable,  that  reparation 
should  be  awarded. 

124.  Lathrop  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ala-  Sec.  15,  Par.  4,  5,  9  and  10;   Sees. 
bama    G.    S.    R.    Co.,    27    L    C.    C.  396b,  396c,  401  and  402,  post. 
250;    Conf.  Ruling  140.   See  also:  127.   Pacific  Elevator  Co.  v.  Chi- 
McCaull-Dinsmore  Co.  v.  Chicago,  cago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C. 
G.   W.    Ry.   Co.,   14    I.  €.    C.    527;  C.  373,  374. 

Gus  Momsen  &  Co.  v.  Gila  Valley  128.  Kaul  Lumber  Co.  v.  Central 

G.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  14  L  C.  C.  614;  of   Ga.   Ry.   Co.,   20   I.   C.   C.    450; 

Goodman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  Tap   Line    Case,   23   I.    C.   C.    277, 

26  I.  C.  C.  423;   Newman  Lumber  549;    Commercial  Club  of  Omaha 

Co.   V.   Mississippi   C.   R.   Co.,    26  v.   Anderson   &   Saline  River  Ry. 

I.  C.  C.  97;    Sec.  15  of  Act;    Sec.  Co.,    27    I.    C.    C.    302,    324.     The 

402,  post.  Kaul  Case  is  hardly  sustained  by 

125.  Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  the  Tap  Line  Cases;  United  States 
Solum,  247  U.  S.  477,  62  L.  Ed.  v.  Louisiana  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  234 
1221,  38  Sup.  Ct.  550.  U.   S.   1,   58   L.   Ed.   1185,   34    Sup. 

126.  Int.  Com.  Act,  Sec.  1,  Par.  Ct.  741. 

15,  16;  Sees.  344b  to  344g,  post;  129.  Sec.  171,  ante. 


540  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  212 

§  212.  Damages  for  Misquoting  a  Rate. — Prior  to  the 
Amendment  of  1910  it  was  held  that  should  a  carrier's  agent 
make  a  mistake  and  quote  a  wrong  rate,  the  shipper  re- 
ceiving such  quotation  of  a  rate  must  nevertheless  pay  the 
correct  rate  even  though  he  suffer  severe  loss  thereby."" 
Nor  does  the  fact  that  there  was  no  rate  on  file  change  the 
rule."^  Discussing  this  subject,  the  Commission,  in  its  twenty- 
second  Annual  Report,  pp.  16,  17,  showed  the  hardship  of 
the  rule  and  said : 

"The  Commission  feels  that  to  require  the  shipper  to  as- 
certain for  himself  at  his  peril  the  rate  imposes  upon  him  an 
undue  burden.  The  railway  should  know  what  its  established 
charges  are,  and  may  be  fairly  required  to  state  in  writing, 
when  a  written  request  is  made  by  the  shipper,  the  rate  which 
it  lias  published  and  maintains  in  force.  We  call  special  at- 
tention to  this  matter  as  one  of  immediate  and  general  con- 
cern, which  discloses  the  need  of  an  appropriate  remedy,  and 
urgently  request  that  a  suitable  measure  be  promptly  en- 
acted." 

In  the  first  edition  hereof,  referring  to  the  quotation  above, 
it  w^as  said : 

"It  is  undoubtedh'  true  that  shippers  ordinarily  do  not 
know,  and  it  would  sometimes  take  an  expert  to  find  out,  what 
a  particular  rate  is,  and  therefore,  reliance  must  be  had  on 
the  information  furnished  by  the  agents  of  the  carriers.     The 

ISO.    Poor  V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Ala.    131,    10    So.    289,    4   I.    C.    R. 

Co.,    12    I.    C.    C.    418,    421,    422;  200;   Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

Tex.  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mugg,  202  v.  Holmes,  18  Okla.  92,  90  Pac.  22, 

U.  S.  242,  50  L.  Ed.  1011,  26  Sup.  New  York   C.   &  H.  R.   R.   Co.  v. 

Ct.  628;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  United    States,   212   U.    S.    500,    53 

Hefley,    158    U.    S.    98,    39    L.    Ed.  L.  Ed.   624,  29  Sup.  Ct.  309;    lUi- 

910,     15    Sup.     Ct.     802;     Suffern  nois    Cent    R.    Co.    v.    Henderson 

Hunt  &  Co.  V.   Indiana,  D.  &  W.  Elevator  Co.,  226  U.  S.  441,  57  L. 

Ry.  Co.,  7  I.  C.  C.  255,  278;  Hous-  Ed.   290,   33   Sup.   Ct.   176,   revers- 

ton  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  V.  Dumas,  43  ing  same  styled  case,  138  Ky.  220, 

S.    W.    609;    Chicago,    R.    I.    &   P.  127  S.  W.  779. 

Ry.  Co.  v.  Hubbell,  54  Kans.  232,  131.  Kansas  City  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Al- 

38  Pac.  266,  5  I.  C.  R.  241;   Pond-  bers  Com.   Co.,  223  U.   S.   573,   56 

Decker    Lumber    Co.    v.    Spencer,  L.    Ed.    556,    32    Sup.    Ct.    316,   re- 

86  Fed.  846,  30  C.  C.  A.  430;   Mo^  versing  same  styled  case,  79  Kan. 

bile  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Dismukes,  94  59,  99  Pac.  819. 


§  212]       Of  the  Act  to  Eegulate  Commerce.  541 

Commission  points  out  the  evil  but  suggests  no  remedy.  It 
would  probably  be  an  effective  remedy  to  allow  the  Commis- 
sion to  award  reparation  in  such  cases  as  it  might  find  were 
based  upon  an  honest  mistake  of  the  carrier.  The  Commis- 
sion would  be  able  to  prevent  the  evils  which  Mr,  Commis- 
sioner Harlan  points  out  in  the  Poor  case,  supra,  and,  if  neces- 
sary to  prevent  discrimination,  the  rate  mistakenly  given 
might  be  open  to  all  who  ship  contemporaneously  with  the 
shipper  who  relied  on  the  misquoted  rate." 

By  the  Amendment  of  1910,'"'  it  was  made  the  duty  of 
the  carrier  ''after  written  request"  to  give  a  statement  of 
the  correct  rate,  and  should  there  be  a  refusal  to  comply  with 
a  request  properly  made,  or  should  there  be  given  a  wrong 
rate,  and  "if  the  person  or  company  making  such  request 
suffers  damage  in  consequence  of  such  refusal  or  omission, 
or  in  consequence  of  the  misstatement  of  the  rate,"  the  car- 
rier is  made  liable  by  the  statute  to  pay  a  penalty  of  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  dollars,  which  penalty  shall  accrue  to  the 
United  States.  As  such  refusal,  omission  or  misstatement 
would  come  within  the  provisions  of  section  eight  of  the 
Act,  the  shipper  could  recover  and  the  Commission  or  a  court 
could  award  "the  full  amount  of  damages  sustained  in  con- 
sequence of  any  such  violations." 

This  statement  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court  in  the  Albers  Commission  case  and  the  Hen- 
derson Elevator  case,  cited  note  supra.  In  the  Albers  Com- 
mission Co.  case  the  court  was  careful  to  limit  its  opinion 
to  the  law  in  efi'ect  prior  to  1910,  and  at  page  598  of  the 
opinion  it  wa.s  said:  "To  avoid  any  misapprehension  in 
respect  to  the  character  of  the  liability  sought  to  be  enforced 
in  this  case,  -Ci^e  deem  it  well  to  repeat  that  there  was  no 
claim  of  any  right  to  reparation  or  damages  under  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act,  *  *  *  b^t  only  an  attempt  to  en- 
force a  supposed  liability  for  a  breach  of  the  special  agree- 
ment." A  like  limitation  could  be  stated  as  to  the  Henderson 
Elevator  case.  The  Commission  in  a  case  decided  in  1913,  re- 
fused reparation,  but  in  that  case  there  was  no  application 

132.    Act  June  8,  1910;  Sec.  368, 
post. 


542  Enfoecement  by  the  Commission.         [^  213 

made  and  refused,  and  no  misstatement  under  the  amended 
law."' 

§  213.  Damages,  to  Whom  Paid. — Keparation  is  paid  to  him 
who  pays  the  unlawful  advance  or  exaction.  For  the  wrong 
of  being  required  to  pay  that  which  is  unlawful  under  the 
Act,  he  who  makes  such  payment  has  suffered  legal  damage 
to  the  extent  of  the  amount  paid  in  excess  of  the  lawful  rate 
or  to  the  extent  that  he  is  damaged  by  an  unlawful  prefer- 
ence to  another. 

It  is  the  person  who  sustains  damages  who  is  given  the 
right  to  an  award  by  way  of  reparation,  and  that  the  injured 
owner  may  add  to  the  price  of  his  commodity  the  amount 
of  his  damages  does  not  relieve  the  carrier  causing  the 
damage  and  keeping  the  unlawful  exaction  of  an  excessive 
rate.    For,  as  said  by  ]\Ir.  Commissioner  Prouty  :"* 

"If  complainants  were  obliged  to  follow  every  transaction 
to  its  ultimate  result  and  to  trace  out  the  exact  commercial 
effect  of  the  freight  rate  paid,  it  Avould  never  be  possible 
to  show  damages  with  sufficient  accuracy  to  justify  giving 
them.  Certainly  these  defendants  are  not  entitled  to  this 
money  which  they  have  taken  from  the  complainants,  and 
they  ought  not  to  be  heard  to  say  that  they  should  not  be 
required  to  refund  this  amount  because  the  complainants 
themselves  may  have  obtained  some  portion  of  this  sum  from 
the  consumer  of  the  commodity  transported." 

This  statement  of  the  Commission  applies  with  more  force 
to  cases  where  the  rate  is  unreasonable  than  to  discrimination 
cases  where  there  must  be  proof  of  damages  by  the  shipper 
who  suffers  the  loss."^ 

The  manufacturer  who  sells  his  produce  f.  o.  h.  his  plant 
pays  no  freight  tbereon,  although  the  value  of  his  product 
may  be  affected  by  the  rate  of  carriage  from  his  plant  to  the 
market.  His  damage,  if  any,  however,  is  not  subject  of  as- 
certainment.   "When  he  sells  free  on  board  cars  at  his  place  of 

13.3..   Franke  Grain  Co.  v.  Illinois  134.    Burgess     v.       Transcontin- 

Cent.  R.   Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.   625.  As  ental  Freight  Bureau   13  I.   C.   C. 

supporting  the   principle   announ-  668,  679,  680. 

ced  in  the  test.  See  St.  Louis  S.  135.   Sec.  208,  supra. 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  V.  Lewellen,  192  Fed. 
540. 


<§>  213]       Of  the  Act  to  Eegulate  Commekce.  543 

business,  the  title  passes  upon  delivery  of  the  commodity 
to  the  carrier.  The  purchaser  then  owns  the  commodity  and 
must  pay  the  transportation  charges  thereon  to  whatever 
place  he  may  direct  shipment.  Should  there  be  loss  or  injury, 
the  manufacturer  Avould  not  suffer,  but  such  loss  or  injury 
must  be  adjusted  between  the  owner  and  the  carrier.  It  may 
be  that  the  higher  rate  affects  the  selling  price  at  the  point 
of  manufacture,  but  to  what  extent  cannot  be  definitely  ascer- 
tained. Besides,  the  manufacturer  does  not  fix  his  selling 
price  according  to  the  final  destination  of  the  commodity.  He 
frequently  does  not  know  where  the  purchaser  will  send  the 
goods  when  the  purchase  is  made.  The  purchaser  may  decide 
to  use  the  commodity  at  the  point  of  manufacture,  or  ship  to 
some  place  where  the  illegal  rate  does  not  apply.  These 
and  other  considerations  make  it  manifest  that  the  legal  in- 
jury is  suffered  by  the  person  who  pays  for  the  carriage. 
This  does  not  mean  the  man  who  actually  hands  the  money 
or  check  to  the  carrier.  It  means  the  one  who  owns  the  com- 
modity wliile  in  transit  and  who  has  undertaken  to  deliver  it 
at  a  point  requiring  its  shipment  over  the  lines  of  the  car- 
rier who  collects  the  unlawful  charge.  Frequently  a  manu- 
facturer will  sell  his  goods  delivered  at  a  particular  point,  but 
allow  the  consignee  to  advance  the  freight  thereto,  deducting 
the  amount  advanced  from  the  purchase  price  of  the  goods. 
In  such  a  case,  the  manufacturer  has  paid  the  freight  and 
is  entitled  to  recover  the  overcharge.  The  manufacturer  may 
add  the  freight  charges  to  the  manufacturing  cost,  the  jobber 
and  the  retailer  may  add  not  only  such  charges  but  a  profit 
thereon  when  they  sell,  and  in  the  end  the  consumer  "pays 
the  freight,"  but  it  would  be  impracticable  to  trace  an 
overcharge  to  the  consumer  who  never  could  make  proof 
entitling  him  to  a  recovery.  The  law  will  not  attempt  to 
follow  these  speculations,  but  will  let  the  carrier  repay  to 
the  man,  who  pays  for  the  transportation  of  his  property, 
all  charges  above  what  such  shipper  is  legally  bound  to  pay"" 

136.   Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  Co.,   14  I.   C.  C.   199,   208;    Sunny- 

V    Anderson    &    S.    R.    R.    Co.,    27  side    Coal    Mining   Co.    v.    Denver 

I.  C.  C.  302,  323;   Nicola,  Stone  &  &   R.    G.   R.   Co.,    19    I.    C.    C.    20; 

Meyers  Co.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Mountain  Ice  Co.  v.  Delaware.  L. 


544  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.        [§  214 

Cases  of  unlawful  discrimination  may  present  a  different  issue 
and  one  where  a  manufacturer  could  show  loss  of  business 
because  a  competitor  had  a  less  rate. 

The  Commission  declined  to  award  reparation  before  a 
complainant  had  paid  the  lawful  rate.'" 

The  right  to  recover  damages  under  the  Act  may  be  as- 
signed/" but  by  conference  ruling  362  the  Commission  said : 
"In  awarding  reparation  the  Commission  will  recognize  an 
assignment  by  a  consignor  to  a  consignee  or  by  a  consignee  to 
a  consignor,  but  will  not  recognize  an  assignment  to  a  stranger 
to  the  transportation  records." 

§  214.  Damages,  by  Whom  Paid. — Where  the  illegal  rate  is 
a  joint  rate  over  a  through  route  consisting  of  several  car- 
riers, the  question  arises  as  to  what  carrier  or  carriers  must 
pay  the  reparation,  and  as  to  whether  the  liability  is  joint 
or  several ;  that  is,  is  each  carrier  jointly  and  severally  liable 
for  all  the  illegal  rate,  or  is  each  carrier  liable  for  only  the 
proportion  of  the  illegal  charge  received  by  it?  The  charg- 
ing of  an  illegal  rate  is  a  tort  and  all  participants  in  such 
illegal  act  are  joint  tort  feasors,  and  as  such  each  carrier  is 
jointly  and  severally  liable.  Where,  as  was  found  to  be  a 
fact  in  the  Tift  case,  supra,  an  illegal  advance  was  made  by 
'  a  combination  of  carriers  by  concerted  and  concurrent  action 
in  violation  of  the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  law,  it  would  seem 
that  each  and  all  carriers  who  participated  in  the  action  by 
which  the  advance  was  made  would  be  joint  tort  feasors  and 
liable  to  any  one  who  suffered  damages  by  such  illegal  ad- 
vance. The  Commission  does  not  fully  agree  with  this  proposi- 
tion, and  in  the  Nicola,  Stone  and  Myers  ease,  announced  the 
rule  as  follows : 

&  W.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  596;  Cent.  R.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  GOC.  South- 
Baker  Mnfg.  Co.  V.  Chicago  &  N  ern  R.  Co.  v.  Darnell  Taenzer 
W.  R.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  605;  Caro-  Lumber  Co.,  245  U.  S.  531,  62  L. 
Una  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  Ed.  451,  38  Sup.  Ct.  196. 
Chesapeake  &  O.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  137.  Rosenblatt  v.  Chicago  &  N. 
C.  C.  533;  Lamb,  McGregor  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  261. 
Co.  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  138.  Edmunds  v.  Illinois  Cent  R. 
22  L  C.  C.  346;  Deming  Lumber  Co.,  80  Fed.  78;  Jubitz,  Assignee, 
Co.  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  24  I.  v  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C. 
C    C.  598;   Sondheimer  v.  Illinois  44.    The   Commission   declined   to 


§  215]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  545 

"The  complainants  contend  that  the  defendant  carriers  who 
concurred  in  establishing  the  unlawful  advance  in  the  rates 
under  consideration  are  jointly'  and  severally  liable  for  all  the 
damages  resulting  therefrom,  whether  or  not  participating 
in  the  particular  rate  from  which  the  individual  overcharge 
resulted.  We  cannot  concur  in  so  broad  a  view  of  the  liability 
of  the  defendants.  We  do  not  think  those  carriers  who 
received  no  part  of  the  charges  and  who  did  not  participate 
in  the  movement  of  the  commodity  should  be  liable  to  refund 
the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  rate  for  the  movement  of  a  ship- 
ment in  Avhich  they  did  not  participate.  AVe  think  that  the 
liability  is  restricted  to  those  carriers  who  participated  in 
the  transportation  of  the  lumber  via  their  respective  routes 
over  which  the  several  shipments  moved,  and  who  shared  in 
the  transportation  charges  therefor,  and  that  such  carriers 
are  jointly  and  severally  liable  to  the  persons  found  to  be 
entitled  to  the  refund.'"'" 

The  rule  announced  in  concluding  the  foregoing  quotation 
has  been  followed  by  the  Commission  whose  orders  are  issued 
against   the   carriers   jointly.^^" 

§  215.  Damage — Protest  Unnecessary, — It  is  not  necessary 
that  a  rate  be  paid  under  protest  in  order  to  enable  a  shippei' 
paying  it  to  recover  the  excessive  and  unlawful  portion 
thereof.    This  is  true  because  the  law  requires  no  useless  thing. 

express  an  opinion  on  tliis  point,  necessary  that  all  the  parties  lia- 
O'Brien  Com.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  ble  should  be  defendants,  Inde- 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C.  68.  The  pendent  Refiners  Assn.  v.  West- 
Commission  has  adhered  to  its  ern  N.  Y.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  6  I.  C.  C. 
conference  ruling  but  the  assign-  378;  Webster  Grocery  Co.  v.  Chi- 
ability  of  the  right  to  recover  cago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21  I.  C. 
has  been  recognized  by  the  Courts.  C.  20. 

A.  T.  &  S.  F.   Ry.   Co.  v.   Spiller,  140.    Green  &   Son   v.    Sou.   Ry. 

246  Fed.   1,  19,   158  C.  C.  A.   227.  Co.,   40   I.   C.   C.   157.    159;    River- 

139.   Osborne  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  side  Mills  v.  A.  &  S.  S.  S.  Co.,  40 

Ry.    Co.,    48    Fed.    49;    Interstate  I.    C.    C.    501,    502;    Squire    &   Co. 

Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  v.   A.    S.   R.   Co.,   44   I.   C.    C.   509, 

Co.,   118   Fed.    613;    Nicola,    Stone  511.    The  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals 

&   Meyers  Co.   v.   Louisville   &   N.  acted  on  a  contrary  principle  but 

R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199;  Blackhorse  probably  without  careful  consider- 

Tobacco    Co.    v.    Illinois    Cent.    R.  ation  as  the  amount  was  trifling 

Co.,    17    I.    C.    C.    588.     Nor    is    it  and    the   question   arose   only   in- 


546 


Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  215 


and  in  no  case  where  a  rate  is  fixed  in  the  schedules  filed  ac- 
cording to  law,  would  protest  avail  anything.  The  carrier 
could  not,  if  it  wished,  yield  to  the  protest  and  charge  less 
tiian  the  tariff  rates.  This  question  has  been  before  the  Com- 
mission and  has  been  decided  in  harmony  with  the  principles 
stated/" 

The  holding  of  the  Commission  is  not  in  conflict  with  the 
decision  of  the  courts.  It  may  be  admitted  that  ordinarily 
where  a  payment  is  voluntarily  made  it  cannot  be  recovered, 
but  where  a  payment  must  be  made  by  force  of  law  and 
where  the  law  prescribes  a  particular  method  by  which  it 
may  be  determined  whether  or  not  the  payment  is  legal,  pro- 
test is  neither  necessary  nor  effective.  The  case  of  Knudsen- 
Ferguson  Fruit  Co.  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  M.  &  0.  Ry.  Co.'"  il- 
lustrates the  distinction  between  changes  collected  under 
the  force  of  a  tariff  and  charges  paid  voluntarily.  In  that 
case,  an  icing  charge  of  $45.00  was  made  under  a  tariff 
treating  icing  as  a  separate  charge  from  transportation,  the 


cidentally  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Fer- 
guson Saw  Mill  Co.,  235  Fed.  474, 
481,  149  C.  C.  A.  20. 

141.  Southern  Pine  Lumber  Co. 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C. 
19.5;  Baer  Bros.  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  329;  National 
Refining  Co.  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S. 
F.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  389;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.  V.  International 
Coal  Co.,  173  Fed.  1,  97  C.  C.  A. 
383.  While  this  case  was  reversed 
by  the  Supreme  Court,  same 
styled  case,  230  U.  S.  184,  57  L. 
Ed.  1446,  33  Sup.  Ct.  893,  that 
court  did  not  discuss  this  ques- 
tion and  remanded  the  case, 
which  would  have  been  useless  if 
protest  had  been  necessary; 
Mitchell  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co..,  181  Fed.  403. 
The  subsequent  history  of  this 
case,  though  not  affecting  this 
question,  is:  Dismissed,  same 
styled  case,  183  Fed.  908,  appeal 


dismissed,  same  styled  case,  192 
Fed.  475,  112  C.  C.  A.  637,  Writ 
of  certiorari  denied  223  U.  S. 
733.  56  L.  Ed.  635,  32  Sup.  Ct. 
528.  On  appeal  affirmed  in  part 
and  reversed  in  part,  230  U.  S. 
247,  57  L.  Ed.  1472,  33  Sup.  Ct. 
916.  The  statement  in  Denver 
&  R.  G.  R.  Co.  V.  Baer  Bros. 
Mercantile  Co.,  209  Fed.  577,  580, 
126  C.  C.  A.  399,  was  directed  to 
the  subject  of  interest  and  can- 
not be  claimed  as  a  precedent 
against  the  principles  stated  in 
the  text.  See  Baer  Bros.  Mer- 
cantile Co.  V.  D.  &  R.  G.  R.  Co , 
233  U.  S.  479,  58  L.  Ed.  1055,  34 
Sup.  Ct.  641.  Sou.  Pacific  Co.  v. 
California  Adjustment  Co.,  237 
Fed.  954,  955.  150  C.  C.  A.  604. 

142.      Knudson-Ferguson     Fruit 

Co.  V.  Chicago,  St.  P.  M.  &  0.  Ry. 

Co.,  149  Fed.  973,  79  C  C.  A.  483, 

204  U.  S.  670,  51  L.  Ed.  672.  Peti- 

.  tion  for  writ  of  certiorari  denied. 


§  216]       Of  the.  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  547 

schedules  stating  "that  the  published  charge  for  transporta 
tion  did  not  include  the  cost  of  icing  in  transit,  but  that 
the  carrier  would  impose  an  additional  charge  for  such  serv- 
ice." Such  a  tariff  would  not  comply  with  the  present  law 
as  to  filing  tariffs,  but  it  is  clear  that  no  icing  charges  were 
specified  in  the  tariff  and  a  payment  of  such  charges  was  not 
made  under  the  force  of  law.  Therefore,  when  ten  days  after 
having  received  his  goods,  the  shipper  voluntarily  paid  the 
icing  charges  the  court  correctly  held,  in  a  suit  brought  a  year 
thereafter,  that  he  could  not  recover.  AVhile  it  is  true  that 
protest  is  not  necessary,  a  shipper,  when  an  illegal  advance 
is  made,  should  not  continue  paying  it,  without  objection  or 
protest  until  a  large  claim  has  accumulated  against  the  car- 
rier. 

§  216.  Damages — Interest  and  Attorneys  Fees. — It  is  the 
practice  of  the  Commission  to  allow  interest  at  six  per  cent 
on  awards  of  damages.  The  statute  makes  no  provision  for 
interest,  but  the  loss  of  money  is  an  injury  and  to  give 
"the  full  amount  of  damages"  must  include  interest.  That 
the  Commission  has  this  power,  has  been  asserted  when  a 
protest  was  made,""*  though  it  would  seem  from  the  authori- 
ties discussed  in  the  next  preceding  section  that  a  protest 
is  immaterial.^" 

Attorneys  fees  are  provided  for  by  the  statute  and  may  be 
fixed  by  the  court  when  the  award  of  the  Commission  is  sued 
on  and  recovery  is  had.     The  statute  is  a  valid  law/" 

The  Commission  has  no  authority  and  does  not  assume  to 
award  attorney's  fees,"'  nor  can  attorney's  fees  be  allowed 
by  the  courts  for  the  services  of  an  attorney  before  the  Com- 

143.  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.  v.  Baer  Bros.  Merc.  Co., 
Baer  Bros.  Merc.  Co.,  209  Fed.  577,  209  Fed.  577,  581  and  cases  there 
580,  126  C.  C.  A.  S99;  Chicago  M.  cited,  126  C.  C.  A.  399.  No  at- 
&  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Harmel,  240  torney's  fees  in  suits  in  state  court 
Fed.  381,  153  C.  C.  A.  307.  for  excess  rate,  Kansas  City  Sou. 

144.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fergu-  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tonn,  102  Ark.  20,  143 
son    Saw   Mill   Co.,    235    Fed.    471,  S.  W.  577. 

and  cases  cited  482,  149  C.  C.  A.  20.  146.     Council   v.   Western   &   A. 

145.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  1  I.  C.  C.  399,  1  I.  C.  R. 
Feintuch,  191  Fed.  482,  488,  489,  638;  Washer  Grain  Co.  v.  Mis- 
112  C.  C.  A.  126;  Denver  &  R.  G.  souri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  147, 


548  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  217 

mission.     The   attorney's  fees  are  allowed   only  for  services 
in  the  conrts. 


147 


§  217.  Award  of  Damages  an  Inadequate  Remedy. — Prior 
to  the  Amendment  of  1910,  when  a  carrier  increased  a  rate 
the  only  remedy  the  Commission  could  enforce  was  to  in- 
vestigate upon  complaint  filed  and,  after  hearing,  award 
damages  for  the  illegal  exaction,  if  the  rate  increased  was 
held  unlawful.  The  Commission  recognized  this  and  stated 
the  fact  as  follows : 

"While  it  is  certainly  true  that  the  remedy  by  way  of 
damages  is  utterly  inadequate  and  inconsistent,  it  is  appar- 
ently the  remedy  prescribed  by  the  act  to  regulate  commerce 
and  the  only  remedy  which  the  shipper  has  against  the  ex- 
action of  an  unreasonable  interstate  rate.""* 

Some  of  the  federal  courts  held  that  an  injunction  could 
issue  preventing  an  advance  or  at  least  staying  the  advance 
until  the  Commission  could  determine  whether  or  not  the 
increased  rate  was  illegal,""  but  there  was  uncertainty  about 
the  remedy.  To  meet  this  evil,  the  Amendment  of  1910  was 
enacted,  giving  the  Commission  power  to  suspend  an  ad- 
vance."^^" 

§  218.  Damages,  Limitation  on  Complaint  for. — Section  six- 
teen of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  as  amended  by  the 
Hepburn  law  fixed  a  limitation  on  the  right  of  action  for 
damages  in  the  folloAving  language:  "All  complaints  for 
the  recovery  of  damages  shall  be  filed  with  the  commission 
within  two  years  from  the  time  the  cause  of  action  accrues, 
and  not  after,  and  a  petition  for  the  enforcement  of  an  order- 
for  the  payment  of  money  shall  be  filed  in  the  circuit  court 
within  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  order,  and  not  after."  '" 
Prior  to  this  amendment  there  was  no  limitation  in  the 
statute  and  the  limitation  laws  of  the  state  in  which  a  suit 

152,  154,  155;   Peller  v.  P.  R.  Co.,  high  V.  R.  Co.,  238  U.   S.  473,  59 

40   I.   C.   C.   84,   86;    Minn.   &   On-  L.  Ed.  1414,  35  Sup.  Ct.  888. 

tario  P.  Co.  v.  B.  F.  &  I.  F.  Ry.  148.  McGrew  v.  ]\Io.  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

Co.,  47  I.  C.  C.  208.  8  I.  C.  C.  630. 

147.     Meeker   v.    Lehigh    Valley  149.    Sees.  304  and  305,  post. 

R.  Co.,  236   U.    S.   412,   59   L.   Ed.  150.   Sec.  398,  post. 

644,  35  Sup.  Ct.  328;   Mills  v.  Le-  151.    Sec.  408,  post. 


<^  218]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 


549 


was  filed  controlled/'''  No  limitation  ran  prior  to  the  ef- 
rective  date  of  the  Hepburn  Amendment  which  date  was  held 
to  be  August  28,  1906,  although  the  Act  was  approved  June 
29,  1906/^' 

A  complaint  filed  by  an  association  demanding  reparation 
under  general  averments,  which  does  not  name  the  members 
on  whose  behalf  it  is  filed  and  which  does  not  with  reason- 
able particularity  specify  and  describe  the  shipments  as  to 
which  the  complaint  is  made,  will  not  operate  to  stop  the 
running  of  the  period  of  limitation  fixed  by  law/" 

When,  however,  an  individual  files  a  comi^laint  for  repara- 
tion in  his  own  behalf,  an  informal  complaint  will  stop  the 
running  of  the  statvite.'''^ 

The  cause  of  action  accrues  when  the  shipment  terminates 
and  the  complainant  becomes  liable  for  the  freight  and  not 
when  the  money  is  actually  paid/''^ 


152.  Ratican  v.  Terminal  R. 
Asso.,  114  Fed.  666.  Contra 
holding  R.  S.  U.  S.  §  1047  ap- 
plied. Carter  v.  New  Orleans  & 
N.  E.  R.  Co.,  143  Fed.  99,  74  C. 
C.  A.  293;  Cattle  Raisers'  Asso. 
V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  10 
I.  C.  C.   83. 

153.  Nicola,  Stone  &  Myers  Co. 
V  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  14  I. 
C.  C.  199,  206.  See  also  Kile, 
Morgan  &  Co.  v.  Deepwater  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  235;  Nollenberger 
v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
595;  Re  When  a  Cause  of  Action 
Accrues,  15  I.  C.  C.  201,  204. 

154.  Missouri  &  Kan.  ShippeBs 
Asso.  V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  411. 

155.  Venus  v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  & 
S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  136,  137, 
Woodward  &  D.  v.  Louisville  & 
N.  R.  Co..  15  I.  C.  C.  170;  Beek- 
man  Lumber  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C. 
274,   276;    Hartman   Furn.   &  Car- 


pet Co.  V.  Wisconsin  Cent.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  5a0,  531;  Duluth 
Log  Co.  V.  Minnesota  &  Int.  Ry. 
Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  627;  Nicola, 
Stone  &  Myers  Co.  v.  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  199,  206; 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Dick- 
erson,  191  Fed.  705,  112  C.  C.  A. 
295;  but  the  informal  complaint 
must  refer  to  the  particular  rate 
involved.  Acme  Cement  Plaster 
Co.  V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.. 
18  I.  C.  C.  376. 

156.  Arkansas  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
United  States,  193  Fed.  667,  Com. 
Court  Opinion  No.  43,  p.  283; 
Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  430;  The  text 
is  true  only  because  the  Trans- 
portation Act  1920  so  provides. 
Sec.  408,  post;  Louisville  Cement 
Co.  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  50  I.  C.  C. 
538,  and  case  cited;  Lamb-Fish 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Transcontinental 
Freight  Bureau,  53  I.  C.  C.  221, 
222  and  cases  cited. 


550  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  219 

The  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  unless  the  claim  is  filed 
in  time  and  cannot  relieve  from  the  operation  of  the  statute/" 

§  219.  General  Investigations  by  the  Commission. — The  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission  is  authorized  and  empowered 
to  enforce  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 
To  accomplish  which  it  has  authority  to  inquire  into  the 
management  of  the  business  of  all  common  carriers  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  shall  keep  itself  informed 
as  to  the  manner  and  method  in  which  the  same  is  conducted, 
and  shall  have  the  right  to  obtain  from  such  common  car- 
riers full  and  complete  information  necessary  to  enable  the 
Commission  to  perform  the  duties  and  carry  out  the  objects  for 
which  it  was  created,  and  it  may  institute  any  inquiry  on  its  own 
motion  in  the  same  manner  and  to  the  same  effect  as  though 
complaint  had  been  made.  It  also  has  "power  to  require, 
by  subpoena,  the  attendance  and  testimony  of  witnesses  and 
the  production  of  all  books,  papers,  tariffs,  contracts,  agree- 
ments, and  documents  relating  to  any  matter  under  investiga- 
tion. Such  attendance  of  witnesses,  and  the  production  of 
such  documentary  evidence,  may  be  required  from  any 
place  in  the  United  States,  at  any  designated  place  of  hear- 
ing. And  in  case  of  disobedience  to  a  subpoena  the  Com- 
mission, or  any  party  to  a  proceeding  before  the  Commis- 
sion, may  invoke  the  aid  of  any  court  of  the  United  States 
in  requiring  the  attendance  and  testimony  of  witnesses  and 
the  production  of  books,  papers,  and  documents  under  the 
provisions  of  this  section."  ^"* 

In  the  Brimson  case,^^°  an  informal  complaint  having  been 
made  of  the  facilities  of  certain  carriers,  the  Commission 
of  its  own  motion  decided  to  investigate  the  matters  set 
forth  in  such  complaint ;  and  thereupon  it  made  an  order 
reciting  the   facts   of  the   informal   complaint   and  requiring 

157.    Werner  Saw  Mill  Co.  v.  II-  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ferguson  Saw  Mill  Co., 

linois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  388;  235  Fed.  474,  484,  149  C.  C.  A.  20. 

Morrisdale   Coal   Co.   v.   Penn.   R.  158.    Sec.   12   of   Act;    Sec.   390, 

Co.,  230  U.  S.  304,  57  L.  Ed.  1474.  2>\s^. 

33  Sup.  Ct.  938;   To  stop  the  run-  15S.   Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Brimson. 

ning    of    the    statute    there    must  154    U.    S.    447,    38    L.    Ed.    1074. 

be  a  definite  claim  for  reparation  14  Sup.  Ct.  1125. 
in   the   complaint   filed.   Mo.    Pac. 


"§  219]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  55 L 

each  of  certain  named  carriers  "to  make  and  file,  in  its 
office  at  "Washington,  a  full,  complete,  perfect  and  specific 
verified  answer  setting  forth  all  facts  in  regard  to  the  mat- 
ters complained  of  and  responding  to"  certain  questions  re- 
lating to  the  methods  of  operation  of  the  carriers  and  es- 
pecially as  to  the  relation  of  such  carriers  to  the  Illinois 
Steel  Company.  To  these  questions  each  carrier  filed  a 
denial  and  each  averred  that  it  had,  in  all  respects,  complied 
with  the  obligations  imposed  ])y  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 
Notwithstanding  these  denials,  the  Commission  continued 
the  investigation  by  the  examination  of  witnesses  and  books 
and  documents.  It  subpoenaed  "W.  G.  Brimson,  who  was 
president  and  manager  of  five  carriers  incorporated  under 
the  laws  of  Illinois,  which  carriers  were  among  those  under 
investigation.  This  witness  refused  to  answer  the  question 
as  to  the  ownership  of  his  companies  by  the  Illinois  Steel 
Company.  Other  witnesses  refused  to  answer  the  same  ques- 
tion. The  Commission  thereupon  filed  its  petition  in  the  cir- 
cuit court  praying  that  the  witnesses  be  required  to  answer 
the  questions.  The  circuit  court  refused  the  order,  holding 
that  the  proceeding  did  not  constitute  a  controversy  to  which 
the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  could  be  extended. 
Section  twelve  of  the  Act  was  held  valid  in  the  Supreme  Court, 
the  circuit  court  reversed  and  the  cause  remanded  with  direc^ 
tions  to  proceed  in  conformity  with  the  opinion  of  the  Su- 
preme Court.  The  very  able  opinion  of  ]\Ir.  Justice  Harlan 
concluded  as  follows : 

"We  are  of  the  opinion  that  a  judgment  of  the  circuit 
court  of  the  United  States  determining  the  issues  presented 
by  the  petition  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and 
by  the  answers  of  appellees,  will  be  a  legitimate  exertion  of 
judicial  authority  in  a  ease  or  controversy  to  which,  by  the 
Constitution,  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  extends. 
And  a  final  order  by  that  court  dismissing  the  petition  of 
the  Commission,  or  requiring  the  appellees  to  answer  the 
questions  propounded  to  them,  and  to  produce  the  btooks, 
papers,  etc.,  called  for,  wnll  be  a  determination  of  questions 
upon  which  a  court  of  the  United  States  is  capable  of  acting 
and  which  may  be  enforced  by  judicial  process." 


552  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  220 

In  the  Baird  case/'"  which  was  also  an  application  of  the 
Commission  to  the  court  to  compel  the  testimony  of  wit- 
nesses, the  defendant  urged  that  though  a  complaint  was 
filed,  the  complainant  "did  not  show  any  real  interest  in 
the  case  brought."     The  witnesses  were  required  to  answer. 

In  the  Harriman  case'"  the  investigation  was  upon  the 
motion  of  the  Commission,  not  upon  complaint.  The  relations 
between  the  ITnion  Pacific  Railroad  Company  and  other  con- 
necting roads,  whether  parallel  or  not,  were  inquired  about 
and  certain  questions  asked  were,  under  advice  of  counsel, 
not  answered  by  the  witnesses. 

The  gist  of  the  opinion  is  contained  in  a  short  paragraph, 
which  is  here  reproduced : 

"We  are  of  the  opinion  on  the  contrary  that  the  purposes 
of  the  act  for  which  the  Commission  may  exact  evidence 
embrace  only  complaints  for  violation  of  the  act,  and  investi- 
gations by  the  Commission  upon  matters  that  might  have  been 
made  the  object  of  complaint.  As  we  have  already  implied 
the  main  purpose  of  the  act  was  to  regulate  the  interstate 
business  of  carriers,  and  the  secondary  purpose,  that  for  which 
the  Commission  was  established,  was  to  enforce  the  regula- 
tions enacted.  These  in  our  opinion  are  the  purposes  refer- 
red to ;  in  other  words  the  power  to  require  testimony  is 
limited,  as  it  usually  is  in  Englifjh-speaking  countries  at 
least,  to  the  only  cases  where  the  sacrifice  of  privacy  is  neces- 
sary— those  where  the  investigations  concern  a  specific  breach 
of  the  law." 

In  its  twenty-second  Annual  Report  (1908)  the  Commission 
pointed  out  the  difficulties  of  administering  the  law  with  the 
limitations  stated  in  the  Harriman  ease. 

§  220.  Same  Subject— Amendment  of  1910.— Section  13  of 
the  Act  in  force  at  the  date  of  the  decision,  in  the  Harriman 
case  supra,  after  providing  for  hearings  on  complaint,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  power  conferred  by  section  12  supra,  gave 
power  to  the  Commission  to  "institute  any  inquiry  on  its 
own  motion   in   the   same  manner  and   to   the   same   eflPect   as 

160.     Int.    Com.    Com.   v.    Baird,  161.    Harriraau     v.     Int.     Com. 

194  U.  S.  25,  48  L.  Ed.   860,  867.       Com.,  211  U.  S.   407,  419,   420,   53 
24  Sup.  Ct.  563.  L.  Ed.  253,  29  Sup,  Ct.  115. 


§  220]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commebce.  553 

though  complaint  had  been  made."  The  same  section  as 
amended  by  the  Act  of  1910"'  materially  enlarges  the  powers 
of  the  Commission  in  this  respect,  giving  it  full  authority  and 
power  "on  its  own  motion  in  any  case  and  as  to  any  matter 
or  thing  concerning  Avhich  a  complaint  is  authorized  to  be 
made,  to  or  before  said  Commission  by  any  provision  of  this 
Act,  or  concerning  which  any  question  may  arise  under  any 
of  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  or  relating  to  the  enforcement 
of  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  Act.  And  the  said  Com- 
mission shall  have  the  same  powers  and  authority  to  proceed 
with  any  inquiry  instituted  on  its  own  motion  as  though  it 
had  been  appealed  to  by  complainant  on  petition  under  any 
of  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  including  the  power  to  make 
and  enforce  any  order  or  orders  in  the  case,  or  relating  to 
the  matter  or  thing  concerning  which  the  inquiry  is  had 
excepting  orders  for  the  payment  of  money." 

The  Transportation  Act  1920  increased  the  subjects  that 
may  be  investigated,  but  did  not  change  the  principles  which 
should  control  such  investigations."'' 

In  the  Harriman  case  this  quaere  was  propounded:  "Whe- 
ther Congress  has  unlimited  power  to  compel  testimony  in 
regard  to  subjects  which  do  not  concern  direct  breaches  of 
the  law,  and  whether,  and  to  what  extent,  it  can  delegate 
such  power."  It  need  not  be  said  that  Congress  has  unlimited 
power  in  this  respect  but  it  would  seem  that  the  power 
granted  to  the  Commission  as  stated  herein  was  a  proper  and 
constitutional  delegation  because  necessary  to  the  perform- 
ance of  the  duties  of  the  Commission  under  the  Act  to  Regu- 
late Commerce.  The  Goodrich  Transit  Co.  case,  while  not 
directly  in  point,  supports  this  statement."* 

The  provisions  of  the  Act  giving  the  Commission  power  to 
prescribe  methods  of  accounting  and  to  require  reports  from 
the  ea'rriers  subject  to  its  jurisdiction,  are  complementary  to 

162.  Sec.  393.,  vost.  reversing  Commerce  Ct.  in  Gov.,1- 

163.  Transportation  Act  1920;  rich  Transit  Co.  v.  Interstate  Coin. 
Sec.  416;  Int.  Com.  Act,  Sec.  13;  Com.,  190  Fed.  943,  Commerto 
Sees.  393,  393  A,  393  B,  post.  Court  Opinions  Nos.  21-24,  p.  9.5; 

164.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Good-  See  in  this  connection:  Smith 
rich  Transit  Co.,  224  U.  S.  194,  v.  Int.  Com.  Com.,  245  U.  S.  33, 
56    L.    Ed.    729,    32    Sup.    Ct.    436,  62   L.  Ed.  135,  38  Sup.  Ct.   34. 


554  F'NFORCEMENT    BY   THE    COMMISSION.  [§    221 

the  po^vel■  to  make  general  investigations,  and  these  powers 
relating  to  *he  accounts  which  snch  carriers  must  keep  are 
valid/"  In  making  investigations  into  the  "accounts,  records 
and  memoranda"  kept  by  the  carriers,  the  Commission  has 
no  power  to  investigate  general  correspondence  and  original 
documents  not  required  to  be  entered  on  their  books/'*  The 
rather  extraordinary  avowal  by  counsel  asking  the  questions 
that  they  were  asked  as  the  begining  of  "an  attempt  to  go 
into  the  whole  business  of  the  Armour  car  lines — a  fishing 
expedition  into  the  affairs  of  a  stranger  for  the  chance  that 
something  discreditable  might  turn  up,"  resulted  in  the  Ellis 
case'"'  in  a  refusal  by  the  witness  to  answer  the  questions. 
After  making  the  statement  in  the  quotation  above,  the  Su- 
preme Court  held  that  the  Commission  had  no  power  to  de- 
mand answers  to  such  questions. 

§  221.  Commission  May  Ask  the  Aid  of  Courts  to  Enforce 
the  Law. — AVe  have  seen  that  the  Commission  may  apply 
to  courts  to  aid  it  in  obtaining  testimony  in  investigations 
relating  to  violations  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  Upon 
the  request  of  the  Commission,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  any 
district  attorney  of  the  United  Etates  to  whom  the  Commission 
may  apply  to  institute  in  the  proper  court  and  to  prosecute 
under  the  direction  of  the  Attorney-General  of  the  United 
States  all  necessary  proceedings  for  the  enforcement  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  and  for  the 
punishment  of  all  violations  thereof. 

At  the  request  of  the  Commission  suit  was  filed  and  an  in- 
junction granted  enjoining  a  carrier  from  engaging  in  inter- 
state commerce  without  filing  tariffs  and  making  reports  as 
required  by  laM^  and  also  enjoining  discriminatory  practices.^'* 

165.  Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  167.  Ellis  v.  Interstate  Com. 
U.  S.,  231  U.  S.  423,  58  L.  Ed.  Com.,  237  U.  S.  434,  59  L.  Ed. 
926,  34   Sup.  Ct.   125.  1036,  35  Sup.  Ct.  645. 

166.  United  States  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  168.  United  States  v.  Union 
Co.,  212  Fed.  486;  affirmed  U.  S.  Stock  Yard  &  Transit  Co.,  226  U. 
V.  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  236  U.  S.  318,  S.  286,  57  L.  Ed.  226,  33  Sup.  Ct. 
59  L.  Ed.  598,  35  Sup.  Ct.  363;  83,  same  .styled  case  in  Commerce 
rrnited  States  v.  N.  C.  &  St.  L.  Court,  192  Fed.  330,  Opinion 
Ry.  Co.,  217  Fed.  254.  Com.  Ct.  No.  15,  p.  189. 


§  222]       Of  the  Act  to  Eeguivvte  Commerce.  555 

§  222.  Commission  Has  Power  to  Prescribe  Rates  for  the 
Future. — AVhen  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce  was  originally 
passed  the  Commission  appointed  thereunder,  believing  the 
law  so  authorized,  exercised  the  power  to  prescribe  rates  for 
the  future.  That  this  power  was  not  delegated  to  the  Com- 
mission prior  to  the  Hepburn  amendment  was  definitely  de- 
cided by  the  Supreme  Court  in  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission V.  Cincinnati,  N.  0.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.,^*"  where  the 
question  was  elaborately  discussed  and  the  conclusion  stated 
"that  under  the  interstate  commerce  act  the  Commission  has 
no  power  to  describe  the  tariff  of  rates  which  shall  control  in 
the  future."  Under  the  old  law  the  Commission  had  and 
exercised  the  power  to  declare  a  particular  advance  in  rates 
illegal.  The  exercise  of  this  power  practically  meant  pre- 
scribing the  old  rate  as  the  rate  for  the  future.  This  is 
clearly  shown  in  the  Tift  case.  There  an  advance  was  made 
by  the  carriers,  this  advance,  on  hearing,  was  declared  il- 
legal, and  the  whole  advance  was  held  to  be  the  measure  of 
reparation  allowed  shippers."" 

The  Amendments  of  1906,  1910  and  of  1920  give  the  Com- 
mission power  to  initiate  rates,  fares  and  charges  and  to 
prescribe  minimum  and  maximum  or  minimum  or  maximum 
rates,  fares  and  charges."^ 

When  a  rate,  regulation  or  practice  of  a  common  carrier 
is  within  the  jurisdiction  conferred  on  the  Commission  it  may 
prescribe  what  shall  be  such  rate,  regulation  or  practice  for 
the  future,  and  when  the  Commission  acts  on  suUstantial 
evidence  in  accordance  with  law,  its  orders  in  respect  to 
the  questions  within  its  jurisdiction  will  not  be  set  aside  by 
the  courts.""     "But,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Lamar,  delivering  the 

169.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  171.  Sec.  16,  Interstate  Com. 
Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co..  Act,  Sec.  15,  par.  1,  Sec.  395,  post. 
167  U.  S.  479,  42  L.  Ed.  243,  17  172.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v. 
Sup.  Ct.  896.  Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co.,    215    U.    S. 

170.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tift,  4.^2,  54  L.  Ed.  280,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
206  U.  S.  428,  51  L.  Ed.  1124,  155;  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Chi- 
27  Sup.  Ct.  109;  Southern  Pine  cago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  215  U.  S.  479, 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Sou.  Ry.  Co.,  14  54  L.  Ed.  291,  30  Sup.  Ct.  163; 
I.  C.  C.  195;  Nicola  Stone  &  Myers  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago, 
Co.  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  14  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  218  U.  S.  88, 
I.  C.  C.  199.  54    L.   Ed.    946,    30    Sup.    Ct.    651; 


556 


Enforcement  by  the  Commission. 


[^  222 


opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court,  "the  legal  effect  of  evidence  is 
a  question  of  law.  A  finding  without  evidence  is  beyond  the 
power  of  the  Commission.  An  order  based  thereon  is  contrary 
to  law,  and  must,  in  the  language  of  the  statute,  be  'set  aside 
by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.'  "  ^^' 

The  "opinion"  of  the  Commission  upon  which  it  may  act 
must  be  based  upon  a  full  hearing  at  which  evidence  is  re- 
ceived, of  which  the  carrier  is  apprised  and  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  meet."* 

The  Commission  has  entered  many  orders  under  the  au- 
thority granted  by  this  provision.  Illustrative  of  these  are : 
distribution  of  cars,^'^  prescribing  rates,"'  division  of  rates,"^ 
terminal   charges,"*   ordinary   switch   connections/'*   prohibit- 


Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Dela- 
ware, L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  220  U. 
S.  235,  55  L.  Ed.  448,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
3.92. 

173.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  227  U. 
S.  88,  57  L.  Ed.  431.  33  Sup.  Ct. 
185,  reversing  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  195 
Fed.    541,    Opinion    Com.    Ct.    No. 

4,  p.  325,  375. 

174.  Atlantic  C.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
terstate Com.  Com.,  194  Fed.  449, 
Opinion  Com.  Ct.  No.  3,  p.  255. 

175.  Traer  v.  Chicago  &  A.  R. 
Co.,  13  I.  C.  C.  451;  Chicago  & 
A.  R.  Co.,  and  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  173 
Fed.  930;  Interstate  Com.  Com. 
V     Illinois    Cent    R.    Co.,    215    U. 

5.  452,  54  L.  Ed.  280,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
155;  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v. 
Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  215  U.  S. 
479,  54  L.  Ed.  280,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
163;  Hillsdale  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 
V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C. 
C.  356,  sustained,  Ptennsylvania 
R.  Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com., 
193  Fed.  81,  Opinion  Com.  Ct. 
No.  31,  p.  275. 

176.  Burnham-Hanna-Munger  Dry 
Goods    Co.    V.    Chicago,    R.    I.    & 


P.  Ry.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  299,  order 
enjoined,  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 
Co.  "v.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  171 
Fed.  680,  Commission  sustained. 
Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  218  U.  S. 
88,  96,  54  L.  Ed.  946,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
651,  holding  that  the  power  ex- 
tends to  the  regulation  of  old 
or  new  rates,  notwithstanding 
changes  in  business  may  be  nec- 
essary. 

177.  Eichenberg  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  250,  Injunction 
denied.  Southern  Pac.  Terminal 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  166 
Fed.  134,  Commission  sustained, 
Southern  Pac.  Terminal  Co.  v. 
Interstate  Com.  Com.  219  U.  S. 
498,  55  L.  Ed.  310,  31  Sup.  Ct. 
279. 

178.  Cincinnati  &  C.  Traction 
Co.  V.  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co., 
20  I.  C.  C.  486,  enjoined,  Balti- 
more &  0.  S.  W.  R.  Co.  V.  United 
States.  195  Fed.  962,  Opinion 
Com.  Ct.  No.  60,  p.  431,  order 
voided.  United  States  v.  Balti- 
more &  O.  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  226  U. 
S.  14,  57  L.  Ed.  104,  33  Sup. 
Ct.  5. 

179.  Corp.  Com.  of  North  Caro- 


§  223]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce. 


557 


ing  discrimination,""'  icing  charges  and  freecooling/" 

The  Commission,  however,  has  no  jurisdiction  to  fix  rates 
based  upon  estoppel  of  the  carrier/"'  AVhen  relief  is  denied 
to  the  shipper,  the  order  cannot  be  set  aside  by  a  court.""* 

§  223.  Suspension  of  Rates,   Regulations   and  Practices. — 

The  Act  of  1910  gives  the  Commission  authority,  with  or 
without  complaint  or  other  formal  pleadings,  but  upon  rea- 
sonable notice,  temporarily  to  suspend  and,  after  hearing,  to 
make  such  orders  in  reference  to  fares,  charges,  classifications, 
regulations,  and  practices,  as  would  be  proper  in  a  proceediiig 
after  such  fares,  etc.,  became  eft'ective.  The  bfurden  of  proof 
to  justify  the  increased  rate  is  on  the  carrier  at  all  hearings 


lina  V.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C.  303,  order  sustained, 
Norfolk  &  W.  Ky.  Co.  v.  United 
States,  195  Fed.  953,  Opinion 
Com.  Ct.  No.  40,  p.  413;  New  Ok 
leans  Board  of  Trade  v.  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C.  231, 
order  set  aside,  Louisville  &  N.  R. 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  195 
Fed.  541,  Opinion  Com.  Ct.  No.  4, 
pp.  325,  375,  Commerce  Ct.  re- 
versed. Interstate  Com.  Com.  v. 
Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.,  227  U.  S. 
88,  57  L.  Ed.  431,  33  Sup.  Ct.  185; 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New- 
port News  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 
23  I.  C.  C.  345,  sustained,  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.  V.  United  States,  204 
Fed.  465,  Opinion  Com.  Ct.  No. 
82,  p.  603;  Railroad  Com.  of  La. 
V.  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  23 
I.  C.  C.  31,  sustained,  Texas  & 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States, 
205  Fed.  380,  Opinion  Com.  Ct. 
No.  68,  p.  655,  (Shreveport  Case); 
Houston,  B.  &  W.  T.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  United  States.  234  U.  S.  342, 
58  L.  Ed.  1341,  34  Sup.  Ct.  833. 
180.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  United  States,  203  Fed.  56, 
59,  Opinion  Com.  Ct.  No.  61,  p. 
537.  For  history  of  case,  see  Arling- 


ton Heights  Fruit  Co.  v.  South- 
ern Pac.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C.  149. 
Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Interstate  Commerce  Com.,  190 
Fed.  591,  Opinion  Com.  Ct.  No. 
7,  p.  83. 

181.  Arlington  Heights  Fruit  Co. 
V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  20  I.  C. 
Co.  106;  Re  Precooling  and  Pre- 
icing,  23  I.  C.  C.  267,  order  sus- 
tained, Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  United  States,  204  Fed.  647, 
Opinion  Com.  Ct.  No.  41,  p.  627, 
affirmed,  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  United  States,  232  U.  S. 
199,  58  L.  Ed.  568,  34  Sup.  Ct. 
291. 

182.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Inter- 
state Com.  Com.,  219  U.  S.  433, 
55  L.  Ed.  283,  31  Sup.  Ct.  288,  re- 
versing Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  In- 
terstate Com.  Com.,  177  Fed.  963, 
and  the  Commission  in  Western 
Oregon  Lumber  Mnfg.  Assn.  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  14  I.  C.  C.  61. 

183.  Proctor  &  Gamble  v.  United 
States,  225  U.  S.  282,  56  L.  Ed. 
1091,  32  Sup.  Ct.  761;  Louisville 
&  N.  R.  Co.  V.  United  States,  207 
Fed.  591,  Opinion  Com.  Ct.  No. 
86,  p.  699.     See  Sec.  308  A.,  post. 


558  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  223 

involving  a  rate  increased  after  January  1,  1910,  or  of  a 
rate  sought  to  be  increased  after  the  passage  of  the  Amend- 
ment of  June  18,  1910/'' 

This  hearing  under  the  Transportation  Act  1920  must  be 
concluded  in  150  days,  else  the  new  individual  or  joint  rate, 
fare,  charge,  classification  or  practice  becomes  effective ;  sub- 
ject, however,  to  the  carrier  being  required  to  render  an  ac- 
counting should  the  Commission  thereafter  condemn  the 
charge."^ 

•The  Commission  has  held  manj^  investigations  under  this 
section,  the  most  conspicuous  of  which  are  the  Advances  in 
Rates — Eastern  case,  ^*"  Advances  in  Rates — "Western  case,^*' 
Five  Per  Cent  Advance,"*  and  in  the  Western  Advance  Rate 
case  1915.'-'''  In  the  Eastern  Advance  case  the  question  of 
the  burden  of  proof  was  discussed,  and  it  was  there  held  that 
the  Amendment  of  1910  was  unlike  the  English  Act  on  a 
similar  subject.     Said  the  Commission: 

"Nor  should  our  statute  receive  exactly  the  same  interpre- 
tation which  has  been  put  upon  the  English  act.  That  act 
provides  that  the  carrier  shall  justify  the  'increase  of  the 
rate.'  Our  act  provides  that  the  burden  of  proof  shall  be  upon 
the  carrier  to  show  that  the  'increased  rate'  is  just  and 
reasonable.  The  English  act  creates  a  presumption  that  the 
rates  in  effect  on  December  31,  1892,  were  reasonable  rates, 
and  the  justice  of  any  increase  must  be  tried  by  that  stan- 
dard. Our  act  does  not  intend  to  enact  that  all  rates  in  ef- 
fect on  January  1,  1910,  are  just  and  reasonable.  Upon  the 
contrary,  it  is  open  to  any  shipper  or  to  this  Commission  to 
attack  such  a  rate  as  unjust  and  unreasonable.  The  only 
effect  of  our  statute  is  to  cast,  in  certain  cases,  the  burden  of 
proof  upon  the  carrier." 

It  was  also  then  held  that  rates  otherwise  reaosnable  would 
not  be  permitted  to  be   advanced  "for  the  purpose   of  bol- 

184.  Re  Rates  on  Crushed  Stone,  187.  Advance  in  Rates,  West- 
29  I.  C.  C.  136.                                          ern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  307. 

185.  Transportation  Act  1920,  188.  Five  Per  Cent  Case,  31  I. 
amending    Sec.    15,    par.    7    2)osr.       C.  C.  351,  32  I.  C.  C.  325. 

sees.  398,  399.  189.  Western  Rate  Advance  Case 

186.  Advances    in   Rates,    East-       1915,  35  I.  C.  C.  497. 
ern  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243. 


§  224]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  559 

stering  np  the  credit  of  our  railroads,"  and  that  ''uo  general 
advance  in  rates  should  *  *  *  be  permitted  until  car- 
riers have  exhausted  every  reasonable  effort  toward  economy 
in  their  business."^"" 

§  224.  Through  Routes  and  Joint  Rates. — The  Commission 
has,  after  hearing,  on  a  complaint  or  upon  its  own  initiative, 
the  right  to  establish  joint  rates  and  prescribe  the  divisions 
thereof,  and  the  terms  and  conditions  under  which  through 
routes  shall  be  operated.  Under  what  circumstances  a  through 
route  and  joint  rate  shall  be  prescribed  has  been  discussed 
herein,  section  195  supra,  and  need  not  be  repeated.  It  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  when  the  carriers  over  whose  lines  the 
through  route  is  to  be  established  are  subject  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  Commission,  the  Commisison  has  a  discretion  as  to 
whether  or  not  it  wmII  establish  the  through  route  and  joint 
rate."^ 

As  shoAvn  in  section  195  this  discretion  must  be  exercised 
within  the  terms  of  the  statute. 

§  225.  Allowances  for  Services  or  Instrumentalities. — The 
Amendment  of  1906  provides : 

"If  the  owner  of  property  transported  under  this  Act 
directly  or  indirectly  renders  any  service  connected  with 
such  transportation,  or  furnishes  any  instrumentality  used 
therein,  the  charge  and  allowance  therefor  shall  be  no  more 
than  is  just  and  reasonable,  and  the  Commission  may,  after 
hearing  on  a  complaint  or  on  its  own  initiative,  determine 
what  is  a  reasonable  charge  as  the  maximum  to-  be  paid  by  the 
carrier  or  carriers  for  the  services  so  rendered  or  for  the 
use  of  the  instrumentality  so  furnished,  and  fix  the  same  by  ap- 
propriate order."  This  authority  of  the  Commission  was  dis- 
cussed in  the  chapter  on  Equality  of  Rates. 

§  226.  Powers  Enumerated,  Not  Exciude  Others. — By  the 
Amendment  of  1906,  concluding  section  15  of  the  Act,  it 
was  provided,  "the  foregoing  enumeration  of  powers  shall 
not  exclude  any  power  which  the  Commission  would  other- 

190.  Pp.  253,  254,  255,  279  of  191.  Truckers  Transfer  Co.  v. 
Opinion  Eastern  Case,  supra.  Charleston  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I. 

C.  C.  275,  277. 


560  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [^  227 

wise  have  in  the  making  of  an  order  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act."  Obviously  this  provision  is  not  a  grant  of  power; 
it  merely  evidences  a  legislative  intention  not  to  limit  any 
general  grant  by  specific  provisions  relating  to  particular 
powers,  an  intention  that  the  Act  should  be  construed  as 
remedial.  The  general  purposes  of  the  Act  were  to  prevent 
unjust  rates,  to  require  fair  play  between  shippers,  and  to 
make  rates  certain  in  order  tliat  such  fair  play  might  exist, 
and  Congress  has  emphasized  the  intention  that  these  general 
purposes  were  not  to  be  unduly  limited.  The  courts  have 
given  a  broad  construction  to  the  Act  in  determining  whether 
or  not  power  exists  to  effectuate  these  general  purposes.'*' 
This  principle  was  well  stated  by  the  Commerce  Court  as 
follows : 

"A  statute  of  the  scope  of  the  interstate  commerce  act, 
designed  to  regulate  the  vast  interstate  transportation  business 
of  the  country,  is  not  to  be  narrowly  interpreted  in  accordance 
with  the  economical  or  physical  conditions  prevailing  at  the 
time  of  its  enactment."'"^ 

The  outlook  of  the  Commission  must  be  as  comprehensive 
as  the  whole  country  and  as  to  all  subjects  within  its  pre- 
scribed authority  it  has  power  to  make  such  orders  as  are 
necessary  to  enforce  the  great  remedial  purpose  of  the  Act."* 

§  227.  Effect  of  Commission's  Orders. — When  an  award  of 
damages  is  made  "the  findings  and  order  of  the  Commission 

192.  Interstate  Com.  Com.  v.  25,  p.  147.  This  case  was  re- 
Goodrich  Transit  Co.,  224  U.  S.  versed  but  tlie  principle  quoted 
194,  .56  L.  Ed.  729,  32  Sup.  Ct.  not  referred  to,  Omaha  &  C.  B. 
436,  reversing  Goodrich  Transit  Street  Ry.  Co.  ^'.  Interstate  Com. 
Co.  V.  Interstate  Com.  Com.,  190  Com.,  230  U.  S.  324,  57  L.  Ed. 
Fed.  943,  Opinion  Com.  Ct.  Nos.  1501,  3.'i  Sup.  Ct.  890.  See  also 
21-24,  p.  95;  Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Lysaght  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.,  254 
Co.    V.    United    States,    231    U.    S.  Fed.  351. 

423,    58    L.    Ed.    296,    34    Sup.    Ct.  194.     Interstate    Com.    Com.    v. 

125,    affirming    same    styled    case,  Chicago.   R.   I.   &  P.   Ry.   Co.,   218 

204    Fed.    G41,   and   sustaining   ac-  U.   S.   88,   54   L.   Ed.   946,   30   Sup. 

counting    orders    of    the    Commis-  Ct.   651;    Interstate  Com.  Com.  v. 

sion.  Chicago,    B.   &    Q.    R.   Co.,    218    U. 

193.  Omaha  &  C.  B.  Street  Ry.  S.  113,  54  L.  Ed.  959,  30  Sup.  Ct. 
Co.   V.   Interstate  Com.   Com.,   191  060. 

Fed.    40,    Opinion    Com.    Ct.    No. 


<§  228]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  561 

shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  facts  therein  stated." 
AVhere  orders  other  than  an  award  of  damages  are  made  they 
are  binding  "nnlpss  *  *  *  suspended  or  set  aside  by  a 
court  of  competent  jurisdiction."  In  what  cases  and  for 
what  causes  the  courts  may  set  aside  these  orders  will  be 
discussed  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

§  228.  Commission's  Control  over  Its  Orders. — The  Com- 
mission is  authorized  to  suspend  or  modify  its  orders  upon 
such  notice  and  in  such  manner  as  it  shall  deem  proper,  and 
it  may  grant  rehearings.  These  powers  will  be  discussed  in 
the  chapter  on  procedure  of  the  Commission. 

Until  such  orders  are  suspended  or  modified,  it  is  the  duty 
of  every  common  carrier,  its  agent  and  employees,  to  observe 
and  comply  therewith. 

The  Commission,  the  United  States  by  the  Attorney-General, 
as  well  as  parties  to  the  orders  made  by  the  Commission,  may 
apply  to  the  United  States  District  Courts  for  the  enforcement 
of  such  orders. 

§  229.  Commission  May  Employ  Attorneys. — "The  Commis- 
sion may  employ  such  attorneys  as  it  finds  necessary  for  proper 
legal  aid  and  service  of  the  Commission  or  its  members  in 
the  conduct  of  their  work,  or  for  proper  representation 
of  the  public  interest  in  investigations  made  by  it  or  cases  or 
proceedings  pending  before  it,  whether  at  the  Commission's 
own  instance  or  upon  complaint,  or  to  appear  for  or  represent 
the  Commission  in  any  case  in  court;  and  the  expenses  of  such 
employment  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  appropriation  for  the 
Commission." 

This  power  the  Commission  exercises,  its  attorneys  appear- 
ing in  investigations  before  the  Commission  or  in  advance 
rate  cases  and  other  investigations  of  general  interest,  and 
cases  where  orders  of  the  Commission  are  involved. 

§  230.  Records  of  Commission. — Copies  of  schedules  and 
classifications  and  tariffs  of  rates,  fares  and  charges  filed  with 
the  Commission,  and  the  statistics,  tables  and  figures  con- 
tained in  the  reports  of  carriers  made  to  the  Commission  as 
required  by  law,  are  public  records  and  shall  be  received  as 
prima  facie  evidence  of  what  they  purport  to  be  in  investi- 
gations by   the   Commission  and  in  all  judicial  proceedings, 


5G2  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [>§.  231 

and  certified  copies  shall  be  received  in  evidence  witli  like 
effect  as  the  originals. 

Section  14  of  the  Act  makes  the  authorized  publication  of 
the  reports  and  decisions  of  the  Commission  competent  evid- 
ence. The  Supreme  Court  held  this  not  to  mean  that  courts 
sliould  take  judicial  notice  of  these  reports  and  decisions, 
but  that  they  were  admissible  without  obtaining  certified 
copies;  otherwise,  the  rules  of  evidence  were  not  changed 


196 


§  231.  Valuation  of  Railroad  Property. — In  the  Eastern  Ad- 
vance Rate  case,""  Mr.  Commissioner  Prouty  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  Commission,  speaking  of  the  facts  which  must 
be  considered  in  determining  the  question  as  to  what  net 
earnings  the  carriers  are  entitled,  stated  the  well  known 
principle:  "Both  the  value  of  the  property  and  what  is  a 
fair  return  upon  that  value  must  be  considered,"  and  then 
said:  "Some  states  have  authorized  and  even  instructed  their 
railway  commissions  to  put  a  value  upon  the  property  of 
railways  operating  within  their  borders.  In  some  instances 
the  elements  to  be  considered  in  determining  that  value  have 
been  prescribed  by  statute,  and  the  effect  of  the  valuation 
when  made  is  indicated.  This  commission  has  no  such  au- 
thority. We  cannot  in  this  case  fix  in  terms  the  value  of 
any  one  of  these  r.^ilroads,  nor  Avould  that  value,  if  determined 
in  this  case,  be  binding  in  subsequent  proceedings ;  but,  mani- 
festly, in  order  to  decide  the  issue  presented  we  must  have 
a  general  notion  of  the  value  of  the  properties  of  these  de- 
fendants and  must  form  an  idea  of  the  elements  which  should 
properly  enter  into  the  determination  of  that  value." 

The  opinion  then  proceeds  to  state  and  discuss  the  rules 
established  in  the  Smyth-Ames  case,"'^  and  to  point  out  the 
benefit  a  knoAvledge  of  the  value  of  the  property  "devoted  to 
the  pnblice  service"  would  be  to  the  Commission. 

Congress,  by  Act  approved  March  1,  1913,  amending  the 
Act  to  Regulate   Commerce,"^   provided   that   the   "Coramis- 

195.  Robinson  v.  Baltimore  &  Case,  20  I.  C.  C.  243,  256  to  277. 
O.  R.  Co.,  222  U.  S.  506,  508,  56  L.  197.  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.  S. 
Ed.  288,  32  Sup.  Ct.  114,  affirm-  466,  42  L.  Ed.  819,  18  Sup.  Ct. 
ing  same  styled   case,  64  W.  Va.  418. 

406,  63  S.  E.  323.  198.    Sec.  19a  of  Act;    Seo.  420, 

196.  Advances  in  rates.  Eastern      post. 


§  232]       Of  tue  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  563 

sioD  shall  *  *  *  investigate,  ascertain  and  report  the 
value  of  all  the  property  owned  or  used  by  every  common  car- 
rier subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  (the)  act.  *  *  *  The 
Commission  shall  make  an  inventory  which  shall  list  the  prop- 
erty of  every  common  carrier  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this 
(the)  Act  in  detail,  and  show  the  value  thereof  *  *  *^ 
and  shall  classify  the  physical  properties,  as  nearly  as  prac- 
ticable, in  conformity  with  the  classifications  of  expenditures 
for  road  and  equipment,  as  prescribed  by  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission." 

§  232.  Valuation,  How  Made. — The  valuation  provided  bj^ 
the  Amendment  shall  include  in  detail,  (1)  the  original 
cost  cf  all  property  to  date,  the  cost  of  reproduction  new, 
the  cost  of  reproduction  less  depreciation,  and  an  analysis  of 
the  methods  used  and  the  reasons  for  their  differences  if 
any;  (2)  the  original  cost  of  all  lands,  rights  of  way  and 
terminals  and  the  present  value  of  the  same;  (3)  the  same 
information  as  to  property  held  for  purposes  other  than  those 
of  a  common  carrier;  (4)  information  relating  to  the  issuance 
of  stocks,  bonds  or  other  securities  and  other  financial  ar- 
rangements; and  (5)  information  as  to  the  value  of  gifts 
and  grants.  Except  as  provided  by  the  statute,  the  Com- 
mission is  given  power  to  prescribe  the  method  of  procedure 
to  be  follow^ed  in  the  conduct  of  the  investigation.  The 
carriers  are  required  to  aid  in  the  investigation  by  furnish- 
ing information  and  access  to  the  sources  thereof. 

After  such  valuation  is  made,  the  Commission  shall  in  like 
manner  keep  itself  informed  of  all  extensions  and  improve- 
ments or  other  changes  in  the  condition  and  value  of  the 
property  of  such  common  carriers,  revising  its  valuations  from 
time  to  time  to  fit  such  changes. 

Application  uiay  be  made  to  the  District  Courts  of  the 
United  States  to  compel  a  performance  by  the  carriers  of  the 
duties  placed  on  them  by  the  Amendment. 

§  233.  Finality  and  Effect  of  Valuation. — Provision  is  made 
for  notice  of  the  completion  of  the  tentative  valuation  of 
the  property  before  such  valuation  shall  become  final ;  pro- 
test may  be  filed  thereto  and  hearings  had. 


564  Enfoecement  by  the  Commission.         [§  234 

After  hearing,  the  Commission  shall  issue  an  order  making 
a  final  valuation,  which  valuation  shall  be  published,  and 
when  published  it  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  value  of 
the  property  in  all  proceedings  under  the  Act  to  Regulate 
Commerce.  The  valuation  so  fixed  is  subject  to  modification 
b}^  the  Commission. 

In  making  its  valuation  the  Commission  disregarded  the 
current  value  of  the  right  of  way.  On  appeal  to  the  Supreme 
Court  this  ruling  was  held  not  to  be  a  compliance  with  the 
statute.'""  The  requirement  of  Section  15a  added  by  the 
Transportation  Act  1920  that  rates  must  be  established  which 
under  the  circumstances  stated  shall  yield  five  and  one-half 
per  centum  on  the  fair  value  of  the  aggregate  property  makes 
the  valuation  powers  of  the  Commission  much  more  import- 
ant.^"" 

§  234.  Office  of  Commission. — The  principal  office  of  the 
Commission  is  in  the  city  of  Washington,  where  its  general 
sessions  are  held.  Its  inquiries  may  be,  and  frequently  are, 
prosecuted  by  one  or  more  Commissioner  or  an  examiner 
who  may  hold  sessions  in  different  parts  of  the  United  States. 
The  testimony  in  cases  is  usually  taken  at  some  place  most 
convenient  to  the  parties  interested ;  this  is  written  out,  and 
the  Commission  at  Washington  determines  what  order  shall 
be  entered. 

§  235.  Annual  Reports  from  Carriers. — The  Commission  is 
authorized  to  require  annual  reports  from  all  common  car- 
owners  of  all  railroads  engaged  in  interstate  commerce.  The 
statute  provides  what  these  reports  shall  contain  and  gives 
the  Commission  authoritj^  to  prescribe  the  manner  in  which 
such  reports  shall  be  made.  The  time  for  filing  these  re- 
ports may  be  extended  by  the  Commission,  which  also  has 
riers  subject  to  the  provision.s  of  the  Act  and  from  the 
authority  "by  general  or  special  orders  to  require  said  car- 
riers, or  any  of  them,  to  file  monthly  reports  of  earnings  and 
expenses,  and  to  file  periodical  or  special,  or  both  periodical 
and  special,  reports  concerning  any  matters  about  which  the 
Commission  is  authorized  or  required  by  this  or  any  other 

199.    Kansas  City  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.      L.  Ed. ,  40  Sup.  Ct.  . 

United  States,  250  U.  S.  ,  64  200.     Sec.  15  a;  Sec.  405  c,  post. 


§  235]       Of  the  Act  to  Eegulate  Commerce.  565 

law  to  inquire  or  to  keep  itself  informed  or  which  it  is  re- 
quired to  enforce."  Penalties  and  forfeitures  are  provided 
for  a  failure  to  comply  with  the  orders  of  the  Commission 
in  this  respect.  Forms  of  accounting  may  also  be  prescribed, 
for  violation  of  which  prescribed  forms  penalties  are  provided. 

The  Commission  may  employ  examiners  to  inspect  accounts. 
False  entries  in,  or  willful  destruction,  mutilation  or  altera- 
tion, of  accounts  are  prohibited. 

The  Commission  may  prescribe  a  time  after  which  books, 
papers  and  documents  may  be  destroyed.  The  Supreme  Court 
held  these  provisions  constitutional  and  applicable  to  water 
carriers  engaged  in  interstate  commerce.""^ 

In  the  Kansas  City  Southern  case,^"^  in  sustaining  an  order 
of  the  Commission  made  under  authority  of  the  section,  the 
Supreme  Court  said:  "In  order  that  accounts  may  be  stand- 
ardized, it  is  necessary  that  the  accounts  of  the  several  car- 
riers shall  be  arranged  under  like  headings  or  titles.  *  *  * 
So  far  as  such  uniformity  requirements  control  or  tend  to 
control  the  conduct  of  the  carrier  in  its  capacity  as  a  public 
servant  engaged  in  interstate  commerce,  they  are  within  the 
authority  constitutionally  conferred  by  Congress  upon  the 
Commission."  It  was  there  held  that  a  requirement  of  the 
Commission  that  when  existing  shops  and  terminal  facilities 
were  abandoned  and  new  ones  erected,  that  there  should  be 
charged  to  operating  expenses  "the  cost  of  replacing  the 
abandoned  property  in  kind,  plus  the  cost  of  removal,  but 
less  the  value  of  salvage,"  was  not  such  an  order  as  would  be 
set  aside  by  a  court  where  the  Commission  had  proceeded 
"with  deliberation  and  after  proper  inquiry."  And  this  was 
true  although  the  apportioumont  of  profits  to  preferred  stock- 
holders, would,  as  a  result  of  such  method,  be  less  than  they 
would  otherwise  be  entitled  to. 

201.    Interstate    Com.     Com.     v.  202.    Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Goodrich    Transit    Co.,    244    U.    S.  United    States,   231   U.    S.   423,   58 

194,  56  L.  Ed.  729,  32  Sup.  Ct.  436,  L.    Ed.    296,   34    Sup.    Ct.    125,   af- 

reversing  Goodricli  Transit  Co.  v.  firming     same     styled     case,     204 

Interstate    Com.    Com.,    190    Fed.  Fed.    641,    Opinion    Com.    Ct.    No. 

943,  Opinion  Com.  Ct.  Nos.  21-24,  56,  p.  641. 
p.  95. 


5G6  Enforcement  by  the  Commission.         [§  23G 

The  Smith  Case""  further  recognized  the  full  powers  of  the 
Commission  whose  powders  of  investigating  and  supervision, 
said  the  Court:  "Extend  to  all  of  the  activities  of  carriers, 
and  to  all  sums  expended  by  them  which  could  afifect  in 
any  way  their  benefit  or  burden  as  agents  of  the  public.  If 
it  be  grasped  thoroughly  and  kept  in  attention  that  they  are 
public  agents,  we  have  at  least  the  principle  which  should 
determine  judgment  in  particular  instances  of  regulation  or 
investigation ;  and  it  is  not  far  from  true — it  may  be  it  is 
entirely  true,  as  said  by  the  Commission — that  "there  can 
be  nothing  private  or  confidential  in  the  activities  and  ex- 
penditures of  a  carrier  engaged  in  interstate  commerce." 

§  236.  Examiners. — The  Commission  may  employ  special  ex- 
aminers "to  inspect  and  examine  any  and  all  accounts,  records 
and  memoranda"  kept  by  carriers  subject  to  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Acts.  Any  examiner  who  divulges  any  fact  or 
information  which  may  come  to  his  knowledge  during  the 
course  of  examinations  made  by  him,  except  in  so  far  as  he 
may  be  directed  by  the  Commission  or  by  a  court  or  Judge 
thereof,  is  guilty  of  a  crime  and  subject  to  a  fine  of  not  more 
than  five  thousand  dollars,  or  imprisonment  for  a  term  not 
exceeding  two  years,  or  both. 

And  to  carry  out  and  give  effect  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Acts  Regulating  Interstate  Commerce  or  any  of  them,  the 
Commission  may  employ  special  agents  or  examiners  "who 
shall  have  power  to  administer  oaths,  examine  witnesses,  and 
receive  evidence." 

Under  these  provisions,  accountants  are  appointed  as  special 
examiners  to.  examine  the  accounts  and  records  of  the  car- 
riers for  the  purpoi^fe  of  obtaining  information  to  enable 
the  Commission  to  perform  its  duties  in  the  enforcement  of 
the  statute,  and  to  aid  in  valuing  the  property  owned  or 
used  by  carriers  subject  to  the  Act. 

There  are  examiners  who  hear  the  evidence  and  submit 
reports  to  the  Commission  in  general  investigations  made  by 
the  Commission  and  upon  complaints  brbiight  before  the 
Commission.  These  act  somewhat  as  masters  in  chancery  and  of 
these  there  are  the  special  examiners  and  the  attorney-examin- 
ers, the  latter  hearing  evidence  in  the  more  important  cases. 

203.    Smith   v.   Int.   Com.   Com.,       245    U.    S.    33,    42,    43,    62    L.    Ed. 

135,  140,  38  Sup.  Ct.  34. 


§  237]       Of  the  Act  to  Regulate  Commerce.  567 

§  237.  Reports  of  the  Commission. — In  addition  to  reports 
of  investigations  made  h^^  it,  "the  Commission  shall,  on  or 
before  the  first  day  of  December  in  each  year,  make  a  report, 
which  shall  be  transmitted  to  Congress,  and  copies  of  which 
shall  be  distributed  as  are  the  other  reports  transmitted  to 
Congress.  This  report  shall  contain  such  information  and 
data  collected  by  the  Commission  as  may  be  considered  of 
value  in  the  determination  of  questions  connected  with  the 
regulation  of  commerce,  together  with  such  recommendations 
as  to  additional  legislation  relating  thereto  as  the  Commission 
may  deem  necessary;  and  the  names  and  compensation  of 
the  persons  employed  by  said  Commission." 

§  238.  Lake  Erie  and  Ohio  River  Ship  Canal. — Section  17 
of  the  Act  to  incorjiorate  the  Lake  Erie  and  Ohio  River  ship 
canal  provides  that  canals  constructed  thereunder  shall  be 
open  to  the  use  and  navigation  of  all  suitable  and  proper 
vessels  or  other  water  craft  upon  fair  and  equal  terms,  condi- 
tions, rates,  tolls  and  charges ;  but  all  charges,rates,and,tolls, 
must  be  equal  to  all  persons,  vessels  and  goods  under  classifica- 
tions" to  be  established  by  the  company  and  approved  by 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  Rebates,  drawbacks 
and  discriminations,  whether  effected  directly  or  indirectly, 
are  prohibited  and  tariffs  must  be  published,  and  not  changed 
except  after  thirty  days  public  notice ;  but  the  Commission 
may  in  its  discretion  and  for  good  cause  shown  permit  changes 
on  less  notice  and  may  modify  the  requirements  in  respect 
to  publishing  and  posting  schedules. 

§  239.  Parcel  Post.— The  statute  approved  August  24,  1912, 
authorized  the  Postmaster-General  to  reform  "subject  to  the 
consent  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  after  investi- 
gation" the  classification  of  articles  mailable  as  well  as  the 
weight  limit,  the  rates  of  postage,  zone  or  zones,  and  other 
conditions  of  mailability  of  articles  under  the  law  creating 
the  parcel  post. 

§  240.  Government  Aided  Railroads  and  Telegraph  Com- 
panies.— By  Act  August  7,  1888,  all  railroad  and  telegraph 
companies  to  which  the  Ignited  States  has  granted  aid  are 
required  to  construct,  maintain  and  operate  a  railroad  or 
telegraph  line  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  act  of  incorpora- 
tion, and  furnish  facilities  without  discrimination. 


568  Enforcement  by    the    Commission.        [§  241 

Complaint  may  be  made  to  the  Commission,  or  the  Commis- 
sion may  act  without  complaint,  to  obtain  a  performance  of 
these  duties. 

Penalties  are  prescribed  for  a  failure  to  perform  the  duties 
required,  and  the  "party  aggrieved"  by  such  failure  may  re- 
cover damages. 

Reports  are  required  as  of  other  carriers  subject  to  the  Act. 

Information  may  be  given  the  Attorney-General  by  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission,  upon  which  the  Attorney- 
General  must  proceed  .judicially  to  enforce  the  forfeitures 
provided  in  the  Act.  Congress  reserved  the  right  to  alter, 
amend  or  repeal  the  law. 

§  241.  Common  Law  Remedies,  Continued. — Nothing  in  the 
Act  contained  shall  in  any  way  abridge  or  alter  the  remedies 
now  existing  at  common  law  or  by  statute,  but  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  are  in  addition  to  such  remedies. 

The  above  provision  was  in  the  original  Act  of  1887,  and 
has  not  been  repealed  by  any  amendment  thereof  or  act  sup- 
plemental thereto. 

This  provision  must  be  construed  conformably  to  the  well 
established  canons  of  statutory  construction,  and  being  con- 
strued with  the  whole  law  as  required  by  such  canons,  it 
must  be  held  to  mean  that  where  a  common-law  right  cannot, 
consistently  with  the  general  purposes  of  the  statute,  be 
enforced,  the  injured  party  must  obtain  redress  under  and  in 
accordance  with  the  statute.  Any  other  construction  would 
destroy  the  general  scheme  intended  to  be  effected  by  the 
enactment.  No  right  is  taten  away,  but  Avhere  a  method  for 
determining  the  right  is  open  under  the  statute,  that  method 
must  be  pursued  to  the  exclusion  of  other  methods.  When  the 
statute  furnishes  no  remedy  for  a  wrong,  or  where  preliminary 
administrative  action  is  unnecessary  to  determine  the  right, 
the  common  law  remedies  may  be  sought.""* 

204.    Mitchell   Coal   &  Coke  Co.  Southern   Ry.   Co.  v.  Tift,   206  U. 

V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  230  U.  S.  S.    428,    437,    51    L.    Ed.    1124,    27 

247,   57   L.  Ed.   1472,    33    Sup.   Cc.  Sup.    Ct.    709;    United    States    v. 

916;     Texas    &    Pac.    Ry.    Co.    v.  Pacific  &  Arctic   R.   Co.,    228    U. 

Cisco   Oil  Mill,  204   U.   S.   449,   51  S.  87,  57  L.  Ed.  742,  33   Sup.   Ct. 

L.  Ed.  562,  27  Sup.  Ct.  358;  Texas  443;    St.    Louis    S.    W.    R.    Co.    v. 

&    Pac.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Abilene    Cot-  Lewellen,  192  Fed.  540.     See  also 

ton    Oil    Co.,    204   U.    S.    426,    444,  Sees.  294,  297,  298  A,  308  A,  iwst. 
51  L.   Ed.   553,   27   Sup.   Ct,   350; 


CHAPTER  VI. 
PROCEDURE    OF    THE    INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

§  242.  Scope  of  Chapter. 

243.  Switch  Connections. 

244.  Relief  under  the  Fourth  Section. 

245.  Water  Competition. 

246.  Railroad   Owned    Steamships. 

247.  Changes  in  Tariffs. 

248.  Forms  of  Tariffs. 

249.  Through  Routes. 

250.  Complaints  for  Damages. 

251.  Same  Subject — Order  of  Commission. 

252.  General  Investigations. 

253.  Procedure  in  Formal  Cases — Complaint. 

254.  Notice  before  Hearing. 

255.  Formal  Complaints — Answer. 

256.  Hearings  by  the  Commission. 
256a.  Proposed  Reports. 

257.  Orders  Relating  to  Rates  and  Practices. 

258.  Suspension  of  Rates. 

259.  Practices   in   Suspension  Cases  Where   There   Exist   Intrastate 

Rates  Lower  than  Proposed  Interstate  Rates. 

260.  The  Weak  and  the  Strong  Roads. 

261.  Other  Orders. 

262.  Service  of  Orders  of  the  Commission. 

263.  Rehearings  by  the  Commission. 

264.  Valuation  of  Property. 

265.  Oral   Argument. 

266.  Estoppel  by  Former  Order  of  the  Commission. 

267.  Rules  of  Procedure  Prescribed  by  the  Commission. 

268.  Public  Sessions  and  Hearings. 

269.  Parties. 
269a.  Interventions. 

270.  Complaints. 

271.  Answers. 

272.  Reparation  Statements. 

273.  Service  of  Papers. 

274.  Amendment  to  Pleadings. 

275.  Continuances. 

276.  Stipulations  Desirable  and  Must  Be  in  Writing. 

277.  Hearings. 

278.  Depositions,  How  Taken. 

279.  Witnesses  and   Subpoenas. 

280.  Documentary  Evidence. 

281.  Briefs  and   Oral  Argument. 

(569) 


570  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  242 

282.  Rehearings. 

283.  Free  Copies  of  Transcript  of  Testimony,  When  Furnished. 

284.  Orders    Must    Be    Complied    with    and    Notice    Given    to    the 

Secretary  of  the  Commission. 

285.  Fourth  Section  Applications. 

286.  Suspension  of  Rate  Increases.  How  Obtained. 

287.  Secretary   to  Give   Information   to   Parties. 

288.  Address  of  the  Commission. 

288a.  Specifications   As   to   Complaints,   etc. 
288b.  Office  and  Address  of  Commission. 

289.  Form   of  Complaints. 

290.  Form  of  Answer. 

291.  Intervening  Petition. 
291a.  Petition  for  Rehearing. 

291b.  Form  of  Reparation  Statement. 

291c.  Form  of  Complaint  Against  Federal  Agent. 

§  242.  Scope  of  Chapter. — In  the  next  preceding  chapter 
there  is  a  discussion  of  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission.  From  this  statement  of  these 
powers  and  duties  it  was  seen  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Commission  divides  itself  into  those  investigations,  (a)  which 
have  to  do  with  the  general  execution  of  the  Commerce  Acts 
in  which  parties  are  not  directly  involved  and  in  which  the 
w^liole  public  is  interested,  and  (b)  into  investigations  which, 
while  affecting  the  whole  public,  more  directly  affect  in- 
dividuals who  are  parties  to  the  proceeding. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  discuss  the  procedural 
statutes  and  rules  adopted  and  used  in  each  of  these  kinds 
of  investigations. 

The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  is  not  a  court,  and 
while  it  hears  testimony  from  which  it  reaches  conclusions 
and  while  some  of  its  forms  of  procedure  are  analogous  to 
those  of  a  court,  it  is  not  and  should  not  be  embarrassed  by 
purely  technical  rules. 

§  243.  Switch  Conne'ction. — To  invoke  the  authority  of 
the  Commission  with  reference  to  the  installation  and  opera- 
tion of  switch  connections,  there  must  exist  a  failure  by  the 
carrier  to  perform  its  duty  in  this  respect,  an  application  in 
writing  by  a  .shipper  tendering  interstate  traffic  for  transpor- 
tation, or  by  an  owner  of  a  lateral  branch  line  of  railroad 
making    complaint    as    provided    in    section    13    of   the    Act. 


'^  244]  Commerce   CoMMissioisr.  571 

Upon  which  complaint  the  Commission  shall  hear  and  in- 
vestigate and  determine  as  to  the  safety,  practicability  and 
justification  of  such  connections  and  the  reasonable  com- 
pensation therefor.  After  which  the  Commission  may  make 
ain  order  directing  a  compliance  with  the  law  requiring 
such  connection/ 

While  formerly  the  Commission  could  not  compel  a  car- 
rier to  permit  the  use  of  its  right  of  way  by  another  carrier,^ 
the  power  given  by  Transportation  Act  1920  over  car  service 
and  terminals  authorizes  the  Commisson  under  the  terms 
stated  in  the  Act  to  open  terminals,  spurs  and  switches  to  a 
joint  use. 

In  requiring  connections  between  rail  lines  and  the  dock  of 
a  water  carrier  the  Commission  has  full  authority  to  deter- 
mine the  terms  and  conditions  upon  which  the  connecting 
tracks,  when  constructed,  shall  be  operated ;  and,  in  the  con- 
struction or  operation  of  such  tracks  it  may  determine  what 
sum  shall  be  paid  to  or  by  each  carrier.* 

§  244.  Relief  under  Fourth  Section.— The  fourth  section  of 
the  Act  prescribes  a  relation  between  long  and  short  hauls 
and  between  through  rates  and  aggregates  of  the  inter- 
mediate rates.  The  section  gives  the  Commission  authority 
to  grant  relief  from  the  absolute  provisions  of  the  statute. 
There  must  be  an  application  to  the  Commission  by  the  car- 
rier showing  a  "special  case,"  some  special  reason  for  the 
relief,  upon  which,  after  investigation,  the  carrier  may  be 
authorized  ''to  charge  less  for  longer  than  for  shorter  dis- 
tances;" and  the  Commission  may  from  time  to  time  provide 
the  extent  to  Avhich  the  carrier  may  b^e  relieved  from  the 
operation  of  the  section.  The  first  statement  of  authority 
to  grant  relief  a])plies  to  that  part  of  the  section  referring 
to  the  long  and  short  haul ;  the  second  statement  is  general 
and  applies  to  the  "operation  of  this  section."  The  making 
of  the  application  stays  the  effect  of  the  prohibition  "until 
a  determination  of  such  application  by  the  Commission."* 

1.  Sec.  1  of  Act;   Sec.  344,  post.  S.    Sec.  6  of  Act;   Sec.  376,  post. 

2.  Consolidated  Pump  Co.  v.  Re  Wli|arf  Facilities  ftt  Peusa- 
Lake   Shore  &  M.   S.   Ry.   Co.,   27       cola,  Fla.,  27  I.  C.  C.  252,  260. 

I.  C.  C.  519.  4.    Sec.  4  of  Act;   Sec.  350,  post. 


572  Peocedure  op  the  Interstate.  [^  244 

The  carriers  filed  over  eleven  thousand  two  hundred  ap- 
plications with  the  Commission  pursuant  to  the  statute. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  "Act  prescribing  the  form,  contents 
or  breadth"  of  applications  filed  thereunder,  and  the  Com- 
mission held  that  blanket  applications  covering  many  devia- 
tions from  the  statute  might  be  filed.^ 

The  statute  does  not  give  arbitrary  power  to  the  Commis- 
sion to  permit  or  refuse  exceptions,  but  its  action  "must  be 
limited  and  conditioned  upon  the  presence  in  special  cases 
of  conditions  and  circumstances  which  would  make  such  ex- 
ceptions legal  and  proper  and  in-  no  wise  antagonistic  to  the 
other  provisions  of  the  Act. ' ' " 

That  Congress  could  make  an  absolute  prohibition  of  a 
greater  charge  for  a  longer  haul  than  for  the  shorter,  was 
stated  by  the  Commission  discussing  the  procedure  under 
the  section,  and  it  was  said  that  the  burden  of  proof  was 
on  the  carrier  seeking  relief  from  the  statutory  general  rule, 
a  burden  that  required  proof  not  only  of  the  cause  of  the 
lower  rate  at  the  longer  distance  point  "but  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  rates  applied  to  intermediate  points."''  It 
has  already  been  shown  that  the  reasonableness  of  the  rate 
to  the  intermediate  point  must  be  considered,  and  in  addi- 
tion to  that  factor  the  'Commission  considers  water*  and 
market   competition"*   and  the  fact,  if  a  fact,  that  the  road 

5.  Southern  Furniture  Mnfg.  C.  519,  530;  Janesville  Clothing 
Assn.  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  25  1.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W-  Ry.  Co., 
C.  C.  379,  381.  See  Rule  18  of  26  I.  C.  C.  628;  Commercial  Club 
the  Rules  of  Practice  of  the  of  Duluth  v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R. 
Commission:    Sec.   285,  jiost.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  639,  660. 

6.  Railroad  Com.  of  Nevada  v.  8.  Re  Transportation  of  Wood, 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  Hides  and  Pelts,  Railroad  Com. 
329,  341;  Bluefild  Shippers  Assn.  of  Oregon  v.  Oregon  R.  &  N. 
V.  Norfolk  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  22  I.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  151,  179;  Bowling 
C.  C.  519,  5a0;  Inter  Mountain  Green  Business  Men's  Protective 
Rate  Cases,  234  U.  S.  476,  58  L.  Assn.  v.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co., 
Ed.  1408,  34  Sup.  Ct.  986.  24   I.  C.   C.  228,  240;    Re  Lumber 

7.  Re  Application  Southern  Pac.  Rates  to  Ohio  River  Crossings, 
Co.,      Long       and     Short      Haul  25  I.  C.  C.  50. 

Docket  1243,  22  I.  C.  C.  366,  374.  9.    Kellogg  Toasted  Corn  Flakes 

See  also  as  to  burden  of  proof:  Co.   v.   Michigan   Cent  R.   Co.,   24 

Bluefield   Shippers  Association  v.  I     C.    C.    604;    Re   Lumber   Rates 

Norfolk   &   W.   Ry.   Co.,   22    I.   C.  to  Ohio  River  Crossings,  25  I.  C. 


§  245]  CoMMEKCE  Commission.  573 

reaching  the  longer  distance  point  is  a  circuitous  route." 
Mere  railway  competition  was  said  to  be  ineffective  to  meet 
the  burden  on  the  carriers.  The  Commission,  speaking  of 
such  competition  and  the  resulting  violation  of  the  Act,  said : 

"So  far  as  the  facts  before  us  disclose,  this  condition  has 
been  brought  about  entirely  by  coniipetition  between  dif- 
ferent railways  serving  New  Orleans.  If  no  other  element 
enters  into  the  situation  this  would  probably  be  wrong."'' 

ThQ  Transportation  Act  1920  restricts  the  authority  of 
the  Commission,  section  349,  post.  Under  the  amended  Act 
the  rate  to  the  more  distant  point  must  be  "reasonably  com- 
pensatory," the  circuitous  litie  cannot  charge  more  to  inter- 
mediate points  no  longer  distant  than  that  of  the  direct  line, 
than  it  charges  to  the  more  distant  point  and  potential  water 
competition  shall  constitute  no  authority  to  grant  relief. 

§  24.5.  Water  Competition. — The  last  paragraph  of  section 
4  which  prohibits  carriers  from  increasing  rates  which  have 
been  lowered  to  meet  water  competition  "unless  after  hear- 
jj^g  *  *  *  j^  shall  be  found  that  such  proposed  increase 
rests  upon  changed  conditions  other  than  the  elimination  of 
water  competition,"  not  only  puts  the  burden  on  the  carriers, 
but  limits  the  reasons  which  are  valid  explanations  of  the 
increase  by  excluding  as  one  of  such  "the  elimination  of 
water  competition." 

In  order  to  make  such  increase  the  Commission  must  con- 
sent after  hearing. 

Suspension  of  lake  navigation  during  the  winter  months  is 
not  an   elimination   of  water   competition,   and   during  these 

C.  50,  59.     In  each  of  these  cases  C.  C.  192,   195;    Edwards  &  Brad- 

the   effectiveness   of   market   com-  ford    Lumber   Co.   v.    Chicago,   B. 

petition    was    considered    aa    de-  &   Q.   R.   Co.,   25   I.   C.    C.    93,   95 

cided.  holding    that    a    route    exceeding 

10.    Wright  Wire   Co.   v.   Pitts-  the  short  line  by  15  per  cent  was 

burg    &   L.    E.    Ry.    Co.,    21    I.    C.  a    circuitous       route.       See    also 

C.     64,     quoting     Judge     Cooley's  Fourth     Section     Application     in 

opinion  first  construing  the  origi-  the  Southeast,  .30  I.  C.  C.  153,  32 

nal    Fourth    Section;    Gile    &    Co.  I.  C.   C.   61. 

V.   Southern  Pac.  Co.,  22   I.  C.  C.  11.    Re  Transportation  Lime,  24 

298,  302;   Re  Rates  on  Salt,  24  I.  I.  C.  C.  170,  172. 


574  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  246 

months  liigher  rail  rates  may  be  justified,^'  althougli  the  ex- 
planation seems  unsatisfactory. 

Whether  or  not  the  paragraph  puts  the  burden  of  justify- 
ing increases  of  rates  that  Avere  lowered  prior  to  the  Amend- 
ment enacting  it,  effective  June  18,  1910,  is  immaterial,  as 
that  burden  exists  to  all  rates  advanced  since  January  1, 
1910,  by  virtue  of  section  15/^ 

§  246.  Railroad  Owned  Steamships. — A  rail  carrier  may 
not  own  or  control  a  water  carrier  in  competition  therewith,^* 
but  .iurisdiction  is  conferred  upon  the  Commission  to  "deter- 
mine questions  of  fact  as  to  the  competition  or  possibility 
of  competition"  upon  application  of  a  railroad  company  or 
other  company  praying  for  an  order  permitting  the  continu- 
ance of  such  ownership  or  control  of  vessels  already  in  opera- 
tion or  permitting  the  installation  of  new  service. 

The  Commission  may  on  its  own  motion  make  such  in- 
vestigation and  enter  an  order  thereon.  There  must  be  a 
hearing  and  the  order  of  the  Commission  is  made  final.  On 
such  hearing  if  the  Commission  shall  be  of  the  opinion  that 
any  such  existing  service  by  water  "other  than  through  the 
Panama  Canal  is  being  operated  in  the  interest  of  the  public 
and  is  of  advantage  to  the  convenience  and  commerce  of  the 
people,  and  that  such  extension  will  neither  exclude  nor 
reduce  competition,"  it  may  extend  the  time  during  which 
such  carrier  controlled  water  vessels  may  be  so  operated.  The 
water  carriers  must  in  that  event  file  tariffs  of  their  rates, 
schedules  and  practices.  Such  applications  must  be  made 
before  July  1,  1914,  but  may  be  considered  and  disposed  of 
thereafter.^^ 

§  247.  Chalnges  in  Tariffs. — Changes  in  rates,  fares  and 
charges  or  joint  rates,  fares  and  charges,  may  not  be  made 
except  after  thirty  days  notice  to  the  Commission  and  to  the 
public,    but    the    Commission    is    granted    a    discretion    "for 

12.  American  Insulated  Wire  &  14.  Sec.  5  of  Act;  Sec.  203  ante; 
Cable    Co.    v.    Chicago    &    N.    W.      Sec.  353,  post. 

Ry.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C.  415,  416.  15.   Sec.  5  of  Act;  Sec.  S55,  post. 

13.  Re  Pig  Iron  Rates  from  Vir-      Sec.  203,  ante. 
ginia,  27  I.  C.  C.  343,  345. 


§  248]  Commerce   Commission.  575 

good  cause  shown"  to  allow  changes  on  less  notice,  and  may 
modify  the  requirements  in  respect  to  publishing,  posting  and 
filing  tariffs.  This  may  be  done  in  particular  instances  or 
by  general  order.'^ 

Si)eaking  of  this  provision  the  Commission  said:  "It  is  be- 
lieved that  this  authority  should  be  exercised  only  in  in- 
stances where  special  or  peculiar  circumstances  or  conditions 
fully  justify  it.  Confusion  and  complication  must  follow^  in- 
discriminate exercise  of  this  authority."  Clerical  or  typo- 
graphical errors  constitute  good  cause.^^ 

General  orders  permit  the  reduction  of  a  through  rate  to 
the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate  locals  and  the  filing  of 
tariffs  by  new  roads  in  less  than  thirty  days.^* 

§  248.  Forms  of  Tariffs. — The  power  granted  the  Commis- 
sion to  determine  and  prescribe  the  form  of  tariff  schedules 
and  to  change  that  form  when  expedient  has  been  exercised 
by  prescribing  rules  in  Tariff  Circular  No.  18-A  and  supple- 
ments thereto. 

§  249.  ThroTig-h  Routes. — After  full  hearing,  on  complaint, 
or  upon  its  own  initiative  without  complaint,  the  Commission 
may  establish  through  routes  and  maximum  joint  rates  be- 
tween rail  and  water  lines. '^ 

Where  a  rail  carrier  enters  into  arrangements  with  any 
water  carrier  operating  from  a  port  of  the  United  States 
through  the  Panama  Canal  or  otherwise  for  the  handling  of 
through  business  between  interior  points  in  the  United  States 
and  such  foreign  country,  similar  arrangements  may  be  re- 
quired with  any  or  all  other  lines  of  steamships  operating, 
from  the  same  port  to  the  same  foreign  country."" 

Orders  with  reference  to  action  authorized  as  herein  stated 
shall  be  served  and  enforced  as  orders  under  section  15  of 
the  Act"^  and  may  "be  conditioned  for  the  payment  of  any 

16.  Sec.  6  of  Act;  Sec.  360,  post.  19.    Sec.  377,  post. 

17.  Tariff    Circular    18a,    Rule  20.    Sec.  6  of  Panama  Canal  Act, 
58,  also  prescribing  a  form  of  ap-  yar.   (b) ;  Sec.  377,  post. 
plication   to   exercise   the   author-  21.   Sec.  6  of  Act,  par.  (d);  Sec. 
ity.  379,  post. 

18.  Tariff  Circular  18a,  Rules  56 
and  57. 


576  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  ["§.  250 

sum  or  the  giving  of  security  for  the  payment  of  any  sum 
or  the  discharge  of  any  obligation  which  may  be  required 
by  the  terms  of"  the  order."" 

PoAver  is  also  given  the  Commission,  after  hearing,  with  or 
without  (^omplaint,  to  establish  through  routes  an.d  joint 
classifications  and  joint  rates  and  the  divisions  thereof,  when 
there  is  a  failure  of  the  carriers  so  to  do.  This  does  not  ap- 
ply to  connection  between  street  electric  passenger  railways 
not  engaged  i'n  the  general  business  of  transporting  freight 
and  railroads  of  a  different  character.  In  establishing  such 
through  route  reference  must  be  had  to  the  entire  line  of  a 
carrier." 

Subject  to  the  limitation  stated  in  the  statute  the  Commis- 
sion has  a  discretion  as  to  w'hen  it  will  order  through  routes.^* 
The  complainant  asking  for  a  through  route  should  show  him- 
self "capable  financially  and  physically"  of  assuming  the 
obligations  such  routes  would  impose. ^^ 

In  fixing  the  divisions  between  the  carriers  the  Commission 
must  "take  into  consideration  all  the  circumstances,  con- 
ditions, and  equities.""" 

§  250.  Complaints  for  Damages. — In  claims  for  damages 
a  complaint  must  be  filed  with  the  Commission.  This  com- 
plaint frequently  seeks  to  have  a  particular  rate  or  practice 
declared  illegal,  and  in  the  same  complaint  asks  for  an  order 
fixing  the  Commission's  finding  as  to  the  amount  of  damages 
the  complainant  is  entitled  to  recover.  It  is  not  proper  to 
divide  up  a  complaint  by  first  asking  a  finding  that  the  rate 
or  practice  is  illegal,  and  thereafter,  by  supplemental  com- 
plaint, to  seek  damages." 

22.  Last  par.  Sec.  6;  Sec.  380,  C.  C.  275;  Enterprise  Transpor- 
post.  tation  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 

23.  Sec.  15  of  Act;  Sec.  195,  12  I.  C.  C.  326.  Baltimore  &  Caro- 
ante;  Sec.  401,  2^ost.  Una   S.  S.  Co.  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  Co., 

24.  Crane  Iron  Works  v.  United  49  I.  C.  C.  176. 

States,    209    Fed.    238,    Com.    Ct.  26.     Star   Grain    &   Lumber   Co. 

Opinion  No.  55,  p.  453,  461,  cited,  v.   Atchison,   T.   &   S.   F.   Ry.   Co., 

Truckers  Transfer  Co.  v.  Charles-  14    I.    C.    C.    364,    370.      See    also 

ton   &  W.   C.    R.   Co.,    27   I.   C.   C.  section  196,  ante.  post.  sec.  397. 

275.  27.     Dallas    Freight    Bureau    v. 

25.  Truckers  Transfer  Co.  v.  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  12  I.  C.  C. 
Charleston  &  W.  C.  R.  Co.,  27  I.  223,  228. 


§  251]  Commerce   Commission.  577 

Many  informal  complaints  for  damages  are  filed  and  al- 
lowed. These  are  in  eases  where  the  carriers  concede  that 
an  award  should  be  made."*  Informal  complaints  are  suffi- 
cient to  give  the  Commission  jurisdiction.""  The  general 
principles  applicable  to  the  question  are  stated  by  the  Com- 
mission to  be  the  intent  of  Congress  to  provide  a  method  of 
obtaining  an  award  of  damages  without  resort  to  the  expen- 
sive and  tedious  processes  of  the  law,  and  that  the  Act  should 
be  construed  with  that  view."" 

The  Commission  prescribes  rules  to  which  it  adheres.  These 
rules  are  copied  section  270,  [yost.  Where  informal  com- 
plaints are  filed  as  provided  in  the  Kules  of  Practice,  and 
relief  denied  on  tlie  informal  docket,  a  formal  claim  must 
be  filed  within  six  months  of  such  denial,  if  the  two  years 
have  expired,  else  the  claim  Avill  be  regarded  as  abandoned. 

§  251.  Same  Subject — Order  of  Commission. — Until  the  act 
complained  of  is  found  to  be  violative  of  the  law  no  award 
of  damages  can  be  made.  In  the  procedure  btt"or(>  tlie  Com- 
mission evidence  is  heard  as  to  the  illegality  of  the  rate, 
regulation  or  practice  under  investigation  and  as  to  the  fact 
of  damages.  If,  after  the  hearing,  it  is  found  that  complain- 
ant or  one  in  whose  behalf  the  complaint  is  filed  has  suf- 
fered injury  by  a  violation  of  the  law  and  the  fact  of  legal 
damage  is  established,  the  Commission  directs  how  proof  of 
the  amount  of  damages  shall  be  made,  and  when  such  amount 
is  ascertained  an  order  therefor  is  made.  What  must  be 
shown  to  fix  this  amount  is  stated  by  the  Commission  as  fol- 
lows : 

"The  complainants  will  be  expected  to  prepare  statements 
showing  as  to  eacli  shipment  upon  which  reparaiiov;  is  chiimed 
the  date  of  movement,  the  point  of  origin,  the  point  of 
destination,  the  route,  the  w^eight,  the  car  number  and  ini- 
tials, the  rate  applied,  the  charges  collected,  and  the  amount 
of  reparation   claimed.     These   statements,   with   the   freight 

28.  Conference  Ruling  396,  Feb.  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
10,   1913.  I.  C.  C.  45. 

29.  Marian  Coal  Co.  v.  Dela-  30.  Michigan  Hardwood  Mnfrs. 
T/are,  L.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  Assn.  v.  Transcontinental  Freight 
C.     441;     Mountain     Ice     Co.     v.      Bureau,  27  I.  C.  C  32,  S7. 


578  Peocedure  of  the  Inte.estate.  [^  252 

bills  covering  the  shipments,  should  be  submitted  to  the  de- 
fendants for  verification  by  them.  Upon  the  receipt  of  state- 
ments so  prepared  by  the  complainants  and  verified  by  the 
defendants,  the  Commission  will  take  the  matter  up  with  a 
view  to  the  issuance  of  an  order  of  reparation. ' ' "" 

This  rule  has  been  elaborated  and  is  now  rule  5  of  Rules 
of  Practice  section  272,  post. 

In  case  damages  are  awarded  the  Commission  mu.si:  make 
a  report  and  state  the  findings  of  fact  on  which  the  award 
is  made,^"  and  on  a  trial  in  court  to  recover  on  such  award  the 
findings  of  fact  set  forth  in  such  report  shall  be  prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  matters  therein  stated.^* 

§  252.  General  Investigation. — In  the  exercise  of  its  power 
to  obrain  ( omplete  infoimation  necessary  t:o  ena,I)!c  it  to 
perform  the  duties  and  carry  out  the  objects  for  which  it 
was  created,  the  Commission  makes  investigations  into  the 
management  of  the  business  of  the  carriers  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Commerce  Acts.  This  authority  extends  to 
any  matter  or  thing  concerning  which  a  complaint  is  author- 
ized to  be  made  or  about  which  any  question  may  arise  or 
which  relates  to  the  enforcement  of  any  provisions  of  the 
Act.^^ 

No  particular  form  of  procedure  is  prescribed  for  these  in- 
vestigations, but  in  a  similar  kind  of  investigation,  that  fix- 
ing accounting  regulations,  the  Supreme  Court  stated  as  a 
material  fact  that  the  investigation  proceeded  "with  due 
deliberation  and  after  proper  inquiry."''^  The  Bills  of  Lad- 
ing and  Industrial  Railways  cases  are  illustrative  of  investi- 
gations without  formal  complaint.'"' 

31.  Standard  Mirror  Co.  v.  Penn-  35.  Kansas  City  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
sylvania  R.  Co.,  27  I.  C  C.  200,  United  States,  2:^1  U.  S.  423,  58 
209.  L.  Ed.  296,  34   Sup.  Ct.  125. 

32.  Sec.  14  of  Act;  Sec.  394,  post.  36.    Re  Bills  of  Lading,  14  I.  C. 

33.  Sec.  16  of  Act;  Sec.  406,  posf,-  C.  346;  Re  Bills  of  Lading,  29  I. 
Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  C.  C.  417;  Industrial  Railways 
207  Fed.  717,  125  C.  C.  A.  235;  Case,  29  I.  C.  C.  212;  Second  In- 
Mills  V.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  dustrial  Railways  Case,  34  I.  C. 
238  U.  S.  473,  59  L.  Ed.  1414,  35  C.  596,  55  I.  C.  C.  469,  56  I.  C.  U. 
Sup.  Ct.  888.  272,  52   L  C.   C.   671. 

34.  ante,  Sees.  219,  220. 


§  253]  CoMMEECE   Commission.  579' 

Investigations  relating  to  consolidation  of  railroads,  to  ex- 
tensions and  abandonment  of  facilities  and  to  determine 
groups  on  the  aggregate  value  of  the  roads  in  which  fair  re- 
turn shall  be  based,  are  among  the  things  which  may  be  in- 
vestigated under  Transportation  Act  1920. 

§  253.  Procedure  in  Formal  Cases — Complaint.  -The  rules 
relating  to  formal  complaints  and  the  form  thereof  are  stated 
in  subsequent  sections  of  this  chapter."  By  conference  rul- 
ing the  Commission  has  provided  that  complaints  involving 
the  same  or  substantially  the  same  principle,  subject  or  state 
of  facts  should  be  included  in  one  complaint ;  that  where  the 
principle  involved  or  the  state  of  facts  is  substantially  the 
same,  two  or  more  complainants  may  join  against  two  or 
more  carriers  in  one  complaint,  and  where  in  such 
cases  two  or  more  complaints  have  been  filed  they  may 
be  consolidated  and  heard  together.''*  Amendments  are  freely 
allowed,  even  to  the  extent  of  claiming  reparation  when  there 
is  no  claim  therefor  in  the  original  complaint.^" 

While  the  Commission's  practice  is  in  no  degree  technical, 
issues  not  clearly  raised  in  the  pleadings  cannot  be  deter- 
mined by  it.  The  Commission  has  said:  "A  party  litigant  must 
by  his  pleading  fairly  advise  his  adversary  ofi  the  contention 
which  the  latter  will  be  expected  to  meet  at  the  hearing,  in 
order  that  we  may  be  adequately  informed  on  the  resulting 
record  of  the  facts  material  to  our  determination  of  the  con- 
troversy. This  principle  of  notice  and  a  fair  opportunity  for 
defendant  to  know  what  charges  he  must  meet  is  substantially 
conformed  to  when  the  course  of  the  hearing  unobjected  to 
shows  definitely  what  complainant  seeks. ^"  Good  faith  both  on 
the  part  of  the  complainants  and  defendants  demands  that  the 
formal  pleadings  shall  be  sufficiently  full  to  disclose  the  claim 

37.  Sees.  268,  et  seq.  Chicago,    M.    &    St.    P.    Ry.    Co., 

38.  Conference  Ruling  206.  21    I.   C.  C.   490;    Board   of  Trade 

39.  Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  of  Chicago  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S. 
Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  29  I.  C.  C.  438,  444. 
Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  1;  Virginia-Car-  Burson  Knitting  Co.  v.  C.  M.  & 
olina  Chemidal  Co.  v.  Chix;ago.  G.  R.  Co.,  42  I.  C.  C.  739,  742; 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  3.  Live    Poultry    &    Dairy    Shippers 

40.  Commercial  Club  of  Omaha  Traffic  Asso.  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
V.    Chicago,    R.    I.    &    P.    Ry.    Co.,  Co.,  49  I.  C.  C.  228,  230. 

6  I.  C.  C.  647;    Sinclair  &  Co.  v. 


580  Peocedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  254 

or  the  answer  thereto.  For  a  defendant  in  its  answer  to  say  that 
it  neither  admits  nor  denies  an  allegation  the  truth  or  falsity 
of  which  could  be  determined  from  its  records,  is  not  to  deal 
frankly  with  Commission  or  complainant,  and  the  complaint 
should  be  sufficiently  definite  to  inform  the  defendant  what 
rate,  rule  or  practice  is  complained  against,  and  upon  what  is 
based  the  claim  of  illegality. 

§  254.  Notice  before  Hearing. — To  constitute  that  full  hear- 
ing required  hy  the  statute  notice  must  be  given  to  the  carrier 
directly  affected.  Where  a  complaint  is  filed  a  statement 
thereof  must  be  forwarded  to  the  carrier  complained  against, 
"who  shall  be  called  upon  to  satisfy  the  complaint,  or  to 
answer  the  same  writing." 

In  hearings  without  formal  complaint  where  an  order 
against  or  affecting  a  particular  carrier  or  carriers,  as  in  sus- 
pension and  similar  cases,  is  contemplated,  notice  must  be 
given. 

Most  rate  situations  have  their  influence  on  other  rates 
and,  having  this  fact  in  mind,  objection  was  made  to  an  order 
of  the  Commission  because  all  carriers  thus  affected  were  not 
served  with  notice.  Replying  to  the  contention,  the  court  said: 

"It  is  obvious  that  the  purpose  was  to  require  that  notice 
should  be  given  to  the  party  immediately  interested,  and 
not  to  those  remotely  concerned.  It  is  a  novel  and  unreason- 
able proposition  that,  when  rates  in  a  given  locality  are 
drawn  in  controversy,  notice  must  be  given  to  every  carrier 
who  may  be  in  the  succession  of  all  or  any  interstate  trans- 
portation which  includes  that  in  question.  The  procedure 
prescribed  is  analogous  to  that  in  all  legal  controversies, 
and  must  be  deemed  sufficient.  The  objections  must  be  over- 
ruled. 

"If  such  an  order  as  is  here  contested  were  to  be  held  to 
be  beyond  the  power  of  the  commission,  and  that  precedent 
were  to  be  followed,  its  functions  would  be  frittered  away, 
piecemeal,  and  the  result  must  be  that  the  power  to  regulate 
rates  through  the  means  provided  by  the  statute  would  be 

41.     Sec.    13    of    Act;    Sec.    392,       post;  Fels  &  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania 

R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  483,  486. 


§  254]  Commerce  Commissioi^.  581 

so  absurdly  inadequate  as  to  furnish  no  reason  for  its  exis- 
tence." "  ' 

Speaking  of  the  same  question  the  Commission  said: 
"The  fact  that  all  of  the  carriers  operating  in  the  Mesaba 
district  and  all  of  the  carriers  and  parties  interested  in  the 
ore  rates  are  not  made  parties  to  this  proceeding  is  immaterial 
in  its  bearing  upon  the  legality  of  this  complaint.  A  com- 
plainant can  not  l)e  expected  to  search  public  and  private 
records  with  the  view  of  discovering  all  parties  that  may 
be  interested  in  a  certain  proceeding.  Full  publicity  attends 
every  step  of  all  proceedings  before  the  Commission,  and  it 
must  be  assumed  that  parties  interested  will  take  notice  of 
what  is  going  on.  Other  parties  interested  may  intervene 
in  the  present  proceeding  if  they  so  desire." 

The  quoted  rule  must  be  read  in  connection  with  vrhat 
the  Commission  said  in  the  Stevens  Grocery  Co.  case.  There 
it  was  said:  "At  the  hearing  defendant  objected  to  the 
sufficiency  of  the  complaint  because  the  carriers  parties  to 
the  movement  east  of  Memphis  were  not  named  as  defend- 
ants. Numerous  cases  were  referred  to  by  parties  as  sup- 
porting their  contentions  that  it  is,  or  is  not  proper  and 
necessary  to  bring  in  issue  the  through  rate  or  charge  and 
to  namie  the  carriers  part/ies  thereto,  before  attacking  a 
factor  of  such  through  rate  or  charge.  In  the  past  the  pro- 
cedure in  this  respect  has  been  varied  somewhat,  dependent 
upon  the  circumstances  of  the  cases.  It  is  important  that 
the  true  rule  be  definitely  announced  and  that  a  uniform 
policy  be  established  under  which  parties  complainant  and 
defendant  may  understand  what  is  rec|uired.  We  now  lay 
down  tile  rule,  which  for  the  future  will  be  strictly  adhered 
to,  that  when  a  complaint  involves  charges  applicable  to  a 
through  shipment  tlie  through  rate  or  charge  must  be  brought 
in  issue  and  the  participating  carriers  must  be  made  defend- 
ants.    When  the  through  rate  or  charge  is  made  up  of  sepa- 

42.   Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Int.  Opinion    Com.    Ct.   No.    4,    p.    235, 

Com.  Com.,  184  Fed.  118,  127,  128.  375;    Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville 

For    further    history    of    the    case  &  N.  R.   Co.,   227  U.   S.  88,   57   L. 

see,    Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.    v.  Ed.  431,  33  Sup.  Ct.  185. 
Int.    Com.    Com.,    195    Fed.    541, 


582  Procedure  op  the  Interstate.  [§  254 

rately  established  rates  or  charges,  applicable  to  the  through 
business,  the  through  rate  or  charge  must  be  attacked  as 
violative  of  the  Act,  although  the  violation  may  be  believed 
to  be  occasioned  by  a  particular  factor,  or  factors  thereof; 
in  such  case  the  complaint  should  be  prepared  at  the  hearing 
to  prove  the  unlawfulness  of  the  through  rate  itself  and  that 
this  is  due  to  a  particular  factor  or  factors.  The  sound  rule 
on  this  point  was  followed  in  Comm,ercial  Club  of  Omaha  v. 
A.  S.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  27,  I.  C.  C.  302;  Scott-Mayer  Commission  Co. 
V.  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C.  529 ;  and  Poehlman  Bros. 
Co.  V.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  30  I.  C.  C.  89.  That  rule  will  be 
followed  consistently  hereafter." 

Later  in  referring  to  this  case  the  Commission  said:  "The 
Rule  is  stated  in  the  Stevens  Grocer  Co.  ease  more  broadly 
than  it  should  be.  In  determining  whether  or  not  a  com- 
plainant has  bieen  damaged  by  the  exaction  of  unreasonable 
or  unduly  preferential  reshipping  rates  the  total  through 
charges  paid  from  point  of  origin  must  be  considered.  But 
this  does  not  hold  true  of  a  determi/nation  of  the  reason- 
ableness or  justness  of  the  reshipping  rate  itself.  Reship- 
ping rates  are  not  merely  divisions  of  through  rates,  but  are 
separately  established  rates  generally  published  by  carriers 
other  than  those  engaged  in  the  inbound  movement  and  without 
the  concurrence  of  the  latter;  and  the  point  of  reshipment 
is  a  rate-breaking  point.  A  change  in  the  reshipping  rates, 
even  though  it  may  aflfect  the  through  charges,  will  have  no 
eflPect  upon  the  inbound  rates.  The  inbound  carriers  have 
a  right  to  secure  reasonable  compensation  for  their  part  of 
the  haul  by  reasonable  inbound  rates.  The  reasonableness 
of  such  inbound  rates  is  in  no  manner  contingent  upon  re- 
sliifli:<ing  rates.  F^ithermore,  inbound  rates  used  in  con- 
nection with  reshipping  rates  generally  serve  also  as  local 
rates  hence  they  are  subject  to  review  independently  of  the 
outbound  rates." 

As  complainants  have  not  always  applied  the  rules  and 
have  at  times  lost  reparation  claims  by  not  making  proper 
parties  the  decisions  of  the  Commission  are  rather  fully  quo- 
ted. '' 

43.  Lum  V.  Great  Northern  R.  see,  Whiteland  Canning  Co.  v. 
Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  558,  561,  562.    And       Pittsburg,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 


§  255]  CoMMERCfE  Commission.  583 

§  255.  Formal  Complaints — Answer. — The  statute  requires 
the  defendant  to  answer  tlie  complaint  in  writing,  but  neither 
the  statute  nor  the  rule  of  the  Commission  hereinafter  given 
states  the  substance  of  what  the  answer  shall  contain.  The 
word  itself  connotes  the  idea  of  stating  what  the  facts  are 
with  reference  to  the  allegation  of  the  complaint.  This 
answer  is  due  "within  a  reasonable  time,"  to  be  specified 
by  the  Commission,  the  time  being  specified  in  the  rule  of 
the  Commission  as  thirty  days  after  service  by  defendants 
whose  general  offices  are  west  of  El  Paso,  Texas,  Salt  Lake, 
Utah,  or  Spokane,  Washington,  and  twenty  days  by  all  other 
defendants.^* 

No  technical  demurrer  is  necessary  but  the  legal  sufBciency 
of  the  complaint  may  be  determined  on  a  motion  to  dismiss, 
the  pratice  being  analogous  to  Federal  Equity  Rule  29. 

The  statute  provides  that,  "no  complaint  shall  at  any  time 
be  dismissed  because  of  the  absence  of  direct  damage  to  the 
complainant,"  so  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  complaint  of  one 
not  then  a  shipper,  but  professing  an  intention  to  Ueeome 
such,  was  denied ;  nor  does  the  complainant  have  to  come 
before  the  Commission  with  clean  hands  as  in  a  court  of 
equity.  " 

§  256.  Hearings  by  the  Commission. — AVhen  complaint  is 
filed  and  served,  the  Connnission  is  given  discretion  "to  in- 
vestigate the  matters  complained  of  in  such  manner  and  by 
such  means  as  it  shall  deem  proper. ' '  "  On  all  hearings  the 
Commission  has  "power  to  require,  by  subpoena,  the  at- 
tendance and  testimony  of  witnesses  and  the  production  of 
all  books,  papers,  tariffs,  contracts,  agreements  and  documents 
relating  to  any  matter  under  investigation."  Such  attendance 
of  witnesses,   and  the   production  of  such   documentary  evi- 

23  I.  C.  C.  92,  93.     But  a  partici-  44.     See   Rules   of    Commission, 

pating  carrier  to  a  tariff  attacked  Sees.   268,   et  seq.     This   chapter; 

is   a   necessary   party,   Reno    Gro-  Sec.    13    of   Act;    Sees.    392,    j^ost. 

eery   Co.   v.    Southern   Pac.    23    I.  4.5.    Lum  v.  Great  Northern  R. 

C.  C.  400.  Stevens  Grocery  Co.  v.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C.  558. 

St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  42  I.  C.  46.   Sec.  13  of  Act;  Sec.  393,  post. 
C.  396,  398;  Cairo  Board  of  Trade, 
4C  I.  C.  C.  343,  350,  351. 


584  Procedure  of  the  InteiRSTate.  [§  256 

dence,  may  be  required  from  any  place  in  the  United  States, 
at  any  designated  place  of  hearing.  The  claim  that  testimony 
may  incriminate  the  witness  is  no  excuse  for  not  testifying, 
but  the  witness's  testimony  shall  not  be  used  against  him 
on  the  trial  of  any  criminal  i^roceeding.*^  Testimony  may  be 
taken  by  depositions  at  the  instance  of  any  party,  or  by  order 
of  the  Commission.'*'  Witnesses  summoned  before  the  Com- 
mission are  entitled  to  the  same  fees  and  mileage  as  are  paid 
witnesses  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States/' 

The  Commission  is  very  liberal  in  its  pratice  with  refel'- 
ence  to  admitting  testimony,  "and,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Lamar, 
speaking  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court,  "is  not  limited 
by  the  strict  rules,  as  to  the  admissibility  of  evidence,  which 
prevail  in  suits  by  private  parties."  In  the  same  case  it 
was  said:  "But  the  statute  gave  the  right  to  a  full  hearing, 
and  that  conferred  the  privilege  of  introducing  testimony, 
and  at  the  same  time  imposed  the  duty  of  deciding  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  facts  proved.  A  finding  without  evidence 
is  arbitrary  and  baseless.  *  *  *  All  parties  must  be  fully 
ap;i3)rised  of  the  evidence  submitted  or  to  be  considered, 
and  must  be  given  opportunity  to  cross-examine  witnesses, 
to  inspect  documents,  and  to  oifer  evidence  in  explanatioii 
or  rebuttal."  '" 

The  same  principles  were  applied  by  the  Supreme  Court 
in  another  ease,  in  wliieh  it  was  indicated  that  parties  were 
not  bound  by  findings  based  upon  specific  investigation  made 
in  a  case  without  notice  to  them.'^ 

An\-  party  may  appear  before  the  Commission  and  be 
heard,  in  person  or  by  attorney.  Every  vote  and  official  act 
of  the  Commission  shall  be  entered  of  record,  and  its  pro- 
ceedings shall  be  pulilic  at  the  request  of  either  party.  Any 

47.  Sec.  12  of  Act;  Sec.  390,  50.  Int.  Com.  Com.  v.  Louisville 
post;  Sec.  3  of  Elkins  Act;  Sec.  &  N.  R.  Co.,  227  U.  S.  88,  57  L.  Ed. 
post,  457;  Compulsory  Testimony  431,  33  Sup.  Ct.  185,  and  cases 
Act,  post,  480;  Immunity  of  Wit-  ciled.  Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry. 
nesses  Act,  Sec.  479,  2iost.  Co.   v.   Spiller,  246   Fed.   1,  158   C. 

48.  Sec.    12    of    Act;    Sec.    390,  C.  A.  227. 

post.  51.    United   States  v.  Baltimore 

49.  Sec.  18  of  Act;  Sec.  418,  &  0.  R.  Co.,  226  U.  S.  14,  57  L.  Ed. 
liost.  104,  33  Sup.  Ct.  5. 


§  256iA]  Commerce  Commission.  585 

one  of  the  members  of  the   Commission   may  administer  oaths 
and  affirmations  and  sign  subpirnas.'^" 

§  256a.  Pro*posed  Reports. — Upon  the  suggestion  of  the 
writer  hereof  tlie  Commission  in  McCormick  Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co., 
37  I.  C.  C.  234  served  the  respective  parties  with  a  copy  of 
the  report  proposed  by  the  Attorney  Examiner.  This  practice 
then  inaugurated  proved  helpful  and  later  was  generally 
adopted  and  the  Commission  issued  rules  as  follows: 

"1.  If  oral  argument  before  the  presiding  commissioner 
or  examiner  is  desired  he  should  be  notified  at  or  before 
the  hearing  and  may  arrange  to  hear  the  argument  at  the  close 
of  the  testimony  within  such  limits  of  time  as  he  may  deter- 
mine, having  regard  to  other  assignments  for  hearing  before 
him.  Such  argument  will  be  transcribed  and  bound  with 
the  transcript  of  testimony,  and  will  be  available  to  the  Com- 
mission for  consideration  in  deciding  the  case.  The  making 
of  such  argument  shall  not  preclude  oral  argument  before 
the  Commission,  or  a  division  thereof,  and  application  there- 
for may  be  made  as  hereinafter  provided. 

"2.  Only  one  initial  brief  shall  be  filed  by  each  party. 
The  presiding  commissioner  or  examiner  shall  fix  for  all 
parties  the  same  time  within  which  to  file  their  briefs.  Reply 
briefs  are  not  permitted  at  this  stage. 

"3.  After  expiration  of  the  time  set  for  briefs,  the  presid- 
ing or  participating  examiner  will  prepare  his  proposed  re- 
port containing  the  statement  of  the  issues  and  facts  and 
the  findings  and  conclusions  which  he  thinks  should  be  made. 
This  proposed  report  will  be  served  Ky  mailing  copies  to  the 
parties  attorneys  who  appeared  at  the  hearing  or  upon  brief, 
except  that  in  genaral  investigations  copies  may  also  be 
mailed  in  the  Commission's  discretion  to  other  parties  whose 
appearances  are  noted   of  record. 

4.  Within  twenty  days  after  service  af  the  proposed 
report  any  party  may  file  and  serve,  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed for  briefs  in  Rule  XIV  of  the  Rules  of  Practice  excep- 
tions to  the  examiner's  proposed  report  and  brief  in  support 
of    the    exceptions.      Exceptions    and    brief    should    be    con- 

52.  Sec.  17  of  i^ct;  Sec.  417,  i}ost. 


586  Peoceduee  of  the  Inteestate.  [§  257 

tained  in  one  print.  Within  ten  days  after  the  expiration 
of. the  time  so  fixed  briefs  in  reply  to  the  exception  briefs 
may  be  filed  and  served,  but  will  not  be  accepted  later  ex- 
cept upon  leave  granted  upon  application  therefor.  Appli- 
cations for  oral  argument  before  the  Commission  or  a  Di- 
vision thereof  if  made  by  a  party  filing  exceptions  must  ac- 
company the  exceptions,  or  if  made  by  a  party  not  filing 
exceptions  must  be  filed  not  later  than  10  days  after  the 
time  fixed  for  filing  and  service  of  exceptions. 

"Parties  or  Attorneys  at  El  Paso,  Tex.,  Salt  Lake  City, 
IHah,  Spokane,  Wash.,  or  points  west  thereof,  who  appeared 
at  the  hearing  or  upon  brief,  will  be  allowed  five  days  ad- 
ditional time  for  filing  and  serving  exceptions,  exception 
briefs  and  reply  briefs  respectively. 

"5.  Exceptivons  to  the  examiner's  proposed  report  either 
as  to  statement  of  facts  or  matter  of  law  should  be  specific 
If  exception  is  taken  to  matters  of  law"  or  conclusions  the 
points  relied  upon  should  be  stated  separately  and  clearly. 
If  exception  is  taken  to  any  statement  of  fact  reference 
should  be  made  to  the  pages  or  parts  of  the  record  relied  up'^n 
and  a  corrected  statement;  incorporated  in  the  exception 
brief. 

"6.  In  the  absence  of  exceptions  that  are  sustained  or  of 
ascertained  error  the  statement  of  the  issues  and  of  the  facts 
by  the  examiner  will  ordinarily  be  taken  by  the  Commission 
as  the  basis  of  its  report." 

§  257.  Orders  Relating  to  Rates  and  Pratices.— By  for- 
mal complaint  as  hereinbefore  stated,  or  on  its  own  initiative 
in  exteu-sion  of  a  complaint,  or  without  any  complaint  what- 
ever, after  full  hearing,  the  Commission  when  "of  opinion" 
that  any  individual  or  joint  rates  or  charges  whatsoever 
demanded,  charged  or  collected,  or  that  any  individual  or 
joint  classifications,  regulations  or  pratices  are  unjust  or 
unreasonable  or  unjustly  discriminatory  or  unduly  preferen- 
tial or  prejudicial,  or  otherwise  violative  of  the  Commerce  Act, 
may  prescribe  joint  and  lawful  rates,  rules  and  charges  for 
the  future  as  maximum  rates  or  minimum  or  maximum  and 
minimum    and    may   likewise    prescribe    just    and    reasonable 


§  258]  CoMMEECE   Commission.  587 

regulations.  And  the  Commission,  the  carriers  failing  to 
agree,  may  prescribe  the  division  of  joint  rates.".  To  do 
this  there  must  be  a  full  hearing  and  the  ''opinion"  of  the, 
Commission  must  be  based  upon  evidence  as  in  formal  com- 
plaints." All  orders  of  the  Commission  under  this  authority 
shall  take  effect  in  some  reasonable  time,  to  be  prescribed  by 
the  Commission,  not  less  than  thirty  days. 

§  258.  Suspension  of  Rates. — A  new  individual  or  joint 
rate,  fare,  or  charge,  or  a  new  individual  or  joint  classifi- 
cation, regulation  or  practice  affecting  any  rate,  fare,  or 
ehai'ge,  may,  upon  complaint,  or  on  the  initiative  of  the 
Commission  without  complaint,  and  without  answer  or  other 
formal  pleadings,  be  suspended  by  the  Commission  and  when 
the  supension  is  had  the  Commission  must  enter  upon  a 
hearing  concerning  the  propriety  of  such  rate,  fare,  charge,  class- 
ification, regulation  or  practice.  When  the  suspension  is  or- 
dered, a  statement  in  writing  of  the  Commission's  reasons 
therefor  must  be  filed  with  the  schedule  involved  and  de- 
livered to  the  carrier  or  carriers  affected  thereby. 

The  first  suspension  can  not  be  for  longer  time  than  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty  days,  although  where  the  hearing  can  not 
be  completed  in  that  time,  the  time  may  be  futher  extended 
for  not  exceeding  thirty  days.  The  hearing  and  decision 
in  suspension  cases  must  be  given  preference  over  all  other 
questions  pending  before  the  Commission  and  must  be  de- 
cided as  speedily  as  possible. 

"At  any  hearing  involving  a  rate  fare  or  charge  increased 
after  January  1,  1910,  *  *  *  the  biurden  to  show  that 
the  increased  rate  fare  or  charge  or  proposed  increased  rate 
fare  or  charge  is  just  and  reasonable  shall  be  upon  the 
carrier,  and  the  Commission  shall  give  to  the  hearing  and 
decision  of  such  questions  preference  over  all  other  questions 
pending  before  it  and  decide  the  same  as  speedily  as  poss- 
ible." '' 

Any  new  practice  which  results  in  increasing  the  rate  is 
within  the  provision  fixing  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  carrier, 

53.  Sec.  15  of  Act;  Sees.  395,  55.  Sec.  15  of  Act  as  amended 
and  3.97,  post.                                          by   Act   of   June    18,    1910;    Sees. 

54.  Sec.  256,  supra.  398,   399,   post.     The   Commission 


588  Peocedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  259 

althongli  it  would  seem  that  a  new  tariff  provision  not  affect- 
ing the  rate  while  subject  to  suspension  would  not  be  within 
the  burden  of  proof  clause/" 

Ordinary  cases  are  given  in  practice  a  Docket  number. 
Suspension  cases  are  distinguished  as  Investigation  and  Sus- 
pension Docket,  and  given  consecutive  numbers. 

§  250.  Practice  in  Suspension  Cases  Where  There  Exist 
Intrastate   Rates   Lower   than   Proposed   Interstate   Rates. — « 

When  it  is  made  to  appear  that  proposed  increased  rates, 
although  shoAvn  to  be  just  and  reasonable  under  section  one 
of  the  Act,  will,  if  they  become  effective,  be  higher  than  in- 
trastate rates  for  related  and  competitive  hauls,  what  should 
be  the  order  of  the  Commission?  In  some  states  maximum 
intrastate  rates  are  prescribed  by  legislative  act,  and  the 
maximum  fixed  cannot  be  exceeded  until  legislative  authority 
is  obtained.  In  other  states  rates  are  fixed  by  a  com- 
mission, in  some  of  which  proposed  increases  may  We  sus- 
pended by  the  Commission  under  a  practice  similar  to  that 
obtaining  with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  in  others 
of  such  states  permission  must  be  obtained  from  the  state 
commission  before  publishing  the  increased  rates.  Obviously 
it  is  not  always  legally  possible  for  carriers  simultaneously 
to  advance  interstate  and  intrastate  rates.  If  increases  are 
denied  in  one  class  of  rates  because  not  effective  in  the  other 
class,  no  increase  can  ever  be  made,  and  the  state  authority 
by  refusing  advances  in  the  state  rates  could  fix  the  limit 
of  iiiterstate  rates.  This  may  not  legally  be  done."  The 
answer  to  the  foregoing  question  was  made  by  the  Commission 

in    Tariff    Circular    18-A,    p.    21,  of    that    fact    must    likewise    be 

prescribed  as  a  rule  for  carriers:  filed  by  the  carrier. 
That   when   a   rate   is   suspended,  56.    Re   Advances    in   Rates   on 

the  carrier  must  immediately  file  Soft   Coal,    23    I.    C.    C.    518,    519; 

with  the  Commission  a  statement  Re     Advances     on     Lumber     and 

stating    that    fact.      Where    only  Forest   Products,   21  I.  C.  C.   455, 

a    part    of   a   tariff    is    suspended,  456.     See  also   Sec.   223,   ante. 
the    carrier    must    file    with    the  57.    Houston,  Tex.  Ry.  Co.  v.  U. 

schedule     suspended     a     copy     of  S.,  234  U.  S.  342,  58  L.  Ed.  1341, 

the    suspending    order.      When    a  34  Sup.  Ct.  833. 
suspension  is  vacated,  a  statement 


§  259]  Commerce   Commission.  589 

as  follows:^'  "The  protestants  contend  that,  shonld  the  pro- 
posed change  of  rating  become  effective,  the  increased  rates 
woul  result  in  unjust  discrimination  against  interstate  ship- 
ments of  live  poultry  to  St.  Paul  and  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  be- 
cause of  existing  lower  intrastate  rates  in  Minnesota.  The 
respondents  answer  that  in  the  6vent  proposed  rates  are  per- 
mitted to  become  effective  it  is  their  purpose  to  bring  about 
substantially  similar  increases  in  their  intrastate  rates.  If  the 
protestants  or  other  shippers  of  live  poultry  should  feel  ag- 
grieved by  discrimination  which  may  result  from  rates  es- 
tablished because  of  our  finding  in  this  case,  the  way  will 
be  open  by  formal  complaint  to  the  Commission,  as  in  other 
cases,  to  obtain  relief  from  such  discriminations  as  may  be 
found  to  be  unlawful."  The  rule  just  stated  was  applied 
ill  the  Five  Per  Cent  case,^'  where  it  apiieared  that  very  low 
intrastate  rates  were  not  increased,  n.otwithstanding  which 
increases  in  interstate  rates  were  permitted. 

In  another  case""  an  interstate  rate  of  5%  cents  was  found 
to  have  been  justified,  although  the  state  rate  for  a  similar 
haul  in  the  same  territory  was  but  3^/^  cents.  The  Com- 
mission refused  to  reduce  an  interstate  rate  where  the  claim 
for  such  reduction  was  based  upon  the  facts  of  the  exist- 
ence of  lower  intrastate  rates,  and  declined  to  pass  upon 
the  question  of  discrimination  because  that  question  was  not 
the  specific  issue  presented.  There  it  was  said:"  "If  any 
rate  for  transportation  wholly  within  a  state  may  be  made 
the  measure  of  the  rate  when  that  transportation  moves  from 
one  state  through  or  into  another,  the  interstate  rate  so  re- 
sulting would  not  be  regulation  of  interstate  commerce  by 
the  authority  prescribed  by  the  Constitution,  but  by  the  state. 
If  the  function  of  this  Commission  be  to  compute  the  sum 
of  intrastate  rates  and  prescribe  the  result  as  the  measure 
of  interstate  rates,  actual  and  direct  regulation  of  interstate 
commerce   by   the  states  would  be   the  result.     That  in  the 

58.  Rates  on  Pcultry  in  Western  60.  Hans  Rees'  Sons  v.  S.  Ry. 
Trunk  Line  Territory,  32  I.  C.  C.       Co.,  30  I.  C.  C.  585. 

380.  61.    Corporation   Com.   of   Okla. 

59.  Five  Per  Cent  Case,  31  I.  C.  v.  .A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  31  I.  C. 
C.    351.  C.  532,  540,  541. 


590  Peocedure  of  the  Intehstate.  [§  259 

regulation  of  interstate  commerce  by  the  general  govern- 
ment ftnd  of  intrastate  commerce  by  the  state  governments 
there  result  inconveniences  and  anomalies,  such  as  is  contend- 
ed to  exist  here,  might  be  conceded ;  but  such  facts,  if  they 
exist  neither  deprive  us  of  the  power  nor  relieve  us  from  the 
duty  of  performing  the  obligations  imposed  upon  us  by  laws 
of  Congress  authorized  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  "Were  v^^e  at  liberty  and  inclined  to  abdicate  the 
authority  and  abandon  the  duty  imposed  upon  us  by  accept- 
ing the  sum  of  state  rates  as  a  measure  of  interstate  rates, 
the  difficulty  would  not  be  removed." 

Where  the  claim  was  made  that  interstate  rates  could  be 
increased  upon  jn'oof  that  intrastate  rates  were  higher  than 
the  interstate  rates  proposed  to  be  advanced,  the  Commission 
said  •!^^  ' '  Unquestionably  the  law  of  Minnesota  presents  a 
situation  to  the  carriers  which  makes  it  necessary  for  them 
either  to  adjust  some  interstate  rates  to  the  mileage  rates 
prescribed  by  that  law,  to  leave  their  intrastate  and  inter- 
state rates  out  of  line  or  to  suffer  material  reductions  below 
the  intrastate  rates  fixed  thereunder.  While  we  may  con- 
sider this  fact,  "Congress  does  not  directly  or  indirectly  in- 
terfere w4th  local  rates  by  adopting  their  sum  as  the  inter- 
state rate,'  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eubank,  181  U.  S.  27,  42 
and  we  cannot  say  that  merely  btecause  a  higher  intrastate 
rate  exists  that  an  increase  of  an  interstate  rate  to  meet  the 
state-made  rate  is  justified,  even  though  the  transportation 
conditions  as  to  distance  and  territory  are  similar.  Nor  do 
the  facts  here  presented  require  that  we  consider  the  appli- 
cation of  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Shreveport 
Case.  H.  E.&  W.  T.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States,  234  U.  S.  342." 

The  cases  discussed  show  the  rule,  which  until  the  decisions 
now  to  be  referred  to  were  rendered,  Avas  followed  by  the 
Commission.  Where  a  gateway  was  sought  to  be  closed 
for  interstate  traffic  although  left  open  for  intrastate  traffic, 
the  Commission  held  that  the  tariff  proposing  the  change 
should   be   canceled.     While   some   of  the   language   used    in 

62.     Rates    on    Beer    and    Other      Malt    Products,    31    I.    C.    C.    544. 


§  259]  Commerce   Commission.  591 

the  opinioin  is  apparently  not  consistent  with  prior  decisions 
of  the  Commission,  the  order  can  be  justified  on  the  ground 
that  the  proposed  tariff  was  unlawful  under  section  one  of 
the  Act."' 

In  discussing  live  stock  rates  the  Commission  without 
reference  to  any  of  the  cases  cited  above,  said  :"^  "The  in- 
congruity between  the  proposed  interstate  rates  and  intra- 
state rates  is  a  circumstance  which  goes  vitally  to  the  pro- 
priety of  the  rates  under  suspension.  To  dispose  of  this 
issue  it  is  necessary  to  have  before  us  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances surrounding  the  estatilishraent  of  these  intrastate 
rates."  In  the  1915  Western  Advance  Rate  case°^  the  ma- 
jority of  the  Commission.  Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan  amd  Mr. 
Commission  Daniels  dissenting,  applied  the  mile  that  lower 
intrastate  rates  may  justify  denying  increases  in  interstate 
rates  in  the  proposed  increases  in  the  rates  on  live  stock  and 
packing  house  products,  but  not  to  the  proposed  increases  in 
the  rates  on  coal  and  the  increased  car  load  minimum  in  grain 
products.  The  principles  stated  in  the  quotat>ions  above 
cannot,  when  taken  from  their  setting,  be  harmonized.  The 
Commission  does  not  apply  the  rule  stare  decisis  and  consid- 
ering what  was  done  in  the  several  cases  rather  than  what 
was  said,  it  may  be  stated  that  when  a  carrier  seeks  to 
justify  increases  in  its  rates  and  the  claim  is  made  or  the 
fact  appears  that  there  exist  lower  intrastate  rates  on  the 
same  commodity  in  the  same  general  territory,  the  safe 
course  is  to  make  full  proof  showing  the  reasons  for  the 
existence  of  the  lower  rates  and  explaining  why  they  have 
not  been  increased.  In  all  cases  where  this  relationship  of 
interstate  rates  higher  than  intrastate  rates  exists,  the  pro- 
testing shippers  should  present  the  fact  supported  by  such 
proof  as  is  available.  Wlien  the  proof  is  made,  the  Com- 
mission upoai  a  consideration  of  "all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances," will  exercise  its  "flexible  limit  of  judgment," 
permitting  or  denying  the  increases,  as  may  seem  just  and 
proper  in  each  case.  A  definite  and  uniform  rule  like   that 

6S.   Class  Rules  between  Stations  65.   Western  Rate  Advance  Case 

in  Louisiana,   33   I.  C.   C.   302.  1915,    35    I.    C.    C.    497.      For    the 

64.   Live  Stock  Rates  from  Colo-  discussion  in  the  dissenting  opin- 

rado,   35   I.   C.   C.   682,   dissenting  ion,  see  pp.  654,  et  seq. 
opinion,  pp.  689-691. 


592  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  2G0 

stated  in  tlie  Live  Poultry  case,  supra,  is  advisable  and  in 
Danville,  Ya.,  Class  and  Commodity  Rates,  38  I.  C.  C.  742. 
was  stated  by  Mr.  Commissioner  Harlan.  This  correct  rule 
seems  to  have  bben  accepted  and  former  cases  applying  a 
contrary  rule  ignored  in  a  second  Live  Poultry  Case,  49 
L  C.  C.  228,  237  the  con-ect  rule  is  stated  and  the  Commission 
said:     "This  ruling  we  have  since  followed." 

§  260.  The  Weak  and  the  Strong  Roads. — Rates  between 
the  same  points  nnist.  as  a  ])ract.ical  matter,  be  the  same  over 
all  lines  connecting  the  points,  otherwise  the  line  maintain- 
ing the  lowest  rates  would  receive  all  the  business.  When 
rates  in  a  general  and  related  ten-itory  are  mcreased  the 
increases  must^  to  be  of  any  benefit  to  the  carriers,  apply 
to  all  carriers  serving  the  territory.  It  not  infrequently 
occurs  that  in  the  general  territory  there  are  carriers  whose 
need  for  additional  revenue  is  indubitable;  other  carriers 
may  be  earning  a  fair  return  on  their  investments  while  as 
to  others  the  need  for  additional  revenue  is  uncertain.  To 
consider  the  weak  roads  or  the  strong  roads  only  would 
manifestly  be  unfair  either  to  the  public  or  to  the  investor 
in  railroad  property.  Lender  such  circumstances  it  has  been 
the  rule  of  the  Commission  to  measure  the  need  for  ad- 
ditional revenue  by  the  condition  of  a  road  which  is  fairly 
represemtative  of  the  general  situation.  This  is  manifestly 
proper,  as  each  road,  the  weak  and  the  strong,  is  necessary  to 
the  public  service  and  to  destroy  the  weak  road  because  there 
may  be  a  road  in  the  same  territory  which  needs  less  revenue, 
benefits  a  few  but  injures  the  many.  Perhaps  it  might  be 
proper  that  there  should  be  regulation  limiting  the  construct- 
ion of  a  road  where  the  territory  is  already  sufficiently  serv- 
ed by  existing  transportation  facilities;  but  so  long  as  the 
law  permits  the  construction  of  roads  and  denies  the  right  to 
pool  freights,  justice  will  permit  the  needs  of  the  roads  so  con- 
structed to  be  considered  in  prescribing  rates  for  a  related 
section.  In  the  general  rate  advance  cases  heretofore  heard 
by  the  Commission,  these  principles  have  been  announced, 
and  in  the  Western  Advance  Rate  case  of  1915,  35  I.  C.  C. 
497,  560  561,  the  authorities  are  collated. 

In  Transportation  Act  1920  Congress  recognized  the  prin- 


§  2G1]  Commerce   Commission.  593 

eiples  stated  in  this  section  in  section  15-a  relating  to  "fair 
return"  on  "aggregate  value." 

§  261.  Other  Orders. — The  procedure  in  prescribing  through 
routes  and  joint  rates  may  be  on  complaint  or  without  com- 
plaint,'" and  so  with  the  procedure  to  determine  the  lUftxi- 
mum  to  be  paid  a  shipper  for  services  rendered  or  facilities 
furnished  in  connection  with  transportation."^  In  each  case 
there  must  be  a  hearing. 

§  262.  Service  of  Orders  of  the  Commission — Every  order 
of  the  Commission  shall  be  f()rtln\'ith  served  upon  the  desig- 
nated agent  of  the  carrier.*"* 

Every  carrier  must  designate  in  writing  an  agent  in  the 
city  of  Washington,  District  of  Columbia,  upon  whom  service 
of  all  notices  and  processes  may  be  made  and  file  such  designa- 
tion with  the  Secretary  of  the  Commission,  and,  in  default 
of  such  designation,  service  of  aaiy  notice  or  other  process  in 
any  proceeding  before  the  Commission  may  be  made  by  post- 
ing such  notice  or  process  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  Commission."^ 

The  Commission  has  an  official  seal,  which  the  law  pre- 
scribes shall  be  judicially  noticed.^" 

§  263.  Rehearing  by  the  Commission. — The  Commission  has 
authority  to  suspend  or  modify  its  orders  upon  notice,  the 
manner  of  acting  and  the  kind  of  notice  being  left  to  its 
discretion.  Section  16-a  gives  the  Commission  power  to  grant 
rehearings  under  such  general  rules  as  it  may  prescrib/e,  but 
unless  specially  permitted  otherwise,  the  order  must  be  obeyed 
peaiding  such  rehearing.  This  section  was  added  by  the 
amendment  of  June  29,  1906,  but  the  power  has  been  exercised 
by  the  Commission  since  its  organization. 

In  re  Petition  of  Produce  Exchange,"'  a  rehearing  was 
denied  the  petitioner,  who  was  not  a  party  on  the  original 
hearing.     In  Myers  v.  Penn.  Co.'"  the  rehearing  was  denied, 

66.  Sec.  15  of  Act;  Sec.  400,  j^ost.  70.   Sec.  17  of  Act;  Sec.  417,  post. 

67.  Sec.  15  of  Act;  Sec.  404,  post.  71.    Re  Petition  of  Produce  Ex- 

68.  Sec.  16  of  Act;  Sec.  410,  post.  change,    2    I.    C.    C.    588,    2    I.    C. 

69.  Sec  6,  par.  2  of  Act  June  18.  R.  412. 

1910;  Sec  450,  post.  72.     Myers    v.    Pennsylvania    R. 


594  Peocedure  of  the  Intebstate.  [§  264- 

the  petition  not  showing  that  any  material  testimony  had 
been  overlooked  or  misapprehended  and  no  error  of  law 
being  disclosed.  In  overruling  the  first  motion  for  rehearing 
filed  with  the  Commission,  Judge  Cooley,  its  then  chairman, 
announced  this  rule  in  relation  thereto  i''" 

"(a)  The  Commission  will  promptly  and  carefully  examine 
an  api:)lication  for  a  rehearing  with  a  view  to  the  immediate 
correction  of  any  error  of  laAv  or  fact  found  to  exist,  but 
will  not  direct  a  rehearing  involving  the  expense  to  parties 
of  appearing  before  the  Commission  for  a  reargument,  unless 
satisfied  that  such  reargument  might  have  the  effect  of  chang- 
ing the  result  of  what  the  Commission  has  already  done. 

"(b)  The  statute  is  construed  as  dealing  with  the  sub- 
stance of  things,  and  as  contemplating,  as  far  as  that  is  pos- 
sible, methods  of  procedure  that  are  speedy  and  which  come 
at  once  to  the  very  right  of  questions  arising  in  the  trans- 
portation of  persons  and  freight." 

On  a  petition  asking  a  rehearing  in  a  case  decided  before 
the  Hepburn  amendment,  so  that  an  order  could  be  made 
under  section  15,  as  amended,  the  Commission  held  that  a 
case  closed  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  the  Amendment  of 
June  29,  1906,  could  not  be  reopened  to  enter  an  order  au- 
thorized by  the  amended  law.'* 

§  264.  Valuation  of  Property. — The  power  given  the  Com- 
mission by  Act  March  1,  1913,  to  classify,  inventory  and 
value  the  property  of  carriers  subgect  to  the  Act  has  been 
stated.^^  The  statute  gives  the  Commission  power  to  pre- 
scribe the  method  of  procedure  to  be  followed  in  the  conduct 
of  the  investigation,  the  form  in  which  the  results  shall  be 
submitted,  and  the  classification  of  the  elements  that  con- 
stitute the  ascertained  value. 

§  265.  Ora^l  Argument. — By  rule  1-4  of  the  rules  of  practice 
it  is  provided:  "Oral  argument  will  be  had  only  as  ordered 
by  the  Commission." 

Co.,    2    I.    C.    C.    573,    2    I.    C.    R.  74.    Cattle  Raisers'  Assn.  v.  Chi- 

403,  544.  cago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C.  6. 

73.    Riddle,  Dean  &  Co.  v.  Pitts-  75.   Sees.  231-233,  supra.    Kansas 

burg  &   L.   E.   R.   Co.,   1   I.   C.   C.       City  Sou.  Ry.  Co.  v.  United  States, 

490,  I.  I.  C.  R.  773.  251    U.    S.   ,    64    L.    Ed.   , 

40  Sup.  Ct.  . 


§  266]  Commerce   Commission.  595 

In  speaking  of  oral  argument  tlie  Commission  said : 

"The  act  provides  for  the  taking  of  testimony  in  these  in- 
vestigations by  a  single  commissioner  or  by  an  examiner.  It 
is  probable  that  the  Commission  might,  in  its  discretion,  re- 
quire the  submission  of  a  case  upon  the  testimony  so  taken 
and  written  briefs.  However  this  may  be,  we  have  never,  in 
fact,  yet  refused;  and  should  only  nefuse  under  peculiar 
and  unusual  circumstances,  the  application  of  a  party  to  be 
heard  orally.  As  above  observed,  testimony  in  these  investi- 
gations is  often  taken  without  the  presence  of  any  member 
of  the  Commission.  It  almost  never  happens  that  a  majority 
of  the  Commission  hear  the  testimony.  The  only  opportunity 
which  a  party  has  of  stating  his  views  to  this  body  by  word 
of  mouth  is  upon  tlie  argument.  The  importance  of  these 
arguments  is  recognized,  and  they  will  ordinarily  b'e  allowed 
as  a  matter  of  course.  Application  for  such  argument  should, 
however,  be  made  when  the  testimony  is  concluded  and  not 
deferred  as  in  this  case,  although  here,  even,  as  soon  as  we 
learned  that  the  parties  desired  to  present  their  views  orally 
the  proceeding  was  reopened  and  set  down  for  argument."''" 

§  266.  Estoppel  by  Former  Order  of  the  Commission. — 
While  the  technical  plea  of  res  adjud\icata  does  not  apply  to 
proceedings  before  the  Commission,  and  the  rule  of  stare 
decisis  has  been  held  inapplicable  to  its  reports,  that  body 
must,  of  necessity,  when  it  reaches  a  conclusion  on  a  par- 
ticular state  of  facts  adhere  to  that  conclusion  unless  and 
until  the  conditions  upon  which  the  conclusion  was  based 
have  changed  or  unless  the  Commission  acted  in  th|e  first 
instance  upon  a  misconception  of  fact  or  a  mistake  of  law." 

Where,  however,  the  Commission  prior  to  the  Hepburn 
Act,  effective  August  28,  1906,  had  declared  a  rate  unr<eason- 

76.  Ullman  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  Freight  Bureau  v.  Houston  &  T. 
14  I.  C.  C.  585,  586.  C.  T.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  22,  24;  Hills- 

77.  Banner  Milling  Co.  v.  New  dale  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Pennsyl- 
York  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  14  I.  vania  R.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  356,  361. 
C.  C.  398,  followed  in,  Kansas  Traugott,  Schmidt  &  Sons  v.  M.  C. 
City  Traffic  Bureau  v.  Atchison,  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  684;  Hires 
T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  Condensed  Milk  Co.  v.  P.  R.  Co., 
491,  497;  Receivers  &  Shippers  38  I.  C.  C.  441,  445;  Traffic  Bureau 
Assn.  V.  Cincinnati,  N.  O.  &  T.  of  Nashville  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co., 
P.  Ry.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C.  440;   Waco  43  I.  C.  C.  366,  367,  and  cases  cited. 


596  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  2G7 

able,  and  its  order  had  not  been  enforced  by  the  courts,  the 
Commission  was  not  prevented  after  the  passage  of  that 
Amendmient  from  again  considering  the  question.'* 

The  statute  requires  that  the  orders  of  the  Commission 
shall  continue  in  force  two  years,  after  which  time  the  Com- 
mission has  power  again  to  consider  the  question  and  enter 
another  and,  if  the  facts  justify,  a  different  order." 

§  267.  Rules  of  Procedure  Prescribed  by  the  Commission. 

— B}^  section  17  of  the  Act  it  is  provided: 

"That  the  Commission  may  conduct  its  proceedings  in 
such  manner  as  will  best  conduce  to  the  proper  dispatch  of 
business  and  to  the  ends  of  justicte.  *  *  *  Said  Commis- 
sion may,  from  time  to  time,  make  or  amend  such  general 
rules  or  orders  as  may  be  requisite  for  the  order  and  regula- 
tion of  proceedings  before  it,  including  forms  of  noticies  and 
the  service  thereof,  which  shall  conform,  as  nearly  as  may 
be.  to  those  in  use  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States.  Any 
party  may  appear  before  said  Commission  and  bie  hieard,  in 
person  or  by  attorney." 

Under  authority  granted  under  said  section,  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commislsion  has  promulgated  rules  of  practice 
which  are  copied  in  the  siections  following. 

By  amendment  repeated  in  the  1920  Act  the  Commission 
may  divide  itself  into  divisions  which  hear  and  decide  cases. 
On  rehearings  the  Commission  sit  as  a  whole. 

§  268.  Public  Sessions  and  Hearings. 

(a)  Public  sessions  of  the  Commission  or  Divisions  thereof 
for  hearing  evidence  or  oral  arguments  or  for  public  con- 
ferences, and  healrings  before  examiners,  will  be  held  as 
set  upon  notiqe  by  the  Commission  subject  to  change  upon 
such  notice  as  may  be  practicable.     Rule  1. 

78.  National  Hay  Assn.  v.  Michi-  Shore    &    M.    S.    Ry.    Co.,    202    U. 

gan  Cent.  R.   Co.,  19   I.  C.   C.   U.  S.    613,    50    L.    Ed.    1171,    26    Sup. 

For    a   history    of    the    first    case  Ct.  865. 

see,  National   Hay  Assn.   v.   Lake  79.    Re   Advances   in   Rates   be- 

Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  9  I.  C.  C.  tween    the    Mississippi    and    Mis- 

264;     Int.     Com.     Com.     v.     Lake  souri     Rivers,     Warnock     v.     Chi- 

Shore    &    S.    Ry.    Co.,    134    Fed.  cago   &    N.   W.    Ry.   Co.,   21    I.   C. 

942;     Int.     Com.     Com.     v.     Lake  C.   546. 


§  269]  Commerce  Commission.  597 

§  269.  Parties. 

(a)  The  parties  to  i)roceedings  before  the  Commission  are 
complainants,  defendants,  interveners,  protestants,  respond- 
ents, applicants,  and  petitioners,  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  proceeding  and  their  relation  thereto.  Any  party  may 
appear  and  be  heard  in  person  or  by  attorney. 

(b)  In  complaint  cases,  the  parties  who  may  complain  to 
the  Commission  of  anything  done  or  omitted  to  be  done  in 
violation  of  the  provisions  of  th|e  Act  to  regulate  commerce, 
as  amended,  otherwise  known  as  the  Interstate  CV>nirnerce 
Act,  and  in  these  rules  referred  to  as  the  Act,  by  any  com- 
mon carrier  subject  to  the  Act  are  thosle  designated  in  sec- 
tion 13  of  the  Act,  and  are  styled  complainants.  The  com- 
mon carriers  so  complained  of,  and  their  receivers  or  operat- 
ing trustees,  if  any,  are  styled  defendants.  Two  or  more 
complainants  may  join  in  one  complaint  if  their  respective 
causes  of  action  are  against  the  same  defendant  or  defend- 
ants and  involve  substantially  the  saniie  violation  of  the  Act 
and  a  like  state  of  facts. 

(c)  If  complaint  is  made  in  respect  of  through  transporta- 
tion l:»y  continuous  carriage  or  shipment  all  carriers  subject 
to  the  Act  participating  therein  should  be  made  defendants. 

(d)  If  complaint  is  made  of  rates,  fares,  charg'es,  regula- 
tions or  practices  of  more  than  one  carrier  all  carriers  against 
which  an  order  is  sought  should  be  made  defendants. 

(e)  If  complaint  is  made  of  a  classification  or  any  pro- 
vision thereof  it  will  ordinarily  suffice  to  make  defendants  th,e 
carriers  operating  one  or  more  through  routes  between  repre- 
sentative points  of  origin  and  destination. 

(f)  The  receiver  or  operating  trustee  of  the  line  of  a 
defendant  must  also  be  made  defendant. 

(g)  In  investigation  proceedings  the  carriers  designated 
therein  are  styled  respondents. 

(h)  In  invlestigation  and  suspension  proceedings  the  ap- 
plicants upon  whose  protests  the  proceeding  was  instituted 
are  styled  protestants. 

(i)  In  applications  for  relief  from  any  provision  of  the 
Act  the  carriers  by  or  on  whose  behalf  the  application  is 
made  are  styled  applicants. 

(j)    Others  seeking  relief  are  styled  petitioners. 


598  Proceduee  of  the  Inteestate.  [^  269 A 

§  269 A,  Interventions. 

I'k)  Petitioners  permitted  to  intervene  as  hereinafter  pro- 
vided are  styled  interveners. 

(1)  Any  one  entitlied  under  the  Act  to  complain  to  the 
Commission  may  petition  for  leave  to  intervene  in  any  pend- 
ing proceeding  prior  to  or  at  the  time  it  is  called  for  hear- 
ing, but  not  after  except  for  good  cause  shown.  The  peti- 
tion shall  set  forth  the  grounds  of  the  proposed  intervention ; 
the  position  and  interest  of  the  petitioner  in  the  proceeding ; 
and,  if  affirmative  relief  is  sought,  should  conform  to  the  re- 
quirements for  a  formal  complaint.  Leave  will  not  be  granted 
except  on  allegations  reasonably  pertinent  to  the  issues  al- 
ready preslented  and  which  do  not  unduly  broaden  them.  If 
leave  is  granted,  the  intervener  thereby  becomes  a  party  to 
the  proceeding.  When  the  pietition  is  filed  prior  to  the 
bearing  the  petitioner  must  furnish  therewith  a  .sufficient 
number  of  copies  for  service  upon  all  parties  to  the  proceed- 
ing and  three  additional  copies  for  the  use  of  the  Com- 
mission. When  not  so  filed  prior  to  but  tendered  at  the 
hearing  sufficient  copies  must  be  provided  for  distribution  as 
motion  papers  to  the  parties  represented  at  the  hearing. 
If  leave  be  granted  at  the  hearing  sufficient  copies  must 
also  be  furnished  for  service  and  3  additional  copies  for  the 
use  of  the  Commission.  It  is  desirable,  especially  Avhere  af- 
firmative relief  is  sought,  that  the  pietition  be  filed  in  season 
to  permit  of  service  on  the  defendants  and  afford  them  an 
opportunity  to  answer  before  the  hearing,  thereby  making 
it  possible  in  some  instances  to  grant  leave  which  otherwise 
it  may  be  necessary  to  deny  in  fairness  to  the  parties  to 
the  proceeding.    Kule  2. 

§  270.  Compilaints. 

(a)  Complaints  may  be  either  informal  or  formal. 

(b)  Informal  complaints  may  be  made  by  letter  or  other 
writing  and  as  received  are  filed.  Matters  thus  presented 
are,  if  their  nature  warrants  it,  taken  up  by  correspondence 
with  the  carriers  affected  in  an  endeavor  to  bring  about  ad- 
justment or  satisfaction  of  the  complaint  without  formal 
hearing,  and  are  given  serial  members  on  the  informal  doc- 


§  270]  CoMMEKCE  Commission.  599 

ket.     This  informal  procedure  has  been  found  efficacious  in 
the  great  majority  of  cases  and  is  recommended. 

(c)  No  form  of  informal  complaint  is  prlescribed,  but  in 
substance  the  letter  or  other  writing  must  contain  the  es- 
sential elements  of  a  complaint,  including  name  and  ad- 
dress of  the  complainant,  a  statement  that  the  Act  has  been 
violated  by  the  carrier  or  carriers  named,  indicating  when, 
where  and  how,  and  a  request  for  affirmative  relief.  It  is 
desirable  that  the  informal  complaint  be  accompanied  by 
copies  in  sufficient  number  to  enable  the  Commission  to 
transmit  one  to  (each  carrier  named,  and  it  may  be  ac- 
companied by  supporting  papers.  Proceedings  thus  instituted 
on  the  informal  docket  are  without  prejudice  to  complain- 
ant's right  to  file  and  prosecute  formal  complaint,  where- 
upon the  proceedings  on  the  informal  docket  will  ble  dis- 
continued. 

(d)  Sec.  ]6  of  the  Act,  as  amended  bry  sec.  424  of  the 
Transportation  Act,  1920,  provides  that  all  complaints  for 
the  recovery  of  damages  shall  be  filed  with  the  Commission 
within  two  years  from  th/e  time  the  cause  of  action  accrues, 
and  not  after,  unless  the  carrier,  after  the  expiration  of 
such  two  years  or  within  ninety  days  before  such  expira- 
tion, begins  an  action  for  recovery  of  charges  in  respect  of 
the  same  siervice,  in  which  case  such  period  of  two  years 
shall  be  extended  to  and  including  ninety  days  from  the  time 
such  action  by  the  carrier  is  begun.  In  either  case  the  cause 
of  action  in  iiesjiect  of  a  shipment  of  property  shall,  for  the 
purposes  of  said  Sec.  16,  be  deemed  to  accrue  upon  delivery 
or  tender  of  delivery  thereof  by  the  carrier,  and  not  after. 
Sec.  206,  subdivision  (f),  of  the  Transportation  Act,  1920, 
provides  that  the»  period  of  Federal  control  shall  not  be 
computed  as  a  part  of  the  period  of  limitation  in  claims  for 
reparation  to  the  Commission  for  causes  of  action  arising  prior 
to  Federal  control.  The  period  of  time  within  which  com- 
plaints for  recovery  of  damages  shall  be  filed  with  the  Com- 
mission under  these  statutory  provisions,  and  those  cited  in 
Appendix  1,  will  be  referred  to  in  these  Rules  as  the  statu- 
tory period. 

(e)  A  complaint  for  the  recovery  of  damages  may  be  in- 
formal bfut  must  be  filed  within  the   statutory  period,  and, 


C)00  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  27Q 

if  informal,  sliculd  contain,  in  addition  to  the  matters  above 
indicated,  such  data  as  will  serve  to  identify  with  reason- 
able definiteness  the  shipments  or  other  transportation  serv- 
ices in  respect  of  which  nacovery  is  sought,  the  carriers  par- 
ticipating, the  kind  and  amount  of  injury  sustained  when  and 
by  whom,  and,  if  any  recovery  is  sought  on  behalf  of  others 
than  complainant,  a  statement  of  the  capacity  or  authority 
in  or  by  which  complaint  is  made  in  their  behalf.  Notification 
to  the  Commission  that  a  complaint  may  or  will  be  filed  later 
for  the  necovery  of  damages  is  not  a  filing  of  complaint  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute. 

Illustrative  of  pertinent  data  are,  in  case  of  shipments,  their 
dates,  origins,  destinations,  consignors  and  consignees,  dates 
of  delivery  or  tender  of  delivery,  car  numbers  and  initials 
if  in  carloads,  routes  of  movement,  if  known,  commodities 
transported,  weight,  charges  assessed,  at  what  rate,  when 
and  by  whom  paid  and  by  whom  borne. 

(f)  Carriers  willing  to  pay  damages  for  vio-lations  of 
the  Act  should  make  application  in  the  form  prescribed  by 
the  Commission  for  authority  to  pay.  Such  applications  will 
be  filed  in  the  special  docket  under  serial  number,  and,  if 
granted,  orders  to  that  eft'ect  will  be  entered  on  the  special 
docket.  Such  application,  when  not  made  upon  informal  com- 
plaint filed  with  the  Commission,  must  be  filed  within  the 
statutory  period  and  will  be  deemed  the  equivalent  of  an 
informal  complaint  and  an  a^ifiwer  thereto  admitting  the 
matters  stated  in  the  application.  If  a  carrier  is  unable  tc 
file  such  application  Avithin  the  statutory  period  and  tin 
claim  is  not  already  protected  from  the  operation  of  the 
statute  by  informal  complaint,  a  statement  setting  forth  the 
facts  may  be  filed  by  the  carrier  within  tte  statutory  perioid. 
Such  statement  will  be  deemed  the  equivalent  of  an  informal 
complaint  fil^d  on  behalf  of  the  shipper  and  sufficient  to  stay 
the  operation  of  the  statute. 

(g)  If  it  develops  that  the  complaint  for  recovery  of  damages 
cannot  be  disposed  of  informally,  the  complainant  and  the  car- 
riprs  affected  will  be  so  notified  in  writing  by  the  Commission. 
In  such  case  formal  complaint  must  be  filed  with  the  CommissioL 
wnthin  6  months  after  the  date  on  which  such  notification  is  mail- 
ed to  complainant,  and,  if  so  filed,  will  be  deemed  to  relate  back 


<§!  270]  Commerce   Commission.  601 

to  the  date  of  filing  the  informal  complaint.  If  formal  com- 
plaint is  not  so  filed  within  6  months  after  the  date  of  mail- 
ing such  notification  the  complainant  will  be  deemed  to  have 
abandoned  the  complaint  and  no  formal  complaint  for  re- 
covery of  damages  based  on  the  same  cause  of  action  will 
thereafter  be  placed  on  file  or  considered  unless  itself  within 
the  statutory  period. 

(h)  Formal  complaints  must  conform  to  the  requirements 
of  rule  XXI.  The  names  of  all  parties  complainant  and 
defendant  must  be  stated  in  full  without  abbreviation,  and 
the  address  of  each  complainant,  with  the  name  and  address 
of  his  attorney,  if  any,  must  appear.  Each  formal  complaint 
must  be  accompanied  by  copies  in  sufficient  number  to  enable 
the  Commission  to  serve  one  upon  each  party  defendant  and 
retain  three  for  its  own  use.  The  Commission  will  serve 
the  complaint  upon  each  defendant  by  leaving  a  copy  with 
its  designated  agent  in  Washington,  D.  C,  or,  if  no  such 
agent  has  been  designated,  biy  posting  a  copy  in  the  office 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Commission. 

(i)  Complaints  should  be  so  drawn  as  fully  and  completely 
to  advise  the  parties  defendant  and  the  Commission  wherein 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  have  been,  are,  (or)  (and)  will  be 
violated,  by  a  continuance  of  the  acts  or  omissions  complained 
of,  and  should  set  forth  briefly  and  in  plain  language  the 
facts  claimed  to  constitute  such  violation  and  the  relief 
sought.  Two  or  more  grounds  of  complaint  involving  the 
same  principle,  subject,  or  state  of  facts,  may  be  included 
in  one  complaint,  but  should  be  separately  stated  and  num- 
bered. The  several  rates,  fares,  charges,  classifications,  regu- 
lations, or  practices  complained  of  should  be  set  out  by 
specific  reference  to  the  tariffs  in  which  they  appear  when- 
ever that  is  practicable. 

(j)  In  case  violation  of  two  or  more  sections  of  the  Act 
is  alleged  the  facts  claimed  to  constitute  violation  of  one 
section  should  be  stated  separately  from  those  in  respect 
of  any  other  section  or  sections,  wherever  that  can  be  done 
by  reference  or  otherwise  without  undue  repetition. 

(k)  In  case  violation  of  section  1  of  the  Act  is  alleged, 
the  complaint  should  show  whether  the  rates,  fares  or  charges 
assailed  have  been  increased  since  January  1,  1910. 


CO'2  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  270 

(1)  In  case  unjust  discrimination  in  violation  of  section 
2  is  alleged  the  special  rate,  rebate,  drawback  or  othei*  device 
and  the  manner  in  which  thereby  the  greater  or  less  com- 
pensation complained  of  has  been  charged,  collected  or  re- 
ceived should  be  specified. 

(m)  In  case  undue  or  unreasonable  preference  or  advan- 
tage, or  undue  or  unreasonablle  prejudice  or  disadvantage, 
in  violation  of  section  3  alleged,  the  particular  person, 
company,  firm,  corporation,  locality  or  description  of  traffic 
affected  thereby,  and  the  particular  preference  or  advantage, 
or  prejudice  or  disadvantage,  relied  upon  as  constituting 
such  violation,  should  be  clearly  specified. 

(n)  If  the  complaint  brings  in  issue  any  rate,  fare,  charge, 
classification,  regulation  or  practice,  made  or  imposed  by 
authority  of  any  State,  or  initiated  by  the  President  duritig 
the  period  of  Federal  control,  as  causing  any  undue  or  un- 
reasonable advantage,  preference,  or  prejudice  as  between 
persons  or  localities  in  intrastate  commerce  on  the  one  hand 
and  interstate  or  foreign  commerce  on  the  other  hand,  or  any 
undue,  unreasonable,  or  unjust  discrimination  against  inter- 
state or  foreign  commerce,  which  is  forbidden  and  declared 
unlawful  under  Sec.  13  of  the  Act,  as  amended  by  Sec.  416 
of  the  Transportation  Act,  1920  the  complaint  should  also 
contain  appropriate  allegations  to  present  for  decision  the 
issue  of  the  justness  and  reasonableness  under  section  1  of 
the  rates,  fares,  charges,  classifications,  regulations  or  prac- 
tices complained  of  in  so  far  as  applicable  to  interstate  or 
foreigTi  commerce,  and  the  issue  as  to  what  should  be  the 
rate,  fare  or  charge,  or  the  maximum  or  minimum,  or  maxi- 
mum and  minimum,  thereafter  to  be  charged,  and  the  classi- 
fication, regulation  or  practice  thereafter  to  b)e  observed  in 
order  to  remove  such  advantage,  preference,  prejudice  or  dis- 
crimination. The  facts  should  be  stated  with  sufficient  de- 
finiteness  to  disclose  fully  the  contention  made  in  respect  of 
any  tariff  provision  prescribed,  established  or  compelled  by 
State  authority  jor  by  the  President.  The  Commission,  be- 
fore proceeding  to  hear  and  dispose  of  such  issue,  must 
cause  the  State  or  States  interested  to  be  notified  of  the  pro- 
ceeding and  must  be  furnished  with  copies  of  the  complaint 
in  sufficient  number  for  that  purpose. 


^  270]  Commerce   CoMMissioisr.  603 

(o)  In  ease  violation  of  section  4  of  the  Act  is  alleged  the 
facts  as  to  compensation  charged  or  received,  the  respects  in 
which  the  section  was  therebfy  violated,  and  the  tariff  pro- 
visions applicable,  should  be  stated  with  particularity. 

(p)  In  case  recovery  of  damages  is  sought  the  complaint 
should  contain  appropriate  allegations  showing,  in  addition 
to  the  matters  indicated  above,  such  data  as  will  serve  to 
identify  with  reasonable  detiniteness  the  shipments  or  other 
transportation  services  in  respect  of  which  recovery  is  sought, 
and  stating  (a)  that  complainant  makes  claim  for  reparation, 
(b)  the  name  of  each  individual  claimant  asking  reparation,  (c) 
the  names  of  defendants  against  which  claim  is  made,  (d)  the 
commodities  transported,  the  rate  applied,  the  date  when 
the  transportation  charges  were  paid,  by  whom  paid,  and  by 
whom  borne,  (e)  the  period  of  time  within  which  or  the 
specific  dates  upon  which  the  shipments  were  made,  and 
the  dates  when  they  were  delivered  or  tendered  for  delivery, 
(f)  the  points  of  origin  and  destination,  either  specifically, 
or,  where  they  are  numerous,  by  definite  indication  of  a 
defined  territorial  or  rate  group  of  the  points  of  origin  and  des- 
tination, and,  if  known,  the  routes  of  movement,  (g)  the  nature 
and  amount  of  the  injury  sustained  by  each  claimant,  and  (h) 
if  any  reparation  is  sought  on  behalf  of  others  than  the  com- 
plainant, in  what  capacity  or  by  what  authority  complaint  is 
made  in  their  behalf. 

(q)  The  Commission  will  consider  as  in  substantial  com- 
pliance with  the  statute  of  limitations  a  complaint  in  which 
the  complainant  alleges  that  the  matters  complained  of,  if 
continued  in  the  future,  will  constitute  violations  of  the 
Act  in  the  particulars  and  to  the  extent  indicated,  and  prays 
reparation  to  the  Commission  for  causes  of  action  arising  prior 
which  may  move  during  the  pendency  of  the  proceeding  and 
on  which  the  transportation  charges  shall  be  paid  and  borne 
by  the  complainant. 

(r)  If  a  general  rate  adjustment  is  challenged  in  the  com- 
plaint, or  many  shipments  or  points  of  origin  and  destina- 
tion are  involved,  it  is  the  practice  of  the  Commission  to  find 
and  determine  in  its  report  the  issues  as  to  violation  of  the 
Act,  injury  therebjy  to  complainant,  and  right  to  reparation, 
and  thereafter  to  afford  the  parties  opportunity  to  agree  or 


004  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  271 

make  proof  respecting  the  shipments  and  amount  of  repara- 
tion due  under  its  finding  before  entering  its  order  awarding 
reparation.  See  Rule  V.  In  such  eases  freight  bills  and  other 
exhibits  bearing  on  the  details  of  shipments,  and  the  amount 
of  reparation  on  each,  need  not  be  produced  at  the  hearing 
unless  called  for  or  needed  to  develop  other  pertinent  facts, 

(s)  Except  under  unusual  circumstances,  and  for  good 
cause  shown,  reparation  will  not  be  awarded  upon  a  com- 
plaint in  which  it  is  not  specifically  prayed  for,  or  upon  a  new 
complaint  by  or  for  the  same  complainant  which  is  based  upon 
any  finding  in  the  original  proceeding. 

(t)  Supplemental  complaints  may  be  tendered  for  filing 
by  the  parties  complainant  against  the  parties  defendant 
in  the  original  complaint,  setting  forth  any  causes  of  action 
under  the  Act  alleged  to  have  accrued  in  favor  of  the  com- 
plainants and  against  the  defendants  since  the  filing  of  the 
original  complaint,  and,  upon  leave  granted,  will  be  filed 
and  served  by  the  Commission  as  provided  in  cases  of  original 
complaints,  and  heard,  considered  and  disposed  of  therewith 
in  the  same  proceeding,  if  practicable. 

(u)  If  recovery  of  damages  is  sought  by  supplemental 
complaint  it  must  be  filed  with  the  Commission  within  the 
statutory  period. 

(v)     Cross   complaints.     See  Rule  IV.     Rule  3. 

§  271.  Answers. 

(a)  Answers  must  conform  to  the  requirements  of  Rule 
XXI. 

(b)  Answers  to  formal  complaints  must  be  filed  with  the 
Commission  within  20  days  after  the  day  on  which  the  com- 
plaint was  served.  For  defendants  having  general  offices 
at  or  west  of  El  Paso,  Tex.,  Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  or  Spokane, 
"Wash.,  said  period  of  20  days  is  extended  to  30  days.  The 
periods  so  fixed  may  be  shortened  or  extended  by  the  Com- 
mission Avhen  it  deems  advisable.  The  answer  must  in  the 
same  period  be  served  as  provided  in  Rule  VI.  Any  defend- 
ant failing  to  file  and  serve  answer  within  said  period  will 
be  deemed  in  default  and  issue  as  to  such  defendant  will  be 
thereby  joined. 

(c)  Answers  to  petitions  in  intervention  or  amended 
complaints  filed  and  served  upon  leave  granted  need  not  be 


§  271]  Commerce  Commission.  605 

separately  made  unless  the  defendants  so  elect,  and  their 
answers  to  the  formal  complaint  will  be  deemed  answers  to 
the  petition  in  intervention.  AnsAvers  if  separately  made 
should  be  tiled  and  served  as  promptly  as  possible,  and  within 
the  same  period  after  service  of  petition  in  intervention  as 
is  above  provided  for  answers  after  service  of  complaints. 
Answers  to  cross-complaints  filed  and  served  upon  leave 
granted  must  be  tiled  and  served  within  the  same  period  after 
service  of  the  cross-complaint. 

(d)  x\ll  answers  should  be  so  drawn  as  fully  and  completely 
to  advise  the  parties  and  the  Commission  of  the  nature  of 
the  defense,  and  should  admit  or  deny  specifically  and  in 
detail  each  material  allegation  of  the  pleading  answered. 

(e)  An  answer  denying  that  an  alleged  discrimination  is 
unjust  under  section  2  of  the  Act,  or  that  an  alleged  prefer- 
ence or  prejudice  is  undue  or  unreasonable  under  section  3 
of  the  Act,  should  state  fully  the  grounds  relied  upon  in 
making  such  denial. 

(f)  Whenever  it  is  apparent  from  the  pleading  answered, 
either  by  direct  allegation  or  otherwise,  that  a  departure 
from  the  requirements  of  the  fourth  section  of  the  Act,  is 
involved,  the  answer  should  set  forth  by  number  the  par- 
ticular application  or  order,  if  any,  which  protects  such  de- 
parture. 

(g)  It  is  desired  that  every  effort  be  made  to  narrow  tlie 
issues  upon  hearing.  Matters  alleged  as  affirmative  defenses 
should  be  separately  stated  and  numbered.  Counterclaims 
and  set-offs  against  shippers  are  not  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Commission. 

(h)  Cross-complaints  alleging  violations  of  1he  Act  by  car- 
riers complainant  or  seeking  relief  against  them  thereunder 
may  be  tendered  for  filing  by  defendants  with  their  answers, 
and,  upon  leave  granted,  Avill  be  filed  and  served  by  the 
Commission  in  the  manner  provided  in  Rule  III  for  com- 
plaints. In  such  cases  the  cross-complaint  will  be  heard, 
considered  and  disposed  of  in  connection  with  the  issues  raised 
by  the  complaint  in  the  same  proceeding. 

(i^  If  a  defendant  satisfies  a  formal  complaint,  either  be- 
fore or  after  answering,  a  statement  to  that  effect  signed  by 


606  Peoceduee  op  the  Inteestate.  [§  272 

both  complainant  and  defendant  must  be  filed  setting  forth 
when  and  how  the  complaint  has  been  satisfied.     Rule  4. 

§  272.  Reparation  Statements — Formal  Claims  For  Repara- 
tion Based  Upon  Finding's  of  the  Commission. 

(a)  When  the  Commission  finds  that  reparation  is  due, 
but  that  the  amount  cannot  be  ascertained  upon  the  record 
before  it,  the  complainant  should  immediately  prepare  a, 
statement  showing  details  of  the  shipments  on  which  repara- 
tion is  claimed  in  accordance  with  Form  5.  (See  page  38). 
The  statement  should  not  include  any  shipment  not  covered 
by  the  Commission's  findings,  or  any  shipment  on  which 
complaint  was  not  filed  with  the  Comjnission  within  the 
statutory  period.  See  Rule  III.  The  statement,  together  with 
the  paid  freight  bills  on  the  shipments,  or  true  copies  thereof, 
should  then  be  forwarded  to  the  carrier  which  collected  the 
charges  for  checking  and  certification  as  to  its  accuracy. 
The  certificate  must  be  signed  in  ink  by  a  general  accounting 
officer  of  the  carrier  and  should  cover  all  of  the  information 
shown  in  the  statement.  If  the  carrier  which  collected  the 
charges  is  not  a  defendant  in  the  case  its  certificate  must  be 
concurred  in  by  likci  signature  on  biehalf  of  a  carrier  defend- 
ant. 

(b)  If  the  shipments  moved  over  more  than  one  route  a 
separate  statement  should  be  prepared  for  each  route,  and 
separately  numbered,  except  that  shipments  as  to  which  the 
collecting  carrier  is  in  each  instance  the  same  may  be  listed 
in  a  single  statement  if  grouped  according  to  routes. 

(c)  Statements  so  prepared  and  certified  shall  be  filed 
with  the  Commission,  whereupon  it  will  consider  entry  of  an 
order  for  reparation.  The  filing  of  statements  will  not  stop 
the  running  of  the  statute  of  limitations  as  to  shipments  not 
covered  by  complaint  or  supplemental  complaint.  See  Rule 
III. 

(d)  All  discrepancies,  duplications,  or  other  errors  in  the 
statements  should  be  adjusted  by  the  parties  and  correct 
agreed  statements  submitted  to  the  Commission.     Rule  5. 

§  273.  Service  of  Papers. 

(a)  Formal  complaints  and,  upon  leave  granted,  petitions 
in   intervention,    supplemental    complaints,    cross- complaints, 


<§  274]  CoMMEECE  Commission.  607 

and  amended  complaints,  will  be  served  by  the  Commission, 
and  copies  of  each  must  be  furnished  in  sufficient  number,  as 
provided  in  Rule  III  in  respect  of  complaints. 

(b)  Answers,  petitions,  motions,  applications,  notices  and 
all  other  papers,  except  depositions,  in  proceedings  pending 
before  the  Commission  upon  its  formal  docket,  must,  when 
filed  or  tendered  for  filing  by  the  Commission  show  service 
thereof  upon  all  parties  to  the  proceeding.  Such  service 
shall  be  made  by  delivering  in  person  or  %  mailing,  properly 
addressed  with  postage  prepaid,  one  copy  to  each  party. 

(c)  When  any  party  has  appeared  by  attorney  service  upon 
such  attorney  will  be  deemed  service  upon  the  party.    Rule  6. 

§  274.  Amendments  to  Pleadings. — Amendments  to  any 
pleading  will  be  allowed  or  refused  by  the  Commission  at  its 
discretion.    Rule  7. 

§  275.  Continuances. — Continuances  and  extensions  of  time 
will  be  granted  or  denied  by  the  Commission  at  its  discretion. 
Rule  8. 

§  276.  Stipulations  Desirable   and  Must  be  in  Writing:. — 

The  parties  may,  by  stipulation  in  writing  filed  with  the 
Commission,  or  presented  at  the  hearing,  agree  upon  any 
facts  involved  in  the  proceeding.  It  is  desired  that  the 
facts  be  thus  agreed^  upon  in  so  far  as  and  whenever  practic- 
able.    Rule  9. 

§  277.  Hearings. 

(a)  When  issue  is  joined  upon  formal  complaint  by  service 
of  answer,  or  by  failure  of  defendant  to  answer,  the  Com- 
mission will  assign  a  time  and  place  for  hearing.  Witnesses 
will  be  examined  orally  before  the  Commission,  a  commis- 
sioner, or  one  of  its  examiners,  unless  their  testimony  is 
taken  by  deposition  or  the  facts  are  agi'eed  upon  as  provided 
for  in  these  rules. 

(bl)  At  hearings  on  formal  complaint  the  complainant  shall 
open  and  close.  At  hearings  upon  applications  for  relief 
from  any  provision  of  the  Act  the  applicant  shall  open  and 
close.  At  hearings  of  investigation  and  suspension  proceed- 
ings the  respondent  shall  open  and  close.  At  hearings  of  all 
other  investigations   on   the   motion   of   the   Commission,   the 


608  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [^  278 

Cnmiiiissioii  shall  open  and  close,  except  as  the  Commission 
may  prescril)e  a  different  order  or  the  presiding  commissioner 
or  examiner  may  otherwise  direct.  In  hearings  of  several 
proceedings  upon  a  consolidated  record  the  presiding  com- 
missioner or  examiner  shall  designate  who  shall  open  and 
close.  Interveners  shall  follow  the  party  in  whose  behalf 
the  intervention  is  made,  and  in  all  cases  where  the  interven- 
tion is  not  in  support  of  either  original  party  the  presiding 
commissioner  or  examiner  shall  designate  at  what  stage  such 
interveners  shall  be  heard.     Rule  10. 

§  278.  Depositions,  How  Taken. 

(a)  The  depositioii  of  a  witness  for  use  in  a  proceeding 
pending  before  the  Commission  may,  after  issue  joined,  be 
taken  in  compliance  with  the  following  rules  of  procedure, 
prescribed  under  section  17  of  the  Act,  but  not  otherwise. 

(b)  Such  despositions  may  be  taken  before  a  special  agent 
or  examiner  of  the  Commission,  or  any  judge  or  commissioner 
of  any  court  of  the  United  States,  or  any  clerk  of  a  dis- 
trict court,  or  any  chancellor,  justice,  or  judge  of  a  supreme 
or  superior  court,  mayor  or  chief  magistrate  of  a  city,  judge 
of  a  county  court  or  court  of  common  pleas  of  any  of  the 
United  States,  or  any  notary  public  not  being  of  counsel  or 
attorney  to  either  of  the  parties  nor  interested  in  the  event 
of  the  proceeding  or  investigation,  according  to  such  designa- 
tion as  the  Commission  may  make  in  any  order  made  by 
it  in  the  premises,  except  that  where  such  deposition  is 
taken  in  a  fcn-eign  country  it  may  be  taken  before  an  officer  or 
person  designated  by  the  Commission  or  agreed  upon  by  the 
parties  by  stipulation  in  writing  to  be  tiled  with  the  Com- 
mission. 

Any  party  desiring  to  take  the  deposition  of  a  witness  in 
such  a  proceeding  shall  notify  the  Commission  to  that  effect, 
and  in  such  notice  shall  state  the  time  Avhen,  the  place  where, 
and  the  name  and  post-office  address  of  the  party  before 
whom  it  is  desired  that  the  deposition  be  taken,  the  name  and 
y)ost-office  address  of  the  witness  and  the  subject  matter  or 
matters  concerning  which  the  witness  is  expected  to  testify, 
whereupon  the  Commission  will  make  and  serve  upon  the 
parties  or  their  attorneys  an  order  wherein  the  Commission 


§  278]  Commerce   Commission.  609 

shall  name  the  witness  whose  deposition  is  to  be  takern, 
and  specify  the  time  when,  the  place  where,  and  the  party 
before  whom  the  witness  is  to  testify,  but  such  time  and 
place,  and  the  party  before  whom  the  deposition  is  to  be 
taken,  so  specified  in  the  Commission's  order,  may  or  may  not 
be  the  same  as  those  named  iu  said  notice  to  the  Commission. 

(c)  Every  person  whose  deposition  is  so  taken  shall  be 
cautioned  and  sworn  (or  affirmed,  if  he  so  request)  to  testify 
the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth  concerning  the 
matter  about  which  he  shall  testify,  and  shall  be  carefully 
examined.  His  testimony  shall  be  reduced  to  typewriting 
by  the  officer  before  whom  the  deposition  is  taken,  or  under 
his  direction,  after  which  the  deposition  shall  be  subscribed 
by  the  witness  and  certified  in  usual  form  by  the  officer. 
After  the  deposition  has  been  so  subscribed  and  certified  it 
shall,  together  with  two  copies  thereof  made  by  such  officer 
or  under  his  direction,  be  forwarded  by  such  officer  under 
seal  in  an  envelope  addressed  to  the  Commission  at  its  office 
in  Washington,  D.  C.  Upon  receipt  of  the  deposition  and 
copies  the  Commission  Mall  file  in  the  record  in  said  proceed- 
ing such  deposition  and  forward  one  copy  to  the  complain- 
ant or  his  attorney  and  the  other  copy  to  the  defendant  or 
its  attorney,  except  that  where  there  are  more  than  one  com- 
plainant or  defendant  the  copies  will  be  forwarded  by  the 
Commission  to  the  parties  designated  by  such  complainants 
or  defendants  as  the  case  may  be. 

(d)  Such  depositions  must  conform  to  the  specifications 
of  Rule  XXI. 

(e)  No  deposition  shall  be  taken  except  after  6  days'  notice 
to  the  parties,  and  where  the  deposition  is  taken,  in  a  foreign 
country  such  notice  shall  be  at  least  15  days. 

(f)  No  such  deposition  shall  be  taken  either  before  the 
proceeding  is  at  issue,  or,  unless  under  special  circumstances 
and  for  good  cause  shown,  within  10  days  prior  to  the  date 
of  the  hearing  thereof  assigned  by  the  Commission,  and  wliere 
the  deposition  is  taken  in  a  foreign  country  it  shall  not  be 
taken  after  30  days  prior  to  such  date  of  hearing. 

(g)  Witnesses  whose  depositions  are  taken  pursuant  to 
these  rules  and  the  magistrate  or  other  officer  taking  the 
same,  unless  he  be  a  special  agent  or  examiner  of  the  Com- 


610  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  279 

mission,  shall  severally  be  entitled  to  the  same  fees  as  are 
paid  for  like  service  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  which 
fees  shall  be  paid  by  the  party  or  parties  at  whose  instance 
the  depositions  are  taken.    Eule  11. 

§  279.  Witnesses  and  Subpoenas, 

(a)  Subpoenas  requiring  the  attendance  of  witnesses  from 
any  place  in  the  United  States  at  any  designated  place  of 
hearing  may  be  issued  by  any  member  of  the  Commission. 

(b)  Subpoenas  for  the  production  of  books,  papers,  or 
documents,  unless  directed  by  the  Commission  upon  its  own 
motion,  will  issue  only  upon  application  in  writing.  Appli- 
cations to  compel  witnesses  who  are  not  parties  to  the  pro- 
ceedings, or  agents  of  such  parties,  to  produce  documentary 
evidence  must  be  verified  and  must  specify,  as  nearly  as 
may  be,  the  books,  papers,  or  documents  desired  and  the 
facts  to  be  proved  by  them.  Applications  to  compel  a  party  to 
the  proceeding  to  produce  books,  papers,  or  documents  should 
set  forth  the  books,  papers,  or  documents  sought,  with  a 
showing  that  they  will  be  of  service  in  the  determination  of 
the  proceeding. 

(c)  Witnesses  who  are  summoned  are  entitled  to  the  same 
fees  as  are  paid  for  like  service  in  the  courts  of  the  United 
States,  such  fees  to  be  paid  by  the  party  at  whose  instance 
the  testimony  is  taken.     Rule  12. 

§  280.    Documentary  Evidence. 

(a)  Where  relevant  and  material  matter  offered  in  evidence 
by  any  party  is  embraced  in  a  book,  paper  or  document  con- 
taining other  matter,  not  material  or  relevant,  the  party  must 
plainly  designate  the  matter  so  offered.  If  the  other  matter  is  in 
such  volume  as  would  unnecessarily  cumber  the  record,  such 
book,  paper  or  document  will  not  be  received  in  evidence 
but  may  be  marked  for  identification  and,  if  properly  authen- 
ticated, the  relevant  and  material  matter  may  be  read  into 
the  record,  or,  if  the  presiding  commissioner  or  examiner  so 
directs,  a  true  copy  of  such  matter,  in  proper  form,  shall  be 
received  as  an  exhibit,  and  like  copies  delivered  by  the  party 
offering  the  same  to  opposing  parties  or  their  attorneys  ap- 
pearing at  the  hearing,  who  shall  be  afforded  opportunity 
to   examine   the   book,   paper   or   document,   and   to    offer   in 


§  280]  Commerce  Commission.  611 

evidence  in  like  maimer  othev  portions  thereof  if  found  to 
be  material  and  relevant. 

(b)  In  case  any  portion  of  a  tariff,  rej)ort,  circular,  or 
other  document  on  file  with  the  Commission  is  offered  in 
evidence,  the  party  offering  the  same  must  give  specific 
reference  to  the  items  or  pages  and  lines  thereof  to  be  con- 
sidered. The  Commission  will  take  notice  of  items  in  tariffs 
and  annual  or  other  periodical  reports  of  carriers  properly 
on  file  with  it  or  in  annual,  statistical,  and  other  official 
reports  of  the  Commission.  When  it  is  desired  to  direct  the 
Commission's  attention  to  such  tariffs  or  reports  upon  hear- 
ing or  in  briefs  or  argument  it  must  be  done  with  the  pre- 
cision specified  in  the  second  preceding  sentence.  In  case 
any  testimony  in  proceedings  other  than  the  one  on  hearing 
is  offered  in  evidence,  a  coi:>y  of  such  testimony  must  be  pre- 
sented as  an  exhibit.  "When  exhibits  of  a  documentary  char- 
acter are  to  be  offered  in  evidence,  copies  must  be  furnished 
to  opposing  counsel. 

(c)  All  exhibits  showing  rates  or  distances  must,  by  proper 
I.  C.  C.  number  reference,  indicate  the  tariff  authority  for 
the  rates,  and  must  also  show  by  lines  and  junction  joints 
the  routes  via  which  the  distances  are  computed,  as  well  as 
the  authority  for  the  distances  used. 

(d)  All  exhibits  received  in  evidence  are  bound  with 
the  rest  of  the  record  in  covers  of  uniform  size.  It  thus  be- 
comes desirable  that,  wherever  practicable,  they  should  be  on 
one  side  only  of  sheets  not  exceeding  12^/^  inches  from  top 
to  bottom  by  22  inches  in  width,  and  imperative  that  a  suf- 
ficient margin  for  binding,  preferably  ly^  inches,  be  left 
blank  on  the  left  side  of  each  sheet.  They  must  be  on  paper 
of  good  quality  and  so  prepared  as  to  be  plainly  legible  and 
durable,  whether  printed,  typewritten,  mimeographed,  piano- 
graphed,  photographed  or  otherwise.  The  use  of  hectograph 
and  white-line  blue  prints  is  discouraged. 

(e)  The  sheets  of  each  exhibit  and  the  lines  of  each  sheet 
should  be  numbered,  wherever  practicable.  The  first  sheet, 
or  title  page  should  be  confined  to  a  brief  statement  of  what 
the  exhibit  purports  to  show,  with  reference  by  sheet  and 
line  to  illustrative  or  typical  examples  contained  in  the  ex- 


612  Peocedube  of  the  Interstate.  [§  281 

hibit.    It  is  desirable  that,  wherever  practicable,  rate  compari- 
sons and  other  evidence  should  be  condensed  into  tables. 

(f)  Where  agreed  upon  by  the  parties  at  or  after  the 
hearing,  the  presiding  commissioner  or  examiner,  if  he  deems 
advisable,  may  receive  specified  documentary  evidence  as  a 
part  of  the  record  within  a  time  to  be  fixed  by  him,  but  which 
shall  expire  not  less  than  10  days  before  the  date  fixed  for 
filing  and  serving  bHefs. 

(g)  Except  as  above  provided,  or  as  may  be  expressly 
permitted  in  particular  instances,  the  Commission  will  not 
receive  in  evidence  or  consider  as  part  of  the  record  any  docu- 
ments, letters  or  other  writings  submitted  for  consideration 
in  connection  with  the  proceeding  after  the  close  of  the  tes- 
timony, and  will  return  the  same  to  the  sender.    Rule  13. 

§  281.  Briefs  and  Oral  Argument. 

(a)  Briefs  must  be  printed  and  comply  with  the  require- 
ments of  Rule  XXI.  The  date  of  each  brief  must  appear  on 
its  front  cover  or  title  page.  Each  brief  should  contain  an 
abstract  of  the  evidence  relied  upon  by  the  party  filing  it, 
preferably  assembled  by  subjects,  with  reference  to  the  pages 
of  the  record  or  exhibit  where  the  evidence  appears.  It  should 
include  requests  for  such  specific  findings  as  the  party  thinks 
the  Commission  should  make. 

(b)  Exhibits  should  not  be  reproduced  in  the  brief,  but 
may,  if  desired,  be  reproduced  in  an  appendix  to  the  b^rief. 
Analyses  of  such  exhibits  should  be  included  in  the  abstract 
of  evidence  under  the  subjects  to  which  they  pertain.  The  ab- 
stract of  evidence  should  follow  the  statement  of  the  case 
and  precede  the  argument.  Every  brief  of  more  than  20  pages 
shall  contain  on  its  front  fly-leaves  a  subject  index  with  page 
references,  the  subject  index  to  be  supplemented  by  a  list  of 
all  cases  cited,  alphabetically  arranged,  with  references  to  the 
pages  where  the  citations  appear.  In  proceedings  upon  com- 
plaint alleging  undue  prejudice  to  or  preference  of  any  locality 
as  contrasted  with  another  locality,  or  otherwise  attacking  a 
rate  relationship,  the  complainant  should  insert  in  his  brief 
opposite  the  statement  of  the  case  a  small  map  or  chart  of  the 
territory  showing  the  situation  involved. 


"^  281]  Commerce  CoMMissioisr.  G13 

(c)  Briefs  not  filed  with  the  Commission  and  served  on 
or  before  the  dates  fixed  therefor  will  not  ]h  received  except 
by  special  permission  of  the  Commission.  All  briefs  must  be 
accompanied  by  notice,  showing  service  upon  all  other  parties 
or  their  attorneys  who  appeared  at  the  hearing  or  on  brief,  and 
20  copies  of  each  brief  shall  be  furnished  for  the  use  of  the 
Commission.  Applications  for  extension  of  time  in  which  to 
file  briefs  shall  be  by  petition,  in  writing,  stating  the  facts  on 
which  the  application  rests,  which  must  be  filed  with  the 
Commision  at  least  five  days  before  the  time  fixed  for  filing 
such  briefs. 

(d)  Except  as  hereinafter  provided  in  subdivision  (e) 
of  this  rule,  briefs  for  the  various  parties  shall  be  filed  in 
the  same  order  as  governs  in  the  taking  of  their  testimony 
at  hearings.  At  the  close  of  the  testimony  in  each  case  the 
presiding  commissioner  or  examiner  will  fix  the  time  for  filing 
and  service  of  the  respective  briefs  as  follows,  unless  good 
cause  for  variation  therefrom  is  shown :  For  the  opening 
brief,  30  days  from  close  of  testimony ;  for  the  bjrief  of  the 
opposing  party,  15  days  after  the  date  fixed  for  the  opening 
brief;  for  reply  brief,  10  days  after  the  date  fixed  for  the 
brief  of  the  opposing  party.  Briefs  of  interveners  shall  be 
filed  and  served  within  the  time  fixed  for  the  brief  of  the 
party  in  whose  behalf  the  intervention  is  made,  or  within  such 
other  time  as  may  be  fixed  by  the  presiding  connnissioner  or 
examiner.  Parties  who  fail  to  file  opening  brief,  as  required 
by  this  rule,  will  not  be  permitted  to  file  reply  to  brief  of  op- 
posing party.  Except  as  provided  in  subdivision  (e)  of  this 
Rule  applications  for  oral  argument  before  the  Commission 
or  a  Division  thereof  shall  be  made  at  the  hearing  or  in  writ- 
ing within  10  days  after  the  close  of  testimony. 

(e)  For  application  in  cases  designated  in  the  notices  set- 
ting them  for  hearing  as  "proposed  report"  cases,  the  follow- 
ing procedure  will  govern,  superseding  that  prescribed  else- 
where in  these  Rules  in  so  far  as  confiicting  therewith : 

I.  If  oral  argmnent  before  the  presiding  conunissioner  or 
examiner  is  desired  he  should  be  so  notified  at  or  before  the 
hearing  and  may  arrange  to  hear  the  argument  at  the  close 
of  the  testimony  within  such  limits  of  time  as  he  may  determine, 
having  regard  to   other   assignments   for  hearing  before   him. 


614  Procedure  of  the  InteiRstate.  [<§  281 

Such  argument  will  be  transcribed  and  bound  with  the  transcript 
of  testimony  and  will  be  available  to  the  Commission  for  con- 
sideration in  deciding  the  case.  The  making  of  such  argument 
shall  not  preclude  oral  argument  before  the  Conmnssion,  or  a 
Division  thereof,  and  application  therefor  may  be  made  as 
hereinafter  provided. 

2.  Only  one  initial  brief  shall  be  filed  by  each  party.  The 
presiding  commissioner  or  examiner  .shall  fix  for  all  parties  the 
same  time  within  which  to  file  their  briefs.  Reply  briefs  are 
not  permitted  at  this  stage. 

3.  After  expiration  of  the  time  set  for  briefs  the  presiding 
or  participating  examiner  will  prepare  his  proposed  report 
containing  the  statement  of  the  issues  and  facts  and  the  findings 
and  conclusions  which  he  thinks  should  be  made.  This  proposed 
report  will  be  served  by  mailing  copies  to  the  parties  or  attorneys 
who  appeared  at  the  hearing  or  upon  brief,  except  that  in 
general  investigations  copies  may  also  be  mailed  in  the  Commis- 
sion's discretion  to  other  parties  whose  appearances  are  noted  of 
record. 

4.  Within  20  days  after  service  of  the  proposed  report 
any  party  may  file  and  serve,  in  the  manner  prescribed  for 
briefs,  exceptions  to  the  examiner's  proposed  report  and  brief 
in  support  of  the  exceptions.  Exceptions  and  brief  should  be 
contained  in  one  print.  Within  10  days  after  expiration  of  the 
time  so  fixed  briefs  in  reply  to  the  exception  briefs  may  be  filed 
and  served,  but  will  not  be  received  later  except  under  leave 
granted  upon  application  therefor.  Applications  for  oral  argu- 
ment before  the  Commission  or  a  Division  thereof  if  made  by  a 
party  filing  exceptions  must  accompany  the  exceptions,  or  if 
made  by  a  party  not  filing  exceptions  must  be  filed  not  later 
than  10  days  after  the  time  fixed  for  filing  and  service  of  ex- 
ceptions. 

Parties  or  attorneys  at  El  Paso,  Tex.,  Salt  Lake  City,  TTtalh 
Spokane,  Wash.,  or  points  west  thereof,  who  appeared  at  the 
hearing  or  upon  brief,  will  be  allowed  5  days'  additional  time 
for  filing  and  serving  exceptions,  exception  briefs  and  reply 
briefs,  respectively. 

5.  Exceptions  to  the  examiner's  proposed  report  either  as 
to  statements  of  fact  or  matters  of  law  should  be  specific.  If  ex- 
ception is  taken  to  matters  of  law  or  conclusions  the  points  re- 
lied upon  should  be  stMed  separately  and  clearly.  If  excep- 
tion is  taken  to  any  statement  of  fact  reference  should  be  made 
to  the  pages  or  parts  of  the  record  relied  upon  and  a  corrected 
statement  incorporated  in  the  exception  brief. 

6.  In  the  absence  of  exceptions  that  are  sustained  or  of 
ascertained  error  the  statement  of  the  issues  and  of  the  facts  by 
the  examiner  will  ordinarily  be  taken  by  the  CommLssion  as  the 
basis  of  its  report.    Rule  14, 


§  282]  CoMMEECE  Commission.  615 

§  282.  Rehearings. 

(a)  Applications  for  further  hearing  in  a  proceeding  be- 
fore final  submission,  for  reopening  a  proceeding  after  final 
submission,  or  for  rehearing  or  reargument  after  decision,  must 
be  made  by  petition,  stating  specifically  the  grounds  relied 
upon,  filed  with  the  Commission  and  served  by  the  petitioner 
upon  all  parties  or  attorneys  who  appeared  at  the  hearing,  or 
oral  argument  if  had,  or  on  brief. 

(b)  If  the  application  be  for  further  hearing  before  final 
submission,  or  for  reopening  the  proceeding  to  take  further 
evidence,  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  evidence  to  be  ad- 
duced must  be  briefly  stated  and  must  appear  not  to  be  merely 
cumulative. 

(c)  If  the  application  be  for  rehearing  or  reargument, 
the  matters  claimed  to  have  been  erroneously  decided  must  be 
specified  and  the  alleged  errors  briefly  stated.  If  thereby  any 
order  of  the  Commission  is  sought  to  be  vacated,  reversed  or 
modified  by  reason  of  matters  which  have  arisen  since  the 
hearing,  or  of  consequences  which  would  result  from  compli- 
ance therewith,  the  matters  relied  upon  ]ty  the  petitioner  must 
be  fully  set  forth  in  the  petition. 

(d)  Applications  for  modification  of  orders  which  seek 
only  change  in  the  date  when  they  shall  take  effect  or  in  the 
period  of  notice  thereby  prescribed  must  be  made  by  petition 
seasonably  filed  and  served  in  like  manner  as  other  applica- 
tions under  this  rule,  except  that,  in  case  of  unforeseen  emer- 
gency satisfactorily  shown  by  the  applicant,  such  relief  may 
be  sought  informally,  by  telegram  or  otherwise,  upon  notice 
thereof  to  all  parties  or  attorneys  who  appeared  as  aforesaid. 

(e)  A  petition  for  rehearing  that  part  of  any  case  relat- 
ing to  reparation  must  be  filed  within  60  days  after  service  of 
the  finding  or  order  therein. 

(f)  Each  petition  filed  under  this  rule  shall  be  accom- 
panied by  15  copies  thereof  for  the  use  of  the  Commission,  and 
by  notice  showing  service  upon  the  parties  or  attorneys  who 
appeared  as  aforesaid.  AVithin  10  days  after  such  service  any 
adverse  party  may  file  and  serve  in  like  manner  a  reply  to  the 
petition,  the  reply  so  filed  to  be  accompanied  by  like  number  of 
copies  for  use  by  the  Commission.    Rule  15. 


616  Procedure  of  the  InteiRState.  [§  283 

§  283.  Free  Copies  of  Transcript   of  Testimony,   When  Fur- 
nished. 

(a)  One  copy  of  the  transcript  of  testimony  will  be 
furnished  by  the  Commission  -without  charge  for  the  use  of 
the  complainant  and  one  copy  for  the  use  of  the  defendant. 
If  two  or  more  complainants  or  defendants  have  appeared  at 
the  hearing,  such  complainants  or  defendants  must  designate 
to  whom  the  copy  for  their  use  shall  be  delivered.  A  similar 
course  will  be  pursued  in  proceedings  involving  the  suspen- 
sion of  tariffs. 

(b)  In  proceedings  instituted  by  the  Commission  on  its 
own  motion,  other  than  proceedings  involving  the  suspension 
of  tariffs,  no  copies  of  the  transcript  will  be  furnished  by  the 
Commission.     Ride  16. 

§  284.     Orders  Must  Be  Complied  With  And  Notice  Given  To 
The  Secretary  Of  The  Commission. 

(a)  AVhen  an  order  has  been  issued  the  defendants  or 
respondents  named  therein  must  promptly  notify  the  Com- 
mission on  or  before  the  date  upon  which  such  order  becomes 
effective  whether  or  not  compliance  has  been  made  therewith. 
If  a  change  in  rates  is  required  the  notification  must  be  given 
in  addition  to  the  filing  of  proper  tariffs,  and  must  specify  the 
I.  C.  C.  numbers  of  the  tariffs  so  filed.  Rule  17. 
§  285.    Fourth  Section  Applications. 

(a)  Any  common  carrier  subject  to  the  Act  may  apply 
to  the  Commission,  under  the  proviso  clause  of  the  fourth  sec- 
tion^ for  such  authorization  as  it  is  empowered  to  grant  there- 
under. Such  application  must  conform  to  Rule  XXI.  The 
application  should  specify  the  places  and  traffic  involved,  the 
rates,  fares,  or  charges  on  such  trafSc  for  the  shorter  and 
longer  distances,  the  carriers  other  than  the  applicant  which 
may  be  interested  in  the  traffic,  the  special  nature  of  the  case, 
the  character  of  the  hardship  claimed  to  exist,  and  the  extent 
of  the  relief  sought  by  the  applicant.  Upon  the  filing  of  such 
application  the  Commission  will  take  such  action  as  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case  require.  Rule  18. 
§  286.  Suspension  Of  Rate  Increases,  How  Obtained. 

(a)  Suspensions  of  tariff  schedules  under  section  15  of 
the  Act  will  not  ordinarily  be  considered  unless  protest  and 


<§>  287]  Commerce   Commission.  617 

application  therefor  is  made  in  writing  or  by  telegram  at 
least  10  days  before  the  effective  date  named  in  the  schedule. 
Applications  for  suspensions  must  indicate  the  schedule  af- 
fected by  its  I.  C.  C.  numljjer  and  give  specific  reference  to 
the  items  against  which  protest  is  made,  together  with  a  state- 
ment of  the  grounds  thereof.  If  such  application  is  made  by 
telegram  it  must  be  confirmed  and  followed  by  application  in 
writing  and  should  succinctly  state  the  substance  of  the  mat- 
ters to  be  set  forth  in  the  written  application.  Seven  copies 
of  each  written  application  should  be  furnished  to  the  Commis- 
sion.   Rule  19. 

§  287.  Secretary  To  Give  Information  To  Parties. 

(a)  The  secretary  of  the  Commission  will,  upon  request, 
advise  as  to  the  form  of  complaint^  answer,  or  other  paper  to 
be  filed  in  any  proceeding.    Rule  20. 

§  2S8A.  Specifications  as  to  Complaints,  Answers,  Petitions, 
Applications,  Briefs,  Etc. 

(a)  All  formal  complaints,  answers,  motions,  petitions, 
applications,  notices,  depositions,  or  other  papers  to  be  filed, 
must  be  typewritten  or  printed. 

(b)  If  typewritten  they  must  be  on  paper  not  more  than 
Si/o  inches  wide  or  12  inches  long,  weighing  not  less  than  16 
pounds  to  the  ream,  folio  base  17  by  22  inches,  with  left-hand 
margin  not  less  than  11/2  inches  wide.  The  impression  must 
be  on  only  one  side  of  the  paper. 

(c)  If  printed  they,  as  well  as  briefs,  must  be  in  10  or  12 
point  type,  on  good  unglazed  paper,  5-7/8  inches  wide  by  9 
inches  long,  with  inside  margin  not  less  than  1  inch  wide, 
and  with  double-leaded  text  and  single-leaded  citations. 

(d)  Complaints,  answers,  motions,  petitions,  applications 
and  notices  must  be  signed  in  ink  by  the  party,  petition  or 
applicant,  or  by  his  or  its  duly  authorized  attorney,  and  must 
show  the  office  and  post  office  address  of  the  signer.  Rule  21. 
§  28&B.  Otfice  and  Address  of  the  Commission. 

(a)  Pleadings  and  other  papers  required  to  be  filed  with 
the  Commission  may  be  transmitted  by  mail  or  express,  or 
otherwise  delivered,  but  must  be  received  for  filing  at  its  of- 
fice in  Washington,  D.  C,  within  the  time  limit,  if  any,  for  such 


618  Peocedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  289' 

filing.  That  office  is  open  from  9  a.  m.  to  4:30  p.  m.  of  each 
business  day. 

(b)     All  communications  to  the  Commission  must  be  ad- 
dressed to  Washington,  D.  C,  unless  otherwise  specifically  di- 
rected.   Rule  22. 
§  289.    Form  of  Complaint. 

Note. — These  forms  may  be  used  f.n  cases  to  which  they  are  appli- 
cable, with  such  alterations  as  the  circumstances  may  render  necessary. 

BEFORE  THE  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 

1 

V.  ] 

The Railroad  Company  J- 

Railway  Company.  | 

{Insert  corporate  title,  ivitJiout 
ahhreviation  of  carrier,  or  car- 
riers, necessary  or  proper  de- 
fendamts.) 

The  complaint  of  the  above-named  complainant,  respect- 
fully shows : 

I.  That  {complainant  should  here  state  nature  and  place 
of  business,  also  whether  a  corporation,  firm,  or  partnership,  a)td 
if  a  firm  or  partnership,  the  individual  names  of  the  parties 
composing  the  same.) 

II.  That  the  defendant  above  named  is  a  (are)  common 
earner  engaged  in  the  transportation  of  (passengers  and)  prop- 
erty, wholly  by  railroad   {or,  partly  by  railroad  and  partly  by 

water),  between  points  in  the  state  of  and  points  in 

the  state  of ,  and  as  such  common  carrier  is  (are)  sub- 
ject to  the  provisions  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  approved 
Februaiy  4,  1887,  and  acts  amendatory  thereof  or  supplemental 
thereto. 

III.  That  {state  in  this  and  suhsecjuent  paragraphs  to  he 
numbered  IV,  V,  etc.^  the  matter  or  matters  intended  to  be  com- 
plained of,  naming  every  rate,  fare,  charge,  classification,  regula- 
tion, or  practice  the  lawfulness  of  which  is  challenged,  and  also 
each  point  of  origin  and  point  of  destination  between  ivhich  the 
rates,  etc.,  complained  of  are  applied.  Whenever  practical  tariff 
references  should  be  given.) 

{Where  discrimination  is  charged,  the  facts  constituting  the 


§  289']  Commerce   Commission.  619 

basis  of  the  charge  should  he  dearly  stated;  that  is,  if  the 
discrimination  he  under  section  2,  the  person  or  persons  claimed 
to  he  favored  and  the  person  or  persons  claimed  to  he  injured 
should  he  named,  and  the  kind  of  service  and  kind  of  traffic, 

.together  with  the  claimed  similarity  of  circumstances  and  con- 
ditions of  transportation,  shmdd  he  set  forth.   If  the  discrimina- 

dion  he  under  section  3,  the  particular  person,  company,  firm, 
corporation,  locality,  or  traffic  claimed  to  he  accorded  undue  or 
unreasonable  preference  or  advantage,  or  subjected  to  undue  or 
unreasonable  prejudice  or  disadvantage,  shoidd  be  stated.  If 
the  discrimination  he  under  section  4,  the  particular  provision 
of  the  section  claimed  to  he  violated — that  is,  ivhether  the  long- 
and-short-haul  provision  or  the  aggregate  of  intermediate  rates 
provision — as  well  as  the  facts  constituting  such  violation  should 
be  stated.) 

X.  That  by  reason  of  the  facts  stated  in  the  foregoing 
paragraphs  complainant  has  (have)  been  subjected  to  the  pay- 
ment of  rates  (fares  or  charges,  etc.)  for  transportation  which 
were  when  exacted,  and  still  are,  (1)  unjust  and  unreasonable 
in  violation  of  section  1  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  and 
(or)  (2)  unjustlj^  discriminatory  in  violation  of  section  2,  and 
(or)  (3)  unduly  preferential  or  prejudicial  in  violation  of  sec- 
tion 3,  and  (or)  (4)  in  violation  of  the  long-and-short-haul  (or, 
aggregate  of  intermediate  rates)  provision  of  section  4  thereof. 
(Use  one  or  more  of  the  allegations  numbered  1,  2,  3,  4,  accord- 
ing to  the  facts  as  intended  to  he  charged.)  That  complainant 
has   (have)  been  injured  thereby  to  his   (its,  their)   damage  in 

the  sum  of dollars. 

Wherefore  complainant  pray  that  defendant  may  be  (sev- 
erally) required  to  answer  the  charges  herein :  that  after  due 
hearing  and  investigation  an  order  be  made  commanding  said 
defendant  (and  each  of  them)  to  cease  and  desist  from  the 
aforesaid  violations  of  said  act  to  regulate  commerce,  and  es- 

tion   of    between   the   origin   and   destination   points 

named  in  paragraph hereof,  in  lieu  of  the  rates  (fares, 

or  charges,  etc.),  named  in  said  paragraph,  such  other  rates 
(fares,  or  charges,  etc.)  as  the  Commission  may  deem  reasonable 
tablish  and  put  in  force  and  apply  in  future  to  the  transporta- 
and  just  (and  also  pay  to  complainant  by  way  of  reparation  for 
the  unlawful  charges  hereinbefore  alleged  the  sum  of , 


620  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  290 

or  such  other  sum  as,  in  view  of  the  evidence  to  be  adduced 
herein,  the  Commission  shall  determine  that  complainant  is  (are) 
entitled  to  as  an  award  of  damages  under  the  provisions  of  said 
act  for  violation  thereof),  and  that  such  other  and  further  or- 
der or  orders  be  made  as  the  Commission  may  consider  proper 
in  the  premises. 

Dated  at ,19... 


( Complainant's   signaiure ) 
Form  No.  1. 

§  290.    Form  of  Answer. 

BEFORE  THE  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 

1 

\ 
The Railroad  CompanyJ 

Docket  No 

The  above-named  defendant,  for  answer  to  the  complaint 
in  this  proceeding,  respectfully  state : 

I.  {Here  folloiv  appropriate  a^id  responsive  admissio7is,  de- 
nials, and  averments,  answering  the  complaint  paragraph  by 
paragraph.) 

Wherefore  defendant  pray  that  the  complaint  in  this  pro- 
ceeding be  dismissed. 

THE    RAILROAD  COMPANY, 

By 


{Title  of  ofcer.) 

Form  No.  2. 

§  291.  Intervening  Petition. 

BEFORE  THE  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 

1 

V.  ^     Docket  No 

J 

Comes  now  your  petitioner,  and  re- 
spectfully represents  that  he  has  an  interest  in  the  matters  in 
litigation  in  the  above-entitled  proceeding  and  moves  that  he 
may  be  allowed  to  intervene  in  and  become  a  party  to  said  pro- 
ceeding, and  for  cause  of  intervention  says: 


§  291A]  Commerce  Commission.  621 

I.  That  (intervener  should  here  state  nature  and  place  of 
business,  and  whether  a  corporation,  firm,  or  partnership,  etc.). 

II.  (Intervener  shoidd  here  set  out  specifically  its  interest 
in  the  above-entitled  proceedAng  in  accordance  with  the  last  para- 
graph of  rule  II  of  the  rules  of  practice.) 

Wherefore  said prays  leave  to  intervene 

and  be  treated  as  a  party  hereto  with  the  right  to  have  notice 
of  and  appear  at  the  taking  of  testimony, .  produce  and  cross- 
examine  witnesses,  and  be  lieard  in  person  or  l)y  counsel  upon 
brief  and  at  the  oral  argument,  if  oral  argument  is  granted. 

Dated  at ,  19 .  . . 


(Intervener's  signature.) 

Form  No.  3. 

§  291a.    Petition  for  Rehearing. 

BEFORE  THE  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 

1 

V.  \     Docket  No 

J 

Comes  now  the  complainant  (or  defendant)  in  the  above- 
entitled  proceeding  and  respectfully  petitions  the  Commission  to 
grant  a  rehearing  therein,  and  in  support  of  said  petition  re- 
spectfully shows : 

I.  (Here  set  out  specifically  the  nmtters  claimed  to  he  er- 
roneously decided,- with  a  brief  statement  of  the  alleged  errors^ 
in  conformity  with  rule  XV  of  the  rules  of  practice.) 

Wherefore  petitioner  prays  tliat  a  rehearing  be  granted  in 
the  above-entitled  case  and  that  the  Commission  enter  such  fur- 
ther order  or  ordei-s  in  the  premises  as  to  it  may  seem  reason- 
able and  just. 

Dated  at ,  19 .  . . 

(Petitioner's  signature. ) 
Form  No.  4. 


§  291C.  Form  of  Original  Complaint    Against    the    Federal 
Agent. 

BEFORE  THE  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 
J 


622  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [*§>  2910 

The  complaint  of  the  above-named  complainant..,  respect- 
fully shows : 

I.  That  (Complainant  should  here  state  nature  and  place 
of  business,  also  whether  a  corporation,  firm,  or  partnership,  and 
if  a  firm  or  partnership,  the  individual  names  of  the  partners 
composing  the  same.) 

II.  That  defendant  ,  Federal 

Agent  is  an  officer  of  the  United  States,  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
,dent  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  section  206(a)  of  the  Trans- 
portation Act,  1920,  and  as  such  agent  is  a  representative  of 
the  federal  government  against  whom  should  be  brought  actions 
at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  based  on  causes  of  action  arising  out 
of  the  possession,  use,  or  operation  by  the  President  of  the 
railroad  or  .system  of  transportation  of  any  carrier  (under  the 
provisions  of  the  Federal  Control  Act,  or  of  the  Act  of  August 
29,  1916)  of  such  character  as  prior  to  Federal  control  could 
have  been  brought  against  such  carrier;  and  that  the  railroads 
and  systems  of  transportation  over  whose  lines  or  routes  the 
rates  (fares,  charges,  classifications,  regulations,  or  practices) 
complained  of  herein  applied,  and  which  during  federal  control 
were  operated  by  the  Director  General  of  Railroads,  are  as  fol- 
lows: (Here  specify  the  carriers  whose  railroads  or  systems  of 
transportation  were  under  federal  control  and  over  which  the 
rates,  fares,  cliarges,  classifications,  regulations  or  practices  ap- 
plied unless  complainant  elects  to  name  the  corporations  or 
companies  as  defendants.) 

III.  That  (state  in  tliis  and  subsequent  paragraphs  to  be 
numbered  IV,  V,  etc.,  the  matter  or  matters  intended  to  be  com- 
plained of,  naming  every  rate,  fare,  charge,  classification,  regu- 
lation, or  practice  the  lawfulness  of  which  is  challenged,  and  also 
each  point  of  origin  and  point  of  destination  between  which  the 
rates  complained  of  are  applied.  Whenever  practical  tariff 
references  should  be  given.) 

(Where  unjust  discrimination  or  undue  prejudice  is  charged, 
the  facts  constituting  the  basis  of  the  charge  should  be  clearly 
stated;  that  is,  if  the  discrimination  be  under  section  2,  tlie 
person  or  persons  claimed  to  be  favored  and  the  person  or  per- 
sons claimed  to  be  injured  should  be  named,  and  the  kind  of 
service  and  kind  of  traffic,  together  with  the  claimed  similarity 
of  circumstances  and  conditions  of  transportation,  should  be 
set  forth.    If  the  discrimination  or  undue  prejudice  be  under  sec- 


Commerce  Commission. 


623 


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624  Procedure  of  the  Interstate.  [§  291C 

tion  3,  the  particular  person,  company,  firm,  corporation,  local- 
ity, or  traffic  claimed  to  be  accorded  undue  or  unreasonable  pref- 
erence or  advantage,  or  subjected  to  undue  or  unreasona1)le  pre- 
judice or  disadvantage,  should  be  stated.  If  the  complaint 
is  brought  under  section  10  of  the  Federal  control  act  approved 
iMarch  21,  1918,  that  fact  should  be  stated  and  appropriate  al- 
legations made.) 

X.  That  by  reason  of  the  facts  stated  in  the  foregoing  para- 
graphs complaint  has  (have)  been  subjected  to  the  payment  of 
rates  (fares  or  charges)  for  transportation  which  were  when  ex- 
acted, and  still  are,  and  if  maintained  in  the  future  will  be  (1) 
unjust  and  unreasonable  in  \dolation  of  section  1  of  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Act  and  (or)  (2)  unjustly  discriminatory  in 
violation  of  section  2,  and  (or)  (3)  unduly  preferential  or  preju- 
dicial in  violation  of  section  3,  and  (or)  (4)  unjust  and  unrea 
sonable  in  violation  of  section  10  of  the  Federal  control  act. 
(Use  one  or  more  of  the  allegations  numbered  1,  2,  3,  4,  accord- 
ing to  the  facts  as  intended  to  be  charged.) 

Wlierefore  complainant  prays  that  defendant  may  be  (sev- 
erally) required  to  answer  the  charges  herein;  that  after  due 
hearing  and  investigation  an  order  be  made  commanding  said 
defendant  (and  each  of  them)  to  cease  and  desist  from  the  afore> 
said  violations  of  said  Interstate  Commerce  Act,  and  (or)  said 
Federal  control  act,  and  establish  and  put  in  force  and  apply 

in  future  to  the  transportation  of between  the  origin 

and  destination  points  named  in  i)aragraph  ....  hereof,  in 
lieu  of  the  rates  (fares,  chargess  classifications,  regulations,  or 
practices)  named  in  said  paragraph,  such  other  maximum  rates 
(fares,  charges,  classifications,  regulations,  or  practices)  as  the 
Commission  may  deem  reasonable  and  just  (and  also  pay  to  com- 
plainant by  way  of  reparation  for  the  unlawful  charges  herein- 
before alleged  the  sum  of  ....  or  such  other  sum  as,  in  view  of 
the  evidence  to  be  adduced  herein,  the  Commission  shall  deter- 
mine that  complainant  is  (are)  entitled  to  as  an  award  of  dam- 
ages under  the  provisions  of  .said  act  for  violation  thereof),  and 
that  such  other  and  further  order  or  orders  be  made  as  the  Com- 
mission may  consider  proper  in  the  premises. 

Dated ,  19.  .. 

Complainant. 
Form  No.  6. 


Conference  Rulings.  625 


EXPLANATORY  NOTE. 

That  the  conference  rulings  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission are  important  to  shippers  and  carriers  and  are  not  al- 
ways available,  make  proper  their  insertion  here.  These  are 
copied  just  as  issued  by  the  Commission.  The  Commission  in  a 
preface  to  the  rulings  says  : 

"Tlie  rulings  of  the  Commission  in  conference  are  announced 
informally  from  time  to  time  through  the  public  press  and  are 
later  edited  and  issued  in  this  form  for  the  information  of  ship- 
pers, carriers,  and  others  interested  in  transpoi-tation  matters. 
The  rulings  express  the  views  of  the  Commission  on  informal  in- 
quiries involving  special  facts  or  requiring  an  interpretation 
and  construction  of  the  law,  and  are  to  be  regarded  as  precedents 
governing  similar  cases.  This  bulletin  contains  all  the  rulings 
promulgated  by  the  Commission  since  it  adopted  the  practice  of 
publishing  them,  and  takes  the  place  of  previous  bulletins. 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  the  light  of  a  wider  knowledge  of 
the  subjects  involved  some  of  the  rulings  have  been  withdrawn, 
while  others  have  been  modified  and  restated  in  later  rulings.  In 
such  instances  the  text  of  the  original  ruling  has  been  omitted, 
while  the  title  and  numl)er  have  been  retained  ^\'ith  annotations 
directing  attention  to  the  development  of  the  principle  in  the 
subsequent  ruling. 

For  convenience  of  reference  it  is  suggested  that  conference 
rulings  be   cited  in   briefs   and   correspondence   in   this   form  ^ 

"Conf.  Ruling ,"  giving  the  number  of  the  ruling,  it  being 

unnecessary  to  refer  also  to  this  bulletin  by  its  number;  where 
the  ruling  consists  of  lettered  paragraphs,  as  for  example  Ruling 
220,  tlie  particular  pragraph  may  be  cited  in  this  form  :  "  Conf. 
Ruling  2206." 


Ci2G  Conference  Rulings. 

CONFFERENCE  RULINGS  OF  THE  INTERSTATE  COM- 
MISSION. 


November  4,  1907. 

1.  PASSES  TO  CARETAKERS.— An  employee  of  a  pro- 
duce company  was  granted  a  pass  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  a 
point  on  the  carrier's  lines  and  returning  as  caretaker  of  a 
carload  of  bananas.  He  was  not  able  to  secure  a  return  ship- 
ment: Held,  That  the  carrier  must  collect  the  full  fare.  (See 
ruling  37.) 

2.  TARIFFS  DISTINGUISHING  BETWEEN  SHIP- 
MENTS HANDLED  BY  STEAM  AND  ELECTRICAL 
POWER. — An  amendment  to  tariff  provided :  ' '  The  above  rates 
will  only  apply  on  shipments  handled  by  steam  power  and  will 
not  apply  when  handled  by  electrical  power ' ' :  Held,  That  the 
limitation  of  the  rates  to  shipments  handled  by  steam  power  is 
unlawful  and  must  be  eliminated  from  the  tariff.  (See  ruling 
34.) 

3.  COLLECTION  OF  UNDERCHARGES.— (Restated  in 
ruling  314.) 

November  11,  1907. 

4.  RATES  ON  NEW  LINES.— Rule  44  of  Tariff  Circular 
No.  14-A,  providing  that  rates  may  be  established  in  the  first 
instance  on  "new  lines"  without  notice,  was  intended  to  ap- 
ply to  newly  constructed  lines  only.  (See  Rule  57,  Tariff  Circu- 
lar 18-A.) 

5.  FREE  STORAGE  CREATING  DISTRIBUTING  POINT 
FOR  PRIVATE  INDUSTRY.— Its  attention  being  called  to  a 
tariff  which,  in  effect,  created  a  distributing  point  for  a  special 
industry  by  granting  it  fi'ee  storage  at  that  point,  either  in  its 
own  or  the  carrier's  warehouses,  and  practically  without  limit  as 
to  time,  the  merchandise  when  shipped  out  to  go  on  balance  of 
through  rate,  the  Commission  expressed  its  disapproval.. 

6.  RECONSIGNMENT  RULE  WILL  NOT  BE  GIVEN  RE- 
TROACTIVE EFFECT.— A  shipment  consigned  to  one  point 
was  reconsigned  en  route  to  another,  the  tariff  containing  no  re- 
consignment  privilege.     As  a  consequence  local  rates   to  and 


Conference  Rulings.  627 

from  the  reconsigiiing  point  were  applied  and  made  higher  than 
the  through  rate :  Held,  TTnder  subsequent  tariff  that  did  not 
reduce  rates,  but  ineoi^porated  a  reconsignnient  privilege,  that 
the  benefit  of  such  privilege  could  not  be  applied  retroactively  to 
a  previoiLS  shipment,  and  can  not  be  accepted  as  the  basis  for  a 
refund  on  special  reparation  docket,  (Extended  in  application 
bj^  rulings  77  and  166.  See  Cady  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
19  I.  C.  C,  13;  Henry  v.  Eastern  Ry.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C,  172;  and 
Swift  &  Co.  v.  M.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C,  701.) 
November  18,  1907. 

7.  COMMISSIONS  ON  IMPORT  TRAFFIC— Tlie  granting 
by  carriers  of  eonunissions  to  persons  acting  as  consignees  on 
import  traffic  is  a  practice  that  can  not  l)e  sanctioned.  (See  rul- 
ings 221«,  300,  and  444.) 

8.  DEMURRAGE  CHARGES  RESULTING  FROM 
STRIKES. — The  Commission  has  no  power  to  relieve  carriers 
from  the  obligation  of  tariffs  providing  for  demurrage  charges, 
on  the  ground  that  such  charges  have  been  occasioned  by  a 
strike.     ( See  note  to  ruling  242,  and  ruling  358. ) 

9.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  BY  CARRIERS  FOR  ONE 

ANOTHER.— (Restated  in  ruling  2256.) 
December  2,  1907. 

10.  STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS.— Claims  filed  with  the 
Conunission  since  August  28,  1907,  must  have  accrued  within 
two  years  prior  to  the  date  when  they  are  filed;  otherwise  they 
are  barred  by  the  statute.  Claims  filed  on  or  before  August  28, 
1907,  are  not  affected  by  the  two  years'  limitation  in  the  act. 
(See  rulings  220 j,  306,  and  307;  also  Fels  t&  Co,  v.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 
23  L  C.  C,  487.) 

11.  REDUCTION  OF  RATE  WHEN  FORMAL  COM- 
PLAINT AGAINST  IT  IS  PENDING.— (Restated  in  ruling 
14.) 

12.  TARIFF  THAT  FAILS  TO  STATE  THE  DATE  OF 
ITS  EFFECTIVENESS  IS  UNLAWFUL.— A  tariff  was  filed 
without  naming  a  date  on  which  it  was  to  take  effect.  Does  it 
ever  become  effective;    and  if  so,  when?     Held,  That  the  tariff 


G28  Conference  Rulings. 

was  imlawful  ai]d  has  never  taken  effect.  (See  rulings  73  and 
1006.) 

13.  TARIFFS  NOT  CONCURRED  IN  ARE  UNLAWFUL. 

— A  properly  accredited  chairman  of  a  tariff  committee  published 
tariffs  for  certain  carriers  for  which  he  was  the  duly  constituted 
attorney  in  fact  for  that  purpose.  A  carrier  declining  to  con- 
cur in  his  tariffs  put  a  new  cover  on  them  and  filed  them  as  its 
own  tariffs  without  securing  the  concurrences  of  the  other  car- 
riers named  therein:  Held,  That  the  tariffs  so  adopted  were 
unlawful  and  could  not  be  used  by  the  carrier. 

Januarij  6,  1908. 

14.  MAINTENANCE  OF  RATE  REDUCED  AFTER  COM- 
PLAINT FILED.— On  December  2,  1907,  it  was  decided  that 
when  a  rate  is  reduced  after  answer  has  been  made  and  before 
hearing,  the  report  disposing  of  the  proceeding  shall  carry  with 
it  an  order  directing  the  defendant  to  maintain  that  rate  as  a 
maximum  for  not  less  than  two  years.  On  December  6  it  was 
decided  that  orders  in  special  reparation  cases  shall  include  a 
clause  providing  that  the  new  rate  or  regulation  upon  the  basis 
of  which  reparation  is  granted  shall  be  maintained  for  a  period 
of  at  least  one  year. 

It  is  now  agi"eed  that  the  two  years  so  required  in  orders  upon 
formal  complaints  and  the  one  year  in  orders  in  special  repara- 
tion cases  shall  run  from  the  date  of  the  order  and  not  from  the 
date  when  the  reduced  rate  or  new  regulation  became  effective. 
(See  rulings  130,  200-a,  and  396.) 

15.  DELIVERING  CARRIER  MUST  INVESTIGATE  BE- 
FORE PAYING  CLAIMS.— (Restated  in  ruling  462.) 

16.  DELIVERING  CARRIER  MUST  COLLECT  UNDER- 
CHARGES.— Even  though  an  undercharge  residts  from  an  er- 
ror in  billing  by  the  initial  carrier  or  a  connection,  the  delivering 
carrier  must  collect  the  undercharge.  The  legal  expense  attend- 
ing its  efforts  to  collect  undercharges  in  such  cases  would  seem 
to  be  a  valid  claim  against  the  carrier  through  whose  fault  the 
mistake  was  made.  (Reaffirmed  by  ruling  156;  see  also  ruling 
214;    also  Wedern  Classification  Case,  25  I.  C.  C,  475.) 


Conference  Rulings.  629 

17.  FEEDING  AND  GRAZING  IN  TRANSIT.— (Restated 
in  rilling  442.) 

18.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  DEAD  BODY  OF  EM- 
PLOYEE.— When  an  employee  of  a  caii-ier  hav^  been  killed  or 
has  died  in  service  at  a  distant  point,  the  carrier  may,  free  of 
charge  and  as  a  general  incident  to  the  relation  between  it  and 
its  employees,  lawfully  transport  the  body  to  the  home  of  the 
deceased  for  burial.     (See  Rulings  173  and  193.) 

Note. — The  amendatory  act  of  April  13,  1908,  expressly  sanctions  the 
free  transportation  of  the  remains  of  a  person  killed  in  its  employ. 

19.  EXPENSE  INCURRED  IN  PREPARING  CARS  FOR 
SHIPMENTS  CAN  NOT  BE  PAID  BY  CARRIER  IN  THE 
ABSENCE  OF  TARIFF  PROVISION  THEREFOR.— Not 
having  box  cars  available  for  the  movement  of  machinery,  cattle 
cars  were  .supplied  at  the  request  of  the  shipper,  who  lined  them 
with  tar  paper  an,d  felt  in  order  to  protect  his  shipments  from 
weather  conditions:  Held,  That  in  the  absence  of  tariff  author- 
ity the  carrier  can  not  lawfully  reimburse  the  shipper  for  the 
expense  so  incurred.     (See  rulings  78,  132,  267,  292,  and  360.) 

20.  SPECIAL  UNDERSTANDINGS  BETWEEN  SHIP- 
PERS AND  CARRIERS,  NOT  PUBLISHED  IN  THEIR 
TARIFFS,  OF  NO  VALID  EFFECT.— A  shipjier  had  an  un- 
derstanding with  agents  of  carriere  that  when  he  delivered  ship- 
ments to  them  consigned  to  stations  at  whicli  there  were  no 
agents  the  carriers  would  so  advise  him  and  hold  the  sliipments 
for  further  direction.  In  a  given  case  a  carrier  neglected  to 
so  advise  him  and  to  hold  the  .shipment,  but  billed  it  and  sent 
it  forward  to  a  nonagency  station  as  a  prepaid  shipment :  Held, 
That  the  shipper  must  pay  the  charges,  and  that  no  understand- 
ing of  that  nature,  not  incorporated  in  the  published  tariffs  of 
the  carrier,  wall  operate  to  relieve  the  carrier  from  the  duty  of 
collecting  the  lawful  chargas.      (See  ruling  235.) 

21.  CARETAKERS  OF  I\IILK.— The  provision  of  law  relat- 
ing to  the  free  transportation,  of  necessary  caretakers  of  live- 
stock, poultry,  and  fruit  can  not  be  constinied  to  include  care- 
takers of  shipments  of  milk. 

Note. — Under  the  amendatory  act  of  June  18,  1910,  free  transporta- 
tion may  be  accorded  to  caretakers  of  milk. 


630  Conference  Rulings. 

22.  FREE  CARRIAGE  OF  COMPANY  MATERIAL.— It 

is  not  unlawful  for  a  carrier  to  return  its  own  property  free  of 
charges,  to  the  manufacturers  thereof  situated  on  its  own  line, 
for  exchange  or  repair. 

23.  EXTENSION  OF  TIME  ON  THROUGH  PASSENGER 
TICKETS.— (Withdrawn  in  ruling  43.) 

24.  CANADIAN  FARES.— A  Canadian  carrier  ha\ang  joint 
through  fares  from  a  point  in  the  United  States  to  points  on  its 
OMTi  line  may  not  depart  from  those  fares  by  the  de\ace  of  plac- 
ing an  agent  at  such  point  in  the  United  States  with  authority  to 
sell  tickets  from  the  first  station  on  its  line  north  of  the  Canadian 
boundary  to  other  points  on  its  line  in  Canada  at  the  rate  of  1 
cent  a  mile,  "to  be  sold  only  to  such  persons  as  produce  a  cer- 
tificate of  the  immigration  agent  of  the  Canadian  government." 
Besides  being  a  device,  tickets  so  limited  to  particular  persons 
operate  as  a  discrimination.  But  in  the  absence  of  such  joint 
through  fares  from  a  point  in  the  United  States  to  points  on  its 
own  lines  this  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  fares  ac- 
tually charged  and  collected  for  the  separate  transportation  be- 
tween points  in  Canada.     (See  ruling  98.) 

25.  REFUND  OF  DRAYAGE  CHARGES  CAUSED  BY 

MISROUTING.— (Restated  in  ruling  509.) 

26.  USE  OF  INTRASTATE  COMMUTATION  TICKET  IN 
INTERSTATE  JOURNEY.— In  the  absence  of  a  provision  in 
the  commutation  contract  forbidding  it,  a  commutation  ticket 
may  be  used  between  the  points  named  on  it  in  connection  with 
an  interatate  journey  on  trains  that  stop  at  such  points. 
January  13,  1908. 

27.  EXCURSION  TICKET  INVALIDATED  THROUGH 
FAILURE  OF  CARRIER  TO  MAKE  CONNECTION.— A  pas- 
senger traveling  on  a  special  limited  excursion  ticket  with  stop- 
over privilege  leaves  a  stop-over  point  in  ample  time  to  make  all 
connections  and  meet  conditions  of  ticket;  but  through  succes- 
sive delays  to  trains  misses  connections  at  a  certain  junction, 
making  the  ticket  twenty-four  hours  out  of  date.  Regular  fare 
w^as  collected  for  the  balance  of  the  return  trip :    Held,  That  the 


Conference  Rulings.  031 

carriers  ought  to  make  the  ticket  good,  it  having  become  invalid 
through  their  fault. 

28.  TICKETS  FOR  TRANSPORTATION  AND  MEALS, 
HOTEL  ACCOMMODATIONS,  ETC.— A  carrier  publishes  a 
tariff  offering  certain  transportation  fares  and  rates  for  per- 
sonally conducted  tours  with  tickets  to  cover  meals,  hotel  accom- 
modations, etc.,  and  declines  to  sell  the  transportation  ticket  to 
anyone  who  does  not  also  purchase  the  tickets  covering  meals 
and  hotel  accommodations:  Held,  That  the  two  matters  must  be 
kept  separate,  and  carriers  may  not  decline  to  sell  such  trans- 
portation without  tickets  for  meals  and  hotel  accommodations. 
(See  ruling  384.) 

29.  QUOTATIONS  FROM  CORRESPONDENCE  OF  THE 
COMMISSION. — The  Commission  requests  that  if  extracts  from 
its  correspondence  are  sent  out  by  carriers,  such  extracts  be 
made  sufficiently  full,  or  that  sufficient  of  the  corraspondence 
be  presented,  to  give  a  complete  view  and  undei-standing  of  the 
meaning  of  the  ruling  and  of  the  circumstances  discussed,  or  of 
the  inquiry  answered  therein. 

January  15,  1908. 

30.  CARRIERS'  MONTHLY  REPORTS  TO  BE  FUR- 
NISHED IN  DUPLICATE.— Beginning  as  of  January  1,  1908, 
monthly  reports  of  revenues  and  expenses,  as  provided  for  in 
the  order  of  the  Commis.sion,  bearing  date  July  10,  1907,  shall  be 
filed  in  duplicate,  and  on  or  before  the  last  day  of  the  month  im- 
mediately following  the  month  covered  by  the  report  shall  be  de- 
posited in  the  United  States  Post  Office,  postage  prepaid,  and 
plainly  addressed  to  the  Bm-eau  of  Statistics  and  Accounts,  In- 
terstate Conunerce  Commission,  Washington,  D.  C, 

31.  DEMURRAGE  CHARGES  ON  ASTRAY  SHIPMENTS. 

— An  astray  shipment  of  perishable  merchandise  was  not  re- 
billed  to  its  proper  destination,  but  was  sold  by  the  consignee  at 
the  point  where  he  found  it.  The  delivering  carrier  at  that  point 
had  assessed  demurrage  charges  before  the  shippers  were  able 
to  locate  the  car.  That  carrier  expressed  its  ^^^llingne.ss  to  waive 
the  demurrage  if  the  Commission  permits :  Held,  That  demur- 
rage charges  stand  in  the  same  light  as  transportation  charges 


632  Conference  Rulings. 

and  may  be  adjusted  under  ruling:  217  of  this  Bulletin,  formerly 
published  as  Rule  74  of  Tariff  Circular  15-A. 
Fehrmry  3,  1908. 

32.  DEMURRAGE  CHARGES.— The  delivering  carrier  is 
under  obligation  to  collect  demurrage  charges  assessed  by  it,  al- 
though such  charges  may  have  accrued  as  the  result  of  error 
on  the  part  of  another  carrier.  (See  ruling  220-/;  see  also  note 
to  ruling  242.) 

The  shipper  should  pay  the  lawfully  published  rate  via  the 
route  over  which  the  shipment  moved,  pending  dispute,  and  then 
make  claim  for  refund.  The  Commission,  in  the  adjustment  of 
misrouting  claims,  will  not  ordinarily  include  demurrage  charges. 
(See  Ruling  220-e;  also  Ed.  Caddell  &  Sotus  v.  C.  &  8.  By.  Co., 
U.  R.  Op.  177.) 

When  the  delivering  carrier  demands  more  than  the  lawful 
rate,  the  consignee  is  released  from  the  obligation  to  pay  demur- 
rage charges  accruing  during  the  pendency  of  the  dispute  as 
to  the  lawful  rate.  (See  Code  of  National  Car  DemuiTage 
Rules.) 

33.  REDUCED  RATE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  FED- 
ERAL, STATE,  AND  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENTS.— Un- 
der section  22  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  carriers  may 
grant  reduced  rates  for  the  transportation  of  property  for  the 
United  States  or  for  state  or  municipal  governments,  under  ar- 
rangements made  directly  with  such  government  and  in  which 
no  contractor  or  other  third  penson  intervenes,  without  filing  or 
posting  the  schedule  of  such  rates  with  the  Counnission.  (See 
mlings  36,  208c,  218,  244,  311,  and  452.) 

34.  COAL  USED  FOR  STEAM  PURPOSES  NOT  EN- 
TITLED TO  REDUCED  RATES.— A  tariff  providing  for  re- 
duced rates  on  coal  used  for  steam  purposes,  or  that  the  carrier 
wdll  refund  part  of  the  regular  tariff  charges  on  presentation  of 
evidence  that  the  coal  wa.s  so  used,  is  improper  and  unlawful. 
That  is  to  say,  the  carrier  has  no  right  to  attempt  to  dictate  the 
iLses  to  which  commodities  transported  by  it  shall  be  put  in  or- 
der to  enjoy  a  transportation  rate.  (See  ruling  2;  also  Board 
of  Bnstol,  Tenn.,  v.  V.  &  S.  W.  By.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C,  456;   In 


Conference  Rulings.  633 

I  the  Matter  of  Restricted  Rates,  20  I.  C.  C,  427;    and  Divisions 
of  Joint  Rates  on  Railway  Fuel  Coal,  37  I.  C.  C,  265. 

35.  USE  OF  STATE  PASSES  IN  INTERSTATE  JOUR- 
NEYS UNLAWFUL. — Passes  granted  to  state  railroad  connnis- 
sioners  can  not  lawfully  be  nsed  in  interstate  journeys. 

February  4,  1908. 

36.  RATES  ON  SHIPMENTS  FOR  THE  FEDERAL  GOV- 
ERNMENT.— If  title  to  property,  such  as  postal  cards,  passes 
to  the  Government  at  the  point  of  manufacture,  the  carrier  may 
agree  upon  a  rate  to  be  applied  for  transporting  it  for  the 
government  to  another  point,  without  filing  a  tariff  with  the 
.Commission.  But  if  the  manufacturer  under  his  contract  is 
required  to  deliver  to  the'  government  at  such  other  point,  the 
transportation  must  be  under  the  published  tariff'  rate.  In  other 
words,  if  the  shipment  is  made  directly  by  the  government,  this 
rate  may  be  fixed  by  the  carrier  without  posting  and  filing  the 
tariff,  but  not  otherwise.  (See  ruling  33,  and  ruling  244  rescind- 
ing ruling  65 ;  also  see  ruling  452 ;  also  United  States  v.  A.  & 
V.  Ry.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.,  406.) 

37-  PASSES  TO  CARETAKERS.— Passes  to  caretakers  must 
be  in  the  form  of  trip  passes  limited  to  the  journey  on  which 
the  person  to  whom  the  pass  runs  acts  as  a  caretaker.  It  may 
also  cover  the  return  journey.  Annual  or  time  passes  to  care- 
takers are  unlawful.     (See  ruling  1.) 

38.  REPARATION  ON  INFORMAL  COMPLAINTS.— (Re 
stated  in  ruling  396.) 

March  3,  1908. 

39.  ACCRUED  DEMURRAGE  CHARGES.— A  shipper 
who  had  customarily  paid  his  freight  charges  in  checks  was 
called  upon,  under  a  general  order  i-ssued  by  the  carrier,  to  pay 
his  freight  charges  in  cash  during  the  recent  financial  dis- 
turbances. While  the  local  agent  was  endeavoring  to  get  author- 
ity from  the  home  office  of  the  carrier  to  continue  to  accept 
checks  from  this  shipper,  demurrage  charges  accrued :  Held, 
That  they  could  not  lawfully  be  refunded.  (See  note  to  ruling 
242.) 


634  Conference  Rulings. 

40.  PRINTING  OF  BRIEFS.— (See  current  Rules  of  Prae- 
'tice. ) 

41.  DIVISION  OF  PROCEEDS  OF  SALE  OF  SHIPMENT 
TO  PAY  FREIGHT  CHARGES.— A  shipment  refused  by  the 
consignee  and  upon  which  demurrage  had  accrued  was  sold  by 
the  delivering  carrier,  but  did  not  realize  the  amount  of  the 
transportation  charges  and  the  amount  paid  for  unloading.  Up- 
on the  request  of  the  carrier  the  Conmiission  declined  to  express 
its  views  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  proceeds  of  the  sale 
should  be  divided  among  the  several  carriers  participating  in 
the  movement,  that  being  a  matter  to  be  determined  by  the  in- 
terested carriers  for  themselves.     (See  rulings  314  and  145.) 

42.  RATES  ON  RETURN  MOVEMENTS.— A  shipment  of 
mining  machinery  M^ent  to  destination  over  the  lines  of  one 
carrier  and  was  subsequently  returned  for  repairs  over  the 
lines  of  another  carrier.  The  published  tariff,  to  which  all 
carriers  participating  in  both  movements  were  parties,  provided 
for  half  rates  on  such  return  movements  when  over  the  same 
route  as  the  original  out-bound  movement.  A  j^ortion  of  the 
route  of  the  return  movement  was  over  the  line  of  a  caiTier 
which  also  formed  a  part  of  the  through  route  over  which  the 
out-bound  shipment  moved :  Held,  That  the  regiilar  tariff  rate 
was  properly  applied  on  the  return  movement;  that  the  return 
movement  under  through  billing  miLst  be  treated  as  a  unit ;  and 
that  there  could  be  no  refund  on  the  basis  of  the  half  rates  for 
any  portion  of  such  through  return  movement. 

43.  EXTENSION  OF  TIME  ON  THROUGH  PASSENGER 
TICKETS. — The  ruling  heretofore  announced  under  this  head 
to  the  effect  that  an  extension  of  time  on  a  tlirough  ticket  by  a 
carrier  whose  line  is  a  part  of  that  route  is  binding  on  the  lines 
of  other  carriers  in  the  route,  is  now  withdrawn.  (Overruling 
ruling  23.) 

44.  LIMITATIONS  OF  PASSENGER  TICKETS.— A  pas- 
senger traveling  on  a  round-trip  ticket  containing  the  provision 
that  "This  ticket  will  be  good  for  return  trip  to  starting  point 
prior  to  midnight  of  date  punched  ])y  selling  agent  in  column  2. 
Final  limit ; ' '  did  not  reach  the  last  connecting  carrier  before  the 


Conference  Rulings.  635 

date  punched  on  the  ticket.  The  passenger  was  recjuired  to  pay 
full  fare  on  the  last  connecting  line :  Held,  That  a  refund  could 
not  lawfully  be  made. 

45.  PASSENGERS  ON  FREIGHT  TRAINS.— Upon  in- 
quiry made  by  a  carrier  the  Commission  holds  that  it  may  not 
confine  the  right  to  travel  on  freight  trains  to  a  particular  class, 
such  as  drummers  and  commercial  agents,  but  if  the  privilege  is 
permitted  to  one  class  of  travelers  it  must  l>e  open  to  all  others 
on  equal  tenns  and  conditions. 

46.  REPARATION  ON  INFORMAL  PLEADINGS— PAS- 
SENGER TICKETS.— The  rulings  of  the  Commission  relating 
to  reparation  on  informal  complaints  do  not  extend  to  pas.senger 
traffic,  but  are  limited  to  freight  traffic  only.  The  Commission 
will  not  entertain  applications  for  authority  to  refund  on  pas- 
senger tickets  on  the  ground  that  the  fare  was  reduced  shortly 
after  the  ticket  was  sold.  (But  see  rulings  113,  247.  266,  277,  and 
385;  see  also  Nonvalidation  of  Limited  Excursion  Tickets,  19 
I.  C.  C,  442.) 

March  9,  1908. 

47.  TARIFF  TAKING  EFFECT  ON  SUNDAY.— Under  a 
tariff  schedule  regularly  filed,  .showing  a  change  in  published 
rates,  it  happened  that  the  thirty  days'  notice  required  by  law 
expired  on  Sunday:    Held,  That  the  tariff  is  lawful. 

48.  MAY  A  SHIPPER  OFFSET  A  CLAIM  AGAINST  A 
CARRIER  BY  DEDUCTION  FROM  FREIGHT  CHARGES 
ON  SHIPMENT?— (Restated  in  ruling  323.) 

49.  BENEFIT  OF  REPARATION  ORDERS  EXTENDS 
TO  ALL  LIKE  SHIP]\IENTS.— (Restated  in  ruling  220fZ;  also 
see  ruling  200c.) 

50.  WHEN  JOINT  AGENT  PUBLISHES  A  NEW  RATE 
BETWEEN  TWO  POINTS,  WITHOUT  CANCELING  THE 
OLD  RATE  DULY  PUBLISHED  BY  ONE  OF  THE  CAR- 
RIERS, THE  OLD  RATE  ON  THAT  LINE  REMAINS  IN 
EFFECT. — The  published  tariffs  of  an  interstate  carrier  named 
a  rate  of  20  cents  on  a  given  commodity  between  specified  points. 
On,  October  1,  1907,  under  a  proper  power  of  attorney,  a  joint 
agent  of  all  carriers  serving  those  two  points  published  a  rate 


636  Conference  Rulings. 

of  22  cen\",s.  He  failed  to  cancel  the  20-cent  rate  and  it  was 
not  formally  canceled  by  the  carrier  that  published  it  until  Jan- 
uary 14,  1908 ;  Held,  That  because  of  the  failure  of  the  joint 
agent  and  of  the  carrier  that  published  it  to  cancel  that  rate  in 
the  manner  required  by  section  6  of  the  act,  and  Rule  8  of  Tariff 
Circular  14-A,  the  20-cent  rate  remained  the  lawful  rate  of  that 
carrier  until  formally  canceled  on  January  14,  1908.  See  rul- 
ings 70,  101,  104,  and  239.  Rule  8  of  Tariff  Circular  14-A 
is  now  published  as  Rule  8  of  Tariff  Circularl8-A.) 
March  11,  1908. 

51.  THE  USE  OF  PULLMAN  CARS  AT  STOP-OVER 
POINTS  CAN  NOT  BE  LIMITED  TO  MEMBERS  OF  A  PAR- 
TICULAR CLUB. — A  carrier  desiring  to  make  excursion  rates 
to  a  point  where  a  convention  is  to  be  held  wishes  to  accord  to 
members  of  certain  clubs  the  privilege  of  occupying  the  sleep- 
ing cars  while  the  convention  is  in  session :  Held,  That  the  car- 
rier may  lawfully  arrange  an  excursion  rate  to  such  point  and 
return,  the  rate  to  include  sleeping-car  accommodations  to  and 
from  that  point  with  the  privilege  of  occupying  the  car  at  that 
point  during  the  convention ;  but  that  the  Commission  does  not 
understand  that  tlie  carrier  may  limit  the  privilege  to  the  mem- 
bers of  any  particular  club. 

52.  RATE  EASTBOUND  CAN  NOT  BE  APPLIED  WEST- 
BOUND UNLESS  SO  PUBLISHED.— A  mixed  carload  of  meat 
eastbound  was  diverted  at  the  Ohio  River  on  account  of  a  flood, 
and,  by  order  of  the  shipper,  was  taken  by  a  roundabout  route  to 
a  point  east  of  its  destination  and  was  thence  hauled  westbound 
to  destination.  The  mixed-carload  rate  applied  on  eastbound 
shipments,  but  the  tariffs  provided  no  mixed-carload  rate  on 
westbound  shipments :  Held,  That  such  interruption  of  the 
eastbound  movement  would  not  justify  the  application  of  a 
mixed-carload  rate  on  the  westbound  movement  to  destination. 

53.  TRANSIT  PRIVII;EGE  NOT  AVAILED  OF  CAN  NOT 
BE  RENEWED  AFTER  THE  EXPIRATION  OF  THE  TIME 
ALLOWED  IN  THE  TARIFFS.— A  consignor  of  sheep,  which 
were  being  grazed  in  transit,  was  unable  because  of  a  severe 
snowstorm  to  get  the  sheep  to  tlie  station  before  the  grazing 
privilege  expired  according  to  the  published  time  limit.     Upon 


Conference  Rulings.  637' 

inquiry  of  the  carrier  it  was  held  that  it  can  not  lawfully  take 
the  sheep  forward  on  the  rates  which  would  have  been  applicable 
under  the  tariff  had  the  sheep  been  shipped  within  the  time  limit. 
March  16,  1908. 

54.  DEIMURRAGE    ON    INTERSTATE    SHIPMENTS.— 

Questions  of  demurrage  and  car  service  on  interstate  shipments 
are  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, which  does  not  concur  in  the  view  suggested  by  certain 
state  conunissions  that  such  matters,  even  when  pertaining  to 
interstate  shipments,  are  within  their  control.  (Reaffirmed  by 
ruling  2236.) 

55.  FREE  PASS  TO  RAILWAY  EMPLOYEE  ON  LEAVE 
OP  ABSENCE.— An  employee  who  has  not  been  suspended  or 
dismissed  from  the  service,  but  is  on  leave  of  absence  and  is 
still  carried  on  the  roll  of  employees  of  the  carrier,  is  still  an 
employee  and  as  such  may  lawfully  use  free  transportation. 

April  7,  1908. 

56.  HOURS-OP-SERVICE  LAW— STREET-CAR  COMPA- 
JvIIES. — Upon  inquiry  whether  the  hours-of-service  law  applies 
to  electric  street  oar  lines  which  are  interstate  carriers:  Held, 
That  it  applies  to  all  railroads  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the 
act  to  regulate  conmaerce,  as  amended,  including  street  rail- 
roads when  engaged  in  interstate  commerce.     (See  ruling  287.) 

57.  RESHIPPING  RATE  FROM  PRIMARY  GRAIN  MAR- 
KETS.— ]\Iay  a  carrier  lawfully  cancel  its  local,  reconsigning, 
proportional,  and  other  rates,  on  outbound  shipments  of  grain 
from  a  primary  market  like  Kansas  City,  where  no  grain  origi- 
nates upon  which  the  local  rate  would  be  applicable,  and  sul)- 
stitute  for  them  a  reshipping  rate  applicable  on  all  outbound 
grain  ? 

Responding  to  the  inquiry  the  Commission  approved  the  sug- 
gestion, but  declines  in  advance  to  express  approval  of  such 

Note. — This  ruling  was  made  by  tlie  Commission  on  March  16,  1908; 
by  the  amendatory  act  of  April  13,  1908,  carriers  w'ere  given  the  right 
to  give  free  transportation  to  "furloughed,  pensioned,  and  superan- 
nuated employees." 


638  Conference  Eulings. 

reshipping  rate  when  it  makes  less  than  the  published  rate  from 
an  intermediate  point. 

58.  DECLARING  A  FALSE  VALUATION  IN  VIOLA- 
TION OF  SECTION  10.— Upon  an  inquiry  from  a  banking 
hoiLse  whether  it  may  lawfully  declare  a  value  of  .^5,000  upon  i* 
package  of  negotiable  bonds  of  the  market  value  of  $10,000  and 
pay  the  express  charges  on  the  basis  of  the  declared  value,  upon 
the  understanding  that  in  ease  of  the  loss  of  the  bonds  the  ex- 
press company  will  be  responsible  only  for  the  amount  so  de- 
,clared,  it  was  held  that  a  shipper  falsely  declaring  the  value  of 
a  package  delivered  to  an  express  company  for  transportation 
(Violates  section  10  of  the  act.  (See  ruling  295  and  compare  rul- 
ing 188;  see  also  Express  Bates,  Practices,  Accounts,  and  Rev- 
enues, 43  I.  C.  C,  510.) 

59.  CARRIERS  MUST  SEND  CAR  THROUGH  OR  TRANS- 
FER SHIPMENT  EN  ROUTE.— Where  connecting  lines 
have  united  in  publisliing  a  joint  through  rate  between  two 
points  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Commission  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  carriers  in  the  route  to  provide  the  car  and  permit  it  to  go 
through  to  destination  or  to  transfer  the  property  en  route  to 
another  car  at  their  own  by  rulings  92  and  95c, 

60.  NO  REFUND  TO  PASSENGER  WHO  EXCEEDED 
STOP-OVER  LII\IIT.— A  passenger,  while  availing  himself  of  a 
stop-over  privilege  at  a  certain  point  in  his  journey,  was  sub- 
poenaed as  a  witness  in  a  proceeding  in  a  civil  court,  and  obey- 
ing the  process  was  not  able  to  proceed  on  his  journey  within 
the  time  limit  of  the  stop-over.  As  a  result  he  was  compelled 
to  pay  an  additional  fare  from  that  point  to  destination:  Held, 
That  a  refund  coidd  not  lawfully  be  made. 

61.  STORAGE  CHARGES  ON  TRUNK  ACCRUING  BE- 
CAUSE OF  INJURY  TO  PASSENGER— The  Pullman  car  in 
which  a  passenger  was  traveling  was  derailed  and  went  over  an 
embankment,  resulting  in  an  injury  to  a  passenger,  who  in  con- 
sequence was  detained  for  some  time.  His  tiimk  was  taken  oi\ 
to  destination  arid  storage  charges  accrued  on  it  until  claimed 
by  him.  Held,  That  the  storage  charges  might  lawfully  be  re- 
funded. 


Conference  Rulings.  639 

April  14,  1908. 

62.  BOATS  THAT  ARE  NOT  COMMON  CARRIERS.— Cer- 
tain, carriers  have  been  in  the  habit  of  advancing  the  charges  of 
sailing  vessels,  boats,  and  barges  bringing  vegetables  to  their  ter- 
jninals  to  be  forwarded  to  interstate  destinations,  and  of  enter- 
ing the  amount  on  waybills  as  charges  in  addition  to  their  tariff 
rates.  Upon  inquiry  whether  the  carriers  may  lawfully  con- 
tinue this  practice  it  was  held  that  if  the  boats  ii.re  common  car- 
riers, making  regular  trips  and  ofPering  their  services  to  the 
general  public,  they  must  file  tariffs  and  the  practice  must  be 
discontinued  until  they  do  so.  (See  ruling  428;  also  ruling 
444.) 

63.  SERVANTS  MAY  NOT  USE  FREE  PASSES.— 
(Amended  by  rulings  92  and  95c.) 

64.  ABSORPTION  OP  SWITCHING  CHARGES.— The 
.tariff  of  a  carrier  provided  for  the  absorption  of  switching 
charges.  Upon  inquiry  it  was  agreed  that  the  Commission  could 
not  sanction  a  practice  under  which  switching  charges  are  paid 
by  the  consignee,  the  carrier  deducting  the  amount  of  the  switch- 
ing charges  from  the  published  rates  and  collecting  the  balance 
from  the  consignee.  In  all  cases  the  carrier  must  collect  the 
full  tariff  rates.  Where  its  tariffs  provide  for  absorptions  of 
switching  charges  the  carrier  must  pay  the  switching  company 
for  its  services  and  not  leave  that  to  be  done  by  the  shipper. 

65.  SPECIAL  RATES  FOR  UNITED  STATES,  STATE, 
OR  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENTS.— (Overruled  and  with- 
drawn by  ruling  244;   also  see  ruling  208c.) 

May  4,  1908. 

66.  JOINT  RATES  BETWEEN  A  WATER  AND  A  RAIL 
CARRIER  SUBJECTS  THE  FORMER  TO  THE  PROVI- 
SIONS OF  THE  ACT.— A  steamboat  line  agreed  upon  joint 
rates  with  a  rail  line  for  certain  passenger  and  freight  traffic : 
Held,  That  it  could  not  unite  with  a  railroad  company  in  mak- 
ing a  through  route  and  joint  rate  on  a  particular  traffic  with- 
out subjecting  all  its  interstate  traffic  to  the  provisions  of  the 
law  and  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission. 


640  Conference  Rulings. 

In  the  Matter  of  J urudiction  Over  Water  Carriers,  15  I.  C. 
C,  205,  the  Commission  held  that  carriers  of  interstate  com- 
merce by  water  are  subject  to  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  only 
in  respect  of  traffic  transported  under  a  common  control,  man- 
agement, or  arrangement  with  a  rail  carrier,  and  in  respect  of 
traffic  not  so  transported  they  are  exempt  from  is  provisions, 
(See  rulings  155,  201,  354,  401,  and  422;  alsoKansas  City  Mis- 
souri River  Navigation  Co.  v.  C.  d'  0.  By.  Co.,  ,34  I.  C.  C,  67.) 

67.  HANDHOLDS— SAFETY-APPLIANCE  LAW.— The 
law  makes  no  distinction  between  passenger  and  freight  cars,  and 
handholds  must,  therefore,  be  placed  on  the  ends  of  passenger 
cars  and  cabooses. 

68.  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIMS.— (Restated  in  ruling  236; 
also  see  ruling  462.) 

69.  ERROR  BY  TICKET  AGENT.— A  station  agent  inad- 
vertently failed  to  indorse  "colonist  ticket"  on  a  regular  ticket 
sold  upon  a  published  colonist  rate :  Held,  That  the  connecting 
carriers  must  be  paid  their  full  proportion  of  the  first-class  rate, 
but  that  the  Commission  would  not  intervene  between  the  initial 
carrier  and  its  agent.  (Reaffirmed  by  ruling  277 ;  see  also  rul- 
ing 105.) 

May  5,  1908. 

70.  EFFECT  OF  A  FAILURE  IN  A  NEW  TARIFF  NAM- 
ING HIGHER  RATES  TO  CANCEL  THE  SAME  RATES 
IN  PRIOR  TARIFF.— A  carrier's  tariff,  eflective  January  1, 
1903,  named  certain  rates  between  two  points.  By  a  joint  tariff, 
effective  February  1,  1908,  higher  rates  were  named  between 
the  same  points,  but  without  reference  to  the  previous  tariffs 
or  cancellation  of  the  lower  rates  therein.  On  I\larch  26,  1908, 
a  supplement  was  filed,  naming  the  same  higher  rates  and 
canceling  the  rates  named  in  the  tariff  of  January  1,  1903 :  Held, 
That  until  March  26,  1908,  when  the  original  rates  were  canceled, 
they  remained  in  effect  and  were  the  lawful  rates.  (See  rulings 
50,  101,  and  104;  compare  ruling  239.) 

71.  DIFFERENT  FARES  TO  DIFFERENT  SOCITIES 
UNLAWFUL. — A  tariff  covering  daily  picnic  excursions  be- 
tween certain  points  for  the  season  named  fares  for  Sunday  and 


Conference  Rulings.  641 

day  schools  and  different  fares  for  "societies:"  Held,  That  the 
tariff  is  discriminatory  and  that  the  fares  for  the  school  picnic 
should  be  the  same  as  for  society  picnics.     (See  ruling  99.) 

72.  RECONSIGNMENT  PRIVILEGES  AND  RULES.— (a) 
Usually  the  combination,  of  intermediate  rates  is  higher  than 
the  through  rate.  Frequently  a  shipper  desires  to  forward  a 
shipment  to  a  certain  point  and  have  the  privilege  of  changing 
the  destination  or  consignee  while  shipment  is  in  transit,  or  after 
it  arrives  at  destination  to  which  originality  consigned,  and  to 
forward  it  under  the  through  rate  from  point  of  origin  to  final 
destination.  ]\Iany  carriers  grant  such  privilege  and  generally 
make  a  charge  therefor. 

(b)  The  privilege  is  of  value  to  the  shipper,  and  in  order  to 
avoid  discrimination  it  is  necessary  for  carrier  that  grants  such 
privilege  to  publish  in  its  tariff  that  fact,  together  with  the  con- 
ditions under  which  it  may  be  used  and  the  charge  that  will  be 
made  therefor.  Such  rules  should  be  stated  in  terms  that  are  not 
open  to  misconstruction. 

(c)  Some  carriers  do  not  count  a  change  of  consignee  which 
does  not  involve  a  change  of  destination  as  a  reconsignment, 
while  others  do  consider  it  a  reconsignment  and  charge  for  it 
as  such.  The  commission  holds  the  view  that  without  specific 
qualifications  the  term  "reconsignment"  includes  changes  in 
destination,  routing  or  consignee.  If  carrier  wishes  to  distin- 
guish between  such,  changes  in  its  privileges  or  charges  it  must 
so  specify  in  its  tariff  rules.  Reconsignment  rules  and  charges 
must  be  reasonable,  and  a  charge  that  would  be  reasonable  for 
a  diversion  or  change  of  destination  might  be  unreasonable  when 
applied  to  a  simple  change  in  consignee  ^A'hich  did  not  involve 
change  in  destination  or  more  expensive  delivery.  (This  ride 
is  the  same  as  rule  74  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A.  See  Beekman  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  K.  G.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C,  87;  Dorau  d-  Co.  v.  N.  C. 
St.  L.  Bij.,  'S3  1.  C.  C,  527 ;  and  Aiwood  &  Co.  v.  C,  B.  &  Q. 
R.  R.  Co.,  42  I.  C.  C,  386.) 

73.  EFFECTIVE  DATE  OF  TARIFF  FILED  BY  A  CAR- 

m  interstate  transportation,  failed  to  note  an  effective  date  on  its 
carrier,  under  its  arrangements  for  the  first  time  to  participate 
RIER    WHEN    FIRST    COMING  UNDER    THE    LAW.— A 


642  Conference  Rulings. 

first  tariff  seliediile :  Held,  Tliat  heing  tliat  carrier's  first  tariff 
it  became  effentive  as  soon  as  filed.     (See  rulings  12  and  1006.) 

74.  HOURS-OP-SERVICE  LAW.— Employees  deadheading 
on  passengers  trains  or  on  freight  trains  and  not  required  to 
perform,  and  not  held  responsible  for  the  performance  of,  any 
service  or  duty  in  connection  with  the  movement  of  the  train 
upon  which  they  are  deadheading,  are  not  while  so  deadheading 
"on  duty"  as  that  phrase  is  used  in  the  act  regulating  the 
hours  of  labor.     (See  ruling  2876.) 


May  12,1908. 

75.  VALIDATION  OF  TICKETS.— The  condition  that  a 
roundtrip  passenger  ticket  shall  be  validated  for  the  original 
purchaser  by  carrier's  agent  at  a  given  point  is  one  of  the  con- 
ditions which  affects  the  value  of  the  service  rendered  the 
passenger  and  one  of  the  conditions  that  must  be  observed 
the  same  as  the  rate  under  which  the  ticket  is  sold,  which  miist 
therefore  be  stated  in  the  tariff  under  which  it  is  sold.  The 
tariff  may  provide  for  validation  at  numerous  points,  and  it  may 
provide  for  validation  at  any  point  intermediate  to  the  original 
destination  named  in  the  ticket.  The  condition  stated  upon 
the  ticket  should  not  conflict  with  the  tariff  provisions,  but  if 
in  any  case  there  should  inadvertently  be  conflict  between  the 
tariff  provisions  and  the  conditions  stated  on  the  ticket  the  tariff 
rule  must  govern.     (See  rulings  125  an,d  167.) 

76.  REDEMPTION  OF  PASSENGER  TICKETS.— The  un- 
used portion  of  a  passenger  ticket,  when  presented  by  the  original 
holder  to  the  carrier  that  issued  it,  may  lawfully  be  redeemed 
by  the  carrier  by  paying  to  the  holder  the  difference  between 
the  value  of  the  transportation  furnished  on  the  ticket  at  the 
full  tariff  rates  and  the  amount  originally  paid  for  the  ticket. 
(See  rulings  115,  228,  238,  265,  and  303.) 


May  14,  1908. 

77.  TRANSIT  PRIVILEGES  NOT  RETROACTIVE.— Ruling 
6,  providing  that  the  benefit  of  reconsignment  privileges  can  not 
be  given  retroactive  effect,  is  held  to  include  cleaning,  milling, 


Conference  Rulings.  643 

concentration,  and  other  transit  privileges.      (See  ruling  166; 
also  Henry  v.  Eastern  By.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C,  172.) 


June  1,  1908. 

78.  GRAIN  DOORS.— (a)  A  carrier  may  not  lawfully  reim- 
burse shippers  for  the  expense  incurred  in  attaching  grain  doors 
to  box  cars  unless  expressly  so  provided  in  its  tariff.  There 
is  a  material  difference  between  the  furnishing  of  ser\ace  or 
facilities  to  carriers  by  one  who  is  not  a  shipper  and  the  furnish- 
ing of  the  same  facilities  or  services  by  one  who  is  a  shipper. 
(See  rulings  19,  292,  and  360.) 

(b)  The  Commission  now  decides  that  its  ruling  above  and  the 
requirements  of  the  law  thereunder  will,  for  the  present  at  least, 
be  satisfied  if  the  carriers  that  propose  to  pay  shippers  for 
grain  doors  furnished  by  such  shippers  pro\4de  in  their  tariffs 
that  where  grain  doors  are  necessary  and  are  furnished  by  the 
shipper  the  carriers  will  pay  the  actual  cost  of  such  doors,  with 
stated  maximum  allowances  per  grain  door  and  per  car.  (Af- 
firmed by  ruling  267.) 

(c)  Such  maximum  allowances  per  door  and  per  car  must  be 
reasonable,  and  where  carrier  pays  for  such  doors  on  the  basis 
of  actual  cost  certified  statement  from  shipper,  verified,  as  to 
the  number  of  doors  furnished  and  the  cars  for  which  furnished, 
by  carrier's  agent,  should  in  every  instance  be  required.  (Re- 
affirmed by  ruling  267 ;  see  ruling  132 ;  also  Loomis  v.  L.  V.  B.  B. 
Co.,  240  U.  S.,  43  National  Lumber  Ass'n  v  A.  C.  L.  B.  B.  Co., 
14  I.  C.  C,  154;  and  N.  Y.  Shippers  Ass'n  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  B. 
B.  B.  Co.,  30  I.  C.  C,  437.) 

June  2,  1908. 

79.  "PRIVATE  SIDE  TRACKS"  AND  ''PRIVATE  CARS" 
DEFINED.— (a)    (Modified  and  restated  in  ruling  121.) 

(b)  A  private  car  is  defined  in  the  opinion  as  "a  car  owned 
and  used  by  an  individual,  firm,  or  corporation  for  the  trans- 
^portation  of  the  commodities  which  they  produce  or  in  which 
they  deal."  It  will  include  also  cars  owned  and  leased  to 
shippers  by  private  corporations.  (Qualified  by  ruling  122; 
also  see  ruling  128.) 


644  Conference  Rulings, 

(c)  The  ruling  as  to  demurrage  charges  on  private  tank  cars 
is  applicable  to  all  other  private  cars  used  by  the  railroads  and 
paid  for  on  a  mileage  basis.     (See  ruling  222.) 

(d)  It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  Commission  that  its  ruling 
shall  be  given  a  retroactive  effect.  The  demurrage  question  has 
been  in  a  state  of  great  confusion,  and  the  desire  of  the  Com- 
mission is  to  establish  a  uniform,  fair,  and  practicable  system 
for  the  future.  Claims  for  refund  of  demurrage  charges  pre- 
viously collected  in  accordance  with  regular  tariff  rules  will  not 
be  entertained  with  favor.  (See  rulings  123,  128,  222,  and  note 
to  ruling  242;  see  also  Rule  75  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A.) 

June  9,  1908. 

80.  SHIPMENT  THAT  MOVED  IN  UNDER  A  FORMER 
TARIFF  DOES  NOT  LOSE  THE  BENEFIT  OF  TRANSIT 
PRIVILEGES  CANCELED  PENDING  THE  OUT  MOVE 
MENT. — A  tariff  enabled  shippers  to  concentrate  commodities 
on  local  rates  at  a  certain  point  for  shipment  within  a  named 
period  in  carload  lots,  the  in-bound  billing  to  be  surrendered 
and  through  rates  from  point  of  original  shipment  to  apply. 
Before  the  period  for  taking  advantage  of  this  privilege  had 
^expired  a  new  tariff  made  a  new  arrangement :  Held,  That  with 
respect  to  shipments  that  had  moved  to  the  concentrating  point 
under  the  old  tariff  and  which  moved  out  within  the  period 
therein  allowed,  the  old  rate  should  apply.  (See  I  shell -Br  own  Co. 
V.  G.  T.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-908.) 

81.  SUPPLEMENTING  MILEAGE  BOOKS  BY  PAYING 
REGULAR  LOCAL  IMILEAGE  RATES.— The  practice  under 
a  published  tariff  rule  which  permits  the  holder  of  a  mileage 
book  which  does  not  contain  enough  coupons  to  enable  him  to 
complete  his  journey  to  pay  for  the  balance  of  the  journey  at  the 
regular  local  rate  per  mile,  as  published  by  the  carrier,  is  not  un- 
lawful.    (See  ruling  382.) 

82.  CHARTERING  TRAINS.— It  is  not  unlawful  for  a  rail- 
road company  to  publish  a  tariff  under  which  a  locomotive  and 
train  of  cars  may  be  chartered  at  a  named  rate,  tickets  for  the 
journey  on  that  train  to  be  sold  by  the  person  chartering  the 
train. 


Conference  Bulings.  G45 

83.  BLOCKADE  BY  FLOOD.— A  carrier  accepted  a  car- 
load shipment  for  movement  to  a  point  beyond  its  line.  After 
delivering  the  shipment  to  a  connection  at  a  junction  point  it 
was  advised  that  the  connecting  line  had  been  closed  by  floods. 
The  initial  carrier  accepted  the  return  of  the  car  from  that  line 
and  ordered  it  forward  to  destination  via  another  route  carrvang 
higher  rates,  taking  this  action  without  instructions  from  the 
shipper:  Held,  That  the  initial  line  was  responsible  to  the 
shipper  for  the  resulting  increa.se  in  the  transportation  charges. 
(See  rulings  146,  147,and  213-a;  also  Woodward  &  Dickerson  v, 
L.  &  N.  B.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C.  173;  Wcyl-Zul-crman  &  Co.  v. 
C.  M.  Ry.  Co.,  27  I.  C.  C.  495;  and  Morse  Lumber  Co.  v. 
L.  d-  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  I.  C.  C.  572.) 

84.  A  COMMODITY  RATE  TAKES  THE  COMIMODITY 
OUT  OF  THE  CLASSIFICATION.— A  carrier  having  a  high 
class  rate  on  furniture  with  a  low  minimum  also  had  a  lower 
commodity  rate  with  a  higher  minimum.  In  response  to  an  in- 
quiry whether  they  are  privileged  to  use  either  rate  as  they 
desire :  Held,  That  the  only  purpose  of  making  a  commodity  rate 
is  to  take  the  conniiodity  out  of  the  classification.  The  commodity 
rate  is,  therefore,  as  stated  in  Rule  7,  Tariff  Circular  15-A,  the 
lawful  rate.  And  if  the  carrier  does  not  desire  to  apply  it  on 
all  shipments  it  must  be  canceled.  (See  also  Rule  7  of  Tariff 
Circular  18-A.) 

85.  SUBSTITUTING  TONNAGE  AT  TRANSIT  POINTS.— 

(Restated  in  Ruling  203.) 

86.  POSTING  TARIFFS  AT  STATIONS.— Under  the  order 
of  the  Commission  of  June  2,  1908,  entitled  "In  the  Matter  of 
Modification  of  the  Provision  of  Section  Six  of  the  Act  with 
Regard  to  Posting  Tariffs  at  Stations,"  if  a  subsidiary  or  small 
connecting  line  has  authorized  the  parent  company,  or  principal 
connecting  line,  to  publish  and  file  for  it  all  of  its  tariffs,  tariffs 
so  issued  and  tiled  on  its  behalf  will  be  included  in  tlie  complete 
public  tariff  files  of  the  parent  or  issuing  line,  and  it  will  not  be 
necessary  for  such  subsidiary  or  small  line  to  maintain  an  ad- 
ditional complete  public  file.   (See  also  ruling  289.) 

The  order  above  mentioned  was  in  effect  superseded  by  an 
order  of  October  12,  1915,  relating  to  the  same  matter. 


G46  Conference  Rulings. 

87.  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  EATING  HOUSES  OPER- 
ATED BY  OR  FOR  CARRIERS.— Carriers  subject  to  the  act 
may  provide  at  points  on  their  lines  eating  houses  for  passengers 
and  employees  of  such  carriers,  and  property  for  use  of  such 
eating  houses  may  properly  be  regarded  as  necessary  and  in- 
tended for  the  use  of  such  carriers  in  the  conduct  of  their 
business.  Such  eating  houses,  however,  must  not  serve  the 
general  public,  or  any  portion  thereof,  with  food  prepared  from 
commodities  which  have  been  carried  at  less  than  the  full  pub- 
lished rate,  and  no  utensils,  fuel,  or  servants  at  all  employed  in 
serving  others  than  passengers  and  employees  of  the  carrier 
as  such  should  be  carried  at  less  than  tariff  rates.  Such  pri- 
ileges  as  may  be  extended  under  this  rule  shall  be  applied  on)y 
as  to  points  local  to  the  line  on  which  the  eating  house  is  situated. 
( Compare  ruling  124 ;  and  see  ruling  340. ) 

88.  HOURS-OF-SERVICE  LAW.—  (a)  The  specific  proviso 
of  the  law  in  regard  to  hours  of  service  is: 

"That  no  operator,  train  dispatcher,  or  other  employee  who 
by  the  use  of  the  telegraph  or  telephone  dispatches,  reports, 
transmits,  receives,  or  delivers  orders  pretaining  to  or  affecting 
train  movements  shall  be  required  or  permitted  to  be  or  remain 
on  duty  for  a  longer  period  than  nine  hours  in  any  twenty-four 
hour  period  in  all  towers,  offices,  places,  and  stations  continuously 
operated  night  and  day,  nor  for  a  longer  period  than  thirteen 
hours  in  all  towers,  offices,  places,  and  stations  operated  only 
during  the  daytime,  except  in  case  of  emergency,  when  the  em- 
ployees named  in  this  proviso  may  be  permitted  to  be  and  remain 
on  duty  for  four  additional  hours  in  a  twenty-four  hour  period 
or  not  exceeding  three  days  in  any  week." 

These  provisions  apply  to  employees  in  towers,  offices,  places, 
and  stations,  and  do  not  include  train  employees  who,  by  the 
terms  of  the  law,  are  permitted  to  be  or  remain  on  duty  sixteen 
hours  consecutively  or  sixteen  hours  in  the  aggregate  in  any 
twenty -four  hour  period,  and  who  may  occasionally  use  telegraph 
cr  telephone  instruments  for  the  receipt  or  transmission  of 
orders  affecting  the  movement  of  trains.     (See  ruling  287.) 

The  commission  decided  in  conference  on  April  9,  1917,  to 
rescind  paragraph  (b)  of  this  ruling,  because  the  question  upon 


Conference  Rulings.  647 

which  it  was  made  has  since  been  judicially  interpreted  and 
is  now  pending  in  the  courts  upon  appeal. 


June  29,  1908. 

89.  JURISDICTION  OF  ACT  OVER  LOCAL  BELT  OR 
SWITCHING  LINES.— The  question  is  asked,  "Is  a  belt  line 
owned  by  a  municipality,  which  participates  in  interstate  move- 
ments, subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  act  and  of  the  Com- 
mission?" Held,  That  it  is  subject  to  such  jurisdiction.  (  Com- 
pare ruling  162.) 

90.  MISROUTING  VIA  LINE  THAT  HAS  NO  TARIFF  ON 
FILE. — A  shipment  was  misrouted  and  passed  over  a  route 
via  a  part  of  which  no  rate  was  filed  with  the  Commission,  and 
was  thus  subjected  to  a  higher  charge  than  the  through  rate  via 
the  proper  route :  Held,  That  misrouting  carrier  may  be  au- 
thorized to  make  refund  on  account  of  its  error  in  misrouting 
shipment,  and  that  can:'ier  which  jiarticipated  in  the  trans- 
portation without  lawful  tariff  applicable  thereto  should  be  dealt 
with  through  the  Division  of  Prosecutions.     (See  ruling  93.) 

91.  A  MUCH  LONGER  AND  MORE  INDIRECT  ROUTE 
NOT  A  REASONABLE  ROUTE.— A  shipment  was  tendered 
destined  to  a  certain  point,  the  direct  route  to  which  was  over 
the  lines  of  two  carriers,  a  distance  of  358  miles,  the  rate  via 
that  route  being  22  cents.  It  was  possible  to  send  the  shipment 
around  over  the  lines  of  three  carriers,  a  distance  of  617  miles, 
and  secure  a  combination  rate  of  only  19  cents.  Application 
for  refund  was  made  on  account  of  the  difference  between  the 
rates:  Held,  That  the  claim  for  refund  should  be  denied  on  the 
ground  that  the  much  longer  and  indirect  route  is  not  a 
reasonable  route.  (See  ruling  214;  also  B.  B.  Homer  Lumber 
Co.  V.  8.  A.  L.  By.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-351.) 

92.  USE  OF  PASSES  BY  SERVANTS.— Opinion  expressed 
on  April  14,  1908,  on  the  subject  of  use  of  passes  by  servants, 
is  modified:  Held,  That  a  household  servant  when  traveling 
with  a  member  of  the  family  entitled  to  a  pass  is  included  witliin 
the  term  "family"  as  used  in  the  act.  (Amending  ruling 
63 ;  see  also  ruling  95c.) 


648  Conference  Rulings. 

June  30,  1908. 

93.  MISROUTING  INVOLVING  CARRIERS  NOT  SUB- 
JECT TO  THE  ACT. — A  shipment  was  tendered  to  a  carrier 
in  North  Carolina,  destined  to  California.  Shipper  requested 
that  it  be  sent  via  New  York  and  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
Shipment  M'^as  forwarded  all  rail  under  a  rate  alleged  to  be 
higher  than  would  have  applied  via  the  route  indicated:  Held, 
That  the  Commission  can  not  authorize  refund  because  no 
tariffs  are  on  file  with  the  Commission  via  route  w^hich  the 
shipper  directed  the  shipment  moved,  and  there  is  therefore  no 
official  measure  of  the  accuracy  of  the  claim  for  overcharge  or 
the   amount   thereof.      (See  rulings   90   and  214.) 

94.  LEASING  CARRIER'S  PROPERTY  IN  CONSIDERA- 
TION OP  LESSEE'S  SHIPMENTS.— A  carrier  leases  a  part 
of  its  property  to  a  certain  industry  under  a  contract  which 
contains  the  obligation  on  part  of  the  lessee  industry  to  make 
all  of  its  shipments  by  the  line  of  the  lessor  carrier.  Such  a 
provision  plainly  implies  that  the  traffic  so  furnished  by  the 
lessee  and  so  secured  by  the  lessor  is  an  important  and  substantial 
consideration  which  might  amount  to  a  concession  in  the  rates 
for  transportation,  and  therefore,  be  an  unlawful  device  or  dis- 
crimination. The  Commission  expressed  doubt  as  to  the  pro- 
priety of  the  practice.     (See  rulings  325  and  421.) 

95.  NOTICE  AS  TO  THE  ISSUANCE  OF  PASSES.— It  ap- 
pearing that  the  ruling  is-sued  by  the  Coimmission  on  the  9th 
day  of  June,  A.  D.  1908,  relative  to  the  issuance  and  use  of 
passes,  should  be  modified  in  certain  respects  relating  to  the 
forms  of  passes  to  persons  eligible  to  receive  free  transportation 
under  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  it  is  ordered  that  said  ruling 
shall  be  amended  to  read  as  follows : 

(a)  Many  abuses  in  the  issuance  and  uses  of  passess  have  been 
discovered  by  the  Commission  which  it  is  desired  to  correct,  and 
to  this  end,  and  because  of  the  misinterpretation  of  the  law  by 
carriers  generally,  the  Commission  at  this  time  makes  announce- 
ment that  it  will  recommend  the  indictment  and  prosecution  of 
all  carriers  and  persons  issuing  passes  to,  or  allowing  the  use  of 
pa.sses  by,  any  persons  not  included  within  the  designated  classes 
to  whom  free  transportation  may  be  given  by  carriers  subject 


Conference  Rulings.  649 

to  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  as  set  forth  in  said  act.  Among 
those  not  included  under  the  provisions  referred  to  are  the 
following : 

1.  Officers  or  employees  of  news  companies  other  than  newsboys. 

(See  Transportation  of  Newspaper  Employees,  12  I,  C.  C, 
15.) 

2.  Officers  or  employeess  of  Telegraph  or  Telephone  companies, 

excepting  when  jiersonally  engaged  in  operation,  extension, 
repair,  or  inspection  of  lines  upon  or  along  the  railroad 
right  of  way  and  used  in  connection  with  the  operation  of 
The  railroad.  The  amendatory  act  of  June  18,  1910,  brings 
Telephone  and  Telegraph  companies  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Commission;  see  ruling  305;  see  also  rulings  161 
and  219.) 

3.  Officers  or  employees  of  surety,  transfer,  and  baggage  com- 

panies, except  baggage  agents.  (See  ruling  216,  also  U.  S. 
V.  Erie  B.  R.,  236  U.  S.  259.) 

4.  Officers  or  employees  of  carriers  not  subject  to  the   act  to 

regulate  commerce,  including  officers  and  agents  of  steam- 
ship and  stage  lines  not  subject  thereto.  (See  ruling  196; 
also  95c  and  475.) 

5.  Officers  or  employees  of  sulisidiary  corporations  engaged  in 

business  other  than  transportation  subject  to  the  act  to 
regulate  commerce,  save  that  such  officers  and  employees 
may  be  granted  free  transportation  when  attending  to 
business  imposed  upon  a  carrier  subject  to  the  act.  (See 
rulings  169,  208,  and  263.) 

6.  Families  of  local  attorneys,  surgeons,  and  ethers  who  are 
not  regularly  employed  by  carriers.     (See  ruling  208a..) 

(b)  Each  pass  issued  must  bear  upon  its  face  the  name  of 
some  person  belonging  to  a  class  named  in  section  1  of  the  act 
as  eligible  to  receive  free  transportation.  In  addition  to  such 
person  so  named  a  pass  may  also  carry  not  to  exceed  a  specified 
number  of  unnamed  persons  of  any  class  eligible  to  receive  free 
transportation ;  the  number  and  the  class  to  which  such  person 
belongs  being  specified  upon  the  face  of  the  pass — that  is  to 


650  Conference  Rulings. 

say,   passes  in  the  following   forms  will  be   recognized   by   tho 
Commission  as  legal : 

"Pass  John  Smith,  President,  car,  and  five  officers  and  em- 
ployees of  the  Z.  Y.  &  Z.  Railway." 

"Pass  J.  R.  Earner  and  six  linemen,  foreman,  and  force  of 
the  Western  Union  Telegraph  Company.  Good  only  when 
traveling  in  connection  with  the  construction,  maintenance,  or 
operation  of  the  lines  of  the  Western  Union  Telegraph  Company 
on  the  right  of  way  of  this  A.  B.  C.  Railway." 

' '  Pass  one  extra  messenger  of  the  Southern  Express  Company 
when  presented  with  letter  signed  by  Superintendent,  Assistant 
Superintend,  or  Route  Agent  of  said  Express  Company, 
authorizing  use  and  giving  name  of  person  to  be  passed. ' ' 

"Pass  John  Smith,  section  foreman,  and  six  emplovees  of  X. 
Y.|  &  Z.  Railway." 

(c)  The  Commission  holds  the  the  word  "family,"  as  used  in 
section  1  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  includes  those  who  are 
members  of,  and  w^ho  habitually  reside  in,  the  household  of  the 
person  eligible  to  receive  family  passes,  including  household 
servants  when  traveling  wnth  the  family  or  with  any  member 
thereof,  and  relatives  who  are  in  fact  dependent  upon  such 
person  although  not  actually  residing  in  his  household.  (See 
rulings  92,  174,  and  417.)  The  Commission  will,  therefore, 
view  passes  in  the  following  form  as  lawful : 

"Pass  John  Smith,  wife,  two  sons,  three  daughters,  and  two 
servants. ' ' 

"Pass  Mrs.  John  Smith  and  daughter,  account  John  Smith. 
Agent  X.  Y.  &  Z.  Railroad  Company  at  Washington,  D.  C." 

(d)  The  name  of  the  person  presenting  the  pass  must  appear 
upon  it.  Passes  intended  to  be  used  in  the  absence  of  the  head 
of  the  family  whose  occupation  makes  the  issuance  of  passes 
lawful  must,  in  addition  to  the  name  of  said  head,  show  the 
name  of  the  person  using  the  same.  (See  ruling  290.)  For  in- 
stance, a  pass  to  be  used  hy  John  Smith,  his  wife,  or  his  daughter, 
separately,  should  read: 

"Pass  John  Smith,  Mrs.  John  Smith,  and  ]\Iiss  Mary  Smith, 
account  C.  &  0.  Agent  at  Richmond,  Va." 


.    Conference  Rulings.  651 

(e)  Every  pass  to  an  officer  or  employee  of  a  carrier  other  than 
the  one  issuing  the  pass,  shall  indicate  the  name  and  rank  of  the 
person  to,  or  on  behalf  of  whom,  such  pass  is  issued,  as  well  as 
the  name  of  the  carrier  employing  him. 

(f )  The  Commission  construes  the  act,  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
railway-mail  service  employees,  as  giving  such  employees  the 
right  to  receive  free  transportation  when  on  duty  in  their  cars, 
or  when  traveling  under  orders  from  a  superior  officer.  The  Com- 
mission does  not  now  undertake  to  say  how  far  this  portion  of 
the  act  to  regulate  commerce  is  modified  or  controlled  as  regards 
railway-mail  service  employees  by  other  statutes  or  by  contracts 
between  carriers  and  the  Post  Office  Department.  (See  ruling 
377.) 

(g)  The  Commission  will  recognize  any  rail  or  water  carrier 
filing  a  tariff,  joint  or  local,  with  the  Commission,  as  a  carrier 
subject  to  the  act  so  far  as  the  issuance  of  passes  to  its  officers 
and  employees  may  be  concerned.  Where  a  carrier  has  no  tariffs, 
on  file  with  the  Commission,  and  does  not  acknowledge  itself 
subject  to  the  Commission's  jurisdiction,  the  Commission  will  re- 
gard the  issuance  of  passes  to  its  officers  or  employees  as  un- 
lawful, without,  however,  thereby  passing  upon  the  question 
of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  act  over  such  carrier  in  so  far  as  it 
may  be  necessary  to  assert  such  jurisdiction.  In  this  regard 
reference  is  made  to  Cosmopolitan  Shipping  Co,  v.  Ilamhurg- 
American  Packet  Co.,  13  I.  C.  C,  266,  and  In  re  petition 
Frank  Parmelee  Co.,  12  I.  C.  C,  39.  By  reference  to  those 
decisions  it  will  be  seen  that  among  the  carriers  not  subject  to 
the  act  are  ocean  carriers  to  nonadjacent  foreign  countries  and 
domestic  carriers  by  wagon,  stage,  or  automobile.  Carriers 
covered  by  these  decisions  are  not  eligible  to  file  tariffs  or  receive 
passes.     (See  rulings  196,  216,  263,  355,  and  475.) 

(/(.)  The  Commission  reaffirms  Rvile  63  of  Tariff'  Circular 
15-A,  Now  reported  as  ruling  208  of  this  bulletin, 

(i)  The  Commission  can  not  undertake,  in  any  case,  to  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  individuals  are  within  any  of  the  classes 
mentioned  in  section  1  of  the  act  as  eligible  to  receive  free 
transportation. 

(j)  The  Commission  will  not  regard  as  unlawful  allowance 
of  use,  or  the  use  of  passes  merely   irregular  in  form,  under 


652  Conference  Rulings. 

tliis  ruling:,  during  the  present  calendar  year.  Passes,  however, 
issued  to  persons  not  eligible  to  receive  the  same  must  be  called  in 
at  once,  as  well  as  passes  so  loosely  framed  that  persons  not  eli- 
gible to  receive  free  transportation  may  be  carried  upon  them — 
that  is  to  say,  a  pass  to  "John  Smith,  family,  and  household  ser- 
vants," although  irregular  in  form,  will  not  be  regarded  by 
the  Commission  as  unlawful  prior  to  January  1,  1909.  A  pass, 
however,  to  "John  Smith,  car,  and  party,"  being  susceptible  of 
use  for  the  transportation  of  persons  not  within  the  act,  should 
be  immediately  corrected. 

(k)  Carriers  are  enjoined  against  the  destruction  of  records 
or  memoranda  touching  the  issuance  of  passes,  and  the  passes, 
themselves,  coming  into  the  hands  of  the  carriers  after  use, 
must,  until  further  order  of  the  Commission,  be  retained  for 
a  period  of  not  less  than  five  years.  (See  Commission's  Re- 
gulations to  Govern  Destruction  of  Records  of  Steam  Roads 
Effective  July  1,  1914,  and  Regulations  to  Govern  Forms  and 
Recording  Passes,  Effective  Jan.  1,  1917.) 


October  12,  1908. 

96.  DEMURRAGE  ON  F.  0.  B.  SHIP:\rENTS.— A  pur- 
chased a  carload  of  lumber  f.  o.  b.  at  the  milling  point.  De- 
murrage accrued  on  account  of  the  failure  of  B,  the  mill  owner, 
to  promptl}'  load  the  car.  Carrier  inadvertently  delivered  the 
car  to  A  without  collecting  the  demurrage.  Upon  its  incpiiry 
as  to  whether  to  demand  the  demurrage  from  A  or  B :  Held, 
That  the  demurrage  must  be  collected  by  the  carrier  either 
from  the  vendor  or  the  vendee,  but  that  the  Commission  can 
not  undertake  to  investigate  the  facts  and  determine  for  the 
carrier  whether  the  vendor  or  the  vendee  is  liable  for  the 
charges.  (See  note  to  ruling  242;  also  Crescent  Coal  d-  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  B.  &  0.  B.  B.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C.  83.) 

97.  COLLECTION  BY  CARRIER  OF  L.  C.  L.  SHIP. 
MENTS. — The  Commission  condeins  as  unlawful  a  practice 
under  which  a  carrier  provides  an  empty  car  at  factory  sidings, 
in  which  the  shipper  may  load  L.  C.  L.  shipments  which  the 
carrier  then  moves  to  its  regular  freight  station  where  the 
shipments  are  assorted  and  placed  in  other  cars  to  be  forwarded 


Conference  Rulings.  653 

to  their  respective  destinations.  Sueh  practices  lawful  only 
under  definite  and  clear  tariff  authority,  nondiscriminatory  in 
terms  and  in  its  application.  (See  Trap  or  Ferry  Car  Service 
Charges,  34  I.  C.  C,  521.) 

98.  LOCAL  BILLING  TO  AVOID  HIGHER  THROUGH 
RATE. — A  lawful  through  rate  existed  between  two  points, 
applicable  over  two  routes,  one  of  which  was  directed,  and  there- 
fore not  ordinarily  used  by  the  carrier  for  through  movements. 
The  shipper  billed  locally  to  a  point  on  the  latter  route,  and 
rebilled  to  destination  without  taking  either  constructive  or 
actual  possession  of  the  shipment  at  the  local  point,  but  making 
his  rebilling  arrangements  with  the  agent  of  the  carrier  at  a 
distant  point.  Upon  arrival  of  the  shipment  at  destination, 
the  carrier  collected  the  balance  of  the  through  rate :  Held,  That 
the  local  billing  was  not  in  good  faith,  but  was  a  device  between 
the  shipper  and  the  carrier's  agents  to  avoid  the  higher  through 
rate  by  having  the  carrier's  agents  act  as  the  forwarding  agent  of 
the  shipper ;  therefore  the  through  rate  is  only  rate  lawfully 
applicable.  Affirmed  in  Ruling  337.  (See  also  rulings  24  and 
365;  also  In  re  Wharfage  Facilities  at  Pensacola,  Fla.,  27  I.  C. 
C,  258;  Doran  &  Co.  v.  N,  C.  &  St.  L.  By.,  33  I.  C.  C,  527; 
and  Kanotex  Refining  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  By.  Co.,  34  I.  C.  C, 
271.) 

99.  REGULATIONS  GOVERNING  COMMUTATION 
TICKETS    MUST    NOT    DISCRIMINATE    AS  BETWEEN 

CLASSES  OP  PERSONS.— (a)  A  Carrier  offers  a  46-trip 
monthly  commutation  ticket  and  provides  that  it  shall  be  issued 
only  to  pupils,  without  regard  to  age,  who  are  in  attendance 
on  schools  of  a  certain  kind  or  class,  and  specifically  provides 
for  the  exclusion  of  pupils  attending  various  other  kinds  of 
schools:  Held,  That  this  regulation  is  unjustly  discriminatory, 
and  therefore  unlawful,  but  that  carrier  may  lawfully  offer 
and  use  a  conmmtation  ticket  limited  in  its  sale  and  use  to 
children  or  young  persons  between  certain  stated  ages  (as,  for 
instance,  from  12  to  21  years  of  age). 

(b)  Such  arrangement  will  provide  desired  rates  for  school 
pupils  and  will  not  exclude  other  children  traveling  under 
substantially    similar    circumstances    but    for    the    purpose    of 


654  Conference  Rulings. 

securing  other  lines  of  instruction  or  on  other  missions.  It  will 
also  protect  against  the  use  of  such  ticket  by  adults.  The  car- 
rier may  not  inquire  into  the  mission,  errand,  or  business  of  the 
passenger  as  a  condition  of  fixing  the  transportation  rate 
which  such  passenger  shall  pay.  (See  ruling  71;  also  Com- 
mutation tickets  to  School  Children,  17  I.  C.  C,  144.) 

100.  EFFECTIVE  DATE  OF  TARIFF  THAT  WAS 
USED  BEFORE  AUGUST  28,  1906,  BUT  WAS  NOT  FILED 
UNTIL  AFTER  THAT  DATE.— (a)  Prior  to  the  effective 
date  of  the  amended  act  some  carriers  used  the  car-service  rules 
of  car-service  associations  under  which  to  assess  demurrage  and 
other  terminal  charges,  but  did  not  file  those  rules  with  the  Com- 
mission until  after  the  amended  act  became  effective.  Such 
publications  bore  effective  dates  antedating  their  filing,  but 
indicated  no  specific  date  subsequent  to  the  date  of  filing  upon 
which  the  schedule  should  become  effective.  The  question  is 
raised  as  to  whether  such  publications  so  filed  became  effective 
on  date  of  filing  or  thirty  days  subsequently  thereto :  Held, 
That  prior  to  August  28,  1906,  as  well  as  subsequent  to  that 
date,  the  law  required  carriers  amenable  to  its  provision  to 
file  with  the  Commission  and  post  to  the  public  schedules  con- 
taining their  terminal  charges  "and  any  rules  or  regulations 
which  in  any  wise  change,  affect,  or  determine  any  part  or  the 
aggregates"  of  their  rates,  fares,  and  charges.  The  amended 
act  prohibits  carrier  from  engaging,  or  participating  in  trans- 
portation of  passengers  or  property,  as  defined  in  the  act,  un- 
less the  rates,  fares,  and  charges  upon  w^hich  the  same  are 
transported  have  been  filed  and  published  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  act. 

(b)  The  Commission  has  decided  that,  excepting  the  first 
tariff  under  which  a  carrier  engages  in  interstate  transportation, 
a  tariff  that  is  filed  without  naming  date  on  which  it  is  to  take 
effect  is  unlawful  and  never  becomes  effective,  and  now  decides 
that  publications  that  were  used  prior  to  the  effective  date  of 
the  amended  act,  that  w'ere  filed  subsequent  to  that  date  and 
which  bore  effective  date  antedating  the  date  of  filing  thereof, 
became  effective  thirty  days  subsequent  to  the  date  of  filing 
the  same.     (See  rulings  12  and  73.) 


Conference  Rulings.  ^  655 

101.  CANCELLATIONS  IN  TARIFFS  MUST  BE  SPECI- 
FIC AND  COMPLETE.— Carrier's  tariff  contains  certain 
rates.  Joint  agent's  tariff  canceled  certain  of  those  rates,  but 
the  carrier  did  not  issue  any  corresponding  amendment  to  its 
tariff,  as  is  required  by  Rule  8,  Tariff  Circular  15-A.  It  is 
essential  that  when  one  tariff  cancels  a  part  of  another  tariff, 
specific  reference  to  the  tariff  so  affected  and  to  the  part  there- 
of so  canceled  shall  be  given,  and  that,  effective  on  the  same 
date,  supplement  to  the  tariff  so  canceled  in  part  shall  show  that 
the  specific  parts  are  canceled  by,  and  that  the  rates  will  there- 
after  be   found   in tariff,    I.    C.    C.    No. .    In   no    other 

way  can  discriminations  and  complaints  be  avoided.  The  car- 
rier knows  that  such  parts  of  its  tariff  are  to  be  canceled  and 
that  superseding  rates  are  to  l)e  shown  in  another  tariff.  There 
is,  therefore,  no  difficulty  about  arranging  its  supplement  and 
furnishing  it  to  the  proper  party  to  be  filed  with  the  issue  that 
contains  the  superseding  rates.  (See  rulings  50,  70,  104,  and 
239;  Rule  8,  Tariff  Circular  15-A,  amended  accordingly;  see 
Rule  8  of  Tariff  Circulars  17-A  and  18-A.) 


October  13,  1908. 

102.  FREE  PASSES  TO  EX-EMPLOYEES.— Under  the 
recent  amendment  to  the  antipass  provision  of  section  1 :  Held, 
That  a  pass  may  be  issued  to  a  bona  fide  ex-employee  of  any 
carrier  subject  to  the  act,  who  is  traveling  for  the  purpose  of 
entering  the  service  of  any  such  common  carrier,  whether  such 
service  has  or  has  not  previously  been  arranged  for.  (See  ruling 
158.) 


Octoher  16,  1908. 

103.  FREE  PASSES  TO  FAMILIES  OF  EMPLOYEES.— 
Upon  an  inquiry  involving  an  interpretation  of  the  recent 
amendment  to  the  antipass  provision  of  section  1,  providing 
that  free  transportation  may  be  given  to  the  families  of  employees 
killed  in  the  service  of  common  carriers :  Held,  that  the  pro- 
vision does  not  include  the  families  of  employees  who  died  a 
natural  death  while  in  the  service  of  common  carriers.  (See 
rulings  188,  173,  193,  and  476.) 


656  Conference  Rulings. 

104.  CONFLICT  IN  PASSENGER  TARIFFS.— Certain 
fares  of  a  carrier  had  been  published  in  a  joint  agent's  tariff 
and  also  in  its  own  tariff.  The  carrier  issued  a  new  tariff 
canceling  the  fares  in  its  own  tariff,  but  did  not  secure  their 
cancellation  in  the  joint  agent's  tariff:  II dd,  That  the  new 
tariff  was  unlawful  because  in  conflict  with  the  uncanceled 
tariff  of  the  joint  agent.  (See  rulings  50,  70,  101,  and  239; 
also  Stilwell  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  Rxj.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C.  405.) 

105.  PASSENGER  TICKET  HONORED  BY  WRONG 
LINE. — A  coupon  reading  over  one  line  was  honored  through 
error  by  the  conductor  of  another  line  running  between  the  same 
points,  and  the  latter  called  upon  its  conductor  to  make  good  the 
amount:  Held,  That  the  matter  was  one  of  discipline  between 
the  company  and  its  conductor,  and  was  not  cognizable  by  the 
Commission.     (See  rulings  69  and  277.) 

106.  TARIFFS  FOR  THE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  EX- 
PLOSIVES.— Under  a  special  act  of  Congress  the  Commission 
prescribed  certain  regulations  governing  the  transportation  of 
explosives.  Such  regulations  are  law  to  the  carriers  as  well 
as  to  the  shippers,  and  they  can  not  be  changed  except  by  act 
of  Congress  or  by  this  Commission.  It  is  therefore  not  con- 
sidered necessary  for  each  carrier  to  file  with  the  Commission 
copy  of  such  regulations  as  a  tariff  issue,  but  it  is  considered 
necessary  that  each  tariff  which  contains  rates  for  the  trans- 
portation of  explosives  shall  also  contain  notice  that  such  rates 
are  applicable  in  connection  and  in  compliance  with  the  regu- 
lations fixed  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Conunission.  This 
provision  must  be  in  every  such  tariff  issued  hereafter,  and 
must  l)e  incorporated  in  existing  tariffs  by  reissue  or  supple- 
ment as  early  as  practicable. 

If  tariff  is  governed  by  classification  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
include  the  notice  in  the  classification  referred  to  as  governing 
the  tariff.  (Rule  4,  Tariff'  Circular  15-A;  amended  accordingly; 
see  also  Rule  665  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A;  also  see  ruling  388.) 


Conference  Rulings.  657 


November  10,  1908. 

107.  REDUCED  FARES  FOR  THE  DEPORTATION  OF 
CHINESE  NOT  PERMISSIBLE.— Special  fares  can  not  law- 
fully be  accorded  by  carriers  for  the  transportation  of  Chinese 
to  the  ports  for  deportation,  even  thougli  the  expense  is  paid 
by  the  Government. 

Provision  for  the  subsistence  and  care  in  tran.sit  of  Chinese 
being  deported  are  matters  of  contract  between  the  carrier  and 
the  Government,  and  need  not  be  published  in  the  tariffs. 

108.  HOURS-OF-SERVICE  LAW— FERRY  EMPLOY- 
EES.— The  hours-of-serviee  law  does  not  apply  to  employees 
on  a  ferry,  even  tliough  the  ferry  be  owned  by  a  railroad 
company.  The  law  applies  to  employees  connected  with  the 
movement  of  trains,  and  hence  does  not  embrace  employees 
engaged  only  in  the  operation  of  a  ferry.  This  i-uling  does  not 
apply  to  car  ferries.     (See  ruling  287.) 

109.  TRANSPORTATION  OF  HOUSEHOLD  GOODS  OF 
AN  EX-EMPLOYEE. — A  carrier  gave  free  transportation  to  an 
employee  and  his  household  effects  to  the  point  where  he  was  to 
be  employed,  and  later  dismissed  him:  Held,  That  the  Commis- 
sion can  not  require  the  carrier  to  return  the  household  effects 
free  of  charge  to  the  point  from  which  they  were  first  moved. 
(Reaffirmed  by  ruling  255;  .see  also  ruling  2085.) 

110.  REPAYMENT  BY  CARRIER  ON  ACCOUNT  OF 
SWITCH  TRACK.— A  shipper  in  1895  paid  $200  to  a  carrier 
as  part  of  the  cost  of  constructing  a  spur  track  to  its  warehouse. 
Upon  application  of  the  carrier  for  permission  to  repay  the 
amount  to  the  shipper:  Held,  That  the  repayment  would  be  un- 
lawful unless  the  shipper  had  some  equity  or  ownership  in  the 
track  which  he  could  transfer  to  the  carrier  in  consideration  of 
the  payment.     (See  ruling  512.) 


November  12,  1908. 

111.     CHANGE  OF  RATE  WHILE  SHIPMENT  WAS  ON 
THE  OCEAN. — A  shipment  of  linoleum  left  Hamburg  on  July 


658  Conference  Rulings. 

4,  at  which  time  there  was  in  effect  a  published  tlirongh  rate 
to  San  Francisco  via  New  Orleans  of  $1.10.  When  the  ship- 
ment reached  New  Orleans  the  through  rate  had  been  canceled, 
leaving  in  effect  a  local  rate  from  New  Orleans  to  San  Francisco 
of  90  cents.  Upon  application  for  permission  to  refund  down  to 
the  $1.10  through  rate:  Held,  That  the  application  must  be 
denied.  (See  Borgfeldt  &  Co.  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  18  I.  C. 
C,  553.) 

112.  CARETAKERS  FOR  BEES  IN  HIVES.— Upon  in- 
quiry from  a  classification  commitee  it  was  agreed  that  tariffs 
may  lawfully  provide  for  free  transportation  of  caretakers  of 
bees  in  hives. 

113.  ERRORS  OF  CARRIER'S  AGENTS.— Agents  of  car- 
riers sometimes  misroute  passengers  or  by  other  error  cause  pas- 
sengers to  pay  additional  and  unnecessary  transportation 
charges.  In  the  view  of  the  Commission  such  cases  are  gov- 
erned by  the  principles  announced  in  Rule  70,  Tariff  Circular 
15-A.  (Reaffirmed  by  ruling  167;  see  also  ruling  247,  266,  and 
277.  Rule  70  of  Tariff'  Circular  15-A  is  now  published  as  rul- 
ing 214  of  this  Bulletin ;  also  see  L.  d-  N.  R.  R.  v.  Maxwell,  237 
U.  S.,  94.) 

114.  RECONSIGNMENT  OF  REFUSED  SHIPMENTS.— 
It  appears  that  in  some  instances  carriers  are  willing  to  recon- 
sign  refused  shipments  to  poin.ts  beyond  the  first  destination  and 
to  apply  the  tariff  rate  from  point  of  origin  to  final  destination, 
even  though  it  be  lower  than  the  rate  to  first  destination,  but 
they  do  not  feel  at  liberty  to  do  so  in  view  of  paragraph  2  of 
Rule  78,  Tariff  Circular  15-A.  It  is  optional  with  the  car- 
rier whether  or  not  it  will  grant  reconsigning  privilege.  If 
granted,  the  conditions  governing  it  must  be  in  tariff,  and  if 
charges  for  back  haul  or  out-of-line  haul  are  to  lie  assessed,  rule 
must  so  state. 

It  is  of  course  understood  that  satisfactory  showing  of  genu- 
ine transaction  and  actual  refusal  by  consignee  will  be  required. 
(Rule  78,  Tariff  Circular  15-A,  amended  accordingly ;  now  pub- 
lished as  Rule  67  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A ;  see  rulings  41  and 
114.) 


Conference  Rulings.  659 

115.  REDEMPTION  OP  UNUSED  PASSENGER  TICK- 
ETS.— Because  of  illness  or  other  compelling  reason  a  passenger 
sometimes  abandons  a  trip  short  of  destination  to  which  fare 
has  been  paid,  or  returns  from  a  point  short  of  that  to  which 
he  has  purchased  a  round-trip  ticket.  On  the  question  of  the 
right  of  the  carrier  to  refund  fare  in  such  a  case  the  Commission 
decides  that  when  the  passenger  has  paid  more  than  lawful  tariff 
fares  for  the  journey  actually  made  the  carrier  may  lawfully  re- 
deem unused  ticket  and  make  refund  on  the  basis  of  lawful  tariff 
fare  for  the  service  actually  rendered,  when  investigation  de- 
velops clear  identity  between  purchaser  of  ticket  and  the  one 
to  whom  refund  is  made.  (Amending  ruling  76;  see  also  rul- 
ings 265,  303,  and  350.) 


November  13,  1908. 

116.  REFUND  OP  UNUSED  PORTION  OP  ROUND-TRIP 
TICKET. — Because  of  a  washout  of  a  portion  of  its  tracks  a  car- 
rier was  unable  to  operate  trains  and  thus  return  a  passenger  over 
that  route  within  the  time  limited  in  a  round-trip  ticket  which 
she  held.  A  circuitous  route  was  open  to  her,  but  on  account  of 
her  age  and  the  condition  of  her  health  she  did  not  think  it  safe 
to  take  so  long  a  journey,  and  therefore,  waiting  until  the  tracks 
had  been  repaired,  "v^iich  was  after  the  expiration  of  the  time 
limit  of  the  ticket,  she  purchased  a  one-way  ticket  back  to  her 
home:  Held,  That  as  the  carrier  was  not  able  to  furnish  the 
service  which  it  undertook  to  furnish  within  the  time  limited  in 
the  round-trip  ticket,  it  might  lawfully  refund  the  extra  return 
fare  so  paid  by  the  passenger.     (See  ruling  266.) 

117.  DEMURRAGE  WAIVED  UNDER  SPECIAL  CIR- 
CUMSTANCES.— A  sidetrack  to  an  industry  upon  which  a  car- 
rier had  delivered  18  heavily  loaded  ears  sank  because  of  the 
marshy  character  of  the  roadbed:  Held,  That  the  carrier  may 
refund  demurrage  collected  for  the  necessary  detention  of  the 
cars  while  the  sidetrack  was  being  rebuilt.  (See  note  to  ruling 
242.) 

118.  REDUCED  RATES  POR  MUNICIPAL  GOVERN- 
MENTS IN  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES  ADJACENT.— Upon  in- 
quiry:   Held,  That  the  reduced-rate  transportation  for  munici- 


GGO  Conference  Rulings. 

pal  governments  permitted  under  section  22  of  llie  act  does  not 
apply  to  municipal  governments  in  foreign  countries  adjacent 

119.  RE  SHIPPING  OF  GRAIN.— Unpon  inquiry  whether  a 
proposed  tariff  rule  providing  that  "the  rate  to  be  applied  on 
all  out-bound  transit  grain  of  record  shall  be  the  specific  rato 

,  that  is  lawfully  in  effect  from  Chicago  at  the  time  the  grain  is 
reshipped"  may  lawfully  be  incorporated  in  a  tariff:  Held, 
That  the  Commission  can  not  sanction  the  rule,  and  that  the 
grain  can  move  only  as  a  through  movement  on  the  through  rate 
in  effect  at  the  time  it  starts,  or  as  a  local  movement.  (See  In 
re  Milling -in-Transit  Rates,  17  I.  C.  C,  113;  Liberty  Mills  v. 
L.  d  N.  B.  B.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C,  184;  and  Board  of  Trade  of  City 
of  Chicago  v.  A.  A.  B.  B.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C,  651.) 

120.  RESPONSIBILITY  OP  CARRIER  FOR  FAILURE 
TO  FURNISH  PROPER  CARS  UNDER  RATE  CONFINED 
TO  CARS  OF  A  CERTAIN  CLASS.— Certain  rates  on  coal 
published  by  a  carrier  to  points  on  a  connecting  line  were  ex- 
pressly  limited  to  shipments  "loaded  in  box  or  s+ock  cars  only," 
because  the  connection  refused  to  handle  coal  shipments  in  open 
ears.  Upon  demand  for  cars  for  a  shipment  to  such  points  the 
carrier,  instead  of  furnishing  box  cars  to  which  the  rate  applied, 
furnished  coal  cars,  which  carried  a  higher  rate :  Held,  That  the 
carrier  having  issued  the  tariff  itself,  and  having  furnished  cars 
that  did  not  comply  wnth  the  tariff  requirements,  was  responsible 
for  the  excess  charges. 


November  14,  1908. 

121.  A  PRIVATE  SIDETRACK  DEFINED.— A  private 
sidetrack  is  one  that  is  outside  the  carrier's  right  of  way,  yard, 
and  terminals,  and  of  which  the  railroad  does  not  own  either  the 
rails,  ties,  roadbed,  or  right  of  way.  (Modifying  ruling  79-a; 
see  note  to  ruling  242. ) 

122.  A  PRIVATE  CAR  OWNED  BY  ONE  SHIPPER  BUT 
USED  BY  ANOTHER. — A  private  car  owned  by  one  shipper 
but  used  with  his  consent  by  another  shipper  dealing  in  a  dif- 
ferent commodity  is  not  a  private  car  as  that  phrase  has  been 
defined  by  the  Commission  in  connection  with  demurrage 
charges.     (Qualifying  ruling  79&;  see  also  ruling  128.) 


Conference.  Rulings.  661 

123.    DEMURRAGE  ON  PRIVATE  CARS  TEMPORARILY 
OUT  OF  SERVICE  STANDING  ON  CARRIERS'  STORAGE 

TRACKS. — Demurrage  is  a  charge  for  detention  to  ears  that 
have  been  set  by  carrier  for  loading  or  unloading.  Private  cars 
,are  subject  to  demurrage  rules  the  same  as  is  the  carriers'  equip- 
ment except  when  the  private  car  is  standing  on  the  private  side- 
track. It  is  not  necessary  to  charge  demurrage  either  on  car- 
riers' equipment  or  private  cars  when  same  are  temporarily  out 
of  service  and  standing  idle  upon  the  storage  tracks  of  the  car- 
rier unless  provision  for  such  charge  is  included  in  carriers'  de 
murrage  rules.  (See  rulings  79,  222,  270,  and  note  to  ruling  242  ; 
see  also  Rule  75  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A ;  see  also  Code  of  Na- 
tional Car  Demurrage  Rules.) 


December  7,  1908. 

124.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  MATERIAL  AND 
WORKMEN. — A  carrier,  not  being  able  to  ol)tain  ice  for  refrig- 
eration purposes  at  a  division  point,  entered  into  a  contract  un- 
der which  a  private  company  there  undertook  to  build  a  plant 
and  manufacture  ice.  The  contract  provided  that  in  case  it  was 
necessary  to  enlarge  the  plant  to  meet  the  increasing  needs  of 
the  carrier,  the  carrier  would  transport  free  of  charge  the  ma- 
trials  and  mechanics  necessary  to  make  the  enlargement.  An  en- 
largement was  re({uired  and  made,  and  upon  application  by  the 
carrier  for  permission  to  refund  the  freight  charges  on  the  mav 
terials  used  and  the  passenger  fares  paid  by  the  mechanics  em- 
ployed on  the  work :  Held,  That  the  ap])lieation  must  be  de- 
nied, it  appearing  that  the  ice  plant  also  sold  ice  commercially  in 
the  community  in  question.     (Compare  ruling  87.) 


December  8,  1908, 

125.  FAILURE  TO  VALIDATE  PASSENGER  TICKET.— 
Upon  inquiry :  Held,  That  a  carrier  might  lawfully  incorporate 
in  its  tariff  a  rule  providing  that  when  a  passenger  is  compelled 
to  pay  the  regular  return  fare  because  of  his  failure  to  have  his 
round-trip  ticket  validated  at  the  return  starting  point,  the  car- 
rier will  refund  the  extra  fare  upon  the  filing  with  it  of  an  affi- 
davit by  the  holder  of  the  round-trip  ticket,  certifying  that  the 


662  Conference  Rulings. 

ticket  had  been  used  in  accordance  with  all  the  conditions  of  the 
tariff  and  the  contract  on  the  ticket  except  as  to  the  matter  of 
validation.     (See  ruling  75  and  167.) 

126.  REFUND  OF  OVERCHARGE  ON  SHIPMENT  TO 
FOREIGN  COUNTRY  ADJACENT.— An  overcharge  was  col- 
lected on  a  shipment  of  tobacco  to  a  point  in  Mexico.  On  appli- 
cation of  the  American  carriers,  in  which  the  Mexican  lines  re- 
fused to  join :  Held,  That  the  American  lines  might  refund 
such  part  of  the  total  overcharge  as  their  division  of  the  through 
rate  bears  to  the  entire  through  rate. 

127.  DAMAGE  TO  FRUIT  BY  DELAYED  NOTICE  OF 
ARRIVAL  AT  DESTINATION.— An  express  company  under- 
took to  notify  the  consignee  of  the  arrival  at  destination  of  a 
shipment  of  strawberries,  but  failed  for  some  days  to  effect  notice 
partly  because  of  an  erroneous  address  on  a  postal  card :  Held, 
That  the  damage  resulting  from  the  delay  was  not  due  to  any 
violation  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  and  therefore  was  not 
cognizable  by  the  Commission.     (See  ruling  366.) 


December  10,  1908. 

128.  INCORPORATION  IN  TARIFFS  OF  AMENDED 
DEFINITION  OF  A  PRIVATE  CAR.— On  June  2,  1908,  the 
Conuni.ssion  amended  its  definition  of  a  private  car  as  used  in 
the  opinion  In  the  Matter  of  Demurrage  Charges  on  Privately 
Owned  Tank  Cars,  13  I.  C.  C,  379,  to  include  also  cars  owned 
and  leased  to  shipper.s  by  private  corporations.  It  is  held  that 
this  amendment  shall  be  incorporated  in  all  new  car-service 
rules  dealing  with  this  subject,  and  that  all  rules  shall  be  so 
amended  as  to  include  leased  cars  on  or  before  the  next  fiscal 
year,  July,  1909.  The  Commission  rules,  however,  that  upon  the 
amendment  of  tariffs  as  indicated,  such  leased  cars,  under  the 
conditions  dealt  with  in  case  No.  933,  may  be  treated  as  private 
cars  and  be  exempt  from  demurrage  when  standing  on  private 
tracks.  (See  rulings  79&,  122,  and  222;  see  also  note  to  ruling 
242.) 


Conference  Rulings.  663 

January  4,  1909. 

129.  SIGNATURE  TO  APPLICATIONS  FOR  SPECIAL 
REPARATION. — In  case  of  the  absence,  illness,  or  disability  of 
the  executive  or  general  ofificer  of  a  carrier  by  whom  special  re- 
paration applications  are  customarily  made  to  the  Commission, 
such  applications  may  be  signed  in  the  name  of  such  executive 
or  general  officer  by  his  chief  clerk,  provided  the  executive  or 
general  officer  has  previously  filed  with  the  Commission  written 
authority  for  the  chief  clerk  to  append  his  signature  in  such 
cases. 

130.  MAINTENANCE  OF  RELATIVE  ADJUSTMENT  IN 
ISSUING  TARIFFS  TO  CONFORM  WITH  FORMAL  OR- 
DER OF  THE  COM]\IISSION.— In  establishing  rates  or  regula- 
tions under  an  order  of  the  Commission  in  a  formal  case,  carrier 
or  carriers  that  are  actually  and  on  the  record  parties  to  the  case, 
or  that  are  lawful  parties  to  a  joint  tariff  in  which  the  rate  or 
regulation  that  is  prescribed  is  published  by  some  carrier  that 
is  party  to  the  case,  may  include  in  the  change  or  changes  made 
in  compliance  with  the  Commission's  order  commodity  or  com- 
odities  that  are  grouped  with  that  or  those  which  are  specified 
in  the  order;  and  may  also  include  adjustment  at  other  points 
in  order  to  preserve  established  grouping  or  relation  of  points, 
and  may  also  include  adjustment  of  rates  to  same  points  on  other 
eonunodities  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  established  relation 
of  rates  between  commodities.  Provided,  all  such  changes  made 
by  authority  of  this  rule  shall  be  effected  by  reductions  in  rates 
or  charges. 

If  can-ier  that  is  not  party  to  the  case  or  to  the  joint  tariff 
desires  to  make  on  less  than  statutory  notice  the  same  changes 
that  are  made  under  the  order  by  carrier  that  is  party  to  the 
same,  it  must  secure  special  permission  so  to  do.  (See  ruling  14, 
200-a,  and  396.) 

131.  "GROSS  TON"  AND  SIMILAR  PHRASES,  AS 
USED  IN  TARIFFS,  DEFINED.— The  term  "per  ton"  and 
"net  ton,"  when  used  in  tariffs,  will,  in  the  absence  of  qualify- 
ing words,  be  held  to  mean  a  ton  of  2,000  pounds.  The  terms 
' '  gross  ton ' '  and  ' '  long  ton ' '  and  ' '  ton  of  2,240  pounds ' '  will  be 
held  to  mean  a  ton  of  2,240  pounds. 


664  Conference  Rulings. 

January  5,  1.909. 

132.  REFUND  ON  GRAIN  DOORS.— Where  a  carrier  has 
established  a  tariff  provision  in  conformity  with  the  Commis- 
sion's rule  with  respect  to  the  payment  hy  carriers  of  the  cost 
of  grain  dooi*s,  and  it  appears  that  prior  to  the  publication  of 
such  a  tariff  it  had  been  the  practice  of  carrier  to  i)ay  for  grain 
doors  furnished  by  shippers:  Held,  That  applications  may  be 
made  on  the  special  reparation  docket  for  authority  to  refund  on 
the  basis  of  the  tariff  provision  for  grain  doors  furnished  within 
six  months  prior  to  the  effective  date  of  the  tariff  rule.  (See  rul- 
ings 19,  78,  267,  292,  and  360.) 

133.  OVERCHARGE  ON  ONE  SHIPMENT  OFFSET 
AGAINST  UNDERCHARGE  ON  ANOTHER.— (Superseded 
by  ruling  323.) 

134.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  WHEN  TAKING 
MEASUREMENTS  OF  EIMPLOYEES  FOR  UNIFORMS.— A 
carrier  requires  that  certain  of  its  employees  shall  wear  uniforms 
made  from  goods  of  texture  and  color  and  according  to  specifica- 
tions prescribed  by  the  carrier.  The  carrier  employs  a  certain 
firm  to  make  such  uniforms  for  any  and  all  of  its  employees  at 
agreed-upon  prices.  A  man  is  sent  over  the  line  to  take  the 
measures  and  orders  of  employees  for  such  uniforms.  The  em- 
ployee generally  gives  an  order  on  the  carrier  for  the  amount 
of  his  order,  which  amount  the  carrier  deducts  in  whole  or  in 
part  from  wages  due  the  employee  and  the  carrier  pays  the  finn 
for  the  uniform. 

We  are  asked  if  the  carrier  may  lawfully  continue  granting 
free  transportation  to  man  so  taking  measures  and  orders  for 
uniform  :  Held,  Tliat  having  its  employees  properly  uniformed 
is  a  duty  of  the  carrier  in  the  interest  of  the  carrier  and  of  its 
patrons,  and  therefore  the  man  so  sent  over  its  lines  for  the  pur- 
pose named  is,  for  that  purpose  and  while  engaged  in  that  work, 
performing  a  duty  devolving  upon  that  carrier  and  may  lawfully 
be  given  free  transportation  to  the  extent  necessary  for  the  per- 
formance of  that  duty,  provided  he  does  not  in  the  same  con= 
nection  receive  any  orders  from  or  sell  any  goods  to  persons  who 
are  not  bona  fide  employees  of  that  carrier.  (Eee  rulings  208b 
and  346.)  ■ 


Conference  Rulings.  G65 

January  27,  1909. 

135.  DEMURRAGE   ON   INTERSTATE   SHIPMENTS.— 

Rule  in  Supplement  No.  2  to  Tariff  Circular  15-A,  entitled  "De- 
murrage on  interstate  shipments,"  is  amended  by  adding  there- 
to the  following: 

It  is  not  permissible  to  provide  that  demurrage  may  be  re- 
funded or  waived  in  ease  of  inclement  weather  and  leave  it  to 
the  judgment  of  some  person  to  determine  what  constitutes  in- 
clement weather.  It  is  permissible  to  provide  that  demurrage 
charges  shall  be  waived  or  refunded  in  case  of  weather  inter- 
\ference  of  such  severity  as  to  damage  the  freight  in  handling  it 
into  or  from  the  car,  or  when  shipment  is  frozen  so  as  to  pre- 
vent or  seriously  hinder  unloading,  or  when  "because  of  flood 
or  high  water,  or  snoAvdrifts  which  it  is  the  carrier's  duty  to 
remove,  it  is  impracticable  to  get  car  for  loading  or  unloading. 

(Amending  ruling  223-f.  ^See  ruling  358  and  see  also  im- 
portant note  to  ruling  242.  Rule  in  Supplement  No.  2,  referred 
to,  is  now  reported  as  Rule  75  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A.  See 
Code  of  National  Car  Demurrage  Rules.) 

136.  ACCRUED  CLAIMS  NOT  INVALIDATED  BY  SUB- 
SEQUENT CANCELLATION  OF  ABSORPTION  RULE.— A 
tariff  providing  for  the  absorption  of  inbound  switcning  charges 
on  certain  traffic  also  provided  that  they  would  not  be  absorbed 
when  the  expense  bills  therefor  were  presented  more  than  six 
months  after  their  date.  Within  six  months  after  certain  switch- 
ing services  had  been  performed  bills  therefor  were  presented, 
but  the  carrier  refused  payment  on  the  ground  that  during  the 
interval  the  absorption  rule  referred  to  had  been  canceled : 
Held,  That  the  subsequent  cancellation  could  not  invalidate  a 
claim  already  accrued. 


Fehruary  2,  1909. 

137.  INITIAL  CARRIER  LIABLE  FOR  MISROUTING.— 
An  initial  carrier  delivered  a  shipment  to  a  connection,  but  did 
not  give  it  any  routing  instructions  beyond  noting  on  the  way- 
bill the  through  rate  via  the  cheaper  of  two  available  routes. 
The  connecting  carrier  sent  it  over  the  route  yielding  it  tlie 
greater  revenue,  but  carrying  the  higher  through  rate :     Held, 


666  Conference  Rulings. 

That  the  initial  carrier  is  liable  for  the  misrouting.     (Construed 
and  amended  by  ruling  286c.    See  ruling  199.) 

138.  CHARGES  FOR  MOVING  PRIVATE  CAR.— A  tariff 
provided  for  the  movement  of  a  private  car  or  sleeper  at  the 
regular  fare  for  each  occupant  with  a  minimum  of  20  adult 
fares  and  a  minimum  collection  of  $25  for  each  movement.  Its 
direct  line  being  blockaded  by  a  washout,  a  carrier  sent  individ- 
ual passengers  around  a  longer  route  over  its  lines  at  the  short- 
line  fare,  but  charged  the  occupants  of  such  private  car  then 
on  its  lines  the  full  mileage  rates  for  the  longer  haul:  Held, 
That  under  the  tariff  rule  the  car  and  party  should  have  moved 
as  the  individual  passengers  were  moved  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances ;  and  the  short-line  fare  ought  also  to  have  been 
applied  to  the  private  ear  and  party.     (See  ruling  213.) 

139.  STATUTE  OF  LIMITATION.— (Construed  and  amend- 
ed by  Ruling  286  a,  &.) 

140.  MISROUTING  SHIPMENT  THAT  COULD  MOVE 
INTRASTATE. — A  shipment  destined  to  another  point  in  the 
same  state  was  delivered  to  a  carrier  without  routing  instruc- 
tions. It  was  sent  by  a  route  which  took  it  outside  the  state 
lines,  and  required  the  payment  of  an  interstate  rate  higher  than 
the  state  rate  which  would  have  applied  on  an  available  intra- 
state route :  Held,  That  tlie  Commission  recognizes  the  right  of 
the  shipper  to  route  his  shipment,  which  in  this  instance  the 
shipper  neglected  to  do ;  that  the  shipment  moved  interstate,  and 
that  the  Commission  can  not  say  that  the  interstate  line  can 
apply  any  other  than  its  lawfully  published  tariff  rate  except 
under  special  permission  or  order  of  the  commission.  (See  rul- 
ings 214  and  419.) 

141.  TARIFF  IS  NOT  GOVERNED  BY  CLASSIFICA- 
TION EXCEPT  WHEN  SO  SPECIFIED.— A  tariff  naming 
commodity  rates  on  strawberries  in  carloads  fixed  a  certain  rate 
on  a  minimum  of  100  crates,  and  a  lower  rate  on  a  minimum  of 
200  crates.  The  classification  in  that  territory  provided  that 
carload  rates  would  apply  only  when  the  carload  is  shipped 
from  one  station  in  one  day  by  one  shipper  to  one  consignee  and 
destination.     The  shipments  in  question  belonged  to  different 


Conference  Rulings.  667 

owners,  but  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  carrier  and 
under  the  admitted  intent  of  the  tariff,  were  loaded  and  for- 
warded as  carload  shipments.  They  were  loaded  to  or  beyond 
the  minimum  of  200  crates  per  car :  Held,  That  they  were  en- 
titled to  the  application  of  the  lower  rate  on  the  basis  of  the 
200-crate  minimum. 


February  8,  1909. 

142.  BUNCHING  CARS  IN  TRANSIT.— Upon  an  informal 
complaint  that  cars  were  delayed  in  transit  and  delivered  by 
a  carrier  in  such  number  as  to  exceed  the  shipper's  facilities  for 
unloading  within  the  free  time :  Held,  That  tariffs  ought  to  con- 
tain a  rule  providing  that  when,  by  fault  of  the  carrier,  cars 
are  bunched  in  excess  of  the  shipper's  or  consignee's  ability  to 
handle  them  within  the  free  time,  demurrage  will  not  accrue. 
In  the  absence  of  such  a  rule  the  Commission  can  determine  the 
reasonableness  of  such  a  practice  only  upon  complaint  filed. 
(See  note  to  ruling  242;  also  Code  of  National  Car  Demur- 
rage Rules.) 

143.  MISROUTING  OF  COMPANY  MATERIAL.— The 
initial  carrier,  disregarding  instructions  to  route  a  shipment 
through  a  particular  junction,  moved  it  to  destination  over  its 
own  lines,  the  rates  over  the  two  routes  being  the  same.  Al- 
though the  shipment  was  consigned  to  a  private  p*^rson,  it  was  in 
fact  the  property  of  the  connecting  line,  which  therefore  could 
have  hauled  it  free  of  charge  from  the  junction  point  to  destina- 
tion. Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  initial  carrier  had  no 
notice  and  was  not  chargeable  with  notice  that  it  was  company 
material :  Held,  That  the  initial  line  is  liable  for  the  additional 
charges  on  the  ground  that  a  carrier  exercising  the  right,  under 
Rule  70  of  Tariff  Circular  15- A,  to  dictate  intermediate  routing 
must  make  its  election  at  the  time  it  accepts  the  shipment,  and 
that  if  the  carrier  accepts  the  shipment  with  specific  instructions 
it  must  so  'move  the  traffic  or  bear  the  damages  arising  out  of  its 
departure  from  the  instructions.  (Rule  70  is  reported  as  ruling 
214  of  this  Bulletin.  See  Fullerton-Powell  Hardwood  Lumber 
Co.  V.  M.  (&  N.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-367;  St.  Louis  SoutJu 
western  Ry,  Co.  v.  P.  &  R.  Ry.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-783 ;    and  In 


668  Conference  Rulings. 

tJic  Matter  of  Transportation  of  Company  Material,  22  I.  C.  C, 
439.) 

144.  SWITCHING  SHIPMENTS  UPON  WHICH  TRANS- 
PORTATION CHARGES  HAVE  NOT  BEEN  PAID.— A  ship- 
ment was  forwarded  with  instructions  to  give  delivery  on  a  cer- 
tain road.  The  car  moved  over  the  proper  route  to  destination, 
and  was  tendered  for  switching  to  the  road  indicated  in  delivery 
directions.  Under  long-established  custom,  it  declined  to  assume 
res])onsibility  for  charges  on  the  shipment  and  refused  to  ac- 
cept the  ear  until  transportation  charges  had  been  paid.  The 
carrier  that  brought  the  car  in  mailed  a  notice  to  the  address 
of  consignee,  who  was  not  known,  and  before  the  difficulty  was 
straightened  out  demurrage  accrued :  Held,  That  the  demurrage 
charges  lawfully  accrued  and  should  stand. 

,  145.  A  TARIFF  RULE  THAT  IS  UNLAWFUL  PER  8E 
CAN  NOT  BE  USED.— A  tariff  contained  a  rule  providing  that: 

When  freight  can  not  be  disposed  of  at  point  held  for  suf- 
ticient  amount  to  realize  by  sale  both  freight  and  car  service,  or 
storage  charges,  demurrage  charges  may  be  refunded,  waived, 
01   canceled. 

Held,  That  the  performance  of  a  transportation  cervi'.p  <1pter- 
mines  the  obligation  of  the  carrier  to  collect  and  of  the  shipper 
to  pay  the  published  rates  therefor  and  no  subsequent  fact,  hav- 
ing no  relation  to  the  service,  can  lawfully  be  made  the  basis 
for  a  refund  or  other  departure  from  such  rates.  The  provision 
is  therefore  unlawful  per  se  and  can  not  be  accepted  as  authority 
for  a  waiver,  refund,  or  cancellation  of  the  tariff^  charges  even  as 
to  a  shipment  made  while  the  provision  was  contained  in  the  pub- 
lished tariff.  (See  note  to  ruling  242;  compare  ruling  41 ;  also 
see  ruling  114.) 

146.  IIMPROPER  AND  UNLAWFUL  TARIFF  PROVI- 
SION.— A  carrier's  tariff  contained  the  following  rule: 

The  Railway  reserves  the  right  to  route  through  to 

destination  property  delivered  to  it  for  transportation  at  the 
through  rates  sliown  in  this  tariff ;  and  every  carrier  participat- 
ing in  such  transportation  shall  have  the  right,  in  cases  of 
necessity,  including  floods,  embargoes,  and  blockades,  to  for- 
ward said  property  by  any  carrier  between  the  point  of  shipment 
and  the  point  to  which  the  rate  is  given.     All  additional  risks 


Conference  Rulings.  669 

and  increased  expense  incurred  by  reason  of  change  in  route  in 
cases  of  necessity,  including  floods,  embargoes,  and  blockades, 
shall  be  borne  by  the  owner  of  the  goods  and  be  a  lien  thereon 

Held,  That  this  rule  is  improper  and  unlawful.      (Compare 
ruling  183;   see  also  ruling  83.) 


February  9,  1909. 

147.  RATE  MUST  APPLY  ACCORDING  TO  MOVE- 
MENT.— Upon  the  arrival  of  a  shipment  at  the  junction  desig- 
nated in  the  consignor's  routing  instructions  it  appeared  that, 
because  of  a  washout  on  its  lines,  the  connecting  carrier  could  not 
accept  the  movement.  The  shipper  thereupon  assumed  custody 
of  the  shipment  and  forwarded  it  by  a  water  line :  TIelel,  That 
the  carrier  must  collect  its  local  rate  to  the  junction  point  and  can 
not  apply  its  proportion  of  the  through  rate.     (See  ruling  83.) 

148.  SIDE  TRIPS  MUST  BE  SHOWN  IN  THROUGH 
TARIFFS.— (Restated  in  ruling  177.) 

149.  AMENDED  RULE  14  OF  THE  RULES  OF  PRAC- 
TICE.—  (See  current  Rules  of  Practice.) 


February  11,  1909. 

150.  CARETAKERS  UNDER  SECTION  22  OF  THE  ACT. 
— Section  22  of  the  act  provides — 

That  nothing  in  this  act  shall  prevent  the  carriage,  storage,  or 
handling  of  property  free  or  at  reduced  rates  for  the  Ignited 
States,  state,  or  municipal  governments,  or  for  charitable  pur- 
poses, or  to  or  from  fairs  and  expositions  for  exhibition  thereat, 
or  the  free  carriage  of  destitute  and  homeles.s  persons  trans- 
ported by  charitable  societies,  and  the  necessary  agents  employed 
m  such  transportation. 

Held,  That  the  words  ' '  and  necessary  agents  employed  in  such 
transportation"  modify  the  entire  preceding  part  of  the  section, 
and  that  the  necessary  caretakers  of  property  transported  for 
the  United  States,  state,  or  municipal  governments,  or  for  char- 
itable purposes,  or  to  or  from  fairs  and  expositions  for  exhibi- 
tion thereat,  may  legally  be  carried  free  or  at  reduced  rates  by 
carriers  subject  to  the  act,  as  well  as  the  caretakers  of  desti- 


670  Conference  Rulings. 

tiite  and  liomeless  persons  transported  by  charitable  societies. 
The  words  "necessary  agents"  as  used  in  this  section  are  in- 
terpreted to  mean  those  persons  necessary  to  the  safe  and  proper 
care  of  the  property  during  the  period  of  transportation,  and 
may  not  properly  be  extended  to  cover  any  persons  other  than 
those  who  actually  accompany  such  property  and  are  actually 
accessary  to  its  care.     (Compare  ruling  171.) 


March  1, 1909. 

151.  RELIEF  OF  AGENT  DOES  NOT  RELIEVE  CAR- 
RIER.— Through  error  an  agent  inserted  a  route  in  a  round- 
trip  ticket  over  which  the  published  fare  was  $10  in  excess  of  the 
amount  actually  collected  from  the  passenger.  Upon  the  re- 
quest of  the  carrier  for  permission  to  relieve  its  agent  of  the  un- 
collected undercharge :  Held,  That  the  collection  of  the  amount 
from  the  agent  would  not  in  any  way  relieve  the  carrier  of  its  re- 
sponsibility for  failing  to  collect  the  full  tariff  fare  from  the 
passenger.     (See  L.  &  N.  B.  R.  v.  Maxwell,  237  U.  S.,  94.) 

152.  RIGHT  OF  SHIPPER  TO  PAY  FREIGHT  CHARGES 
ON  FICTITIOUS  WEIGHT  IN  ORDER  TO  RECEIVE  FREE 
ICING. — A  consignor  having  a  shipment  of  dressed  poultry 
weighing  9,910  pounds  offered  to  pay  freight  charges  on  the 
basis  of  10,000  pound  in  order  to  have  the  advantage  of  free 
icing  under  a  tariff  rule  providing  that  the  cost  of  icing 
would  not  be  assumed  by  the  carrier  when  the  weight  in  each  ear 
was  less  than  10,000  pounds;  but  the  carrier  refused  to  accept 
the  77  cents  additional  freight  charges  and  compelled  the  shipper 
to  pay  $5.25  for  the  icing:  Held,  In  analogy  to  the  common 
practice  of  carriers  to  apply  the  carload  rate  and  minimum  on 
shipments  of  less  weight  where  the  application  of  the  le.ss-than- 
carloacl  rate  would  result  in  higher  charges,  that  such  a  tariff 
rule,  if  susceptible  of  the  construction  placed  upon  it  by  the 
carrier,  is  unreasonable  and  ought  to  be  amended. 


April  5,  1909. 

153.  CARRIER  WHEN  A  SHIPPER  CAN  NOT  EVADE 
PAYMENT  OF  LAWFUL  RATES  OF  A  CONNECTION  BY 
SECURING  TRACKAGE  RIGHTS  OVER  ITS  LINE.— An  in- 


PONFERENCB   EuLINGS.  671 

terstate  carrier  desiring  stone  for  ballast  on  its  right  of  way, 
leased  a  trackage  right  over  a  short  connecting  line  leading  to 
a  quarry,  and  proposed  to  purchase  the  stone  at  the  quarry  and 
haul  it  to  its  own  line  with  its  own  crews  and  equipment :  Held, 
That  the  Commission  must  decline  to  sanction  the  arrangement 
for  the  reason  that  the  carrier  under  the  circumstances  is  a 
shipper  and  the  proposed  arrangement  is  a  mere  device  to  evade 
the  payment  of  the  lawful  rates  and  would  result  in  unlawful  dis- 
crimination. (See  rulings  225,  and  439;  also  see  rulings  in- 
dexed under  Company  Material  and  Divisions.) 

154.  TICKETS  PURCHASED  AT  THE  REGULAR  PUB- 
LISHED FARE  MAY  BE  GIVEN  BY  A  LAND  CO:\IPANY 
TO  PROSPECTIVE  PURCHASERS.— A  land  company  having 
no  relations,  direct  or  indirect  with  a  carrier  has  a  lawful  right 
to  pay  all  or  any  part  of  the  carrier's  lawful  transportation 
charges  for  such  persons  as  it  may  choose  to  supply  with  tickets. 

155.  MOVEMENT  BETWEEN  PORTS  IN  CONNECTION 
WITH  RAIL  HAULS  TO  AND  FROM  INLAND  POINTS 
SUBJECT  TO  THE  ACT.— Traffic  moving  by  rail  from  an  in- 
land point  to  a  port  and  thence  by  water  to  another  port,  or- 
moving  by  water  from  one  port  to  another  port  and  from  the 
latter  port  to  an  inland  point  by  rail,  and  which  does  not  pass 
into  the  possession  or  custody  of  the  owner  or  his  agent  at  the 
port,  is,  when  interstate  traffic,  subject  to  the  act  and  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.  (See  rulings  66,  201,  354, 
401,  and  422.) 

156.  DELIVERING  CARRIERS  MUST  COLLECT  LAW- 
FUL CHARGES  UPON  PREPAID  SHIP]\IENTS.— Upon  in- 
quiry: Held,  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  delivering  carrier  to 
collect  the  lawful  rates  on  prepaid  shipments  and  to  correct  any 
errors  that  may  have  been  made  by  the  agents  of  the  initial 

: carrier  in  billing  or  in  the  collection  by  the  initial  carrier  of 
the  prepaid  charges.  (Reaffirming  ruling  16;  see  ruling  314; 
also  Western  Classification  Case,  25  I.  C.  C,  475.) 


April  6,  1909. 

157.  FREE  TRANSFORATION  FOR  OFFICERS  AND 
AGENTS  OF  EXPRESS  COMPANIES  AND  THEIR  FAM- 


672  Conference  Eulings. 

ILIES. — Upon  inquiry  it  was  Held,  That  a  carrier  subject  to 
the  act  may  lawfully  give  free  or  reduced  rate  transportation 
to  the  officers  and  agents,  and  their  families,  of  express  com- 
panies that  are  subject  to  the  act.  The  Commission's  decision 
in  formal  case  No.  1985.  {In  re  Contracts  for  free  Trans- 
portation, 16  I.  C.  C,  246,  is  not  to  be  understood  as  con- 
tradicting or  rescinding  this  ruling.  See  ruling  361 ;  also 
ruling  513.) 

158.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  FAMILIES  OF  EX- 
EMPLOYEES. — Free  transportation  may  lawfully  be  acorded 
to  members  of  the  family  accompanying  an  ex-employee  travel- 
ing for  the  jiurpose  of  entering  the  service  of  any  common  carrier 
subject  to  the  act.     (See  ruling  102.) 

159.  BILL  OF  LADING  SPECIFYING  A  ROUTE,  BUT 
NAMING  A  RATE  APPLICABLE  OVER  ANOTHER 

ROUTE.— (Canceled  by  ruling  474.) 

160.  HIGHER  RATES  WHEN  SHIPMENTS  ARE  TEN- 
DERED WITH  OTHER  THAN  UNIFORM  BILL  OF  LAD- 
ING.— A  carrier's  tariff  provided  higher  rates  on  shipments 
not  tendered  with  a  uniform  bill  of  lading:  Held,  That  the 
tender  of  a  shipment  accompanied  by  other  than  a  uniform 
bill  of  lading  may  not  be  taken  by  the  carrier  as  evidence  of  the 
shipper's  election  to  use  the  higher  rate.  The  carrier  must  direct 
his  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  lower  rate  is  available  under 
the  uniform  bill  of  lading.      (Compare  ruling  226.) 

161.  TELEPHONE  AND  TELEGRAPH  LINEMEN  NOT 
ENTITLED  TO  FREE  TRANSPORTATION.— (Telegraph  and 
telephone  companies  are  brought  within  the  law  by  the  amend- 
atory act  of  June  18,  1910 ;  see  antipass  provisions  of  section 
one.    Also  see  ruling  305,  95a  par.  2,  219,  and  364.) 

162.  MUNICIPAL  FERRIES  SUBJECT  TO  THE  ACT 
WHEN  PARTICIPATING  IN  TRANSPORTATION  DE- 
FINED BY  THE  STATUTE.— The  city  of  New  York  operates 
a  municipal  ferry  between  St.  George  and  the  foot  of  Whitehall 
street.  The  Staten  Island  Transit  Company  sells  commutation 
tickets  from  Perth  Amboy  to  the  Whitehall  street  pier,  and  tiles 
a  tariff  of  local  and  joint  passenger  fares  to  cover  such  trans^ 


Conference  Rulings.  673 

portation.  TTpon  inquiry  from  the  commissioner  of  docks:  Held, 
That  the  nnmicipality  must  join  in  the  tariffs.  (Compare  ruling 
89.) 

163.  REFUND  ON  ACCOUNT  OF  FULL-FARE  TRANS- 
PORTATION USED  BY  A  BOY  UNDER  12  YEARS  OF 
AGE  NOT  PERMISSIBLE.— A  purchaser  of  two  full-fare 
tickets  called  upon  the  initial  carrier  for  a  refund,  after  they 
had  been  used,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  asked  for  a  ticket 
and  a  half,  and  that  he  had  used  one  of  the  full-fare  tickets  for 
his  son,  who  was  under  12  years  of  age.  The  agent  of  the  carrier 
denied  that  a  half-fare  ticket  had  been  requested,  and  the 
fact  appeared  that  the  father  had  accepted  and  paid  for  two 
full  fares:  Held,  That  the  Commiasion  would  not  authorize 
a  refund. 

164.  A  CARRIER  MUST  PUBLISH  FARES  AND  OFFER 
TO  THE  PUBLIC  RAILROAD  TICKETS  INDEPENDENT 
OF  OMNIBUS  ARRANGEMENTS.— A  carrier  under  a  tariff 
provision  sells  excursion  tickets  to  a  point  on  its  line  to  which 
is  attached  a  coupon  for  carriage  from  that  point  to  Luray  Cav- 
erns and  return  on  the  omnibuses  of  a  designated  transfer  com- 
pany Held,  That  this  is  not  a  discrimination  under  the  act  against 
another  transfer  company.  But  the  Commission  holds  that  while 
such  tickets  may  lawfully  be  sold,  the  carrier  must  publish  the 
railroad  fare  to  the  point  in  question  and  separately  show  bus 
fare  beyond,  and  must  also  have  on  sale  tickets  to  that  point  at 
the  rate  named  without  bus  coupons  attached. 

165.  OFFICERS  AND  EMPLOYEES  OF  A  RAILROAD 
RECEIVER  ENTITLED  TO  FREE  TRANSPORATION.— 
Upon  inquiry  from  a  receiver  duly  appointed  by  the  court  to 
manage  the  property  and  assets  of  a  railroad  company :  Held. 
That  officers  and  employees  engaged  under  the  receiver  in  the 
operation  of  the  railroad  occupy  the  same  position  under  the 
antipass  provision  of  the  act  as  do  the  officers  and  employees 
of  any  other  railroad.      (See  ruling  436.) 


April  13,  1909. 

166.  RETROACTIVE  APPLICATION  OF  RECONSIGNING 
PRIVILEGE  NOT  PERMISSIBLE.— Adhering  to  Conference 


674  Conference  Rulings. 

ruling  6,  the  Commission  will  not  sanction  the  application, 
retroactively,  of  a  reconsigning  privilege,  even  though  it  had 
long  been  the  custom  of  the  carrier  to  permit  reconsignment 
without  tariff  authority.     (See  ruling  77.) 

167.  A  PASSENGER  WRONGFULLY  DEPRIVED  OF  THE 
BENEFIT  OF  RETURN  COUPON  OF  A  ROUND-TRIP  EX- 
CURSION TICKET  MAY  HAVE  REPARATION.— A  pas- 
senger holding  a  round-trip  ticket  on  the  certificate  plan,  or  a 
round-trip  ticket  requiring  validation,  was,  through  ignorance 
or  fault  of  a  carrier's  agent,  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  the  re- 
duced fare  on  the  return  journey  and  was  compelled  to  purchase 
a  full-fare  ticket:  Held,  That  such  cases  are  analogous  to  the 
misrouting  of  freight  and  ought  to  be  adjusted  on  the  general 
principle  underlying  Rule  70  of  Tariff  Circular  15-A   (ruling 

^214  of  this  bulletin).  The  Commission,  therefore,  authorizes 
carriers  in  such  eases,  without  a  special  permissive  order,  to  re- 
ifund  to  the  passenger  the  difference  between  the  total  fare 
paid  by  him  and  the  reduced  rate  which  he  would  have  enjoyed 
except  for  the  carrier's  error;   and  the   carrier  at  fault  must 

-bear  the  full  burden  without  recourse  upon  any  other  road 
participating  in  the  carriage.  (Reaffirming  ruling  113.  See 
also  rulings  75,  125,  247,  266,  and  277.  Also  see  L.  &  N.  R.  R. 
v.  Maxwell,  237  U.  S.  94.) 

168.  EFFECT  OF  TRACKAGE  ARRANGEMENTS  UN- 
DER THE  ACT  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE  WITH  RES- 
PECT TO  SHIPMENTS  ROUTED  BY  SHIPPER.— The  Min- 
eral Point  &  Northern  Railway  Company  has  trackage  arrange- 
ments with  the  Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  for  the  joint  use 
of  the  latter 's  tracks  between  Highland  Junction  and  Mineral 
Point,  Wis.  Upon  inquiry  from  the  general  manager  of  the 
first-named  road  as  to  whether  the  St.  Paul  rightfully  may 
refuse  to  turn  shipments  over  to  it  at  Highland  Junction,  when 
so  routed,  and  retain  possession  of  the  revenue  for  the  haul 
from  that  station  to  Mineral  Point :  HeJd,  On  the  understanding 
/that  the  shipments  in  either  case  would  be  delivered  at  the 
same  warehouse  and  at  the  same  rate,  that  under  the  act  to  re- 
gulate commerce  no  obligation  rests  on  the  Chicago,  Milwaukee 
&   St.   Paul   to  turn   over  shipments   to   the   Mineral   Point   & 


Conference  Rulings.  675 

Northern  Railway  at  Highland  Junction  for  transportation  to 
Mineral  Point. 

169.  FREE  PASSES  TO  EMPLOYEES  OF  A  CAR-LIGHT- 
ING COMPANY  UNLAWFUL.— Upon  inquiry  from  a  car- 
lighting  company  it  was  Held,  That  its  experts  for  the  testing 
and  observation  of  the  performance  of  its  lights  on  trains  are 
not  employees  of  the  carrier,  and  are  not  therefore  entitled  to 
free  transportation.   •  (See  ruling  95.) 

170.  IMPORTED  MERCHANDISE  NOT  ENTITLED  TO 
INLAND  PROPORTIONAL  RATE  WHEN  THE  TRANS- 
PORTATION FROM  THE  PORTS  IS  PURELY  LOCAL.— An 
importer  of  flax,  after  unloading  a  cargo  at  the  port,  sold  it, 
and  the  purchaser  some  months  later  sold  a  part  of  the  original 
shipment  to  a  manufacturing  company,  by  which  it  was  shipped 
to  a  point  in  the  Middle  West  at  the  regular  local  rate  of  the 
carrier  that  took  the  movement.  At  the  time  there  was  in  effect 
an  inland  proportional  rate  from  the  port  to  destination :  Held, 
That  the  movement  from  the  port  was  a  separate  and  distinct 
transaction  upon  which  the  local  rate  was  the  only  lawfully 
applicable  rate. 


May  4,  1909. 

171.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  SHIPPERS  OF  PER- 
ISHABLE FREIGHT.— The  tariffs  of  a  carrier  included  a 
refrigeration  service,  under  rates  named  therein,  on  perishable 
freight.  Upon  inquiry  whether  the  shippers  or  their  agents 
might  have  free  transportation  to  inspect  the  reicing  of  the 
cars:  Held,  That  it  does  not  appear  that  they  are  necessary  care 
takers  within  the  meaning  of  section  1  of  the  act.  (Compare 
ruling  150.) 

172.  RATE  IN  EFFECT  ON  RECEIPT  OF  SHIPMENT 
IS  THE  LAWFUL  RATE.— Freight  was  received  by  a  carrier 
and  bills  of  lading  were  issued  therefore  on  December  21  and  29, 
1908.  The  freight  was  actually  moved  on  January  1,  1909,  on 
which  date  a  lower  rate  went  into  effect:  Held,  That  the  rate 
in  effect  on  the  date  the  carrier  received  the  property  for  trans- 
portation is  the  lawful  rate. 


676  Conference  Rulings. 

173.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  FAMILY  OF  DE- 
CEASED EMPLOYEE. — An  engineer  of  one  carrier  having 
ended  his  run  for  the  day  was  preparing  to  return  to  his  home 
over  another  line  the  train  service  of  which  was  more  convenient. 
He  lost  his  life  by  inadvertently  stepping  in  front  of  a  train  of 
this  carrier.  Upon  inquiry  whether  under  the  recent  amend- 
ment to  the  antipa.ss  provision  of  section  1  free  transportation 
might  be  given  to  his  widow  and  children  by  the  road  by  which 
he  had  been  employed:  Held^  That  the  case  comes  within  the 
spirit  and  meaning  of  the  amendment.  (The  amendment  re- 
ferred to  is  in  the  act  of  April  13,  1908.  See  rulings  18,  103, 
193,  and  476.) 

174.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  FAMILY  OF  EM- 
PLOYEE.— May  an  employee  use  free  transportation  for  the 
remains  of  his  wife  after  they  had  been  temporarily  interred? 
Held,  That  within  the  meaning  of  section  1  of  the  act  the  deceased 
wife  of  an  employee  may  be  regarded  as  a  member  of  his  family 
until  given  permanent  burial.    (Se  ruling  95c.) 

175.  CARLOAD  SHIPMENTS.— A  coffee  broker  purchased 
from  three  different  merchants  at  New  York  three  lots  of  coffee 
for  shipment  to  one  customer  as  one  carload.  The  three  lots 
were  delivered  to  the  carrier  under  circum.stanees  that  would 
have  entitled  them  to  go  to  destination  as  a  carload  shipment 
had  proper  instructions  been  given.  Because  of  the  failure  of 
the  shipper's  agent  to  give  such  instructions  the  three  lots  went 
forward  to  destination  as  three  shipments,  at  the  less-than-carload 
rate.  Upon  inquiry  by  the  carrier  whether  it  might  assess  the 
carload  rate:  Held,  That  freight  charges  must  be  collected  on 
the  basis  of  the  less-than-carload  rate. 

176.  FREE  OR  REDUCED-RATE  TRANSPORTION  TO 
AND  FROM  EXHIBITIONS.— Specimens  of  ore  that  are  not 
to  be  offered  for  sale  but  are  intended  exclusively  for  exhibition 
at  the  Chamber  of  Mines  at  Los  Angeles  may  be  carried  free 
of  charge  or  at  reduced  rates,  under  section  22  of  the  act. 


May  10,  1909. 

177.     SIDE  TRIPS  NOT  SPECIFICALLY  SHOWN  IN  A 
THROUGH  TARIFF. — Modifying  Conference  Ruling  No.  148, 


Conference  Rulings.  677 

it  is  Held,  That  a  note  in  a  through  tariff  providing  that  pas- 
sengers purchasing  through  tickets  thereundei"  shall  be  entitled  to 
such  side-trip  privileges  as  are  stated  in  the  individual  tariffs 
on  tile  with  the  Commission,  of  the  carriers,  that  are  parties  to 
the  through  fares,  is  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  law  and  with  the  rules  of  the  Commission. 

178.  USE  OF  MILEAGE  TICKETS  IN  NEW  TERRI- 
TORY.— A  tariff  authorizes  the  sale  of  mileage  tickets  good  be- 
tween points  within  a  specified  limited  territory.  Subsecjuent 
to  the  date  upon  which  such  a  ticket  is  sold  and  prior  to  the  date 
of  its  expiration  the  tariff  is  amended  so  as  to  include  additional 
territory.  May  such  mileage  tickets  be  thereafter  honored  for 
transportation  between  points  in  the  added  territory?  Held, 
That  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  original  sale  must  be  adhered 
to  unless  the  amendment  to  the  tariff  specifically  authorizes 
honoring  outstanding  tickets  between  points  in  the  added  terri- 
tory. 

179.  TARIFFS  PROVIDING  FOR  TRANSPORTATION  OF 
CARETAKERS  IN  PASSENGER  CARS.— When  an  express 
company  provides  in  its  tariff  for  free  transportation  for  care- 
takers in  charge  of  live  stock,  poultry,  or  fruit,  and  the  rail- 
road company  over  whose  lines  such  express  company  operates 
provides  in  its  tariff  that  such  caretakers  may  be  permitted  to 
ride  in  passenger  cars,  the  tariff  of  the  express  company  and 
that  of  the  railroad  company  must  give  reference  to  each  other. 

180.  LESSEE  ROAD  NOT  SERVING  PUBLIC  AS  COIMMON 
.CARRIER. — For  operating  purposes  only  a  carrier  leased  20 
,miles  of  its  line  to  another  railroad  company.  The  contract 
.required  the  lessee,  for  an,  agreed  compensation  to  be  paid  to  it 
,by  the  lessor,  to  operate  the  lessor's  trains  and  to  maintain  its 
way,  tracks,  and  appurtenances,  the  rates  and  charges  to 
be  collected  by  the  lessor  and  the  lessee  to  have  no  direct  deal- 
ings with  the  public.  On  the  facts  a^  stated  in  the  inquiry :  Held, 
That  the  lessor  must  publish  the  rates,  fares,  and  charges,  and 
the  lessee  need  not  be  a  party  to  the  tariffs  nor  concur  therein, 
but  is  simply  a  contractor  performing  certain  services  for 
the  lessor.     (Compare  ruling  229.) 


678  Conference  Rulings. 

June  7,  1909. 

181.  SUBSTITUTION  OF  TONNAGE.— (Withdrawn  Febru- 
ary 10,  1913;  see  The  Transit  Case,  26  I.  C.  C,  20-1,  210.) 

182.  SALE  OF  TICKETS  AFTER  DEPARTURE  OF  LAST 
TRAIN  ON  FINAL  SELLING  DATE.— Tariff  quoting  pas- 
senger fares  provides  that  tickets  shall  be  on  sale  between  cer- 
tain specified  dates  and  that  they  shall  be  good  going  for  a 
specified  period,  including  the  date  of  sale.  Passenger  desir- 
ing to  take  advantage  of  such  fare  applied  for  such  ticket  on  the 
last  day  of  sale  and  after  the  last  train  for  the  day  had  departed 
from  that  station.  Agent  refused  to  issue  the  ticket  desired. 
The  time  limit  specified  in  the  tariff  was  sufficient  to  carry 
passenger  through  to  destination  within  that  limit  even  if  he 
left  the  initial  point  on  the  day  following  the  last  date  of  sale. 
Tariff  did  not  require  that  journey  should  commence  on  date 
of  sale  of  ticket :  Held,  That  agent  should  have  issued  the 
ticket  requested,  the  time  limit  thereunder  being  sufficient  to 
carry  passenger  through  to  destination  by  his  starting  on  the 
following  day;  and  the  tariff  containing  no  requirement  as 
to  date  upon  which  journey  should  begin:  Held  furiher,  That 
if  tariff  had  provided  that  journey  must  commence  on  the  day 
of  sale  of  ticket,  agent  could  not  legally  have  issued  such 
ticket  after  the  last  train  for  the  day  had  departed  on  the  last 
date  of  sale. 

183.  RESERVATION  OF  RIGHT  TO  ROUTE  SHIP- 
MENTS.— The  following  rule  in  a  published  tariff  was  ap- 
proved as  law^f ul,  subject  to  complaint  by  shippers : 

The  A.  &  B.  Railroad  Company  reserves  the  right  to  route 
through  to  destination  property  delivered  to  it  for  trans- 
portation at  the  through  rates  shown  in  this  tariff,  and  every 
carrier  participating  in  such  transportation  shall  have  the  right, 
in  cases  of  necessity,  to  forward  said  property  by  any  railroad 
,or  route  between  the  point  of  shipment  and  the  point  of  des- 
tination, or  the  point  to  which  the  rate  is  given ;  if  such  diver- 
sion shall  be  from  a  rail  to  a  water  route,  the  liability  of  the 
carrier  shall  be  the  same  as  tliough  the  entire  carriage  were 
by  rail.     (Compare  ruling  146.) 


Conference  Rulings.  679 

(See  section  15  of  the  amended  act  reserving  to  shippei'S 
the  right  to  route  shipments.) 

184.  PERFORMANCE  OF  TRANSPORTATION  SER- 
VICE WITHOITT  RATES  ON  FILE.— In  a  recent  prose- 
cution instituted  by  the  Commission  of  a  carrier  for  engaging  in 
transportation  of  interstate  commerce  without  having  previously 
filed  with  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  lawful  tariffs 
applicable  thereto,  and  in  which  conviction  was  had  and  fine 
of  $12,000  was  assessed,  the  court,  speaking  through  Humph- 
rey, J.,  said: 

It  thus  appears  not  only  that  the  performance  of  interstate 
transportation  by  a  carrier  which  has  neglected  to  file  and 
publish  its  rates  and  charges  is  a  misdemeanor  under  the  act 
to  regulate  commerce  and  under  the  Elkins  Act,  punishable 
by  as  severe  penalties  as  any  other  violation  of  these  acts,  but 
it  also  appears  that  the  requirement  for  filing  and  publication 
of  the  rates  has  been  in  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  ever 
since  the  passage  of  the  original  CuUom  bill,  and  that  its  im- 
portance has  been  recognized  by  the  Congress  by  successive 
amendments  designed  to  make  it  more  precise  and  its  violation 
more  surely  and  more  severely  punishable. 

The  railroad  line  of  the  defendant  here  is  entirely  situated 
within  the  state  of  Illinois.  It  is  not  more  than  16  miles  in 
length.  It  is  really  no  more  than  a  switching  road  connecting 
the  various  railways  reaching  East  St.  Louis  and  Alton,  111., 
with  each  other  and  with  various  industries  which  have  been 

established  upon  its  rails.  From  the  indictment  and  the  plea 
thereto  it  appears,  however,  that  this  defendant  is  engaged  in 
the  transportation  of  property  moving  wholly  by  railroad  from 
one  state  to  another  state.  It  is,  therefore,  as  much  subject  to 
the  act  as  though  is  owmed  and  operated  all  the  line  of  railroad 
connecting  the  points  in  different  states  between  which  moved 
the  commodities  mentioned  in  the  indictment.  C.  N.  0.  &  T. 
P.  Ry.  V.  /.  C.  C,  162  U.  S.  184;  L.  d-  N.  R.  R.  v.  Behhner,  175 
U.  S.  648;  U.  S.  v.  C.  &  A.  W.  R.  Co.  (C.  C.  A.,  157  Fed. 
Rep,  321;  Belt  Ry.  Co.  of  Chicago  v.  United  State,  168  Fed. 
Rep.,  542. 

These  authorities  establish  that  the  law^  regarding  pub- 
lication of  rates  and  charges  for  interstate  transportation  applies 
with  equal  force  to  all  carriers  engaging  in  such  interstate  trans- 
portation, whether  such  carriers  operate  trains  from  one  state  to 
another  or  operate  entirely  within  the  boundaries  of  a  single  state. 


G80  Conference  Rulings. 

The  eliit'f  ol)jeet  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  is  the  pre 
vention  of  discrimination.  Carriers,  being  engaged  in  a  public  em- 
ployment, must  serve  all  members  of  the  public  on  equal  terms. 
This  was  tlie  doctrine  of  the  common  law.  It  has  been  ex- 
plicitly stated  and  strengthened  by  the  successive  acts  to  re- 
i;ulate  commerce.  The  requirement  of  the  act  that  all  rates 
.'■liould  be  published  is  perhajis  the  chief  feature  of  the  scheme 
provided  for  the  effective  outlawing  of  all  discriminations.  If 
this  portion  of  the  act  is  not  strictly  enforced,  the  entire  basis 
of  effective  regulation  will  be  lost.  Secret  rates  will  inevitably 
become  discriminating  rates.  Whenever  discriminating  rates  or 
practices  are  made  public,  a  thousand  forces  of  self-interest  and 
of  public  policy  will  be  set  at  work  to  reduce  them  to  fairneas 
and  equality.  The  failure  of  any  carrier  to  properly  tile  and 
publish  its  rates  is  quite  as  serious  a  violation  of  the  act  to  re- 
gulate commerce  as  a  failure  to  observe  such  rates  after  they 
have  been  properly  filed  and  published.  {U.  S.  v.  Illinois  Ter- 
minal R.  C,  168  Fed.  Rep.,  546,  548.) 

It  is  clearly  the  duty  of  the  Commission  to  strictly  enforce  the 
provision  of  the  law  referred  to,  and  it  may  confidently  be  ex- 
pected that  that  duty  will  be  performed.     (See  ruling  194.) 

185.  FREE  OR  REDUCED  RATE  TRANSPORTATION 
TO  MUSEUM  OF  NATURAL  HISTORY.— A  r-uiseum  of  natu- 
ral history,  erected  in  a  public  park  by  private  subscription  and 
supported  partly  by  taxes  and  partly  by  the  income  of  funds 
contributed  by  citizens,  may  be  given  free  or  reduced  rate  trans- 
portation under  section  22  of  the  act  on  articles  intended  for 
exhibition  therein,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  as  a  means  of 
securing  additional  income  it  charges  an  admission  fee  on  certain 
days  of  the  week,  admission  being  free  on  other  days.  (See 
ruling  245.) 


June  8,  1909. 

186.  LIABILITY  FOR  MISROUTING.— (Canceled  by  ruling 
474c.) 

187.  INTERPRETATION  OF  CONFERENCE  RULING 

NO.  3.— (Restated  in  ruling  314.) 


June  14,  1909. 

188.  RATES  BASED  ON  DECLARED  VALUATION.— The 
agent  of  a  shipper  not  knowing  the  value  of  a  dog  to  be  sent  by 


CONFEEENCE    RULINGS.  681 

express,  nevertlieless  named,  a  valuation  of  $500,  and  the  re- 
sulting charges  to  destination  amounted  to  $45.  The  dog  was 
actually  worth  $15,  and  at  this  valuation  the  express  charges 
would  have  been  $8.  The  consignee  declined  to  accept  delivery 
and  pay  the  charges  demanded.  Upon  inquiry  whether  charges 
may  be  collected  on  the  basis  of  the  actual  value  of  the  dog, 
it  was  ITcId,  That  the  shipper  is  responsible  for  the  act  of  his 
and  that  the  charges  at  the  valuation  given  must  be  collected. 
(Comi)ore  rulings   58  and  295.) 

189.  RETURN  OF  CARETAKERS.— A  shipment  of  live 
stock  moved  between  two  points  over  two  connecting  lines.  Upon 
inquiry  by  the  delivering  road,  which  had  a  through  direct  line 
between  the  two  points,  it  was  Held,  That  it  can  not  free  of  charge 
return  the  caretakers  over  its  own  direct  line  through  to  the  point 
of  origin  of  the  shipment. 

190.  IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  INSTRUCTIONS  INITIAL 
CARRIER  NOT  REQUIRED  TO  ROUTE  VIA  RAIL  AND 
WATER.— Rule  70  of  Tariff  Circular  No.  15-A  {Conference 
Riding  214)  contemplates  that  where  rail-and-water  and  all-rail 
rates  are  available  for  a  shipment  the  shipper  shall  designate 
which  class  of  routing  he  desires  and  that  the  agent  of  the  car- 
rier shall  secure  such  designation  from  the  shipper. 

A  shipment  was  delivered  to  a  rail  carrier  destined  to  a  point 
to  which  it  might  be  forwarded  via  either  all-rail  or  rail-lake-and 
rail  route.  No  class  of  route  was  designated  by  the  shipper. 
Shipment  was  forwarded  all  rail :  Held,  That  taking  into  con- 
sideration the  liabilities  of  carriers  and  tlie  (pieslion  of  marine 
insurance  upon  water-borne  traffic,  the  carrier's  agent  did  not 
negligently  misroute  this  shipment.  (Interpreted  in  ruling  316. 
See  Keeton  v.  St.  L.  S.  W.  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas,  39  I.  C.  C,  221.) 

191.  CAR-SERVICE  CHARGES  ON  TRAFFIC  FROM  AND 
•>T0  CANADA. — With  respect  to  traffic  between  points  in  Can- 
ada and  points  in  the  United  States,  the  Commission  does  not 
vwaive  the  requirement  that  carriers  shall  file  tariffs  showing  their 
terminal  charges  and  that  such  charges  must  either  appear  speci- 
fically in  the  tariffs  naming  the  rates  or  the  tariffs  establishing 
such  charges  must  be  specifically  referred  to  in  the  tariffs  nam- 
ing the  rates, 


682  Conference  Eulings. 

192.  INTERPRETATION  OR  AMENDED  RULE  70  OF 
TARIFF  CIRCULAR  15-A.— (Canceled  by  ruling  474.) 

193.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  REMAINS  OF  DE- 
CEASED   EMPLOYEE    AND    FAMILY    ACCOMPANYING 

SAME. — It  is  the  view  of  the  Commission  that  the  spirit  and 
meaning  of  the  law  with  relation  to  free  passes  for  employees  and 
their  families  will  not  be  violated  if,  in  the  case  of  the  death  of 
an  employee  while  in  the  service  of  a  carrier,  free  transportation 
be  given  to  his  remains  and  to  members  of  his  family  who  might 
lawfully  use  free  transportation,  if  he  were  still  alive,  to  the  place 
of  interment  and  return  to  their  homes.  (See  rulings  18,  103, 
173,  and  476.) 

Note. — The  amendatory  act  of  June  18,  1910,  authorizes  free  trans- 
portation to  widows  and  minor  children  of  deceased  employees,  the 
former  during  widowhood  and  the  latter  during  minority. 

194.  REFUND  DENIED  OF  DEMURRAGE  COLLECTED 
UNDER  TARIFF  NOT  ON  FILE.— The  Commission  will  not 
entertain  with  favor  claims  for  refund  of  demurrage  charges, 
collected  in  accordance  with  a  carrier's  established  practice, 
solely  upon  the  ground  that  the  demurrage  tariffs  were  not  on  file 
with  the  Commission  at  the  time  the  demurrage  charges  accrued. 
The  failure  to  file  demurrage  tariffs  constitutes  a  violation  of  the 
act,  with  which  the  Commission  will  deal  through  the  Division  of 
Prosecutions.     (See  ruling  184.) 

195.  APPLICATION  OF  COMBINATION  RATES  ON 
FREIGHT  MOVING  THROUGH  ANOTHER  JUNCTION.— 
The  conference  ruling  of  June  14,  1909,  under  this  caption  was 
rescinded  on  November  24,  1909.  Amended  Rule  5,  Tariff  Cir- 
cular No.  18-A,  covers  and  governs  the  subject. 

196.  INERCHANGE  OF  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR 
EMPLOYEES  OF  WATER  LINES.— When  a  common  carrier 
by  water,  other  than  ocean  carrier  not  subject  to  the  act,  unites 
with  a  carrier  by  rail  for  the  interstate  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers, partly  by  water  and  partly  by  rail,  under  a  common 
control,  management,  or  arrangement  for  a  continuous  carriage 
shown  by  concurrence  in  tariff  or  tariffs  duly  published  and 
filed  with  the  Commission,  such  carriers  can  lawfully  interchange 
transportation  for  their  officers,  agents,  and  employees.  (Reaf- 
firming ruling  95g.    IModified  bj^  ruling  475.) 


Conference  Rulings.  683 


June  21,  1909. 


197.  CARRIERS  SUBJECT  TO  THE  ACT.— A  railroad  not 
otherwise  subject  to  the  act  subjects  itself  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Commission  and  tlie  provisions  of  the  act  if  it  transports 
express  matter  for  an  express  company  that  is  subject  to  the  act. 
(See  rulings  368  and  418.) 


June  22,  1909. 

198.  INTERPRETATION  OF  RULE  70,  TARIFF  CIRCU- 
LAR NO.  15-A  (Ruling  214  of  this  Bulletin).— Under  this  rule 
any  carrier,  whether  it  be  the  initial  or  a  connecting  line,  that 
misroutes  a  shipment,  thereby  causing  additional  transportation 
charges,  may,  upon  admitting  its  error,  pay  the  damages  arising 
therefrom,  provided  the  whole  burden  is  borne  by  it  without  par- 
ticipation therein  by  its  connections.  But  the  admission  nuist  be 
in  good  faith  with  respect  to  the  particular  case  of  misrouting ; 
the  Commission  will  not  recognize  the  validity  of  any  general 
agreement  between  two  or  more  carriers  by  which  one  assumes 
responsibility  for  misrouting  in  all  cases. 

199.  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  MISROUTING.— When  a  ship- 
per has  given  routing  instructions  which  a  carrier  fails  to  trans- 
mit to  its  connection,  the  carrier  so  failing  shall  be  responsible 
for  all  additional  transportation  charges  resulting  from  a  mis- 
routing of  the  shipment.  (Amended  by  ruling  286-c.  See  ruling 
137.) 

200.  REPARATION  CLAIMS  ON  THE  INFORMAL 
DOCKET. —  (a)  At  a  recent  conference  between  the  Connnission 
and  representatives  of  a  number  of  carriers  the  embarrassments 

,  arising  through  the  tying  up  of  rate  schedules  under  the  one-year 
clause  customarily  inserted  in  informal  reparation  orders  were 
fully  considered,  and  the  discussion  that  then  took  place  as  well 
as  our  subsequent  reflection  upon  the  matter  have  led  us  to 
the  conclusion  that  some  modifications  of  our  practice  in  that 
regard  may  be  made  in  certain  cases  to  advantage  and  without 
impairing  the  effectiveness  of  the  law.  We  have  therefore  agreed 
ujion  the  following  rules  which  we  think  will  afford  some  relief  in 
the  premises.     (See  rulings  14,  and  396.) 


084  Conference  Rulings. 

1.  In  cases  whore  the  through  rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the 
shipment  was  in  exceSvS  of  the  sum  of  the  local  rates  the  order, 
instead  of  requiring  the  maintenance  of  an  absolute  rate  for  one 
year  from  the  date  of  the  tiling  of  the  application,  shall  require 
the  absolute  rate  to  be  maintained  for  a  period  of  only  six  months 
from  the  date  upon  which  the  reduced  through  rate  equaling 
the  sum  of  the  locals  became  effective ;  this  rule  shall  apply,  how- 
ever, only  in  cases  where  the  local  rates  in  question  are  to  and 
from  some  well-recognized  and  established  basing  point  or  line, 
such  as  the  Mississippi,  Missouri,  and  Ohio  Rivers,  Chicago,  Min- 
nesota Transfer,  Buffalo,  etc.  In  all  other  eases  the  present 
practice  shall  be  enforced.     (Modified  by  ruling  425.) 

2.  Where  there  is  a  natural  geographical  relation  between  the 
point  involved  and  other  points,  which  relation  the  carrier  has 
theretofore  expressed  in  its  tariffs  by  grouping  that  point  wnth 
the  other  points,  either  with  respect  to  rates  on  the  commodity 
in  question,  or  with  respect  to  rates  on  other  commodities,  or 
with  respect  to  class  rates,  the  order  may  require  the  maintenance 
of  the  group  relation  for  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  applica- 
tion instead  of  requiring  an  absolute  rate  to  or  from  the  point 
in  question. 

3.  Where  the  rates  on  a  product  of  a  raw  material  have  had 
a  definite  relation  to  the  rates  on  the  raw  material,  and  that 
relation  has  been  temporarily  disturbed  and  subsequently  re- 
stored, the  order  may  control  the  relation  for  one  year  instead 
of  fixing  an  absolute  rate  on  the  product. 

4.  Where  a  carrier  is  compelled  to  charge  a  higher  rate  than 
was  intended  because  of  an  error  in  printing  a  tariff,  the  one-year 
clause  may  be  omitted  only  where  the  error  is  specifically  called 
to  the  attention  of  the  Commission  within  ninety  days  after  the 
tariff  containing  the  error  has  been  filed. 

(b)  Because  of  the  uncertain  condition  of  the  tariffs  of  carriers 
the  Commission  has  been  rather  liberal  in  the  past  in  the  conduct 
of  its  special  reparation  docket  and  proposes,  in  order  to  help 
carriers  dispose  of  claims  that  have  accumulated  in  tlie  past,  to 
continue  this  policy  for  the  present.  It  is  manifest,  however, 
that  the  time  is  approaching  when  in  the  general  interest  of  all 
concerned  the  Commission  must  adopt  a  different  attitude.  We 
take  occasion  therefore  now  to  say  that  the  Commission  will 


Conference  Rulings.  685 

cooperate  with  carriers,  so  far  as  that  may  legally  be  possible, 
in  the  effort  to  get  all  old  claims  disposed  of,  and,  with  respect 
to  shipments  made  prior  to  September  1  next,  will  pursue  its 
present  policy  of  liberality.  But  with  respect  to  shipments  mov- 
ing on  and  after  that  date  the  Commission  will  draw  the  lines 
much  more  closely,  and  will  adopt  such  measures  as  will  materi- 
ally narrow  the  scope  of  its  activities  in  that  connection.  We 
are  not  prepared  at  this  time  to  define  in  detail  what  our  policy 
in  the  future  will  be.  It  may  be  well,  however,  uow  to  say  that 
after  that  date  we  shall  not  award  reparation,  either  on  the  for- 
al  or  the  special  docket,  in  any  case  where  the  carj-ier  in  question 
has  reduced  a  rate  simj^ly  in  order  to  meet  the  lower  rate  of  a 
competitor.  Any  other  course  of  action  not  only  deprives  the 
competitor  of  the  natural  benefits  of  its  lower  rate,  but  tends 
to  destroy  the  inducements  for  making  a  lower  rate.  Moreover, 
any  other  course  of  action  is  demoralizing  in  that  it  enables  the 
carrier,  before  its  own  lower  rate  has  become  effective,  to  assure 
shippers  that  they  may  ship  by  its  line  notwithstanding  its  higher 
rate  and  afterwards  secure  reparation  on  the  basis  of  the  lower 
rate  of  its  competitor.  "Wliere  there  is  a  difference  in  rates  be- 
tween two  points  over  different  lines,  shippers  must  understand 
that  they  may  get  the  benefit  of  the  lower  rate  only  by  sending 
their  merchandise  over  the  line  publishing  the  lower  rate.  (See 
ruling  205 ;  also ;  Nohle  v.  D.,  T.  &  I.  By.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-510 ; 
Trussed  Concrete  Steel  Co.  v.  E.  B.  B.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-512  and 
A-513;  Athens  Pottery  Co.  v.  T.  &  N.  0.  B.  B.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op. 
A-796;  Ishell  &  Co.  v.  L.  8.  c&  M.  S.  By.  Co.,  19  I.  C.  C,  450; 
Georgia-Carolina  .Brick.  Co.  .v..  8.  By.  Co.,  20  I.  C.  C,  149; 
Bailroad  Commissioners  of  Montana  v.  N.  P.  By.  Co.,  26  I.  C. 
C,  482;  and  PuyaUup  &  Summer  Fruit  Grower's  Asso.  N.  P  By. 
Co.,  38  I.  C.  C,  702.) 

(c)  It  may  be  well  also  to  announce  that  it  has  been  suggested 
that  when  reparation  is  granted  to  a  complainant,  either  in  a  for- 
mal or  an  informal  proceeding,  on  a  finding  that  the  rate  under 
which  his  shipment  moved  was  excessive  and  therefore  unlawful, 
..the  spirit  of  the  law  requires  that  the  order  ought  also  to  com- 
^pel  the  carrier  to  make  a  refund  on  the  same  basis  on  all  other 
shipments,  moving  after  the  date  of  the  filing  of  any  such  com- 
plaint,  under  the   rate   thus   condenmed.   Wliile   no   conclusion 


686  Conference  Rulings. 

lias  l)oen  reached  there  is  force  in  this  view  and  it  will  have 
further  consideration.      (See  ruling  220-f7.) 

(d)  The  suggestions  that  have  come  to  us  from  various  quar- 
ters in  relation  to  the  conduct  of  the  special  reparation  docket 
indicate  that  some  misapprehension  exists  as  to  the  purpose  of 
that  docket,  and  as  to  the  authority  of  the  Commission  in  deal- 
ing with  such  cases.  It  may  be  well,  therefore,  to  say  that  our 
action  in  special  raparation  cases  has  no  authority  in  law  ex- 
cept the  authority  upon  which  we  take  similar  action  in  formal 
cases.  In  all  cases,  whether  on  the  formal  or  the  special  docket, 
the  law  in  section  15  specifically  requires  a  complaint  and  ans- 
wer and  a  full  hearing;  and  in  section  14  it  is  provided  that 
where  damages  are  awarded  the  report  of  the  Commission  shall 
include  the  findings  of  fact  on  which  the  award  is  made.  We 
have  endeavored  to  simplify  the  procedure  on  the  special  docket 
by  accepting  the  application  of  the  carrier  as  the  eciuivalent 
of  a  complaint  and  answer,  and  by  accepting  its  admission  that 
the  rate  charged  under  the  circumstances  then  existing  was  un- 
reasonable as  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  requirements  of 
section  15  for  a  full  hearing  The  informality  in  the  pleadings 
in  such  cases  seems  to  have  led  some  carriers  as  well  as  shippers 
into  the  error  of  supposing  that  special  reparation  cases  can  be 
disposed  of  still  more  informally.  This,  however,  is  a  mistaken 
view  of  our  authority.  The  special  docket  it  not  an  informal 
docket  in  any  sense  except  in  respect  to  the  form  of  the  pleadings 
and  the  character  of  the  hearing.  Our  orders  in  such  cases  must 
be  regarded  as  formal  orders  as  fully  in  all  respects  as  our 
orders  in  formal  cases.  The  Commission  can  exercise  no  au- 
thority on  the  informal  docket  that  it  can  not  exercise  on  the 
formal  docket,  nor  may  it  omit  any  requirement  with  respect 
to  cases  on  the  special  docket  that  the  law  imposes  upon  us  in 
the  disposition  of  cases  on  the  formal  docket.  (See  ruling  14 
and  220.) 


June  23,  1909. 

201.  JOINT  THROUGH  RATES  TO  AND  FROIM  PORTO- 
RICAN  PORTS.— Without  at  this  time  deciding  whether  Porto 
Rico  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  territory  of  the  ITnited  States  as 
that  phrase  is  used  in  section  1  of  the  act,  the  Commission  will 


Conference  Rulings.  687 

"^ecognize  the  validity  of  joint  through  rates  from  or  to  points  in 
the  United  States  or  to  or  from  a  port  or  ports  in  Porto  Rico 
when  properly  concurred  in  by  the  water  carriers.  (See  rulings 
155,  354,  401,  and  422.) 

June  24,  1909. 

■  202.  DISTANCE  TARIFFS  TO  SHOW  DISTANCE  BE- 
TWEEN STATIONS.— Where  rates  are  stated  in  a  tariff  as  so 
much  per  mile,  or  according  to  distance,  that  tariff,  or  .some 
tariff  sijecifically  referred  to  therein,  must  show  the  distances 
between  the  stations  between  which  such  rates  are  to  be  ai)plied. 
For  the  present  the  Commission  will  not  apply  lliis  rule  to  ordi- 
nary mileage  tickets  or  books  for  passenger  travel. 


June  29,  1909.- 

203.  SUBSTITUTION  OF  TONNAGE  IN  TRANSIT.— 
(Cancels  ruling  85.  Ruling  20.'>  withdrawal  February  10,  1913. 
see  The  Transit  Case,  24  I.  C.  C,  344,  and  26  I.  C.  C.,  210.) 

204.  TRANSIT  PRIVILEGES.— It  is  the  sense  of  the  Com- 
mission that  no  transit  privilege  should  extend  beyond  one  year. 
(Qualified  by  ruling  232.) 

205.  LIABILITY  FOR  MISROUTING.— An  initial  carrier 
misrouted  a  shipment,  resulting  in  additional  transportation 
charges,  for  which  it  admitted  its  responsibility  and  made  settle- 
ment in  accordance  with  Rule  70  of  Tariff  Circular  No.  15-A 
(Ruling  214  of  this  bulletin).  Subsequently  the  connecting 
line  over  which  the  shipment  moved  became  a  party  to  a  tariff' 
naming  the  same  rate  that  applied  at  the  time  of  the  movement 
over  another  route.  Thereupon  the  initial  carrier  and  the  con- 
necting line  requested  permission  to  divide  the  misrouting  over- 
charge: Held,  That  the  petition  must  be  denied  on  the  ground 
that  such  a  course  would  amount  to  the  retroactive  application 
of  a  published  rate.     (See  rulings  200&  and  220/(.) 


July  2,  1909, 

206.  PROCEDURE    IN    FORMAL    CASES.— (See    current 
Rules  of  Practice.) 


688  Conference  Rulings. 

September  15,  1906. 

207.  PAYMENT  FOR  TRANSPORTATION.— Nothing  but 
money  can  be  lawfully  received  or  accepted  in  payment  for  trans- 
portation subject  to  the  act,  whether  of  passengers  or  property, 
or  for  any  service  in  connection  therewith,  it  being  the  opinion 
of  the  Commission  that  the  prohibition  against  charging  or 
colleeting  a  greater  or  less  or  different  compensation  than  the 
established  rates  or  fares  in  effect  at  the  time,  precludes  the 
acceptance  of  services,  property,  or  other  payment  in  lieu  of  the 
amount  of  money  specified  in  the  published  schedule.  (See 
In  the  Matter  of  Transportation  of  Company  Material,  22  I.  C. 
C,  439  ;C.  /.  &  L.  Ry.  (Jo.  v.  U.  S.,  219  U.  S.,  486;  L.  d'  N.  R.  R. 
v.  Mottley,  219  U  S.,  467 ;  and  N.  Y.  Central  R.  R.  v.  Gray,  239 
U.  S.  583.) 


October  12,  1906. 

208.  FREE  PASSES  AND  FREE  TRANSPORTATION.-^ 

(a)  The  pro\dsions  of  the  act  relative  to  -the  issuance  of  free  tick- 
ets, free  passes,  free  transportation,  or  free  carriage  to  employees 
of  carriers  apply  only  to  persons  who  are  actually  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  carriers  and  who  devote  substantially  all  of  their 
time  to  the  work  or  business  of  such  carriers.  Land  and  im- 
migration agents  unless  they  are  bona  fide  and  actual  em- 
ployees, representatives  of  correspondence  schools,  agents  of 
accident  or  life  insurance  companies,  agents  of  oil  or  lubricat- 
ing companies,  etc.,  are  not  within  the  classes  to  Avhich  free  or 
reduced-fare  transportation  can  be  lawfully  furnished.  (See 
rulings  95,  308,  412,  449,  454,  and  466.) 

(b)  But  the  Commission  does  not  construe  tlie  law  as  pre- 
venting a  carrier  from  giving  necessary  free  transportation  to  a 
person  traveling  over  its  line  solely  for  the  purpose  of  attending 
to  the  business  of  or  performing  a  duty  imposed  upon  the  car- 
rier, nor  from  giving  free  carriage  over  its  line  to  the  household 
and  personal  eff'ects  of  an  employee  who  is  required  to  remove 
from  one  place  to  another  at  the  instance  of  or  in  the  interest  of 
the  carrier  by  which  he  is  employed.  (See  rulings  109,  134,  255, 
361,  478,  and  479.) 

(c)  Nor  does  the  Commission  construe  the  law  as  preventing 
a  carrier  from  giving  free  or  reduced-rate  carriage  over  its  line 


Conference  Rulings.  689 

to  contractors  for  material,  supplies,  and  men  for  use  in  con- 
struction, improvement,  or  renewal  work  on  the  line  of  that 
carrier,  provided  such  arrangements  for  free  reduced-rate  carri- 
age are  made  a  part  of  the  specifications  upon  which  the  contract 
is  based  and  of  the  contract  itself.  (See  rulinirs  386  and  413 j 
also  Railroad^Telegraph  Contracts,  12  I.  C.  C,  H.) 

(d)  The  provision  of  the  act  relative  to  the  issuance  of  free 
or  reduced-fare  transportation  to  ministers  of  religion  do  not 
apply  to  or  include  members  of  the  families  of  ministers  of 
religion.  Neither  do  the  provisions  of  the  act  relative  to  the  is- 
suance of  free  or  reduced-fare  transportation  admit  of  including 
therein  officers  of  the  Government,  the  army, or  the  navy,  or 
members  of  their  families,  or  other  persons  to  whom  such  con- 
siderations may  have  been  extended  in  the  past,  unless  they 
are  within  the  classes  specifically  named  in  the  act. 

Reduced  rate  or  fare  transportation  may  be  granted  to  such 
persons  as  are  specified  in  the  law  as  those  to  whom  free  trans- 
portation may  be  given.     (See  ruling  95.) 

(e)  Section  22  of  the  act  authorizes  carriers  to  grant  free  or 
reduced-rate  transportation  of  property  for  the  United  States, 
state,  or  municipal  governments,  or  for  charitable  purposes  or 
for  exhibition  at  fairs  or  expositions.  It  also  authorizes  free 
or  reduced-fare  transportation  of  certain  specified  persons. 
This  special  provision  and  the  words  "reduced  rates"  are  con- 
strued to  be  special  authority  for  carriers  to  depart  from  estab- 
lished tariff  rates  or  fares;  and  for  such  transportation  as  is 
provided  for  in  said  section  22  it  is  not  necessary  for  carriers 
to  provide  tariff's  or  observe  tariff  rates  or  fares  and  regulations 
excepting  in  the  issuance,  sale,  and  use  of  mileage,  excursion, 
or  commutation  passenger  tickets,  and  joint  interchangeable  mile- 
age tickets.  As  to  these,  the  provisions  of  section  6  with  regard 
to  publishing,  filing,  posting,  and  observing  tariffs  must  be  com- 
plied with.  (See  rulings  33,  36,  65,  218,  244,  297,  and  311; 
compare  ruling  107.) 

November  16,  1906. 

209.  DIVISION  OF  JOINT  RATES  OR  FARES— CON- 
TRACTS AND  AGREEIMENTS  FOR,  MUST  BE  FILED.— A 
contract,  agreement,  or  arrangement  between  common  carriers. 


690  Conference  Rulings. 

governing  the  division  between  them  of  joint  v?tes  or  fares  on 
interstate  business,  is  a  contract,  agreement,  or  arrangement  in 
relation  to  traffic  within  the  meaning  of  section  6  of  the  act 
to  regulate  commerce,  and  a  copy  thereof  must  be  filed  with  the 
Commission.  Where  such  contract,  agreement,  or  arrangement 
is  verbal,  or  is  contained  in  correspondence  between  the  parties, 
or  rests  on  their  custom  and  j^ractice,  a  memorandum  of  its 
terms  must  be  filed  with  the  Commission. 

When  the  agreement  or  arrangement  under  which  divisions 
are  made  is  in  the  form  of  a  contract  or  formal  agreement  or 
recorded  memorandum,  a  copy  of  each  such  contract,  agreement, 
or  memorandum  is  to  be  filed  with  the  Commission.  Where 
such  arrangement  is  made  by  correspondence  or  verbally,  a  con- 
cise memorandum  of  the  basis  and  general  terms  and  application 
of  the  arrangement  or  practice  is  to  be  filed  with  the  Commission. 
The  filing  of  the  division  sheets  themselves  is  not  desired.  (See 
ruling  269  and  372;  amended  by  order  in  Divisioa  of  Joint  Rates 
on  Bail  way  Fuel  Coal,  37  I.  C.  C,  265.) 

210.  CORRESPONDE^[CE  WITH  COMMISSION  ON 
FREIGHT  AND  PASSENGER  MATTERS.— It  is  believed  that 
the  best  results  and  understandings  will  be  reached  if  the  con- 
ducting of  ordinary  correspondence  between  carriers  and  the 
Commission  is  confined  to  as  few  persons  as  possible.  Request 
is  therefore  made  that  the  traffic  manager  or  the  general  pas- 
senger and  general  freight  agents  of  each  road  designate  not 
more  than  two  officials  or  other  representatives  to  respectively 
conduct  the  correspondence  with  the  Commission  on  freight  and 
passenger  matters  and  to  promptly  advise  the  Commission  of 
such  appointments. 

211.  DISTRIBUTION  OF  OFFICIAL  CIRCULARS  AND 
RULINGS. — It  is  obviously  impracticable  for  the  Commission 
to  place  copies  of  its  official  circulars  and  rulings  in  the  hands 
of  all  the  officers  of  carriers  or  to  furnish  copies  for  distribution 
among  them.  The  officers  at  the  head  of  the  traffic  departments, 
or  in  charge  of  the  passenger  and  freight  departments,  res- 
pectively, will  please  designate  for  each  road  one  official  in  the 
passenger  department  and  one  in  the  freight  department   (un- 


Conference  Rulings.  G9L 

less  both  are  imder  one  liead  officer  and  one  appointment  is  con- 
sidered sufficient),  to  whom  such  circidars  and  rulings  are  to  be 
sent;  and  arrange  for  such  designated  officials  to  disseminate 
the  information  among  other  interested  officers  and  agents. 
Please  report  these  appointments  to  the  Commission  as  carin- 
as possible. 

With  the  view  of  giving  prompt  information  to  those  who 
may  be  interested,  the  Commission  will  upon  application  place 
upon  its  mailing  list  regularly  organized  boards  of  trade,  cham- 
ber of  commerce,  commercial  clubs,  and  shippers'  associations, 
for  the  purpose  of  mailing  to  them  copies  of  official  circulars 
containing  rulings  and  orders  of  the  Commission. 


January  21,  1907. 

212.  TEANSPORTATION  OF  NEWSPAPER  EMPLOYEES 
ON  SPECIAL  NEWSPAPER  TRAINS.— In  Transportation  of 
Newspaper  Employees,  12  I.  C.  C.  15,  on  the  petition  of  certain 
newspapers  in  New  York  City,  the  Commission  decided  that  a 
conrmodity  rate  may  not  be  applied  to  the  transportation  of 
passengers  or  a  passenger  fare  to  the  transportation  of  a  com- 
modity, and  that  therefore  emplo^-ees  of  the  newspapers,  riding 
on  special  newspaper  trains,  can  not  lawfully  be  transported 
under  a  commodity  rate  established  for  the  carriage  of  news- 
papers or  at  any  rate  other  than  the  one  specified  m  the  regularly 
published  schedule  of  passenger  fares. 

213.  DIVERTING  TRAFFIC  BECAUSE  OF  BLOCK 
ADES. —  (a)  Whenever,  by  reason  of  blockade  upon  the  line  o- 
a  carrier  resulting  from  storm,  washout,  wreck,  or  similar 
casualty,  it  becomes  necessary  for  it  to  divert  to  the  line  of  an- 
other carrier  passengers  or  freight  that  are  in  transit,  the  car- 
rier so  diverting  its  business  should  pay  the  carrier  or  carriers, 
upon  whose  train  such  passengers  or  freight  are  carried,  regular 
tariff  rates  or  fares  from  and  to  the  points  between  which  it  or 
they  transport  such  diverted  traffic,  except  that  if  the  carrier 
accepting  such  diverted  traffic  is  participant  in  a  joint  tariff  in 
which  the  diverting  line  is  also  a  participant  and  under  which  the 
diverted  traffic  is  being  moved,  settlement  may  be  made  on  basis 
of  the  division  of  the  through  joint  rate  or  fare.  (See  rulings  83, 
138,  146,  147,  and  183.) 


692  Conference  Rulings. 

(b)  If,  because  of  such  blockade,  a  carrier's  train  is  de- 
toured  over  the  line  of  another  carrier,  or  special  train  is  ar- 
ranged for  movement  of  the  interrupted  traffic,  the  tariff  rates 
or  fare,  if  there  be  any  for  such  movement,  must  be  applied 
In  the  absence  of  such  tariff  regulations  compensation  should 
be  agreed  upon.     (See  ruling  138.) 

This  rule  does  not  apply  in  cases  of  congested  lines  due  to 
lieavy  traffic  or  ordinary  causes.  (See  Woodwarjl  <&  Dickerson 
y.L.  cO  N.  R.  B.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C,  170. 


March  18, 1907. 

214.ROUTING  AND  MISROUTING  FREIGHT.— (a)  Al- 
leged neglect  or  errors  on  part  of  agents  of  carriers  in  misrout- 
ing  shipments  lead  to  numerous  claims  of  overcharge,  many  of 
which  are  meritorious.  The  lawful  charge  on  any  shipment  is 
the  tariff  rate  via  the  route  over  which  the  shipment  moves.  No 
carrier  can  lawfully  refund  any  part  of  the  lawful  charge  ex- 
cept under  authority  so  to  do  from  the  Commission  or  from  u 
court  of  competent  jurisdiction.  (See  rulin  286-a.)  That  thor- 
ough understanding  and  uniform  practice  may  be  had  m  this 
connection,  the  Commission  issues  the  following  administrative 
ruling : 

(b)  In  order  to  secure  desired  delivery  to  industries,  plants, 
or  warehouses  and  avoid  unnecessary  terminal  or  switching 
charges,  the  shipper  may  direct  as  to  terminal  routing  or  de- 
livery of  shipments  which  are  to  go  beyond  the  lines  of  the 
initial  carrier ;  and  his  instructions  as  to  such  terminal  delivery 
must  be  observed  in  routing  and  billing  such  shipments.  The  car- 
rier may  not  disregard  the  instructions  of  shippers  as  to  in- 
termediate routing,  except  when  tariff  of  initial  line  reserves 
the  right  to  carrier  to  dictate  intermediate  routing.  When  such 
reservation  is  made  in  tariff,  (1)  where  all-rail  rates  and  rail- 
and-water  rates  are  available  the  agent  of  carrier  must  have 
the  shipper  designate  which  of  the  two  he  wishes  to  use ;  and 
(2)  the  agent  must  not  route  shipment  via  a  route  that  will  be 
more  expensive  to  the  shipper  than  the  one  desired  by  him, 
or  that  does  not  furnish  substantially  as  good  and  expeditious 
service.  If  carrier  is  not  willing  to  observe  the  intermediate  rout- 
ing instructions  of  shii)per  it  must  not  execuie  bill  of  lading 


Conference  Rulings.  09.'] 

contaming  such  routing.  Carriers  will  be  held  responsil)le  for 
routing  shown  in  bill  of  lading.  (See  rulings  190,  284,  and  316. 
Amended  hy  ruling  321.) 

(c)  In  the  absence  of  specific  through  routing  by  shipper, 
which  carrier  is  willing  to  observe,  it  is  tlie  duty  of  tlie  agent  of 
the  carrier  to  route  shipment  via  the  cheapest  rea.sona])le  route 
knoAvn  to  him  of  the  class  designated  by  the  shipper — that  is, 
all-rail,  or  rail-and-water — and  via  which  he  has  rates  which  he 
can  lawfully  use.  If  a  foreign  car  is  available  which  under  rules 
as  to  car  service  must  be  sent  via  a  particular  line  or  route  over 
which  a  higher  rate  obtains,  agent  must  explain  to  shipper  that 
fact  and  allow  shipper  to  elect  whether  he  will  use  that  car  at  the 
higher  rate  or  wait  for  another  car.  If  shipper  elects  to  use  the  car 
at  the  higher  rate,  agent  should  so  note  on  bill  of  lading.  If  agent 
is  in  doubt,  he  should  secure  information  from  proper  officers  of 
traffic  department.  It  is  important  that  agents  at  initial  points 
be  able  to,  and  that  they  do,  quote  correct  rates  and  give  correct 
routings.  (See  rulings  91.  140,  190,  284,  316;  also  United  Port- 
land Cement  Co.  v.  M.  P.  Rif.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-321;  Lord  & 
Bushnell  Co.  v.  31.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C,  463;  Meeds  Lumber 
Co.  V.  A.  &  V.  Ry.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C.  679;  Donahue-Stratton  Co. 
V.  G.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C,  739;  and  Chattanooga 
Implement  &  Mfg.  Co.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C.  146.) 

(d)  If  a  carrier's  agent  misroutes  a  shipment  and  thus  causes 
extra  expense  to  the  shipper  over  and  above  the  lawful  charges 
via  another  available  route  of  the  class  designated  by  shipper — 
that  is,  all  rail  or  rail  and  water — over  which  such  agent  Iiad 
applicable  rates  which  he  could  lawfully  use,  and  responsibility 
for  agent's  error  is  admitted  by  the  carrier,  such  carrier  may, 
as  to  shipments  moving  subsequent  to  ]\Iarch  18,  1907,  adjust  the 
overcharge  so  caused  by  refunding  to  shipper  the  difference  be- 
ween  the  lawful  charge  via  the  route  over  which  shipment  moves 
and  what  would  have  been  the  lawful  charges  on  same  shipment 
at  the  same  time  via  the  cheaper  available  route  of  the  class  de- 
signated which  could  have  been  lawfully  used.  Such  refund  must 
in  no  case  exceed  the  actual  difference  between  the  lawful  charges 
via  the  different  routes  as  specified,  and  must  in  every  instance  be 
paid  in  full  by  the  carrier  whose  agent  caused  such  overcharge 
and  must  not  be  shared  in  by  or  divided  with  any  other  carrier, 
corporation,  firm,  or  person.  This  authority  is  limited  strictly 


()9i  Conference  Rulings. 

to  the  cases  specified  and  to  the  circumstances  recited  and  does 
not  extend  or  apply  to  instances  in  which  soliciting  or  commercial 
agents  of  carriers  induce  shippers  to  route  shipments  over  a  parti- 
cular line  via  which  a  higher  rate  obtains  than  is  effective  via 
some  other  line.  (See  rulings  93  and  286;  also  Duluth  &  Iron 
Range  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C,  St.  P.,  31.  d'  0.  Rrj.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C,  485.) 
(e)  The  rule  is  intended  to  apply  to  cases  in  which  the  agents 
who  bill  or  actually  forward  or  divert  shipments  through  error 
or  oversight  send  the  shipments  via  routes  that  are  more  ex- 
pensive than  those  directed  by  shippers  or  available  in  the  ab- 
sence of  routing  instructions  by  shippers.  It  must  not  be  used 
in  any  case  or  in  any  way  to  "meet"  or  "protect"  a  rate  via 
another  route  or  gateway  via  which  the  adjusting  carrier  has 
not  in  its  tariffs  at  the  time  the  shipment  moves  rates  which 
are  available  and  lawfully  applical)le  thereto,  nor  as  a  means 
or  device  by  which  to  evade  tariff  rates  or  to  meet  the  rate  of  a 
competing  line  or  route,  nor  to  relieve  shipper  fro.m  responsibility 
for  his  own  routing  instructions. 


November  15,  1907. 

(f)  The  prerequisites  to  any  refund  under  this  rule  are  ad- 
mission by  carrier  of  responsibility  for  its  agent's  error  in  mis- 
routing  the  shipment,  and  such  carrier's  willingness  to  bear  the 
extra  expense  so  caused,  without  recourse  upon  any  other  car- 
rier for  any  part  thereof.  If,  therefore,  the  error  is  discovered 
before  the  shipment  has  been  delivered  to  consignee  or  before 
charges  demanded  upon  same  have  been  paid,  the  carrier  ac- 
knowledging responsibility  for  the  error  may  authorize  the 
delivering  carrier  to  deliver  shipment  upon  payment  of  the 
charges  that  would  have  applied  but  for  the  misrouting  and  to 
bill  upon  it  for  the  extra  charge;  or,  if  the  shipment  has  been 
delivered  undercharged  before  the  error  is  discovered,  the  car- 
rier that  acknowledges  responsibility  for  the  error  may  pay  the 
undercharge  to  the  carrier  that  delivered  the  shipment  instead 
of  requiring  it  to  collect  the  undercharge  from  shipper,  to  be 
refunded  to  shipper.     (Interpreted  by  ruling  198.) 

Complete  distinction  nmst  be  observed  between  cases  to  whict 
this  rule  applies  and  those  provided  for  under  ruling  217. 


Conference  Rulings.  695 

(g)  Shippers  must  bear  in  mind  that  there  is  a  limit  beyond 
which  an  agent  of  a  carrier  could  not  reasonabl.y  be  expected  to 
know  as  to  terminal  delivery  or  local  rates  at  distant  points  and 
on  lines  of  distant  roads  to  or  with  which  he  has  no  specific 
joint  through  rates.  Consignors  and  consignees  should  cooperate 
with  agents  of  carriers  in  avoiding  misunderstandings  and  errors 
in  routing  and  must  expect  to  bear  some  responsibility  in  con- 
nection therewith.  (See  What  Cheer  Tool  Co.  v.  K.  &  M.  By.  Co., 
U.  R.  Op.  2159,  and  Ishell  &  Co.  v.  L.  ^.  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  19 
I.  C.  C,  450.) 


March  9,  1909. 

(h)  If,  under  this  rule,  a  carrier  adjusts  a  claim  for  misrout- 
ing  and  later  learns  that  the  responsibility  for  misrouting  actu- 
ally rests  upon  another  carrier,  such  other  carrier  may 
voluntarily  reimburse  the  carrier  that  made  the  payment  in 
the  full  amount  of  such  payment,  or  the  matter  may,,  if  necessary, 
be  referred  to  the  Commission  for  determination  of  the  question 
of  which  carrier  is  responsible  for  the  error. 


April  6,  1909. 

(i)  Restated  in  ruling  474c. 


March  18,  1907. 

215.  COMBINATION  OF  JOINT  RATI]  OR  FARE  TO  COM- 
MON POINTS  AND  LOCAL  RATE  OR  FARE  BEYOND.— 

(a)  In  order  to  secure  uniformity  in  practice  and  understand- 
ings and  to  remove  the  cause  of  many  complaints,  the  Commis- 
sion decides  that  when  a  joint  through  rate  or  fare  is  the  same 
to  two  or  more  points  and  rate  or  fare  on  through  shipment  or 
passenger  to  local  station  to  which  no  specific  joint  through  rate 
or  fare  applies  is  made  up  by  combination  of  such  joint  through 
rate  or  fare  to  common  points  and  local  rate  or  fare  beyond, 
the  rate  or  fare  for  through  shipment  or  passenger  must  be 
Idetermined  by  calculating  the  joint  through  rate  or  fare  to 
the  point  from  which  the  lower  local  rate  or  fare  applies  to 
point  of  destination  and  adding  thereto  such  local  rate  or  fare. 
For  example :  Joint  through  tariff  names  the  same  rates  or  fares 


696  Conference  Rulings. 

from  certain  eastern  points  to  Chicago  and  Milwaukee.  Ti  .^hip. 
ment  or  passenger  is  destined  to  a  point  to  which  the  local  rate 
or  fare  is  less  from  Milwaukee  than  from  Chicago,  the  rate  or 
fare  applied  should  be  the  joint  through  rate  or  fare  to  ^Milwaukee 
plus  tlie  local  rate  or  fare  from  Milwaukee  to  destination,  and 
unless  the  lines  of  delivering  carrier  reach  both  Chicago  and 
Milwaukee  the  shipment  or  passenger  should  move  via  ^Milwaukee. 
If  the  local  rate  or  fare  from  Chicago  to  point  of  destination 
is  lower  than  from  l\Iilwaukee,  the  rate  or  fare  should  be  the 
joint  through  rate  or  fare  to  Chicago  plus  the  local  rate  or  fare 
from  Chicago  to  destination,  and  unless  the  lines  of  delivering 
carrier  reach  both  Mihvaukee  and  Chicago  the  shipment  or 
passenger  should  move  via  Chicago.  (See  Larrowe  Milling  Co. 
V.  C.  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C,  443  and  548;  also  Relilerg 
&  Co.  V.  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  17  I.  C.  C,  508.) 

(b)  Rates  or  fares  for  outbound  through  movements  from 
such  local  stations  and  under  like  circumstances  must  be  applied 
on  the  same  basis  where  the  joint  through  rates  or  fares  are  the 
same  from  two  or  more  points. 

(c)  This  does  not  authorize  any  carrier  to  apply  to  trans- 
portation over  its  lines  any  rate  or  fare  except  those  stated  in 
its  own  lawfully  published  tariffs  or  in  the  lawfully  published 
joint  tariffs  in  which  it  has  concurred.  If  a  carrier  desires  to 
"meet  the  rate"  of  a  competitor,  it  must  do  so  by  lawfully  in- 
cluding in  its  own  tariffs  such  specific  rates  or  fares,  proportional 
or  otherAvise,  as  may  be  necessary  so  to  do.  (See  rulings  195 
and  214.) 

(d)  It  is  suggested  that  shippers  can  assist  in  avoiding  mis- 
takes and  misunderstandings  by  calling  attention  to  the  rate 
that  should  apply  in  such  cases  as  come  under  this  rule  by  in- 
dicating it  on  shipping  bill  in  connection  with  routing  instruc- 
tions; for  instances,  "Rate  on  ^lilwaukee."  This  is,  however, 
merely  a  suggestion,  and  does  not  relieve  the  agents  of  carriers 
from  the  responsibility  of  quoting  and  applying  the  correct 
lawful  rate. 

(e)  This  rule  does  not  apply  where  a  shipment  has  reached 
its  destination  as  originally  given  by  shipper  and  has  been  re- 
consigned,  except  when  tariff  contains  reconsigning  rule  that 
provides  for  such  application, 


Conference  Rulings.  697 

(f)  This  rule  must  not  apply  in  any  case  wiiere  there  is  an 
applicable  specific  joint  through  rate  or  fare  from  point  of 
origin  to  point  of  destination.      (See  Rule  55,   Tariff  Circular 

18-A.) 


March  25,  1907. 

216.  FRP:E  transportation  of  officers  or  EM- 
PLOYEES OF  OI\lNIBUS  OR  BAGGAGE  EXPRESS  COM- 
PANIES.— In  its  decision  on  the  petition  of  the  Frank  Parmelee 
Company  (Exchange  of  Free  Transportation,  12  I.  C.  C.  39) 
the  Commission  hold  that  a  carrier  subject  to  the  act  can  not 
lawfully  give  free  transportation  to  officers,  agents,  or  employees 
of  an  omnibus  or  baggage  express  company,  except,  as  authorized 
in  the  act,  for  baggage  agents  who  meet  passenger  trains  at 
some  point  near  the  larger  cities  and  go  through  the  trains  to 
arrange  for  transfer  of  passengers  and  their  baggage.  (See 
ruling  95a,  par.  3,  and  95g.) 


May  6,  1907. 

217.  RETURN  OF  ASTRAY  SHIPMENTS.— Instances  occur 
in  which,  through  error  or  oversight  on  the  part  of  some  agent 
or  employee,  a  shipment  is  billed  to  an  erroneous  destination  or 
is  unloaded  short  of  destination  or  is  carried  by.  The  Com- 
mission is  of  the  opinion  that  in  hon<i  fide  instances  of  this  kind 
carriers  may  return  such  astray  shipments  to  their  proper  des- 
tination or  course  without  the  assessment  of  additional  charges, 
and  may  arrange  for  such  movement  of  such  astray  shipments 
for  each  other  on  mutually  acceptable  terms  without  the  neces- 
sity of  publishing,  posting,  and  tiling  tariff  under  which  it  will 
be  done.     (See  rulings  31  and  240.) 

Complete  distinction  must  be  observed  between  cases  to  which 
this  rule  applies  and  those  provided  for  under  Conference  Rul- 
ing 214. 


May  27,  1907. 

218.  TRANSPORTATION  OF  FEDERAL  TROOPS.— The 
Commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  carriers,  either  by  contract  or 
bid  or  other  arrangement  with  the  War  Department,  may  law- 


698  Conference  Rulings. 

fully  make  special  rates  or  fares  for  the  movement  of  federal 
troops,  when  moved  under  orders  and  at  the  expense  of  the  United 
States  government,  and  that  the  rates  or  fares  so  made  need 
not  be  posted  or  filed  with  the  Commission.  (See  rulings  33  and 
208e.) 

The  lawfully  published  rates  or  fares  for  the  transportation 
of  the  general  public,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Commission,  are  to 
be  regarded,  however,  as  the  maximum  rates  and  fares  that  maj' 
lawfully  be  charged  the  government  for  the  movement  of  federal 
troops.     (See  United  States  v.  A.  tt-  V.  Ry.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C,  406.^ 

Tliis  ruling  also  governs  similar  transportation  for  the  naval 
and  marine  services.  (Ruling  does  not  apply  lo  state  or  terri- 
torial troops;  see  ruling  297.) 


June  3,  1907. 

219.  TRANSPORTATION  OF  I\IEN  OR  PROPERTY  FOR 
TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES.— (a)  In  its  decision  on  the  peti- 
tion of  the  Western  Union  and  Postal  Telegraph  companies,  in 
Railroad-Telegraph  Contracts,  12  I.  C.  C,  10,  the  Commission 
held  it  would  be  unlawful  for  a  carrier  subject  to  the  act  to  con- 
tract or  stipulate  with  a  telegraph  company  for  the  carriage  of 
its  officials,  employees,  or  property  for  any  greater  or  less  or 
different  compensation  than  that  specified  in  the  regularly  pub- 
lished tariffs  in  effect  at  the  time,  except  in  connection  with  the 
construction,  operation,  and  maintenance  of  telegi'aph  line  and 
service  on  its  own  line.  It  was  held  that  a  group  of  separate!}' 
incorporated  roads,  recognized  as  a  "railway  system,"  may  be 
considered  as  one  in  the  making  of  contracts  for  telegraph  service 
on  that  system.  (Modified  by  ruling  491.  See  also  rulings  95a, 
par.  2,  161,  and  364;  see  also  amendatory  act  of  June  18,  1910, 
interpreted  in  ruling  305.) 

(6)  This  definitely  differentiates  between  the  employees  of 
the  telegraph  company  who  are  aetualy  engaged  in  constructing 
and  maintaining  a  telegraph  line  along  the  line  of  a  railway,  or 
in  operating  such  telegraph  line  as  a  part  of  the  actual  operation 
of  that  railway,  and  those  who  are  engaged  in  the  commercial 
business  of  the  telegi-aph  company.  The  fact  that  railway  of- 
ficials may,  by  use  of  deadhead  franks,  send  messages  on  rail- 
way business  from  or  receive  such  messages  at  a  commercial  office 


Conference  Rulings.  699 

of  a  telegraph  company  does  not  constitute  that  office  a  part  of 
the  operation  of  any  of  tlie  lines  of  railway  which  such  of- 
ficials represent  nor  hring  that  teleg'ra])h  office  into  such  relation- 
ship with  the  business  of  the  railways  as  to  warrant  treating  it 
as  part  of  the  operating  facilities  of  such  railways.  Practically 
all  telegraphing  so  done  is  "off  the  line"  business  and  is  to  be 
considered  as  commercial  business.  The  same  distinction  is  to 
be  observed  in  the  hauling  of  materials  and  supplies  for  tele- 
graph companies  with  which  the  railway  company  has  contract 
for  telegraphic  service.  (Amended  by  ruling  491.  See  also  rul- 
ing 305.) 


November  15,  1907. 

(c)  This  rule  applies  also  to  telephone  service,  and  carriers 
that  have  not  already  done  so  are  hereby  requested  and  called 
upon  to  promptly  tile  with  the  Commission  copies  of  all  contracts 
for  telegraph  or  telephone  service  on  their  lines.  (See  ruling 
305.) 


June  7,  1907. 

220.  SPECIAL  REPARATION  ON  INFORIMAL  COM- 
PLAINTS.—  (fl)  To  assist  in  the  settlement  of  certain  claims  of 
shippers  against  carriers,  and  as  a  practical  means  of  disposing 
with  promptness  of  informal  complaints  that  might  otherwise  de- 
velop into  formal  complaints,  and  in  connection  with  which  the 
unreasonableness  of  the  rate  or  regulation  is  admitted  by  the 
interested  carrier  or  carriers,  the  Commission  on  full  informa- 
tion will  authorize  adjustment  by  special  order  if  all  of  the  facts 
and  conditions  warrant  such  action.  The  connections  in  which 
the  Commission  has  authority  to  modify  the  provisions  of  the 
law  are  specified  in  the  act.  The  Commission  will  not  assume 
to  modify  it  in  any  other  connections  or  features. 

{h)  The  instances  in  which  the  Commission  will  authorize 
refund  or  reparation  on  informal  complaint  and  in  an  informal 
way  will  be  confined  to  those  in  which  the  informal  showing  de- 
velops plainly  a  case  in  which  the  Commission  would  award  re- 
paration on  formal  hearing  and  in  which  an  adjustment  agree- 
able to  complainant  and  carrier  or  carriers  and  in  conformity 
with  the  provisions  of  the  law  is  reached. 


700  Conference  BulingS. 

(c)  (Superseded  by  ruling  396.) 

(d)  No  carrier  may  pay  any  refund  from  its  published  tarifP 
charges  save  with  the  specific  authority  of  the  Commission  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  act.  When  an  informal 
or  formal  reparation  order  has  been  made  by  the  Commission  the 
principle  upon  which  it  is  based  shall  be  extended  to  all  like  ship- 
ments, but  no  refunds  shall  be  made  upon  such  like  shipments  ex- 
cept upon  specific  authority  from  the  Commission  therefor.  (See 
rulings  49  and  200c;  qlso  Bergcrman  v.  A.,  T.  (0  S.  F.  Ry.  Co., 
I  J.  R.  Op.  2132.) 

(e)  The  shipper  should  pay  the  lawfully  published  charges 
applicable  via  the  route  over  which  the  shipment  moves,  and 
make  claim  for  refund  if  he  believes  he  has  been  overcharged. 
The  Commission  will  not  ordinarily  include  in  reparation  award 
demurrage  charges  which  accrue  pending  adjustment  or  subse- 
quent to  consignee's  refusal  to  accept  the  shipment  and  pay  the 
lawful  charges  thereon,  but  in  special  cases  such  demurrage 
charges  may  be  included  in  the  amount  of  refund.  (See  ruling 
32.) 

(/)  It  is  the  duty  of  the  delivering  carrier  to  collect,  and  of 
the  consignee  to  pay,  demurrage  charges  as  per  lawful  tariffs. 
Demurrage  charges  accruing  because  of  error  of  a  carrier  are 
considered  in  the  same  light  as  are  other  additional  transporta- 
tion charges  caused  by  carrier's  error;  and  if  adjusted,  the  full 
expense  thereof  must  be  borne  by  the  carrier  whose  agent  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  error.  (See  ruling  214;  see  also  note  to  ruling 
242;  see  Code  of  National  Car  Demurrage  Rules;  also  Middle 
West  Coal  Co.  V.  C.  &  0.  Rij.  Co.,  41  I.  C.  C,  724.) 

(g)  The  Commission  has  repeatedly  announced  the  view  that 
the  law  does  not  permit  the  use  of  any  rate  or  fare  except  that 
contained  in  a  lawful  tariff  that  is  applicable  via  the  line,  route, 
and  gateway  over  and  through  which  the  shipment  or  passenger 
moves.  The  lawful  rate  or  fare  for  through  movement  is  the 
through  rate  or  fare,  wherever  such  through  rate  or  fare  exists, 
even  though  some  combination  makes  a  lower  rate  or  fare  and 
even  though  the  practice  in  the  past  has  been  to  give  to  some  the 
benefit  of  such  lower  combination.  The  Commission  long  since 
extended  to  carriers,  in  a  general  order,  permission  to  reduce, 
on  one  day's  notice,  a  joint  commodity  or  class  rate  or  fare  that 
is  higher  than  the  sum  of  the  intermediate  rates  between  the 


Conference  Rulings.  701 

same  points  to  make  it  equal  the  sum  of  such  intermediates.  If, 
therefore,  carriers  have  maintained  through  rates  or  fares  that 
are  higher  than  the  sums  of  the  intermediates  between  the  same 
points,  it  is  because  of  their  desire  so  to  do,  and  not,  as  some 
agents  of  carriers  have  informed  shippers,  because  the  law  or 
the  Commission  forces  them  to  do  so.  (See  Rule  56,  Tariff  Cir- 
cular 17-A  or  18-A;   also  ruling  448.) 

(h)  If  a  carrier  desires  to  give  its  patrons  the  benefit  of  the 
same  rate  or  fare  that  applies  via  another  line  or  gateway,  and 
which  is  lower  than  its  own  rate  or  fare,  it  can  do  so  by  lawfully 
incorporating  that  rate  or  fare  in  its  own  tariffs,  and  so  give  the 
benefit  of  it  to  all  of  its  patrons  alike.  The  law  forbids  giving 
such  lower  rate  or  fare  to  one  and  withholding  it  from  another, 
but  neither  the  law  nor  the  Commission  stands  in  the  way  of 
adoption  in  lawful  manner  of  the  lower  rate  or  fare  as  available 
for  all.     (See  ruling  205.) 

(i)  The  Commission's  power  to  authorize  shipments  will 
not  be  exercised  in  such  way  as  to  create  the  very  discrimina- 
tions which  the  law  aims  to  prevent.  No  doubt  instances  will 
occur  in  which  seeming  hardship  will  come  to  some.  Much  of 
such  embarrassment  will  be  avoided  if  agents  of  carriers  and 
shippers  take  pains  to  be  certain  that  correct  rates  are  quoted 
and  correct  routing  is  given. 

(i)  Claims  filed  since  August  28,  1907,  unist  have  accrued 
within  two  years  immediately  prior  to  the  date  upon  which  they 
are  filed  ;  otherwise  they  are  barred  by  the  statute.  Claims  filed 
with  the  Commission  on  or  before  August  28,  1907,  are  not  af- 
fected by  the  two  years'  limitation  in  the  act.  The  Commission 
will  not  take  jurisdiction  of  or  recognize  its  jurisdiction  over 
any  claim  for  reparation  or  damages  which  is  barred  by  the  stat- 
ute of  limitation,  as  herein  interpreted,  and  the  Commission  will 
not  recognize  the  right  of  a  carrier  to  waive  the  limitation  pro- 
visions of  the  statute.     (See  rulings  10,  306,  and  307.) 


July  8, 1907. 

221.  REFUNDS  AND  COMMISSIONS.— (a)  The  act  pro- 
hibits a  carrier  from  demanding,  collecting,  or  receiving  a  gi'eater 
or  less  or  different  compensation  for  transportation  than  that 
named  in  its  tariffs  in  effect  at  the  time.     It  prohibits  the  re- 


702  Conference  Rulings. 

bating  or  refunding  to  any  person  in  any  manner,  or  by  any 
device,  whatsoever,  any  part  of  the  lawful  charges  so  collected. 
It  is  therefore  manifestly  unlawful  for  a  carrier  to  refund  to  any 
association,  committee,  or  person  any  part  of  the  charges  col- 
lected by  the  carrier  as  a  condition  of  the  sale  of  transportation. 
A  carrier's  agents  may,  as  a  matter  of  convenience,  sell  admis- 
sion tickets  to  entertainments  in  connection  with  which  excur- 
sion-fare tickets  are  sold,  l}ut  the  purchase  of  such  admission 
ticket  must  not  be  made  a  condition  of  the  sale  of  transportation 
ticket.     (See  ruling  7.) 


March  1, 1908. 

(&)  The  act  does  not  prohibit  a  carrier  from  providing  in  its 
own  interest  and  as  a  means  of  stimulating  travel  over  its  line 
an  entertainment  at  a  point  on  its  line ;  nor  from  contributing 
to  the  expense  of  such  an  entertainment  if  such  contribution  be 
made  in  a  definite  sum  and  be  in  no  way  dependent  or  contingent 
upon  the  number  of  tickets  sold,  and  provided  that  no  part  of 
such  contribution  be  by  any  device  or  through  any  person  what- 
soever permitted  to  effect  any  departure  from  or  discrimination 
under  the  carrier's  tariff  fares. 


May  12,  1908. 

(c)  The  ruling  of  the  Commission  on  this  date,  published  in 
Conference  Rulings  Bnlletm  No.  4,  was  amended  on  February 
14,  1911,  to  read  as  follows: 

A  carrier  may  employ  an  agent  to  act  for  it  in  working  up 
passenger  excursions  and  make  his  compensation  depend  upon 
the  results  of  his  efforts  by  executing  a  contract  in  the  follow- 
ing form  and  filing  a  copy  with  the  Commission,  together  with 
reference  by  I.  C.  C.  number  to  the  tariff  which  contains  the 
fares.  Any  person  so  appointed  becomes  in  fact  the  agent  of 
the  appointing  carrier,  and  such  carrier  will  be,  and  will  be  held, 
responsible  and  liable  for  his  acts  as  its  agent.  If  any  part  of 
the  compensation  paid  by  a  carrier  to  such  an  agent  is  used  or 
is  permitted  to  be  used,  either  directly  or  indrectly,  in  such 
way  as  to  reduce  for  any  person  the  lawful  tariff  charges  of 
any  carrier  subject  to  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  the  agent 
or  agents  and  the  carriers  or  carriers  causing  or  permitting  suclj 


Conference  Rulings.  703 

departure  from  the  lawful  tariff  charges  will  be  held  to  full  re- 
sponsibility and  liability  therefor : 

The  rail company,  having  arranged  to  run  an 

excursion  from  to  and  return,  on  ,  to  be 

Icnown  as  the  excursion,  at  the  following  fare :     Adults, 

;     children,    ,    hereby    appoints ,    residing 

at ,  its  agent  to  solicit  and  develop  business  for  said  ex- 
cursion and  accepts  responsibility  and  liability  for  the  acts  of 

said  agent.     The  said  hereby  agrees  to  devote  to  this 

work  such  portion  of  his  time  from to as  may  be 

necesary,  in  consideration  of  which  the rail  com- 
pany agrees  to   compensate  him  as  follows:     If   adult 

tickets,    or   their   equivalent,   are   sold  cents   for   each 

adult  and  cents  for  each  half  tick  so  sold. 

It  is  understood  and  agreed  that  no  compensation  will  be 
paid  hereunder  if  less  than adult  tickets,  or  their  equiva- 
lent, are  sold. 


April  13,  1908. 

222.     DEMURRAGE  ON  PRIVATELY  OWNED  CARS.— 

The  Commission  decided  in  Demurrage  Charges  on  Privately 
Owned  Tank  Cars,  13  1.  C.  C,  378,  that  private  cars  OA\Tied  by 
shippers  and  hired  to  carriers  upon  a  mileage  basis  are  subject 
to  demurrage  when  said  cars  stand  upon  the  tracks  of  the  car- 
rier either  at  point  of  origin  or  destination  of  shipment,but  are 
not  so  subject  when  upon  either  the  private  track  of  the  owner 
of  tlie  car  or  the  private  track  of  the  consignee.  The  carrier 
must  charge  demurrage  in  all  cases  where  such  demurrage  is 
imposed  by  tariff  provision  upon  its  own  equipment,  except 
when  a  privately  owned  car  is  upon  a  privately  owned  siding 
or  track  and  the  carrier  is  paying  or  is  responsible  for  no  rental 
or  other  charge  upon  such  car.  (IModified  and  explained  by 
ruling  79 ;  see  important  note  to  ruling  242 ;  see  also  Rule  75  of 
Tariff  Circular  18-A  and  rulings  123  and  270  of  this  bulletin; 
and  Code  of  National  Car  Demurrage  Rules.) 


Maij  12,  1908. 

223.  DEMURRAGE  ON  INTERSTATE  SHIPMENT.— (o) 
The  act  requires  that  carriers  shall  publish,  post,  and  file  "all 
terminal  charges     *     *     *     which  in  any  wise  change,  affect, 


704  Conference  Rulings. 

or  determine  *  *  *  the  value  of  the  service  rendered  to 
the  passenger,  shipper,  or  consignee,"  and  all  such  charges  be- 
come a  part  of  the  "rates,  fares,  and  charges"  which  the 
carriers  are  required  to  demand,  collect,  and  retain.  Such 
terminal  charges  include  demurrage  charges. 

(&)  On  March  16,  1908,  the  Commission  <lecided  that  de- 
murrage rules  and  charges  applical^le  to  interstate  shipments  arc 
governed  by  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  and  therefore  are 
within  its  jurisdiction  and  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  state 
authorities.  Any  other  view  would  open  a  wide  door  for  the 
use  of  such  rules  and  charges  to  effect  the  discriminations  which 
the  act  prohil)its.     (Reaffirming  ruling  54.) 

(c)  (Amended  and  restated  by  ruling  135.)  (See  Code  of 
National  Car  Demurrage  Rules.) 

224.  TRANSPORTATION  OF  TRUCKS  OF  CARS  DE- 
STROYED ON  FOREIGN  LINES.— If  a  car  of  one  company  is 
destroyed  on  the  line  of  another  company  and  the  lines  of  those 
two  companies  directly  connect  Avith  each  other,  the  carrier  upon 
whose  line  the  car  is  destroyed  may  transport  free,  as  its  own 
property,  to  junction  with  the  line  of  the  carrier  owning  the 
car,  the  trucks  of  the  destroyed  car,  which  are  understood  to  be 
salvage  from  a  wreck,  the  cost  of  which  must  be  borne  by  the 
carrier  on  whose  line  it  occurs.  If  there  is  not  direct  connec- 
tion between  the  line  of  the  carrier  owning  the  car  and  the 
line  upon  whicli  it  is  destroyed,  the  carrier  on  whose  line  the 
car  is  destro3'ed  may  transport  the  trucks  free  to  a  junction  witli 
an  intermediate  carrier,  and  pay  to  the  intermediate  carrier  or 
carriers  their  full  tariff  rates  for  transporting  them  to  a  junc- 
tion Math  the  line  of  the  carrier  owner  of  the  car  destroyed,  and 
such  owner  may  transport  them  on  its  own  line  as  it  own  prop- 
erty. 

It  does  not  appear  to  the  Commission  that  opportunity  for 
abuse  or  discrimination  is  opened  by  this  practice.  It  does  not 
appear  to  transgress  the  Commission's  rule  that  carriers  may  not 
haul  freight  free  for  each  other;  and  it  is  approved  with  the 
reservation  that  if  discrimination  or  unlawful  practice  is  found 
to  grow  out  of  it  the  plan  will  be  condemned.     (See  ruling  225.) 


OONFERENCE    RuLlNGS.  '  705 

November  13,  1908. 

225.  CARRIERS  iMAY  NOT  IVP]  CUVKN  PREFERENTIAL 
RATES. —  (a)  In  answer  to  in({uiries  the  Connnis.sion  expresses 
the  opinion  that  under  tlie  law  a  carrier,  or  a  person  or  corpo- 
ration operating  a  railroad  or  other  transportation  line,  may  not, 
as  a  shipper  over  the  lines  of  another  carrier,  be  given  any 
preference  in  the  application  of  tariff  rates  on  interstate  ship- 
ments, but  it  may  lawfully  and  properly  take  advantage  of 
legal  tariff  joint  rates  applying  to  a  convenient  junction  or  other 
point  on  its  own  line,  provided  such  shipments  are  consigned 
through  to  such  point  from  point  or  origin  and  are,  in  good  faith, 
sent  to  such  billed  destination.  In  other  words,  one  carrier  ship- 
ping its  fuel,  material,  or  other  supplies  over  the  lines  of  an- 
other carrier  must  pay  the  legal  tariff  rates  applicable  to  the 
same  commodities  shipped  by  an  individual,  but  when  a  car- 
rier is  the  consignee  of  a  shipment  of  its  own  property  which 
moves  under  a  joint  rate  and  is  to  participate  in  the  haul  of 
same  via  its  own  line,  routing  instructions  of  consignor  to  a 
specified  junction  point  on  the  line  of  consignee  carrier  must 
be  observed.  There  may  be  some  instances,  such  as  movement 
of  needed  fuel,  in  which,  in  order  to  keep  the  trains  or  boats 
moving,  such  traffic  could  temporarily  be  given  preference  in 
movement  without  creating  unjust  or  unwarranted  discrimina- 
tion. (See  rulings  153,  224,  and  373;  also  In  the  flatter  of  Re- 
stricted Rates.  20  I.  C.  C.  427 ;  Beehman  Lumher  Co:  v.  L.  &  N. 
Ry.  Co.,  21  I  C.  C.  281;  Jn  the  Matter  of  Transportation  of 
Companji  Material,  22  I.  C.  C,  440;  American  Brake  Shoe  cO 
Foundry  Go.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C,  448;  and  Divi- 
sions of  Joint  Rates  on  Railway  Fuel  Coal,  37  I.  C.  C,  266.) 

(&)  Where  stock  in  one  carrier  company  is  owned  by  another 
carrier  company  but  both  maintain  separate  organizations  and 
report  separately  to  the  Commission,  they  may  not  lawfully 
carry  property  free  for  each  other.  (Restating  ruling  9.  See 
/.  C.  C.v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.,  225  U.  S.,  326.) 


November  9,  1909. 

226.  SIGNATURE  TO  RELEASED  VALUATION 
CLAUSES  ON  BILLS  OF  LADING.— Rule  6  of  the  Southern 
Classification  provides  that  where  the  tariff  oft'ers  a  reduced 


706  Conference  Rulings. 

rate  based  on  a  certain  fixed  valuation  a  release,  in  the  form 
specified  in  the  tariff  and  containing  the  agreed  valuation,  must 
be  written  and  signed  by  the  shipper  on  the  face  of  the  bill  of 
lading.  As  applied  to  a  case  where  the  shipper  indorsed  the  re- 
leased valuation  on  the  bill  of  lading,  but,  not  knowing  the  re- 
quirements of  the  rule,  omitted  to  indorse  the  special  form  across 
its  face,  it  was  Held,  That  the  rule  is  unreasonable  and  that  it 
is  the  carrier's  duty  to  secure  the  shipper's  signature  to  such 
a  release  on  the  bill  of  lading  when  it  has  reasonable  notice  of 
his  desire  to  take  advantage  of  the  lower  rate  upon  a  released 
valuation.     (Compare  ruling  160.) 

227.  EXCHANGE  BILLS  OF  LADING.— It  is  the  view  of 
the  Commission  that  exchange  bills  of  lading  ought  to  show 
specifically  the  point  of  origin  of  the  shipment  and  the  route 
over  which  it  has  moved.      (See  ruling  415.) 

228.  REDEMPTION  OF  MILEAGE  BOOKS.— The  rules 
governing  the  sale,  use,  and  redemption  of  mileage  books  should 
be  a  part  of  the  tariff  under  which  they  are  sold.  If  a  carrier 
deems  it  wise  to  provide  in  such  rules  for  the  redemption  of  un- 
used portions  of  such  books  on  the  basis  of  the  mileage  rate  for 
the  portion  used,'  it  will  be  recognized  by  the  Commission  as 
redemption  "at  the  full  tariff  rates"  within  the  meaning  of  Con- 
ference Riding  76,  of  this  bulletin,  when  the  books  were  sold  un- 
der tariff  authority  and  on  the  basis  of  a  specific  sum  per  mile. 

229.  LINE  JOINTLY  OPERATED  THROUGH  SEPA- 
RATE COMPANY  ]\IUST  CONCUR  IN  TARIFFS  FOR 
THROUGH  TRAFFIC. — Two  carriers  desiring  a  joint  opera- 
tion of  their  combined  lines  between  two  points  propose  that 
they  shall  be  operated  by  a  new  and  separate  company  which 
shall  handle  as  its  own,  and  under  its  own  tariffs,  all  local  busi- 
ness between  those  points,  and  shall  handle  all  other  business 
under  some  arrangement  with  the  two  lines  which  does  not  per- 
mit it  to  participate  in  the  earnings  on  the  through  traffic:  Held, 
That  Conference  Ruling  108,  entitled  "Lessee  road  not  serving 
as  common  carrier,"  does  not  apply  and  that  the  road  operating 
between  the  two  points  must  concur  in  the  through  rates  over 
its  lino. 


Conference  Kulings.  707 

November  22,  1909. 

230.  TRANSIT  PRIVILEGE— RESPONSIBILITY  OF 
CARRIER  FOR  MISROUTING.— As  the  agent  of  an  inter- 
mediate carrier  has  no  means  of  knowing  just  why  a  shipment 
has  been  routed  through  particular  junctions,  he  has  no  right 
to  substitute  his  own  judgment  as  to  routing  for  the  specific 
routing  instructions  accompanying  the  shipment.  In  a  stated 
case  the  initial  carrier  issued  bills  of  lading. showing  particular 
routing  but  not  rates;  the  transfer  billing  subsequently  issued  to 
a  connecting  line  shoM^ed  the  routing  and  a  10-cent  division  of 
a  33-cent  rate  that  did  not  apply  through  the  junctions  named 
but  through  another  junction ;  and  the  agent  of  the  connection 
therefore  diverted  the  shipment  through  the  latter  junction  to 
destination.  It  subsequently  appeared  that  because  of  the  di- 
version the  shipper  had  lost  a  transit  right  at  a  given  point  on 
the  route  specified,  which  was  necessary  to  effect  the  sale  of  the 
shipment  at  destination :  Held,  That  as  tariffs  are  permitted  to 
contain  rules  providing  that  they  are  subject  to  the  transit  privi- 
leges shown  on  the  tariffs  of  individual  carriers  on  file  with  the 
Commission,  the  intermediate  line  was  responsible  to  the  ship- 
per for  the  difference  between  the  rate  paid  in  order  to  get  the 

.^shipment  back  to  the  transit  point  and  the  legal  rate  over  the 
route  directed  by  the  shipper.     (See  ruling  21-1.) 

231.  CARRIER  MUST  FIND  THE  RATE  NAMED  BY 
SHIPPER  AND  ROUTE  ACCORDINGLY  OR  ASK  IN- 
STRUCTIONS.—(Canceled  by  ruling  474-c.) 

232.  CREOSOTING  LUMBER— TRANSIT  PRIVILEGE  OF 
EIGHTEEN  MONTHS  NOT  EXCESSIVE.— The  Commission 
has  expressed  the  view  that  a  transit  privilege  extending  through 
a  period  of  more  than  one  year  is  primn  facie  unreasonable. 
(Ruling  204.)  Experience  has  shown,  however,  that  as  applied 
to  the  creosoting  of  lumber  a  period  of  eighteen  months  is  not 
unreasonably  long,  provided  the  full  local  rates  on  the  inbound 
material  are  required  to  be  paid.  (See  National  Lumber  &  Creo- 
soting  Co.  v.  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  42  I.  C.  C,  36.) 

233.  PARTIAL  UNLOADING  AT  INTERMEDIATE 
POINT  OF  SHIP:MENTS.— Upon  inquiry  as  to  the  legality  of 
a  practice  permitting  the  stoppage  of  shipments  of  perishable 


708  Conference  Rulings. 

commodities  at  points  short  of  destination  to  partly  unload : 
Held,  That  the  practice  is  legal  only  when  authorized  under 
proper  tariff  rules. 

234.  MISROUTING  RESULTING  IN  WRONG  TERMINAL 
DELIVERY.— (Restated  and  modified  in  rulinc:  509.) 

235.  DRAYAGE  CHARGES.— Certain  shipments  were  de- 
livered at  a  destination  as  actually  routed  by  the  consignor, 
but  there  was  a  general  understanding  with  the  carrier,  not 
covered  by  tariff  provision,  that  traffic  should  be  diverted  at  a 
certain  point  in  order  to  accommodate  consignees  located  near 
certain  team  tracks  on  the  delivering  line.  The  agent  having 
failed  to  divert  the  shipments  at  that  point,  the  consignees  were 
subjected  to  extra  drayage  charges :  Held,  Thai  the  claim  for 
a  refund  must  be  rejected.     (See  rulings  20  and  234.) 

236.  CLAIMS  MAY  NOT  LAWFULLY  BE  PAID  UNTIL 
THEY  HAVE  BEEN  INVESTIGATED.— The  Commission  ad- 
hers  to  Conference  Rtde  68,  to  the  effect  that  it  is  not  a  proper 
practice  for  railroad  companies  to  adjust  claims  immediately 
upon  presentation  and  without  investigation.  The  fact  that 
shippers  may  give  a  bond  to  secure  repayment  in  case,  upon  sub- 
sequent examination,  their  claims  prove  to  have  been  improperly 
adjusted  does  not  justify  the  practice.  Carriers  that  have 
adopted  that  practice  will  be  expected  promptly  to  discontinue 
it.  (See  also  ruling  462;  also  Charleston  &  Car.  B.  R.  v.  Varn- 
ville  Co.,  237  U.  S.,  597.) 


November  23,  1909. 

237.  REFUND  ON  SHIPMENT  FORWARDED  TO  ERRO- 
NEOUS DESTINATION  THROUGH  CONSIGNOR'S  ER- 
ROR.— A  ear  of  coal  was  forwarded  to  the  destination  named 
in  the  bill  of  lading,  but  the  carrier,  not  being  able  to  find  the 
consignee  and  learning  that  a  company  of  the  same  name  at  a 
near-by  point  was  tracing  a  coal  shipment,  reconsigned  it  to 
that  point  without  consulting  the  consignor,  and  that  subse- 
quently proved  to  be  the  correct  destination :  Held,  That  a  re- 
fund might  be  allowed  upon  showing  that  the  additional  trans- 
portation expense  fell  on  the  consignor. 


Conference  Rulings.  700 

111  this  connection  tlie  general  principle  is  expressed  in  the 
following  rule :  If  a  shipper  sends  a  shipment  to  an  erroneous 
destination  he  should  have  the  right  to  guard,  so  far  as  possible, 
against  resulting  loss  by  disposing  of  the  shipment  at  that  point. 
The  carrier  should  not,  therefore,  forward  such  shipment  to  an- 
other destination  with  attendant  additional  transportation 
charges  wdthout  having  made  reasonable  effort  to  secure  dispo- 
sition instructions  from  the  shipper.     (See  rulings  248  and  433.) 


December  6,  1909. 

238.  REFUND  OF  FARE  PAID  FOR  NEW  TICKET 
WHEN  LIMITED  TICKET  ORIGINALLY  PURCHASED 
HAS  BEEN  LOST  OR  DESTROYED.— If  a  Ihnited  passenger 
ticket  is  lost  or  destroyed  before  being  used  (and  no  error  or  neg- 
lect of  a  carrier's  agent  is  involved),  it  is  not  unlawful  for  the 
carrier,  after  the  limit  of  the  ticket  has  expired,  to  refund  to 
the  passenger  the  extra  fare  paid  as  a  result  of  such  loss  or  de- 
struction, provided  the  loss  or  destruction,  the  identity  of  the 
claimant  as  the  original  holder,  and  the  fact  that  the  extra  fare 
was  paid  for  travel  by  the  original  holder  over  the  route  and 
within  the  limit  of  the  lost  ticket,  are  clearly  and  definitely 
proved  in  a  form  that  becomes  a  part  of  the  record  in  the  case ; 
and  provided  it  is  clearly  shown  that  such  ticket  has  not  been 
used  or  redeemed  by  any  other  person.  Such  action  should  be 
withheld  for  a  sufficient  period  of  time  properly  and  reasonably 
to  guard  against  the  lost  ticket  being  redeemed  or  used  by  some 
person  other  than  the  original  holder.  (Compare  rulings  76  and 
247.  See  Waber  v.  U  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  2204;  and 
Miller  v.  A.  C.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  I.  C.  C,  528.) 

239.  CONFLICTING  RATES— LOWEST  RATE  IS  THE 
LEGAL  RATE. — A  carrier  in  reissuing  a  tariff  brought  for- 
ward certain  rates  originally  named  in  a  previous  tariff,  and 
also  slightly  increased  the  rates  named  between  the  same  points 
on  the  same  commodity  in  a  supplement  to  the  previous  tariff: 
Held,  That  where  a  tariff  contains  conflicting  rates  the  lower 
or  lowest  of  the  rates  so  published  is  the  legal  rate.  (Compare 
rulings  50,  70,  101,  and  104.  See  Ireland  (0  RoUings  v.  St.  L.  d- 
S.  F.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C,  592.) 


710  Conference  Kulings. 

240.  SWITCHING  IMOVEMENT  ANALOGOUS  TO  AN 
ASTRAY  MOVEMENT.— The  yardmen  of  an  interstate  carrier 
being  under  the  impression  that  a  loaded  car  was  empty  deliv- 
ered it  to  a  switching  road  by  which  it  was  switched  to  a  load- 
ing point,  and  the  error  being  there  discovered  it  was  thence 
switched  back:  Held,  That  while  the  switching  line  may  treat 
the  shipment  as  analogous  to  an  astray  movement  and  on  that 
account  may  waive  its  charges,  if  it  desires  to  do  so,  it  may 
nevertheless  lawfully  demand  and  collect  of  the  carrier  that 
made  the  error  its  lawful  rates  for  the  service  performed.  (See 
ruling  217.) 

241.  A  CANAL  BOAT  LINE  ENGAGED  IN  THROUGH 
MOVEMENTS  IN  CONNECTION  WITH  A  RAIL  LINE  IS 
SUBJECT  TO  THE  ACT  AND  MUST  FILE  TARIFFS.— A 
canal  boat  line  carrying  traffic  moving  from  Nev  York  City  to 
Canadian  points  under  an  arrangement  for  through  movement, 
the  traffic  being  transferred  to  a  rail  line  at  Buffalo  by  its  own 
agents  or  the  agents  of  the  railroad,  is  a  common  carrier  under 
the  act  and  must  file  tariffs  with  the  Commission. 

242.  UNIFORM  DEMURRAGE  RULES  AND  PRACTICES. 

— Recognizing  the  great  benefits  to  be  derived  from  uniformity 
of  car-service  rules,  the  Commission  endorses  the  code  which  was 
reported  to  the  National  Association  of  Railway  Commissioners 
and  by  that  association  recommended  to  the  state  and  interstate 
commissions,  it  being  understood  that  this  action  is,  of  course, 
subject  to  the  right  of  the  Commission  to  inquire  into  the  legality 
or  reasonableness  of  any  rule  or  rules  which  may  be  the  sub- 
ject of  complaint,  and  that  announcement  to  that  effect  be  made 
with  the  Code  of  Demurrage  Rules. 

In  view  of  the  exhaustive  investigation  upon  which  the  Demurrage 
Code  is  based,  it  is  to  be  understood  as  controlling  in  cases  where  any 
conference  ruling  previously  made  conflicts  with  any  of  its  pro- 
visions.    (See  ruling  404.) 

243.  ROUTING  INSTRUCTIONS  WITH  AND  WITHOUT 
NAMING  THE  RATE.— A  shipment  was  routed  through  a 
certain  junction  by  the  consignor,  but  on  the  papers  presented  to 
the  Commission  it  did  not  clearly  appear  whether  he  also  named 
the  rate  that  had  been  available  through  that  junction  but  was 


Conference  Rulings.  711 

onuceled  shortly  before  the  movement.  The  iii&truetions  were 
complied  with  by  the  carrier  and  the  new  and  higher  rate  ap 
plied:  Held,  That  this  was  a  shipper's  error  and  the  higher 
rate  must  be  collected  unless  he  also  named  in  the  bill  of  lading 
the  lower  rate  legally  in  effect  through  another  junction,  in 
which  case  carrier  was  liable.     (See  ruling  474.) 


December  7,  1909. 

244.  REDUCED  RATES  ON  PROPERTY  FOR  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OR  MUNICIPAL  G  0  V  E  R  N  M  EN  T  S. 
— Rule  61  of  Tariff  Circular  17-A  and  Conference  Ruling  65  are 
hereby  withdrawn  and  the  previous  ruling  of  February  4,  1908, 
reported  as  Conference  Ruling  36,  is  restored.  (See  rulings 
208e  and  311.) 


December  13,  1909. 

245.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  PERSONS  UNDER 
SECTION  22. — There  is  nothing  in  the  provisions  of  section  22 
of  the  act  relating  to  free  or  reduced  rate  transportation  to 
warrant  carriers  in  according  free  transportation  to  scientists  or 
other  employees  of  a  public  museum.     (See  ruling  185.) 

240.  COMPLAINTS  FILED  BY  TRAFFIC  OR  CREDIT 
BUREAUS. — ^While  it  is  the  policy  of  the  Commission  to  en- 
tertain complaints  instituted  on  behalf  of  shippers  by  traffic 
or  credit  bureaus,  in  all  such  cases  where  reparation  is  awarded, 
the  order  will  require  payment  to  be  made  by  the  defendant  car- 
riers either  to  the  consignor  or  the  consignee,  as  their  interests 
may  appear.     (Amended  by  rulings  362  and  517.) 


December  14,  1909. 

247.  PASSENGER  TICKET  LOST  BY  CARRIER 
THROUGH  ERROR— Through  error  a  carrier's  agent  so 
punched  a  round-trip  ticket  to  New  York  as  to  limit  its  use 
to  October  14  instead  of  October  17.  The  holder  at  destination 
requested  a  correction,  the  ticket,  being  sent  back  for  that  pur- 
pose by  the  passenger  agent,  was  lost  in  the  mails.  The  initial 
earner's  agent  at  New  York  secured  from  its  connection  a  re- 
turn ticket  in  lieu  of  the  lost  ticket.     It  now  asks  that  its  eon- 


712  Conference  Rulings, 

uections  be  authorized  to  accept  report  of  this  ticket  without 
revenue :  Held,  That  the  initial  carrier  must  \^?^y  the  cost  of 
the  return  ticket.  (Compare  ruling  288;  see  rulings  113,  167, 
266,  and  277.) 


January  4,  1910. 

248.  COLLECTION  OF  ESTABLISHED  RATES  ON  RE- 
CALLED SHIPMENT.— A  shipment  had  moved  150  miles  from 
the  point  of  origin  before  the  consignor  discovered  that  an  error 
had  been  made  in  filling  the  consignee's  order.  On  inquiry  by 
telephone  he  was  informed  by  the  carrier's  clerk  that  the  car 
could  be  returned  without  extra  charge ;  and  thereupon  the 
consignor  requested  its  return  for  a  correction  of  the  loading. 
A  part  of  the  carload  was  exchanged,  the  shipment  w^as  again 
billed  out  and  moved  to  destination :  Held,  That  the  Commis- 
sion can  not  relieve  the  carrier  from  the  obligation  of  collecting 
the  published  rates  for  all  the  movements  actually  made.  (See 
rulings  237  and  433.) 

249.  OUTBOUND  CHARGES  ON  A  SHIPMENT  MAY 
NOT  BE  REFUNDED  BY  THE  CARRIER  AND  CHARGED 
BACK  AGAINST  THE  CONSIGNOR.— A  shipment  having 
been  accepted  by  the  consignee  at  destination  and  removed  to 
his  place  of  business  was  subsequently  returned  to  the  deliver- 
ing carrier,  the  outbound  charges  were  refunded  and  included  in 
the  return  waybill  as  advance  charges.  Upon  delivery  of  the 
returned  shipment  to  the  original  consignor  the  return  charges, 
as  well  as  such  advance  charges,  were  demanded  and  collected : 
Held,  That  the  published  rate  for  the  return  movement  was 
the  only  charge  that  carrier  could  lawfully  exact  from  the  origi- 
nal consignor. 

250.  DEMURRAGE  ON  CARLOAD  SHIPMENT  TRANS- 
FERRED INTO  TWO  CARS.— (Amended  and  restated  in  rul- 
ing 357.) 


January  10,  1910. 

251.      NO    REPARATION    ON    BASIS    OF    RATE    NOT 
FILED.— (Restated  in  ruling  419.) 


Conference  Rulings.  713 

262.  DESTRUCTION  OF  DOCUMENTS.— The  destruction 
of  canceled  tariffs  that  have  been  posted  at  the  stations  of  a 
carrier  as  recjiiired  by  law  is  not  regarded  by  the  Commission  as 
an  offense  under  section  20  of  the  act  so  long  as  a  copy  of  the 
same  tariff  is  preserved  by  the  carrier  in  its  general  files.  (See 
general  orders  of  Commission  relating  to  preservation  and  de- 
struction of  records.) 


February  7,  1910. 

253.  l\riSROUTING  THROUGH  ERROR  OF  JOINT 
AGENT  OF  TWO  CARRIERS.— A  shipment  originating  on 
one  line  and  not  routed  by  the  shipper  reached  a  junction  point 
with  another  line  where  a  joint  agent  was  maintained.  Instead 
of  delivering  the  shipment  to  the  other  line  at  that  point,  the 
joint  agent  permitted  it  to  go  forward  on  the  originating  line 
to  another  junction  point  with  the  second  line,  over  which  route 
the  charges  were  substantially  higher  than  if  the  second  line  had 
taken  the  shipment  at  its  first  junction  with  the  originating  car- 
rier :  Held,  That  although  the  agent  was  a  joint  agent,  he  w^as, 
with  respect  to  this  shipment,  acting  as  agent  for  the  originating 
carrier,  and  the  cost  of  his  error  should  be  borne  by  that  line 
alone.     (See  ruling  286.) 

254.  NO  REFUND  ON  THE  BASIS  OF  A  RATE  NOT  EF- 
FECTIVE.— Through  inadvertence  a  carrier  quoted  a  north- 
bound rate  of  26  cents  instead  of  a  southbound  rate  of  29.5 
cents.  A  sale  having  been  effected  on  the  basis  of  the  rate 
quoted,  application  is  made  for  authority  to  refund  on  that 
basis.  Within  a  few  months  after  the  date  of  the  movement  the 
southbound  rate  was  reduced  to  17  cents :  Held,  That  repara- 
tion on  the  basis  of  the  northbound  rate  must  be  denied,  but  that 
an  application  for  authority  to  refund  on  the  basis  of  the  sub- 
sequently established  southbound  rate  would  be  entertained. 

255.  FREE     TRANSPORTATION     OF     HOUSEHOLD 

GOODS  OF  EIMPLOYEES.— Upon  inquiry.  Held,  That  a  car- 
rier can  not  lawfully  transport  free  of  charge  ^md  deliver  to  a 
connection  the  household  goods  of  an  employee  who  has  left  its 
service  to  accept  a  position  with  another  carrier.  (Reaffirming 
ruling  109;  see  also  ruling  2086.) 


714  Conference  Rulings. 

256.  THE  LOWEST  COMBINATION  OF  RATES  IS  THE 
LAWFUL  CHARGES,  IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  A  JOINT 
THROUGH  RATE,  ONLY  WHEN  BOTH  FACTORS  ARE 
FILED  WITH  THIS  COM]\IISSION.— Upon  a  movement  from 
a  domestic  point  to  a  destination  in  Canada  charges  were  as- 
sessed at  a  combination  of  rates  both  factors  of  which  were  on 
file  Avith  this  Commission,  bat  wliich  made  higher  than  another 
combination  over  the  same  route  one  factor  of  wliicli  was  on 
file  with  the  Canadian  Commission  but  not  with  this  Commis- 
sion :  Held,  That  the  Commission  can  not  award  reparation  on 
the  latter  combination.  (See  rule  5,  Tariff  Circular  18-A,  also 
see  ruling  262.) 

257.  COMMISSARY  CAR  OPERATED  BY  A  CARRIER 
UNLAWFUL.^ — A  carrier  for  25  years  has  operated  a  commis- 
sary car  making  two  trip  monthly  with  a  staple  line  of  meats, 
groceries,  and  a  restricted  stock  of  shoes,  overalls,  and  other 
wearing  apparel.  The  sales  are  limited  to  employees  of  the 
company  and  their  immediate  families  and  are  not  made  for 
cash,  but  on  tickets  signed  by  the  company  foreman  showing  the 
amount  of  wages  due  the  holder.  The  purchases  are  limited 
to  two-thirds  of  this  amount :    Held,  That  the  practice  is  illegal. 

Upon  a  subsequent  further  consideration  of  this  inquiry  it  wa.s 
Held,  That  the  operation  of  such  a  car  is  in  violation  of  the 
commodities  clause  of  the  act  and  also  in  violation  of  sections 
2  and  3  in  that  such  a  practice  unjustly  discriminates  against 
other  persons  who  pay  full  tariff  rates  for  the  same  service. 

258.  WAIVER  OF  UNDERCHARGES.— (Rescinded  by 
ruling  472.) 

259.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  RED  CROSS  SO- 
CIETY.— Upon  inquiry  it  was  Held,  That  interstate  carriers 
would  not  be  in  violation  either  of  section  1  or  section  22  in  ac- 
cording free  transportation  to  a  car  occupied  by  the  American 
National  Red  Cross  Society  and  its  attendants  when  traveling 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  courses  of  instiiiction  looking  to  the 
prevention  of  accidents  in  mines  and  factories  and  on  railroads 
and  trolley  lines,  and  of  methods  for  first  aid  to  the  victims  of 
such  accidents,  the  car  being  used  also  for  displaying  approved 
safety  appliances  and  illustrating  methods  followed  in  relief 
work. 


Conference  Rulings.  715 

260.  THE  CREDENTIALS  OF  EXAMINERS  OF  THE 
COMMISSION  MUST  BE  HONORED  BY  CARRIERS 
WHETHER  PRESENTED  WITH  OR  WITHOUT  SPECIAL 
LETTERS  OF  ADVICE.— While  it  has  been  the  practice  of 
the  Commission  when  examining  the  accounts  of  interstate  car- 
riers though  the  board  of  examiners  attached  to  the  Bureau  of 
Statistics  and  Accounts  to  give  notice  in  advance  to  carriers, 
this  is  done  for  the  convenience  of  the  Commission  and  of  the 
carriers  and  is  not  a  requirement  imposed  upon  the  Commission 
by  the  law.  The  credentials  of  an  examiner  are  all  that  is 
necessary  to  entitle  him  to  free  and  full  access  to  the  carrier's 
records  whether  at  its  general  offices  or  at  a  station  or  lese- 
where,  and  the  refusal  to  give  access  on  the  preseintation  of 
such  credentials  by  an  examiner  is  in  violation  of  the  law. 
The  Commission,  except  in  special  eases  where  another  course 
is  desirable,  will  continue  to  give  previous  notice  of  any  such 
examination  in  writing,  unless  the  refusal  of  the  carriers  to 
honor  the  credentials  of  examiners  when  presented  without 
such  notice  shall  make  it  necessary  to  withdraw  the  practice. 


February  8,  1910. 

261.  DEMURRAGE  ACCRUING  BECAUSE  OF  CAR- 
RIER'S FAILURE  TO  NOTIFY  CONSIGNEE.— Although  the 
tariffs  of  a  carrier  provided  that  it  would  not  accept  shipments 
consigned  to  " Shippers 's  Order,  Notify"  where  the  party  to 
be  notified  is  not  located  at  destination,  it  nevertheless  accepted 
such  a  shipment,  and  because  of  its  failure  on  the  transfer  billing 
to  note  the  shipper's  instructions  to  notify  the  consignee  at  a 
distant  point  demurrage  accrued  at  destination:  Held,  That  the 
claim  has  no  standing  except  upon  the  carrier's  admission  that  its 
tariff  rule  was  unreasonable  and  a  showing  that  it  has  been 
changed ;  and  if  presented  under  such  conditions  and  acted  upon 
favorably,  the  order  would  require  the  maintenance  of  the  newly 
established  rule  for  a  period  of  one  year. 

262.  MISQUOTATION  OF  CANADIAN  RATES.— Upon  in- 
quiry as  to  the  rates  on  a  locomotive  "on  cars,"  from  a  point 
in  New  York  to  a  point  in  the  Province  of  Quebec,  the  carrier 
quoted  a  rate  to  Sherbrooke  and  a  7-cent  local  rate  beyond, 
at  20  per  cent  less  than  the  actual  weight.     Charges  were  col- 


736  CONFEEENCE    RuLINGS. 

lected  upon  that  ])asis  and  the  carrier  now  applies  to  the  shipper 
for  payment  of  an  undercharge  arising  out  of  the  fact  that  the 
tariff  naming  the  rate  beyond  Sherbroke  contains  no  provision 
for  a  deduction  from  the  actual  weight  of  the  shipment.  The 
shipper  makes  the  point  that  the  rate  beyond  Sherbrooke  is  a 
Canadian  rate  and  that  the  domestic  carrier  is  therefore  not 
prohibited  by  the  act  from  adjusting  the  charges  on  the  basis 
of  the  rate  quoted  by  it :  Held,  That  it  would  be  a  violation  of 
law  to  omit  the  collection  of  the  undercharge.  (Also  see  ruling 
256.) 


February  14,  1910. 

263.  FREE  INTERSTATE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  OFFI- 
CERS AND  EMPLOYEES  OF  BRIDGE  COMPANIES.— Up- 
on inquiry  by  an  interstate  carrier  whether  free  transportation 
may  lawfully  be  accorded  to  the  officers  and  employees  of  a  bridge 
company  which  makes  annual  reports  but  tiles  no  tariffs  and 
collects  no  charges  from  shippers  or  passengers :  Held,  That  free 
transportation  may  not  lawfully  be  accorded  to  the  officers  and 
and  employees  of  a  nonoperating  company.  (See  ruling  95 
and  355.) 

The  fact,  subsequently  developed,  that  trains  move  over  the 
bridge  only  on  signal  and  telegraphic  orders  by  employees  of 
the  bridge  company  was  held  not  to  be  sufficient  ground  for 
modifying  the  ruling. 

264  CARLOAD  MINIMUM  UNDER  A  JOINT  THROUGH 
RATE. — A  tariff  named  a  .joint  through  carload  rate  from  A 
to  D  of  $1  and  provided  that  as  to  30  cents  of  the  rate  the  mini- 
mum weight  should  be  20,000  pounds  and  as  to  70  cents  of  the 
rate  the  minimum  should  be  12,000  pounds.  The  Commission 
declined  to  entertain  an  informal  request  for  reparation  on  the 
basis  of  that  rate  until  the  tariff  was  changed ;  and  it  was  said 
that  if  the  tariff  were  not  changed  a  formal  complaint  would 
be  entertained :  Held  also.  That  where  two  or  more  carriers  pub- 
lish a  joint  through  rate  they  must  publish  in  connection  there- 
with one  carload  minimum  weight  for  the  through  movement 
under  that  rate.  This  ruling  is  not  to  be  understood,  however, 
as  condemning  the  publication  in  joint  tariffs  and  the  use  of 
through  rates  made  up  in  combination  on  a  specific  base  point 


Conference  Rulings.  717 

and  providing  one  minimum  weight  in  connection  with  the 
specified  portion  of  the  rate  up  to  the  base  point  and  a  different 
minimum  weight  in  connection  with  the  specified  portion  of 
the  rate  beyond  the  base  point. 


February  17,  1910. 

265.  REFUND  OF  PORTION  OF  UNUSED  PASSENGER 
TICKET. — A  man  and  wife  holding  round-trip  tickets  embrac- 
ing a  stop-over  privilege  at  an  intermediate  point  returned 
from  that  point  without  completing  the  rest  of  the  journey.  The 
tariff  naming  the  excursion  rate  under  which  the  tickets  were 
sold  also  named  an  excursion  rate  to  that  intermediate  point  and 
return  and  prescribed  the  same  conditions:  Beld  That  the 
case  falls  within  Conference  ruling  76.  (Affirmed  by  ruling 
303;  see  also  ruling  115.) 


March  7,  1910. 

266.  REFUND  ON  PASSENGER  TICKET.— In  selling  a 
round-trip  ticket  the  carrier's  agent  neglected  to  punch  the  re- 
turn limit  in  the  margin.  The  ticket  was  used  on  the  going 
journey  in  accordance  with  its  conditions.  The  tariff  permitted 
a  stop-over  at  an  intermediate  point  on  the  return  journey.  When 
the  holder  presented  the  ticket  for  validation  that  agent  punched 
a  return  limit  in  the  margin,  which  rendered  the  ticket  useless 
except  for  continuous  passage  back  to  the  point  of  origin.  Not 
observing  this  limitation,  the  passenger  stopped  over,  and  upon 
presenting  the  ticket  at  that  point  the  agent  marked  it  ''Void,'* 
thus  compelling  the  holder  to  purchase  a  ticket  from  that  point 
to  his  home.  He  arrived  there  within  the  time  limit  under  which 
the  original  ticket  was  sold,  having  traveled  also  over  the  route 
named  in  the  tariff  and  otherwise  complied  with  its  conditions : 
{Held,  That  the  holder  was  entitled  to  a  refund  or  the  excess  fare 
paid  on  account  of  the  carrier's  error,  each  of  the  carriers  to 
reserve  the  earnings  due  it  under  the  round-trip  ticket.  (See 
rulings  113,  167,  and  277.) 

267.  GRAIN-DOOR  ALLOWANCES.— Tariffs  authorizing  al- 
lowances for  grain  doors  do  not  conform  with  Conference  Ruling 
78  unless  they  state  both  the  maximum  allowance  per  car  and 


718  Conference  Rulings. 

the  maximum  allowance  per  grain  door.     (See  rulings  119,  132, 
and  360.) 

268.  CARRIERS  MAY  NOT  DEFEAT  THEIR  PUBLISH- 
ED THROUGH  FARES  WITH  PARTY  RATE  TICKETS.— 
The  tariffs  of  certain  carriers  provide  a  10-party  fare  from 
A  to  B  but  no  such  fare  from  B  to  C.  Upon  inquiry  whether  it 
would  be  legal  to  ticket  a  party  of  ten  from  A  to  C  on  the  basis 
of  the  party  fare  from  A  to  B  and  the  individual  fares  from  B 
to  C  when  such  combination  makes  less  than  the  joint  through 
individual  fare  from  A  to  C :  Held,  That  while  a  party  of  ten, 
acting  on  their  own  initiative,  would  have  the  right  to  use  the 
party  fare  from  A  to  B  and  to  purchase  such  transportation  as 
is  available  from  B  to  C,  the  carriers  may  not  ticket  them  through 
from  A  to  C  on  such  a  combination  and  thus  defeat  their  own 
published  through  fare.  (See  Rules  and  Regidations  Governing 
Checking  of  Baggage,  35  I.  C.  C,  161.) 

269.  PUBLISHED  DIVISIONS  OF  THROUGH  RATES  TO 
AND  FROM  MEXICO.— The  purpose  of  Rule  72  of  Tariff 
Circular  No.  18-A  requiring  the  domestic  carriers  to  publish 
their  divisions  of  rates  to  and  from  Mexico  is  to  give  to  this 
Commission  definite  information  as  to  their  lawful  earnings 
and  was  not  intended  as  a  means  of  exercising  any  jurisdiction 
over  carriers  in  Mexico.     (See  rulings  209  and  372.) 

270.  DERRICK  AND  SIMILAR  CONSTRUCTION  CARS 
ARE  NOT  ORDINARILY  SUBJECT  TO  DEIMURRAGE 
CHARGES. — In  the  absence  of  specific  tariff  provision  there- 
for demurrage  does  not  accrue  on  derrick  cars,  pile-driver  cars, 
and  similar  cars  that  are  not  and  ordinarily  can  not  be  unloaded, 
when  owned  or  leased  by  a  contractor  doing  construction  work 
on  the  line  of  the  carrier  concerned,  or  when  standing  upon 
storage  tracks.    (Qualifying  ruling  222;  see  also  ruling  123.) 


March  8,  1910. 

271.  DESTRUCTION  OF  DOCUMENTS.— The  regulations  of 
the  Commission  respecting  the  preservation  and  destruction  of 
the  records  and  documents  of  common  carriers  also  apply  to 
the  records  and  documents  of  all  joint  agencies  maintained  by  or 
on  behalf  of  carriers  subject  to  the  act. 


Conference.  Rulings.  71^ 

March  14,  1910. 

272.  EXCURSION  OF  COMMERCIAL  ASSOCIATION  AT 
EXPENSE  OF  CARRIER.— The  Commission  can  not  sanction 
a  proposed  interstate  excursion  for  certain  commercial  clubs, 
the  members  of  which  are  to  be  carried  at  the  expense  of  the 
railroad  company  and  as  its  guests. 


March  15,  1910. 

273.  SHIPMENT  TRANSFERRED  IN  TRANSIT  FROM 
ONE  LARGER  CAR  TO  TWO  SMALLER  CARS.— For  a 
through  shipment  of  an  emigrant  outfit  the  initial  carrier,  at  the 
request  of  the  consignor,  furnished  a  40-foot  car  which  became 
out  of  order  while  on  its  line.  At  the  junction  point  the  con- 
necting carrier  transferred  the  shipment  into  two  36-foot  cars, 
and  in  that  form  it  moved  to  destination  on  the  line  of  a  third  car- 
rier. There  was  no  joint  through  rate  but  the  second  and  third 
carriers  maintained  a  rate  for  a  36-foot  car,  all  weight  in  excess 
of  a  given  minimum  to  be  charged  for  proportionately,  the  tariff, 
however,  expressly  forbidding  the  use  of  larger  equipment.  At 
destination  charges  were  collected  on  the  basis  of  two  carloads 
from  the  point  of  transfer:  Held,  That  in  transferring  the  ship- 
ment, the  connecting  carrier  ought  to  have  loaded  the  full  mini- 
mum weight  into  one  car  and  to  have  adjusted  the  charges  on 
the  balance  of  the  shipment  in  the  second  car  at  the  less-than- 
carload  rate.     (Compare  ruling  357.) 

274.  LARGER  CAR  FURNISHED  AT  CONVENIENCE  OF 
INITIAL  LINE  UNDER  TARIFF  AUTHORITY  FOR  AP- 
PLYING THE  MINIMUM  ON  THE  SMALLER  CAR  ORDER- 
ED, CONNECTING  LINE  NOT  PUBLISHING  SUCH  PROVI- 
SION.—  (a)  Complaints  of  alleged  overcharge  arise  in  con- 
nection with  shipments  that  move  over  the  lines  of  two  or  more 
carriers  under  combination  rates,  the  initial  having  a  provision 
in  its  tariff  that  in  case  a  car  of  certain  dimensions  or  capacity 
is  ordered  by  a  shipper,  and  the  carrier  for  its  own  convenience 
furnishes  a  larger  car,  such  larger  car  may  be  used  on  the  basis 
of  the  minimum  weight  applicable  to  the  car  ordered,  while  the 
connecting  carrier  does  not  have  such  tariff  provision  and  there- 
fore charges  for  the  full  minimum  weight  applicable  to  the  ear 
used.      (See  rule  QQ>  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A.) 


720  Conference  Rulings. 

(b)  The  law  imposes  upon  carriers  the  obligation  of  arranging 
to  every  reasonable  extent  for  through  carriage  and  through 
shipment.  Neither  the  burden  of  following  his  shipment  to  a 
^connecting  point  between  two  carriers  and  there  transferring 
it,  nor  of  bearing  the  expense  of  such  transfer,  can  be  laid  upon 
the  shipper.  It  is  not  deemed  reasonable  that  in  a  case  of  this  kind 
the  shipper  should  be  required  to  pay  higher  charges  than  he 
would  have  paid  had  the  initial  carrier  furnished  the  equipment 
that  is  provided  for  in  its  tariif  and  that  was  ordered  by  the 
shipper.  The  carriers  in  the  different  classification  territories 
ought  to  have,  and  should  provide  at  the  earliest  practicable 
moment,  a  uniform  rule  on  this  subject. 

(c)  It  is  believed  that  where  the  initial  carrier  provides  in 
its  tariffs  that  if  for  its  own  convenience  it  furnishes  a  car  larger 
than  that  ordered  by  the  shipper,  it  will  be  used  upon  the  basis 
of  minimum  weight  applicable  to  the  car  ordered,  and  the  con- 
necting carrier  to  or  over  whose  lines  such  shipment  is  moved 
has  not  such  provision  in  its  tariff,  the  initial  carrier  should  note 
upon  the  bill  of  lading  and  upon  the  way  bill  or  transfer  bill, 
which  accompanies  delivery  of  a  shipment  to  its  connections,  the 
fact  that  car  of  certain  size  was  ordered  and  car  of  certain  size  for 
its  own  convenience  furnished  by  the  carrier  to  be  used  on  the 
basis  of  the  minimum  weight  applicable  to  the  car  ordered  and 
that  connecting  carrier,  receiving  such  notice  on  the  way  bill  or 
transfer  bill  and  not  having  provision  in  its  tariff  which  permits 
the  use  of  the  car  on  the  basis  of  the  lower  minimum  weight, 
should  transfer  the  shipment  into  car  of  the  size  or  capacity 
ordered  by  the  shipper  or  into  car  to  which  the  same  minimum 
weight  applies,  without  additional  expense  to  the  shipper. 

This  ruling  outlines  the  policy  which  the  Commission  will 
follow  in  cases  of  this  nature  which  may  be  brought  before  it. 
It  is,  of  coui-se,  understood  that  shipper  may  not  demand  any  car 
that  is  not  provided  for  in  the  initial  carrier's  tariff.  (See 
ruling  339 ;  also  Gisholt  Machine  Co.  v.  C.  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  U. 
R.  Op.  A-618.) 


April  4,  1910. 

275.  HOURS    OF    SERVICE    LAW— TRAIN    BAGGAGE- 
MEN.— The  provisions  of  section  1  of  the  liours  of  service  law 


Conference  Rulings.  721 

apply  to  train  baggagemen  who  are  employees  of  the  railway 
company  and  who  are  required-  by  the  rules  of  the  company  to 
perform  or  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness,  when  called  upon, 
to  perform  any  duty  connected  with  the  movement  of  any  train. 
(See  rulings  74  and  287.) 

278.  DEMURRAGE  CHARGES— TARIFF  AUTHORITY 
THEREFOR. — A  consignor  while  loading  cars  at  the  point  of 
origin  detained  them  for  several  days  before  they  were  billed  out 
for  movement  to  interstate  destinations.  The  initial  carrier 
issued  a  tariff  providing  for  demurrage,  but  the  tariff  naming  the 
rate  applicable  on  the  movements  neither  provided  demurrage 
charges  nor  referred  to  the  initial  carrier's  tariff  where  such 
charges  were  specified :  Held,  That  there  was  sufficient  tariff 
\authority  for  the  collection  of  the  charges  by  the  initial  carrier, 

277.  ERROR  IN  THE  ISSUANCE  OF  PASSENGER  TICK- 
,  ETS. — The  Commission  adheres  to  its  formerly  expressed  view 
(that  connecting  lines  are  entitled  to  divisions  according  to  the 
transportation  which  they  honor  on  presentation  by  the  traveler, 
and  therefore  that  a  carrier  whose  agent  had  mfide  an  error  in 
not  properly  punching  half-fare  and  lower-class  tickets  must 
bear  the  full  burden  of  the  mistake.  (See  rulings  69,  113,  167, 
247,  266,  and  481.) 

278.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  TRAVELING  SECRE- 
TARIES OF  Y.  W.  C.  A.— Under  the  provisions  of  the  act  free 
or  reduced  rate  transportation  may  not  lawfully  be  accorded  to 
traveling  secretaries  of  a  Young  Woman's  Christian  Association. 


April  5,  1910. 

279.  APPLICATION  OF  RATES  ON  ARTICIiES  SOLD 
UNDER  TRADE  NAMES.— A  compound  described  under  its 
technical  chemical  name  in  the  tariff  carrying  the  rate  is  of 
fered  for  shipment  and  sold  by  a  manufacturer  under  a  trade 
name :  Held,  That  while  the  packages  may  bear  ihe  trade  name 
of  the  article,  the  shipper  is  not  entitled  to  the  rate  applicable 
on  the  specified  compound  unless  the  packages,  as  tendered  for 
transportation,  are  also  labled  so  as  to  indicate  that  they  con- 
tain the  compound. 


722  Conference  Rulings. 

280.  ESTIMATED  AVEIGHTS  PER  PACKAGE.— Sometimes 
a  trausportation  rate  is  stated  to  be  a  certain  sura  per  package, 
and  sometimes  the  rate  is  stated  in  cents  per  100  pounds,  and  it 
is  provided  that  the  package  will  be  taken  at  a  stated  estimated 
weight.  Changes  in  size  or  dimensions  of  packages  and  disagree- 
ments as  to  the  size  or  dimensions  upon  w^hich  the  estimated 
weight  was  fixed  have  caused  troublesome  complications.  In  so  far 
as,  and  whenever,  it  is  practicable,  the  size  and  dimensions  of 
such  packages  should  be  clearly  and  accurately  described  and  de- 
fined in  the  tariff. 


April  11,  1910. 

281.  A  CONCURRENCE  BY  ONE  CARRIER  IN  THE  TAR- 
IFFS OF  ANOTHER  DOES  NOT  LEGALIZE  THE  USE  BY 
THE  FORMER  OF  THE  LOCAL  RATES  OF  THE  LAT- 
TER.— A  tariff  published  by  one  carrier  in  addition  to  certain 
joint  through  rates  also  named  local  rates  between  two  points 
on  its  line  that  were  also  served  by  the  lines  of  another  and  con- 
curring carrier:  Held,  That  the  local  rates  of  the  carrier  that 
published  the  tariff  could  not  be  recognized  as  the  rates  of  the 
concurring  carrier  on  local  movements  between  the  two  points 
in  question. 

282.  JOINT  RATE  REDUCED  TO  THE  SUM  OF  THE  LO^ 
CALS,  MINIMUM  WEIGHT  BEING  INCREASED.  (Rescind- 
ed by  ruling  338.) 


May  10,  1910. 

283.  DRAYAGE  CHARGE  RESULTING  FROM  MISROUT- 
ING. — Modified  and  restated  in  ruling  509. 

2&4.  INTERPRETATION  OF  MISROUTING  RULING  NO. 
214.     (Superseded  by  ruling  316.) 

285.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  THE  REMAINS  OF 
AN  EX-EMPLOYEE.— The  Commission  finds  no  warrant  in 
law  for  holding  that  free  transportation  may  be  accorded  to  the 
remains  of  an  ex-employee  of  a  carrier  who  resigned  from  the 
service  some  time  prior  to  his  death.     (Compare  ruling  193.) 


Conference  Rulings.  723 

286.  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIMS  FOR  DAMAGES  RE- 
SULTING FROM  THE  MISROUTING  OF  FREIGHT.— (a) 
The  Commission  holds  that  it  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  over 
claims  for  damages  arising  from  the  misrouting  of  freight.  (See 
rulings  139  and  214.) 

(6)  The  statute  of  limitations  embodied  in  section  16  of  the  act 
to  regulate  commerce,  as  amended,  governs  misrouting  claims, 
and  thereunder  the  Commission  is  without  jurisdiction  to  take 
cognizance  of  claims  presented  more  than  two  years  after  the 
delivery  of  shipments  at  destination.  (See  ruling  139;  also 
Phillips  V.  Grand  Trunk  By.,  236  U.  S.,  662.) 

(c)  If  a  connecting  line  accepts  a  shipment  at  the  junction 
point  without  routing  instructions,  it  will  be  lield  responsible 
for  any  excessive  charges  that  may  directly  accrue  from  its  error 
in  forwarding  the  shipment  to  destination  via  any  other  than 
the  cheapest  available  route.  (Amending  rulings  137  and  199. 
See  Duluth  &  Iron  Range  R.  R.  Co.  v.  C,  St.  P.,  M.  &  0.  Rij.  Co., 
18  I.  C.  C,  485;  and  American  Lumber  d'  Export  Co.  v.  A.,  T.  & 
N.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  I.  C.  C,  260.) 

(d)  (Restated  in  ruling  509.) 

(e)  The  Commission  will  exercise  jurisdiction  to  award  dam- 
ages as  against  the  carrier  guilty  of  misrouting  to  the  extent 
of  the  additional  cost  thus  imposed  on  the  delivering  carrier. 

(/)    (Amended  and  restated  in  ruling  474c.) 


March  16, 1908. 

287.  THE  HOURS  OF  SERVICE  LAW.— (a)  The  provisions 
of  this  act  apply  to  all  common  carriers  by  railroad  in  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  or  in  any  Territory  of  the  United  States,  or 
engaged  in  the  movement  of  interstate  or  foreign  traffic ;  and  to 
all  employees  of  such  common  carriers  who  are  engaged  in  or 
connected  with  the  movement  of  any  train  carrying  traffic  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  or  in  any  Territory,  or  carrying  interstate 
or  foreign  traffic.    (See  ruling  56.) 

{h)  Sec.  2.  The  requirement  for  ten  consecutive  hours  off 
duty  applies  only  to  such  employees  as  have  been  on  duty  for 
sixteen  consecutive  hours.  The  requirement  for  eight  consecutive 
hours  in  the  aggregate  out  of  a  twenty-four  hour  period.  Such 
duty  sixteen  consecutive  hours  but  have  been  on  duty  sixteen 


724  Conference  Rulings. 

hours  in  the  aggregate  out  of  a  twenty-four  hour  period.  Such 
twenty-four  hour  period  begins  at  the  time  the  employee  first 
goes  on  duty  after  having  had  at  least  eight  consecutive  hours 
off  duty.  The  terms  ''on  duty"  includes  all  the  time  during 
which  the  employee  is  performing  service  or  is  held  responsible 
for  performance  of  service.  An  employee  goes  "on  duty"  at 
the  time  he  begins  to  perform  service,  or  at  which  he  is  required 
to  be  in  readiness  to  perform  service,  and  goes  "off  duty"  at 
the  time  he  is  relieved  from  service  and  from  responsibility  for 
performance  of  service.      (Qualified  l)y  ruling  74.) 

(c)  The  act  does  not  specify  the  classes  of  employees  that  arc 
subject  to  its  terms.  All  employees  engaged  in  or  connected  with 
the  movement  of  any  train,  as  described  in  section  1,  are  within 
its  scope.  Train  dispatchers,  conductors,  engineers,  telegraphers, 
firemen,  brakemen,  train  baggagemen,  who,  by  rules  of  carriers, 
are  required  to  perform  any  duty  in  connection  with  the  move- 
ment of  trains,  yardmen,  switch  tenders,  tower  men,  block-signal 
operators,  etc.,  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  statute.  (Quali- 
fied by  rulings  108  and  275 ;  see  also  ruling  88. ) 

(d)  The  proviso  in  section  2  covers  every  employee  who,  by 
the  use  of  the  telgraph  or  telephone,  handles  orders  pertaining 
to  or  affecting  train  movements.  In  order  to  preserve  the  ob- 
vious intent  of  the  law  this  provision  must  be  construed  to  in- 
clude all  employees  who,  by  the  use  of  an  electrical  current,  han- 
dle train  orders  or  signals  which  control  movements  of  trains. 
(See  ruling  88.) 

(e)  The  prime  purpose  of  this  law  is  to  secure  additional 
safety  by  preventing  employees  from  working  longer  hours  than 
those  specified  in  the  act.  Therefore  a  telegraph  or  telephone  oper- 
ator who  is  employed  in  a  night  and  day  office  may  not  be  requir- 
er  to  perform  duty  in  any  capacity  or  of  any  kind  beyond  nine 
hours  of  total  service  in  any  twenty-four  hour  period.  (See 
United  States  v.  G.  R.  &  I.  By.  Co.,  224  Fed.  Kep.,  667.) 

(/)  The  phrase  "towers,  offices,  places,  and  stations"  is  in- 
terpreted to  mean  particular  and  definite  locations.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  law  and  of  the  proviso  for  nine  hours  of  service  may 
not  be  avoid'ed  by  erecting  offices,  station,  depots,  or  buildings 
in  close  proximity  to  each  other  and  operating  from  one  a  part 
of  the  dav  while  the  other  is  closed  and  vice  versa. 


Conference  Rulings.  725 

The  statute  is  remedial  in  its  intent  and  must  have  a  broad 
construction  so  that  the  purpose  of  the  Congress  may  not  be 
defeated.. 

(g)  The  Commission  interprets  the  phrase  "continously 
operated  night  and  day"  as  applying  to  all  offices,  places,  and 
stations  operated  during  a  portion  of  the  day  and  a  portion  of 
the  night,  a  total  of  more  than  thirteen  hours. 

The  phrase  "operated  only  during  the  daytime"  refers  to 
stations  which  are  operated  not  to  exceed  thirteen  hours  in  a 
twenty-four  hour  period,  and  is  not  considered  as  meaning  that 
the  operator  thereat  may  be  employed  only  during  the  daytime 

(h)  The  act  provides  that  operators  employed  at  night  and 
day  stations  or  at  daytime  stations  may,  in  case  of  emergency, 
be  required  to  work  four  additional  hours  on  not  exceeding 
three  days  in  any  week.  Manifestly,  the  emergency  must  be 
real  and  one  against  which  the  carrier  can  not  guard. 

''In  any  week"  is  construed  to  mean  in  any  calendar  week, 
beginning  with  Sunday. 

(?")  (The  Commission  decided  in  conference  on  April  9,  1917. 
to  rescind  this  paragraph  because  the  question  upon  which  it  was 
made  has  since  been  judicially  interpreted  and  is  now  pending 
in  the  courts  upon  appeal.) 

(j)  It  will  be  noted  that  the  penalties  for  violation  of  this  act 
are  against  the  "common  carriers,  or  any  officer  or  agent  there- 
of, requiring  or  permitting  any  employee  to  go,  be,  or  remain  on 
duty,"  in  violation  of  the  law.  It  is  clear  that  the  officers  and 
agents  of  carriers  who  are  liable  to  the  penalties  provided  in  the 
act  are  those  who  have  official  direction  or  control  of  the  em- 
ployees ;  and  that  the  penalties  do  not  attach  to  the  employees, 
who,  subject  to  such  supervision  or  control,  perforin  the  service 
prohibited. 

(k)  Sec.  4.  To  enforce  this  act  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission has  all  the  powers  which  have  been  granted  to  it  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  including  authority 
to  appoint  employees,  to  require  reports,  to  examine  books, 
papers,  documents,  to  administer  oaths,  to  issue  subpoenas, 
and  to  interrogate  witnesses. 


726  CONFEEENCE.    EuLlNGS. 

Octoher  3,  1910. 

288.  COMPETENCY  OF  RAILROAD  EMPLOYEES— CON- 
DITION OF  SIGNAL  DEVICES.— Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That, 
except  in  cases  of  accident,  the  Commission  has  no  authority 
under  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  to  look  into  the  competency 
of  railroad  employees  or  the  physical  condition  of  block  signals, 
and  makes  no  general  investigations  of  that  nature. 


Octoher  4,  1910. 

289.  POSTING  NAMES  OF  RESIDENT  AGENTS  AT 
BLIND  SIDINGS. — The  act  requires  a  carrier  to  post  the  name 
of  its  resident  agent  in  every  office,  warehouse,  depot,  or  station 
building  at  which  freight  is  received.  But  upon  inquiry :  Held, 
That  this  is  not  necessary  at  blind  sidings  where  there  is  no 
station  agent  or  any  station  building  at  which  freight  is  received. 
(See  ruling  86.) 


Octoher  10,  1910. 

290.  STATEMENT  OF  SEX  OF  CHILDREN  ON  APPLICA- 
TIONS FOR  PASSES. — Upon  inquiry  by  a  carrier  whether  un- 
der Conference  Biding  95  it  is  necessary  that  applications  by 
one  carrier  on  another  for  exchange  transportation  should  show 
the  sex  of  the  child  or  children  for  whom  free  transportation  is 
requested:  Held,  That  an  application  in  behalf  of  "John  Smith 
and  children"  is  not  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  rule;  it 
should  be  made  in  the  name  of  "John  Smith,  one  son,  and  two 
daughters,"  so  that  the  representation  that  they  are  the  children 
of  the  person  named  may  affirmatively  appear. 


Octoher  11, 1910. 

291.  PARAGRAPH  5  OF  SECTION  15  OF  THE  AMENDED 
ACT  DOES  NOT  APPLY  TO  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES.— 
Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That  the  paragraph  of  section  15  of  the 
amended  act  to  regulate  commerce  giving  the  shipper  the  right 
to  route  his  shipment  does  not  apply  to  telegraph  companies. 
(Also  see  Routing.) 


Conference  Rulings.  727 

November  7,  1910. 

292.  ALLOWANCES  FOR  FLOOR  RACKS  JN  REFRIGER- 
ATOR CARS  ANALOGOUS  TO  GRAIN-DOOR  ALLOW- 
ANCES.— Certain  carriers  filed  tariffs  providing  that  when  re- 
frigerator cars  without  floor  racks  are  set  for  loading,  and  ship- 
pers are  required  to  furnish  floor  racks  to  protect  the  freight 
loaded,  allowances  will  be  made  equal  to  the  cost  of  the  rack, 
but  not  to  exceed  $2.50  per  car.  The  question  of  the  lawfulness 
of  such  tariffs  being  under  consideration :  Held,  That  the  prin- 
ciple involved  is  the  same  as  that  relating  to  grain  doors  furnish- 
ed by  shippers.     (See  rulings  19,  78,  132,  267,  and  360.) 

29'3.  RATES  OR  FARES  PUBLISHED  SUBSEQUENT  TO 
FEBRUARY  17,  1911,  IN  VIOLATION  OF  SECTION  4  AS 
AMENDED, — Subsequent  to  February  17,  1911,  any  rate,  fare, 
or  charge  maintained  or  imposed  in  violation  of  the  long-and- 
short-haul  provision  of  the  fourth  section  of  th«  act  as  amended, 
which  rate,  fare,  or  charge  is  not  covered  by  an  order  of  the 
Commission  granting  relief  from  the  provisions  of  the  section, 
or  by  pending  application  for  such  relief,  will  be  held  not  to  bo 
brought  into  conformity  with  said  section  by  a  change  in  classi- 
fication ;  cancellation  of  commodity  rate  leaving  class  rate  or 
combination  rate  to  apply;  cancellation  of  a  rate  with  provision 
that  in  lieu  thereof  a  rate  in  some  other  tariff  shall  apply;  cor 
rection  of  error  in  tariff;  addition  or  elimination  of  routes  with- 
out change  in  list  of  participating  carriers ;  or  by  any  other 
change  which  does  not  leave  the  rate,  fare,  or  charge  free 
from  conflict  with  the  law.     (See  rulings  299,  304,  318.) 

294.  TRANSPORTATION  FROM  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 
NOT  ADJACENT  THROUGH  THE  UNITED  STATES  TO 
AN  ADJACENT  FOREIGN  COUNTRY.— (Withdrawn  No- 
vember 11,  1912;  see  Seymour  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  R.  R.  &  S.  S.  Co., 
35  I.  C.  C,  492.) 

295.  RATES  BASED  ON  VALUE  OF  MERCHANDISE. 
— Carriers  may  lawfully  establi.sh  schedules  of  »'harges  applica- 
ble to  a  specific  commodity  and  graduated  reasonably  according 
to  value.  When  such  rates  are  published  shippers  are  entitled  to 
the  rate  corresponding  to  the  actual  value  of  the  property  of- 
fered by  them  for  transportation.    Shippers  are  not  entitled  un- 


728  Conference  Rulings. 

der  such  rates  to  understate  the  actual  value  of  shipments  for 
the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  rate  applicable  upon  articles  of  less 
value.  The  valuation  stated  to  carriers  should  correspond  witli 
the  actual  value  as  shown  by  invoices,  etc.  Shippers  misstating? 
the  vahie  of  property  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  rate  ap- 
plicable to  property  of  less  value  are  guilty  of  misbilling  and  are 
subject  to  prosecution  under  section  10  of  the  act  to  regulate 
commerce.  (See  ruling  58;  compare  ruling  188:  see  also  The 
Cummin's  Amendment,  33  I.  C.  C,  696 ;  and  Express  Bates, 
Practices,  Accounts,  and  Revenues,  43  I.  C;  C,  510.) 


November  8,  1910. 

296.  POWER  TO  REQUIRE  ADDITIONAL  PASSENGER 
TRAIN  SERVICE. —  {a)  Upon  complaint  of  a  resident  at  a 
suburban  station  that  sufficient  trains  are  not  run  to  and  from 

"New  York  City  during  the  morning  and  evening  hours  to  ac- 
commodate commuters :  Held,  That  the  Commission  is  without 
authority  to  require  the  running  of  additional  trains. 

(6)  Upon  complaint  of  the  discontinuance  of  a  daily  accom- 
modation train  between  Washington  and  a  rural  commiuiity  27 
miles  distant,  Held,  That  the  Commission  is  without  power  to 
grant  relief. 

297.  FREE  AND  REDUCED.  RATE  TRANSPORTATION 
OF  PERSONS  TRAVELING  AT  THE  EXPENSE  OF  STATE 
OR  TERRITORIAL  GOVERNMENTS.— Cox/ercnce  Bulincj 
218  is  confined  to  movements  at  the  instance  and  expense  of  the 
United  States.  The  Commission  finds  nothing  in  the  law  author- 
izing free  or  reduced  rate  transportation  of  persons,  other  than 
indigents,  traveling  at  the  expense  of  a  state  or  territorial  gov- 
ernment.    (See  ruling  208-e  and  452.) 


November  14,  1910. 

298.  THROUGH  FARES  HIGHER  THAN  THE  COMBI- 
NATION OF  INTERMEDIATE  FARES.— Upon  inquiry 
whether  the  prohibition  against  charging  a  greater  compensation 
as  a  through  charge  than  the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate 
charges  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  act  is  to  be  construed  as 
meaning  that  fares  must  be  made  not  higher  than  the  lowest  pos- 


Conference  Rulings.  729 

sible  combination  of  intermediate  fares,  and  if  not,  upon  what 
basis  they  may  be  constructed :  Held,  That  the  fares  must  be 
constructed  upon  the  basis  of  being  no  higher  than  the  lowest 
combination  of  fares  that  are  published  and  filed  as  available 
for  interstate  travel  or  in  making  up  interstate  fares.  If  a  car- 
rier desires  to  exclude  from  this  consideration  any  of  its  purely 
intrastate  fares  it  must  refrain  from  publishing  and  filing  such 
intrastate  fares  as  available  for  use  in  making  up  interstate 
fares.  (See  Vnited  States  v.  N.,  C.  &  St.  L: Ry.,  U.  R.  Op.  A- 
691 ;   and  V),ited  States  v.  B.  d-  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  I.  C.  C,  470.) 


December  17,  1910. 

299.  APPLICATION  OF  SECTION  4,  AS  AMENDED 
JUNE  18,  1910,  TO  EXPORT  AND  IMPORT  RATES.— (a) 
Inland  export  and  import  rates  are  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
the  act  and  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission. 

(i)  The  fourth  section  of  the  amended  act  forbids  carriers 
subject  thereto,  without  authority  from  the  Commission  in  ac- 
cordance with  said  section,  to  charge  more  for  the  transportation 
of  a  like  kind  of  export  or  import  traffic  for  a  shorter  than  for 
a  longer  haul  over  the  same  line  in  the  same  direction;  that  is, 
as  we  understand  the  law,  the  validity  of  a  rate  under  this  sec- 
tion is  determined  by  comparison  of  an  export  rate  with  an  ex- 
port rate,  or  an  import  rate  with  an  import  rate. 

(c)  So  far  as  the  fourth  section  is  concerned,  carriers  are 
not  required  in  the  first  instance  to  establish  export  and  import 
rates  which  shall  be  measured  and  limited  by  domestic  inter- 
state rates  between  the  same  points  of  origin  and  destination  in 
the  United  States ;  but  as  export  and  import  rates,  as  well  as 
domestic  interstate  rates,  are  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  act 
and  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission,  it  is  clear  that  the  rea- 
sonableness of  any  of  these  rates  under  the  provisions  of  sec- 
tion 1,  and  questions  of  discrimination  under  the  third  section, 
may  all  be  considered  and  the  Commission  may  condemn  any 
discrimination  in  export  and  import  rates,  upon  comparison  with 
those  applicable  on  domestic  interstate  traffic,  to  the  extent  that 
the  same  may  be  found  unjust  or  unreasonable  in  any  particular 
case  upon  investigation  and  full  hearing. 


730  Conference  Eulings. 

(Section  4  as  amended  is  also  interpreted  in  rulings  293,  304, 
318.    See  Import  Rates  on  Manganese  Ore,  12  I,  C.  C,  666.) 
January  14,  1911. 

300.  BROKERAGE  CHARGES  BY  EXPRESS  COMPA- 
NIES  ON  SHIPMENTS  PROM  ABROAD.— A  suit  case  con- 
signed from  London  in  care  of  an  express  company  at  New  York 
City  for  further  transportation  inland  by  express  was  appraised 
by  the  customs  officials,  with  its  contents,  at  the  sum  of  $363. 
Upon  complaint  of  a  charge  of  $3  exacted  by  the  express  com- 
pany for  its  services  in  clearing  the  shipment  ihrough  the  cus- 
toms house,  no  scale  of  such  charges  being  filed  with  this  Com- 
mission, it  was  Held:  That  brokerage  charges  of  this  nature 
are  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission,  not  being  a 
part  of  the  transportation  service.  (See  rulings  7,  221,  300,  and 
444.) 


Fehruary  13,  1911. 

301.  EMPLOYEES  ON  PRIVATELY  OWNED  OR  CHAR- 
TERED CARS. — Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That  porters,  cooks, 
or  waiters  on  privately  owned  or  chartered  cars  moving  under 
tariff  authority  may  be  carried  as  employees. 

302.  TELEGRAMS  RELATING  TO  SHIPMENTS.— Tele- 
gTaphic  instructions  or  incpiiries  made  by  shippers  to  or  of  a 
carrier  in  relation  to  their  shipments  may  not  properly  be  paid 
for  by  the  carrier  unless  so  provided  in  its  published  tariffs; 
a  telegram  sent  by  the  carrier  to  the  shipper  relating  to  his  traf- 
fic, and  his  reply  thereto,  pertain  to  the  business  of  the  carrier 
and  may  be  sent  at  its  expense.  (Construed  by  rulings  327  and 
351;  see  rulings  363,  480.) 


Fehruary  22,  1911. 

303.  REDEMPTION  OF  TICKETS.— Under  appropriate 
provision  in  its  tariffs  a  carrier  may  redeem  the  unused  portion 
of  a  round-trip  ticket  on  the  basis  of  a  lower  round-trip  fare  to  a 
point  directly  intermediate,  provided  the  latter  fare  was  law- 
fully available  for  the  journey  as  actually  commenced  and  con- 
cluded ;  or  it  may,  under  a  tariff  provision  to  that  effect,  ex- 
change a  round-trip  ticket  to  a  point  directly  intermediate  for 


Conference  Bulings.  731 

a  round-trip  ticket  available  at  the  same  time  to  a  more  distant 
point,  upon  collecting  the  difference  in  the  fares  of  the  two 
tickets.     (Affirming  ruling  265;   see  also  rulings  76,  115.) 

March  13,  1911. 

304.  APPLICATION  OF  SECTION  4  AS  AMENDED 
JUNE  18,  1910.— (a)  The  fourth  section  applies  to  all  rates 
and  fares,  but  in  determining  whether  its  provisions  are  con- 
travened rates  and  fares  of  the  same  kind  should  be  compared 
with  one  another;  that  is,  transshipment  rates  should  be  com- 
pared with  transshipment  rates;  proportional  rates  with  pro- 
portional rates;  excursion  fares  with  excursion  fares;  and 
commutation  fares  with  commutation  fares.  It  would  not  be  in 
violation  of  the  fourth  section,  for  instance,  if  a  proportional 
rate  to  or  from  a  given  point  were  lower  than  the  regular  rate 
to  or  from  an  intermediate  point,  nor  if  the  commutation  fare 
to  or  from  a  more  distant  point  were  lower  than  the  regular 
fare  to  or  from  an  intermediate  point.  (Rulings  309,  310.  See 
Southern  Illinois  Millers  Asso.  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  I.  C.  C, 
673;  and  Rates  on  Grain  and  Grain  Products  to  Texarkana, 
Ark.,  29  I.  C.  C,  36.) 

(h)  A  proportional  rate  is  defined  as  one  which  applies  to 
part  of  a  through  transportation  which  is  entirely  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce ;  that  is,  the  bal- 
ance of  the  transportation  to  which  the  proportional  rate  applies 
must  be  under  a  rate  filed  with  this  Commission.  A  rate  to  a 
port  for  shipment  beyond  by  a  water  carrier  not  subject  to 
the  provisions  of  this  act  would  not  be  a  proportional  rate.  (See 
Crescent  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  C.  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  24  I.  C.  C, 
155.) 

The  foregoing  holding  is  not  intended  to  approve  the  lawful- 
ness of  any  existing  transshipment  rate. 

(c)  An  excursion  rate  is  one  which  provides  for  a  return  to 
the  initial  point  or  some  corresponding  point. 

(d)  Wliere  from  the  absorption  of  a  switching  charge  it  re- 
sults that  the  total  transportation  charge  from  a  more  distant 
point  to  the  point  where  the  property  is  delivered  is  less  than 
the  total  transportation  charge  from  or  to  an  intermediate  point 
the  fourth  section  is  violated.    Owing,  however,  to  the  very  gen- 


732  Conference  Rulings. 

eral  practice  of  absorbing  switching  charges  from  competitive 
and  not  from  noncompetitive  stations,  and  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  much  benefit  and  little  complaint  results,  the  Commission 
will,  by  general  order,  permit  a  continuance  of  this  practice,  re- 
serving for  consideration  and  determination  individual  cases 
which  may  require  special  consideration.  (Such  an  order  was 
entered  March  20,  1911.) 

(e)  If  a  carrier  has  been  given  authority  to  maintain  from  or 
to  noncompetitive  intermediate  points  rates  higher  than  those 
from  or  to  more  distant  competitive  points  and  a  new  intermedi- 
ate station  is  opened,  rates  from  or  to  such  intermediate  station 
which  are  the  same  or  in  harmony  with  those  authorized  may  be 
established  by  the  carrier  without  special  authority  from  the 
Commission. 

(/)  If  a  carrier  is  authorized  to  maintain  rates  to  or  from  a 
given  point  which  are  not  in  conformity  with  the  fourth  sec- 
tion, it  may  establish  rates  upon  branch  lines  connecting  with 
the  main  line  at  these  points  which  are  higher  than  such  inter- 
mediate rates  by  arbitraries  or  by  the  branch-line  locals,  without 
special  authority  from  the  Commission. 

(Section  4  as  amended  is  also  interpreted  in  rulings  293,  299, 
318.) 

305.  APPLICATION  OF  THE  AMENDED  ACT  TO  TELE- 
GRAPH AND  TELEPHONE  COMPANIES.— (a)  Each  and 
every  telegraph  and  telephone  company  which  transmits  mes- 
sages over  its  line  or  lines  from  a  point  in  one  state,  territory,  or 
district  of  the  United  States  to  any  other  state,  territory,  or  dis- 
trict of  the  United  States,  or  to  any  foreign  country,  is  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  act. 

(&)  If  a  telegraph  or  telephone  company,  the  line  of  which 
is  wholly  within  a  single  state,  territory,  or  district  of  the  United 
States,  receives  a  message  within  such  state,  territory,  or  district 
of  the  United  States,  for  transmi.ssion  to  a  point  without  the 
state,  territory,  or  district  of  the  United  States,  which  it  trans- 
mits over  its  line  to  another  point  in  the  same  state,  territory,  or 
district  of  the  United  States  and  there  delivers  it  to  an  inter- 
state line  for  transmission  to  destination,  the  first-named  com- 
pany by  virtue  of  its  participation  in  this  transcation,  is  not 
made  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  act ;  uidess  there  be  an 


Conference  Rulings.  733 

arrangement  between  that  company  and  its  connection  for 
through  continous  transmission  of  snch  messages,  in  which 
latter  case  all  of  the  participating  companies  in  such  through 
continous  transmission  are  sub^'ect  to  the  provisions  of  the  act. 

(c)  If  two  or  more  lines  are  connected  so  that  a  person  within 
one  state,  territory,  or  district  of  the  United  States  talks  with  a 
person  at  a  point  without  such  state,  territory,  or  district  of  the 
United  States,  or  so  that  a  message  is  transmitted  directly  from 
a  point  within  a  state,  territory,  or  district  of  the  United  States 
to  a  point  without  the  same,  the  transmission  of  messages  in  this 
manner  constitutes  interstate  commerce  and  brings  all  of  the  par- 
ticipating lines  within  the  purview  of  the  act. 

(d)  It  follows  that  telegraph  and  telephone  companies  sub- 
ject to  the  act,  as  above  indicated,  must  conform  to  the  provi- 
sions of  section  1  thereof,  requiring  that  all  of  their  rat&s  and 
charges  for  the  transmission  of  interstate  messages  shall  be  rea- 
sonable and  just,  and  that  such  companies  may  lawfully  issue 
franks  covering  free  interstate  service  or  may  grant  free  in- 
terstate service  to  the  same  extent,  and  subject  to  the  same 
limitations  as  other  common  carriers  under  the  provisions  of  said 
section.     (See  rulings  95a,  par.  2,  161,  219,  and  364.) 

(e)  Such  telegraph  and  telephone  companies  subject  to  the 
act  are  also  governed  by  the  provisions  of  section  3  forbidding 
any  undue  or  unreasonable  preference  or  advantage  by  rebates 
or  otherwise,  or  any  undue  or  unreasonable  prejudice  or  disad- 
vantage in  any  respect  whatsoever,  and  are  subject  to  the  law- 
ful orders  of  the  Commission  made  pursuant  to  the  provisions 
of  section  15  of  the  act,  and  also  of  section  20  thereof  respecting 
the  keeping  of  accounts  and  memoranda  and  the  making  of  re- 
ports to  the  Commission. 


April  3,  1911. 

306.  STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS  NONOPERATIVE  AS 
BETWEEN  CARRIERS.— Before  the  expiration  of  two  years 
a  delivering  line  discovered  and  at  once  refunded  an  overcharge ; 
upon  demand  made  by  it  after  the  two  years  had  expired  a  con- 
necting line  declined  to  repay  its  share,  on  the  ground  that  the 
statute  had  run :  Held,  That  in  such  cases  the  statutes  does 
not  run  as  between  carriers.     (See  rulings  10,  220 j,  and  307.) 


734  Conference  Rulings. 

307.  CLAIMS  BARRED  BY  THE  STATUTE  OF  LIMITA- 
TIONS.— Overlooking  a  higher  through  rate,  chargas  were  col- 
lected on  the  sum  of  the  intermediate  rates.  After  two  years  had 
expired  the  through  rate  was  reduced  to  that  basis  and  still  later 
the  balance  of  the  through  rate  legally  in  effect  on  the  date  of 
-ithe  shipment  was  collected.  Upon  presentation  of  the  claim 
some  months  later :  Held,  That  it  was  barred  by  the  statute,  and 
that  the  case  is  controlled  by  Blmn  Lumher  Co.  v.  8.  P.  Co.,  18 
I.  C.  C,  430.     (See  rulings  10,  220i,  306,  and  508.) 

308.  USE  OF  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  BY  RAILROAD 
EMPLOYEE    WHILE    CONNECTED    WITH    MUNICIPAL 

I  OFFICE. — Upon  inquiry :  Held,  That  a  railroad  employee  on 
leave  of  absence  for  the  purpose  of  filling  a  term  in  a  public 
office,  or  to  engage  in  other  business,  is  not  entitled  during  such 
period  to  free  passes  either  for  himself  or  his  family.  (See  rul- 
ing 208d) 

309.  PASSENGER  FARES  UNDER  THE  FOURTH  SEC- 
TION.— Held,  That  carriers  may  not  disregard  the  fourth  sec- 
tion in  order  that  passenger  fares  may  be  stated  in  multiples  of 
five.     (See  ruling  304a.) 

310.  PASSENGER  FARES  UNDER  THE  FOURTH  SEC- 
TION.— Held,  That  in  determining  whether  the  provisions  of 
the  fourth  section  are  contravened,  mileage,  commutation,  party 
rate,  and  half  fares  for  children  should  be  compared  only  with 
fares  of  the  same  character.     (See  ruling  304a.) 


April  4,  1911. 

311.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OP  PROPERTY  FOR 
COUNTY  AUTHORITIES.— (Restated  in  ruling  452.) 

312.  TERMINAL  COMPANIES  SUBJECT  TO  ACT.— Up- 
on inquiry:  Held,  That  terminal  companies  miLst  file  statistical 
reports  as  required  by  the  Commission. 


April  10,  1911. 

313.  DEIMURRAGE  RULES.— (See  Code  of  National  Car 
Demurrage  Rules  indorsed  by  the  Connnission  January  17, 
1916.) 


Conference  Rtjlings.  735 


May  1,  1911. 


314.  COLLECTION  OF  UNDERCHARGES.— The  law  re- 
quires the  carrier  to  collect  and  the  party  legally  responsible  to 
pay  the  lawfully  established  rates  without  deviation  therefroiu. 
It  follows  that  it  is  the  duty  of  carriers  to  exhaust  their  legal 
remedies  in  order  to  collect  undercharges  from  the  party  or  par- 
ties legally  responsible  therefor.  It  is  not  for  the  Commission, 
however,  to  determine  in  any  case  which  party,  consignor  or 
consignee,  is  legally  liable  for  the  undercharge,  that  being  a 
question  determinable  only  by  a  court  having  jurisdiction  and 
upon  the  facts  in  each  case.  (Superseding  rulings  3  and  187. 
See  also  rulings  16  and  156  and  Y.  &  M.  V.  B.  Co.  v.  Zemurray, 
238  Fed.,  789.)     See  interpretation  ruling  515. 

315.  USE  OF  INTRASTATE  MILEAGE  BOOKS  ISSUED 
IN  EXCHANGE  FOR  ADVERTISING.— A  state  statute  per- 
mits the  exchange  of  intrastate  mileage  books  for  advertising. 
Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That  such  books  may  not  be  used  upon 
any  part  of  an  interstate  journey.  (See  C,  I.  &  L.  By.  Co.  v. 
United  States,  219  U.  S.,  486.) 

310.  CONFERENCE  RULING  284  SUPERSEDED.— Upon 
inquiry  as  to  the  application  of  Conference  Bulings  190  and 
214  to  routes  made  up  partly  of  a  car  ferry :  Held,  That  routes 
involving  the  transshipment  of  freight  from  a  rail  line  to  a 
water  line  or  from  a  water  line  to  a  rail  line  are  ' '  rail-and- water 
routes, ' '  and  that  routes  composed  of  rail  lines  connected  by  car 
ferries  over  which  the  freight  is  ferried  in  the  car  constitute 
"car- ferry  routes"  and  are  understood  to  be  included  in  the 
general  term  '^all-rail."  (See  HolUngshead  &  Blei  v.  P.  &  L. 
U.  B.  B.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C,  193.) 

Held  further,  That  where  a  shipper  does  not  specify  a  par- 
ticular route  or  a  rail-and-water  route,  the  carrier's  agent  nuist 
consider  ear-ferry  routes  as  available  in  performing  the  duty  of 
routing  a  shipment  over  the  cheapest  route.  (See  ruling  190, 
interpreting  ruling  214.) 


May  2,  1911. 

317.     ERRORS  IN  TRANSMISSION  OF  TELEGRAPHIC 
MESSAGES.^Upon  inquiry:    Held,  That  the  Commission  has 


736  CONFEEENCE    RuLINGS. 

no  jurisdiction  over  claims  for  damages  due  to  alleged  errors  in 
the  transmission  of  telegraphic  messages.  (See  Unrepeated  Mes- 
sage Case,  44  I.  C.  C,  670.) 


May  8,  1911. 

318.    APPICATION  OF  FOURTH  SECTION  WHEN  ONE 
OR  MORE  POINTS  ARE  IN  A  FOREIGN  COUNTRY.— The 

fourth  section  does  not  apply  when  the  more  distant  point  and 
the  intermediate  point  are  in  a  foreign  country;  nor  when  the 
point  of  origin  and  point  of  destination  are  both  in  the  United 
States  and  the  intermediate  point  is  in  a  foreign  country.  (See 
rulings  293,  299,  304,  and  447.) 


June  2,  1911. 

319.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  WITNESSES.— 
Upon  inquiry :  Held,  That  a  carrier  may  not  lawfully  issue  free 
interstate  transportation  to  one  not  otherwise  entitled  to  it  in 
order  to  enable  him  as  a  witness  to  attend  a  proceeding  in  court 
unless  the  carrier  is  a  party  thereto  or  has  a  direct  legal  interest 
in  the  result.     (See  ruling  414.) 

330.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  INSTRUCTOR  IN 
USE  OF  BOILER  COMPOUND.— (Overruled  by  ruling  336. 
See  ruling  169.) 

321.     SHIPPER  MAY  DIRECT  TERMINAL  ROUTING.— 

In  view  of  the  amendment  to  section  15  of  the  act,  paragraph  h 
of  Conference  Biding  No.  214  is  now  amended  so  as  to  read  as 
follows : 

(&)  In  order  to  secure  desired  delivery  to  industries,  plants, 
or  warehouses  and  avoid  unnecessary  terminal  or  switching 
charges,  the  shipper  may  direct  as  to  terminal  routing  or  deliv- 
ery of  shipments  which  are  to  go  beyond  the  lines  of  the  initial 
carriers;  and  his  instructions  as  to  such  terminal  delivery  must 
be  observed  in  routing  and  billing  such  shipments.  When  ship- 
ments are  accepted  without  specific  routing  instructions  from 
shipper,  where  all-rail  rates  and  rail-and-water  rates  are  avail- 
able, the  carrier's  agent  must  have  the  shipper  designate  which 
of  the  two  he  wishes  to  use.  Carriers  will  be  held  responsible 
for  routing  shown  in  bill  of  lading.     (See  rulings  190  and  316.) 


Conference  Rulings,  737 

322.  SUSPENSION  OF  TARIFF  SCHEDULES.— The  au- 
thority conferred  on  the  Commission  by  the  amendatory  act  of 
June  18,  1910,  to  suspend  schedules  stating  new  individual  or 
joint  rates,  fares,  or  charges,  or  any  new  individual  or  joint  clas- 
sification, or  any  new  individual  or  joint  regulation  or  practice 
affecting  any  rate,  fare,  or  charge,  was  not  intended  to  withdraw 
from  carriers  the  right  to  initiate  their  rates,  fares,  charges,  and 
regulations  and  does  not  mean  that  in  every  case  of  advanced 
rates  or  charges  the  schedules  should  be  suspended.  The  statute 
vests  a  discretion  in  the  Commission  in  that  regard  and  con- 
templates that  it  will  be  exercised  in  a  judicial  spirit.  Except  in 
cases  where  it  acts  on  its  own  initiative  the  Commission  will  not 
ordinarily  suspend  the  operation  of  a  schedule  unless  the  changes 
complained  of  are  called  to  its  attention  at  least  10  days  before 
the  effective  date  of  the  schedule,  thus  giving  the  Commission 
time  in  which  to  act  intelligently  and  to  avoid  discriminations 
that  might  result  from  the  improper  suspension  of  a  schedule. 

Requests  for  such  action  by  the  Commission  should  be  made  in 
the  form  of  a  complaint  indicating  the  schedule  by  its  I.  C.  C. 
number  and  specifically  referring  to  the  parts  thereof  as  to  which 
suspension  is  asked,  together  with  reasonably  detailed  explana- 
tions as  to  the  probable  effect  of  the  proposed  new  rates,  fares, 
etc. 


June  8,  1911. 

323.    OFFSETTING  OF  UNDER  OR  OVER  CHARGES.— 

It  appearing  that  some  confusion  has  been  caused  by  the  Com- 
mission's Conference  Rnlings  Nos.  48,  133,  and  its  ruling  of 
February  14,  1911,  the  following  is  issued  in  lieu  of  the  three 
rulings  above  mentioned : 

The  Commission  has  no  authority  to  control  the  disposition  of 
an  overcharge.  The  carrier  must  charge  no  other  than  its  law- 
ful rate  and  the  failure  to  collect  the  full  rate  as  to  any  ship- 
ment is  a  violation  of  the  law,  as  is  the  collection  of  more  than 
the  full  rate.  The  Commission  declines  to  declare  that  an  over- 
charge may  be  offset  as  against  an  uncollected  undercharge ; 
such  offset  is  not  within  the  power  of  the  Commission  to  author- 
ize or  condemn.  (See  Illinois  Cent.  B.  Co.  v.  W.  L.  Hoopes  & 
Sons,  233  Fed.  Rep.,  135.) 


738  Conference  Rulings. 

June  19,  1911. 

324.  DIVISIONS  ON  COMPANY  COAL.— Upon  inquiry: 
Held,  That  it  is  unlawful  for  carriers  to  make  special  and  dis- 
criminatory divisions  of  joint  rates  upon  locomotive  fuel  as  be- 
tween an  originating  or  participating  carrier  and  a  purchasing 
carrier.  In  the  division  of  joint  rates  a  railroad  must  be  treated 
precisely  as  any  other  shipper  is  treated,  and  the  Commission 
will  regard  any  special  division  as  a  device  to  defeat  the  pub- 
lished rate.  All  divisions  upon  fuel  coal  must  be  made  in  good 
faith  without  respect  to  the  fact  that  one  of  the  carriers  is  the 
purchaser  of  such  coal.  (See  order  if  one  of  the  carriers  is  the 
purchaser  of  such  coal.)  (See  Rates  an  Railroad  Fuel  and 
Other  Coal,  36  I.  C.  C,  1,  and  order  in  Divisions  of  Joint  Rates 
on  Railway  Fuel  Coal,  37  I.  C.  C,  265;  also  ruling  486.) 


June  20,  1911. 

325.  LEASE  OF  LAND  BY  SHIPPER  FROM  A  CARRIER 
AT  NOMINAL  RENTAL  UNLAWFUL.— Under  a  lease  in 
which  a  nominal  rental  is  reserved  a  private  person  has  erected 
a  grain  elevator  upon  land  belonging  to  an  interstate  carrier: 
Held,  That  the  arrangement  constitutes  an  undue  preference. 
(See  rulings  94  and  421.) 


October  9,  1911. 

326.  BAGGAGE  CHECKED  BY  INITIAL  LINE  WITH 
ROUTING  INADEQUATELY  SPECIFIED.— Upon  inquiry  as 
to  the  legal  propriety  of  a  proposed  agreement  by  an  association 
of  general  baggage  agents  providing,  in  substance,  that  an  in- 
termediate line  shall  forward  to  checked  destination  by  the  most 
direct  route  any  baggage  received  by  it  not  fully  routed ;  that 
the  initial  line  shall  report  to  the  lines  actually  moving  the 
baggage  the  amount  of  any  excess  baggage  charges  collected  by 
it;  and  that  in  ease  there  is  more  than  one  station  at  destina- 
tion the  initial  as  well  as  the  terminal  line  shall  be  advised  of 
the  station  at  which  the  baggage  may  be  found,  it  was.  Held, 
That  subject  to  such  modified  conclusions  as  may  be  required  in 
the  light  of  further  information,  the  Commission  sees  no  present 
objection  to  such  rules  if  properly  published  in  the  tariffs. 


Conference  Rulings.  739 

October  10,  1911. 

327.  TELEGRAMS  RELATING  TO  SHIPMENTS— RUL- 
ING 302  CONSTRUED.— Telegrams  from  a  shipper  relating  to 
his  traffic  must  be  paid  for  by  him,  but  a  carrier  may  lawfully  an- 
swer such  a  message  at  its  expense.  (See  rulings  302,  351,  363, 
and  480.) 


November  6,  1911. 

328.  SAFETY  APPLIANCES— CARS  OF  SPECIAL  CON- 
STRUCTION.— Locomotives  while  equipped  with  snowplows  or 
flangers  are  to  be  regarded  as  cars  of  special  construction  within 
the  meaning  of  the  order  of  March  13,  1911. 

329.  SAFETY  APPLIANCES— ORDER  OF  MARCH  13, 

1911,  CONSTRUED.— The  order  entitled  "United  States  Safety 
Appliance  Standards,"  adojoted  on  March  13,  1911,  is  inter- 
preted with  respect  to  the  details  mentioned  as  follows : 

1.  That  gondola  and  ballast  cars  with  swinging  side  doors  at 
ladder  locations  may  be  considered  as  cars  of  special  construc- 
tion. 

Ladders  and  handholds  need  not  be  applied  to  swinging  side 
doors. 

A  side  vertical  handhold  shall  be  placed  on  corner  post  of 
such  cars,  as  nearly  as  possible  over  sill  step. 

2.  That  high-side  gondola  and  ballast  cars  with  end  plat- 
forms 18  inches  or  more  in  length  may  be  considered  as  cars 
of  special  construction. 

Ladders  shall  be  placed  on  such  cars  as  prescribed  for  high- 
side  gondola  and  hopper  cars,  with  sill  step  under  ladder,  or  as 
near  under  ladder  as  car  construction  will  permit.  Ends  and 
side  of  cars  to  be  equipped  with  handholds  in  the  same  manner 
as  fiat  cars. 

3.  Ladders — spacing  of  ladder  treads.  That  the  spacing  of 
top  ladder  treads  shall  l)e  taken  from  eave  of  roof  at  side  of  car, 
whether  latitudinal  running  board  is  used  or  not.  (Shown  on 
plates  illustrating  LTnited  States  States  safety  appliance  stan- 
dards, issued  by  the  Commission  July  1,  1911.) 

4.  Box  and  other  house  cars — automobile  cars  with  swinging 
end  doors — end  ladders : 

That  these  cars  may  come  under  the  head  oi!  cars  of  special 
construction,  as  per  clause  on  page  37  of  the  order,  and  the  end 
ladders  placed  as  nearly  as  possible  to  designated  location. 


740  Conference  Eulings. 

November  14,  1911. 

330.  FREE  CARRIAGE  OF  RAILWAY  Y.  M.  C.  A.  LI- 
BRARY BOOKS. — It  is  not  unlawful  for  an  interstate  railroad 
to  carry  without  charge,  for  use  by  railway  employees,  books  be- 
longing to  the  libraries  of  Railway  Young  Men's  Christian  As- 
sociations. 

331.  TRANSFER  OF  SHIPMENT  IN  TRANSIT  TO  AN- 
OTHER CAR. — A  shipment  started  to  move  under  a  joint 
through  rate  and  an  established  mininuim  for  the  car  of  the 
size  in  which  it  was  loaded,  but  for  the  convenience  of  the  car- 
rier was  subsequently  transferred  into  a  smaller  car  taking  a 
lower  minimmn  under  the  same  through  rate.  Charges  were 
collected  on  the  actual  weight,  which  was  in  excess  of  the  lower 
and  less  than  the  higher  minimum  weight :  Held,  That  where  a 
joint  through  rate  is  in  effect  the  through  charges  are  not  af- 
fected by  such  a  transfer  of  the  shipment  in  transit  from  one 
car  to  another  whether  larger  or  smaller ;  and  that  the  through 
charges  here  should  have  been  collected  at  the  joint  through 
rate  and  on  the  basis  of  the  minimum  weight  applicable  on  the 
car  ordered  or  accepted  by  the  consignor  for  the  movement.  (See 
rulings  273,  274,  339,  and  357.) 


Decemhei'  11,  1911. 

332.  CARRIERS  FAILING  TO  OBEY  ROUTING  IN- 
STRUCTIONS LIABLE  TO  PROSECUTION.— (Rescinded  by 
ruling  502.) 

333.  COMPANY  MATERIAL.— Material  for  use  in  the  re- 
pair of  one  of  its  cars  was  shipped  by  a  carrier  to  the  shop  of 
a  connecting  line.  Upon  inquiry  whether  the  material  could 
move  free  of  charge  over  both  roads  it  was  Held,  That  in  cases 
of  this  kind  company  material  may  move  without  charge  only 
over  the  line  at  whose  expense  the  repair  is  made.  (See  ruling 
373.) 


January  9,  1912. 

334.     RATES  ON    GASOLINE    MOTOR    CARS    IMOVING 
UNDER  THEIR  OWN  POWER.— The  movement  of  a  gasoline 


Conference  Rulings.  741 

motor  car,  from  the  manufacturer  to  the  purchaser,  over  the 
rails  of  a  common  carrier  is  transportation  that  is  subject  to 
the  act,  when  between  interstate  points,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  it  moves  under  its  own  power  and  is  operated  by  em- 
ployees of  the  manufacturer.  Such  tranportation  is  lawful 
only  when  a  rate  for  it  has  been  duly  published.  Except  on 
the  commodities  specifically  enumerated  in  section  1  of  the  act, 
rates  can  not  lawfully  include  the  passage  of  attendants,  and  as 
gasoline  motors  cars  are  not  so  enumerated  the  attendants  must 
pay  fares  on  the  basis  of  the  regularly  published  i^assenger  fare 
then  in  effect.  In  adjusting  its  rates  the  carrier  should  take  into 
consideration  the  conditions  surrounding  the  movement  of  traf- 
fic of  this  kind. 

335.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  HOUSEHOLD 
GOODS. — A  bureau  of  the  American  Railway  Association, 
known  as  the  Bureau  for  the  Safe  Transportation  of  Explosives, 
ordered  one  of  its  inspectors  to  permanent  duty  at  another  sta- 
tion. Held,  That  the  carriers  in  the  route  between  the  two  points 
can  not  lawfully  transport  his  household  goods  free  of  charge, 
even  though  they  are  members  of  that  association. 

336.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  INSTRUCTOR  IN 
THE  USE  OP  BOILER  COMPOUNDS.— Annual  passes  may 
not  lawfully  be  issued  to  or  used  by  employees  of  companies 
manufacturing  boiler  compounds ;  nor  may  a  carrier  transport 
such  persons  free  of  charge  when  going  to  or  from  instruction 
work  on  the  line  of  a  connection.  A  carrier  using  the  compound 
in  its  locomotive  boilers  may  give  free  transportation  to  an  ex- 
pert of  the  manufacturer  whom  it  desires  to  send  over  its  own 
line  to  instruct  its  employees  in  the  use  of  the  compound,  but 
only  for  that  purpose  and  to  the  extent  necessary  in  the  per- 
formance of  that  duty,  provided  the  agent  does  not  sell  or  solicit 
orders.     (Overruling  Conference  Ruling  320.     See  ruling  346.) 


January  15,  1912. 

337.  AGENTS  FOR  CARRIERS  MAY  NOT  ACT  AS 
AGENTS  FOR  SHIPPERS.— At  certain  docks  the  stevedores, 
who  are  also  the  loading  contractors  for  a  connecting  rail  line, 
unload  the  vessel  and  load  its  cargo  into  the  cars,  handling  a 


742  Conference  Rulings. 

loading  slip  to  the  rail  line,  upon  which  the  latter  issues  bills 
of  lading.  For  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  through  rate,  or  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  have  that  result,  they  also  act  as  agents  for 
consignees,  and  forward  to  inland  rail  points  goods  received 
by  water  at  the  docks  and  originally  intended  for  such  destina- 
tions. (See  In  re  Wharfage  Facilities  at  Pensacola,  Fla.,  27  I. 
C.  C,  258 ;  and  Boran  &  Co.  v.  .V.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.,  33  I.  C. 
C,  527.) 

Affirming  the  principle  of  Conference  Ruling  98,  it  i^  Held, 
That  neither  a  railroad  nor  its  agents  or  employees  may  law- 
fully act  as  forwarding  agents  for  shippers.     (See  ruling  365.) 


February  5  1912. 

338.  JOINT  RATE  REDUCED  TO  THE  AGGREGATE  OF 
THE  INTERMEDIATES,  MINIMUM  WEIGHT  BEING  IN- 
CREASED.— A  joint  rate  exceeding  the  aggregate  of  the  inter- 
mediate rates  was  later  reduced  to  equal  their  sum,  the  mini- 
mum weight,  however,  being  increased.  Held,  That  in  such 
cases  reparation,  when  awarded  informally  by  the  Commission, 
will  be  on  the  basis  of  the  newly  established  joint  rate  and  mini- 
mum weight,  subject  of  course  to  the  actual  weight  when  higher 
than  the  new  minimum.     (Rescinding  ruling  228.) 

339.  TWO  SMALL  CARS  FURNISHED  IN  LIEU  OF  A 
LARGER  CAR  ORDERED  BY  THE  SHIPPER.— Upon  in- 
formal complaints  and  numerous  inquiries  it  is  Held,  That  the 
act  of  a  carrier  in  furnishing  two  small  cars  in  lieu  of  the  larger 
car  ordered  by  a  shipper  under  appropriate  tariff  authority  is 
binding,  at  the  rate  and  minimum  applicable  to  the  ear  ordered, 
upon  all  the  carriers  that  are  parties  to  the  joint  rate  under 
which  the  shipment  moves  from  the  point  of  origin;  the  ship- 
per is  entitled  to  all  privileges  in  transit,  to  reconsignment,  and 
to  switching  at  the  same  charges  as  would  be  applicable  under 
the  joint  tariff  had  the  shipment  been  loaded  into  one  car  of  the 
capacity  ordered;  and  demurrage  will  likewise  accrue  on  that 
basis.  If  the  shipment  moves  beyond  the  point  to  which  the 
joint  rates  applias,  the  connecting  line  or  lines  are  entitled  to 
and  should  collect  their  transit,  reconsigning,  switching,  and  de- 
murrage charges  as  provided  in  their  own  tariffs. 


Conference  Rulings.  743 

In  all  cases  the  initial  carrier  will  be  lia])le  for  such  additional 
charges  as  may  be  imposed  on  the  sliipper  by  reason  of  its  fail- 
ure to  furnish  a  car  of  the  capacity  ordered.  Carriers  that  are 
parties  to  the  joint  rate  under  which  the  shipment  commenced 
to  move  may  share  in  such  additional  expense  so  incurred  by  the 
initial  carrier. 

Rule  66  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A:  General  Chemical  Co.  v.  N. 
&  W.  By..  15  1.  C.  C,  349 ;  Conference  Ruling  250;  Milwaukee 
Falls  Chair  Co.  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Eij.,  16  I.  C.  C,  217;  Confer- 
ence Rilling  59;  Nolle  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.,  22  I.  C.  C,  432;  and 
Conference  Ruling  274  reaffirmed,  with  the  understanding,  how- 
ever, that  the  duty  of  transferring  the  shipment  rests  upon  the 
carriers  and  not  necessarily  upon  the  connecting  carrier.  (See 
ruling  357  amending  ruling  250.) 

340.  RESTAURANT  EMPLOYEES  AT  A  UNION  STA- 
TION NOT  ENTITLED  TO  FREE  TRANSPORTATION.— A 

restaurant  is  conducted  in  a  union  station  primarily  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  traveling  public  by  a  terminal  company  claiming  to  be  a 
common  carrier  within  the  meaning  of  the  act.  Upon  inquiry, 
Held,  That  its  emploj^ees  in  the  restaurant  are  not  entitled  to 
free  transportation.     (See  ruling  87.) 

341.  SWITCHING  ROAD  S— CONCURRENCES.— Two 
lines  having  no  direct  connection  effect  an  interchange  of  traffic 
through  a  terminal  railroad  under  an  arbitrary  switching  charge 
of  $3  a  car,  which  they  absorb  out  of  the  joint  rate.  Upon  in- 
quiry it  is  Held,  That  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  switching  road 
be  shown  as  concurring  in  the  joint  through  rate  if  its  tariff  of' 
switching  charges  is  on  file  and  the  tariff  naming  the  joint 
through  rate  provides  that  such  charges  will  be  so  absorbed. 
(See  ruling  402.) 


February  12,  1912. 

342.  HOURS  OF  SERVICE  LAW.— A  trainman  required  by 
the  rules  of  the  carrier,  in  conjunction  with  his  duties  as  train- 
man, to  send,  receive,  or  deliver  orders  affecting  the  movement 
of  trains  comes  within  the  proviso  of  section  2  of  the  hours  of 
service  act,  and  therefore  a  carrier  may  not  require  a  trainman, 
who  has  been  on  duty  longer  than  the  limit  of  time  fixed  for  a 


7-14  Conference  Rulings. 

telegraph  or  telephone  operator,  to  send,  receive,  or  deliver  or- 
ders affecting  the  movement  of  trains,  as  a  part  of  the  duties 
regularly  assigned  to  him. 

But  upon  inquiry  whether  the  practice  of  requiring  conductors 
of  trains  delayed  at  stations  where  there  is  no  regularly  as- 
signed telegraph  or  telephone  operator  on  duty,  and  conductors 
of  trains  about  to  be  overtaken  by  superior  trains,  to  telephone 
or  telegraph  the  train  dispatcher  for  instructions  is  in  accord 
with  the  act  and  with  the  Commission's  order  of  interpretation 
of  June  25,  1908,  Held,  That  a  trainman  who  has  been  on  duty 
for  more  than  9  hours  or  for  more  than  13  hours  is  not  prohibited 
from  occasionally  using  the  telegraph  or  telephone  to  meet  an 
emergency. 


March  4,  1912. 

343.  ICED  REFRIGERATOR  CAR  NOT  USED.— A  refrig- 
erator car  set  for  loading,  fully  iced,  was  not  used  because  of 
weather  conditions,  and  the  shipper  refused  to  pay  the  ice  com- 
pany's bill:  Held,  That  wiiile  an  action  may  doubtless  lie  at 
common  law,  it  is  not  clear,  in  the  absence  of  a  tariff  pro\'ision 
to  cover  such  cases,  that  the  ice  charges  are  collectible  under  the 
act. 

344.  RATES  LAWFULLY  CANCELED.— Upon  inquiry, 
Held,  That  a  rate  once  lawfully  canceled  may  not  be  reinstated  as 
a  reissued  item. 

345.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION.— The  free-pass  provision 
of  section  1  is  construed  as  implying  that  free  transportation 
may  be  accorded  by  carriers  to  Canadian  customs  and  immigra- 
tion inspectors  on  duty. 


March  11,  1912. 

346.    FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  INSTRUCTORS.— In 

the  interest  of  safety  and  economy  many  carriers  have  adopted 
certain  appliances  and  methods  in  the  use  of  which  by  their 
employees  instruction  and  supervision  are  essential  to  proper 
results  and  can  only  be  given  by  experts.  The  contracts  under 
which  carriei*s  undertake  to  use  such  appliances  or  materials 


Conference  Rulings.  745 

not  infrequently  contain  provisions  requiring  the  vendor  to  fur- 
nish experts  for  these  purposes  and  the  carrier  to  transport  them 
over  its  line  free  of  charge. 

The  successful  use  of  such  appliances  or  matei-ials  makes  for 
the  public  interest,  and  upon  full  consideration  of  numerous  in- 
quiries in  the  light  of  more  complete  information,  and  differen- 
tiating clearly  between  vendors'  expert  demonstrators  and  in- 
structors and  other  of  their  agents,  it  is  Held,  That  where  a  car- 
rier purchases  appliances,  materials,  or  supplies,  in  the  use  of 
M'hich  instruction  and  supervision  of  emploj^ees  by  experts  are 
essential  to  proper  and  successful  results,  it  may,  in  the  con- 
tract of  purchase,  undertake  to  grant  free  transportation  over 
its  own  line  to  such  expert  demonstrators  and  instructors  as  are 
furnished  by  the  vendor  under  the  contract,  to  the  extent  and 
only  to  the  extent  that  such  transportation  is  necessary  for  the 
performance  of  their  duty  on  that  line ;  and  provided  that  no 
such  expert  so  traveling  under  free  transportation  shall  in  any 
way  engage  in  the  sale  of  goods  or  in  the  soliciting  or  taking  of 
orders  therefor:  Held  further,  That  such  experts  are  not  rail- 
way employees  in  the  sense  that  they  may  be  given  free  trans- 
portation to  travel  over  one  road  or  system  for  the  purpose  of 
reaching  another  road  or  system  to  which  they  may  have  been 
assigned  upon  like  duty. 

The  view^s  expressed  in  Conference  Biding  Ko.  '208  as  to  gen- 
eral application  of  the  law  are  adhered  to;  Conference  Rulings 
134  and  336,  in  which  the  principles  of  Conference  Ruling  208 
are  applied,  are  not  to  be  understood  as  being  modified  by  any- 
thing here  said. 

347.  ERROR  IN  STATING  CONCURRENCE  NUMBER. 
— Through  inadvertence  a  tariff  showed  an  erroneous  number 
of  a  lawful  concurrence  by  a  participating  carrier :  Held,  That 
the  tariff  is  not  invalidated  by  a  minor  error  of  that  character 
but  is  a  lawful  issue,  and  is  binding  upon  the  participating  car- 
riers. 

348.  FABRICATION  OF  STRUCTURAL  STEEL.— In  mak- 
ing shipments  of  structural  iron  and  steel  the  consignor  intended 
to  take  advantage  of  the  privilege  of  fabricating  the  material  in 
transit,  but  failed  to  note  on  the  bill  of  lading  as  required  by 
the  tariff  "To  be  fabricated  at  ."     As  a  result  of  this 


74-6         •  Conference  Rulings. 

omission  higher  charges  accrued:  Held,  That  the  Commission 
will  not  authorize  the  carrier  to  refund  the  additional  charges 
resulting  from  the  shipper's  own  error.  (See  Woodland  Lumhef 
Co.  V.  N.  8.  R.  R.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C,  710.) 

349.  DESTRUCTION  OF  RECORDS.— The  sale  of  docu- 
ments, records,  and  papers  of  an  interstate  carrier  as  waste  pa- 
per is  held  to  be  a  lawful  destruction  of  such  records  within 
the  meaning  of  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  Commission 
touching  the  destruction  of  records,  provided  all  other  require- 
ments under  those  rules  and  regulations  have  been  complied  with. 

April  1,  1912. 

350.  RATES  APPLICABLE  TO  SHIPMENTS  STOPPED 
SHORT  OF  INTENDED  DESTINATION,  AND  FARES  AP- 
PLICABLE TO  PASSENGERS  DISCONTINUING  JOUR- 
NEYS.— Under  transit  tariffs  requiring  the  payment  of  the  full 
rate  to  final  destination  at  the  time  the  shipmeiit  is  delivered  at 
the  transit  point,  it  sometimes  occurs  that  a  shipment  is  never 
forwarded  to  the  destination  to  which  charges  have  been  paid : 
Held,  That  it  is  not  unlawful  or  improper  in  such  cases  to  re- 
fund the  charges  that  have  been  paid  in  excess  of  what  the  law- 
ful charges  on  the  shipment  would  have  been  if  the  transit  point 
had  been  its  final  destination.  (See  Clinton  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
V.  C.  &  N.  W:  Ry.  Co.,  28  .  C.  C,  367,  and  Pillshiiry  Flour  Mills 
Co.  V.  G.  N.  Ry.  Co.,  39  I.  C.  C,  357.) 

Held  further,  That,  subject  to  the  time  limit  of  ticket,  the  same 
rule  applies  where  a  passenger  has  purchased  n  ticket  and  has 
abandoned  his  journey  at  a  point  short  of  the  destination  sho^^^^ 
on  his  ticket  and  also  to  a  prepaid  shipment  of  freight  that  is 
stopped  and  delivered  at  a  point  short  of  that  to  which  prepaid. 
(See  ruling  115.) 

351.  TELEGRAMS  OF  SHIPPERS.— Upon  inquiry,  under 
Conference  Ruling  327,  whether  carriers  may  send  at  their  ex- 
pense over  shippers'  names  telegrams  directing  the  routing  of 
certain  traffic:  Held,  That  carriers  may  not  pay  for  such  tele- 
grams.    (See  rulings  302,  327,  363,  and  480.) 


April  2.  1912. 

352.     FREE  TRANSPORTATION.— A  carrier  that  has  ac- 
quired a  railroad  by  foreclosure,  reorganization,  or  otherwise, 


Conference  Rulings.  747 

mRv  lawfully  continue  to  issue  free  transportation  to  the  widows, 
during  widowhood,  and  minor  children,  during  their  minority, 
of  persons  who  died  while  in  the  service  of  the  company  formerly 
operating  the  road. 

353.  SHIPMENTS.  BY  WATER  —In  the  application  of  the 
act,  a  shipment  by  water  from  one  port  to  another  in  the  terri- 
tory of  the  United  States  is  to  he  regarded  as  coastwise  business; 
a  shipment  by  water  from  a  port  of  the  United  States  to  a  port 
of  any  foreign  country,  even  though  adjacent,  is  export  busi- 
ness.    (See  rulings  359,  369,  and  468.) 

354.  THROUGH  SHIPIMENTS  VIA  WATER  AND  RAIL. 

— Upon  inquiry,  and  referring  to  w^ater  carriers  as  defined  in 
section  1  of  the  act :  Held,  That  if  a  rail  carrier  and  a  water 
carrier  separately  publish  and  file  their  rates  applicable  to 
through  shipments,  traffic  over  such  route  may  lawfully  be 
transported  under  through  bills  of  lading,  even  though  the 
rates  are  not  .joint  through  rates. 

Held  further,  That  a  water  carrier  may  not  lawfully  accept 
shipments  for  transportation  on  through  bills  of  lading  issued 
by  a  rail  carrier  unless  the  water  carrier  has  lawfully  published 
and  filed  rates  applicable  thereto. 

Held  further.  That  the  acceptance  by  a  water  carrier  of 
through  traffic  on  through  bills  of  lading  issued  by  a  rail  carrier 
is  an  evidence  of  an  arrangement  for  continuous  carriage  which 
subjects  the  traffic  to  the  provisions  and  jurisdiction  of  our  act. 
(See  rulings  66,  155,  201,  401,  and  422.) 

These  holdings  shall  not  be  construed  so  as  to  conflict  with 
Rule  71,  Tariff  Circular  18-A,  which  covers  export  and  import 
traffic.  (Last  paragraph  as  amended  in  conference  November 
11,  1912.) 

Held  fnrther  (as  amended  Mar.  6,  1917),  That  it  is  not  law- 
ful for  a  carrier  subject  to  this  act  to  issue  through  bills  of  lading 
under  an  arrangement  with  a  water  or  other  carrier  for  a  con- 
tinuous carriage  until  such  water  or  other  carrier  shall  have  law- 
fully filed  with  this  Commission  rates  applicable  to  such  carriage. 


April  8,  1912. 

355.      FREE    TRANSPORTATION    OF    OFFICERS    OF 
NONOPERATING      COMPANY.— A      railroad      constructed 


748  GONFERENCB    RuLINGS. 

by  municipal  trustees  was  afterwards  leased  under  a  contract 
antedating  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  and  providing  that  the 
lessee  company  would  issue  annual  passes  to  Ihe  trustees  and 
their  agents  and  would  furnish  a  car  for  their  use  in  inspecting 
the  line. 

Upon  incpury  whether  these  covenants,  being  a  part  of  the 
consideration  for  the  lease,  may  now  be  complied  with  by  the 
lessee  company,  it  is  Held,  That  officers  directors,  and  other  per- 
sons connected  with  a  nonoperating  company  are  not  entitled  to 
use  free  transportation.     (See  rulings  95  and  263.) 


May  6,  1912. 

356.  DISCLOSING  NAME  OF  CONSIGNEE.— Upon  in- 
quiry: Held,  That  it  is  unlawful  for  a  carrier  to  disclose  to  a 
shipper  the  name  of  the  ultimate  consignee  of  a  shipment  recon- 
signed  in  transit  by  the  original  consignee.  (Sec.  15,  act  to  reg- 
ulate commerce  as  amended  June  18,  1910.  See  In  the  Matter  of 
Freight  Bills,  29  I.  C.  C,  498.) 

357.  DEMURRAGE,  SWITCHING,  RECONSIGNMENT, 
AND  DIVERSION  CHARGES  ON  A  CARLOAD  SHIPMENT 

TRANSFERRED  INTO  TWO  CARS.— In  case  a  shipment 
leaves  a  point  of  origin  in  a  single  car  and  for  the  convenience 
of  the  carriers  is  transferred  in  transit  into  two  cars  which  are 
subsequently  detained  at  destination  beyond  the  free  time,  de- 
murrage should  be  assessed  as  for  one  car  only,  so  long  as  either 
ear  is  detained ;  and  in  such  cases  switching,  reconsignment,  and 
diversion  charges  should  be  assessed  as  for  one  car  only.  (Amend- 
ing ruling  250 ;  also  also  rulings  273,  274,  331,  and  339.  Also 
Scudder  v.  T.  &  P.  By.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C,  60.) 

358.  DEMURRAGE  AT  PORTS  RESULTING  FROM  VES- 
SEL DELAY. — Coal  consigned  to  tidewater  was  held  in  the 
cars  at  the  port  awaiting  the  arrival  of  a  vessel  which  had  been 
delayed  by  storms:  Held,  That  the  delay  being  due  to  condi- 
tions beyond  the  control  of  the  rail  carrier  its  demurrage  charges 
might  not  lawfully  be  waived.     (See  rulings  8  and  135.) 


May  13,  1912. 

359.  SHIP:\rENTS  TO  COLON,  PANAMA.— Colon,  although 
within  the  geographical  limits  of  the  Canal  Zone,  is  governed  by 


Conference  Rulings.  749 

and  is  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Republic  of  Panama.  The 
Commission  holds,  therefore,  that  shipments  from  the  United 
States  to  that  point  are  entitled  to  export  rates.  (See  ruling 
468.) 


May  17,  1912. 

360.  ALLOWANCES  UNDER  SECTION  15.— Held,  Tha: 
an  allowance  purporting  to  he  made  under  sectioji  15  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  concession  from  the  rate  unless  duly  published  by 
the  carrier  in  its  tariffs  and  thus  made  available  to  all  shippers 
furnishing  a  like  facility  or  performing  a  like  service  of  trans- 
portation in  connection  with  their  traffic.  (See  rulings  19.  78, 
132,  267,  and  292.) 


June  3,  1912. 

361.    FREE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  JOINT  EMPLOYEE. 

— It  is  desired  to  move  to  another  station  a  messenger  carried  on 
the  pay  rolls  of  an  express  company  who  also  acts  as  baggage- 
man for  a  rail  line,  45  per  cent  of  the  salary^  paid  him  by  the 
,  former  being  refunded  to  it  by  the  latter :  Held,  That  the  rail- 
road company  may  not  lawfully  transport  his  household  goods 
free  or  at  rates  other  than  those  duly  established.  (See  ruling 
208&,  also  ruling  157.) 


June  4,  1912. 

362.  ASSIGNMENT  OF  CLAIM.— In  awarding  reparation 
the  Commission  will  recognize  an  assignment  by  a  consignor  to 
a  consignee  or  by  a  consignee  to  a  consignor,  but  will  not  recog- 
nize an  assignment  to  a  stranger  to  the  transportation  records. 
(Amending  ruling  246.  See  Fohinson  Co.  v.  Ameriean  Expresa 
Co.,  38  I.  C.  C,  735;  also  Oden  &  Elliott  v.  8.  A.  L.  By.,  37  L 
C.  C,  345.) 


June  8,  1912. 

363.  PAYIMENT  BY  CARRIER  OF  TOLLS  ON  TELE- 
GRAMS.— A  carrier's  tariffs  provide  that  it  will  pay  for  tele- 
grams by  consignees  to  shippers  when  they  contain  nothing  in 
addition  to  the  necessary  specific  instructions  to  route  shipments 


750  Conference  Rulings. 

over  its  rails :  Held,  That  such  a  rule,  when  lawfully  incorpo- 
rated in  the  tariffs  of  a  carrier,  is  not  objectionable.  See  rul- 
ings 302,  327,  351,  and  480.) 

364.  EXCHANGE  OF  SERVICES  BY  TELEGRAPH  AND 
RAILROAD  COMPANIES.— See  rulings  305  and  491. 

365.  CARRIERS  ACTING  AS  FORWARDERS  OF  SHIP- 
MENTS.— Conference  Rulings  98  and  337  do  not  apply  when 
the  consignment  is  to  or  in  care  of  the  carrier  itself  for  the  pur- 
pose of  being  forwarded  by  that  carrier  from  the  point  of  re- 
ceipt, at  the  regular  rate,  over  its  own  line  and  connections  ac- 
cording to  routing  instructions,  and  when  no  lawful  through 
rate  is  defeated  and  no  discrimination  or  other  violation  of  the 
act  results.  In  no  ease  may  the  same  person  act  as  the  agent 
of  the  carrier  and  the  shipper.  (See  In  re  Wharfage  Facilities 
at  Pensacola,  Fla.,  27  I.  C.  C,  258 ;  and  Doran  &  Co.  v.  N.,  C. 
&  St.  L.  Uy.,  33  L  C.  C,  527.) 


June  10,  1912. 

366.  DEMURRAGE  OR  STORAGE  CHARGES  RESULT- 
ING FROM  FAILURE  TO  GIVE  NOTICE  AT  NAMED  AD^ 
DRESS. — Upon  informal  complaint  it  is  Held,  That  when  the 
definite  address  of  a  consignee  is  noted  upon  the  bill  of  lading  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  initial  and  of  each  succeeding  carrier  to  trans- 
mit that  address  to  connections  participating  in  the  movement, 
and  the  duty  of  the  delivering  carrier  to  send  notice  of  arrival 
to  that  address ;  the  carrier  at  fault  in  this  respect  will  be  held 
liable  for  demurrage  or  storage  charges  accruing  as  the  result  of 
the  failure  of  the  notice  to  reach  the  consignee.  (See  ruling  127, 
also  see  Code  of  National  Car  Demurrage  Rules.) 

367.  LIQUOR  SHIPMENTS  NOT  DELIVERED.— An  ex- 
press company  may  not  refund  the  prepaid  charges  on  ship- 
ments of  liquor  which  it  carried  to  destination  but  could  not  de- 
liver under  a  local  law. 


October  7,  1912. 

368.    CARRIER  LOCATED  WHOLLY  WITHIN  A  STATE. 
— Some  of  the  express  matter  carried  by  a  traction  company  for 


Conference  Rulings.  751 

an  express  company  between  points  within  a  state  originates  at 
or  is  destined  to  points  outside  the  state.  Upon  in([uiry,  Held, 
That  the  traction  line  is  subject  to  the  act  to  regulate  commerce 
and  must  file  reports  and  otherwise  comply  with  its  requirements. 
(See  rulings  197  and  418.) 


October  8,  1912. 

369.  COASTWISE  TRAFFIC  OVER  PANAMA  RAIL- 
ROAD.— Shipments  moving  between  ports  of  the  United  States 
by  vessel  and  the  Panama  Railroad  and  to  ultimate  destination 
by  rail  are  interstate  and  must  take  interstate  rates  for  the  rail 
haul  from  the  port  to  destination.  (See  rulings  353,  359,  and 
468.) 

370.  MISROUTING  INVOLVING  LOSS  OF  TRANSIT 
PRIVILEGE. — Besidess  stating  the  route  and  giving  instruc- 
tions to  stop  the  car  in  transit  to  finish  loading  a  shipper  also 
noted  a  through  rate  on  the  bill  of  lading.  This  rate  did  not 
apply  over  the  indicated  route,  but  was  appliciable  over  a  route 
that  did  not  permit  the  stop  specified.  Held,  that  the  initial 
carrier,  not  having  advised  the  shipper  of  the  facts,  is  liable 
under  Conference  Biding  286f  for  the  higher  charges  that  re^ 
suited  from  following  the  routing  instructions.  (See  ruling  474 
amending  286f ;  also  Jefferson  Lumher  Co.  v.  M.  cO  0.  B.  B.  Co.. 
40  L  C.  C,  44.) 

371.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  EMPLOYEES  OF  BL 
REx\ITS  OF  CARRIERS.— The  following  persons  may  lawfully 
use  free  transportation : 

(a)  Employees  of  a  weighing  and  inspection  bureau  who  per- 
form and  supervise  the  weighing  of  cars  for  the  carriers  main- 
taining such  bureau  are  exclusively  engaged  upon  the  work  of 
such  carrier,  and  are  subject  to  the  direction  of  their  officials, 
but  report  to  and  are  paid  by  the  w^eighing  and  inspection 
bureau. 

(&)  Employees  of  the  American  Association  of  Railroad 
Superintendents  known  as  chief  interchange  inspectors,  whose 
duties  are  to  settle  disputes  among  car  inspectors  at  junction 
points  where  traffic  is  interchanged  Avith  other  lines.  (See  ruling 
448.) 


752  CONFEEENCE    RuLINGS. 

372.  FREIGHT  MOVED  FOR  AN  EXPRESS  COMPANY.— 
On  a  shipment  consigned  to  itself  under  a  joint  freight  rate 
an  express  company  is  not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  a  rail  car- 
rier's division  to  its  junction  with  the  line  over  which  the  ex- 
press company  operates.  (See  ruling  209;  also  Jn  re  Contracts 
for  Free  Transportation,  16  I.  C.  C,  246.) 

373.  REPAIR  OF  CARS  ON  FOREIGN  LINES.— A  carrier 
on  whose  line  a  car  was  damaged  made  an  order  on  a  connect- 
ing line,  M'hich  owned  the  car,  for  certain  castings  to  be  delivered 
to  it  at  the  junction  of  the  two  lines.  Held,  That  the  former  line 
was  a  shipper  over  the  line  of  the  owning  carrier  and  must  pay 
the  published  rate.     (See  rulings  225  and  333.) 

374.  CAR  FERRY  COMPANY  SUBJECT  TO  THE  ACT.— 

An  incorporated  company  operates  a  car  ferry  connecting  the 
two  interstate  rail  lines  by  which  it  is  owned.  It  separately 
conducts  its  own  affairs  and  keeps  its  own  accounts,  but  has  no 
direct  dealings  with  the  public.  Held,  That  the  ferry  company 
is  a  common  carrier  subject  to  the  act,  and  must  file  tariffs,  keep 
its  accounts,  and  make  reports  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and 
regulations  of  the  Commission. 

375.  DESTRUCTION  OF  RECORDS  OF  LESSOR  COM- 
PANY.— A  corporation  ow^ning  a  railroad  that  it  has  leased  to 
a  carrier  for  use  in  interstate  traffic  is  itself  subject  to  the  act 
and  must  designate  an  officer  to  have  charge  of  the  destruction 
of  its  records. 

376.  REPARATION  CLAIMS  ON  THE  INFORMAL 
DOCKET.— (Restated  in  ruling  425.) 

November  14,  1912. 

377.  USE  OF  COMMISSIONS  BY  POST-OFFICE  INSPEC- 
TORS WHEN  OFF  DUTY.— The  use  of  his  commission  for 
transportation  by  a  post-office  inspector  when  returning  to  duty 
from  a  pleasure  trip  is  unlawful.     (See  ruling  95/.) 

378.  EXPORT  BILL  OF  LADING. — The  rules  and  regula- 
tions of  carriers  governing  bills  of  lading  on  export  traffic  must 
be  published  and  filed  with  the  Commission. 

379.  INTEREST  UPON  OVERCHARGE  CLAIMS.— (Re- 
.stated  in  ruling  489.) 


Conference  Rulings.  753 


October  15, 1912. 


380.  REFUND  ON  UNUSED  PORTION  OF  PASSENGER 
TICKET. — A  passenger,  having  a  round-trip  ticket  for  an  inter- 
state journey  with  stop-over  privileges,  stopped  off  at  an  inter- 
mediate point  on  the  going  trip  and  later  proceeded  to  des- 
tination. He  did  not  use  the  return  portion  of  the  ticket.  The 
tariff  provided  for  redemption  in  such  eases  at  the  difference 
between  the  fare  paid  and  the  published  rate  to  the  point  where 
the  trip  was  discontinued.  There  were  in  effect  between  the 
starting  point  and  destination  a  one-way  fare  with  stop-over  pri- 
vileges, a  one-way  fare  for  a  continuous  passage,  and  one- 
way fares  for  continuous  passage  to  the  stop-over  point  and  from 
that  point  to  destination.  The  latter  .combination  was  lower 
than  the  through  fare  with  stop-over. 

Held,  That  the  refund  was  properly  made  on  the  basis  of  the 
difference  between  the  fare  paid  and  the  one-way  fare  with 
stop-over  privileges. 


November  11, 1912. 

381.  BRIDGE  COIMPANIES.— A  bridge  company  which  does 
not  own  or  operate  any  motive  power  or  cars  and  rents  its  bridge 
to  an  interstate  carrier  need  not  file  tariffs  with  the  Conunission. 
(See  ruling  399.) 

382.  MILEAGE  IN  PART  PAYMENT  FOR  TICKET.— A 

mileage  book  presented  in  part  payment  for  a  passenger  ticket 
must  be  accepted  for  transportation  to  the  farthest  station  cover- 
ed by  the  remaining  coupons,  the  passenger  to  pay  the  local  fare 
from  that  point  to  destination.     (See  ruling  81.) 

383.  MISROUTING  SHIPMENT.— The  address  of  the  con- 
signee having  been  omitted,  a  shipment  arriving  at  destination  by 
a  line  other  than  that  designated  in  the  routing  instructions  was 
sent  to  a  storage  warehouse.  The  consignee  had  made  inquiry 
for  it  of  the  delivering  carrier  noted  on  the  bill  of  lading.  The 
freight  rates  were  the  same  by  either  route.  Held,  That  the  in- 
itial carrier  is  liable  for  the  storage  and  drayage  charges  re- 
sulting from  misrouting  the  shipment. 


754  Conference  Rulings. 

384.  CHARGES  FOR  MEALS  ON  DINING  CAR.— The  Cora- 
mission  has  no  jurisdiction  over  charges  made  for  meals  on  din- 
ing car.     (See  ruling  28.) 

385.  HIGHER  PASSENGER  FARE  TO  INTERMEDIATE 
POINT  THAN  TO  MORE  DISTANT  POINT.— A  higher  pas- 
senger fare  was  charged  to  an  intermediate  point  than  was  in 
effect  to  a  more  distant  point  over  the  same  route.  .Held,  That, 
the  discrimination  in  its  tariff  being  corrected,  the  Commission 
will  entertain  an  application  by  the  carrier  to  be  permitted  to 
make  refund  on  the  basis  of  the  lower  fare  to  the  more  distant 
point. 

386.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  TIE  INSPECTOR.— 

A  carrier  purchases  all  its  erossties  from  one  source  and  the  con- 
tract provides  for  free  transportation  to  the  inspectors  of  the 
contractor  while  traveling  to  inspect  and  purchase  the  ties.  Held, 
That  free  transportation  may  not  lawfully  be  extended  to  such 
inspectors.     (See  rulings  208-c  and  430.) 

387.  UNIFORM  BILL  OF  LADING.— The  uniform  bill  of 
lading  contains  the  following  clause : 

The  value  of  the  property  (being  the  bona  fide  invoice  price, 
if  any,  to  the  consignee,  including  the  freight  charges,  if  pre- 
paid), at  the  place  and  time  of  shipment  under  this  bill  of  lading. 

At  the  time  a  particular  shipment,  lost  in  transit,  was  made, 
the  market  price  of  a  commodity  had  advanced  beyond  the  price 
fixed  in  a  contract  previously  entered  into,  under  which  a  large 
quantity  had  been  purchased  for  future  delivery.  A  construc- 
tion of  the  clause  being  requested,  it  is  the  view  of  the  Com- 
mission that  the  provision  in  the  bill  of  lading  contained  in  the 
parentheses  above  quoted  does  not  apply  to  a  shipment  made 
several  weeks  later  than  the  contract  of  sale. 


December  2, 1912. 

388.  TRANSPORTATION  OF  EXPLOSIVES.— The  regula- 
tions of  the  Commission  touching  the  transportation  by  freight 
and  express  of  explosives  and  other  dangerous  articles,  together 
with  the  specifications  for  the  containers  thereof,  are  amended 
by  extending  their  application  to  company  materials  and  supplies 
of  that  nature.     (See  ruling  106.) 


Conference  Rulings.  755 

389.  TARIFFS  CONTAINING  EXPORT  OR  IMPORT 
RATES.— (Restated    in    ruling    468.) 

390.  AGENT'S  ERROR  IN  FIXING  TIME  LIMIT  TO 
PASSENGER  TICKET.— Under  a  tariff  providing  for  an  ex- 
tension of  the  time  limit,  when  the  privilege  of  stop-over  on  a 
through  ticket  is  availed  of,  the  carrier's  agent  at  the  stop-over 
point  attached  the  necessary  certificate  but  erroneously  showed 
an  expiration  date  not  sufficiently  in  advance  to  permit  the 
holder  to  reach  destination  by  a  continuous  trip  on  a  regular 
train ;  and  in  consequence  it  was  necessary  for  the  holder  to  pay 
the  local  fare  of  a  connecting  line  to  destination  from  the  point 
where  the  time  limit  expired. 

Held,  That  the  carrier  whose  agent  made  the  error  must  bear 
the  entire  burden  of  the  refund  of  the  additional  fare.  (See  rul- 
ings 167  and  277.) 

391.  FARE  PAID  UNDER  MISAPPREHENSION  OF  A 
.PRIVILEGE  OFFERED  UNDER  A  THROUGH  TICKET.— 
A  passenger,  not  knowing  that  a  coupon  attached  to  his  through 
ticket,  and  good  for  passage  between  two  intermediate  points 
by  steamship,  might  be  exchanged  for  transportation  by  rail 
between  those  points,  failed  to  make  the  request  required  under 
the  tariff  and  purchased  a  local  railroad  ticket  therefor. 

Held,  That  that  carrier  may  not  lawfully  refund  the  amount 
of  the  local  fare. 


December  9,  1912. 

392.  MISROUTING  INVOLVING  WRONG  TERMINAL  DE- 

LIVERY.— Rescinded  by  ruling  509. 


December  10,  1912. 

393.  REFUND  OF  PASSENGER  FARE.— The  holder  of  a 
round-trip  ticket  died  at  destination,  all  required  steps  for  ex- 
tending the  time  limit  for  the  return  trip  having  been  previoush^ 
taken  except  the  affixing  of  the  holder's  signature.  Had  the 
signature  been  affixed  the  ticket  would  have  sufficed  for  the  trans- 
portation for  the  corpse.  Upon  inquiry,  Held,  That  refund  may 
be  made  by  the  carrier. 


756  Conference  Rulings. 

394.  JURISDICTION  OVER  WIRELESS  I\IESSAGES.— 
The  Commission  considers  that  it  has  jurisdiction  over  wireless 
messages  from  a  commercial  station  in  the  United  States  to  a 
ship  at  sea,  whether  it  be  a  United  States  or  foreign  ship.  It 
does  not  consider  that  it  has  jurisdiction  over  messages  between 
two  American  ships  at  sea.     (See  ruling  410.) 


December  16,  1912. 

395.  VIOLATIONS  OF  THE  FOURTH  SECTION.— Con- 
firming the  general  principle  of  an  order  entered  and  announced 
on  January  26,  1911,  it  is  Held,  That  when  a  carrier  in  obedience 
to  the  requirement  of  the  fourth  section  of  the  act  has,  after 
August  17,  1910,  corrected  discriminations  against  intermediate 
points,  it  may  not  lawfully  restore  such  discriminatory  rates  un- 
less upon  formal  application  the  Commission  finds  justifying 
circumstances  and  authorizes  a  deviation  from  the  long-and- 
short-haul  rule.  (See  ruling  406 ;  also  Cement  Rates  From  Mason 
City,  la.,  30  I.  C.  C,  429.) 


Fehruary  10,  1913. 

396.  SPECIAL  REPARATION  ON  INFORMAL  COM- 
PLAINT. SUPERSEDING  RULING  220-c.— Reparation  under 
informal  proceedings  will  be  authorized  in  instances  where  the 
tariff  rate  has  been  applied,  upon  the  filing  of  an  application 
by  the  carrier  or  carriers  which  participated  in  the  transportation 
of  the  property  in  question,  containing  an  admission  that  the  rate 
charged  was  unreasonable,  supported  by  a  statement  of  the  facts 
substantially  showing  that  the  charges  demanded  for  the  trans- 
portation service  performed  was  excessive,  that  within  a  reason- 
able time  a  tariff  naming  the  rate  upon  basis  of  which  adjustment 
is  sought  has  been  published,  and  that  such  rate  has  been  made 
lawfully  applicable  via  the  route  over  which  the  shipment  moved. 
The  Commission's  order  for  refund  on  account  of  a  reduced  rate 
or  changed  tariff  regulation  will  require  the  maintenance  of  such 
rate  or  regulation  for  at  least  one  year.  (Superseding  ruling 
38;  also  see  rulings  14,  130,  and  200-a ;  also  Riverside  Mills  v. 
Georgia  R.  R.,  20  I.  C.  C,  424;  and  Jefferson  Lumber  Co.  v.  M. 
&  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C,  44.) 


Conference  Eulings.  757 


January  6,  1913. 


397.  REPARATION  FOR  MISROUTINO.— ITntil  the  Com- 
mission otherwise  directs,  carriers  may  adjust  claims  arising 
under  item  (/')  of  Conference  Ruling  286  without  first  bringing 
them  to  the  attention  of  the  Commission ;  in  pursuing  this 
course,  however,  they  must  accept  full  responsibility  for  the 
correct  application  of  the  rule.  (See  ruling  474,  amending 
ruling  286f.) 


January  13,  1913. 

398.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  COLLEGE  SUP- 
PLIES.— A  college  maintained  largely  by  voluntary  contri- 
butions provides  free  tuition  through  scholarships  for  worthy 
and  needy  pupils,  but  collects  tuition  from  all  students  who 
are  able  to  pay  it :  Held,  That  under  section  22  of  the  act  coal 
contributed  to  the  institution  may  not  be  transported  by  carriers 
at  other  than  the  published  rates.     (See  ruling  477.) 

399.  REPORTS  BY  BRIDGE  COMPANIES.— A  bridge  com- 
pany which  has  leased  its  bridge  to  an  interstate  rail  line  must 
file  the  annual,  monthly,  and  other  reports  required  of  lessor 
companies  under  the  accounting  rules  of  the  Commission.  (See 
ruling  381.) 

400.  PASSES  FOR  TRAIN  AUDITORS  EMPLOYED  BY 
AN  AUDIT  COMPANY.— An  audit  company  under  contract 
with  several  carriers  provides  train  auditors  to  collect  tickets ; 
they  do  no  other  work  and  may  be  transferred  from  road  to  road 
as  the  parties  to  the  contract  may  require.  Upon  inquiry,  Held, 
That  a  trip  pass  may  be  issued  by  any  such  carrier  for  a  parti- 
cular journey  over  its  line  by  an  auditor  in  connection  with  its 
own  business,  but  that  annual  passes  must  not  be  granted. 


January  14,  1913. 

401.  COASTWISE  TRAFFIC  MOVING  ON  A  THROUGH 
BILL  OF  LADING  TO  INLAND  POINT.— A  through  bill  of 
lading  was  issued  on  a  shipment  routed  over  a  rail-and-water 
iroute  from,  an  inland  point  in  one  state  to  an  inland  point  in 
another  state,    Under  instructions  from  the  consignee  the  ship- 


758  Conference  Rulings. 

ment  was  delivered  by  the  coastwise  line  to  a  forwarding  com- 
pany at  the  port  of  arrival^  to  be  delivered  by  it  to  a  rail  line  for 
carriage  to  the  inland  destination  as  a  local  state  movement.  The 
delivering  rail  line  advanced  the  charges  of  the  initial  and  coast- 
wist  lines  and  those  of  the  forwarding  company  and  collected 
them,  together  with  its  own  charges,  at  destination.  The  sum  of 
the  local  rates  thus  applied  exceeded  the  through  published  rate 
from  point  of  origin  to  destination.  Held,  That  the  through 
rate  should  have  been  assessed  on  the  shipment.  (See  rulingfs 
m,  155,  201,  354,  and  422.) 


February  3,  1913. 

402.  CONCURRENCE  BY  A  LESSOR  COMPANY  IN 
RATES  PUBLISHED  BY  A  LESSEE.— When  the  lessor  com- 
pany participates  in  the  service  with  its  engines  and  crews  and 
is  compensated  therefor  on  a  percentage  division  it  should  con- 
cur in  and  be  shown  as  a  party  to  the  tariffs  of  the  lessee  nam- 
ing passenger  fares  and  freight  rates  over  the  lessor's  rails. 
(See  ruling  341.) 


February  4,  1913. 

403.  STORAGE  CHARGES  ACCRUING  DURING  RECON- 
STRUCTION OF  A  LEASED  WAREHOUSE.— A  terminal 
company  may  not  cancel  charges  that  accrued,  under  published 
rates,  on  shipments  landed  and  stored  on  its  wharf  with  its 
consent  pending  the  repair  of  a  warehouse  which  it  had  leased 
to  the  shipper  and  which  had  been  destroyed  during  a  storm. 


March  10,  1913. 

I  404.  STORAGE  CHARGES  ACCRUING  BECAUSE  OF 
WEATHER  CONDITIONS.— Because  of  inclement  weather  and 
impassable  roads  shippers  failed  to  remove  less-than-carload 
vided  in  the  tariff.  (See  rulings  242  and  313.)  See  code  of 
National  Car  Demurrage  Rules. 

freight  within  the  free  time  specified  in  the  tariffs  and  storage 
charges  resulted.  T^pon  inquiry :  Held,  That  the  same  rule  may 
be  applied  to  storage  charges  as  to  demurrage  charges  if  so  pro- 


Conference  Rulings.  759 

405.  DEMURRAGE  RULES  APPLICABLE  TO  SHIP- 
MENTS.— Before  certain  shipments  were  removed  by  the  con- 
signee at  destination  amended  demurrage  rules  became  effective 
providing  charges  after  certain  free  time  had  elapsed:  Held, 
That  the  rules  in  effect  at  the  time  the  shipments  arrived  at  the 
demurrage  point  must  control.     (See  rulings  473  and  518.) 


April  7,  1913. 

406.  VIOLATION  OF  THE  FOURTH  SECTION.— A  viola- 
tion of  the  long-and-short-haul  clause,  having  been  canceled  out 
of  its  tariffs,  may  not  lawfully  be  restored  by  the  carrier  without 
the  special  authority  of  the  Commission,  even  though  the  violation 
was  in  existence  w^hen  section  4  of  the  act  was  amended  on  June 
18,1910.     (See  ruling  395.) 

407.  COMMISSIONS  PAID  BY  TELEGRAPH  COMPA- 
NIES.— It  is  unlawful  for  a  telegraph  company  to  pay  to 
the  person,  firm,  or  company  in  whose  building  a  telegraph 
office  is  located  any  commission  on  the  messages  received  by 
or  transmitted  for  that  establishment. 


April  8,  1913. 

408.  NOTICES  OF  ORAL  ARGUMENT.  (See  current  Rules 
of  Practice.) 

409.  APPLICATION  OP  AVERAGE  AGREEMENT  UN- 
DER UNIFORM  DEMURRAGE  RULES.— No  average  agree- 
ment made  under  the  uniform  demurrage  rules  may  properly 
combine  in  one  account  the  cars  of  more  than  one  consignee ; 
each  average  agreement  must  cover  the  business  of  one  consignee 
only.  Demurrage  agreements  may  not  lawfully  be  made  with 
draymen  or  with  public  elevators  serving  various  consignees. 

This  rule  is  not  intended  to  prohibit  the  application  of  the 
average  agreement  at  a  public  elevator  or  warehouse  so  far  as  it 
applies  to  cars  consigned  to  the  elevator  or  warehouse  company. 
(See  ruling  463;  also  see  Code  of  National  Car  Demurrage 
Rules.) 

.    410.  EXCHANGE  OF  PASSES  WITH  WIRELESS  TELE- 
GRAPH COMPANIES.— It  is  the  view  of  the  Commission  that 


760  C0NFEREi<[CB    RuLINGS. 

passes  and  franks  may  lawfully  be  exchanged  between  wireless 
telegraph  companies  and  other  common  carriers  subject  to  the 
act.     (See  ruling  394.) 

411.  LABOR  AGP]NT  MAY  NOT  LAWFULLY  RECEIVE 
PASSES.— The  proprietor  of  a  labDr  agency,  who  furnishes 
laborers  to  railway  companies  and  contractors,  is  not  an  employee 
of  the  carriers  within  the  meaning  of  the  first  section  of  the  act^ 
and  passes  may  not  lawfully  be  issued  to  him. 

412.  PASSES  TO  AN  ATTORNEY  ENGAGED  IN  THE 
WORK  OF  A  CARRIER. — A  carrier  arranged  with  a  lawyer 
to  give  preferred  attention  to  its  railroad  business  at  a  monthly 
salary,  the  attorney  being  permitted  also  to  engage  in  general 
practice.  Upon  inquiry :  Held,  That  time  passes  may  not  law- 
fully be  issued  in  such  a  case  unless  substantially  all  the  attor- 
ney's time  is  devoted  to  the  work  of  the  carrier.  (See  rulings 
95a  and  208a.) 

413.  SUPPLIES  SOLD  TO  EMPLOYEES  OF  CARRIER  BY 
A  CONTRACTOR  NOT  TO  BE  TRANSPORTED  FREE.— 

An  employment  agent  is  under  contract  with  an  interstate  car- 
rier to  furnish  it  with  track  laborers  and  to  keep  them  supplied, 
even  at  remote  points  along  its  line,  with  provisions,  foodstuffs, 
iclothing,  etc.,  which  they  purchase  of  him  from  time  to  time 
with  written  orders  upon  the  carrier  against  their  pay.  The  con- 
tractor does  no  business  with  the  general  public.  Held,  That  the 
supplies  may  not  lawfully  be  transported  free.  (See  ruling  208c. 
Compare  ruling  469.) 

414.  PASSES  TO  WITNESSES  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES.— 
Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That,  in  case  of  a  criminal  prosecution 
for  theft  of  property  from  a  carrier  subject  to  1he  act,  the  car- 
rier may  lawfully  issue  to  witnesses  on  the  side  of  the  state 
interstate  passes  to  and  from  the  place  of  trial,  even  though 
the  witnesses  are  not  cmploj-ees  of  that  or  any  other  common 
carrier.      (See  ruling  ol9.) 


April  14,   1913. 

415.  EXCHANGE  OF  BILLS  OF  LADING.— The  exchange 
at  an  intermediate  point  of  one  bill  of  lading  for  anotlier.  show- 


Conference  Rulings.  761 

iug  a  different  consignor  or  consignee  or  a  different  destination, 
is  unlawful  except  in  connection  with  a  reconsigninent  or  diver- 
sion authorized  in  the  tariff.     (See  ruling  227.) 


May  6,  1913. 

416.  CONSIGNEE  RELIEVED  OP  DEMURRAGE 
CHARGES   THAT   ACCRUED   AT   POINT    OF   ORIGIN.— 

A  consignee  received  a  carload  shipment,  paid  the  freight 
charges  thereon  as  agent  for  the  shipper,  sold  the  goods,  and 
remitted  the  proceeds  to  the  shipper  after  first  deducting  the 
freight  charges.  About  six  months  afterwards  a  bill  was  pre- 
sented to  the  consignee  for  demurrage  charges  which  accrued 
at  the  shipping  point.  The  demurrage  charges  were  not  shown 
as  advance  charges,  but  a  clear  bill  of  lading  was  issued  by  the 
carrier.  Upon  inquiry :  Held,  That  the  issuance  of  a  clear  bill 
of  lading  by  the  carrier  and  its  failure  to  bill  the  demurrage 
as  advance  charges  relieves  the  consignee  from  the  obligation 
to  pay  the  demurrage  charges,  and  the  initial  carrier  must 
look  elsewhere  for  their  payment. 

417.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  TRAINED  NURSE 
IN  FAMILY  OF  EMPLOYEE.— Upon  inquiry  whether  a  train- 
ed nurse  is  entitled  to  free  transportation,  under  section  1  of 
the  act,  when  in  attendance  upon,  and  traveling  with,  an  em- 
ployee of  a  carrier,  who  is  himself  entitled  to  free  transpor- 
tation, or  with  one  of  his  family,  the  Commission  affirms  its 
definition  of  the  term  ''families"  a.s  contained  in  Conference 
Ruling  95c  and,  conforming  to  its  uniform  practice  with  res- 
pect to  such  matters,  declines  to  determine  whether  particular 
individuals  are  eligible  to  receive  free  transportation. 


May  12,  1913. 

418.  INTERSTATE  CARRIER  DEFINED.— An  electric 
street  railway,  with  a  large  passenger  traffic  and  a  substantial 
intrastate  freight  movement,  derives  a  very  small  percentage 
of  its  revenue  from  shipments  moving  between  interstate  points. 
It  asserts  that  its  entire  freight  service,  both  state  and  interstate, 
is  performed  as  a  matter  of  accommodation  1o  patrons  along 
its  line. 


762  Conference  Rulings. 

Upon  inquiry :  Held,  That  if  a  company  engages  in  interstate 
commerce  at  all  it  thereby  becomes  subject  to  the  act  and  is 
amenable  to  its  provisions  with  respect  to  making  statistical, 
annual,  and  other  reports  to  the  Commission  and  must  file 
tariffs     (See  rulings  197  and  368.) 

419.  REPARATION  ON  THE  BASIS  OF  STATE  RATES. 
— Upon  further  consideration  Conference  Billing  251  is  modi- 
fied as  follows: 

The  Commission  will  not  recognize  as  a  basis  for  reparation 
any  rate  that  is  not  on  file  with  it,  except  that  in  misrouting 
cases  a  lower  state  rate  not  on  file  here  may  be  accepted  as  the 
basis  for  reparation  when  officially  verified  by  local  authorities. 
(Se  ruling  93;  also  Lathrop  Lumber  Co.  v.  A.  G.  S.  R.  B..  27 
I.  C.  C.  250,  and  McCaull-Dimmore  Co.  v.  G.  N.  By.,  41  I.  C. 
C,  178.) 


June  3,  1913. 

420.  JURISDICTION  OVER  TELEPHONE  COMPANIES 
IN  PORTO  RICO.— It  is  the  view  of  the  Commission  that  it 
has  no  jurisdicion  over  the  service  and  rates  of  telephone  com- 
panies the  lines  of  which  are  wholly  within  Porto  Rico. 

421.  A  CARRIER  MAY  NOT  LEASE  ITS  ELEVATORS 
AT  A  NOMINAL  RENTAL. — An  interstate  carrier  desires  to 
lease  to  a  grain  dealer  at  a  nominal  rental  an  elevator  which 
has  not  been  in  use  for  some  time,  and  which  the  carrier  is 
anxious  to  dispose  of  because  the  operation  of  the  elevator 
would  attract  business  to  the  road.  Upon  inquiry :  Held, 
That  such  a  transaction  would  be  illegal  (See  rulings  94  and 
325.) 


June  5,  1913. 

422.  JURISDICTION  OVER  TRAFFIC  MOVING  ON 
THROUGH  BILL  OF  LADING  TO  HAWAII— A  steamship 
company  filed  a  porportional  tariff  with  the  Commission  pro- 
viding export  commodity  rates  from  a  port  in  the  United 
States  to  a  port  in  the  territory  of  Hawaii.  The  traffic  was 
covered  by  through  bills  of  lading  from  inland  points  in  the 
Ignited  States  to  the  port  of  transshipment  and  moved  under 


Conference  Rulings.  703 

tariffs  filed  with  the  Commission.  Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That 
imder  the  Panama  Canal  act  the  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
over  shipments  moving  under  the  steamship  company's  pro- 
portional tariff.     (See  rulings  66,  155,  201,  354,  and  401.) 

423.  COMBINATION  RATE  MAY  NOT  BE  APPLIED 
UNTIL  JOINT  THROUGH  RATE  IS  CANCELED.— A 
mixed  carload  shipment  moved  under  a  joint  mixed  carload 
rate.  There  was  also  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the  shipment  a 
combination  carload  rate  on  the  heavier  weighted  commodity 
in  the  mixture  and  a  through  less-than-carload  rate  on  the 
lighter  weighted  commodity,  which  made  a  lower  charge  than 
that  based  on  the  joint  mixed  carload  rate.  The  joint  mixed 
carload  rate  had  not  been  canceled.  Upon  inquiry :  Held, 
That  a  refund  to  the  basis  of  the  lower  combination  could  not 
lawfully  be  made. 

424.  ABSORPTION  OF  SWITCHING  CHARGES  OF  AN 
INDUSTRY. — An  industry  operates  its  own  rails  as  a  plant 
facility  to  a  connection  with  the  plant  rails  of  another  industrial 
concern,  the  latter  rails,  on  the  other  side  of  the  plant,  con- 
necting with  the  rails  of  an  interstate  carrier.  The  trunk  line 
desires  to  extend  its  service  to  the  rails  of  the  first  industry. 
The  intermediate  industry  refuses  trackage  rights  to  the  car- 
rier but  will  continue  itself  to  switch  cars  to  it,  and  will  accept 
compensation  therefor  from  the  carrier  instead  of  from  the  other 
industry,  provided  this  course  does  not  sul)ject  it  to  the  act 
as  a  common  carrier. 

It  is  the  view  of  the  Commission  that  the  service  performed 
by  the  intermediate  industry  is  a  service  for  the  shipper  and 
luot  for  the  carrier  and  that  the  carrier  may  not  lawfully  ab- 
,sorb  the  switching  charge  of  the  intermediate  industry. 

425.  REPARATION     CLAIMS      ON     THE      INFORMAL 

DOCKET. — Upon  further  consideration  Conference  Ruling  376 
is  amended  to  read  as  follows : 

In  special  docket  cases  no  order  as  to  the  rate  for  the  future 
shall  be  entered  where  the  joint  rate  in  effect  at  the  time  of 
shipment  exceeded  the  aggregate  of  the  intermediate  rates  and 
the  rates  have  been  subsequently  changed  in  sufh  a  manner  as 
that  at  the  time  the  order  of  the  Commission  is  entered  the 


764  Conference  Rulings. 

I  through  rate  does  not  exceed  the  sum  of  the  intermediate  rates, 
or  in  cases  where  at  tlie  time  the  shipment  moved  the  rate  for 
a  short  haul  was  greater  than  tlie  rate  for  a  longer  haul  over 
the  same  line  or  route,  in  the  same  direction,  the  shorter  being 
included  within  the  longer  distance  and  the  rates  have  been 
subsequently  changed  in  such  a  manner  that  at  the  time  the 
distance  does  not  exceed  the  rate  for  the  longer  distance. 
(Modifying  ruling  200rt..) 


June  9,  1913. 

426.  TIME  PASSES  TO  LOCAL  ATTORNEYS,  SUR- 
GEONS, ETC. — The  Commission  adheres  to  the  ruling  many 
times  repeated  that  it  is  uidawful  for  an  interstate  carrier  to 
issue  time  passes  to  local  attorneys,  surgeons,  and  others,  who 
do  not  devote  subtantially  all  their  time  to  the  work  or  busi- 
ness of  the  carrier.  The  principle  of  Conference  Ruling  208-a 
is  reaffirmed.     (See  ruling  449.) 

427.  INDUSTRIAL  SWITCHING  TRACKS>— Restated  in 
ruling  512. 

428.  PAYMENT  BY  RAIL  CARRIERS  OF  ADVANCE 
CHARGES  ON  IMPORT  TRAFFIC— A  rail  carrier  may  not 
advance  charges  to  an  ocean  carrier  on  import  traffic  except 
under  a  proper  provision  therefor  in  its  tariffs.  When  such 
advance  charges  are  made  the  freight  bill  of  th^  rail  line  must 
show  in  separate  items  the  charges  so  advanced  and  the  charges 
of  the  inland  carrier  or  carriers;  it  must  also  show  the  tariff 
rate  or  rates  of  the  inland  carrier  or  carriers.  The  name  of 
the  ocean  carrier  to  which  the  charges  are  advanced  must  also 
be  shown. 

In  order  that  carriers  may  have  time  in  which  to  ad,just  their 
tariffs  in  conformity  herewith  this  ruling  will  become  effective 
on  August  15,  1913.  (See  rulings  62  and  444;  also  Express 
Rates,  Practices,  Accounts,  and  Revenues,  U.  R.   Op.   A-980.) 


June  16,  1913. 

429.  FREE  OR  REDUCED  RATE  TRANSPORTATION 
TO  FAMILIES  AND  HOUSEHOLD  GOODS  OF  POSTAL 
CLERKS. — The  law  does  not  authorize  free  or  reduced  rate 


Conference  Rulings.  7f<5 

transportation  for  the  families  and  household  goods  of  postal 
clerks  whose  headquarters  were  changed  for  the  convenience 
of  a  carrier. 

430.  TIE  INSPECTORS  NOT  ENTITLED  TO  FREE 
TRANSPORTATION.— A  man  who  has  a  contract  to  furnish 
ties  to  an  interstate  carrier  may  not  lawfully  have  free  trans- 
portation as  a  tie  inspector.     (See  ruling  386.) 

431.  REDUCED  RATE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  CON- 
VICTS UNLAWFUL.— It  is  the  view  of  the  Commission  that 
reduced  interstate  fares  may  not  be  granted  by  carriers  for 
transporting  to  the  penitentiary  persons  convicted  in  the 
United  States  courts  for  violation  of  Federal  laws. 


June  18,  1914. 

432.  WAIVER  OF  UNDERCHARGES.— (Canceled  by  rul- 
ing 472.) 


June  23,  1913. 

433.  SHIPPER  LIABLE  FOR  HIS  ERROR  IN  MAKING 
L.  C.  L.  SHIP]\IENTS. — Besides  being  expressly  so  provided 
in  the  rules  of  all  freight  classifications,  it  is  on  broad  general 
grounds  the  duty  of  a  shipper  correctly  to  mark  packages  of 
less-than-carload  freight  intended  for  transportation,  and  when 
so  marked  the  carrier  is  held  to  a  strict  responsibility  for  their 
safe  delivery  at  destination. 

A  package  of  merchandise  was  addressed  by  a  shipper  to 
Lake  City,  Fla.,  instead  of  Lake  City  S.  C.  Held,  That  the 
shipper  making  the  error  must  bear  the  burden  of  the  resulting 
freight  charges,  and  the  fact  that  the  correct  address  was  noted 
on  the  bill  of  lading  is  not  material.  Parlin  &  Orendorff  Flow 
Co.  V.  United  States  Express  Co.,  26  I.  C.  C,  561,  reaffirmed. 
(See  rulings  237  and  248;  also  Amepican  Agricultural  Chemical 
Co.  V.  B.  &  0.  B.  B.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C,  401.) 

Jtily  23,  1913. 

434.  PASSES  TO  OFFICIALS  OF  RAILROADS  IN  ADJA- 
CENT    FOREIGN     COUNTRIES.- Free  interstate  transpor- 


76fi  Conference  Kulings. 

tation  may  lawfully  be  issued  to  officials  of  any  railroad  in 
an  adjacent  foreign  country  which  has  filed  with  this  Commis- 
sion  joint  tariffs  and  concurrences  in  connection  with  interstate 
carriers  in  the  United  States  without  reservation  as  to  the 
Commission's  jurisdiction.     (See  ruling  475.) 


Jidy  24,  1913. 

435.  DESTRUCTION  OF  RECORDS.— It  is  the  view  of  he 
Commission  that  all  maps,  profiles,  plans,  specifications,  esti- 
mates of  work,  records  of  engineering  studies,  field  books,  and 
other  records  pertaining  to  the  physical  property  of  carriers 
come  within  the  prohibition  of  destruction  contained  in  section 
20  of  the  act,  and  as  such  shall  not  be  destroyed  or  otherwise  dis- 
posed of  unless  their  destruction  be  specifically  authorized  in 
the  orders  of  the  Commission  in  the  matter  of  the  destruction 
of  records.  (See  orders  of  the  Commission  governing  the  des- 
truction of  records.) 


Jiihj  25,  1913. 

436.  PASSES  TO  DIRECTORS  OF  A  CARRIER  IN  THE 
HANDS  OF  RECEIVER.— When  the  management  of  a  rail- 
road company  has  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  receivers  and  the 
officers  and  directors  of  the  railroad  company  are  not  employed 
by  the  receivers :  Held,  That  such  officers  and  directors  are  not 
entitled  to  free  transportation.      (See  ruling  165.) 

437  EMBARGOES  ON  ACCOUNT  OF  REVOLUTION  IN 
ADJACENT  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES.— Embargoes  against 
the  receipt  of  freight  have  been  astablished  by  Mexican  rail- 
roads at  different  times  on  account  of  revolutionary  troubles 
in  Mexico.  Upon  inquiry:  Ecld,  That  interstate  carriers  in 
the  United  States  under  the  special  circumstances  Mill  be  per- 
mitted to  file  with  the  Commission  the  proper  application  for 
authority  to  establish  on  short  notice  tariffs  naming  the  con- 
ditions and  rates  under  which  they  will  return  or  otherwise  dis- 
pose of  property  billed  to  points  in  IMexico,  but  which  they 
have  been  unable  to  deliver  because  of  the  revolutionary  con- 
ditions in  that  country.  It  is  understood  that  the  tariffs  will 
arrange   that   those    carriers   which   participated    in    the    haul 


Conference  Rulings.  767 

within  the  United  States  will  prorate  the  expenses  of  per  diem, 
storage,  loading,  and  unloading  of  the  shipments  or  of  their 
return  to  the  points  of  origin. 

438.  REFUND  OF  PASSENGER  FARES.~A  ticket  was 
purchased  for  an  interstate  journey  during  a  time  of  high  water, 
the  agent  stating  that  through  trains  were  being  operated  with- 
out difficulty  or  delay.  Upon  arrival  of  the  train  at  an  inter- 
mediate point  the  conductor  informed  the  passenger  that  the 
train  would  be  abandoned  on  account  of  high  water.  The  pas- 
senger then  purchased  a  ticket  back  to  the  point  of  origin. 
Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That  a  refund  of  all  the  fares  paid  on  the 
trip  may  be  made,  provided  the  railroad  company  publishes  a 
general  tariff  rule  providing  a  refund  of  fares  to  all  passengers 
affected  by  such  circumstances  and  conditions. 

439.  COMPANY  MATERIAL  HAULED  OVER  ANOTHER 
LINE  UNDER  TRACKAGE  RIGHTS.— A  carrier  having 
trackage  rights  permitting  it  to  haul  general  traffic  may  haul 
its  own  company  material  over  the  leased  track  as  over  its 
own  rails.  In  the  case  passed  upon  in  Conference  Rulmg  153 
there  was  no  arrangement  for  handling  commercial  freight 
over  the  leased  track. 

440.  DESTRUCTION  OF  RECORDS.— An  express  company 
has  retired  from  business  and  asks  permission  to  destroy  cer- 
tain of  its  records :  Held,  That  in  the  absence  of  special  per- 
mission by  the  Commission  the  records  must  not  be  destroyed 
except  under  the  rules  of  the  Commission. 

441.  TARIFFS  COVERING  ABSORPTION  OF  DRAY- 
AGE  CHARGES. — The  absorption  of  drayage  charges  being 
under  consideration,  the  Commission  holds : 

{a)  Where  there  is  an  additional  transfer  or  drayage  charge 
in  connection  with  a  through  shipment,  the  carrier's  tariffs  must 
specify  what  that  charge  shall  be. 

(&)  If  such  drayage  or  transfer  charge  is  absorbed,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  by  a  carrier,  the  tariffs  must  show  the  amount  of 
such  transfer  charge  that  will  be  absorbed. 

(c)  A  drayage  firm  is  not  a  proper  party  to  a  joint  tariff 
nor  is  it  a  carrier  under  the  provisions  of  our  act;  therefore, 
no  tariffs  can  properly  be  filed  by  it. 


768  Conference  Rulings. 

(d)  There  is  no  provision  in  the  law  which  requires,  and  the 
Commission  has  no  authority  to  require,  a  carrier  to  confine 
such  drayage  to  one  draymen  or  one  firm  of  draymen. 

(e)  The  responsibility  in  case  of  loss  and  damage  while  a 
shipment  is  in  charge  of  truckman  to  whom  it  has  been  com- 
mitted by  the  carrier  is  a  question  for  the  carrier  to  resolve, 
and  is  not  for  our  determination. 

442.  FEEDING  AND  GRAZING  IN  TRXNSIT.— Confer- 
ence Ruling  17  is  amended  to  read  as  follows : 

In  connection  with  the  published  privilege  of  feeding  and 
grazing  in  transit,  or  where  carriers  are  required  to  feed  live 
stock  in  transit,  under  the  provision  of  an  act  approved  June 
29,  1906,  commonly  called  the  28-hour  law,  carriers  may  law- 
fully pro^^de  in  their  tariffs  that  they  will  furnish  feed  at 
current  market  prices  and  bill  the  cost  thereof,  together  with 
an  addition  not  exceeding  10  per  cent  of  such  cost  to  cover 
the  value  of  their  services,  as  advance  charges. 


October  7,  1913. 

443.  THROUGH  RATE  ONLY  LAWFUL  RATE  FOR 
THROUGH  SHIPMENTS.— Upon  inquiry  as  to  whether  a 
through  distance  tariff  rate  should  be  applied  in  cases  where  a 
combination  i^ate  made  up  of  a  rate  to  an  intermediate  point 
and  a  distance  tariff  rate  beyond  makes  a  lower  though 
charge:  Held,  That  the  through  rate  is  the  only  lawful  rate. 
(See  ruling  220^.) 

444.  ADVANCES  OF  CUSTOMHOUSE  BROKERAGE 
FEES. — Rail  carriers  may  properly  advance  customhouse  brok- 
erage fees  and  import  duties  and  charges  only  when  proper 
provision  therefor  is  made  in  their  published  tariffs.  (See 
rulings  7,  221,  and  300.) 

445.  CHECKING  SAMPLE  BAGGAGE.— When  carriers' 
tariffs  provide  for  checking  sample  baggage  and  define  sample 
baggage  as  that  which  is  carried  for  display  and  not  for  dis- 
tribution or  sale,  it  is  not  lawful  to  distribute  or  sell  articles 
contained  in  such  baggage  at  any  point  to  which  it  has  been 
so  checked.  Such  articles  may  lawfully  be  distributed  or  sold 
at  any  point  to  which  they  are  shipped  by  mail,  freight,  or  Q?.- 


Conference  Eulings.  769 

press,  and  they  may  lawfully  be  so  shipped  from  a  point  to 
which  they  have  been  checked  as  baggage  for  use  as  samples  or 
for  display.  (See  ruling  455;  see  also  Jewelers'  Protective  Un- 
ion V.  P.  R.  R.,  36  I.  C.  C,  73.) 


November  4,  1913. 

446.  PASSES  TO  STATION  AGENT  WHO  DEVOTES 
ONLY  PART  TIME  TO  RAILROAD  DUTIES.— Upon  in- 
quiry :  Held,  That  a  station  agent  employed  by  a  railroad  com- 
pany may  not  lawfully  receive  free  transportation  when  he 
employs  other  persons  to  perform  his  duties  so  that  he  may  de- 
vote the  greater  part  of  his  time  to  other  business.  (See  ruling 
208a.) 

447.  APPLICATION  OF  FOURTH  SECTION.— The  pro- 
visions of  the  fourth  section  apply  where  the  point  of  origin  is 
in  an  adjacent  foreign  country  and  the  intermediate  point  and 
more  distant  point  of  destination  are  in  the  United  States,  or 
where  the  point  of  origin  and  the  intermediate  point  are  in 
the  United  States  and  the  more  distant  point  of  destination  is 
in  an  adjacent  country.     (See  ruling  318.) 

448.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  MEMBERS  OF 
FAMILIES  OF  EMPLOYEES  OF  BUREAUS  OF  CAR- 
RIERS.— LTpon  inquiry  it  was  agreed  that  Conference  Ruling 
371,  holding  that  employees  of  bureaus  maintained  by  com- 
mon carriers  may  lawfully  use  free  transportation,  must  neces- 
sarily be  understood  as  meaning  that  members  of  their  families 
may  also  lawfully  use  free  passes. 


December  1,  1913. 

449.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  VETERINARY 
SURGEONS. — A  veterinary  surgeon  not  earned  regularly  on 
the  pay  rolls  of  a  carrier  but  engaged  by  the  carrier  to  examine 
live  stock  offered  for  shipment  or  to  care  for  injured  stock  may 
not  be  furnished  wdth  a  term  pass  but  may  lawfully  use  a  trip 
pass  over  the  lines  of  a  carrier  w^hen  performing  a  bona  fide 
service  for  it.     (See  rulings  208a,  2086,  and  426.) 


770  Conference  Rulings. 

December  4,  1913. 

450.  TARIFFS  OF  A  RAILROAD  SYSTEM— THE 
TRADE  NAjME. — The  tariffs  and  concurrences  of  a  railroad 
system  must  show,  in  addition  to  its  trade  name,  the  corporate 
title  or  titles  of  the  various  lines  of  which  the  system  is  com- 
posed. 


January  6,  1914. 

451.  DE:\IURRAGE  charges  on  D'A]\IAGED  SHIP- 
MENTS.— The  uncertainty  of  a  consignee  as  to  whether  or  not 
he  will  accept  a  damaged  shipment  does  not  justify  the  carrier 
in  waiving  the  demurrage  charges  accruing  on  the  shipment 
pending  his  decision. 

452.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  PROPERTY  FOR 
TOWNSHIPS  AND  COUNTIES.— Upon  inquiry:  Held, 
That  townships  and  coiuities  are  municipalities  within  the  mean- 
ing of  section  22  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce  and  carriers 
may  lawfully  transport  their  property  free  or  at  reduced  rates. 
(See  rulings  33,  36,  297,  and  311.) 

453.  CHANGE  OF  ROUTE  BY  CONSIGNEE.— Rescinded 
by  ruling  502. 


Januanj  12,  1914. 

454.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  CUSTOMS 
BROKER. — A  customs  broker  emploj'ed  by  a  carrier  on  a  com- 
mission basis  and  not  paid  a  regular  salary  and  who  does  not 
devote  substantially  all  his  time  to  the  service  of  the  company  is 
not  entitled  to  use  free  transportation.     (See  ruling  208a.) 


Fchruanj  3,  1914. 

455.  SALE  OF  PROPERTY  TRANSPORTED  AS  BAG- 
GAGE.— Upon  inquiry  as  to  whether  or  not  it  is  unlawful  for 
a  person  to  sell  property  transported  as  baggage  and  upon  which 
excess  baggage  charges  on  the  entire  weight  are  paid :  Held, 
That  if  the  carrier 's  tariffs  make  provision  for  the  transportation 
of  .such  property  at  excess  baggage  rates  on  the  entire  weight  it 
would  not  be  in  violation  of  the  law  to  dispose  of  the  property 


Conference  Rulings.  771 

by  sale  or  otherwise.     (See  ruling  445;  also  Jewelers'  Protective 
Union  v.  P.  B.  B.,  36  I.  C.  C,  73.) 


3Iarch  2,  1914. 

456.     WRITTEN  NOTICE  TO  CARRIER  CONSTITUTES 
PRESENTATION  OF  CLAIM.— Restated  in  ruling  510. 


March  3,  1914. 

457.  WRITTEN  STATEMENTS  OF  RATES  FURNISHED 
BY  Carriers. — it  is  the  understanding  of  the  Commission 
that  under  section  6  of  the  act  carriers  are  recjuired  to  make 
written  statements  as  to  rates  only  in  relation  to  shipments  about 
to  be  made  or  shipments  affected  by  contracts  about  to  be  en- 
tered into,  and  that  the  provisions  of  that  section  do  not  re- 
quire carriers  to  expend  their  time  and  labor  in  making  such 
statements  upon  demands  therefor  by  individuals  wishing  to  is- 
sue books  or  notices  of  rates,  or  for  other  purely  speculative  pur- 
poses. 


March  16,  1914. 

458.  LOSS  OP  RETURN  PORTION  OF  PASSENGER- 
FARE  TICKET  BY  AGENT  OF  CARRIER.— The  return  por- 
tion of  a  passenger-fare  ticket  was  lost  by  the  agent  of  a  carrier, 
and  the  carrier  was  obliged  to  furnish  the  traveler  another  ticket 
upon  which  to  complete  the  return  journey.  Upon  inquiry: 
Held,  That  the  carrier  at  fault  must  assume  the  entire  loss  and 
pay  to  each  carrier  interested  its  proportion  of  the  value  of 
ticket  furnished  in  lieu  of  the  return  portion  of  ticket  lost.  If, 
however,  the  return  portion  of  ticket  is  later  found,  the  carriers 
receiving  settlement  for  the  ticket  furnished  in  lieu  thereof  may 
properly  return  the  amounts  received  in  settlement  of  the  ad- 
ditional ticket  furnished. 


April  13,  1914. 

459.  PASSES  FOR  SUPERINTENDENT  OF  MAIL  SERV- 
ICE OF  THE  CANADIAN  GOVERNIMENT.— It  is  the  view 
of  the  Commission  that  free  annual  transportation  may  not  law- 


772  Conference  Rulings, 

fully  be  issued  to  a  superintendent  of  mail  service  of  the  Ca- 
nadian government. 

460.  TELEGRAMS  AND  CABLEGRA]\IS.— The  practice  by 
telegraph  and  cable  companies  of  returning  to  patrons  the  origi- 
nal telegrams  or  cablegrams  in  support  of  their  bills  is  unlaw- 
ful. Such  documents  must  be  retained  in  conformity  with  the 
regulations  of  the  Commission  governing  the  destruction  of  rec- 
ords of  telephone,  telegraph,  and  cable  companies. 

April  14,  1914. 

461.  WATER  CARRIERS  CONTROLLED  BY  OTHER 
CO:\I]\ION  CARRIERS.— Section  5  of  the  act  as  amended  by 
the  Panama  Canal  act  prohibits  common  carriers  subject  to  the 
act  to  have,  after  July  1,  1914,  any  interest,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, in  any  common  carrier  by  water,  or  any  vessel  carrying 
freight  or  passengers,  with  which  said  carrier  does  or  may  com- 
pete for  traffic. 

The  manifest  purpose  of  this  law  is  to  bring  about  discon- 
tinuance of  common  ownership  or  control  of  water  carriers  ex- 
cept in  those  in.stances  in  which,  after  investigation  and  hearing, 
it  is  found  that  such  operation  is  in  the  interest  of  the  public 
or  of  advantage  to  the  convenience  and  commerce  of  the  people, 
and  neither  excludes,  prevents,  nor  reduces  competition  on  the 
route  by  water.  The  act  does  not  in  specific  words  authorize  the 
continuance  of  such  common  ownership  or  control  beyond  July 
1,  1914,  pending  the  decision  of  the  Commission  on  application 
relative  thereto;  but  it  is  provided  that  any  application  filed  be- 
fore July  1,  1914,  may  be  considered  and  granted  thereafter.  It 
is  not  conceivable  that  the  Congress  intended  that  the  service 
should  be  withdrawn  from  the  public  on  July  1,  1914,  if  for  good 
and  sufficient  reasons  it  had  been  impossible  for  the  Commission 
to  determine  the  questions  presented  in  the  application  before 
that  date.  Although  the  language  employed  is  difi'erent,  it 
seems  that  the  legislative  intent  was  similar  to  that  expressed  in 
the  amended  fourth  section  of  the  act  and  in  the  safety  appliance 
acts. 

The  Commission  therefore  interprets  the  amendment  to  section 
5  of  the  act  as  contemplating  and  authorizing  a  continuance  of 
any  existing  common  ownership  or  control  after  July  1,  1919, 


Conference  Rulings.  773 

between  rail  and  other  carriers  and  water  carriers  not  traversing 
the  Panama  Canal  until  such  time  as  the  Commission  has  passed 
upon  the  application  relative  thereto,  provided  such  application 
is  filed  with  the  Commission  prior  to  July  1,  1914. 


April  25,  1914. 

462.  CARRIER  MUST  INVESTIGATE  BEFORE  PAYING 
CLAIMS. — Upon  further  consideration  Conference  Ruling  15 
is  modified  as  follows : 

A  carrier  can  not  shield  itself  from  responsibility  in  paying  a 
claim  by  accepting  the  authority  of  a  connecting  line  to  pay  it, 
but  must  ascertain  the  lawfulness  of  the  claim  and  allow  it  or  not 
upon  the  basis  of  its  own  investigation.  This  is  not  to  be  un- 
derstood, however,  as  requiring  each  carrier  interested  in  the 
claim  to  make  an  independent  investigation.  The  principle  of 
direct  investigation  embodied  in  the  rules  of  the  freight  claim 
association,  whereby  the  carrier  against  which  a  claim  is  pre- 
sented undertakes  to  make  the  investigation  for  itself  and  for 
the  other  carriers  concerned  in  the  joint  movement  out  of  which 
the  claim  arises,  is  approved  by  the  Commission  as  a  means  of 
expediting  the  adjustment  of  claims.  In  all  cases,  however,  the 
investigation  so  made  must  be  thorough  and  must  disclose  a  law- 
ful basis  for  payment  before  the  claim  is  adjusted.  (See  ruling 
236;  also  Charleston  &  W.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Varnville  Co.,  237 
U.  S.,  597.) 


May  19,  1914. 

463.  APPLICATION  OF  THE  AVERAGE  AGREEMENT 
UNDER  UNIFORM  DEMURRAGE  RULES.— A  storage  ware- 
house company  which  is  specifically  designated  as  the  consignee 
of  carloads  of  miscellaneous  freight,  the  property  of  others, 
and  which  company  is  responsible  for  the  unloading  and  for 
the  detention  of  cars  so  received,  may  be  made  the  subject  of 
the  average  demurrage  rule.  Cars  arriving  otherwise  consigned 
and  afterwards  ordered  to  the  warehouse  for  storage  may  not  be 
included  under  the  average  agreement  with  the  warehouse  com- 
pany.    (See  ruling  409.) 


774  Conference  Rulings. 

May  28, 1914. 

464.     INTEREST   UPON   OVERCHARGE    CLAIMS.— Re- 

Btated  in  ruling  489. 


July  11,  1914. 

465.  ORDERS  ISSUED  ABROAD  FOR  DOMESTIC  PAS- 
SENGER TICKETS.— Under  an  arrangement  with  the  rail  car- 
riers trans-Atlantic  steamship  lines  in  selling  a  ticket  for  ocean 
passage  from  a  foreign  port  will  also  sell  an  order  upon  a  rail 
line  for  transportation  from  the  port  of  arrival  to  an  inland 
point,  based  on  the  fare  in  force  at  the  time  the  order  is  i.ssued. 
Upon  inquiry  as  to  whether  a  carrier  may  honor  such  an  order 
when  the  fare  has  been  changed  between  the  date  of  its  issue  and 
the  date  of  its  presentation :  Held,  That  the  order  may  be  hon- 
ored on  the  basis  of  the  fare  in  effect  at  the  time  it  was  sold,  pro- 
vided the  rail  carrier  has  published  an  appropriate  tariff  provi- 
sion for  the  acceptance  of  .such  orders  at  th(!  fares  in  effect 
when  they  were  issued. 

July  17,  1914. 

466.  PASSES  FOR  OFFICERS  AND  E:\IPL0YEES  OF 
TAP  LINES. — Under  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  in  The  Tap  Line  Cases,  234  U.  S.,  1,  it  is  the 
view  of  the  Commission  that  the  law  does  not  prohil)it  the  use 
of  interstate  free  passes  by  the  officers  and  employees  of  common- 
carrier  tap  lines  who  devote  substantially  all  their  time  to  the 
service  of  the  tap  line  and  where,  by  the  use  of  such  free  passes, 
no  unlawful  discriminations  are  effected.  (See  ruling  208a  and 
The  Tap  Line  Case,  31  I.  C.  C,  494.) 


July  29,  1914. 

467.  EXCURSION  TICKET  ISSUED  ON  DATE  NOT  AU- 
THORIZED BY  TARIFF.— A  .station  agent  sold  a  colonist 
ticket  at  a  reduced  fare  before  the  commencement  of  the  period 
designated  in  the  tariff.  Upon  inquiry :  Held,  That  the  selling 
carrier  is  responsible  for  the  error  and  in  settlement  with  its  con- 
nections must  allow  them  their  usual  divisions  of  the  fare  law- 
fullv  in  effect  on  the  date  of  sale. 


Conference  Rulings.  775 

December  23,  1914. 

468.  EXPORT  AND  IMPORT  RATES— CONFERENCE 
RULING  389  RESTATED.— In  order  to  avoid  controversies 
and  questions:  Held,  That  tariffs  hereafter  issued  containing 
rates  applicable  to  export  or  import  traffic  shall  specify,  by  in- 
clusion or  exclusion,  the  countries  to  or  from  which  such  rates  are 
applicable,  whether  such  countries  are  or  are  not  adjacent  to 
the  United  States. 

In  the  interest  of  clearness  the  tariffs  should  also  specify 
whether  or  not  shipments  to  or  from  Cuba,  the  Philippine  Is- 
lands, Porto  Rico,  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  or  the  Canal  Zone  are 
included.     (See  rulings  353,  359,  and  369.) 

469.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  SUPPLIES  FOR  LA- 
BORERS.— Upon  inquiry  as  to  whether  or  not  a  carrier  may 
transport  without  charge  food  or  other  supplies  for  the  use  of 
laborers  employed  on  its  line :  Held,  That  such  shipments  may 
not  be  carried  free  except  when  shipped  hy  an  agent  of  the  car- 
rier acting  for  it  and  for  whose  actions  the  carrier  assumes  and 
accepts  responsibility.     (Compare  ruling  413.) 


December  24,  1914. 

470.  SPECIAL  RATES  ON  SHIPMENTS  IN  FOREIGN 
CARS. — A  carrier  may  not  by  tariff  limit  the  application  of  cer- 
tain proportional  rates  to  shipments  in  cars  of  other  can'iers. 

January  19,  1915. 

471.  CHANGES  IN  RECONSIGNMENT  CHARGES.— At 

the  time  a  shipment  commenced  to  move  from  the  point  of  origin 
the  tariff  provided  four  days  free  time  for  reconsignment,  but 
before  the  shipment  reached  the  reconsigning  point  the  time 
had  been  lawfully  reduced  to  one  day:  Held,  That  the  tariff  in 
effect  when  the  shipment, was  made  applied. 


May  3,  1915. 

472.  WAIVER  OF  UNDERCHARGES.-On  and  after 
August  1,  1915,  the  Commission  will  not  consider  on  the  infor- 
mal docket  any  application  for  authority  to  waive  collection  of 
undercharges  in  connection  with  shipments  delivered  subsequent 


776  Conference  Rulings. 

to  July  31,  1915.     Conference  Rulings  258  and  432  are  hereby 
rescinded  as  of  Augnst  1,  1915. 


May  24,  1915. 

473.  DEMURRAGE  AND  STORAGE  RULES.— Upon  in- 
quiry and  to  remove  the  confusion  that  exists  among  carriers 
and  shippers  it  is  Held,  That  demurrage  and  storage  in  transit 
are  controlled  by  the  tariff  in  effect  when  the  initial  movement 
begins ;  that  demurrage  on  outbound  shipments  is  controlled  by 
the  tariff  in  effect  when  the  car  is  actually  set  for  loading ;  that 
demurrage  and  track  storage  at  destination  are  controlled  by 
the  tariff  in  effect  when  the  car  is  actually  or  constructively  set 
for  unloading;  and  that  offtrack  storage  by  a  carrier  at  des- 
tination, in  its  warehouse  or  otherwise,  is  controlled  by  the  tariff 
in  effect  at  the  time  such  storage  begins.  (See  rulings  405  and 
518.) 


May  25,  1915. 

474.  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIMS  FOR  DAMAGES  RE- 
SULTING FROM  MISROUTING.— CoH/ere/ice  Bulings  286-d 
and  286-f  are  amended  to  read  as  follows : 

(a)  It  is  the  duty  of  a  carrier  to  make  delivery  in  accordance 
with  routing  directions.  Where  such  routing  instructions  have 
not  been  followed  and  delivery  is  tendered  at  another  terminal 
than  that  designated,  it  remains  the  duty  of  the  delivering  car- 
rier to  make  delivery  at  the  terminal  designated  in  routing  in- 
structions, either  by  a  switch  movement  or  by  carting.  In  either 
event  the  additional  expense  involved  in  making  such,  delivery 
must  be  borne  entirely  by  the  carrier  responsilile  for  the  mis- 
routing  and  the  reimbursement  thereof  to  the  delivering  carrier 
may  be  made  by  the  carrier  at  fault  without  a  specific  order  of 
the  Commiasion.     (See  ruling  214cZ.) 

(&)     Restated  in  ruling  509. 

(c)  The  obligation  lawfully  rests  upon  the  carrier's  agent  to 
refrain  from  executing  a  bill  of  lading  which  contains  provisions 
that  can  not  lawfully  be  complied  with  or  provisions  which  are 
contradictory,  and  therefore  impossible  of  execution.  When, 
therefore,  the  rate  and  the  route  are  both  given  by  the  shipper 
in  tb.e  shipping  instructions  and  the  rate  given  does  not  appjy 


Conference  Rulings.  777 

via  the  route  designated  it  is  the  duty  of  the  carrier's  agent  to 
ascertain  from  the  shipper  whether  the  rate  or  the  route  given 
in  the  shipping  instructions  shall  be  followed.  The  carrier  wall 
be  held  responsible  for  any  damages  which  may  result  from  the 
failure  of  its  agent  to  follow  this  course. 

If,  however,  the  agent  of  the  carrier,  after  exercising  reason- 
able diligence,  is  unable  to  obtain  more  definite  instructions  as 
to  routing,  the  goods  should  b'e  sent  via  the  rout  specified  in 
the  bill  of  lading.     (Cancels  rulings  159,  186,  192,  2U-i,  and  231 
see  rulings  243,  370,  and  397.    See  Gibson  Fruit  Co.  v.  C.  &  N 
W.  By.  Co.,  21  I.  C.  C,  645;    Ludowici-Ccladon  Co.  v.  M.  P 
By.  Co.,  22  I.  C.  C,  589 ;   American  Agricultural  Chemical  Co 
V.  B.  &  A.  B.  B.  Co.,  28  I.  C.  C,  400;   Goldfield  Cases,  34  I.  C 
C,  378 ;    Texarkana  Pipe  Works  v.  B.,  S.  L.  &  Wn.  By.,  38  I 
C.  C,  341 ;   Chapin  &  Co.  v.  C,  I.  &  L.  By.  Co.,  38  I.  C.  C,  613 
Jefferson  Lumber  Co.  v.  M.  &  0.  B.  B.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C,  44 
Laclede. Christy  Clay  Products  Co.  v.  M.  P.  By.  Co.,\].  R.  Op 
A-780;  and  B.  McCracken  &  Son  v.  B.  &  0.  B.  B  Co.,  U.  R.  Op 
2199.) 

475.  PASSES  TO  OFFICERS  AND  EMPLOYEES  OF 
OCEAN  AND  FOREIGN  COMMON  CARRIERS.— In  view  of 
the  decisions  in  United  States  v.  Erie  Bailroad,  236  U.  S.,  259. 
so  much  of  Conference  Bulings  59-a,  95-g,  and  196  as  pertains 
to  passes  to  officers  and  employees  of  ocean  common  carriers 
and  of  rail  common  carriers  in  foreign  countries  not  adjacent  is 
withdrawn.     (See  ruling  434.) 


June  2,  1915. 

476.  PASSES  TO  THE  FAMILY  OF  A  DECEASED  PEN- 
SIONED EMPLOYEE.— Upon  inquiry  as  to  whether  or  not 
common  carriers  may  grant  free  transportation  to  the  members 
of  the  family  of  a  deceased  pensioned  employee :  Held,  That 
with  the  exception  of  widows  during  widowhood  and  minor 
children  during  minority,  the  members  of  the  family  of  a  de- 
ceased pensioned  employee  may  not  lawfully  use  free  passes. 
(See  rulings  103,  173,  and  193.) 


June  14,  1915. 

477.    FREE  TRANSPORTATION  OF  CAR  WITH  EXHIB- 
ITS FOR  STATE  AGRICULTURAL  COLLEGE.— A  state  col- 


778  Conference  Rulings. 

lege  uses  a  car  containing  live  stock  and  agricultural  products 
in  giving  free  educational  lectures  and  demonstrations  to  farm- 
ers in  different  parts  of  the  state.  Upon  inquiiy :  Held,  That 
if  the  college  is  sustained  by  the  state  and  if  the  arrangements 
are  made  with  the  proper  and  responsible  officers  of  the  state 
such  car  and  contents  and  the  necessary  agents  employed  in 
connection  therewith  may  lawfull}^  be  moved  by  carrier  without 
cliarge  or  at  reduced  rates.     (See  ruling  398.) 


July  8,  1915. 

478.  PASSES  TO  WATCH  AND  TIME  INSPECTORS.— 
Upon  inquiry:  Eeld,  That  free  passes  may  not  lawfully  be  used 
by  watch  and  time  inspectors  who,  while  engaged  in  the  per- 
formance of  a  service  for  a  carrier,  pursue  other  business  or 
sell  or  solicit  the  sale  of  merchandise  of  any  character  either  to 
the  employees  of  the  carrier  or  to  the  general  public.  (See  rul- 
ing 208&.) 


Jidy  22,  1915. 

479.  PASSES  TO  EMPLOYEES  OF  PRIVATE  CAR 
LINES. — A  company  owns  and  leases  cars  to  railroad  companies 
on  a  mileage  basis  and  ices  and  re-ices  such  ears  at  various 
points  on  the  carriers'  lines  at  the  expense  of  the  carrier.  In- 
asmuch as  the  furnishing  of  cars  and  the  icing  of  cars  are  duties 
imposed  upon  carriers  under  section  1  of  the  act,  and  following 
the  principle  laid  down  in  Conference  Riding  208-h,  it  is  Held, 
That  passes  may  lawfully  be  issued  to  the  officers  and  employees 
of  the  car  company  when  traveling  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
furnishing  or  icing  cars  for  shipments  over  the  carrier's  own 
lines,  but  may  not  lawfully  be  issued  to  or  used  by  the  officers 
of  the  car  company  when  not  traveling  in  the  performance  of  a 
hona  fide  service  for  the  carrier. 


July  22,  1915. 

480.  TELEPHONE  MESSAGES  RELATING  TO  SHIP- 
IMENTS.— Upon  inquiry:  Eeld,  That  Conference  Rulings  302, 
327,  351,  and  363,  regarding  the  exchange  of  messages  between 
carriers  and  shippers,  relate  to  telephone  messages  as  well  as 
to  telegrams. 


Conference  Rulings.  77D 

July  23,  1915. 

481.  ERROR  IN  THE  ISSUANCE  OF  PASSENGER  TICK- 
ETS.—Restated  in  ruling  487. 
July  26,  1915. 


482.    ROUTING  OP  SHIPMENTS  BY  CONSIGNEES.— Re- 
scinded by  ruling  502. 


October  4,  1915. 

483.  COMMODITY  RATE  BASED  UPON  A  MAXIMUM 
CARLOAD  WEIGHT.— Under  a  tariff  namin<^  a  commodity 
rate  per  car,  not  exceeding  a  specified  maximum  weight,  and 
also  a  class  rate  with  a  minimum  carload  weight:  Held,  Thar 
charges  should  be  assessed  upon  the  basis  of  the  commodity  rate, 
any  excess  weight  to  be  charged  proportionately ;  but  the  car- 
rier may  refuse  to  receive  in  one  car  a  shipment  weighing  more 
than  the  maximum  load  prescribed  for  that  car.  (See  ruling 
84,  and  also  Rule  7  of  Tariff  Circular  18-A.) 

484.  PASSES  TO  EMPLOYEES  OF  PRIVATE  CAR 
LINES. — Conference  BuUng  479  has  no  application  to  the  of- 
ficers and  employees  of  a  private  car  company,  .such  as  a  fruit 
express  company,  that  owns  cars  and  leases  them  to  a  common 
carrier  railroad,  all  its  capital  stock  being  owned  by  the  lessee 
carrier  and  its  employees  being  treated  by  the  owning  road  in 
all  respects  as  its  own  employees. 


November  1,  1915. 

485.  PASSES  TO  FAMILIES  OP  SECRETARIES  OF 
RAILROAD  YOUNG  MEN'S  CHRISTIAN  ASSOCIATIONS. 
— Members  of  the  family  of  a  secretary  of  a  Railroad  Young 
Men's  Christian  Association  are  not  entitled  to  use  free  passes. 
(See  ruling  208f?.) 


Decemiber  22,  1915. 

486.  DIVISIONS  OF  JOINT  RATES  ON  RAILWAY  FUEL 
MUST  BE  PILED  WITH  THE  CO]\U\IISSION.— For  the  pur- 
pose of  giving  the  matter  wider  publicity,  this  means  is  adopted 


780  CONFEKENCE    RULINGS. 

of  directly  attending  to  the  Commission's  report  and  order  in 
Filing  of  Divisions  of  Joint  Bates  Applicable  to  Railway  Fiiel, 
37  I.  C.  C,  265,  and  to  its  supplemental  report  and  order  in 
the  same  proceeding,  38  I.  C.  C,  169.  By  these  orders  Con- 
ference Ruling  209  was  modified  and  carriers  were  required  to 
file  with  the  Commission  sheets  or  statements  showing  the  di- 
visions of  all  joint  rates  on  railway  fuel ;  and  to  file  all  changes 
and  amendments  to  such  sheets  or  statements;  and  to  file  all 
new  sheets  or  statements  which  in  any  wise  affect  or  determine 
the  division  of  joint  rates  on  railway  fuel.     (See  ruling  324.) 


Decemher  23,  1915. 

487.  ERROR  IN  ISSUANCE  OF  PASSENGER  TICKETS. 
— Conference  Ruling  481  revised.  The  contract  portion  and 
some  of  the  coupons  of  a  half-fare  or  lower  class  ticket  were 
properly  punched  by  the  agent  of  an  initial  carrier,  but  the 
remaining  coupons  were  overlooked.  Upon  inquiry,  Held,  That 
while  adhering,  under  Conference  Ruling  277,  to  the  principle 
that  the  initial  carrier  in  such  cases  must  bear  the  full  burden 
of  the  mistake  of  its  agent  and  settle  wdth  its  connecting  lines 
on  the  basis  of  the  class  of  ticket  as  honored  b}^  them,  neverthe- 
less, when  the  conductor  of  a  connecting  line  honoring  the  un- 
marked or  unpunched  coupons  indicates  thereon  that  the  con- 
tract portion  of  the  ticket  was  properly  marked  or  punched  and 
that  the  holder  was  actually  accorded  half  fare  or  lower  class 
transportation,  such  line  may  accept  its  proportion  of  the  fare 
applicable  to  the  transportation  so  furnished. 


January  10,  1916. 

488.     RATES    BETWEEN    POINTS    IN    IHE    UNITED 
STATES  AND  ADJACENT  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES.— In  the 

absence  of  a  published  through  rate  between  a  point  in  the 
United  States  and  a  point  in  an  adjacent  foreign  country,  the 
published  through  rate  between  the  border  gateway  and  the 
domestic  point  should  be  applied  in  constructing  the  total  rate. 
In  the  absence  of  a  published  through  rate  between  the  border 
gateway  and  the  domestic  point  the  lowest  combination  of  legal 
rates  should  be  applied.     (See  ruling  2205r.) 


Conference  Rulings.  781 

Fehruary  18,  1916. 

489.  INTEREST  UPON  OVERCHARGE  CLAIMS.— Con- 
ference  Ruling  464  amended  and  restated. 

Interest  on  an  overcharge  (by  which  is  meant  the  amount  col- 
lected on  a  shipment  in  excess  of  the  legally  published  rate)  ac- 
crues from  the  date  of  its  collection  by  the  carrier  whether 
arising  from  an  error  in  rate,  weight,  or  classification. 

The  Commission  does  not  regard  it  as  unlawful  for  a  claimant 
to  accept  in  satisfaction  of  his  claim  the  ascertained  amount  of 
an  overcharge  without  interest ;  and  the  Commission  is  of  the 
opinion  that  w^ien  such  a  refund  is  made  by  the  carrier  within 
30  days  after  the  improper  collection  of  the  overcharge,  it  may 
be  regarded,  in  accordance  with  a  well-established  usage,  as  a 
cash  transaction,  upon  which  interest  does  not  accrue. 

The  views  expressed  in  this  ruling  shall  be  understood  as  ap- 
plying to  all  pending  and  unsettled  overcharge  claims  and  to 
those  arising  in  the  future,  but  not  as  authorizing  or  requiring 
the  reopening  of  any  claim  which  has  been  settled  and  closed 
by  the  acceptance  by  a  claimant  of  the  amount  of  an  overcharge 
without  interest.  (See  Scattergood  d-  Co.  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  By. 
Co.,  U.  R.  Op.  2040;  and  International  Lumber  Co.  v.  C.  N. 
Rij.  Co.,  40  I.  C.  C,  283.) 


March  13,  1916. 

490.  TRACKAGE  RIGHTS  OVER  AN  INDUSTRIAL 
ROAD. — Upon  inquiry  by  a  common  carrier  respecting  proposed 
trackage  rights  over  a  portion  of  a  logging  road.  Held,  That  if 
the  common  carrier  uses  the  logging  road  in  interstate  com- 
merce or  as  a  higliM^ay  for  interstate  commerce  the  logging  road 
must  keep  its  accounts  as  required  by  section  20  of  the  act ;  it 
will  also  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  safety-appliance  acts. 


March  23,  1916. 

491.  EXCHANGE  OF  SERVICES  UNDER  CONTRACTS 
BETWEEN  RAILROADS  AND  TELEGRAPH,  TELE- 
PHONE, OR  CABLE  COiMPANIES.— Upon  inquiry  whether 
under  section  1  of  the  act'  a  railroad  may  contract  with  a  tele- 
graph company  to  transport  the  latter 's  property,  either  for  use 
on  the  railroad's  line  or  elsewhere,  at  a  rate  different  to  the 


782  Conference  Rulings. 

regularly  published  rate  for  such  transportation :  Held,  That 
such  an  exchange  of  services  may  lawfully  be  made  only  upon 
the  basis  of  the  legally  established  rates  of  the  railroad  and 
on  the  basis  of  the  fixed  charges  of  the  telegraph  company 
regularly  exacted  of  other  customers  for  similar  services;  ex- 
cept that  such  carriers  may  so  contract,  without  reference  to 
said  lawful  rates  and  charges,  for  the  transportation  of  the 
property  of  the  telegraph  company  over  the  line  of  the  con- 
tracting railroad  company  for  use  along  the  latter 's  line  and  in 
the  construction,  improvement,  or  operation  thereof;  that  is  to 
say,  when  such  transportation  is  not  conducted  by  said  railroad 
as  a  common  carrier.  (Amends  and  modifies  ruling  219  and 
cancels  ruling  364 ;  see  also  ruling  305.  This  ruling  cited  in 
Chicago  G.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co.,  245  Fed. 
600.) 

1.  Section  1  provides:  "That  nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  con- 
strued to  prevent  telephone,  telegraph,  and  cable  companies  from  en- 
tering into  contracts  with  common  carriers  for  an  exchange  of 
services." 


April  4,  1916. 

492.  REFUND  OF  FARE  FOR  CHILD  UNDER  FIVE 
YEARS  OF  AGE.— A  passenger  traveling  with  a  child  under 
five  years  of  age  intended  to  purchase  one  ticket,  the  tariffs  pro- 
viding for  the  free  transportation  of  children  under  that  age. 
The  carrier's  agent,  however,  sold  the  passenger  two  full-fare 
tickets  and  they  were  used  for  the  journey.  Held,  That  the 
participating  lines  might  join  in  refunding  the  fare  paid  for 
the  child.     (Compare  ruling  163.) 

493.  FREE  TRANSPORTATION  TO  INSURANCE  SU- 
PERVISORS.—Insurance  supervisors  carried  on  the  pay  rolls 
of  a  railroad  and  devoting  only  a  part  of  their  time  to  the  rail- 
road service,  but  who  are  subject  to  call,  may  lawfully  use  trip 
passes  when  traveling  exclusively  on  the  business  of  the  railroad. 
(See  rulings  208,  412,  and  426.) 


April  22,  1916. 

494.     RESPONSIBILITY    OF    INITIAL    CARRIER    FOR 
STOLEN  TICKETS  HONORED  BY  ITS  CONNECTIONS.— 


Conference  Rulings.  783 

Certain  passenger  tickets  stolen  from  an  initial  carrier  were 
later  honored  by  the  connecting  lines.  Held,  That  the  initial 
carrier  is  responsible  to  its  connections  for  their  revenue,  the 
tickets  showing  its  approved  stamp  although  fraudulently  af- 
fixed thereon. 


April  27,  1916. 

495.  REFUND  OF  PASSENGER  FARE  IN  EXCESS  OF 
SERVICE  RENDERED.— A  passenger,  applying  for  second- 
class  carriage,  was  handed  a  first-class  round-trip  ticket  from 
Minneapolis  to  San  Francisco  and  return,  and  paid  the  tariff 
fare  therefor.  Under  the  belief  that  it  was  a  second-class  ticket 
he  traveled  in  that  class  to  Los  Angeles,  and  then  presented  the 
unused  portion  of  the  ticket  for  redemption :  Held,  That  re- 
fund should  be  made  in  the  difference  between  the  fare  paid  for 
the  ticket  and  the  fare  applicable  to  a  second-class  one-way 
ticket  from  Minneapolis  to  Los  Angeles. 


July  3,  1916. 

496.  RATES  BASED  ON  VALUE  OF  PROPERTY  AS  DE- 
CLARED AT  THE  TIME  AND  PLACE  OF  SHIPMENT.— 

A  tariff  provided  that — 

carriers,  parties  hereto,  have  no  means  of  determining  value  of  live 
stock  when  offered  for  shipment  and  live  stock  will  not  be  accepted 
for  transportation  unless  the  shipper  or  his  agent  declares  in  writing 
the  valuation  at  time  and  place  of  shipment.  The  rates  named  in 
tariff  shall  be  applied  on  animals,  the  actual  value  of  which  does  not 
exceed  the  following  amount. 


Live  stock  valued  at  $5  per  head  at  the  shipping  point  was 
sold  at  destination  at  an  average  price  exceeding  that  amount. 
Upon  inquiry  whether  the  charges  should  be  assessed  at  the  rate 
applicable  to  live  stock  of  the  value  at  which  it  was  sold  at  des- 
tination :  Held,  That  unde'r  such  a  tariff  provision  the  value  de- 
clared by  the  shipper  at  the  time  and  place  of  shipment  is  the 
basis  for  determining  the  rate  applicable  and  that  a  reasonable 
difference  between  that  value  and  the  value  at  destination  is  not 
evidence  of  a  misstatement  of  value  at  the  point  of  origin.  (See 
rulings  58  and  295;  also  In  re  The  Cummins  Amendment,  33 
L  C.  C.  682,  693.) 


784  CONFEHENCE    EULINGS. 

October  3,  1916. 

497.  APPLICATION  OP  AVERAGE  AGREEMENT  UN- 
DER CODE  OF  UNIFORM  DEMURRAGE  RULES.— A  con- 
signee at  St.  Louis,  under  proper  tariff  authority,  reconsigned 
a  shipment  to  a  storage  warehouse  on  the  tracks  of  a  terminal 
carrier  at  that  point.  Upon  inquiry,  Held,  That  as  the  terminal 
carrier  had  an  independent  average  demurrage  agreement  with 
the  storage  warehouse,  it  must  treat  the  storage  warehouse  as  the 
consignee  within  the  meaning  of  Conference  Ruling  463.  (See 
also  ruling  409.) 


Octoher  16,  1916. 

498.  APPLICATION  OF  AVERAGE  AGREEMENT  UN- 
DER CODE  OP  UNIFORM  DEMURRAGE  RULES.— Before 
cars  loaded  by  an  industry  were  switched  from  its  warehouse 
their  contents  were  sold  to  another  shipper  to  whom  bills  of  lad- 
ing were  issued  by  the  carrier:  Held,  That  the  average  agree- 
ment between  the  carrier  and  the  industry  may  lawfully  be 
applied.     (See  rulings  409  and  463.) 


November  8,  1916. 

499.  CANCELED  TARIFFS  NEED  NOT  BR  KEPT  POST- 
ED.— Under  section  6  of  the  act  to  regulate  commerce,  carriers 
are  required  to  keep  posted  for  public  inspection  only  their  cur- 
rent tariffs  and  tariffs  filed  to  become  effective  in  the  future. 

500.  RELEASED  RATES  UNDER  CUMMINS  AMEND- 
MENT AS  FURTHER  AMENDED.— Under  the  so-called  Cum- 
mins amendment  as  further  amended,  carriers  when  authorized 
or  required  by  the  Commission  may  establish  rates  on  property, 
other  that  ordinary  live  stock,  based  upon  its  agreed  or  declared 
value  even  though  the  value  so  declared  or  agreed  to  may  be 
less  than  the  true  value  of  the  property  transported. 


November  28, 1916. 

50L  ISSUING  CARRIER'S  RESPONSIBILITY  UNDER 
JOINT  RATE  PUBLISHED  WITHOUT  PROPER  CONCUR- 
RENCE.— An    originating    carrier    having    pu])lished    a    joint 


Conference  Rulings.  785 

through  rate  without  the  concurrence  of  a  connecting  line,  the 
higher  combination  of  intermediate  rates  was  applied.  Fol- 
lowing du  Pont  de  Nemmirs  Powder  Company  v.  Wabash  Rail- 
road, 33  I.  C.  C,  507,  Held,  That  the  through  rate  should  have 
been  applied,  the  originating  carrier  assuming  the  difference 
between  that  rate  ond  the  higher  combination  rate  without 
assistance  from  the  other  carriers  participation  in  the  move- 
ment (See  rule  68  of  Tariff  Circular  18- A.) 


January  8,  1917. 

502.  ROUTING  OF  SHIPMENTS  BY  CONSIGNEES.— In 
view  of  the  provisions  of  an  act  of  Congress  entitled  "An  act 
relating  to  bills  of  lading  in  interstate  and  foreign  commerce," 
approved  August  29,  1916,  Conference  Rulings  332,  453,  and 
482  are  rescinded. 


February  26,  1917. 

503.  HANDLING  OF  CIRCUS  AGENTS  AND  ADVANCE 
CARS. — While  the  advance  cars  of  a  circus  may  properly  be 
handled  on  regular  trains  under  special  circus  rates,  the  use 
of  special  circus  mileage  books  should  be  confined  to  employees 
and  circus  members  accompanying  the  circus  train  and  should 
not  be  used  on  regular  passenger  trains. 


March  12,  1917. 

504.  RELEASED  AND  DECLARED  VALUE  RATES.— 
Upon  the  petition  of  a  vshipper  to  require  a  carrier  to  establish 
,rates  depending  upon  the  declared  or  agreed  value  of  the  prop- 
erty transported,  a  hearing  will  be  had  and  an  order  thereon 
will  issue.  L^pon  a  petition  by  a  carrier  for  authority  to  es- 
tablish such  a  rate,  the  Commission  will  investigate  its  reason- 
ableness and  propriety  in  such  manner  and  by  such  means  as 
it  may  deem  proper;  any  rate  so  authorized  must  be  published 
and  posted  as  required  by  law  and  will  be  subject  to  suspension 
on  protest  and  to  attack  on  complaint  as  in  the  case  of  other 
rates. 


786  CONFEBENCE    RuLINGS. 

April  2,  1917. 

505.  TRAFFIC  PASSING  THROUGH  THE  UNITED 
STATES  FROM  A  POINT  IN  AN  ADJACENT  FOREIGN 
COUNTRY  TO  A  POINT  IN  AN  ADJACENT  FOREIGN 
COUNTRY. — With  respect  to  a  shipment  inoviug  from  a  point 
in  Canada  through  the  United  States  to  Boston  consigned  for 
export  to  a  point  in  Nova  Scotia:  Held,  That,  following  the 
ruling  announced  in  Seynwur  v.  M.  L.  &  T.  B.  R.  d?  8.  S.  Co., 
35  I.  C.  C,  492,  and  Cannles  v.  G.,  H.  t£-  .Sf.  A.  By.  Co.,  37  I.  C.  C, 
573,  the  Commission  is  without  jurisdiction.  Rescinded.  See 
Ruling  514. 


April  17,  1917. 

500.  DEMURRAGE  UNDER  AVERAGE  AGREEMENT 
ON  STATE  AND  INTERSTATE  SHIPMENTS.— Where  the 
demurrage  rules  and  rates  on  state  and  interstate  traffic  differ, 
Held,  That  credits  on  state  traffic  under  an  average  agreement 
may  not  lawfully  be  offset  against  the  debits  on  interstate  traffic. 


April  23,  1917. 

507.  SHIPMENTS  HELD  AT  TRANSIT  POINT  BEYOND 
TRANSIT  PERIOD  BECAUSE  OF  INABILITY  OF  CAR- 
RIER TO  SUPPLY  CARS.— Certain  shipments  were  placed  in 
transit  under  a  tariff  rule  providing,  in  substance,  that  the  bill- 
ing would  not  be  recognized  for  Avarehousiug  and  reshipping 
purposes  with  respect  to  shipments  on  hand  at  the  close  of  Au- 
gust 31  of  any  year.  Upon  inquiry  whether,  the  carrier  being 
unable  to  comply  with  a  demand  for  cars  made  only  a  day  or 
two  before  the  clearing  day,  the  shipper  is  entitled  to  a  refund 
of  the  difference  between  the  through  rate  and  the  sum  of  the 
local  rates  to  and  from  the  transit  point:  Held,  it  not  being 
sho\vii  that  the  carrier  failed  in  its  duty  to  supply  cars  upon 
reasonable  request,  the  refund  may  not  be  made.  (See  Peck  v. 
A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  By.,  U.  R.  Op.  A-923.) 


May  12,  1917. 

508.    FILING  OF  INFORMAL  COMPLAINTS.    STATUTE 
OF  LI]\riTATIONS.— Section  16  of  the  act  to  regulate  com- 


Conference  Rulings.  787 

meree,  as  amended,  provides  that  "All  complaints  for  the  re- 
covery of  damages  shall  be  filed  with  the  Commission  within 
two  years  from  the  time  the  cause  of  action  accrues  and  not  af- 
ter." In  Blinn  Lumber  Co.  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C, 
430,  it  was  decided  that  the  two-year  period  is  to  be  computed 
from  the  date  of  the  delivery  of  the  shipment. 

In  all  eases  the  complaint  nuist  be  filed  by  or  on  behalf  of  the 
party  who  has  borne  the  transportation  charges  as  such.  Inter- 
national Agricultural  Corporation  v.  Louisv\ille  &  Nashville  Rail- 
road Co.,  29  I.  C.  C,  391,  and  Oden  cf-  Elliott  v.  SeaUard  Aid 
Line  Railway,  37  I.  C.  C,  345. 

In  order  that  it  may  operate  to  stay  the  statute  of  limitations, 
an  informal  complaint  must  be  filed  with  the  Commisston  within 
two  years  from  the  time  the  cause  of  action  accrues,  and  (a) 
must  name  the  defendant  carrier  or  carriers;  (&)  must  allege 
a  violation  of  the  act  and  ask  affirmative  relief;  and  (c)  must 
describe  the  shipment  by  naming  the  point  of  origin  and  destina- 
tion, the  consignor  and  consignee,  the  date  of  the  shipment,  the 
initials  and  number  of  the  car,  in  the  case  of  carload  shipments, 
or  {d)  must  give  such  available  information  as  may  be  reason- 
ably necessary  to  enable  the  defendant  carrier  or  carriers  to 
identify  the  shipment.  A  notification  to  the  Commission  of  the 
possibility  or  intention  of  filing  a  complaint  for  the  recovery  of 
damages  is  not  such  a  filing  as  is  contemplated  by  the  statute. 

An  informal  complaint  embodying  the  information  above  in- 
dicated should  be  filed  with  sufficient  copies  to  enable  the  Com- 
mission to  send  one  copy  to  each  defendant  carrier  as  notice 
to  it  of  the  complaint,  retaining  one  copy  for  its  own  use. 

When  a  complaint  for  reparation  has  been  before  the  Connnis- 
sion  informally  on  the  special  docket  or  otherwise,  and  the  par- 
ties have  been  notified  by  the  Commission  that  the  complaint  is 
denied  or  that  it  can  not  be  determined  informally,  or  when  the 
parties  voluntarily  withdraw  the  complaint  from  informal  con- 
sideration, it  may  not  be  reconsidered  informally  if  not  again 
submitted  to  the  Commission  within  six  months  from  the  date 
of  such  notification  or  withdrawal,  nor  may  it  be  filed  as  a  formal 
complaint  unless  so  withdrawn :  Provided,  however,  That  this  rule 
does  not  apply  when  the  two-year  period  from  the  date  of  de- 
livery of  the  shipment  has  not  expired.  (See  rule  III  of  the 
Rules  of  Practice.)     ]\[odified  ruling  516. 


788  CONFEBENCE    RULINGS. 

June  19,  1917. 

509.  DRAYAGE  EXPENSE  RESULTING  FROM  ERRO- 
NEOUS TERMINAL  DELIVERY.— Co;(/erence  Ruling  474-b 
amended  and  392  rescinded. — In  case  the  consignee  elects  to  ac- 
cept the  shipment  at  the  terminal  where  delivery  has  been  er- 
roneously offered  rather  than  insist  upon  delivery  at  the  ter- 
minal designated,  the  shipper  or  the  consignee  is  entitled  to  re- 
cover damages  in  the  sum  of  the  difference  between  the  expense 
of  drayage  actually  incurred  at  a  reasonable  charge  therefor  and 
the  expense  which  would  have  been  incurred  if  proper  delivery 
had  been  effected  by  the  carrier.  The  carrier  responsible  for 
misrouting  the  shipment,  resulting  in  a  claim  of  this  character, 
may  reimburse  the  shipper  or  consignee  entitled  to  reimburse- 
ment wholly  at  its  expense  without  a  specific  order  of  the  Com- 
mission in  each  case.  In  pursuing  this  course  carriers  must 
accept  full  responsibility  for  the  correct  application  of  the  rule 
and  must  make  reports  to  the  Commission  in  accordance  with 
its  order  of  July  3,  1917, 


June  21,  1917. 

510.  WRITTEN  NOTICE  TO  CARRIER  CONSTITUTES 
PRESENTATION  OF  CLAIM.— Modifying  conference  ruling 
456.  It  is  the  view  of  the  Commission  that  the  provision  in  the 
uniform  bill  of  lading  requiring  that  claims  for  loss,  damage,  or 
delay  must  be  made  in  WTiting  within  a  specified  period  is  legally 
complied  with  when  the  shipper,  consignee,  or  the  lawful  holder 
of  the  bill  of  lading,  w^ithin  the  period  specified,  files  with  the 
agent  of  the  carrier,  either  at  the  point  of  origin  or  the  point  of 
delivery  of  the  shipment,  or  with  the  general  claims  department 
of  the  carrier,  a  claim  or  a  written  notice  of  intended  claim  de- 
scribing the  shipment  with  reasonable  definiteness.  (See  G.  F. 
<&  A.  Rij.  v.  Blish  Milling  Co.,  241  U.  S.,  190.) 


Julij  19,  1917. 

511.  PASSES  TO  FURLOUGHED  EMPLOYEES  ENTER- 
ING MILITARY  OR  NAVAL  SERVICE  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES. — Upon  inquiry:  Held,  That  employees  of  common 
carriers  who  enter  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United 
States  in  the  present  war  and  who  are  carried  on  the  records  of 


Conference  Rulings.  /89 

the  carriers  as  furloughed  employees,  to  be  restored  to  the  car- 
rier's service  at  the  termination  of  the  war,  are  furloughed  em- 
ployees within  the  meaning  of  section  1  of  the  act  to  regulate 
commerce  and  the  carriers  may  lawfully  grant  free  passes  to 
dependent  members  of  their  families. 


July  20,  1917. 

512.  [NDUSTRIAL  SWITCHING  TRACKS.— Conference 
Ruling  427  modified  and  amended. — A  carrier  may  not  lawfully 
build  a  switch  track  inside  the  plant  boundary  of  an  industrial 
company  without  adequate  compensation  therefor.  And  an 
agreement  by  the  industry  to  give  the  carrier  all  or  a  part  of 
its  traffic  as  compensation  for  the  building  of  the  track  is  not 
regarded  as  "adequate  compensation."     (See  Ruling  110.) 

513.  EXPRESS  COMPANIES  MAY  NOT  CARRY  PROP- 
ERTY FOR  OFFICERS  AND  EMPLOYEES  EXCEPT  AT 
PUBLISHED  RATE.— Upon  inquiry.  Held,  That  the  act  to 
regulate  commerce  as  amended  does  not  authorize  an  express 
company  subject  to  the  act  to  carry  property  either  for  its  own 
officers  or  employees  or  for  the  officers  and  employees  of  other 
common  carriers,  except  at  its  legally  published  rate.  (See 
rulings  157,  208&,  and  361.) 

514.  In  conference  on  March  25,  1918,  the  Commission  ap- 
proved the  following  ruling  rescinding  conference  ruling  503, 
concerning  the  HANDLING  OF  CIRCUS  AGENTS  AND  AD- 
VANCE CARS: 

In  the  light  of  changed  practices,  conference  ruling  503  is 
rescinded  pending  the  issuance  of  a  further  ruling  if  that  be 
found  necessary.  The  present  practices  may  be  continued  pend- 
ing such  further  ruling. 

515.  In  conference  on  May  4,  1918,  the  Commission  approved 
the  following  interpretation  of  conference  ruling  314,  concern- 
ing the  COLLECTION  OF  UNDERCHARGES : 

RULING  314  INTERPRETED.— In  conference  ruling  314 
the  Commission  held  it  to  be  the  duty  of  common  carriers  to  ex- 
haust their  legal  remedies  to  collect  undercharges.  But  the 
Commission  has  pointed  out  from  time  to  time  and  now  holds 
that  this  ruling  does  not  require  the  filing  of  a  suit  where  the 
party  liable  for  the  undercharge  cannot  be  located,  or  service 
cannot  be  made,  or  where  upon  investigation  by  the  carrier  in 


790  Conference  Rulings. 

good  fnith  it  is  found  that  legal  process  would  be  futile  and 
ineffectual. 

516.  The  following  Conference  Ruling  has  been  approved  and 
adopted : 

RIGHT  OP  ACTION  TO  RECOVER  REPARATION  ON 
ACCOUNT  OF  UNLAWFUL  CHARGES  ACCRUES  WHEN 
THEY  ARE  PAID.— The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
in  TJ.  S.  ex  rel.  v.  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  decided  on 
April  29,  1918,  held  that  the  right  to  recover  reparation  on  ac- 
count of  unlawful  freight  charges  accrues  when  they  are  paid, 
and  not  upon  the  delivery  of  the  shipment  as  held  by  the  Com- 
mission in  Blinn  Lumher'Co.  v.  S.  P.  Co.,  18  I.  C.  C,  430. 

The  Commission  will  therefore  entertain  petitions  for  the  re- 
consideration of  any  such  formal  or  informal  claims  that  were 
filed  within  two  years  from  the  time  the  charges  were  paid  and 
were  denied  by  the  Commission  under  the  ruling  of  the  Blinn 
case.  Such  petitions  should  be  filed  not  later  than  December 
31,  1918.    Modifying  Conference  Ruling  508. 

517.  In  conference  on  April  14,  1919,  the  Commission  ap- 
proved the  following  restatement  of  conference  ruling  362 : 

ASSIGNMENT  OP  CLAIM.— In  awarding  reparation  the 
Commission  will  recognize  an  assignment  by  a  consignor  to  a 
consignee  or  by  a  consignee  to  a  consignor,  but  will  not  recog- 
nize an  assignment  to  a  stranger  to  the  transportation  records. 
The  phrase  ".stranger  to  the  transportation  records,"  as  here 
used,  has  no  reference  to  the  lawful  rights  of  an  undisclosed 
principal,  either  in  matters  of  reparation  before  the  Commission 
or  the  adjustment  by  the  carriers  of  plain  undercharge  or  over- 
charge claims.  Amending  ruling  246.  See  Oden  rf*  Elliott  v. 
»S'.  A.  L.,  37  I.  C.  C,  345,  and  Robinson  Co  v.  Am.  Express  Co., 
38  I.  C.  C,  735. 

518.  The  Commission  in  conference  October  6,  1919,  adopted 
the  following  conference  ruling  which  rescinds  Rulings  405  and 
473. 

DEMURRAGE  AND  STORAGE  RULES.— Upon  inquiry 
find  to  remove  the  confusion  that  exists  among  carriers  and 
shippers,  Held,  That  off-track  storage  not  in  transit,  track  stor- 
age and  demurrage  are  controlled  bj^  the  tariffs  in  effect  con- 
temporaneously with  the  accrual  of  these  services,  and  there- 
fore are  subject  to  such  changes  as  la\\^ully  may  be  made  in 
the  applicable  tariffs  during  the  period  of  accrual ;  that  off -track 
storage  in  transit  is  controlled  by  the  tariffs  in  effect  upon  the 
date  of  shipment.  (Rescinding  Conference  Rulings  405  and 
473.) 


*INDEX  TO  CONFERENCE  RULINGS. 


Arsorption  of  switching  charges:  Ruling, 

carrier  to  pay  terminal  line  for  switching  and  not  leave  it  to 

consignee    64 

intermediate   industry,  disapproved 424 

on  competitive  traffic  only;    application  of  fourth  section   .  .  304d 
on  inbound  cars,  accrued  claim  not  invalidated  by  cancella- 
tion  of  tariff    136 

Accident: 

exception  in   case  of,  no  authority  over  competency  of  em- 
ployee or  condition  of  signal    288 

unavoidable,  exception  in  hours-of-service  law  88 

Accounts  of  telegraph  and  telephone  companies  subject  to  act  . .  305e 

Accrual  of  cause   of  action    220/ 

Address: 

damages  resulting  from  erroneous,  on  notice  of  arrival  ....  127 

duty  of  carriers  in  connection  with  transmitting   127 

consignee's,  omitted  from  routing  instructions    358 

failure  to  send  notice  of  arrival  to  named 366 

Adjacent  foreign  country: 

Canadian  local  rate  not  legally  applicable  unless  filed  with 

Commission 256 

car-service  charges  to  and  from  Canada 191 

divisions  of  rates  to  and  from  Mexico  must  be  published  ....  269 

municipal  governments   in,  no   free  transportation    118 

one  or  more  points  in;     long-and-short  haul    318 

overcharge   on   shipment   to    Mexico    126 

railroad  officials  in,  passes  to    434 

rule  applicable  in  absence  of  through  rates  between  points  in 

the  United  States  and   488 

shipments  to,  export  business  353 

traffic  through  the  United  States  from  and  to  an    505 

Admission,  by  erring  road  of  responsibility  for  misrouting 

198,  214rt,   214/ 

Advance  charges: 

by  forwarding  company,   shipment  covered   by   through  bill 

of  lading  and  through  rate 401 

covering  cost  of  feed  and  services  in  transit   442 

customhouse  brokerage  fees  and  import  duties    444 

failure  to  bill  demurrage  as   416 

to  boats  that  are   not  common   carriers,    unlawful    62 

to  acean  carriers  on  import  traffic   428 

(791) 


792  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Ruling 
Advance  of  rates: 

while  import  shipment  on   seas    Ill 

discretionary  with  Commission  whether  to  suspend  322 

request  for  suspension  of;    what  must  be  shown   322 

♦For  general  index  see  end  of  Volume  Two. 

Ruling. 
Advertisikg.     State    mileage    book    exchanged    for;      Interstate 

journey  ; 815 

Agents   (see  also  Employees): 

astray  shipments  resulting  from,  error  817 

awaiting  authority  to  accept  check  for  charge  demurrage  ac- 
crued    '. 89 

Canadian  fares,  in  United  States  selling  tickets  34 

caretaker  accompanying  shipments  where  carrier  furnishes 

refrigeration   171 

carriers',  acting  as  forwarding  agent  for  shipper  98,  337,  8&5 

disciplinary   matters   between    carrier    and    its    agent,    Com- 
mission will  not  Intervene  69,  105 

duty  of,  when  rail-and-water  rates  available  (routing)  190,  316,  321 
duty  of,  with  respect  to  routing  and  quoting  rates  ....   214c,  215d 

error  of,  in  not  limiting  ticket  69,  277 

joint,  error  in  misrouting  shipment   253 

labor,  may  not  lawfully  receive  passes   411 

land  and  immigration  passes  to,  if  bona  fide  employees  ....     208a 

misrouting  of  passengers    113,   167 

"necessary  agents"  in  free  transportation  for  Government  or 

charity    150 

posting  name  of,  at  blind  sidings    289 

rate  and  route  in  conflict,  duty  of  474 

relief    of,    does    not    relieve    carrier    from    collecting    under 

shipper's,  binds  principal  when  declaring  valuation   188 

station,  devoting  part  time,  no  passes 446 

tariffs  filed  by  tariff  agent,  conflict  with  carrier's  own  tariffs 

50,   104 

tickets  to  entertainments  in  connection  with  excursions,  may 

sell   221o 

Agreements: 

baggage  agents'  association,  with  respect  to  forwarding  bag- 
gage inadequately  routed   326 

between  carriers  respecting  responsibility  for  routing  traffic       198 
between  carriers  for  division  of  joint  rates  or  fares  must  be 

flled   209 

between  carrier  and  shipper  respecting  delivery,  no  refund 

of   drayage    235 

between  carrier  and  shipper  respecting  prepayment  to  non- 
agency  stations    20 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  793 

Ageeements — Continued.  Ruling 

exchange  of  services  under,  between  railroads  and  telegraphs, 

telephone,   or   cable   companies    491 

Allowances: 

floor  racks  in  refrigeration  cars  furnished  by  shippers 292 

grain  doors,  maximum  per  door  and  per  car  must  be  pub- 
lished     78,  132,  267 

must  be  published  and  nondiscriminatory 360 

to  shipper  for  fitting  cars  must  be  in  tariff 19,  78,  132,  292 

.\ll-rail  route: 

all-rail    route    defined 316 

car-ferry   route    included    in   term   "all-rail"    316 

duty  of  carrier  to  forward  by,  in  absence  of  instruction  . .  190,  316 
Amendment  to  tariff.     See  Supplement  to  tariffs;    Tariffs. 
American  Association  of  Railroad  Superintendents,  free  trans- 
portation ,    371 

American  Railway  Association,  household  goods  of  inspectors  .  335 

Applications  for  passes  must  show  sex  of  children  290 

Application  on  special  docket  signatures  to   129 

charges   151 

Argument,  notices  of  oral  408 

Army,  transportation  of,  under  orders    218 

Army  and  Navy,  no  free  transportation  to  officers  of   208d 

Assignment  of  reparation  claim   362 

Association,  commercial,  no  free  excursion  by  carrier   272 

Astray  shipments: 

accepted   by  consignee  at   point    found;     adjustment   of  de- 
murrage    31 

return  of    217 

switched  in  error;    right  of  switching  line  to  charges  240 

Attorney : 

employed  on  monthly  basis,  but  has  other  practice 41:J 

local,  not  regularly  employed,  family  of   95a 

not  devoting  substantially  all  of  time 426 

Auditors'   train,  to  collect  tickets,   passes    400 

Automobile  cars,   safety  appliances    329 

Automobile  lines,   officers  and  employees  no  passes    95gr 

Average    agreement,    application    of    under    uniform    demurrage 

rules    409,  463,  497,  498,  506 

Baggage: 

checked  by  initial  line  with  routing  inadequately  specified  326 

property  transported  as,  date  of   455 

sample,  checked  and  sale  of  at  destination   445 

storage  on,  refunded  to  passenger  injured  in  wreck 61a 

Baggage  express  cojipanies.  passes  only  to  baggage  agents   ....95,  216 

Baggagemen  on  trains  subject  to  hours-of-service  law   275 

Ballast  cars,  safety  appliances   329 

Parked  claims.     See  Limitations. 


794:  Index  to   Conference  Eulings. 

Ruling 

Bees  in  hives,  passes  to  caretakers  * 112 

Belt  line,  municipal,  subject  to  act   89 

Bill  of  lading  (see  also  Unifokm  hill  of  lading)  : 

date  of  issuance  not  necessarily  determinative  of  applicable 

rate 172 

clear,  issued,  and  failure  to  bill  demurrage   41G 

containing  provisions  which  can  not  be  complied  with 474c 

destination  erroneously  stated  in,  by  shipper   237 

exchange,  at  intermediate  points  showing  different  consignor, 

consignee,  or  destination    415 

exchange,  route,  and  origin  should  be  shown  227 

loss  of  transit  privilege  through  error  in 348 

naming  route,  and  rate  applicable  over  different  route,  mis- 
routing   214,  243,  474c 

rules  and  regulations  governing  export  378 

shipper's  error  in  failure  to  make  required  notation  on  ....  348 

signature  to  released  valuation  clause    22*5 

through,  over  rail  and  water  line,  no  joint  rate  354 

through,  over  rail  and  water  line,  through  published  rate  ap- 
plies and  not  combination  of  locals    401 

uniform;    measure  of  damages;    value  of  lost  goods   387 

Blind  sidings,  posting  name  of  agent  at   289 

Blockade.     See  Diversion. 

Boat  line.     See  Water  lines. 

Body  of  deceased  person.    See  Corpse. 

Boiler  compound,  pass  to  instructor  in  use  of 336 

Bonds: 

to  secure  repayment  of  claims  paid  on  presentation    236 

valuation  of,  when  shipped  by  express  58 

Books  of  Railway  Y.  M.  C.  A.  Library,  free  transportation 330 

Box  cars,  safety  appliances    329 

Branch  line  station,  rate  from,  not  directly  intermediate   304f 

Breaking   bulk,   stopping   cars   for   part  unloading,   legal   when 

under   tariffs    233 

Bridge  company: 

nonoperating,  no  passes  to  officers  and  employees 263 

when  not  subject  to  act   381 

when  subject  to  act   399 

Brokerage  charges  need  not  be  published  by  express  companies  300 
Brokers,  customs,  employed  on  commission  basis    (passes)    ....  454 
Bunching  cars,   demurrage  charges   resulting   from  owner's   in- 
ability  to   unload    142 

Bureau  of  carriers,  pass  to  employee  and  members  of  family  371,  448 

BURB^AU   FOR   SAFE  TRANSPORTATION    OF  EXPLOSIVES,    gOOds   Of   inspec- 
tor    335 

Bus.   See  Transfer  company. 

Cable  companies.     See  Telegraph  companies. 


Index  to   Conference  Bulings.  795 

Ruling 
Canada  {see  also  Adjacent  foreign  countries): 

Canadian  customs  and  immigration  inspectors,  passes    ....  345 

Canadian  superintendent  mail  service,  no  passes   459 

car-service  charges  to  and  from   191 

fares  for  immigrants  between  points  in,  no  jurisdiction 24 

local   Canadian   rate  note  legally  applicable   unless   filed  with 

Commission  256 

misquotation  of  rate  to,  undercharge  must  be  collected   ....  262 
Canal  boat  line,  subject  to   act   when  operating  in   connection 

with  rail  line 241 

Canal  Zone,  tariffs   containing  export  rates 359 

Cancelled  tablffs  :  need  not  be  kept  posted  499 

Cancellation  of  accrued  storage  charges    403 

must  be  specific  and  complete   101 

no  bar  to  accrued  claim  for  absorption  of  switching  charges  136 

reissue  of  cancelled  rate  344 

tariffs  and  rates  remain  in  effect  until  specifically  cancelled 

50,  70,  104 

Car  and  party  : 

passes,   unlawful   in   form    95; 

private,  diverted  account  blockade,  entitled  to  shore-line  mile- 
age  rate   13S 

Cakei'Akers: 

accompanying  gasoline  motor  car  moving  under  own  power  334 
accompanying  fruit  by  express,   free  transportaiicn   in   pas- 
senger cars    179 

accompanying  property  transported  for  Government;    to  ex- 
positions;   persons  or  property  transported  for  charity   ..  150 

bees  in  hives,  passes  to    ]  12 

going  on  passes  intending  to  return  with  fruit   1 

milk   21 

passes  only  for  trip  or  round  trip,  not  annual 37 

refrigeration   included    in    rates,    no   passes    to   shippers    ac- 
companying freight    171 

return  to  point  of  origin  only  over  original  route 189 

Car  ferries    (see  also  Ferries): 

car-ferry   route,    defined    316 

car-ferry  route  included  in  term  "all-rail"   316 

car  ferry  connecting  two  interstate  rail  lines  by  which  it  is 

owned 374 

hour-of-service   law   applicable    108 

route   equivalent  to   all   rail    , 316 

Car  kitting,  refund,  or  allowance  to  shipper  for,  if  in  tariff.  . 

19,   78,   132,  292 

Car  lighting  company,  passes  to  inspectors,  unlawful  169 

Carload  rate,  not  applicable  where  shipments  delivered  in  sepa- 
rate less-than-carload   lots    175 

Carload  weight.     See  Minimum  weight. 


796  Index  to   Conference  Rulings. 

Ruling 

Carrip:rs   {see  also  Delivering  carrier): 

boats  that  are  not  common  carriers  may  not  receive  advances  62 

erring,  liable  for  demurrage    220/ 

erring,  liable  for  misrouting   ia7,  198,  199,  286,  474a 

exchange    of    service    with    telegraph,    telephone,    or    cable 

companies 491 

excursion  tickets  sold  prior  to  effective  date  of  tariff 467 

issuing  half  rate  or  lower-class  tickets  and  failing  to  punch 

all   coupons   487 

issuing,    responsibility    under    joint   rate    published    without 

proper    concurrence    501 

lessee  roads  not  serving  public  as  common  carrier,  tariffs..  180 
liable  for  demurrage  and  storage;    failed  to  forward  notice 

of  consignee    366 

located  wholly  within  a  State,  when  subject  to  the  act  197,  368,  418 

loss  of  return  portion  of  ticket  by,  agent  458 

misrouting  of  shipment  of  railroad  supplies  143 

must  investigate  before  paying  claims  236,  462 

officials  of,  in  adjacent  foreign  countries  (passes)    434 

Panama  Canal  act  interpreted   461 

participating  in  interstate  transportation  without  legal  rates; 

prosecution  90,   184,  194 

passes  to   employees    95 

payment   for    telegrams    or   messages    to   or    from    shippers 

302,  327,  351,  363,  480 

rail  common,  in  nonadjacent  foreign  countries  (passes)    ....  475 
railroad    carrying    interstate    traffic    for    express   companies 

subject  to  act 197,  368,  418 

railroad  system  must  show  corporate  title   450 

reporting  separately  may  not  transport  free  for  one  another  225 

statute  of  limitations  nonoperative  as  between  carriers   ....  306 

tickets  stolen  from  initial,  and  honored  by  connections   ....  494 
trackage  rights  by  one  railroad  over  another,  as  device  to 

avoid  charges   153 

Cars: 

allowances  to  shippers  for  grain  doors,  etc.  ..19,  78,  132,  267,  292 

bunched  in  transit,  demurrage  resulting  from    142 

carload  shipment  transferred  in  transit  into  two  cars 357 

carriers,  out  of  service  on  storage  tracks  123 

commissary,  operated  by  carriers  unlawful   257 

demurrage  on  construction  cars  and  derricks  used  by  contrac- 
tors    270 

destroyed  on  foreign  lines,  transportation  of  trucks 224 

duty  of  carriers  in  through  route  to  furnish  through  cars  or 

transfer    free    59 

handling  of  circus  advance,  and  use  of  special  circus  mileage 

books 503 

large  car  loaded,  transferred  by  carrier  to  two  small  cars  . . .  273 


Index  to  Conference  Rulings.  797 

Cars — Continued.  Ruling 

larger  car  furnished  than  ordered;    connecting  lines  without 

tariff  for  lower  minimum    274 

leased,  when  are  private 79b,  122,  128 

loaded,  erroneously  placed  in  lieu  of  empty 240 

motor,  moving  under  their  own  power   334 

private,  defined,  in  connection  with  demurrage..  79&,  122,  128,  222 

private,  diverted,  short-line  mileage  rate  applies   13S 

private,  out  of  service  on  carrier's  storage  track  demurrage. .  123 
rate  applying  only  on  coal  in  box  cars;    carrier  furnishing 

hopper  cars  liable  for  excess  charges  120 

repair  of,  on  foreign  lines  333,  373 

safety  appliances  required  on   (handhold)    67 

sleeping  cars,  privilege  of  occupying  at  destination   51 

special  rates  on  shipments  in  foreign  470 

transfer  of  shipment  to  another  car  in  transit   331 

two  small  cars  furnished  in  lieu  of  car  ordered   339 

Cars  of  special  constbuctiox,  what  included    328,  329 

Car  service..   See  Demurrage. 

Casualties,  exception  in  hours-of-service  law 88 

Cartage.     See  Drayage. 

Cause  of  action,  when  accrues  220y 

Change  in  rate,  while  import  shipment  on  seas  Ill 

Charges   (see  also  Rates): 

brokerage,  need  not  be  published  by  express  companies  ....  300 

delivering  carrier  must  collect  lawful,  on  prepaid  shipments  156 

for  transportation  services  must  be  paid  in  money   207 

outbound,  can  not  be  refunded  to  consignee  and  billed  as  ad- 
vances on  return  movement   249 

proceeds  of  sale  for  charges  insufficient  to  cover  freight  and 

demurrage 41,  145 

telegraph  and  telephone,  must  be  fair  and  reasonable 305 

T;elegram  or  message  to  or  from  shippers  . . .  .302,  327,  351,  363,  480 

waiver  of,  loaded  car  placed  in  lieu  of  empty  240 

Charity: 

passes  to  caretakers  with  persons  or  property  carried  free  for 

charity    150 

reduced  rates  to,  without  tariffs   208e 

Charter,   train  at  published  rate  per  car  or  per  train,  tickets 

sold  by   charterer  at  special   fare    82 

Check,  agent  awaiting  authority  to  accept  for  freight  charges; 

demurrage 39 

Checking  baggage: 

by  initial  line  with  routing  inadequately  specified   326 

sample,  and  sale  of  at  destination  445 

Child  (see  also  Family): 

commutation  tickets  for,  must  not  discriminate  in  favor  of 

school   children    99 


798  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Child    (sec  also   Family) — Continued.  Ruling 

sex  of,  must  be  shown  on  application  for  passes  290 

under  12  years,  full-fare  ticket  purchased,  no  refusal   163 

under  five,  traveled,   full-fare  ticket  purchased    492 

Chinese,  deportation  of,  by  Government   (fares;    subsistence)    .  .       107 

Circulars  and  rulings  of  Commission  distributed  to  carriers  ....       211 

Circuses,    handling   of   advance   cars   and   use   of  special    circus 

mileage   books    50S 

Claims    (see  also  Reparation;     Special  reparation): 

accrued,  for  absorption  of  switching  charges,  not  invalidated 

by  cancellation  of  tariff   136 

adjustment  of,  for  damages  resulting  from  misrouting  .  .     214,  474 

assignment   of    362 

barred  by  statute    220;,   307 

bureaus  filing  reparation  complaints,  order  in  favor  of  ship- 
per          246 

carrier  must  investigate  before  paying    236,  462 

damages  due  to  errors  in  telegraph  messages  317 

demurrage    refunds    79d 

drayage  expense  resulting  from  misrouting,  adjustment  of  474,  509 
filing   of    informal   complaints,    procedure;     statute   of  limi- 
tations         508 

interest  upon  overcharge   489 

legal  expense  to  collect  undercharge  valid,  against  carrier  at 

'    fault  16 

loss  and  damage  while  in  charge  of  truckman   441c 

misrouting,  adjustment  of,  under  Ruling  214   474 

misrouting,  barred  before  Commission  by  statute;    jurisdic- 
tion of  courts  139,  286o,  b 

misrouting,  Commission  will  exercise  jurisdiction  and  make 

award  against  guilty  carrier    286e 

misrouting,  exclusive  jurisdiction  over   286a 

misrouting,   principles   fixing   liability  and   governing   claim    • 

adjustments 198,  205,  214,  286,  397,  474,  509 

offsetting  of  under  or  overcharge   323 

special  reparation,  principles  underlying   356 

statute  does  not  run  as  between  carriers   306 

written  notice  to  carrier  constitutes  presentation  of 510  " 

Classification,  does  not  govern  tariff  unless  referred  to 141 

Class  rates.     See  Rates;    Commodity  rates. 

Cleaning  in  transit.     See  Transit  privileges. 

Coal  cars.    See  Cars. 

Coal  contributed  to  college  39S 

Coal  for  steam  purposes  may  not  be  given  special  rate 34 

Coastwise  business,  defined   853 

Coastwise  traffic: 

moving  on  through  bill  laid  to  inland  rail  point  and  through 

rate   effective    401 

over  Panama  Railroad    369 


Index  to   Conference  Eulings.  799 

Rulin? 

College,  coal  contributed  to   398 

Collection  of  charges.     See  Charges;    Payment. 
CoLLECTio'N  OF  demitrrage.     See  Demurrage. 

Collection  of  shipments  by  carriers  and  free  switching  for  In- 
dustries           97 

Collection  of  undercharges.     See  Undercharges. 

Colon,  Panama,  shipment  to;    export  rates  359,  468 

Colonist  tickets.     See  Tickets. 
Combination  rates  (see  also  Rates;    Fares): 

of  intermediate   rates  or   fares   less   than   through    rates   or 

fares   220g,  298,  443,  488 

joint,  or  fares  to  common  points  and  local  rate  or  fare  be- 
yond          215 

Commercial  association  not  entitled  to  excursion  at  carrier's  ex- 
pense          272 

Commissary  car  operated  by  carrier,  unlawful   257 

Commission  : 

correspondence  with,  if  quoted,  must  be  fully  and  accurately         29 
correspondence  with,   conducted   through  designated  officers 

of  carriers    210 

credentials  of  examiners  must  be  honored    260 

official  circulars  and  ruling;     distribution  of   211 

Commission  for  transportation,  use  of,  by  post-office  inspectors 

off  duty    377 

Commissioners  of  states,  not  to  use  passes  on  interstate  jour- 
neys            35 

Commission: 

import  traffic,   to  consignees,  not  sanctioned    7 

on   traffic,  equivalent  to  rebates,   illegal    221ia 

telegraph  company,  to  persons,  firms,  company  where  office 

located,   none    407 

Commodity  r.\te«: 

may  not  be  applied  to  transportation  of  passengers   212 

supersede   class    rates,   although   carrying   high    minimum 

weight 84 

tariff  naming,  per  car  and  also  class  rate    483 

trade  name,  rates  on  articles  sold  under   273 

Common  arrangement   (see  also  Through  routf;),  through  bill- 
ing over  rail-and-water  line    354 

Common  point,  rates  on  point  making  lowest  combination    ....       215 
Commutation  fares  and  tickets: 

application  of  fourth  section  of  amended  act  304a 

compared  only  with  tickets  of  same  character  under  section  4       310 

exception  as  to  tariffs  in  section  22  not  applicable  to 208e 

must  not  be  discriminatory;    limited  to  school  children   ....         99 

state,  may  be   used  on   interstate  journey    26 

Company  material: 

destroyed  on  foreign  line,  return  free  to  road  owning 224 


800  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Company  material — Continued.  Ruling 

division  of  joint  rate  on  fuel  coal   324,  486 

free  carriage  returning  to  manufacturers  for  repairs   22 

free  transportation  by  one  carrier  for  another   225 

giving  express  company  benefit  of  rail  carrier's  division   . .  372 
lease  by  carrier  of  trackage  rights  over  another,  as  device 

to   avoid    charges    153 

lease  by  carrier  of  trackage  rights  to  haul  general  traflBc  . . .  439 

misrouting  of  143 

regulations  concerning  explosives  apply  to   388 

repair  of  car  for  free  transportation    333 

repair  of  cars  on  foreign  lines  373 

Compensation,  for  building  industrial  switch  tracks   512 

Competency  of  railroad  employees  not  inquired  into  by  commis- 
sion      288 

Complaints  for  reparation.     See  Claims;    Reparation. 

Concentration.     See  Transit  privileges. 

Concession  : 

by  means  of  leasing  carriers  property   in  consideration  of 

lessee's    shipments    94 

unpublished   allowance    360 

Concurrence: 

agent  files  tariff,  noncurring  carrier  refiles  as  its  own  with- 
out securing  concurrences,  unlawful    13 

by  carrier  in  tariffs  of  another  does  not  legalize  local  use  of 

local  rates    281 

by  lessor  company  in  rates  published  by  lessee  402 

by  switching  roads    341 

error  in  stating  concurrence  number  347 

in  tariffs  for  through  traffic  by  leased  lines  jointly  operated 

through   separate   company    229 

issuing   carrier's   responsibility   under   joint   rate   published 

without  proper  concurrence    501 

railroad  system  must  show  corporate  title   450 

Conductor,  error  of,  in  honoring  void  ticket   105 

Conflict: 

between  rate  and  route    474c 

In  tariffs,  rates,  or  fares  50,  70,  104,  239 

Connecting  carrier  : 

discrimination  in  division  of  rate  on  fuel  coal  324 

for  misrouting  involving 137,  199,  286c 

two  small  cars  furnished  in  lieu  of  car  ordered  339 

Consignee: 

commissions  to,  on  imports,  not  sanctioned  7 

disclosing   name   of    358 

failure  to  notify,  at  distant  point,  demurrage   261 

f.  o.  b.  shipment,  liability  for  demurrage  96 

omitting  the  address  of   3831 


Index  to   Conference   Rulings.  801 

Consignee — Continued.  Ruling 

reconsignment  includes  changes  of,  at  same  desiination    .  .         72 

routing  of  shipments  by    502 

shipment   accepted   at  destination   by,   and   subsequently   re- 
turned           249 

unknown  at  destination,  notice  of  arrival  of  car  mailed,  de- 
murrage accrues    144 

Consignor: 

error  of,  in  loading  car;    shipment  recalled  in  transit  charges 

for  actual  haul 248 

error  of,  in  marking  L.  C.  L.  shipments   433 

exchange  of  services  under,  between  railroad  and  telegraph, 

charges  upon  unauthorized   reconsignment    237 

f.   o.  b.   shipment,  liability  for  demurrage    96 

must  pay  lawful  charges  on  shipment  billed  as  prepaid  ....         20 

shipment  returned  to,  by  consignee  with  advances   249 

should   cooperate  to  avoid  mistakes    215(J 

Continuous  carriage.     See  Through  rate. 

Construction,  private  side  track,  by  shipper,  cost  repaid  by  car- 
rier     110,  512 

Construction  cars.    See  Cars. 
Contracts : 

exchange  of  services  under,  between  railroad  and  telegraph, 

telephone  or   cable   companies    491 

for  division  of  joint  rates  or  fares  must  be  filed  209 

free  transportation  of  materials  and  men  for  icing  plant   .  .        124 
free  transportation  of  material  for  contractors  under  agree- 
ment   therefor    208c 

pass  to  officers  of  nonoperating  road   355 

pass  to  instructor  in  use  of  appliances  and  material 346 

solicitors  for  excursion,  form  of  contract  with    221c 

tailor    under    contract    making    uniforms    for    railway    em- 
ployees, passes  to    134 

telephone  and  telegraph  service;    carriers  must  file  contracts 

for    219 

Contribution: 

of  coal  to  college   398 

to  expense  of  entertainment   (excursion)    2216 

Convicts,  no  reduced  fares  431 

Cooks  may  be  carried  free  on  private  cars   30*1 

Correspondence: 

with  Commission,  if  quoted,  must  be  full  and  accurate   ....         29 
with   Commission,  conducted   through  designated   officers   of 

carriers  210 

Correspondence  school,  agents  of,  not  entitled  to  passes 208« 

County    authorities,    transportation    free    or    at    reduced    rate, 

lawful 452 


802  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Ruling 

Coupon    for    water    transportation    exchangable    for    rail    trans- 
portation .   ...  - 361 

Courts  : 

death  of  round-trip   ticket  holder  before  return  trip  made; 

refund     393 

deceased   wife  of  employee,  free  transportation  to  place   of 

interment  174 

employee  killed  or  died  in  service,  free  transportation  of  . .  18,  193 

ex-employee,   no  free   transportation    285 

jurisdiction    in    misrouting    claims    that    are    barred    before 

Commission    286a 

witnesses  attending  proceeding  in    319,  414 

Credentials  of  examiners  must  be  honored  without  special  let- 
ters   of    advice    260 

Creosoting  lumber:    transit  privilege  of  18  months  not  excessive  232 

Cross  reference: 

in  tariffs   101,  276 

terminal   charges,   Canada    191 

Cuba,    tariffs   containing   export   rates    468 

Cummins  amendment: 

released  rates  under,  as  further  amended  500 

Customs  brokers: 

acting  as   consignees,   no  commissions  on   imports    7 

employed   on   commission   basis    (passes)     454 

Customs  clearance,  brokerage  charges  for,  need  not  be  published  300 

Customs  inspectors,  Canadian  passes    345 

Damaged  shipments,  demurrage  on   451 

Damages: 

adjustment  of  claims  for,  resulting  from  misrouting   474 

error  in  transmission  of  telegraphic  message,  no  jurisdiction  317 

measure  of,   under  uniform  bill  of  lading    387 

refusal  of  shipper  to  pay  ice  charges    343 

resulting   from   delayed   notice   of  arrival  of  fruit  at  desti- 
nation    127 

Dangerous  articles,   regulations  concerning,   apply    to  company 

material    388 

Date  effective   (see  Efiective  date  of  tariffs)  : 

excursion  ticket  sold  before,  of  tariff  467 

shipments   received   prior  to,   of   reduced   rate    172 

Deadheading  employees  not  on  duty  under  hours-of-service  law  74 

Deceased  employees.    See  E.mployees;   Corpse. 

rates  based  on,  at  time  and  place  of  shipment 496 

IlECL^VEED   valuation    (.SCC   VALUATION): 

Delay: 

damages    resulting    from    delayed    notice    of   arrival    of    per- 
ishable   freight    127 

of  vessel;    no  waiver  of  demurrage  358 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  803 

Ruling 
trains,  causing  passenger  to  miss  connections,  invalidating 

ticket  27 

Deficit  resulting  from  sale  of  freight  to  pay  charges   41,  145 

Definition  of  "net,"   "gross,"  and   "long  ton"    131 

Delivering  carrier: 

must  collect  demurrage,  although  another  carrier  at  fault..  220/ 

must  make  delivery  at  terminal   designated    474o 

Delivery  : 

drayage  expenses  resulting  from  misrouting  and  erroneous 

terminal 509 

duty  of  carrier  to  make,  in  accordance  w^ith  routing  instruc- 
tions    474a 

prevented  by  local  law,  prepaid  charges  not  to  be  refunded  367 

shipper's   instructions  must  be  followed    214b 

wrong  terminal,   resulting   from   misrouting,   no    refund   for 

drayage 234,  283,  509 

Demurrage  (see  important  note  to  Ruling  242) : 

accruing  while   agent  waits   authority  to   accept  check   for 

charges   39 

accruing   on    "order    notify"    shipments    through    failure    to 

notify,  such  shipments  being  prohibited  by  tariffs    261 

astray  shipment  accepted  by  consignee  at  point  found    ....  31 

average  agreement,   application   of    409,   463,    497,   498,   506 

bunching  cars  in  transit    142 

Canada,   on  traffic  to   and  from,   terminal   charges   must  be 

published 191 

carriers'  cars  out  of  service  on  storage  track    123 

claims    for    refund    of    79(J 

clear  bill  of  lading  issued  and  failure  to  bill,  as  advanced  .  .  416 

code  of  National  Car  Rules    313 

collected  under  tariff  not  filed,  refund  denied    194 

construction  cars  and  derricks    270 

damaged   shipments    451 

delivering  carrier  must  collect  on  misrouted  shipments;    con- 
signee  should  accept  delivery  and  pay  charges    32,  220f 

destination,  when  tariff  is  effective 405,  473 

due  to  vessel  delay;    no  waiver   358 

erring  carrier  liable  for   220/ 

failure  to  give  notice  at  named  address   366 

f.  o.  b.  shipments,  at  point  of  origin,  against  consignor  or 

consignee   96 

in  transit,  when  tariff  effective  473 

jurisdiction  of  Commission  exclusive  over  demurrage  on  in- 
terstate traflSc    54,  223b 

must  be  published  when  applied  on  interstate  shipments   . .  223a 

occasioned  by  strike,  no  refund   8 

outbound  shipments,  when  tariff  effective    478 


804  Index  to  Conference  Rulings. 

Demurrage — Continued.  Ruling 

private  cars  on  private  sidetracks   79,  121,  128,  222 

private  car,  out  of  service,  on  carrier's  storage  track   123 

private  car  owned  by  one  shipper  but  used  by  another 122 

private  car,  when  subject  to   222 

proceeds  of  sale  insufficient  to  cover  transportation  and  de- 
murrage charges  41,  145 

published  in   separate   tariff  or  originating  carrier  without 

cross  reference  in  rate  tariff  276 

sidetrack  on  marshy  land  sank  with  cars,  demurrage  waived  117 
tariffs  used  before  August  28,  1906,  but  not  filed  by  carriers 

until    later     100 

terminal    line    refused    to    accept    and    switch    until    freight 

charges   paid,    demurrage    accrues    144 

transferred  from  one  to  two  cars  in  transit,  demurrage  on 

one   357 

Uniform  Code  indorsed  by  Commission  242 

waiver  where  proceeds  of  sale  insufficient  to  cover  all  charges  145 

weather  or  floods  preventing  unloading,  tariff  rule  waiving  135 

where  two  small  cars  are  furnished  in  lieu  of  car  ordered  .  .  339 

Deportatiox  of  Chinese  for  Goverxment,  no  reduced  fares    . . .  107 

Destination  : 

astray  shipments  sent  to  wrong,  through  agent's  error   ....  217 
erroneously  billed  by  shipper,  carrier  should  secure  disposi- 
tion orders    237 

reconsignment  includes  changes  in   72c 

shipment  accepted  at,  and  subsequently  returned  to  shipper  249 
Destructions: 

maps,   profiles,  plans,   specifications,   etc.,  and   other  records. 

pertaining  to  physical  property    435 

of  canceled   tariffs  by   carrier    252 

of  records,  regulations  apply  also  to  joint  agencies   271 

of  records,  express  company  retired    440 

of  records,  of  lessor  company    375 

of  records,  sale  of  records 349 

telegrams  and  cablegrams   460 

Detour  of  trains  because  of  blockade;     adjustment  of  revenues 

betw^een  carriers    213 

Device: 

division  of  joint  rate  on  fuel  coal   324,  486 

evasion  of  through  rate  by  employing  carriers'  agents   ....  337 

evasion  of  through  fare  by  selling  local  tickets  24 

evasion  of  through  rate  by  billing  locally  and  rebilling  ....  98, 

337,  365 
lease  by  carrier  of  trackage  over  another  road,  avoid  charges 

on    m^aterial     \ 1*53 

lease  of  carrier's  property  in  consideration  of  lessee's  ship- 
ments    94 


Index  to  Conference  Rulings.  805 

Ruling 

Dining  car;    charges  for  meals;    no  jurisdiction   384 

DiREtTioN,  rates  published  in  one  direction  do  not  apply  in  re- 
verse   direction    52 

Discipline,  matters  of,  between  carriers  and  their  agents  and  em- 
ployees     69,  105 

Disclosing  information;    name  of  consignee   356 

Discrimination  between  connecting  lines  in  division  of  rate  on 

fuel  coal 324 

Distance  tariits  to  show  distance  between  freight  stations  ....  202 
Distinction: 

in  rates,  based  on  difference  in  use  to  which  shipment  is  to 

be  put,  unlawful    34 

in  rates,  between  shipments  handled  by  steam  and  electricity, 

unlawful  ,    2 

Diversion   (see  also  Washout)  : 

by   consignor,   account   washout   on  connecting   line,    carrier 

not  liable   147 

charges,  carload  transferred  into  two  cars  in  transit   357 

of  shipment  account  floods,  carrier  liable  for  excess  charges 

as    misrouting    83 

of  traffic.     Adjustment  of  revenues  between  carriers    213 

private  car  and  party,  account  floods,  short-line  mileage  rate  138 

rules  reserving  to  carrier  right  of  146,  183 

special  understanding  not  in  tariff 235 

transit  privilege  lost  by  reason  of,  and  misrouting  230 

Divisions: 

contracts   for,   must  be   filed;     division    sheets    need   not   be 

filed    209 

company  materials  moving  under  joint  through  rates    ....  225 

express  company  not  entitled  to  rail  carrier's   372 

Mexico,  publication  of,  to  and  from . .  .  269 

of  charges  on  detoured  trains  and  diverted  traffic    213 

of  overcharge  on  misrouting  claim  205 

of  joint  rates  on  fuel  coal   324 

of  joint  rates  on  railway  fuel  must  be  filed    486 

refund   of  overcharge  on  shipment  to  Mexico  based   on,   of 

through  rate   126 

Doors,  grain,  allowances  to  shipper  for  furnishing   78,  132,  267 

Drayage: 

absorption  of  charges  and  tariff  requirements    441 

additional,  charges  and  tariff  requirements   441 

adjustments  of  claims  for  damages  resulting  from  misrout- 
ing     509 

initial  line  liable  for  drayage  charges  resulting  from  its  mis- 
routing      383 

misrouted   shipment,   wrong  terminal  delivery,   no   refund..  283 
no  refund  where  routing  instructions  followed,  but  shipment 

not  diverted  in  accordance  with  understanding  not  in  tariff  235 


806  Index  to   Conference  Rulings. 

Ruling 
resulting  from  wrong  terminal  delivery  due  to  misrouting. 

234,  283,   509,   474a 
Drummers,  preference  to  drummers  or  other  special  classes  un- 
lawful             45 

Eastbound  rate  can  not  be  applied  westbound 52 

Eating  Houses: 

operated  for  employees  and  passengers,  free  transportation 

for 87 

no  passes  to  employees  340 

Effective  date  of  tariffs: 

first  tariff  filed  by  new  carrier,  date  omitted,  effective   im- 
mediately           73 

issued  and  used  before  August  28,  1906,  but  not  filed  until 

later  100 

none,  illegal,  never  effective   12 

Sunday,   lawful    47 

Election  by  shipper  as  to  released  rate;    carrier  must  inquire  . .       160 
Electricity  and  steam,  distinction  in  rates  on  traffic  handled  by, 

unlawful  2 

Electric  line.     See  Street  railways. 

Elevator,  lease  by  carrier  of  land  for,  at  nominal  rental 325 

Elb^'ator,  leased  by  carrier  at  nominal  rental  421 

Embargoes  account  of  revolution  in  adjacent  foreign  countries  . .       437 
Employees  (see  also  Agent)  : 

American  Asso.  of  R.  R.  Superintendents,  free  transportation       371 

American  Ry.  Asso.,  free  transportation    335 

application  of  hours-of-service  law 56,  74,  88,  108,  287,  342 

baggagemen  on  trains,  subject  to  hours-of-service  law  ....  275 
bodies  of,  deceased  or  killed  in  service,  free  transportation  18,  193 
body  of  deceased  wife  of,  free  transportation  to  place  of  in-    . 

terment  174 

bridge   company,    nonoperating,    no    passes    263 

Bureau   for   Safe   Transportation    of   Explosives,   free  trans- 
portation           335 

car-lighting  company,  no  passes  to  inspectors  169 

chief  interchange  inspectors,  free  transportation    371 

competency   of,   Commission   will   not   investigate   except    in 

case  of  accident  288 

cooks,  porters,  and  waiters  on  private  cars  may  be  carried 

free 301 

discharged,  transportation  of  household  goods    109 

disciplinary  matter  between  carrier  and   69.  105 

entering  another  carrier's  service,  no  free  carriage  of  house- 
hold   goods    255 

ex-employees,  families  of,  passes   158 

ex-employees,  traveling  to  enter  service  of  common  carrier. 


Index  to   Conference  Eulings.  807 

Employees — Continued.  Rulins 

passes  to    102 

express  companies,  and  their  families,  passes  to 157 

family  of  deceased  pensioned,  passes   47G 

free  transportation  for    95 

furloughed  and  on  leaves  of  absence,  entitled  to  passes 55 

furloughed,    entering    military    or    naval    service    of    United 

States    511 

household  effects  of  ex-employees   109,  255 

household  effects,  free  transportation  of 208b,  255 

hours-of-service  law,  application  58,  74,  88,  287,  342 

hours-of-service  law,  application  of,  to  employees  on  ferries .  .        108 

inspection  bureau,  free  transportation    371 

insurance  supervisors  carried  on  pay  rolls  devoting  only  part 

time  but  subject  to  call  493 

joint  employee  of  express  and  railroad  companies,  free  trans- 
portation           361 

killed  in  service,  passes  to  families   173,  193 

laborers  receiving  supplies  from  contractor  413 

laborers  receiving  supplies  shipped  by  carrier's  agent 469 

must  be  actually  in  service  of  carrier  to  obtain  pass 208a 

must  devote  substantially  all  time  to  service  of  carriers  to 

obtain  pass  412,  426,  446,  449,  454,  466 

nonoperating  road,  employees  of,  no  passes    355 

nonoperating  road,  families  of  deceased  employees,  free  trans- 
portation           352 

ocean  common  carriers,  passes  475 

omnibus  and  baggage  express  companies,  passes  to    ....    95a,  216 

on  leave  to  fill  term  in  public  office,  pass  308 

private  car  line  (passes)   479,  484 

private;    porters,  cooks,  and  waiters  may  be  carried  free   . .       301 
property  of,  may  not  be  transported  by  express  com.panies  ex- 
cept at  published  rate   513 

rail    common    carriers     in    nonadjacent    foreign    countries 

(passes)     475 

receivers  and   officers,   entitled   to   free  passes    165 

restaurant  employees    87,  340 

station  agent  devoting  part  time,  no  pass  440 

tailor  making  uniforms  for  railway  employees,   under  con- 
tract, passes    134 

water  lines;    interchange  of  passes  with  rail  lines 196 

weighing   bureau,    free    transportation    371 

Entertainments,   carrier  may   arrange  for  or  contribute  to,   in 

order  to  stimulate  travel  221  & 

Equalization  over  one  route  of  rate  over  another   195,  220(7 

Erring  road: 

alone  must  bear  burder  of  misrouting 137,  199,  286c 

alone  must  bear  burden  of  its  agent's  error 390 


808  Index  to  Conference  Eulings. 

Kuling 
Error: 

additional  charges  through  shipper's    348 

agent's  in  punching  time  linait  on  ticket;     refund  of  addi- 
tion   charges     390 

agents',  in  selling  round-trip  ticket  resulting  in  undercharge  151 

agent  selling  ticket  prior  to  effective  date  of  tariff 467 

agent  selling  half  rate  or  lower  class  tickets,  but  failing  to 

punch   all  coupons    487 

Canadian  rate  misquoted  resulting  in  undercharge    262 

damage  to  shipment  resulting  from,  in  arrival  notice   127 

fare  paid  under  misapprehension  of  privilege  offered  under 

through  ticket   391 

in  billing  prepaid  shipments  delivering  carrier  must  collect 

lawful  charges   156 

in  destination,  by  shipper;     reconsigning  orders    237 

in  destination.     Return  of  astray  shipments    217 

in  loading  car;     shipment  recalled   in  transit;     charges   for 

actual  haul    248 

in  printing  tariff,  special  reparation  based  on 200a 

in  stating  concurrence  number  347 

of  agent  in  selling  colonist  ticket,  carrier's  loss 69,  277,  467 

of  agent  in   punching  time  limit  on   ticket;     refund   of  ad- 
ditional fare  paid   266 

of  agent,  passenger  misrouted  or  required  to  pay  unnecessary 

transportation  charges    113,  167,  277 

of  conductor  in  honoring  ticket  over  wrong  line 105 

shippers,  in  routing  through  certain  junction  in  conflict  with 

rate 243 

shippers,  in  marking  L.  C.  L.  shipments   433 

yardmen  erroneously  placed  loaded  instead  of  empty  car   .  .  240 
Estimated    weights    per    package,    tariff    should    define    size    of 

package     280 

Examiners,  credentials  must  be  honored  by  carriers  without  spe- 
cial   letters    260 

Excess   baggage    c  harges    326 

Exchange: 

bills  of  lading  at  intermediate  points  showing  difterent  con- 
signor, consignee,  or  destination   415 

bills  of  lading  should  show  origin  and  route   227 

company  material  returned  for,  or  repair   22 

intrastate  mileage  books  in,  for  advertising  315 

of  franks  and  passes,  wireless  companies  410 

of  passes.     See  Passes. 

of  services  under  contracts  between  railroads  and  telegraph, 

telephone,  or  cable  companies  219,  305,  491 

ticket  to  one  point  for  ticket  to  farther  distant  point   303 

Excursion  and  excursion  fares: 

carrier  may  employ  ticket  solicitors  or  promoters 221c 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  809 

Excursion  and  EXtuRSioN  fares — Continued.  Ruliii;-; 

carrier  may  not  give  free,  for  commercial  association    ....  272 

defined  304c 

exception  as  to  tariffs  in  section  22  not  applicable  to 208e 

fourth  section  applies  to  304a 

privilege  of  remaining  in  sleeping  cars  at  stopover  point  of 

destination 51 

rate  must  be  same  for  all  schools  and  societies  71 

Excursion  tickets.     See  Tickets. 

Ex-EMPLOYEES : 

carriers  placed   in  receivership,   no  passes    436 

deceased,  no  free  transportation  of  remains  2S5 

families  of,  passes    158 

free  transportation  of  household  goods,  none 109,  255 

passes  to,  traveling  to  enter  service  of  common  carrier 102 

Exhibitions: 

car,  contents,  and  necessary  agents  for  state 477 

free  transportation  of  ores  to   176 

reduced  rates  to,  without  tariffs   208e 

Expense: 

monthly  report  of  carriers   30 

of  collecting  undercharges  borne  by  carrier  at  fault 16 

of  fitting  cars  for  shipments,  no  allowance  unless  in  tariffs 

19,  78,  132,  267,  292 

Explosives  : 

regulations  concerning,  apply  to  company  material    388 

tariffs  and  regulations  for  transportation  of   106 

Export  bills  of  lading,  rules  and  regulations  governing   378 

Export  business,  defined    353 

Export  rate: 

inland  proportional,  subject  to  fourth  section   299 

shipment  to  Colon,  Panama   359 

tariffs  shall  specify  the  countries  to  which,  is  applicable  ....  468 

Express  company: 

brokerage  charge  for  clearing  goods  through  customs 300 

destruction  of  records  of,  retired  440 

express   matter  carried  by   traction  company    (jurisdiction)  368 

not  entitled  to  benefit  of  rail  carrier's  division   372 

overvaluation  (dog)    188 

passes  to  oflTicers,  agents,  and  their  employees    157 

property  of  employees  may  not  be  given  free  transportation 

by  513 

railroads   carrying   interstate   traffic   for   express   companies 

subject  to  act   197 

refund  of  prepaid  charges  on  undelivered  shipment   367 

valuation  and  liability  on  shipments  of  bonds  58 

Extension  of  through  ticket  by  one  carrier  43 

Fabrication  in  transit.     See  Transit  privileges. 

False  billing,  undervaluation  of  shipments  by  consignor 58,  295 


810  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Ruling 
Family: 

bureaus  of  carriers    448 

definition   95c 

deceased  employee  of  nonoperating  road    352 

employee  killed  or  dying  in  service,  passes  to  . .  .  .103,  173,  193,  476 

ex-employees  traveling  to  enter  service   of  carrier    158 

express   companies,   families   of   officers   and   agents,   passes 

to.    157 

Government   officer's,    no   passes    2QSd 

local  attorney's  or  surgeon's,  no  passes  95a 

of  furloughed  employees  entering  military  or  naval  service 

of    United    States    511 

of  secretaries  of  railroad  Y.  M.  C.  A.'s   (no  passes)    485 

of  employee  on  leave  to  fill  public  office,  no  pass  308 

postal  clerks  (passes)    429 

servants  are  included    92,   95c 

trained  nurse  in,  of  employee   417 

wife  of  employee,  free  transportation  of  deceased   174 

Fares  : 

caretakers   unable   to   secure   return  load   must   collect    ....  1 

caretakers  traveling  with  motor  car  must  pay   334 

child  under  5  traveled  on   full,  ticket   492 

combination  of  joint  fare  to  common  points  and  local  fare 

beyond    215 

combination  of  party  rate  and  single  fares  as  device  to  evade 

through  fares   268 

excursion,    subject    to   fourth    section    304a 

contrasts  for  division  of,  must  be  filed   209 

convicts,  no  reduced    431 

diverted  traffic   213 

excursion,  defined    304« 

excursion,  must  be  same  for  all  schools  and  societies 71 

excursion,    including   sleeping-car   accommodations    51 

excursion,  subject  to  fourth  section    304« 

fourth  section  application  when  one  or  more  points  in  for- 
eign country 318 

higher  to  intermediate  point;    subsequent  reduction;    refund  385 

journey  abandoned  short  of  destination  350 

lawfully  established  rates  must  be  collected 314 

of  s^tae  character  are  to  be  compared  under  section  4 310 

orders  issued  abroad  for  domestic  passenger  tickets 465 

paid    under    misapprehension    of    privilege    offered     under 

through  ticket    391 

passenger,  may  not  be  applied  to  transportation  of  property  212 

passenger  traveled  second  class  on  first-class  ticket 495 

private   car  and   party  diverted   account  blockade  and   full 

mileage  rates   charged    138 

remain  in  effect  until  specifically  canceled   104 


Index  to   Conference  Eulings.  811 

Fares — Continued.  Ruling 

stating  fares  in  multiples  of  fives,  no  excuse  for  violation  of 

section    4    309 

suspension  of   322 

through,  may  not  be  higher  than  combination  of  intermediate 

fares    298 

transportation  of  Federal  troops  under  special  fares 218 

violation  of  amended  fourth  section .   293,  406 

Federal  troops,  transportation  of,  under  orders  218 

Feeding  in  transit.    See  Transit  privileges. 

Ferries.    See  also  car  ferries. 

employees  on,  application  of  hours-of-service  law   108 

municipal,  subject  to  act  when  engaged  in  interstate  trans- 
portation      162 

Ferry  car  se^ivicb.  without  tariif  authority  unlawful   97 

Fictitious  weight,  payment  of  charges  on,  to  obtain  free  icing  152 

Filing.     See  Tariffs;   Contracts. 

Flanges,    locomotives    equipped    with     328 

Floods.     See  Diversion. 

Floor  racks  in  refrigerator  cars  furnished  by  shippers   292 

F.  O.  B.  shipments,  demurrage  on  96 

Foreign  country.     See  Adjacetstt  foreign  country. 

Foreign  lines: 

not  adjacent,  officers  and  employees  of   (passes)    475 

repair  of  cars  on    373 

Form  of  contract,  agent  working  up  excursions   221c 

Forwarders,  carriers,  agents  acting  as,  for  shippers   98,  337,  365 

Forwarding  company,  acting  at  port  for  shipper  in  connection 
with  shipment  covered  by  through  bill  of  lading  and  ef- 
fective through  rate    401 

Four  months'  clause  in  uniform  bill  of  lading  510 

Fourth  section: 

absorption  of  switching  charges  to  competitive  points  only 

304rf,  304e 

applies  to  rates  and  fares  of  all  kinds   304' 

discriminations  that  have  been  corrected  not  to  be  restored 

without  sanction  of  Commission   395 

future  rate;    special  docket  cases 425 

higher   fare   to   intermediate   point;     subsequent   reduction; 

refund   385 

inland  export  and  import  rates    299a 

interpreted 293,  299b.  304 

not  to  be  disregarded  in  order  that  fares  may  be  stated  in 

multiples   of  five    309 

one  or  more  points  in  foreign  country  3.18,  447 

only  fares  of  same  character  are  to  be  compared  under  . .  304o,  310 

rates  from  branch-line  stations  not  directly  intermediate   .  .  304/ 


812  Index  to  Confehenoe  Rulings. 

Fourth  Sectiox — Continued.  Ruling 

rates  published  subsequent  to  February  17,  1911,  in  violation 

of 293 

through  fares  may  not  be  higher  than  combination 29& 

transshipment    rates    304 

Franks,  issuance  of,  by  telegraph  and  telephone  companies  .  .21'9&,  305d 

Franks  and  passes,  exchange  of  wireless  companies   410 

Free  icing  upon  payment  of  fictitious  weight   152 

Free  storage  in  transit.     See  Storage  in  transit. 

Free  time.    8ee  Demurrage. 

Free  transmission  of  messages  by  telephone  and  telegraph  com- 
panies        305(2 

Free  transportation: 

body  of  employee  killed   or  died   in   service    18,  193 

body    of    ex-employee    285 

body  of  deceased  wife  of  employee  174 

Free  transportation  of  persons.    See  Passes. 

Free  transportation  of  property: 

by  carriers  for  one  another   225 

caretakers  of  shipments  for  Government,  for  charity  or  ex- 
positions     150 

college,  coal  contributed  to  398 

commissary  car  operated  by  carrier  unlawful    257 

company  material  by  one  for  another    225 

company  material  for  repair  of  car    333 

company  material  for  repair  of  cars  on  foreign  line 373 

company   material    or   trucks    destroyed   on   foreign    line   to 

road    owning    224 

company  material,  returning  to  manufacturers  for  repairs  .  .  22 

contractors,  material   for    208(; 

county  authorities,  under  section  22,  lawful  452 

employees  may  not  be   granted    513 

exchange  by  telegraph  and  railroad  companies   364 

exchange  of  services  under  contracts  between  railroads  and 

telegraph,  telephone,  or  cable  companies    219,  305.  491 

exhibit.  State,  car  contents  and  necessary  agents  477 

gasoline  motor  cars  moving  under  own  power    334 

Government,  under  section  22   33,  36,  208c,  244 

household  effects  of  employee    208&,  255 

household  goods  of  postal  clerks  429 

household  goods  for  ex-employees    109,  255 

household  goods  of  joint  employee  of  express  and  railroad 

companies    361 

household  goods  of  inspector  of  American  Railway  Associa- 
tion    335 

ice  plant,  free  transportation  to  men  and  materials  124 

money  only  can  be  accepted  in  payment  for  transportation  207 

municipal  governments  in  adjacent  foreign  countries   118 


Index  to   Conference   Rulings.  813 

Free  transpoktation  of  puopkkty — Continued.  Ruling 

ores    for    exhibition    purposes    17G 

public  museum  of  natural  history    185 

railway  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  library  books   330 

railroad   eating   houses    87 

Red  Cross  Society  car  for  instructions  in  relief  of  accidents  259 

supplies  sold  to  employees  of  carrier  by  contractor  413 

supplies  shipped  to  employees  by  carrier's  agent   469 

telephone  and  telegraph  companies,  men  and  materials  for  . 

95tt,   219,  305,  491 

townships  under  section  22,  lawful    452 

Freight  bill  of  rail  line  on  import  traffic  to  show  details 42S 

Freight  trains,  privilege  of  riding  on,  can  not  be  limited  to  one 

class 45 

Fruit.     See  Caretakers. 

Fuel,  divisions  of  joint  rates  on  railway,  must  be  iiled   486 

I'UEL  COAL,  division  of  joint  rate  on 324 

Gasoline  motor  cars  moving  under  own  power  334 

Given  away,  tickets  bought  at  published  fare  may  be 154 

Gondola  cars,  safety  appliances    329 

Government: 

Canadian  customs  and  immigration  inspectors   345 

caretakers, /'necessary  agents,"  accompanying  property   for, 

passes 150 

deportation  of  Chinese,  fares  for  107 

municipal,  in  adjacent  foreign  country,  no  free  transporta- 
tion    118 

officers  and  families  of,  no  passes 208fZ 

property  transported   for,   reduced   rates    36,  244 

state  or  territorial,  no  free  transportation  of  persons  for   .  .  297 
transportation  for  Federal  or  municipal,  at  special  rates 

33,  208e,  244,  297,  452 

troops  for,  transportation  under  orders  218 

Grain: 

reshipping  rate  in  effect  when  reshipped,  not  legally  applica- 
ble    119 

reshipping    rate    from,    primary    market,    superseding    locals 

and  proportionals 57 

Grain  doors,  allowance  or  refunds  to  shippers  for  furnishing.  . 

78,  132,  267 
Grazing  in  transit.     See  Transit  privileges. 

Gross  ton,  defined 131 

Group  rates;    maintenance  of  relation  under  special  reparation 

orders  200a 

Half-fare  : 

agent  fails  to  indorse  ticket,  selling  carrier's  loss  69,  277 

application  of  section  4    310 

child  under  12  years,  full-fare  ticket  purchased,  no  refund..  163 


814  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Ruling 
Half  rates,  return  shipments,  must  move  over  original  outgoing 

route    42 

Handholds,  safety  appliances    67,  329 

Haw^aiiax  traffic  under  steamship  proportional  tariff   422 

Holding  companies:    Corporation  owning  a  railroad  that  it  has 
leased  to  a  carrier  for  use  in  interstate  traffic,  is  subject 

to  act    375 

Hotel  accommodations: 

must  be  kept  separate  from  transportation  fares   28 

privilege  of  occupying  cars  at  stop-over  or  destination  point 

can  not  be  limited  to  particular  club    51 

HOURS-OF-SERVICE   LAW: 

application  to  street  railways    56 

employees  deadheading,  not  on  duty  under   74 

ferry    employees    108 

interpretation    88,  287 

train  baggagemen  subject  to    275 

trainmen  who  delivers  orders  affecting  train  movements   . .  342 

House  cars,  safety  appliances   329 

Household  goods: 

of  employees,  free  transportation  of   208& 

of  ex-employees,  no  free  transportation  for   109,  255 

of  inspector  of  American  Railway  Association 335 

of  joint  employee  of  express  and  railroad  companies   361 

Ice  plant: 

contract  with  carrier,  free  carriage  of  men  and  materials  . .  124 

Icing  : 

employees  of  private-car  line  traveling  for  purpose  of  ....479,  484 

free,  payment  of  charges  on  minimum  weight  to  obtain  ....  152 
iced  refrigerator  car  not  used;    shipper's  refusal  to  pay  ice 

charges   343 

Illness,  redemption  of  unused  passenger  tickets  because  of  ....  115 

Immigrants,  Canadian  fares,  no  jurisdiction    24 

Immigration  agent,  p.asses  to,  if  bona  fide  employees   208a 

Immigration  inspectors,  Canadian,  passes   345 

Imports: 

advance  charges  to  ocean  carriers  on  428 

advance  in  rate  while  shipment  on  seas   Ill 

brokerage  charge  by  express  company  for  clearing  customs. .  300 

commissions  on,  to  consignees,  not  sanctioned    7 

customhouse  brokerage  fees  and  import  duties  advanced    . .  444 

inland  proportional  rate  subject  to  fourth  section 299 

moving  from  port  purely  local;    inland  proportional  not  ap- 
plicable     170 

tariff  should  state  to  which  countries  import  rate  is  appli- 
cable      468 

Industrial  road: 

common  carrier  having  trackage  rights  over,  subjects  latter  to 

jurisdiction    490 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  8l5 

Ruling 
Industry: 

lease  of  property  to,  in  consideration  of  exclusive  traffic   .  .         94 
intermediate  refusing  trackage  rights   (switching)    424 

iNFOKMAi    COMPLAINT.      See    SPECIAL    KEPAUATIOX. 

Information  ;    disclosing  name  of  consignee   356 

Initial  carrier,  liability  for  misrouting.    See  Misrouting. 

Inland  proportional  rate.    See  Proportional  rates. 

Inspection  bureau  of  carriers;    pass  to  employee  of  371 

Inspectors: 

American  Railway  Association,  household  goods    335 

Canadian  customs  and  immigration,  on  duty    (passes)    ....       345 
post   office;     use    of   commissions    for    transportation,    when 

off   duty    377 

tie  inspector,  pass    386,   430 

watch   and   time    478 

Instructions.     See  Routing  instructions. 

Instructors  in  use  of  appliances  or  materials,  passes 336,  346 

Insurance  companies,  agents  of,  not  entitled  to  passes   208a 

Insurance  supervisors  carried  on  pay  rolls,  devoting  only  part 

time  but  subject  to  call    (passes)    493 

Interchange  of  passes.     See  Passes. 

Interest  on  overcharge  claims    489 

Intermediate  point,  rates  to.     See  Long  and  short  haul. 

Interpretation  of  valuation  clause  in  uniform  bill  lading 387 

Interstate  rates,  applicable  for  rail  haul  from  port  of  entry  on 

coastwise   tralfic    369 

Intrastate  carrier,  when  subject  to  act  197,  368 

intrastate  carrier  handling  interstate  traffic   197,  3.68 

Intrastate  commutation  ticket,  use  on  interstate  journey  ....         26 

Intrastate  mileage  book,  use  on  interstate  journey    315 

Intrastate  shipment,  misrouted  over  interstate  route    140 

Investigation,    claims    must    be    investigated    by    carrier   before 

payment 236,  462 

Investigation  and  suspension.    See  Suspension  of  tariffs. 

Joint  age^nt: 

destruction  of  records,  regulations  apply  to  271 

error  in  misrouting  shipment  253 

Joint  employee  of  express  and  railroad  company,  free  transpor- 
tation          361 

Joint  operation  of  two  lines  by  separate  company  229 

Joint  rates    (see  also  Through  rates)  : 

combination  of,  to  common  point  and  local  beyond   215 

reduced  to  sum  of  locals,  minimum  weight  increased    338 

water  line  with  rail  carrier,  subjects  tralfic  to  jurisdiction  . .         66 

Jurisdiction: 

bridge  companies   381,  399 

brokerage  charges  by  express  companies  on  shipments  from 
abroad,  no    300 


816  Index  to   Conference  Rulings. 

JrRiSDicTioN — Continued.  Ruling 

Canada,  none  over  fares  between  points  in   24 

canal-boat  line,  when  subject  to  act    241 

car  ferry  company  subject  to  act    374 

charges  for  meals  in  dining  cars  384 

claims  barred  by  the  statute   10,  220;,  306,  307 

claims  resulting  from  misrouting,  exclusive 286a 

commission  can  not  require  additional  train  service    296 

common  carrier  having  trackage   rights   over   logging   road 

subjects  latter   to    490 

competency  of  employees  in  case  of  accident  288 

corporation  owning  leased  line  subject  to 375 

courts,  in  misrouting  claims  that  are  barred  before  Commis- 
sion        286a,    b 

damages  for  error  in  transmission  of  telegraphic  message  . .  317 

damages  to  perishable  shipment  resulting  from  delay    127 

demurrage  charges  on  interstate  traffic   54,  223 

divisions  of  through  rates  or  fares  to  or  from  Mexico   ....  269 

drayage,  loss  and  damage  while  in  charge  of  truckman  ....  441 

drayage  to  one  drayman  or  one  firm   441 

Hawaiian  traffic  under  steamship  proportional  tariff    422 

inland   proportional,    export   and    import   rates    299 

intrastate  traction  company  carrying  interstate  traffic,  when 

subject  to  act    368,  418 

joint  rates  between  water  and  rail  carrier  subjects  former  to  66 
misrouting    damages.    Commission    will    exercise,    to    award 

against  guilty  carrier   286e 

misrouting  via  carrier  not  subject  to    93 

motor  cars  moving  under  their  own  power   3.34 

municipal  belt  line  subject  to  act   89 

municipal  ferries  subject  to  act   1 02 

offsetting  under  or  over  charges   323 

Porto  Rican  ports  and  inland  points  in  United  States,  joint 

rail  and  ocean  rates  between  ' 201 

port-to-port  traffic  in  connection  with  inland  rail  haul 1.55 

railroads   carrying   interstate   traffic   for   express   companies 

subject   to   act    197,  368 

refusal  of  shipper  to  pay  ice  charges  ?.43 

signals  in  case  of  accident    288 

telegraph  and  telephone  companies  subject  to  amended  act..  305 

telephone  companies  in  Porto  Rico,  none  420 

terminal  companies  subject  to   312 

traflJic  through  the  United  States  from  and  to  an  adjacent 

foreign  country,   no    505 

water  lines  accepting  traffic  from  rail  line  on  through  bill 

lading  354 

wireless  messages;    ships  at  sea  .  : 394 

Killed.    See  Employees. 

Labor  agent  may  not  lawfully  receive  passes   411 


Index  to  Conference  Rulings.  817 

Ruling 

Ladders:     Safety  appliances    329 

Lake-and-kaul  route.     See  Car  ferries. 

Land  agents,  passes  to,  if  bona  fide  employees 208a 

Land  company  may  give  away  tickets  bought  at  published  fare       154 
Large  car: 

ordered,  small  car  furnished  274 

Lease: 

by  carrier  of  trackage  rights,  as  device  to  avoid  charges  on 

materials    153 

by  carrier  of  trackage  rights  to  baud  general  traffic   439 

elevator  leased  by  carrier  at  nominal  rental   421 

of  property  by  carrier  to  shipper,  and  purchase  of  traffic  .  .         94 

of  railroad-owned  land,  by  shipper,  at  nominal  rental    325 

liEASKD  LINES  joiutly  Operated  through  separate  company;    tariff 

concurrences     229 

Legal  expense  to  collect  undercharge,  valid  claim  against  car- 
rier  at   fault    16 

Legal  rate: 

lower  of  two  conflicting  rates  in  same  tariff   239 

lowest  combination  of  published  rates  in  absence  or  tnrough 

rate 256 

one  in  effect  on  date  of  receipt  of  property  for  transportation       172 
one  in  effect  over  actual  route  of  movement  ...  .32,  195,  214a,  220^7 

reissue  of  canceled  rate  344 

liEGAL  remedies,   Carriers  must  exhaust,   in  collection   of  under- 
charges          314 

loaded,  shipment  transferred  by  carrier  to  two  small  cars.  .       273 

transportation   stopped   short  of  intended   destination    350 

Lessee  and  lessor  roads: 

concurrence  by  lessor  company  in  rates  published  by  lessee. .       402 

corporation  owning  leased  line,  subject  to  act   375 

joint  operation  of  combined  road  under  special  arrangement       229 
lessee  not  serving  public  as  common  carrier,  lessor  only  to 

file   tariffs ISO 

shipments  routed    over   lessor   road,   but   handled    by   lessee 

road ;     same   delivery    168 

Less-than-carload  shipments    [see   also   Carload  rate),   collec- 
tion by  carrier  and  free  switching  from  industries   97 

Liability  for  misrouting.     See  Misrouting. 

Lighting   company',    no   passes   to   employees    testing   lights    on 

trains    169 

Limitation  s  : 

carrier  can  not  waive  the  statute  and  revive  barred  claims  .     220; 
effect  of  two-year,  in  the  act,  upon  reparation  claims  .10,  220/,  307 

filing  of  informal  complaints,  procedure;    statute  of 508 

jurisdiction    of   courts   in   misrouting   claims    barred    before 

Commission 139,  286a,  6 

statute  does  not  run  as  between  carriers  306 


818  Index  to  Conference  Rulings. 

Ruling 
Limited  tickets.     See  Tickets. 

Linemen,  telegraph  and  telephone  companies,  free  passes  ....   95a,  219 

Liquor,  refund  of  prepaid  charges  on  undelivered  367 

Live  stock   (see  also  Caketakers),  rates  based  on  value  of,  at 

time  and  place  of  shipment   49G 

Loading  in  transit;    loss  of  privilege  by  misrouting   370 

LocAx,  BILLING  AND  KEBiLLiNG,  to  cvade  higher  through  rate  98,  337,  365 

Locomotives  equipped  with  snowplows  or  flangers   328 

Long  and  short  haltl  (see  also  Fourth  section): 

absorption  of  switching  charges  to  competitive  points  only  3fl4d 

applies  to  rates  and  fares  of  all  kinds   304a 

future  rate;    special  docket  cases    425 

higher   fare    to    intermediate   point;     subsequent    reduction; 

refund   385 

inland  export  and  import  rates  299 

intermediate  points  under   304e 

interpreted 293,  299,  304 

one  or  more  points  in  foreign  country  318,  447 

only  fares  of  same  character  are  to  be  compared  under  ....  310 

rates  from  branch  line  stations  not  directly  intermediate  . .  304/ 

rates  in  violation  of  rule  of  section  4  may  not  be  restored 

without  sanction   of  Commission    395 

rates  published  subsequent  to  February  17,  1911,  in  violation 

of  fourth  section  293,  395,  406 

rule  not  to  be  disregarded  in  order  that  fares  may  be  stated 

in  multiples  of  five    309 

transshipment  rates   304 

violations  of  amended  fourth  section    293,  395,  406 

Long  ton,  defined    131 

Lost  ticket.     See  Tickets. 

Lubricating  companies,   agents   of,   no   passes    208a 

Lumber,    creosoting,   transit   privilege   of   eighteen   months    not 

excessive 23.2 

Machinery,  fitting  cattle  cars  for.  no  refund  unless  in  tariff  .  .  19 

Mailing  list  for  distribution  of  official  circulars  and  rulings   .  .  211 

Maintenance  of  rate   (see  also  Orders  of  Commission): 

group   rates;     maintenance  under   informal   orders    200a 

or  relative  adjustment;    error  in  printing  tariff 200a 

relation  in  rates  between   raw  material  and   manufactured 

products   200a 

through  rate  exceeds  combination  on  important  basing  point  200a 

to  conform  to  orders  of  Commission;    to  group  points  or  on 

like   commodities    130 

under  informal  reparation  orders  14,  200,  425 

Marking,  1.  c.  1.  shipments,  error  of  shippers    433 

Material,  Company.     See  Company  material. 

Maximum  load,  carriers  rhay  refuse  to  receive  in  one  car  more 

than  prescribed   483 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  819 

Ruling 

Meals  : 

carrier    may    publish    excursion    fare    including    meals,    but 

must  also  offer  transportation  separately   28 

charges  for,  in  dining  car;     no  jurisdiction   384 

Measure  of  damages  under  uniform  bill  of  lading   387 

Messages  by  telephone  or  telegraph,  interstate   305 

Messages,  payment  for  telegraph  or  telephone  ..302,  321,  351,  363,  480 

Messages   received   or   transmitted   for   establishment   in   which 

telegraph  company  has  office,  commissions   407 

Mexico  (see  also  Adjacent  foreign  country): 

embargoes  account  of  revolution  in   437 

overcharge  on  shipment  to,  refunded   126 

publication  of  divisions  of  rates  to  and  from  269 

JiTileage  books  ok  tickets: 

application  of  section  4    310 

distances  between  stations  not  required  to  be  shown  in  tar- 
iffs    202 

in  part  payment  of  ticket   382 

insufficient  coupons,  passenger  may  pay  for  balance  of  jour- 
ney at  regular  per-mile  rate  under  tariff  rule   81 

not  good  in  new  territory  unless  so  provided  in  tariff   ....  178 

rates  must  be  published    208e 

rules  governing  redemption  should  be  in  tariff  , 228 

state,  used  on  interstate  journey   315 

use   of   special    circus    503 

Mileage  tariffs,  to  show  distances  between  freight  stations   .  . .  202 

Milk,  caretakers  of   21 

Milling  in  transit.    See  Transit  pri\ileges. 

Minimum  weight: 

class  rate  and  minimum  make  lower  charge  than  commodity 

rate  with  higher  minimum,  latter  applies    84 

increased  when  through  rate  reduced  to  sum  of  locals;  basis 

of  reparation 338 

joint  through  rate  must  be  subject  to  only  one   264 

larger    car    furnished    than    ordered;     connecting    lines    no 

rules   covering    274 

payment  of,  to  obtain  free  icing  under  tariff  152 

shipment  transferred  by  carrier  into  two  cars   273 

transfer  of  shipment  in  transit  to  another  car 331 

two  small  cars  furnished  in  lieu  of  larger  car  ordered    ....  339 

Ministers,  free  transportation  does  not  include  families  of  ....  208d 

Misapprehension.    See  Error. 

Misbilling,  undervaluation  of  shipment  by  consignor   58,  295 

Misquotation  : 

of  Canadian  rates,  carrier  must  collect  undercharges   262 

of  rate,  not  a  basis  for  reparation   254 

Misrouting   (see  also  Diversion)  : 

adjustment  of  claims  for  damages  resulting  from   474 


820  Index  to   Confeeenoe  Rulings. 

MiSBOUTiNG — Continued.  Ruling 

agreement    between    carriers    respecting    respon'oibility    for 

misrouting  traffic    198 

all-rail  and  lake-and-rail  routes  available   190,  316,  321 

bill  of  lading  specifying  route  and  rate  applying  over  differ- 
ent route    243,   474c 

blockade  on  specified  route,  diversion  order  by  consignor,  car- 
rier not  liable    147 

car-ferry    routes    316 

carrier  at  fault  to  bear  entire  burden 198,  205,  214d,  474a 

carrier  at  fault  liable  for  storage  and  drayage   383 

claims   that  are  barred   before   Commission,   jurisdiction   of 

courts    286a,    b 

company  material,  routing  instructions  violated 143 

connecting  carrier  accepting  shipment  at  junction   without 

routing    instructions    286c 

demurrage  ordinarily  not  refunded  in  misrouting  cases  .  .  32,  220e 

diversion  of  private  car  and  party  account  of  flood   138 

diversion   of  shipment   account   blockade,   carrier   liable   for 

excess   charges   as   misrouting    83 

drayage  expense  resulting  from   (claims)    474a.  509 

error  of  joint  agent  of  two  lines  in  forwarding  from  inter- 
mediate point 253 

inconsistent  instructions  followed;    transit  privilege  lost  ...       370 
indirect  and   longer  route  carrying  lower  rate  but  not  rea- 
sonable             91 

jurisdiction  exclusive  in  Commission  over  claims  for   286a 

jurisdiction  to  award  damages  versus  carrier  guilty  of  ....     286e 

lawful  charge  is  tariff  rate  over  route  moved   214a 

liability  of  initial  carrier  for  failure  to  transmit  instructions 

137,  199 

over  line  of  carrier  not  subject  to  the  act 93 

over  line  without  legal  published  rate   90,  93 

passengers,  through  errors  of  agents 113,  167 

principles  fixing  liability  and  governing  claim  adjustments 

205,  214,  230,  286,  397,  474 
refund  must  be  authorized  by  Commission  or  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction    214a 

refund  when  agent  misroutes    214d 

reparation  on  basis  of  State  rate  419 

road  having  trackage  rights  handles  shipment  routed  over 

lessor  road;    same  delivery;    no  misrouting  168 

routing  of  shipments  by  consignees    502 

shipment   that   could   move   Intrastate   sent  over   higher   in- 
terstate route    140 

transit  privilege   lost   as  result   of  misrouting,   erring   road 

liable   230 

undercharges,  adjustments  among  carriers    214/,  h 

wrong  terminal  delivery  resulting  in  drayage  expense  234,  283,  509 


Index  to  Conference  Rulings.  821 

Ruling 

Money,  transportation  must  be   paid   for   in,  not   in   services  or 

property    207 

Monthly  basis,  attorney  employed  on,  but  engaged  in  other  prac- 
tice, no  time  passes   412 

Monthly  reports,  time  and  manner  of  filing  with  Commission  .  30 

Motor  cars,  gasoline,  moving  under  own  power   334 

Municipal: 

belt  line,  subject  to  act  89 

ferry,  subject  to  act    162 

government,  in  adjacent  foreign  country,  no  froo   transpor- 
tation    118 

government,  transportation  for    33,   244 

Museum: 

of  natural  history,  public,  free  transportation  of  property  of  185 

of  natural  history,  public,  no  passes  to  employees    245 

Navy  : 

free  transportation  of  naval  and  marine  forces  under  orders  218 

free  transportation  to  officers  of,  unlawful   2Q8d 

Net   ton,    defined    131 

New  lines,  Rule  44  of  17-A  applies  to  newly  constructed  roads..  4 

News  companies,  employees,  other  than  newsboys,  no  passes   . .  95a. 

Newspaper  employees,   transportation  of,   on   special   newspaper 

trains 212 

Nominal  rental: 

lease  of  elevator  by  carrier  at   421 

lease  of  railroad  land  by  shipper  at   325 

Nonopekating  roads: 

family  of  deceased  employee,  pass   352 

officers  and  employees,  no  passes  3.55 

Northbound  rate  can  not  be  applied  southbound   52 

Notations  on  bill  of  lading,  etc.,  when  larger  car  furnished  at 

carrier's    convenience    274 

Notice: 

less  than  statutory,  for  tariff  of  newly  constructed  lines    . .  4 

of  arrival  at  named  address;    failure  to  give;    demurrage  ..  3G6 
of  arrival,   damages  to  perishable   shipment   resulting  from 

delay  in    127 

of  arrival,  demurrage  accrues  on  prohibited  "order  notify" 

shipment    261 

statutory,  expiring  on  Sunday,  tariff  legal 47 

written,  to  carrier,  constitutes  presentation  of  claim    510 

Number,  concurrence  erroneously  stated  in  tariff   347 

Ocean  carriers,  officers  and  employees  of   (passes)    475 

Officebs    (see  also  Employees): 

nonoperating  road,   no  passes    355 

of  government,  no  passes  to,  or  families   208rf 

subsidiary  railroad  companies,  passes  to  95a 


822  Index  to   Conference  Bui/Ings. 

Ruling 
Offset: 

demurrage  under  average  agreement  on  state  and  interstate 

shipments    506 

offsetting  of  under  or  over  cliarges,  no  jurisdiction   323 

undercliarge,  by  carrier,  against  overcharge  on  another  ship- 
ment      323 

Oil  companies,  agents  of,  no  passes  208a 

Omnibus  companies  (see  also  Transfer  companies)  : 

joint  rates  with  railroads   164 

no  passes  to  officers  and  employees  of  95a,  216 

Operators  of  gasoline  motor  car  moving  under  own  power   ....  334 

Order  notify.     See  Shippers  order  notify. 

Orders,  issued  abroad  for  domestic  passenger  tickets   465 

Orders  of  Commission: 

complaints  filed  by  traffic  or  credit  bureaus    246 

discrimination  will  not  be  caused  by  reparation  orders 220i 

drayage  expense,  reimbursement  without  specific   509 

fourth  section  violations,  granting  relief   293 

rates    reduced   after   formal   complaint   filed   will   be   main- 
tained  two  years    14 

relative    adjustment   of   rates,    to   group    points    or    on    like 

commodities,  preserved  by  carrier  in  obeying  order  130 

reparation,  precedents  for  entry  of  similar  orders  covering 

like  shipments 220d,  a96 

special  permissive,  not  required   (passenger)    167 

special   reparation,  "fourth  section"    425 

special    reparation    orders    require    maintenance    of   reduced 

rate   14,  396 

switching  absorptions   under   "fourth   section"    304(i 

Ores,  free  transportation  to  and  from  exhibition    176 

Origin,  exchange  bills  of  lading  should  show  point  of 227 

Outbound  charges,  on  returned  shipment,  may  not  be  refunded 

by  carrier  and  charged  against  original  consigner   249 

Overcharge  claims   (see  also  Claims;    Special  reparation): 

division  of  overcharge  on   misrouting    205 

interest  on  489 

offsetting  of  over  or  under  charges,  no  jurisdiction    323 

on  one  shipment  set  off  by  carrier  against  undercharge  on 

another  323 

shipment  to  adjacent  foreign  country,  Mexico,  refunded  ....  126 

Package,  estimated  weights  on,  tariffs  should  define  size  280 

Panama: 

Canal  act  (sec.  5  of  the  act  as  amended)   interpreted   461 

coastwise  traffic   over   Panama   Railroad    369 

Hawaiian  traffic  under  steamship  proportional  tariff   422 

shipments  to  Colon    359 

Parmelee  case,  reference  to  decision  51 

Parking  cabs   (see  also  Sleeping  cars)    51 


Index  to   Conference   Rulings.  823 

Ruling 

Part  payment,  mileage  for  ticket  382 

Party  rate  tickets: 

application  of  section  4    310 

may  not  be  used  with  single  fares  to  defeat  through  fares  . .  2G8 
Passenger  fare.     (See  Fares.) 
Passengers   (see  also  Tickets): 

child  under  5  traveled  on  full  fare  ticket  492 

Commission  can  not  require  additional  train  service   296 

deprived  of  return  portions  of  ticket  lost  by  carriers   247 

deprived  of  return  portions  of  ticket  through  error  of  agent  167 
discontinuing  journey   short   of   intended   destination,    legal 

rate    350 

high   water   causing,  to   abandon   trip   and   purchase   ticket 

back  to  starting  point  438 

injured   in   wreck,   refund   of  resulting  storage   charges   on 

trunk     61 

misrouted  by  carrier's  agents,  or  to  put  unnecessary  transpor- 
tation charges 113,  167 

money  only  can  be  accepted  in  payment  for  transportation  207 
private   car   and   party   diverted   account   blockade    and    full 

mileage  rates  charged    138 

privilege  of  riding  on  freight  trains  can  not  be  limited  to  one 

class     45 

reaching  last  carrier  after  expiration  of  time  limit,  must  pay 

local  fare   44 

reparation  not  ordinarily  allowed  by  Commission  informally 

where  fare  has  been  reduced   46 

returning  to  starting  point  from  intermediate  stop-point   . .  265 
subpoenaed  as  witness  and  delayed  at  stop-over  point  beyond 

ticket  limit   60 

traveling  second  class  on  first-class  ticket    495 

use  of  special  circus  mileage  books    503 

Passes: 

American   Association  of  Railroad    Superintendents,    inspec- 
tors  of    371 

application  for,  must  show  sex  of  children   290 

attorney  employed  on  monthly  basis  but  has  other  practice  412 

attorney,  local,  not  devoting  substantially  all  time   426 

attorney,  local,  not  regularly  employed,  none  to  family 95a 

automobile  lines,  offices  and  employees,  none 95^; 

baggage  companies,  except  baggage  agents,  none   95a,  216 

body  of  deceased  wife  of  employee  to  place  of  interment  . .  174 

body  of  employee  killed  or  died  in  service   18,  173,  193 

body  of  ex-employee,  no  free  transportation 285 

bridge  company,  nonoperating,  no  passes  to  employees   ....  263 

broker,  custom,  employed  on  commission  basis   454 

Canadian  customs  and  immigration  inspectors    345 

Canadian   Government   superintendent,   mail   service    459 


824  Index  to   Conference  Eulings. 

Passes — Continued.  Ruling 

caretakers  accompanying  fruit  by  express,  transportation  in 

passenger  cars 179 

caretakers  accompanying  shipments  for  Government,  or   to 

expositions,  or   for  cliarity    150 

caretakers  accompanying  shipments  where  carrier  furnishes 

refrigeration    171 

caretakers  going  to  get  fruit  but  returning  without  load   .  .  1 

caretakers  must  return  to  point  of  origin  over  original  route  189 

caretakers  of  gasoline  motor  car  moving  under  own  power  334 

caretakers  of  bees  in  hives   112 

caretakers    of    milk    21 

caretakers,  only  trip  or  round-trip,  not  annual  or  time   ....  37 

car-lighting  company,  no  passes  to  inspectors  169 

carriers  not  subject  to  act,  no  passes  for  employees 95a.  g 

carriers,  other  (rail  or  water)  filing  tariffs  subject  to  act  so 

far  as  issuance  of,  to  its  officers  or  employees   95(7 

children,  sex  of,  must  be  shown  on  application  for 290 

Commission  can  not  undertake  to  determine  who  are  eligible 

for 95i 

commissioners  of  states,  on  interstate  journeys  35 

contract   between   carrier   and    ice   company   for    free   trans- 
portation      124 

contractor,  employees  of,  for  work  on  line  208c 

cooks,  porters,  and  waiters  on  private  cars   301 

correspondence  schools,  agents  of,  not  entitled  to 208rt 

deportation  of  Chinese  by  Government   107 

destruction   of    used    passes    95fc 

employees  and  families  of,  on  leave  to  engage  in  other  busi- 
ness    308 

employees  devoting  part  time,  no  pass    446 

employees,  furloughed,  entering  military  or  naval  service  of 

United  States   511 

employees  of  carriers  not  devoting  substantially  all  time   . .  208a 

employees  of  common   carriers  filing  tariffs    95g 

employees  of  nonoperating  bridge  companies,  no  passes  ....  263 

employees  of  omnibus  and  baggage  express  companies   ....  216 

employees  of  telegraph  and  telephone  companies   219 

employees   of  water   lines   subject   to   act;    interchange   rail 

passes   for    196 

employees  of  inspection  and  weighing  bureau  of  carrier   . .  371 

employees  of  restaurant  at  union  station    340 

employees   on   leave  of  absence   or   furlough    55 

employees   on   private   cars    301 

exchange  by  telegraph  and  railroad  companies   219,  305,  491 

excursion  for  commercial  club  at  expense  of  carrier 272 

ex-employees,  traveling  to  enter  service  of  common  carrier  .  .  102 

express  companies,  officers,  employees,  and  families 157 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  825 

Passes — Continued.  Ruling 

"family,"    definition    95c 

families  of  deceased  or  killed  employees    103,  173,  193,  476 

families  of  deceased  employees  of  nonoperating  road    352 

families  of  employees  of  bureaus  of  carriers   448 

families  of  employees  of  express  companies   157 

families   of  ex-employees    158 

families  of  furloughed  employees  entering  military  or  naval 

service  of  the  United   States    511 

families  of  local  attorneys  and  surgeons,  no  passes   95a 

families  of  postal  clerks   429 

families  of  secretaries  of  railroad  Y.  M.  C.  A.'s    485 

foreign  countries  adjacent,  oflBcials  of  railroads  in 434 

foreign  countries  not  adjacent,  officials  and  employees  of  rail- 
roads   in    475 

form  of  95 

Government  (U.  S.,  State,  or  municipal)   under  section  22..     208e 

Government  officers  under  section  22  208d 

inspectors,  watch  and  time 478 

instructors  in  use  of  appliances  or  materials  336,  346 

insurance   supervisors    carried   on   pay   rolls,    devoting   only 

part  time  but  subject  to  call    493 

insurance  companies,  agents  of,  not  entitled  to  95a.  208a 

irregular   in   form,   only    95; 

labor  agent  may  not  lawfully  receive    411 

land  and  immigration  agents,  not  entitled  to  208a 

linemen  of  telephone  and  telegraph  companies   95o,  219 

ministers,  does  not  include  family   208d 

museum,  public,  no  passes  to  scientists  or  employees  of  ....       245 
news  companies,  employees,  other  than  newsboys,  none  to  .  .       95a 

newspaper  employees  on  special  newspaper  trains    212 

nonoperating  road,   officers  and  employees  of   95a,  355 

ocean  common  carriers,  officers  and  employees  of 475 

oil  and  lubricating  companies,  agents  of,  not  entitled  to  ....     208a 

persons  traveling  over  carrier's  line  on  its  business 2086 

preservation  of  used  or  canceled  passes   95fc 

private  cars;    cooks,  porters,  and  waiters  on  301 

private  car  lines,  employees  of  479,  484 

prosecution  for  unlawful  issuance  or  use  of 95a 

rail  or  water  carriers  filing  tariffs,  employees  entitled  to   . .       95g 
Railway-Mail  Service  employees,  passes  or  reduced  rates  to       95/ 

receiver,  officers  and  directors  not  employed  by    436 

receiver,  officers  and  employees  of,  entitled  to   165 

Red  Cross  Society's  car  and  employees,  for  instruction,  relief 

of  accidents    259 

restaurant,  employees  of  railway,  not  also  serving  general 

public    87 

servants  with  family   (reverse  Rule  63)    92,  95e 


826  Index  to   Conference  Rulings. 

Passes — Continued.  Ruling 

sex  of  children  must  be  shown  on  application  for    290 

shippers   accompanying  shipments   where   carrier   furnished 

refrigeration   171 

stage  line  not  subject  to  act,  none  to  employees   95a 

stage  line  not  subject  to  act,  none  to  employees   95o,  g 

steamship  company,  if  not  subject  to  act,  employees  not  en- 
titled      95a 

subsidiary  line,  no  passes  to  employees  except  on  carrier's 

business   95o 

surgeons  not  devoting  substantially  all  time   426 

surgeons,  not  regularly  employed,  none  to  family 95a 

surgeons,  veterinary,  performing  bona  fide  service 449 

tailors  making  uniforms  for  railway  employees,  under  con- 
tract    134 

tap  lines,  officers  and  employees  of    466 

telegraph  and  telephone  companies    305(1 

telegraph  and  telephone  companies,  linemen  95a,  219 

tie  inspector    386,  430 

to  persons  traveling  at  expense  of  State  or  Territorial  gov- 
ernments      297 

train  auditors  employed  by  audit  company    400 

trained  nurse  in  family  of  employee  417 

transfer  companies,  employees,  none  to  95a,  216 

traveling  secretaries  of  Y.  W.  C.  A.,  none  to    278 

use  of  commissions  by  post-office  inspectors  off  duty  377 

wagon  lines,   no  passes    ^5g 

water  lines  not  subject  to  act  95a.  g 

water  lines  subject  to  act,  interchange  of,  with  rail  lines  for 

officers,  agents,  and  employees  196 

water   lines   subject   to  act    95^^ 

wireless  companies,   exchange  of    410 

witnesses  not  entitled  when  carrier  has  no  legal  interest  in 

proceeding   3.19 

witnesses  when  carrier  has  legal  interest    414 

Payment: 

absorbed  switching  charges,  by  consignee  disapproved   ....  64 

advance  charges  by  rail  lines  to  ocean  carriers  on  imports  . .  428 
compensation  must  not  be  greater,  less,   or  diiferent   from 

that  named  in  tariffs   221a 

demurrage  accruing  while  agent  awaits  authority  to  accept 

check  39 

for  transportation  to  be  made  only  in  money,  not  services..  207 

telegram  relating  to  traffic   327,  351,  363 

Perishable  freight  (see  also  Caretakers)  : 

delayed  notice  of  arrival,  damages  127 

refrigeration  service  by  carrier  included  in  rate;    no  passes 

to  caretakers    171 


Index  to  Conference  Rulings.  827 

Ruling 

Philippines,  tariffs  containing  export  rates   468 

Physical  rkcorus,  such  as  maps,  profiles,  plans,  etc 435 

Picnics,   fares   for   societies  and   schools,   must  be   nondiscrimi- 
natory           71 

Pile  dkiveb.    See  De:erick. 
Placing  car.    See  Switching. 

Porters  may  be  carried  free  on  private  cars  301 

PoRTO  Rico: 

joint  rates  from  ports  in,  to  inland  rail  points  in  the  United 

States    201 

tariffs  containing  export  rates    468 

PORT-TO-PORT    traffic: 

in  connection  with  inland-rail  haul,  subject  to  act 155,  201 

in  connection  with  rail-line  haul  under  through  bill  of  lad- 
ing     354 

moving  on  through  bill  lading  to  inland  rail  point  and  pub- 
lished through  rate  effective    401 

via  Panama  Railroad   369 

Postal  cards,   may   be  transported   for   Government   at   special 

rates   36,  244 

Postal  clerks'  families   (free  or  reduced  rates)    429 

Posting  name  of  resident  agent  at  blind  sidings 289 

Posting  tariffs: 

by  parent  line  for  subsidiary  line   86 

canceled  tariffs  need  not  be  kept  posted 499 

Post-office   inspectors'   use   of   commissions   for   transportation 

when  off  duty  377 

Practice  rules.     See  current  Rules  of  practice. 

Precedents;    reparation  orders;    reparation  on  like  shipments  . 

49,   200c,   200d 

Preferential  rates: 

division  of  joint  rate  on  fuel  coal    324 

may  not  be  given  to  carriers  225 

Prepaid  shipment: 

undelivered   because   of  prohibition   law    367 

underbilled,  delivering  line  must  collect  lawful  charges    . .  156 

Prepayment,  special   understanding  with  shipper   as   to  prepay- 
ment on  shipments  to  nonagency  stations   20 

Presentation,  written  notice  to  carrier  constitutes,  of  claim  ....  510 

Preservation  of  records,  regulations  apply  also  to  joint  agencies  271 

Preservation  op  tickets,  canceled,  by  carrier 252 

Primary  market,  reshipping  rates  on  grain  from   57 

Private  car: 

defined  in  connection  with  demurrage   79,  122,  128,  222 

demurrage  on,  out  of  service  on  carrier's  storage  track  ....  123 
diverted  account  blockades,  occupants  entitled  to  short-line 

mileage  rate   138 

free  transportation  for  cooks,  porters,  and  waiters  on  301 


8^S  Index  to   Confeeence   Rulings. 

Ruling 

Pbivate  cab  lines,  employees  of   (passes)    479,  484 

Feivate  sidetrack.     See  Sidetrack. 

Privileges  (see  also  Reconsignment  privilege;    Storage  in  tran- 
sit; Transit  privileges),  fare  paid  under  misapprehension 

of  privilege  offered  under  through  ticket   391 

Proceeds  of  sale  of  shipment  to  pay  freight  41,  145 

Process,    legal,    passenger   obeying,    delayed    at   stop-over    point 

beyond   limit 60 

Prohibition    law;     refund    of   prepaid    charges    on    undelivered 

liquor 367 

Proper  cars  not  furnished  by  carrier   120 

Proportional  rates: 

inland,  not  applicable  on  import  traffic  handled  locally   ....       170 

inland,  export  and  import,  subject  to  fourth  section   299 

long-and-shorr-haul  provision,   application  to    304 

defined    304& 

Prosecution  : 

carriers  and   persons  violating  pass   regulations    95 

of  carriers  participating  in  transportation  without  published 

rates 90,  184,  194 

Public  office;    no  pass  to  railroad  employees  on  leave  to  hold       308 

Pullman  cars.     See  Sleeping  cars. 

Quarry,  lease  by  carrier  of  trackage  rights  to;    device  to  avoid 

charges     153 

Quotation: 

erroneous,  Canadian  rates,  carrier  must  collect  undercharge      262 

erroneous,  of  rates,  not  a  basis  for  reparation    254 

from  Commission's  correspondence,  must  be  made  in  full   . .         29 

Rail  and  lake  190,  214,  316 

Rail-and-water  routes,  defined   316 

Railroad.     See  Carriers. 
Railroad  consignee: 

division  of  joint  rate  on  fuel  coal   324 

material  for  repair  of  car,  free  transportation   333 

not  to  be  given  preferential  rates   225 

Railroad  eating  houses  for  employees  and  passengers,  free  trans- 
portation      87,  340 

Railway  Mail  Service,   employees  entitled   to  passes  when  on 

duty   95^ 

Railway  Y.  M.  C.  A.: 

ffee  transportation  of  library  books   .■ 33» 

families  of  secretaries  of  (no  passes)   485 

Rates   (see  also  Through  rates;   also  Maintenance  of  rates)  : 

advance  cars  under  special  circus   503 

all-rail  and  rail-and-water,  available,  duty  of  agent   ..190,  316,  321 
applicable  on  shipment,  one  in  effect  on  date  of  receipt  for 

transportation    172 

applying  in  one  direction,  not  in  reverse  direction  unless  so 

published   52 


Index  to  Conference  Eulings.  829" 

Rates — Continued.                                                                                      Ruling 
applying  only  on  coal  in  box  cars;    carrier  furnishing  hop- 
per cars  liable  for  excess  charges  120 

applying  to  shipments  stopped  in  transit  short  of  destination  350 

based  on  valuation  of  merchandise  295 

based  on  value  of  property  as  declared  at  time  and  place  of 

shipment 496 

Canadian  rate,  not  filed  with  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 

■  sion,  can  not  be  applied  on  through  movement  to  Canada.  .  256 

Canadian,  misquoted  resulting  in  undercharge    262 

carload,  and  minimum  weight  to  obtain  free  icing  152 

carload,  not  applicable  where  shipment  taken  in  separate  1.  c. 

1.   lots    175 

carrier   without  published   rates   participating  in  misrouted 

movement 90,  93 

carrier   without   published   rates   participating   in    interstate 

transportation;    subject  to  prosecution  90,  184,  194 

cars,  motor  moving  under  own  power 334 

cars,  destroyed  on  foreign  lines,  transportation  of  trucks  . . .  224 

coastwise  traffic  over  Panama  Railroad    369 

Colon,  Panama,  entitled  to  export   359 

combination,  lowest,  of  rates  filed  with  commission  must  be 

applied    256 

combination   may   not  be  applied   until  joint   through,   can- 
celed      423 

combination  of  locals  inapplicable  when  covered  by  through 

rate  and  through  bill  of  lading 401 

combination  of,  on  one  junction  applied  on  shipment  moving 

via  another  195 

combination,  joint  rate  to  common  points  and  local  rate  or 

fare  beyond  215 

commodity  rate  supersedes  class  rate  although  carrying  high- 
er minimum   84 

commutation,  application  of  fourth  section  to 304a 

concurrence  by  lessor  company  in,  published  by  lessee 402 

conflicting,  due  to  failure  to  cancel    50 

conflicting,  named  in  same  tariff,  lowest  applies    239 

conflicting   with    routing    24.3.,    370,  474(? 

contracts  for  divisions  of,  must  be  filed    209 

demurrage    does   not   accrue   where    carrier    demands    more 

than  legal  rate    32 

disputed,  no  demurrage  accrues  if  carrier  wrong  32,  220/ 

disputed,  shipper  should  pay  published,  pending  dispute   ..32,  220e 
distinction  between  traffic  handled  by  steam  and  electricity, 

unlawful   2 

diverted  traffic    213 

divisions  of  joint,  on  railway  fuel  must  be  filed 486 

excursion,  application  of  fourth  section  to  304<j 


830  Index  to  Conference  Rulings. 

Rates — Continued.  Ruling 

excursion,  defined    304c 

expired  before  transit  privilege  availed  of   53 

fourth  section  application  when  one  or  more  points  in  for- 
eign country   318,  447 

freight,  may  not  be  applied  to  transportation  of  passengers  . .  312 
higher,  when  shipments  tendered  with  other  than  uniform 

bill  of  lading    160 

import,  advanced  while  shipment  on  seas    Ill 

inland    proportional,    export   and    import,   subject   to    fourth 

section 299 

inland    proportional    not    applicable    on    import    movement 

locally  from  port    170 

joint,  between  water  and  rail  carrier  subjects  former  to  ju- 
risdiction     6G 

larger  car  furnished  than  one  ordered    274 

lawfully  established,  must  be  collected   314 

legal,  what  constitutes 220^ 

local  to  line  issuing  tariff,  not  applicable  locally  over  concur- 
ring lines    281 

maintenance  of,  under  orders  on  formal  and  informal  com- 
plaint      14,   200 

meeting  the,  of  competitors  215c,  220h 

minimum  weight  governing  joint  through  rate  264 

must  apply  according  to  movement   147 

must  collect  full  tariff  (absorbed  switching)    64 

named  in  bill  of  lading,  canceled  over  specified  route  before 

movement    243 

newly  constructed  lines,  publication  on  short  notice    4 

not  effective,  no  refund   254 

order    requiring    reduction,    carrier    may    reduce    related    on 

short  notice  130 

petitions  of  shippers  and  carriers  with  respect  to  agreed  or 

released   rates    504 

prepaid  shipments,  duty  of  delivering  carrier  to  collect  lawful  156 

proportional,   defined    304b 

rates,  reissue  of  canceled 344 

recalled  shipments,  published,  must  be  collected 248 

reduced,  for  governments,  need  not  be  published  .  .33,  36,  208e,  244 

refused    shipments,    reconsigned    114 

released,  under  Cummins  amendment  as  further  amended  . .  500 
released,  duty  of  carrier  to  inform  shippers  and  secure  elec- 
tion      160 

remain  in  effect  until  specifically  canceled 50,  70,   104 

reshipping  rates  on  grain  from  primary  market 57 

reshipping  rate  in  effect  when  grain  left  point  of  origin  is 

legal    rate    119 

return  movement  carrying  advance  charges   249 


Index  to  Conference  Eulings.  8»U 

Rates — Continued.  Ruliug 

rule  applicable  in  absence  of  through,  between  points  in  the 

United   States  and  adjacent   countries    488 

shipments  held  at  transit  point  beyond  transit  period  because 

of  carrier's  inability  to  supply  cars 507 

special,  on  shipments  in  foreign  cars   470 

statutory  notice  expiring  on  Sunday,  tariff  legal    47 

suspension  of    322 

tariff  is  not  governed  by  classification  except  when  so  speci- 
fied     141 

tariff  naming  commodity,  per  car  and  also  class  rate  483 

tariffs  containing  in  import  or  export,  specifications    468 

telegraph  and  telephone,  must  be  fair  and  reasonable  305fZ 

trade  name,  articles  sold  under    279 

transferred  in  transit  from  one  to  two  cars  273 

transferred  in  transit  to  another  car  331 

transit,  in  effect  when  shipment  leaves  point  of  origin  are 

available  until  expiration  of  transit  limit 80 

transshipment,  application  of  fourth  section  to  304a 

troops  under  sepecial  rates,  transportation  of  Federal  218 

two  small  cars  furnished  in  lieu  of  larger  car  ordered  339 

unpublished,  not  recognized  as  basis  for  reparation  419 

use  to  which  shipments  will  be  put,  not  proper  basis  for  dis- 
tinction in  rates   34 

valuation,  declared  less  than  actual   58 

valuation,  clauses,  signatures  on  bills  of  lading 226 

United   States  and   adjacent  foreign   countries    488 

vaiv-ation  of  shipments,  basis  for    295 

violation  of  amended  "fourth  section"   293,  395,  406 

water  lines,  handling  shipments  in  connection  with  rail  lines 

under  through  bills  of  lading  and  no  water,  filed   354 

written  statement  of  457 

ICecalled  shipments,  full  charges  must  be  paid  for  service  ren- 
dered     248 

Receiver  : 

employees  and  officers  of,  entitled  to  passes  165 

officers  and  directors  not  employed  by   (passes)    436 

Reconsignment  privilege: 

change  in  free-time  allowance   471 

charge  on  carload  transferred  into  two  cars  in  transit 357 

charge  where  two  small  cars  are  furnished  in  lieu  of  car  or- 
dered     339 

combination  rates  in  connection  with  215e 

conditions  governing,  must  be  published ;    must  be  reasonable  72c 

disclosing  name  of  consignee 356 

exchange  bills  of  lading  at  intermediate  points  under,  au- 
thorized      415 

includes  changes  in  consignee,  destination,  or  routing 72c 

refused   shipment    114 


832  Index  to   CoNFERENCEi  Rulings. 

Reconsignment    privilege — Continued.  Ruling 

retroactive  effect  not  given  to,  on  special  docket 6,  77,  166 

unauthorized  by  shipper,  refund   of  charges    237 

Reconstruction  of  leased  warehouse,  storage  accruing  during  .  .  403 

Records    (see  also  Destruction),  passes,  and  memoranda  to  be 

preserved   95fc 

Red  Cross  Sooiety,  free  transportation  of  instruction  car  and  at- 
tendants      259 

Redemption   (see  also  Refunds  and  Tickets): 

loss  of  return  portion  of  passenger  ticket  by  carriers'  agent  458 

of  mileage  books,  rules   should   be   in   tariff    228 

unused  portion  of  excursion  ticket  on  basis  of  intermediate 

excursion  fare    303 

unused  portion  of  lost  ticket   238,  247 

unused  portion  of  ticket   76,  115,  265,  266,  3.03,  380 

Reduced  rates  or  fares: 

authorized  departure  from  published   rates    ....    33,  36,  208c,  244 
caretakers     accompanying     shipments     for     United     States, 
States,   or   municipal    governments,    or   to   expositions,    or 

for   charity    150 

contractor  doing  work  on  line  of  carrier  208c 

convicts,    no    431 

county  authorities,  under  section  22,  lawful    452 

deportation  of  Cliinese  by  Government   107 

exhibit.  State  car  contents  and  necessary  agents    477 

exhibit  of  ores  at  Chamber  of  Mines  176 

express  companies,  officers,  agents,  and  families    157 

foreign  countries  adjacent,  no    118 

Government  shipments,  when  contractor  not  interested   .... 

36,  208c,  244 

household  goods  of  joint  employees    361 

may  be  given  to  such  persons  as  are  entitled  to  free  trans- 
portation         208(7 

museum,  public,  no  passes  to  scientists  or  employees   245 

museum   of  natural   history    185 

postal   clerks   and   families   of    429 

railroad  eating  houses    87 

returned  shipments  must  move  over  original  outgoing  route  42 
to  persons  traveling  at  expense  of  state  or  territorial  gov- 
ernment      297 

townships,  transportation  for   452 

transportation    for    governments,    without    publication    .... 

33,  36,  208e,  244 

transportation  of   federal   troops   under    218,  297 

Reduction  of  rates: 

on    one    day's    notice    ■ 220^ 

tariff  publishing,  in  conformity  with  formal  order,  may  re- 


Index  to  Conference   RuLiNoa  833 

Reduction  of  rates — Continued.  Ruling 

duce  related  rates  on  short  notice   1:JU 

while  formal  complaint  pending,  will  be  ordered  maintained 

for  two  years    14 

Refrigeration  : 

by  carrier  included  in  rate;    no  passes  to  caretakers   171 

payment  of  charges  on  minimum  weight  to  obtain  free  icing  152 
Refrigerator  cars. 

floor  racks  in,  furnished  by  shippers    292 

refusal  of  sliipiJer  to  pay  ice  charges    243 

Refunds  :- 

additional  fare  paid  by  passenger  unable  to  complete  jour- 
ney under  tickets  on  account  of  washout    llf' 

agent's  error  in  fixing  time  limit  to  ticket   390 

car  fitting,  or  grain  doors,  no  allowance  unless  in  tariff  . . 

78,    132,  292 

child  under  12  traveled  on  full-fare  ticket   163 

child  under  5  traveled  on  full-fare  ticket   492 

commissions  or  refunds  influencing  traffic  equivalent  to  re- 
bates;    illegal   221(( 

Commission  or  court  only  to  authorize  214f.' 

consignor's  error  in  forwarding  to  wrong  destination   237 

death  of  round-trip  ticket  holder  before  return  trip    39.! 

demurrage,    account    of    weather    interference     135 

demurrage,  at  ports  resulting  from  vessel  delay 358 

demurrage  collected  under  tariff  not  on  file  191 

demurrage  on  astray   shipments    31 

demurrage  resulting  from  strikes,  no  refund   8 

drayage   resulting   from   misrouting    509 

fare  paid  under  misapprehension  of  privilege  offered  under 

through    ticket    391 

formal    and    informal    proceedings   on   same    basis   as   other 

shipments  200(: 

from  legal  rates  and  charges  only  on  specific  aulhority  by 

Commission    200,  220(Z 

higher  fare  to  intermediate  point;     subsequent  reduction..  385 
high  water  causing  passenger  to  abandon  trip  and  purchase 

ticket  to  starting  point    438 

indirect  route,  no  refund    91 

misrouted  over  line  having  no  tariff  on  file,  authorized    . .  90 

misrouting  involving  carrier  not  subject  to  act 93 

misrouting,  principles  governing 214d.  c,  f,  (j,  h 

none,  on  basis  of  rates  not  effective   254 

order,  special  permission  not  required  (passenger)    167 

outbound  charges,  no,  to  consignee  and  billing  as  advances, 

versus  original  consignor  249 

overcharge  on  shipment  to  adjacent  foreign  country,  IMexico  126 

passenger  traveled  second  class  on  first-class  ticket   495 


834  Index  to   Conference   Hulings. 

Kkfunds — Co7itinue(l.  Ruling 

prepaid  charges  on  undelivered  liquor   367 

reconsignment  or  transit  rules  not  given  retroactive  effect 

6,  77,  166 

return   movement    42 

shipments   held   at   transit   point  beyond   transit   period   be- 
cause of  carrier's  inability  to  supply  cars 507 

shipper's  error  cause  of  additional  charges,  no  refund 348 

sidetrack,  repayment  by  carrier  account  of   110 

special   reparation,  principles   governing 49,   220 

storage  charges  on  baggage,  passenger  in  wreck   61 

tariff  rule  unlawful,  per  se,  no  145 

transportation  stopped  short  of  intended  destination    350 

unused  portion  of  excursion  ticket  on  basis  of  inlermediate 

excursion  fare    265,   303 

unused  portions  of  lost  tickets    238,  247 

unused    portion    of    ticket    invalidated    by    agent's    error    in 

punching  limit   266 

unused  portions  of  tickets  76,  115,  265,  303,  380 

validation  of  ticket,  failure  of  passenger  to  secure   125,  167 

Fefused  shipment: 

division  of  proceeds  of  sale  to  pay  freight   41 

dog  sent  by  express  overvalued    188 

reconsignment    of    114 

terminal  line,  until  charges  paid   (demurrage)    144 

unlawful  tariff  rule    145 

Regulations  for  transportation  of  explosives  106,  3SS 

PCELATIVE    ADJUSTMENT    OF    RATES     130,     200 

Released  eates.   See  Rates;    Valuation. 

Relief  of  agent  does  not  relieve  carrier  from  collecting  under- 
charge         151 

Remedies,  refusal  of  shipper  to  pay  ice  charges  343 

Rental: 

lease  of  elevator  by  carrier  at  nominal  421 

lease  of  land  by  shipper  at  nominal    325 

Repair  of  cars  on  foreign  lines   333,  373 

Repairs,  company  material  returned  for   22 

Reparation    (see   also   Refunds;    Special   reparation): 

admission  that  rate  charged  was  unreasonable   396 

assignment  of  claim  362 

awarded  to  shippers  who  paid  charges,  though  complaint  filed 

by  bureaus  241 

both  factors    (rates)    not  on  file  with  commission    256 

claim  for,  effect  of  two-year  limitation  in  the  act   

10,  220i.   306,  307 

claims  for,  filed  by  claims  bureaus  246,  362 

claims,  on  informal  docket,  future  rate,  "fourth  section"   ..200,  425 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  835 

Reparation — Continued.  Ruling 
filing  of  informal  complaints,  procedure;     statute  of  limita- 
tions         508 

joint  rate   reduced   to  sum   of  locals;     minimum   weieht  in- 
creased           338 

maintenance  of  rate  reduced  after  complaint  filed    14 

misQuoted  rate  not  a  basis  for 254 

misrouting  claims,   adjustment   of    397 

not  awarded  on  basis  of  rate  not  on  file  with  Commission  .  .       419 
orders    extend    only    to    particular    shipments,    but    Commis- 
sion will  enter  similar  orders  covering  like  shipments   . . 

200c,    220r?, 
passenger  deprived  of  benefit  of  return  coupon  of  round-trip 

excursion  ticket  may  have  167 

Repayment,  by  carrier  to  shipper,  cost  of  construction  of  private 

sidetrack    110 

Reports  : 

by  bridge  companies    .  . . : 381,  399 

monthly,  time  and  manner  of  filing  with  Commission    ....         30 

telephone  and  telegraph  companies  must  render   305e 

terminal  companies  must  render  3^12 

Reservation  of  right  to  route  traffic   146 

Resiiipping  rates: 

grain,  from  primary  market,  superseding  locals  and  propor- 
tionals           57 

grain,  in  effect  when  shipment  left  point  of  origin   is  legal 

rate    119 

Restaurant  employees  (passes)    87,  340 

Retroactive  effect: 

demurrage  rules  of  Commission   79fL  128 

not  given  to  reconsignment  or  transit  rules 6,  77,  166 

not  given  to  rates   53,  205 

Return  of  caretakers,   free   over   same  route   as  original   move- 
ment            189 

Return  shipments: 

account  of  revolution  in  Mexico    437 

astray 217 

at  half  rates,  must  move  over  original  outgoing  route 42 

company  material   for  repairs,   free  carriage   22 

consignor    recalls    shipment,    must    pay    charges    for    actual 

haul   248 

outbound  charges  refunded  to  consignee  and  charged  against 


consignor 


249 


Return  trip.    See  Tickets. 

Revenues,  monthly  report  of  carriers    30 

Route: 

exchange  bill  of  lading  should  show   227 

indirect  and  longer  route  not  reasonable,  although  cheaper        91 


836  Index  to   Confeeence   Rulings. 

Ruling 

Routing    (see  also  Misrouting  and  Routing  instruciions)  : 

all-rail    and   lake-and-rail   routes   available    190,    316,    321 

blockade  on   specified   route,    diversion   order   by   consignor, 

carrier   not   liable   147 

lease  of   property,   contract   containing,    obligation    to   favor 

lessor   line   disapproved    94 

of    shipments    by    consignee    502 

principles  fixing  liability  and  governing  claim  adjustments 

205,  214,  474 

rate  and,  in  conflict   243,  370,  474c 

reconsignment  includes  changes  in  route  or  routing   72c 

reservation  by  carrier  of  right  to  route  shipments   (tariffs) 

146,   183 

right  of,  does  not  apply  to  telegraph  companies    291 

right  of,  failure  of  shipper  to  exercise    (misrouting)    140 

right  of  shipper  to  direct  terminal   321 

road  having  trackage  rights  handles  shipment  routed  over 

lessor  road;    same  delivery;     no  misrouting   168 

Routing  instructions   (see  also  Routing)  : 

accepted    without    specific,    rail-and-water    rates    available.. 

190,  316,  321 
accepted  without  specific,  duty  of  agent  to  route  cheapest  .  .  214c 
accepted  without  specific,  and  only  foreign  car  available..  214c 
bill  of  lading  naming  route  and  rate  applying  over  different 

route 214i.,  243,  370,  474 

company  material,  disregarded   143- 

connecting  line  accepting  shipments  at  junction  without   .  .     286c 

duty  of  carrier  to  observe    214,  230,  321 

duty  of  carrier  when,  have  not  been  followed    474a 

duty  of  initial  carrier  to  transit  to  connection   137,  199 

inadequate,   for   checking  baggage    326 

inconsistent,  followed;    carrier  liable  370 

Rule  in  tariff,  unlawful  per  se,  can  not  be  used   145 

RtHLEs  OF  practice.     See  Practice  kules. 

Rulings  and  circulars  of  Commission,  distribution  of   211 

Safety  appliances: 

block  signals,  no  authority  except  in  case  of  accident   ....        288 

handholds  required   on   passenger  cars  and   cabooses    67 

locomotives  equipped  with  snowplows  or  flangers    328 

order  entitled  "U.   S.   Safety  Appliance   Standards"    inter- 
preted           329 

Sale: 

of  records  as  waste  paper   349 

of  property   transported   as  baggage    455 

of  sample  baggage  which  has  been  checked  to  destination  .  .  445 
of  tickets  after  departure  of  last  train  on  final  selling  date  .  .  182 
orders  issued  abroad  for  domestic  passenger  tickets   465 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  837 

Sale — Continued.  Ruling 

proceeds    of,    insuflBcient    to    cover    freight    and    demurrage 

charges,  no  waiver  41,  145 

Sami'Lf.  baggage.     See  Baggage. 

Schools,   commutation  tickets  to   pupils    9iJ 

Scientists,  employed  by  public  museum,  no  passes  to 245 

Secretaries,  traveling,  of  Young  Women's  Christian  Association, 

no  passes   278 

Servants,  accompanying  family,  passes  (reverses  rule  63)    ....  92,  95c 

Services  in  lieu  of  money  in  payment  for  transportation   207 

Set-off.     See  Offset. 

Sex  of  children  must  be  shown  on  application  for  passes   290 

Sheep,  not  shipped  out  of  grazing  point  because  of  snowstorm, 

lose  transit  rates  53 

Shipper,   lease    of   property   to,    by   carrier,    in    consideration    of 

traffic  94 

Shipper.     See  Consignee. 

Shipper's   order  notify,   shipment   accepted,   against   tariff;     de- 
murrage on  account  of  failure  to  notify    261 

Sidetrack: 

on  marshy  land  sank   with  cars,  demurrage  waived    117 

posting  name  of  resident  agent  at  blind  sidings 289 

private,  defined,   in  connection  with  demurrage    121,  222 

private,  may  not  be  built  without  adequate  compensation   .  .       512 

private,  repayment  by  carrier  of  cost  of  construction  110 

Side  trips,  limited  to  holders  of  through  tickets,  must  be  author- 
ized in  through  tariffs    177 

Signals,  Commission   investigates  condition  of,   only   in  case  of 

accidents 288 

Signatures  : 

of  railroad  officials  to  applications  for  special  reparation    .  .        129 

to  release  valuation  clauses,  on  bills  of  lading   226 

Sleeping  cars,  privilege  of  ocupying  cars  at  stop-over  point  or 

destination  can  not  be  limited  to  particular  club   51 

Snowplows,  locomotives  equipped  with    328 

Snows,  preventing  unloading,  tariff  rule  waiving  demurrage   .  .        135 

Southbound  rate  can  not  be  used  northbound  52 

Southern  classification  rule  with  respect  to  signatures  on  bills 

of  lading   (valuation  clauses)    226 

Special  construction,  cars  of,  as  interpreted  in  connection  with 

safety   appliances    329 

Special  docket.     See  Special  reparation;    Claims. 
Special  rates: 

on  shipments  in  foreign  cars    470 

transportation  of  Federal  troops  under  orders    218 

Special  reparation.    See  also  Reparation. 

awarded  only  on  basis  of  rate  on  file  with  Commission 419 

carrier  at  fault  pays  misrouting  claim  and  later  established 

lower  rate  via  route  of  movement   205 


838  Index  to   Conference  Eulings. 

Special  keparation — Continued.  Ruling 
filing  of  informal  complaints,  procedure;     statute  of  limita- 
tions           508 

future  rate;     fourth   section    425 

grain    doors,    allowances    for    furnishing    subsequently    pub- 
lished          132 

informal  request  for,  declined  until  tariff  changed    264 

joint   rates  reduced  to  sum  of  local;     minimum   weight   in- 
creased           338 

order  extends  onlj'  to  particular  shipments,  but  Commission 

will  enter  similar  orders  covering  like  shipments    220d 

orders  will  require  maintenance  of  rate  14,  396 

passenger  deprived  of  benefit  or  return  coupon  of  a  round- 
trip  ticket    167 

passenger  fares  reduced,  reparation  not  allowed  informally.         46 
power  of  Commission  to  authorize  refunds;    rules  and  prin- 
ciples governing 200,  220 

principles   underlying    3-96 

reconsignment  or  transit  rules  not  given  retroactive  effect 

6,  77,  166 

signatures  of  officials  to  applications  for   129 

waiver  of   undercharge,   cases   on   informal   docket    472 

Special   u>'ueksta>di>gs,    between    carrier   and    snipper,    not    in 

tariffs   20,  235 

S."TJB  TRACK.    See  Sidetrack. 

Stage  lines,  no  passes  to  employees   95a 

State,    See  Intrastate. 
State  commissions: 

no  control  over  demurrage  on  interstate  shipments 54,  223?; 

passes  not  to  be  used  for  interstate  journeys  35 

State  exhibit,  car,  contents,  and  necessary  agents   477 

Statement  of  rates    457 

Statute  of  limitations.     See  Limitations. 

Statutory  notice.     See  Notice. 

Steam: 

coal  for,  may  not  be  given  special  rate    34 

distinction   in   rates   on   traffic   handled   by,   and   electricity, 

unlawful    2 

Steamship  companies.     See  Water  lines. 

Steivedores  acting  as  forwarding  agents  for  shippers   337 

Stock-holding   railroad,    no   free   carriage   between   owner   and 

owned    225 

Stop-over    (see   also   Tickets),    exceeded   by   passenger    because 

subpoenaed  as  witness   60 

refund  of  unused  portion  of  passenger  ticket  380 

Stoppage  in  transit.     See  Transit  privileges. 

Stopping  shipments  en  route  for  part  loading  or  unloading.  .  233,  370 


Index  to   Confeeence  Rulings.  839 

Ruling 
Storage: 

off  track,  when  tariff  is  effective  473 

proceeds  of  sale  insufficient  to  cover  cliarges,  no  waiver  ....  14.5 

track,  when  tariff  is  effective    47i> 

Stouace  chakges: 

accruing  because  of  weather  conditions 404 

accruing  during  reconstruction  of  a  leased  warehouse 403 

carrier  failing  to  forward  notice  to  consignee,  liable  for   . .  36G 

misrouting  carrier,   liable  for    388 

on  baggage  refunded  to  passenger  injured  in  wrecic  61 

Storage  in  transit    {see  also  Transit  PRiviLEtiES),  free,  at  one 

point,  for  one  industry,  disapproval    5 

when    tariff    effective    473 

Storage  track,  private  car  out  of  service  on  carrier's  demurrage  123 

Street  railways: 

intrastate,  carrying  interstate  express  matter   368 

subject  to  hours-of-service   law    56.   287 

Strikes,  (Jemurrage  occasioned  by  strikes,  no  refund   S 

Sl'BSIDIARY   line: 

passes  to  employees  only  when  traveling  on  carrier's  busi- 
ness     95a 

posting   of   tariffs   for,  by  parent   line    86 

Sunday,  statutory  notice  of  tariff  expires  on,  lawful    47 

Superintendent  Canadian  mail  service,  no  pass   459 

Supplements  to  tariffs,   canceling  rates,  must  be  specific  and 

complete    70,  101 

Supplies: 

(coal)    contributed  to  college    398 

furnished  railroad  employees  through  commissary  car 257 

shipped  to  employees  by  carrier's  agent    469 

sold  to  employees  of  carrier  by  contractor   413 

Supreme  Court,  reference  to  decision  of  in  The  Tap  Line  Case.  .  466 

Surety  companies,  passes  to  employees,  none  95a 

Surgeons,  local,  not  regularly  employed,  no  passes  to  families  . .  95a 

not  devoting  substantially  all  time  to  carrier    (passes)    ...  426 

veterinary,  performing  bona  fide  service    449 

Suspension  of  tariffs: 

discretionary  with  Commission  whether  to  suspend   322 

requests  for  suspension;    what  must  be  shown   322 

Swinging   side   doors,    safety   appliances    329 

Switching   and    switching    charges    (see   also   Terminal   deliv- 
ery) : 

absorption  of,  to  competitive  points  only  304d 

absorption  rule  published,  carrier  must  pay  terminal  line  . .  64 
absorption  of,  claim  not  invalidated  by  subsequent  cancella- 
tion of  tariff  rule   136 

additional,  expense  resulting  from  misrouting    474a 

carload  transferred  into  two  cars  in  transit 357 


S40  Index  to  Conference   Rulings. 

SwiTCHiXG  AND  SWITCHING  CHARGES — Continued.  Ruling 

charge  where  two  cars  furnished  in  lieu  of  car  ordered  ....  339 
demurrage   accrues,  belt  line  will   not  switch   uiitil   freight 

charges  paid    144 

erroneous  placing  of  cars  for  loading;     analogous  to  astray 

movement  240 

intermediate  industry,  absorption  of,  disapproved   424 

less-than-carload   shipments,   free,    from    industries    97 

Switching  line: 

concurrences  341 

municipal,  subject  to  act  89 

Switch  track.     See  Sidetrack. 
Systems,  railroad: 

free  transportation  by  one  carrier  member  for  another  ....  225 

tariffs  should  show  both  corporate  and  trade  names    450 

Tailor  making  uniforms  for  railway  employees,  under  contract 

( passes )    134 

Tank  cars.     See  Cars;  Private  Cars. 

Tap  lines,  officers  and  employees  of  (passes)    .' 466 

Tariffs: 

advance  charges  to  ocean  carriers  on  imports    428 

advances  of  customhouse  fees  and  import  duties  must  be  pro- 
vided in    444 

advances  to  boats  that  are  not  common  carriers,  must  file..  62 
allowances  for  fitting  cars  for  shipments  must  be  published 

19,  78,  132,  292 

allowances  for  grain  doors  78,  132,  267 

allowances  must  be  published    360 

astray  shipments  may  be  moved  without  published,  etc 217 

baggage  inadequately  routed,  rule  as  to  forwarding    326 

baggage,  sample,  defined  in    445 

baggage  transported  at  excess  baggage  rates,  sale  of 455 

bridge  companies   381,  399 

cancellation  of  transit  rules  does  not  withdraw  right  from 
shipments  moving  thereunder  until   expiration  of  transit 

limit 80 

cancellations  in,  must  be  complete  and  specific   101 

canceled,  accrued  claim  for  absorption  switching  not  invalir 

dated   136 

canceled,  need  not  be  kept  posted   499 

caretakers  of  bees   in  hives,   may  provide    112 

car  ferry,  when  subject  to  the  act   374 

carrier  filing  another's  tariff  as  its   own,   without   securing 

concurrences    13 

carriers  filing,  recognized  as  subject  to  act  95(7 

carrier,  participating  in  transportation  without  filing  prose- 
cution      184,  194 

carrier  participating  in  misrouted   movement  without  pub- 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  841 

Tariffs — Continued.  Ruling 

lished  rates   90,  9'.i 

change  in  free  time  allowance   (transit)    471 

charity,    transportation    for,    without    tariffs    208e 

chartering  locomotive  and  train  under  published   82 

Chinese  deported,  care  and  subsistence  in  transit  need  not  be 

published    107 

classification  does  not  govern  tariff  unless  specified   141 

commodity  rate  per  car  named  in,  and  also  class  rate  ....  483 
concurred  in,  do  not  authorize  carrier  to  use  local  rates  of 

publishing  road 281 

concurrence  by  lessor  in  rates  published  by  lessee 402 

concurrences  of  switching  roads   341 

confiicts  in    50,   70,    104,   239 

demurrage,  bunching  in  transit  rule  in  142 

demurrage   charges   on   interstate   shipments   must   be   pub- 
lished       223a 

demurrage  collected  under  tariff  not  on  file,  refund  denied..  194 
demurrage   published    in   separate   tariff   without   cross   ref- 
erence     276 

demurrage,  rules  waiving  must  be  aflfirmative  and   specific 

135,  223 

destruction  of  canceled  tariffs  at  stations  252 

distance,  must  show  distances  between  freight  stations   ....  202 
distinction  between  traffic  handled  by  steam  and  electricity, 

unlawful  2 

distinguishing  between  coal  for  steam  and  domestic  purposes, 

unlawful  34 

drayage  charges  when  absorbed  or  when  added  to  rate 441 

effective  date,  issued  before  August  28,   1906,  but  not   filed 

until  later   100 

effective  date,  none,  illegal  (see  Rule  73)    12 

effective  date,  omitted  in  carrier's  first  tariff,  effective   im- 
mediately     73 

error  in  stating  concurrence  number  347 

estimated  weights  ^pei;  package  should  be  defined  in  280 

exceptions  in  section  22  not  applicable  to  mileage,  excursion 

or  commutation  tickets    20Sc 

excursion  fares  in,  containing  different  fares  to  different  so- 
cieties, unlawful 71 

explosives,  notice  of  regulations  106,  388 

export  bills  of  lading,  rules  and   regulations  must  be  pub- 
lished    378 

express   companies,   tariffs   providing   passes   for   caretakers 

of   fruit,   cross   reference    to    railroad   tariffs    170 

feeding  and  grazing  in  transit,  feed  and  service  charges    . .  442 

free  storage   in   transit    5 

Government  rates  need  not  be  published   33,  36,  208e.  244 


842"  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Tariffs — Continued.  Ruling 

Hawaiian  traffic  under  steamship  proportional    422 

intrastate  carrier  when  subject  to  act   368,  418 

issuing   carrier's    responsibility   under   joint    rate    published 

without  proper  concurrence    501 

lessee  road  not  serving  public  as  carrier,  need  not  file  tariffs       180 
lessee  road  operating  combined  lines  under  special  arrange- 
ment, filing  rates    229 

meals  included  in  rate,  transportation  charge  must  also  be 

shown   separately    28 

mileage  books,  redemption  rules  in  tariffs    228 

minimum  carload  rate  under  joint  through    264 

municipal   ferry   participating  in   through   traffic    162 

newly  constructed  lines,  publication  on  short  notice    4 

order  by  Commission  requiring  rate  reduction;    carrier  may 

reduce  related  rates  on  short  notice   130 

partial   unloading  at  intermediate  point    23;i 

performance  of  transportation  service  without  filing  tariffs 

90,  93,  184,  194 
petitions  of  shippers  and  carriers  with  respect  to  agreed  or 

released  rates   504 

posting  name  of  resident  agent  at  blind  sidings   289 

private  cars.  Commission's  definition  to  be  incorporated   in 

tariffs    128 

provisions  govern  even  where  in  conflict  with  conditions  in 

•  tickets     73 

railroad   system   must  show   both   corporate   title   and   trade 

name   450 

rates  based  on  value  of  property  as  declared  at  tho  time  and 

place  of  shipment 496 

reconsignment  rules  and  conditions  should  be  published  ....       72b 
refused     shipments,     conditions     governing     reconsignment 

must  be   in    114 

refused  shipments,  unlawful  tariff  rule  145 

reissue  of  canceled  rates    344 

released     rates     under     Cummins     amendment     as     further 

amended   500 

remain  in  effect  until  specifically  canceled  or  superseded    .  . 

50,  70,  104,  136,  239 
retroactive  effect  not  given  to  reconsignment  or  transit  rules 

6,   77,   166 
return    or    disposition    of    shipments    account    revolution    in 

]\Iexico 437 

routing,  rule  reserving  right  of  routing  or  diverting   ....  146,  183 
rule  applying  reshipping  rate  in  effect  date  grain  leaves  tran- 
sit point 119 

shall  specify  to  what  countries  export  and  import  rates  are 

applicable  468 


Index  to   Conference   Rulings.  843 

Tariffs — Continued.  Ruling 

side  trips  limited  to  holders  of  throuj^h  tickets  must  be  in 

tariff    177 

special  understandings,  not  in   20 

special  rates  on  shipments  in  foreign  cars   470 

statutory  notice  expiring  on  Sunday,  legal   47 

subsidiary  line  need  not  post,  if  posted  by  parent  line 86 

supplements  canceling  rates  must  be  specific   101 

suspension  of   322 

telegrams,  payment  for,  rule  in 363 

terminal  charges  to  and  from  Canada  must  be  published    .  .  191 

transit  privilege  expired  while  sheep  grazed  in  transit   ....  53 

transit  privilege  time  limit   204,  232 

trap-car  service  must  be  under  tariff  authority    97 

unlawful  per  se,  can  not  be  used  145 

validation  rule  with  respect  to  refunds  extra  fare  125 

violation  of  amended  fourth  section    293 

Tarip^f  circular  No.  14-A: 

Rule   8,   cited    50 

Rule  44,  modified    4 

TARiiiT  circular  No.  15-A: 

Rule  4,  amended   106 

Rule   7,   cited    84 

Rule  8,  cited   (same  as  Rule  8  of  14-A)    50,  101 

Rule  59,   same  as    209 

Rule  60,  same  as   213 

Rule  63,  same  as  208 95,  208 

Rule  64,  same  as    219 

Rule   65,  same  as    212 

Rule  66,  same  as    216 

Rule  67,  same  as    207 

Rule  70,  same  as  214;    cited 113,  14?>,  167,  190,  198,  205,  214 

Rule  72,  same  as    216 

Rule  74,  same  as  217,  cited   31,  217 

Rule  75,  same  as    218 

Rule  78,  same  as  Rule  67  of  17-A;    modified  114 

Rule  79,   same  as    210 

Rule  80,  same  as    211 

Rule  81,   same  as    220 

Supplement  No.  2   135 

Tariff  circulars  17-A  or  18-A: 

Rule  4  being  amended  Rule  4  of  Circular  15-A  106 

Rule  5,  modified  and  cited  195,  256 

Rule  7,  same  as  Rule  7,  Circular  15-A,  cited   84 

Rule  8,  same  as  Rule  8,  Circular  14-A,  cited   50,  100,  101 

Rule  55,  cited  215 

Rule  56,  cited  220 

Rule  57,  as  modified  4 


844  Index  to   Conference   Rulings. 

Tariffs  circulars  17-A  or  18-A — Continued.  Ruling 

Rule    61,    overruled    244 

Rule  65,  cited  106 

Rule  66,  reaffirmed  or  cited    274,   339 

Rule  67,  being  Rule  78,  Circular  15-A,  as  amended,  cited  ....       114 

Rule  72,  interpreted   269 

Rule  74,  published  as  Conference  Ruling   72 

Rule  75,  being  amended  rule  in  supplement  No.  2  to  Circular 

15-A    135,   223 

Teleoraph  and  telephone  companies: 

application  of  amended  act  to    305 

application  of  hours-of-service  law  to  operators   88,  287 

commissions  to  persons,  firms,  company  where,  office  located, 

none  407 

employees  of 95a,  219 

error  in  transmission  of  message,  no  damages   317 

exchange  of  services  with  railroads   219,  305,  491 

paragraph   5,   section  15,   of  amended  act  not   applicable   to 

(routing)    291 

telephone  companies  in  Porto  Rico,  jurisdiction 420 

transportation  of  men  and  materials  for  95a,  219 

wireless  messages;    ships  at  sea   394 

Telegrams  : 

commissions  on  407 

to  or  from  shippers;    payment  of  charges  on  .302,  327,  351,  3.63,  480 

Telegrams   and   cablegrams,    destruction   of    460 

Telephone  messages  relating  to  shipments   480 

Terminal  charges  to  or  from  Canada  must  be  published    191 

Terminal  companies: 

are  subject  to  the  act   312 

belt  line  owned  by  municipality    89 

concurrences  of   341 

employees  of  restaurant  of,  no  passes 340 

refused  to  accept  car  until  charges  paid   (demurrage)    ....       144 

Terminal  delivery    {see   also   Delivery),   shipper's    instructions 

must  be  followed 321 

Territory.     See  Porto  Rico. 

Theft;     ticket  stolen  from  initial  carrier  and  honored  by  con- 
nections           494 

Through  rates  or  fares: 

canceled,    while   shipment  on   sea    Ill 

coastwise  traffic  moving  on  through  bill  of  lading  to  inland 

rail-line  point,  through  rate  applies    401 

combination  of  locals;     making  less;     special  reparation    ..     220g 
combination  of  rate  to  intermediate  point  plus  distance  rate 

beyond,    applicable    443 

combination  rate  may  not  be  applied  until  joint  canceled   .  .       423 
company  material  moving  under  joint   225,  372 


Index  to   Conference  Rulings.  845 

Through  RATES  ok  fakes— Continued.  Ruling 

contracts  for  division  of,  must  be  filed   209 

device  to  evade,  by  local  billing  and  rebilling 98,  337,  365 

device  to  evade,  by  sale  of  local  tickets  24 

device  to  evade,  by  sale  of  party  rate  and  local  single  tickets  268 

division  of,  to  or  from  Mexico  269 

division  of,  on   company  material    324 

in  excess  of  combination  on  important  basing  point;    main- 
tenance     200a 

issuing  carrier's  responsibility  under  joint,   published  with- 
out proper   concurrence    501 

joint  rates  reduced  to  sum  of  locals;     minimum  weight  in- 
creased      338 

may  not  be  higher  than  combination  of  intermediate  fares..  298 

minimum  weight  governing  joint  through  rate   264 

order  requiring  rate  reduction;    carrier  may  reduce  related 

rates  on  short  notice    130 

petitions  of  shippers  and  carriers  with  respect  to  agreed  or 

released    rates    504 

rule  applicable  in  absence  of,  between  points  in  the  United 

States  and  adjacent   foreign  countries    488 

through  billing  over  rail-and-water  route  in  absence  of  joint 

rate 354 

to  or  from   Porto  Rican  ports  to  or  from  inland  points   in 

the  United  States,  legal    201 

transfer  of  shipment  to  another  car  in  transit   331 

Through  route: 

advancing  charges  to  boats  that  are  not  common  carriers  .  .  62 

canal  boat  line  under  arrangement  with  rail  line  241 

coastwise  traffic  moving  on  through  bill  of  lading  to  inland 

rail  point 401 

duty  of  carriers  to  furnish  through  cars  or  transfer  free  ..59,  274 

port-to-port  and  inland  rail  haul   155 

steamboat  line  and  rail  line  agreed  upon  joint  rates    66 

through  billing  over  rail-and-water  route  in  absence  of  joint 

rate 354 

Through  traffic: 

from  and  to  an  adjacent  foreign  country  through  the  United 

States,  no  jurisdiction  505 

Tickets: 

agent  selling  half  rate  or  lower  class,  but  failing  to  punch 

all  coupons    487 

agent's  error   in  fixing  time  limit   390 

agent's  error  in  selling  round-trip   (undercharge)    151 

application  of  section  4    310 

Canadian    immigration,    no    jurisdiction    24 

charterer  of  train  may  sell,  at  special  rate   82 

child  under  5  years  traveled  on  full  fare    492 


846  Index  to   Conference  Rulings, 

TiCKErrs— Continued.  Ruling 

child  under  12  years,  full-fare  ticket  purchased,  no  refund  . .  163 

collectors  on  trains,  auditors    (passes)    400 

colonist,  agent  fails  to  indorse,  selling  carrier's  loss 69,  277 

commutation  State  may  be  used  on  interstate  journey   ....  26 

commutation  to  school  children  nondiscriminatory    99 

conditions  on  ticket  conflicting  with  tariff  provisions  latter 

govern  75 

connecting  line  entitled  to  compensation  for  class  of  ticket 

honored  69,  277 

death  of  round-trip  ticket  holder  before  return  trip  made  . .  393 

discontinuance  of  journey  short  of  intended   destination    .  .  350 

distance  tariffs  with  respect  to  mileage 202 

entertainment  tickets  may  be  sold  by  carrier  as  matter  of 

convenience 221a 

exchange   of  ticket  to   one   point  for  ticket   to   farther   dis- 
tant point    303 

excursion,  issued  on  date  not  authorized  by  tariff   467 

excursion,  redemption  of,  on  basis  of  intermediate  excursion 

fare 265,  303 

extension  of  time  by  one  carrier  not  binding  on  others   (re- 
verses  Rule   23)     43 

fare  paid  under  misapprehension  of  privilege  offered  under 

through  ticket   391 

high  water  causing  passenger  to  abandon  trip  and  purchase 

local,  back  to  starting  point    438 

honored  over  wrong  line  through  error  of  conductor   105 

loss  of  return  portion  of,  by  agent  of  carrier  458 

lost,   refund    should   be  withheld   reasonable   time   to    guard 

against  improper  redemption    238 

lost,  refund  of  additional  fare  paid   238 

lost  by  carrier,  must  pay  connections  for  substituted  ticket  247 
meals,  etc.,  may  be  included,  but  transportation  must  be  of- 
fered separately   28 

mileage  books   (intrastate)   issued  in  exchange  for  advertis- 
ing not  good  on  interstate  journey  465 

mileage  book   presented    in   part   payment    382 

mileage  not  good  in  new  territory  unless  tariff  so  provides  . .  178 
mileage,  insufficient  coupons,  passenger  may  pay  for  balance 

of  trip  at  regular  rate  per  mile   81 

orders  issued  abroad  for  domestic  passenger   465 

party   rate,   may    not   be    used    with    single   fares   to   defeat 

through  fares  268 

passenger  traveled  second  class  on  first-class   495 

passenger  obeying  legal  process  exceeds  stop-over    60 

passenger  reaching  last  carrier  after  expiration  of,  must  pay 

local  fare   44 

redemption   of  mileage  books    228 


Index  to   Conference  Kulings.  847 

TicKBTTS — Continued.  Ruling 

reparation  on  informal  pleadings  inapplicable  lo  passenger 

traffic  4fi 

sale  of,  after  departure  of  last  train  on  final  selling  date  . .  182 
side   trips   limited   to   holders   of   through   tickets   must   be 

authorized  in  through  tariffs   177 

sold  at  lawful  fare  may  be  given  away  by  purchaser   154 

stolen  from  initial  carrier  and  honored  by  connections    . . .       494 
train  delays  cause  passenger  to  miss  connections,  invalidat- 
ing  ticket    27 

transfer   of   passengers   by   bus   at   destination   may    be   in- 
cluded, but  transportation  must  be  offered  separately  ....       164 
unused  in  part  because   of  washout;     refund   of   additional 

fare  paid   IIG 

unused  portion,  invalidated  by  agent's  error;    refund  of  ad- 
ditional fare   266,   390 

unused  portions,  value  refunded  by  carrier   76,  115,  238,  380 

unused  portion  of  excursion  ticket;    refund  on  basis  of  an- 
other excursion  rate  from  intermediate  stop-over  point  .265,  303 
validation  of,  failure  of  passenger  to  secure,  tariff  rule  may 

permit  refund 125 

validation  of   75,   167 

Tie  ixspectob;     pass    386,   430 

Time  limit  ox  tickets.    Sec  TickI'Tis. 

Ton,  gross,  long,  and  net,  defined    131 

Townships,  transportation  for    452 

Trackage  rights: 

common  carrier  having,  over  logging  road  subjects  latter  to 

jurisdiction   490 

intermediate  industry  refusing   (switching)    421 

lease  by  carrier  of,  over  another  line  to  haul  general  traffic  439 
lease  by  one  carrier  to  another,  device  to  avoid  charges  .  .  153 
shipments    routed    over    lessor    road   but   handled   by   lessee 

road;     same  delivery;     no   misrouting    168 

Track : 

private  side,  defined  121 

repayment  by  carrier  on  account  of  switch  110 

switch  or  industrial  may  not  be  built  without  adequate  com- 
pensation          512 

Traction  company,  located  wholly  within  a  state,  when  subject 

to  act   368,  418 

Trade  name: 

application  of  rate  to  commodity  sold  under  279 

of  carriers,  corporate  title  must  also  be  shown  in  tariffs  and 

concurrences    450 

Traffic,  purchase  of  an  industry's,  by  carrier,  through  lease  of 

property   94 


848  Index  to   Conference  Rulings. 

Ruling 
Traffic  bureau,  filing  reparation  complaints;    orders  in  lavor  of 

shipper   246 

Train: 

chartered  at  published  rate  per  car  or  per  train,  charterer 

sells  tickets  at  special  fare   82 

delayed,  causing  passenger  to  miss  connections,  invalidating 

ticket  27 

freight,  privilege  of  riding  on,  can  not  be  limited  to  one  class  45 

service.  Commission  can  not  require  additional   296 

Train   auditors,   passes    400 

Train  employees,  application  of  hours  of  service  law  to    

88,   275,   287,  342 

Trained  nurse  in  family  of  employee  (passes)    417 

Transfer : 

carriers  in  through  route  must  transfer  free  if  through  cars 

not    furnished    59 

of  shipment  from  one  to  two  cars   273 

of  shipment  in  transit  273,  274,  331,  339,  357 

Transfer   company,    carrier   may   make    exclusive   arrangement 

with,  but  charges  must  be  published  separately    164 

passes,  none  to  employees    95a,  216 

Transit  privileges: 

additional  charges  resulting  from  shipper's  error    348 

change  in  free  time  allowance  at  reconsigning  point   471 

charges  where  two  small  cars  are  furnished  in  lieu  of  car 

ordered    333 

disclosing  name  of  consignee   356 

eighteen  months  for  creosoting  of  lumber,  not  excessive  . .  .  232 
exchange  bills   of  lading  at    intermediate   points   under  au- 
thorized      415 

fabrication  of  structural  steel,  shipper's  error   348 

feeding  in  transit,  and  sale  of  feed  and  services 442 

if  not  availed  of  within  time  limited  in  tariffs,  can  not  be  re- 
vived or  renewed    53 

inconsistent  instructions  followed  resulting  in  loss  of 370 

loss  through  misrouting  by  intermediate  line    230 

partial  unloading  at  intermediate  point    233 

rates  applicable  when  shipments  stopped  short  of  intended 

destination    350 

rates  applying  out  of  transit  points  as  of  date  grain  left  point 

of   origin    119 

reconsignment  privileges  and  rules    72 

refused  shipments,  reconsignment  of  114 

retroactive  effect  not  given  to   6,  77,  166 

sheep,  movement  of,  prevented  by  snow,  lose  transit  rates  . .  53 
shipments  held  at,  point  beyond,  period  because  of  carrier's 

inability  to  supply  cars    507 

should  not  extend  beyond  one  year   204 


Index  to   Conference  Eulings.  849 

Transit  privilege— Coniinucrf.  Ruling 

special  understandings  not  published    20 

storage,  free,  at  one  point  for  one  industry;    disapproved  .  .  5 
traffic  moving  into  concentration  point  retains  privileges  un- 
til expiration  of  limit  regardless  of  cancellation   80 

Transmission  of  messages  by  telephone  or  telegraph,  interstate  305 

Transportation  (see  also  Free  transportation): 

carrier  engaging  in,  without  published  rates   90,  184,  194 

meals  may  be  furnished,  but  must  be  offered  separately...  28 

money  only  can    be  accepted  in  payment  for   207 

transfer  may  be  furnished,  but  must  be  offered  separately 

(omnibus  arrangements)    164 

Trap  car  service,  without  tariff  authority,  unlawful   97 

Traveling   secretaries.   Young   Women's   Christian   Association, 

no  passes   278 

Troops,  Federal,  transportation  of,  under  orders   218 

Trucks  destroyed  on  foreign  line,  return  free  to  road  owning  . .  224 

Trunks.    See  Baggage. 

Tw^o  cars  for  one.    See  Cars. 

Undeiliverbd  shipments  of  liquor,  prepaid  charges    367 

Undercharges: 

arising  out  of  misquotation  of  Canadian  rates,  must  be  col- 
lected    262 

carriers   must   exhaust   legal    remedies    in    collection    314 

Commission  does  not  determine  who  is  liable  to  pay 314 

delivering  carrier  must  collect  lawful  charges  upon  prepaid 

shipments  156 

legal  expense  to  collect,  valid  claim  against  carrier  at  fault  16 

misrouting,   adjustments  among  carriers    214/ 

offsetting  of  under  or  over  charges,   no  jurisdiction    323 

relief  of  agent  does  not  relieve  carrier  from  collecting    ....  151 

set-off  against  overcharges,  by  carrier    323 

waiver  of,  cases  on  informal,  docket    472 

Understandings,    special    between    carrier    and    shipper,    not    in 

tariffs   20,  235 

Uniform  bill  of  lading  (see  also  Bill  of  lading)  : 

carrier  should  advise  shipper  of  higher  rates  applying  when 

not  used   160 

four  months'  clause  in   510 

measure  of  damages  under;    value  of  lost  property   387 

Uniform  demurrage  code: 

indorsed  by  Commission    242 

Uniforms: 

duty  of  carrier  with  respect  to   134 

passes  to  makers  of,  under  contract   134 

Union  station,  no  passes  to  restaurant  employees    340 

Unloading  : 

part  of  shipment  at  intermediate  point,  legal  under  tariffs  .  .  233 

prevented  by  weather,  tariff  rule  waiving  demurrage   135 


850  Index  to  Conference   Rulings. 

Ruling 

Unpublisiikd  rate  not  a  basis  for  reparation   419 

TfNUSED    PORTION    OF    TICKET     (SeC    (llSO    TiCKETS): 

excursion  on  basis  of  intermediate  excursion  fare   265,  303 

invalidated  by  agent's  error  266,  390 

refund  of  value  by  carrier  .  .76,  115,  116,  238,  265,  266,  ,?.03,  380,  393 

Use,  carrier  may  not  dictate  use  to  which  shipment  is  put 34 

Validation  of  tickets: 

conditions  in  tariff  must  be  observed;    at  points  other  than 

destination 75 

error  of  agent,  tickets  not  properly  validated,  refund   167 

failure  of  passenger  to  secure,  tariff  rule  may  permit  refund  125 
Valuation  : 

bonds,  falsely  declared  by  consignor    58 

clause,  signature  to,  on  bill  of  lading 226 

declared  by  consignor's  agent;    charges  must  be  collected  on 

basis   of    188 

of  lost  goods  under  uniform  bill  of  lading   387 

petitions  of  shippers  and  carriers  with  respect  to  agreed  or 

released  rates  504 

rates  based  on    295 

rates  based  on,  of  property  as  declared  at  the  time  and  place 

of  shipment 496 

released     rates     under     Cummins     amendment     as     further 

amended   500 

Vendor  or  vendee,  f.  o.  b.  shipment,  liability  for  demurrage  at 

point  of   origin    96 

Veterinary  surgeon  performing  bona  fide  service   (pass)    449 

Violation  of  amended  fourth  section  293,  395,  406 

of  amended  fourth  section    (export  and  import)    299 

when  not  in,  of  fourth  section   304a 

Waiters  may  be  carried  free  on  private  cars    r 301 

"Waiver  of  underciiarge.  informal  docket  cases  472 

Washout   {see  also  Diversion)   preventing  passenger  from  com- 
pleting journey  under  ticket,  refund  additional  fare  paid  116 

Watch  and  time  inspectors,  passes    478 

Water  line: 

advancing  charges   to,  when  not  common  carrier,   unlawful  62 
canal  boats,  subject  to  act  if  through  arrangement  with  rail 

line    241 

interchange  of  railroad  passes  for  employees  of 95£i^,  196 

joint  rate  with  rail  carrier  subjects  traffic  to  jurisdiction   .  .  66 

Panama  Canal  act  interpreted   461 

through  billing  over  rail  and  water  lines  in  absence  of  joint 

rate 354 

Water  transportation: 

coastwise  and  export  business  defined   353 

coastwise  traffic  moving  on  through  bill  of  lading  to  inland 

rail  line  point   401 


Index  to   Confeeexce   Rulings.  851 

V.'atkr  TUA.N'.sroRTATiox — Contin iird.  Rulin;^ 

port  to  port,  in  connection  with  inland  rail  haul,  subject  to 

act   155 

joint  rates  to  and  from  Porto  Rican  ports  legal  201 

Weatheb: 

inclement,  preventing  removal  of  goods  from  storage   4   4 

inclement,    preventing    unloading,    tariff    rule    waiving    de- 
murrage         135 

\Veigiiixg  burkau  of  carrier,  pass  to  employee  of  oTl 

Weight.     See  Minimum  weight;    Fictitious  weight;    Estimated 
WEIGHT  ) . 

V/estbouxd  rate  can  not  be  used  eastbound    32 

Widow  of  employee.     {See  Family.) 

Wireless  companies,  exchange  of  passes  and  franks   410 

WiREXESS  MESSAGES,  ships  at  sea  3.94 

Witnesses,  passes  to   319,  414 

Wreck  : 

diversion   of  traffic  account  of;     adjustment   of   charges   be- 
tween   carriers    213 

passenger  injured  in,  storage  charges  on  baggage  refunded         ol 

Written  statements  of  rates   457 

VouNG  Men's  Christian  Association,  Railway: 

families  of  secretaries  of  railway,  no  passes   485 

free  carriage  of  library  books   330 

Young  Women's  Christian  Asso<iation.  traveling  secretaries  of, 

no  passes    278 

End  of  Volume  One. 
For  general  Index,  see  end  of  Volume  Two. 


!\. 


# 


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